Idea Transcript
Intercalated BSc in Philosophy 6AAN4043 Knowledge, Objectivity and Relativism Syllabus and schedule of lectures, second semester 2013-2014
This semester, we continue our studies in metaphysics and epistemology. We will be concentrating on the distinction between facts and values. We will be thinking both about the metaphysical questions of what sorts of things values are (whether there are ‘real’ values), whether some value judgments can be in some sense ‘objective’; and on the epistemological question of how, if at all, we might hope to know what the ‘real’ values are. As before, I give you a schedule of lectures, with the issues to be discussed and a few required readings (often only one). I will also mention some further reading, and once again how much of it you do is up to you. Most of the required reading either comes from the Singer book we used last semester, or is to be found on line. In some cases, I will provide you with a copy of required reading via Keats. But there is one book you will have to buy: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Relativity (Oxford: Blackwell 1995) Unfortunately, this is not all that cheap—currently about £25 on Amazon, although second hand copies will come a bit cheaper. We will need this in the second miniterm, after reading week. I also recommend, but do not require you to have, the following two books David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell 1988) Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Collins 1985) The McNaughton is a very good general introduction to ethics (there are many others), and gives a particularly helpful explanation of the central problem we will be discussing, in one way or another, throughout the semester. The Williams book is also, in a sense, an introductory book on ethics, but it is far from offering a neutral, textbook-like perspective on the subject. It is provocative, iconoclastic, controversial, and never boring; and it is also provides an illuminating perspective on the problem of moral relativism, which we will discuss at length in the second miniterm.
Schedule of lectures Lecture 1: Locke, primary and secondary qualities Many 17th century philosophers (including Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Bacon and Newton) attempt to distinguish the primary qualities of matter from the non-primary qualities. However, they do not all draw the distinction the same way, and they do not even agree on which qualities are primary. All are agreed, though, that shape is a primary quality. Amongst the non-primary qualities are the secondary qualities, and once again they do not all agree on which qualities are secondary. They do
agree, though, that colour is a secondary quality. We will think mostly about the ways in which Locke motivates and attempts to describe his version of the distinction. Reading Locke, An Essay on Human Understanding, Book 2 Chapter 8 (free on line, and available on Keats) There is a whole course of metaphysics in this relatively short chapter, so take it slowly, and read it several times, and make a note of the parts that you find implausible, or hard to understand. In the version I have posted on Keats, the passages that are especially important from our point of view are highlighted in bold. Locke’s text gives rise to many difficult questions of interpretation. We will very largely ignore them. We will take Locke’s words at face value, so far as possible, and try to find a way of understanding them that makes his position as interesting and plausible as possible (by our lights, of course, rather than his). The result is bound to be a distortion of Locke’s thought, but hopefully it will be a sympathetic, philosophically interesting distortion.
Lecture 2: Primary qualities and the nature of matter Here we will try to isolate the core of the Lockean distinction. Reading The required reading is two classic articles, copies of which are available on Keats: Reginald Jackson, ‘Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Mind 38 149 (1929) 56-76 Noel Fleming, ‘The idea of a solid’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 no2 (1965), 131-143.
Lecture 3: Mackie on objective value John Mackie takes the Lockean distinction, as he understands it, to provide an argument (or rather, two distinct arguments) against the objectivity of value judgments. Mackie’s argument attacks all value judgments, so it therefore applies to ethical evaluation as a special case. Reading John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmonsworth: Penguin 1990), Chapter 1. You can read this on line, for example at: http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/jlm.html
Lecture 4: The argument from queerness The core of Mackie’s case against objective value is the argument from queerness. Reading The most accessible discussion I know of comes in Chapter 7 of the McNaughton book mentioned above.
Lecture 5: The moral problem Reading The phrase ‘the moral problem’ is the title of a book by Michael Smith, the first chapter of which outlines the problem we discussed today. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell 1994) For a comprehensive discussion of the problem starting at a more introductory level, see above all the MacNaughton book.
Reading week Lecture 6: Harman on moral relativism Reading Read Harman’s initial defence of moral relativism in Harman and Thomson.
Lecture 7: Moral frameworks Harman argues that moral judgments express propositions only when ‘relativized’ to what he calls a moral framework. We give some thought to what sort of thing a moral framework could be. Reading It would be helpful to review some of the relevant material in Singer, especially Part 1 Section B III. There is also some useful material (with a guide to further reading in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/ One distinguished contemporary defender of moral relativism is the Chinese American philosopher David Wong. (I mention the fact that he is the son of Chinese immigrants to the USA because he himself emphasizes that his view has emerged in part out of a very personal attempt to do justice
both to the values of his Chinese family and the seemingly very different values of his American peers.) Wong contributes a good article to the Blackwell Companion to Ethics: David Wong, ‘Moral relativism’, in The Blackwell Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell 1991)
Lecture 8: Objectivity returns? Today we will discuss Thomson’s response to Harman, and consider the kind of objectivity that at least some moral judgments may have. Reading Thomson’s contribution to Harman and Thomson, with Harman’s response and Thomson’s reponse.
Lecture 9: Truth in relativism? ‘The truth in relativism’ is the title of a well known essay by Bernard Williams (see below). Reading I recommend reading the last three chapters of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (see above). (The most recent edition has an excellent commentary by A.W. Moore.) You might also try: Bernard Williams, ‘The truth in relativism’, in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: CUP 1981) (You may find the emphasis on the language in which moral judgments are expressed off putting, in which case don’t bother with it. You will get everything you really need from Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.)
Lecture 10: Review Today we will look back over the entire course. There is no required reading.