SISA Report no. 20 -‐ 2014
Pakistani or Baloch? A Precursory Study of the Baloch Separatist Movement in Pakistan
Qandeel Siddique Oslo, April 2014
Centre for International and Strategic Analysis © SISA 2014 All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) 932 49 083 E-‐mail:
[email protected] Internet: www.strategiskanalyse.no
Executive Summary Baloch nationalists have arguably never accepted Balochistan as part of present-‐day Pakistan or Iran. Inside Pakistan, and in its more extreme form, this resistance has translated to recurrent insurgencies against the state. Continued violence by Baloch separatist groups against Pakistani symbols of state or what it deems as Punjabi control over Baloch reflects that the movement remains aggressively vocal. While there prevail moderate (demanding more economic rights and political autonomy) to radical (clamoring for disunion from Pakistan and the forming of an independent Baloch federation) segments of the Baloch nationalist movement, the common denominator remains a visceral sense of having been subjected to long-‐standing discrimination; at the hands of the (largely Punjabi) Pak Army and GoP the Baloch have felt, and still feel, an array grievances, including militarization, marginalization, expropriation, trans-‐ migration and dispossession. In recent years cases of enforced disappearances and discoveries of mass graves (believed to have been perpetrated by the Pakistani security forces) have brought Balochistan to international attention. Rise in sectarian violence in the heart of the province as well as increased ethnic tensions (Baloch and Punjabi target killings) have further beleaguered Balochistan. Militant attacks on Pakistani security forces and gas pipelines, along with the peaceful protest of the Baloch Long March that culminated in Islamabad on 1 March 2014, represent the current strands of Baloch opposition to what they perceive as unjust treatment meted out to them by the Pakistani establishment. While it is possible that Baloch separatist movement receives a limited degree of “foreign support”, an overemphasis on this front by the GoP ignores the fundamental issues afflicting the Baloch – a full acknowledgement of which is required for a peaceful reconciliation.
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Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 Balochistan and the Baloch Issue ........................................................................................................... 9 Casus Belli? Grievances of the Baloch ................................................................................................ 16 Foreign Involvement in Balochistan ................................................................................................... 27 The Sectarian Ensnare .............................................................................................................................. 31 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 33
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Introduction1 With international focus decidedly on militant Islamist forces emanating from the region, a number of other, equally menacing and magnifying conflicts – ranging from ethnic, secessionist to sectarian – inside Pakistan have been overlooked. In the multiethnic Pakistan federation,2 unsettled disputes that have taken on the expression of separatist and nationalist movements, flourish unabated. One such struggle is that of a disaffected Baloch people who have launched at least three armed rebellions (1948, 1958, 1973) against the Pakistani government and continue to clash with the dominant Punjabi majority/state. While some regional parties seek provincial autonomy within a federal parliamentary democratic framework – seeking economic and constitutional reforms – those with a more separatist leaning demand secession, are pushing for an outright independent state. Simultaneously, with the Quetta Shura situated in the heart of the province, the Taliban have evolved in dynamic ways and is casting a powerful influence across the region. While these two insurgencies have effectively destabilized Pakistan, recent years have seen the resurgence of a new pattern of violence – namely, sectarianism – that threatens to further aggravate the security situation in an already fragile state. As “Balochistan” could be construed as a dragnet term encompassing an array of people – all arguably heralding a conflict unique to their political history and motives – it should be noted that the Baloch movement in Pakistan’s present-‐day context refers specifically to the ethnic Baloch population of the country and their grievances vis-‐à-‐vis the federation. The region hosts a variety of ethnic groups, including Pashtuns and Hazaras who maintain their individual set of complaints against the state, as well as Sindhis and Punjabis, among others. The Baloch people in Pakistan reside primarily in Balochistan but also maintain a sizeable presence in other provinces and cities, most notably Karachi (Sindh province) and areas in Punjab such as Dera Ghazi Khan. A considerable number also make up the Diaspora in the Persian Gulf states. Historically parts of Iran and
1 The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). All views expressed are those of the author. 2 Pakistan has four federal units or provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan.
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Afghanistan have been home to the Baloch and still carry a large population – Iran (2%) and Afghanistan (2%).3 Along with a strong separatist strife, Pakistan’s Balochistan province has been home to the Quetta Shura, sectarian violence, geopolitical warfare, as well as alleged activities propagated by national and foreign spy agencies. Despite this there remains a relative dearth of research literature on the region or examination of various power pursuits. This has been largely due to the otherwise notoriously “hermetic”4 nature of the Balochistan province – which has remained virtually closed off to most global or local media. However, in recent years the province has made steady headlines in mainstream news. The region and the various strains of conflict and issues plaguing it have risen from relative anonymity to becoming one of the more animated topics in public debate. Greater international recognition of the crisis in Balochistan owes partly to efforts by exiled Baloch leaders currently residing in the West. Other reasons behind the growing awareness include increased reportage of human rights violations, which apparently occur de rigueur in Balochistan. The international community is ostensibly more alert to the crisis is Balochistan: The United States and the United Kingdom expressed concerns over the human rights situation in Balochistan during the 19th session of the UN Human Rights Council. Advocacy groups have regularly denounced the dismal state of human rights in the province. The Pakistani security forces, predominantly, are seen to act with impunity, responsible for the impingement on rights of individuals. In 2008, an investigation by Amnesty International revealed: “the Pakistani Government has used the rhetoric of fighting ‘terrorism’ to attack its internal critics”;5 perpetuating enforced disappearances
3 CIA World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/ 4 Karlos Zurutuza, “A Black Hole for Media in Balochistan”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 5 February 2014. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/black-‐hole-‐media-‐balochistan-‐ 2014238128156825.html 5 “Denying the Undeniable” Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan”, Amnesty International, July 2008. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-‐and-‐updates/report/denying-‐the-‐undeniable-‐enforced-‐ disappearances-‐in-‐pakistan-‐20080723
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of activists who are seen “pushing for greater regional ethnic and regional rights… and greater access to provincial resources” by branding them terrorists and holding them in “undeclared places of detention run by Pakistan’s intelligence with the government concealing their fate or whereabouts”.6 Again in 2013, AI alleged that acts of enforced disappearances, as well as extra-‐judicial executions, of suspected terrorists, political activities and journalists, continue unhindered.7 Journalists, in particular, have come under severe threat and persecution. According to Reporters Without Borders, 2012 was the deadliest year on record with a high number of journalists and netizens killed worldwide: Pakistan was one of the main countries contributing to this statistic, ranking 159th in the World Press Freedom Index.8 Websites dedicated to Baloch nationalist movement, and persons associated with them, have also been targeted. In 2006 the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority blocked four such websites for carrying “misleading information”.9 Samiullah Baloch, President of Balochistan Institute for Future Development, and his brother, Obaidullah Ali, who ran the organization’s website, were kidnapped by intelligence agencies in 2006 and the website was barred.10 Forced disappearances in Balochistan are purportedly prevalent.11 In 2012, Pakistan Minister of Interior claimed: “6,000 persons had gone missing initially but now the Balochistan Chief Minister’s office has estimated that around 800 were missing after some progress has been made on the issue”.12 According to the Baloch activists, since 6 Ibid.
7 “Annual Report: Pakistan 2013”, Amnesty International. Available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-‐report-‐pakistan-‐2013 8 “Press Freedom Index 2013”, Reporters Without Borders. Available at: http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-‐bd.pdf 9 “Authorities Block Access to Baloch Nationalist Sites”, Reporters Without Borders, 28 April 2006. Available at: http://archives.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=17508 10 Both were subsequently released following intervention from Amnesty International; “Possible ‘Disappearance’/Fear of Torture: Samiullah Baloch”, Amnesty International document, 15 December 2006. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/028/2006/en/17431ae8-‐d40d-‐11dd-‐ 8743-‐d305bea2b2c7/asa330282006en.html 11 “Annual Report: Pakistan 2013”, Amnesty International. Available at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-‐report-‐pakistan-‐2013 12 Kalbe Ali, “Afghan Camps for Baloch Militants Shut: Malik”, Dawn, 5 March 2012. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/700285/karzai-‐acted-‐against-‐separatists-‐malik-‐afghan-‐camps-‐for-‐baloch-‐ militants-‐shut
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2002, 18,000 Baloch have disappeared and in the past three years 1,600 were victims of the state’s “kill and dump” tactic.13 A vast number of those targeted have included the Baloch literary class, such as journalists, lawyers, and so on.14 However, an exact estimate of how many Baloch persons have been or are subject to enforced disappearances is unclear. However, reports of mass graves continue to surface; these graves are said to contain bodies of suspected missing people who were victims of extra-‐ judicial killings.15 Balochistan has also arguably risen in stature in domestic and international political psyche for its geo-‐strategic importance as gateway between South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. Three main factors contribute to this: Balochistan is a mineral rich province where Reko Diq copper fields provide a potentially lucrative resource; controlling the 756km long coastline the province offers is also strategically essential for the Pakistani defense establishment; and the rising relevance of the Gwadar port which is crucial for both economic and defense purposes – there prevails a tacit understanding between Islamabad and Beijing that Gwadar can act as a leverage for Beijing to gain influence in the Middle East and counter American presence.16 The situation in Balochistan is a multifaceted gestalt with converging and overlapping trends and composites: political – covering separatist, sectarian and radical Islamist strands; economic and geo-‐strategic significance; and a humanitarian crisis that sees alarming levels of enforced disappearances and killings. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive account of these various aspects. The present report seeks to address the paucity in research on the prevailing conflict between the Baloch people and the Pakistani State/Army. This report will focus on offering an overview of the Baloch crises and discuss them in view of recent developments. The key themes to arise here include: national separatist/liberation movement, grievances of the Baloch people of Pakistan, rise of sectarianism, and involvement of “foreign actors”. 13 Baloch political activists, interview, London, February 2014. 14 Ibid. 15 “Pakistan: More than 100 Dead Bodies From Three Mass Graves were Found in One District in
Balochistan”, Asian Human Rights Commission, 27 January 2014. Available at: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-‐news/AHRC-‐STM-‐023-‐2014 16 Journalists, personal communication, February 2014.
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Balochistan and the Baloch Issue Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan, stretching over an area of 347,190 square kilometers, forming 43.6% of the country’s total land mass.17 However, thinly populated it remains the smallest province in terms of the number of inhabitants. Accurate demographic accounts including ethnic composition of Balochistan or indeed Pakistan appear to be fraught with unreliable or outdated data. A preliminary census suggested in 2012 that the population of Balochistan had frog-‐leaped from 5,501,164 (census, 1998) to 13,162,222 – reflecting a 139.3% increase, the most significant out of all the provinces.18 Other sources place the figure at 7,914,000.19 The major ethnicities of the Balochistan povince are Baloch and Pashtun. Hazaras, Sindhis, and Punjabis, among others, make up minority communities. However a precise ethnic arithmetic is unclear. As per the 2008 Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 40% of Balochistan’s inhabitants spoke the Balochi language, 20% Brahui and 25% Pashtun.20 Others claim the ethnic divide to be between 45% Baloch, 38% Pashtun and a further 17% population of mixed or other ethnicity.21 Some Baloch political leaders claim that up to 65-‐70% of Balochistan’s population is ethnic Baloch while 30-‐35% is Pashtun.22 Hazaras have typically contributed to less than 1% of the population, but their numbers are said to have grown over the years as a repercussion of Saudi-‐Iranian rivalry where Balochistan served as “ground zero”; now it is claimed the majority of the 40,000 Hazaras in the province live in Quetta.23 Other sources have placed the Hazara population of Quetta at 500,000-‐600,000.24 Meanwhile, according to the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, the population set of Afghan refugees is larger than the
17 Government of Balochistan website, www.balochistan.gov.pk 18 Abdul Sattar Khan, “Population Shoots Up by 47 percent Since 1998”, The News, 29 March 2012.
Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐13-‐13514-‐Population-‐shoots-‐up-‐by-‐47-‐percent-‐ since-‐1998 19 “Special Balochistan Report”, Media Point, March 2012; “Balochistan”, UNPO. Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/ 20 Mohd. Shayan Lakdawalla, “The Tricky Demographics of Balochistan”, Dawn, 5 April 2012. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/708123/the-‐tricky-‐demographics-‐of-‐balochistan 21 Ray Fulcher, “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Internal War”, Green Left Weekly, 23 November 2006. Available at: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/36658 22 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 23 Ibid. 24 Imran Yusaf, “Who are the Hazara?” Express Tribune, 5 October 2011. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/267225/who-‐are-‐the-‐hazara/
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combined total of the three ethnic groups of Baloch, Brauhi and Pashtun.25 At the national level, however, it is calculated that Punjabis comprise the largest ethnic group in Pakistan (44.68%), followed by Pashtun (15.42%) and Sindhi (14.1%), while Balochi only make up 3.57% of the population.26 Geographically, Balochistan is an extensive plateau of rough terrain surrounded by two mountain ranges. It borders Punjab and Sindh provinces to the east and Iran and Afghanistan to the West and North West. The province is divided in four zones – namely, upper high lands, lower high lands, plains and deserts – that hold of all 30 provincial districts. The upper highlands rise to 3,700 meters above sea level with valley floors at 1,500 above sea levels.27 Its districts include Zhob, Saifullah, Quetta, Ziarat and Kalat. The lower high lands have an altitude ranging from 600-‐1200 meters above sea levels and are primarily located in the South-‐Eastern region of Balochistan; this covers the southern end of Dera Bugti and Nasirabad districts, as well as Gwadar, Turbat and Chaghi areas. The plains of Kachi, Las Bela, as well as Chaghi and Kharan on the western border to Iran cover a broad expanse. The Pashtun of Balochistan is concentrated in the North West belt of the province stretching from the Afghan border to the Quetta and Loralai to the east. The coastal line is 760 kilometres long and features the Gwadar deep seaport created and owned by China; the Pakistani government is set to implement a comprehensive development plan to revive the country’s economy – Gwadar port plays a key part in this strategy. The Baloch issue is chiefly a separatist movement with the more hard-‐line factions calling for a separate state. It can be said to comprise of the following canons of thought:28 • Sardars who co-‐joined the federalist parties. • Nationalist parties, such as those of Malik Baloch, who aim for greater autonomy for the Baloch but are decidedly anti-‐separatist and pro-‐federalist. 25 Mohd. Shayan Lakdawalla, “The Tricky Demographics of Balochistan”, Dawn, 5 April 2012. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/708123/the-‐tricky-‐demographics-‐of-‐balochistan 26 The World Factbook (February 2014), Central Intelligence Agency website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/ 27 Government of Balochistan website. Available at: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/ 28 Journalist from Balochistan, personal communication, February 2014.
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• Nationalist parties, such as the Akhtar Mengal group, who straddle the line of both a separatist leaning as well as siding with the federalists. In addition, there exist various Baloch groups who are virulently anti-‐Pakistan and claiming an independent Balochistan state that would include the Sistan-‐Baluchistan province of Iran. The separatist movement in Balochistan is essentially driven by the goal to revive the Khanate of Kalat (capital Kalat), a princely state that existed from 1666 to 1955 in the center of modern-‐day Balochistan. The British occupation of the State of Kalat in 1839 marked a significant turning point in Baloch history, eventually resulting in the partition of the greater Balochistan area. The partition of British India cobbled together warring ethnic factions that had not, prior to the arrival of the British, been united under one polity. Baloch, along with Sindhis and Pashtuns, had, for centuries, resisted Punjabi incursions into their lands;29 sizeable sections amongst these groups of people continue to grapple with the shift in paradigm that saw a Punjabi majority rule dictate military and political structures. Since Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan, the Baloch have recurrently risen against the Pakistani state. The Khan of Kalat in 1947 formed two houses of parliament to ascertain the will of the people with regards to joining the Pakistani federation. The Baloch House of Commons and the House of Lords unanimously opposed it: “We [Baloch people] have a distinct civilization… We are Muslims but it is not necessary that by virtue of being Muslims we should lose our freedom and merge with others. If the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also amalgamate with Pakistan. We are ready to have friendship with that country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means [are we] ready to merge with Pakistan…”30
Pakistan purportedly rejected Baloch concerns, opting instead to ploy machinations that would buy allegiances off the nawabs and state feudatories of the three other princely 29 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009.
Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/pakistan-‐harrison-‐policy-‐recommendations 30 Leader of House of Commons, quoted in Yaqoob Khan Bangash, “Recalling Baloch History”, Express Tribune, 14 June 2011. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/188798/recalling-‐baloch-‐history/
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states of Balochistan (Makran, Las Bela and Kharan), eventually leading to the accession to Pakistan.31 Baloch reaction was immediate and powerful, spearheading the first insurgency against Pakistan by Prince Abdul Karin in 1948. It is interesting to note that for 11 years Mohd. Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, acted as an attorney for the Khan of Kalat; during this time Jinnah prepared arguments that supported a separate Kalat state.32 However, Jinnah is seen as having later “backstabbed” Balochistan by “threatening it to join Pakistan.”33 This could be the sentiment that propelled armed extremist groups like the BLA to attack and nearly demolish the historical residence of Jinnah in Balochistan where he is said to have spent the final days of his life; the group removed the flag of Pakistan from the monument site to replace it with their own BLA flag.34 In similar vein, in Quetta's Balochistan University, a lecturer was asked by students to remove a portrait of Muhammad Ali Jinnah from her office wall.35 While separatist groups have an obvious interest in promulgating a particular version of history, the Pakistan government needs to cloak the Baloch insurgency in its proper historical context – one that recognizes the geographical and political history of Balochistan as different from British India/Pakistan – in order to understand and tackle the grievances originating from the Baloch province. Baloch revolts continued with the 1958-‐60 Baloch rebellion against the formation of “one unit”36 and the corresponding demolition of the Baloch state union; furthermore, the Baloch uprising of 1973-‐77 gave rise to a new wave of insurgent groups. All these 31 Ibid; Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014.
32 Journalist belonging to the region, personal communication, February 2014. Documents outlining
Jinnah’s legal arguments supporting the rights to a Baloch state are presently in the custody of the Khan of Kalat, currently in exile in Cardiff, Wales. 33 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014. 34 “BLA Claims Attack on Jinnah Residency in Ziarat”, Express Tribune, 15 June 2013. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/563531/one-‐official-‐killed-‐in-‐attack-‐on-‐quaid-‐e-‐azam-‐residency-‐in-‐ balochistan/ 35 Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War", Guardian, 29 March 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐secret-‐dirty-‐war 36 The One Unit Plan merged the western provinces of Balochistan, the North-‐West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Punjab, and Sindh into a single administrative unit named West Pakistan, which in the new Legislative Assembly was to have parity with the more populous province of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
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revolts resulted in innumerous deaths and displacements of the Baloch people. The Baloch insurgency of 1970s ought to be contextualized in the broader Indo-‐Pak war of 1971 that saw the dismemberment of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); shaken by the loss Pakistan was determined not to risk any further territory – it therefore abolished the Baloch parliament and allegedly encouraged in-‐migration of Punjabis.37 Some scholars see the Baloch nationalism of today as a product of the Baloch middle class, often educated outside of Balochistan: This has affected a shift from rural to urban areas and spillover into big cities in other parts of Pakistan, like Karachi.38 The Baloch separatists are apparently also supported – “with money, influence or sympathy” – by the powerful Bugti tribe and parts of the Baloch middle class.39 Baloch nationalist parties, on the other hand, have traditionally aimed to function within the federal constitutional framework to realize political and socio-‐economic parity; they were only “radicalized” after the Pakistani State started to repress Balochistan in an effort to maintain complete authority.40 While Baloch history is dotted with recurring uprisings, the latest conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani State came to an overspill 2005; after years of simmering insurgency caused in part due to disfranchisement associated with the price of natural gas produced in the restive province, construction of military cantonments and the development of the Gwadar port. However, according to a prominent Baloch leader of the national liberation movement, Akbar Khan Bugti (also known as Tiger of Balochistan), one particular incident in January 2005 triggered the eruption of violence – namely, the alleged rape of a female doctor in Sui by army personnel: “[The present insurgency] is a reaction and resentment because of an incident in which a lady doctor, Shazia Khalid, was gang-‐raped by army personnel.
37 R. T. Naylor, Satanic Purses: Money, Myth and Misinformation in the War on Terror, McGill-‐Queen’s University Press: 2006. 38 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 39 “Baluchistan: ‘We only receive back the bodies’” The Economist, 12 April 2012. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21552248 40 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a
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As I am privy to the information, the case was spread all over the are an the Baloch Liberation Army took things into their own hands and they attacked Defense Security Guards camps and destroyed them and demanded that all foreign elements should leave and not do these nasty things in areas which originally belonged to Baloch culture”.41
The incident sparked a renewed battle between Baloch fighters – in particular, those hailing from the Bugti and Marri tribes – and Pakistani security forces.42 In a televised interview in Jaunary 2005, former President, General Pervez Musharraf, issued a warning to Baloch nationalists: “Do not push us. It is not the 70s, when you can hit and run, and hide in the mountains. This time, you won’t even know what hit you”.43 The threat ultimately culminated in the killing of Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006. Riots and curfews ensued across Balochistan as well as Karachi (Sindh province) and over 450 people were arrested.44 In efforts to control the rise of Baloch nationalism Musharraf launched a military as well as political war – a devolution plan that bypassed provincial assemblies. Arrests of Baloch leaders and army intervention in Dera Bugti further rankled the rebellion. Baloch nationalists continue an intense struggle for self-‐determination against the federal government to date, targeting and sabotaging Pakistani military forces and gas pipelines. One of the groups underpinning the current Baloch insurgency includes the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist militant organization banned by the Pakistani regime in 2006. The organization is allegedly affiliated with the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and Lashkar-‐e-‐Balochistan (LeB).45 The BLA calls for the unification of Balochistan that includes western
41 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Tribals Looking Down a Barrel in Balochistan”, Asia Times Online, 15 January 2005. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GA15Df07.html 42 Tension has been particular strong in Bugti and Marri areas due to their rich natural gas resources and the determination of their leaders/tribe to attain a greater share of the royalties. 43 Roedad Khan, “Our Descent Into Chaos”, The News, 29 February 2012. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/todays-‐news-‐9-‐95137-‐our-‐descent-‐into-‐chaos 44 “Unrest After Pakistan Rebel Death”, BBC, 27 August 2006. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5290194.stm 45 Balochistan Liberation Group, Institute for the Study of Violent Groups. Available at: http://www.isvg.org/follow/blog/page/71/
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Balochistan (Sistan-‐Baluchistan in Iran), Baloch areas in Afghanistan, as well as some areas in Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan. Pro-‐freedom Baloch activists maintain that within Balochistan areas north of Quetta belong to Pashtun and the divide is “honored” by separatists.46 They postulate that violent activity by some armed Baloch groups is in “self-‐defense” because the people have been consistently robbed of their rights: “It is not because there is a desire to be violent. However, honor or revenge killings occur in retaliation to attacks by them [security forces]”.47 Some disaffected Baloch leaders who previously served in the Balochistan provincial assembly are disenchanted by the “ineffectuality” of the political process: “I have tried the political route but it was futile. Pakistan does not want parity or give equal rights; it only wants Baloch as subjects. Punjabis [central government] made us static, institutionalizing the degradation of the Baloch people”.48
Sizeable segments of the Baloch population (and, to various degrees, Sindhis and Pashtun) view Punjabi, Seraiki and Urdu speakers as adhering to a unified political bloc disposed against the interests of Baloch people. The psychological rift between the central government and minority provinces is exacerbated by the under-‐representation of ethnic minorities in the armed forces and civil service.49 Feelings of marginalization are also compounded by the fact that Urdu, spoken by only 8% of the Pakistani population, is the official language. The more moderate Baloch nationalist groups, like the Baloch National Party (BNP), headed by Akhtar Mengal, are interested in extensive provincial autonomy and a limited role of the federal government to defense, foreign affairs, and communications. BNP primarily pushes for provincial control over natural resources. Other political parties such as the National Party (NP) are distinctly anti-‐separatist and pro-‐federalist. Its 46 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014. 47 Ibid. 48 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 49 As of 2006 1% of the FC personnel, and 3% of the coastguards in Balochistan were ethnic Baloch; Ray
Fulcher, “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Internal War”, Green Left Weekly, 23 November 2006. Available at: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/36658
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leader, Abdul Malik Baloch, is the current Chief Minister of Balochistan and maintains cordial ties with the central government. The Baloch Student Organization (BSO) was created in the 1960s and is considered the “middleclass entry point into nationalist movements;”50 it consists of branches that represent all different expressions – from moderate to radical – of the Baloch movement. Given this diversity, the “Baloch movement” cannot to be treated as a monolith but represents a range of political positions arguably joined by the common sense of disenfranchisement. Casus Belli? Grievances of the Baloch Resentment of Pakistan’s Balochis is rooted in, but not limited to, the followed key factors: continued militarization, expropriation of Balochistan’s natural resources, political marginalization, transmigration, and gross violation of human rights committed against the Baloch people – leading some academic quarters to term the state actions against the Baloch population a “slow-‐motion genocide”.51 A Joint Member Resolution presented before the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) by UNPO members Balochistan and Sindh in Brussels in May 2008 underpin the prime grievances of the Baloch people of Pakistan:52 •
Whereas Baloch and Sindhi Nations are indigenous and original owners of the regions known as the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh in the state of Pakistan, their rights and privileges as true owners of these lands have never been recognized by the government of Pakistan.
50 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 51 Thus coined to describe the situation in Balochistan, by Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia Centre for International Policy and author of ”In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington: 1980. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/35442/donald-‐s-‐zagoria/in-‐afghanistans-‐shadow-‐baluch-‐ nationalism-‐and-‐soviet-‐temptations 52 “Balochistan and Sindh: UNPO General Assembly Joint Member Resolution”, UNPO, 16 June 2008. Available at:http://www.unpo.org/images/2008_IX_General_Assembly/Member_Resolutions/member%20resoluti on%20-‐%20balochistan%20and%20sindh.pdf
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Since 1947, when the state of Pakistan was established as a federation, the military and civilian bureaucracies have centralized power into a unitary state, ignoring and dismissing the fact that Pakistan was established as a federation.
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Employing a highly armed state apparatus and using state terrorism through its intelligence agencies the Government of Pakistan has sought to silence all Baloch and Sindhi voices that seek to establish fundamental human rights for their people.
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Balochistan and Sindh have vast qualities of natural resources that are exploited by the Government of Pakistan to benefit the majority province of Punjab and other urban centers of Pakistan like Islamabad, Peshawar and Karachi.
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Whereas the urban centers of Baloch and Sindhis have been turned into a minority through official policy of resettlement of non-‐Baloch and non-‐Sindhis. Resettling and appropriating land from native people has been one of the most powerful tools used by the colonists to obliterate resistance and mitigate indigenous identity and concomitant claims.
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Whenever and wherever political activists or members of civil society have attempted or sought to raise awareness or protest against these acts of exploitation and oppression, they have been treated worse than ordinary criminal and have been incarcerated and tortured.
•
Balochistan has suffered five military operations and Sindh too is highly militarized.
The first point reflects one of the fundamental convictions of pro-‐autonomy Baloch nationalists – namely, the idea of “Balochistan’s historical 3000 years long existence as a separate state;”53 whereby it has remained autonomous and resisted incorporation into other polities. In the context of the Indian subcontinent, ever since the dawn of partition the Baloch opposed the Muslim League movement that lead to the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947.54 53 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014.
54 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009.
Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/pakistan-‐harrison-‐policy-‐recommendations
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Today, segments of the Baloch nationalist movement view the accession as coercion and are vehement in their disassociation from Pakistan, claiming the Baloch are not Pakistanis and referring to province as “Pakistan-‐occupied” territory:55 History, they maintain, has been distorted by Pakistan: “We are not Pakistani and we do not share a history with Pakistan. The latter’s identity is rooted in the Indian subcontinent; Baloch are not part of it.”56 Balochistan’s distinction from the Indian subcontinent lies at the crux of the separatist movement’s ideology: “If Pakistan can justify its separation from India after hundreds of years of coexistence, why can’t Balochistan that was never even a part of it?”57 Therefore, in their struggle, proponents of an independent Balochistan state insist on terming their struggle a “freedom” movement rather than a “separatist” since they reject ever being a part of Pakistan.58 The perception of the Pakistani state as a “foreign occupier”59 is most pronounced in Balochistan, where the state is Pakistan is viewed as having forcibly annexed, and now controlling, Balochistan via the armed forces and secret agencies. Baloch separatist claim it is impossible to co-‐exist with a country when “the very foundation of their relationship is an occupation.”60 Hardline separatist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army envision a unified Baloch federation that brings together contiguous Baloch regions of Iran and Afghanistan. Jointly, the Baloch, Sindhis and Pashtuns comprise 33% of the national population – yet identify themselves with 72% of Pakistani’s territory as their historic homeland.61 To quell the Baloch insurgency of 1973-‐77, 80,000 Pakistani troops were sent to Balochistan and in 2005, 6 Army brigades and over 25,000 paramilitary forces personnel were needed.62 Army and Air Force garrisons in the region have expanded –
55 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 60 Ibid. 61 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009.
Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/pakistan-‐harrison-‐policy-‐recommendations 62 Ibid.
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perceived locally as the “militarization” of the area.63 This was a key concern of the 2005 Senate Subcommittee on Balochistan of the Pakistani Senate that called for the suspension of new military cantonments in the region and a diminished role of the Frontier Corp.”64 In a rare visit by foreign journalists to Balochistan, The Guardian’s Declan Walsh reported an area “crowded with military checkpoints manned by paramilitary forces.”65 The GoP’s interest in constructing military garrisons in three sensitive areas of Balochistan – Sui, Gwadar and Kohlu (“capital” of Marri tribe) has further left the Baloch feeling dispossessed.66 However, in a bid to allay Baloch frustration, the Army in 2011 converted the newly constructed cantonment in Sui to a military college.67 Augmenting Baloch sentiment of suffering at the hands of the Pakistani state and security forces is the perceived exploitation of natural resources in the minority provinces and the unfair tax allocation between the central government and the provinces. Although gas obtained from Balochistan accounts for 36% of Pakistan’s total gas production, the central government charges a lower price and the province receives lower royalties compared to other gas producing provinces in the country. Reports by geological experts indicate the presence of 19 trillion cubic feet of gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil reserves in Balochistan; the Baloch seek a lawful agreement for the equitable sharing of these resources.68 Sui (Dera Bugti district of Balochistan) gas is extracted under the direct control of the Pakistan Army. Symbolic of what the Baloch see as systematic disregard for their interests by the GoP is the fact that even though gas was discovered in Sui in 1953 and supplied to cities in Punjab by 1964, Balochistan’s capital Quetta only received gas 63 “Balochistan Insurgency: Third Conflict 1963-‐1969”, GlobalSecurity.org.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/balochistan-‐1963.htm; Ray Fulcher, “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Internal War”, Green Left Weekly, 23 November 2006. Available at: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/36658 64 “Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan”, Senate of Pakistan website, November 2005. Available at: http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1308267066_685.pdf 65 Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War", Guardian, 29 March 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐secret-‐dirty-‐war 66 “Special Balochistan Report – March 2012”, Media Point, 6 March 2012. Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/ 67 “Sui Cantonment Turned Into Military College”, Dawn, 3 January 2011. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/595950/sui-‐cantonment-‐turned-‐into-‐military-‐college-‐2 68 “Special Balochistan Report – March 2012”, Media Point, 6 March 2012. Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/
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supply in 1986.69 Presently 14 urban townships in Balochistan’s 30 districts receive gas, while the facility is unavailable in rural areas.70 Interfering with access to the gas has been a hallmark of Baloch insurgents. The Marri resistance in the 1950s curtailed attempts by the Pakistan to explore gas opportunities in the region. Since 2005 to mid-‐February 2014 a total of 209 attacks have been carried out on gas pipelines.71 On 26 February 2014, the Baloch Republican Army – an organization banned by the Pakistani government – claimed to havedestroyed four gas pipelines, including one in Sui.72 In an interview with Asia Times Online in January 2006, the late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti asserted that the GoP’s strategic design was to eliminate “dissenting voices” that demanded a greater stake in what the Baloch claim to be assets on their land: “They [government] think that natural resources are national assets, and we think they are Baloch assets, and whoever wants to use them must do so through us, not by direct possession”.73 The distribution of tax revenue, based on a population-‐based formula, implies that Balochistan receives a mere 2% share of the 45% allocated to provinces. This is largely seen as inequitable and remains a bone of contention in the minority provinces. However, a White Paper Budget for 2013-‐2014 suggests an effort towards greater inclusivity.74 Yet, despite promises and claims by the central/provincial government over the years, the Baloch continue to contest that little has changed in terms of policy or practice and benefits are seldom accrued to native Balochis. Similarly, an economic package entitled Aghaz-‐e-‐Haqooq-‐Balochistan hailed by the GoP for introducing industrialization to the province, including higher gas development surcharge and 69 Massoud Ansari, “The Battle for Balochistan”, Newsline, 17 September 2006. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/794058/the-‐battle-‐for-‐balochistan 70 Shahzad Baloch, “Assembly Members Demand Natural Gas for Balochistan”, Express Tribune, 29 January 2012. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/328760/assembly-‐members-‐demand-‐natural-‐ gas-‐for-‐balochistan/ 71 South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) website. Available at: http://www.satp.org/ 72 Baloch Republican Army (BRA) website. Available at: http://balochrepublicanarmy.com/ 73 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Tribals Looking Down a Barrel in Balochistan”, Asia Times Online, 15 January 2005. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GA15Df07.html 74 Government of Balochistan website. Available at: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/
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royalties, has yet to deliver on key implementations.75 It is often said that money never seems to reach its targets in the province; in 2010 Islamabad doubled Balochistan’s budget as well as settled outstanding natural gas revenue debts – but according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the provincial government is “nowhere to be seen” with many of its leaders residing and holding meetings in Islamabad as of 2012.76 Balochistan appears to have been singled out in terms of the unfair treatment levied to provincial governments. Typically, people compromising the majority in the various provinces – such as, Sindhis and Pashtun – have been granted a political stake by the Punjabi ruling state; Balochis, however, have remained disfranchised, denied of similar attention.77 Separatists believe that the key reason why the establishment “cannot let go of Balochistan” is due to its geo-‐political – and economic importance.78 Situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East and linking the Central Asian states with the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, Balochistan is a natural transit hub for energy resources and trade. Extending some 756 kilometers, it offers the lion’s share of Pakistan’s entire coastline and invites an economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas and minerals and spread across a vast expanse of land. However, some analysts point out: “if Balochistan were [such] an energy bonanza, Islamabad would have already tapped it” – implying that gas and oil reserves need to be put in context.79 The area is home two of Pakistan’s three naval bases – Ormara and Gwadar. Gwadar deep-‐sea port (Chinese-‐funded and operated) lies at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and close to the Strait of Hormuz. Current Sino-‐Pak relations largely pivot on developing 75 Zahid Gishkori, “Aghaz-‐e-‐Haqooq Package: Reassurances Aside, Much Left to be Done in Balochistan”,
Express Tribune, 11 October 2011. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/271533/aghaz-‐e-‐haqooq-‐ package-‐reassurances-‐aside-‐much-‐left-‐to-‐be-‐done-‐in-‐balochistan/ 76 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 77 Journalists, personal communication, February 2014. 78 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 79 Jonah Blank, RAND Corporation, quoted in Palash Ghoush, "Pakistan's Dirty War in Its Poorest, Most Lawless, But Resource-‐Rich Province", International Business Times, 14 September 2013. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐dirty-‐war-‐its-‐poorest-‐most-‐lawless-‐resource-‐rich-‐ province-‐1405620
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economic relations in which Gwadar features highly.80 Road and rail networks linking Gwadar to Afghanistan and Central Asia are underway. However, the economic profits it is likely to generate for Pakistan is also a source of tension amongst the Baloch who expect that benefits will fill up Punjabi and Chinese coffers only. Nawabzada Mehran Marri, a Balochistan representative at the United Nations Human Rights Council, has accused both Pakistan and China of conspiring to defraud the Baloch people: “The Chinese and Pakistanis are the partners in the crimes against the Baloch nation and the Gwadar port project is not a commercial project aimed at bringing prosperity in the region, and especially for the Baloch people, absolutely not. It is a naval base created for the Chinese to have [a] listening post in the region. This is [a] danger to America, international and regional powers, and, first and foremost, a danger to us.”81
There is also fear that the materialization of Gwadar will see an influx in population from outside, thus transforming the ethnic makeup of the region to include greater numbers of Punjabis, Sindhis and other workers – effectively “trying to change the Baloch majority into a minority.”82 Such fears have led some observers to posit that the present-‐day crisis in Balochistan: “[Was] provoked, ironically, by the central government’s attempt to develop this backward area by undertaking a series of large projects. Instead of cheering these projects, the Baloch, faced with slowing population growth, responded with fear that they would be dispossessed of their land and resources and of their distinct identity”.83
80 Qandeel Siddique, “Deeper Than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of Pakistan-‐China Relations”, SISA report, 27 February 2014. Available at: http://strategiskanalyse.no/Publikasjoner%202014/2014-‐02-‐ 27_SISA16_Sino-‐Pak_QS.pdf 81 Palash Ghoush, "Pakistan's Dirty War in Its Poorest, Most Lawless, But Resource-‐Rich Province", International Business Times, 14 September 2013. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/balochistan-‐ pakistans-‐dirty-‐war-‐its-‐poorest-‐most-‐lawless-‐resource-‐rich-‐province-‐1405620 82 Nawab Akbar Bugti, quoted in Kanchman Lakshman, ”Opening Another Front?” Outlook India, 24 January 2005. Available at: http://www.kashmirherald.com/opinions/balochistan.html 83 “Special Balochistan Report – March 2012”, Media Point, 6 March 2012. Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/
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Balochistan is also significant for its Ras Koh ranges where Pakistan conducts its nuclear tests. Pipeline projects like the Turkmenistan-‐Afghanistan-‐Pakistastn-‐India (TAPI) pipeline also pass through this province; billed as the “Peace Pipeline” it is likely to be completed by 2017-‐18.84 Balochistan holds extensive copper and gold deposits, as well as platinum, aluminum and uranium. One of the world’s largest cooper deposits is found at Reko Diq in the Chagai district of Balochistan.85 Beijing operates gold and copper mines in Saindak near the Afghan and Iran borders. However, development on a number of these projects has largely remained paralyzed: Baloch leaders challenge the right of the central government to seal licensing agreements without Baloch participation that ensures a fair share of profits. The perceived victimization of the Baloch is rooted also in the routine neglect of the Balochistan province that has resulted in staggering figures on human development indices; this resentment is further stiffened by the deprivation of Baloch political and human rights. Social progress in Balochistan has remained consistently and despairingly low as compared to other provinces: the literacy rate of Punjab is seven times higher; per capita income in Punjab is $80, compared to $54 in Balochistan; and while the national average of infant mortality rate is 70 per 1,000 live births, in Balochistan this figure is as high as 130.86 Balochistan has long lagged behind other provinces in development and despite claims of investment and reformation, continues to struggle with basic necessities. According to surveys that factored household assets, levels of education and literacy, employment, household amenities, housing quality, household structure, family size and dependency ratio, a report by the Social Policy and Development Centre (Karachi) found that
84 “TAPI Gas Pipeline Likely to Complete by 2017-‐18”, Economic Times, 3 December 2013. Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-‐12-‐03/news/44710659_1_ipi-‐pipeline-‐iran-‐ pakistan-‐india-‐pipeline-‐company 85 “Special Balochistan Report”, Media Point, March 2012; “Balochistan”, Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/ 86 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009. Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/pakistan-‐harrison-‐policy-‐recommendations
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Balochistan remained the province with the most – 45.68% – people living below the poverty line.87 It also scores low in infrastructure, health, sanitation, job quality, wages, and state institutions – having the weakest in the country.88 From 1972/3 to 2004/5 the economy of Punjab grew 4.0 times while that of Balochistan expanded by 2.7, and per capita income level was only two-‐thirds of Pakistan’s mean level, at $400.89 Ironically, while many of Pakistan’s major economic projects/investments in the future (e.g. Gwadar port) are featured in Balochistan, the province remains on the periphery of economic and/ or institutional development. Former Senator from Balochistan, Sanaullah Baloch, suggests that Balochistan is deliberately being hindered from development through the actions of the pervasive Pak-‐ Army: “How can a region develop when it has more soldiers than teachers, more garrisons than universities, more naval bases than institutions devoted to science, technology and research? In Balochistan, cantonments of the Frontier Corps outnumber colleges. There are more police stations than vocational training centers and more check-‐posts than girls’ schools”.90
For its part, the government of Pakistan asserts that the Baloch insurgency is part of a greater attempt by some tribal chieftains (known as sardars) to maintain their traditional power-‐hold over and stump any significant development in Balochistan. In fact, some research on the topic suggests that areas under the auspices of nationalist leaders, such as Nawab Khair Marri and the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, often fare better in
87 Balochistan Tops Poverty List: SPDC”, The News, 26 June 2013. Available at: http://www.mediapoint.pk/special-‐balochistan-‐report-‐march-‐2012/ 88 “Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report: From Periphery to Core”, World Bank report, May 2008. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8094 89 Ibid. 90 Sana Baloch, “The Real Balochistan”, The News, 23 March 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐9-‐99110-‐The-‐real-‐Balochistan
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development91 – pointing at the willingness of local leaders to ameliorate socio-‐ economic conditions. Nevertheless, the entrenched corruption attributed to the reign of sardars in Balochistan has been a legitimate grievance of Baloch people; allied with the central government and considered pro-‐establishment, they are deemed responsible for the slow progress in the region and depriving the province of its rights. There is a widespread impression that Islamabad endorses the sardari system as a ploy to keep Balochistan backward; as early as 1972 a resolution was moved in the Balochistan Assembly asking for “the eradication of outdated institutions such as the sardari system, the jirga system and the tribal system so that the province of Balochistan may progress socially and economically”.92 The Assembly adopted the resolution despite opposition by chieftains, “Islamabad paid no heed to the demand. Furthermore, any socio-‐economic development of the Baloch bothered the regional powers, resulting in the dismissal of the first truly elected Baloch government and also in a full-‐fledged military operation”.93 To date the sardari trend appears to have continued: With the formation of the new provincial government in 2013, of the 14-‐member Balochistan cabinet 11 were tribal chieftains and feudal lords.94 Senior officials of moderate nationalist political parties have accused the country’s civilian and military establishment of creating “fake leadership” to fill the provincial/assembly seat and rubber stamp state policies.95 The human rights situation in Balochistan has been discussed in the introductory chapter of this report. While the new government claims that cases of “missing people” have lessened and that the activity of death squads diminished, it is likely that provincial
91 Ray Fulcher, “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Internal War”, Green Left Weekly, 23 November 2006. Available at: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/36658 92 Sanaullah Baloch, “The Truth About Balochistan”, The News, 2 February 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐9-‐157695-‐The-‐truth-‐about-‐Balochistan 93 Ibid. 94 Syed Ali Shah, “Sardars, Nawabs Continue to Dominate Balochistan Cabinet”, Dawn, 14 October 2013. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1049721/sardars-‐nawabs-‐continue-‐to-‐dominate-‐balochistan-‐ cabinet 95 Asad Hashim, “Baloch Nationalists Fight Pakistan at Polls”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 5 May 2013. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/201354155123504533.html
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leaders – under pressure to prove state atrocities have decreased – exaggerate these figures; however, enforced disappearances and killings appear to continue.96 In 2011 it was reported that nearly 200 political activists had been “abducted, tortured, and killed” in Balochistan in the preceding two years; their families believed the ISI was responsible.97 Drawing international attention to the issue, the United Nations in September 2012 conducted a mission to assess the missing persons situation in Balochistan. According to the Voice of Baloch Missing Persons rights group, more than 2,200 Baloch citizens have gone missing since 2005 (to 2013).98 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its initial observations in 2013 claimed the human rights situation in Balochistan had grown adverse since the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, including cases of abduction and the spread of fear.99 While expressing hope in the new government, the team of NGOs, political party members, press, lawyers, ethnic and religious minority groups affirmed that there was no change in security policy or the law and order condition.100 According to the BSO, any Baloch who raises “his voice or his pen” is imprisoned or killed.101 The victims of supposed ISI activity are generally thought to be men between the ages of 20 and 40 and include nationalist politicians students; about one-‐third of all "kill and dump" victims are members of the BSO.102 An perceived driver behind Baloch militant activity is the presumed prosecution of Baloch people: “kill and dump” operations by the Pakistani secret service have allegedly increased whereby Baloch nationalists are said to be routinely abducted in night raids 96 Journalist, personal communication, February 2014. 97 Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Can Anyone Control Pakistan’s ISI Spies?” BBC News, 4 June 2011. Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-‐south-‐asia-‐13638478 98 Asad Hashim, “Baloch Nationalists Fight Pakistan at Polls”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 5 May 2013. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/201354155123504533.html 99 “Despite Increasing Violence, Balochistan Hopeful of New Govt.: HRCP", The Express Tribune, 25 June 2013. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/568170/despite-‐increasing-‐violence-‐balochistan-‐ hopeful-‐of-‐new-‐govt-‐hrcp/ 100 Ibid. 101 Asad Hashmi, “Pakistan’s Unending Battle Over Balochistan”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 16 April 2013. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/2013415113250391656.html 102 Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War", Guardian, 29 March 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐secret-‐dirty-‐war
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and later found buried in mass graves.103 Furthermore, some activists proclaim the situation to be “more detrimental in Iran for the Baloch populace””104 Meanwhile, Afghanistan is seen as the only country where Baloch are not victimized. Foreign Involvement in Balochistan “The only foreigner meddling in Balochistan is Pakistan.”105
For nearly a decade Pakistan has ritually incriminated “outside involvement” in fomenting the Baloch insurgency via its consulates in Afghanistan. The perennial blame game toes the narrative of “foreign intelligence agencies want to worsen the Balochistan situation in order to destabilize Pakistan”106 and so on. Hitherto no supporting evidence has been provided by the Pakistani State to buttress these charges. It is likely that Islamabad overplays foreign involvement, glossing over the real issues true to the province; however, that does not imply that the allegations are devoid of any truth. While it is difficult to validate any claims pointing at infiltration or engagement of other countries’ secret services, it is worth reflecting on the war of accusations that is commonplace in the Indian subcontinent. An oft-‐cited example of an outside hand playing a part in the Baloch insurgency dates back to 1973 when Pakistani authorities entered the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad to find an arms cache which the GoP claimed was destined for Balochistan.107 There remains speculation that separatist groups like the BLA receive financing in the form of donations from sympathizers to the Baloch cause in the region.108
103 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. Marri claimed the days before, 70 Marri tribesmen
were abducted in a night raid. 104 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014. They further allege that it is commonplace for the Baloch in Iran to be labelled ”heretic” and subsequently hanged on that charge. 105 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 106 "Balochistan Unrest: Judicial Panel Faults Foreign Spy Agencies", The Express Tribune, 10 June 2012. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/391539/balochistan-‐unrest-‐judicial-‐panel-‐faults-‐foreign-‐spy-‐ agencies/ 107 Shahid Saeed, “Caught! (But What?)”, The Friday Times, 4-‐10 March 2011. Available at: http://www.thefridaytimes.com/04032011/page26.shtml 108 Balochistan Liberation Army, Institute for the Study of Violent Groups. Available at: http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Groups/Balochistan_Liberation_Army
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Pakistan has in particular accused its neighbors India and Afghanistan of meddling in its internal affairs and stoking various insurgencies, from the Pakistan Taliban to the Baloch separatist movement. Afghanistan especially is known for harboring a “soft corner” for Balochists and a number of Baloch leaders have found refuge in Afghanistan.109 Some sources have claimed that Afghanistan was possibly the first to offer a “terrorist training camp” to Baloch rebels and a base to operate against Pakistan.110 This was allegedly under the auspices of Afghan President Daoud Khan (1973-‐78), a secular leader known for his progressive policies. In 2012, Pakistani Minister for Interior Rehman Malik alleged that the Baloch Republican Party chief Brahamdagh Bugti had been operating militant training camps in Afghanistan that were directly linked to Baloch insurgents causing unrest in Balochistan.111 In response to Islamabad’s request to dismantle the camps, Kabul formally gave its assurance to end the infiltration of militants from its Kandahar province to Balochistan’s border district Chaman.112 According to chief of paramilitary troops in Balochistan, “over 300 militant camps” are established in Afghanistan for the purpose of launching terrorist and anti-‐state activities in Balochistan.113 US Embassy cables retrieved by The Guardian newspaper further support the notion that Baloch nationalists were harboring in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai.114 Karzai, however, has maintained denial of any support from Afghanistan’s Baloch to the armed struggle in Balochistan.115
109 Journalist, personal communication, February 2014. 110 R. T. Naylor, “Satanic Purses: Money, Myth and Misinformation in the War on Terror”, McGill-‐Queen’s
University Press: 2006. 111 Zahid Gishkori, “Kabul Helped Dismantle Brahamdagh Camps: Malik”, Express Tribune, 5 March 2012. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/345631/baloch-‐insurgency-‐kabul-‐helped-‐dismantle-‐ brahamdagh-‐camps-‐malik/ 112 Ibid. 113 “Over 30 Training Camps in Afghanistan Fuelling Unrest in Balochistan: IG FC”, Dawn, 2 June 2012. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/723332/over-‐30-‐training-‐camps-‐in-‐afghanistan-‐fuelling-‐ balochistan-‐unrest-‐ig-‐fc 114 “US Embassy Cables: Karzai Admits to Sheltering Baloch Nationalists”, Guardian, 1 December 2010. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-‐embassy-‐cables-‐documents/93284 115 Mobashir Hassan, “What if They Get Stringers”, The Nation, 23 April 2012.
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India has also been frequently charged with fuelling the Baloch rebellion with the aim of destabilizing Pakistan by the Pakistani civil – and military leadership. In August 2011, Army officials posted in the Marri tribal area of Balochistan claimed that Baloch fighters were receiving ammunition from India via Afghanistan: “We have undeniable evidence that India is funding the Baloch insurgency since the last few years.”116 The blame has not always stemmed from Islamabad; some western observers, too, have pointed to possible covert funding of groups, like BLA, from the Indian government.117 According to WikiLeaks cables, US and British intelligence services broadly agree that India sees Balochistan as payback for Pakistani meddling in Kashmir.118 In an interview with BBC Urdu in August 2013, US Special Representative James Dobbins acknowledged Pakistani concerns over the presence of India in Afghanistan and two-‐way cross-‐border infiltration:“The dominant infiltration of militants is from Pakistan into Afghanistan, but we recognise that there is some infiltration of hostile militants from the other direction as well. So Pakistan's concerns aren't groundless.”119
Similarly, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel remarked in speech made in 2011: “India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border.”120 India has categorically denied any link to Baloch separatism and underlines the fact that there is thus far no provision of evidence from Pakistan to support its assertion. US official, like Richard Holbrooke, have also framed the issue as lacking any real
116 Qaiser Butt, “Balochistan Conflict: ‘PM’s Talks with Leaders Unlikely to Succeed”, Express Tribune, 7 August 2011. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/225958/balochistan-‐conflict-‐pms-‐talks-‐with-‐ leaders-‐unlikely-‐to-‐succeed/ 117 David Wright-‐Neville, “Dictionary of Terrorism”, Polity Press: 2010. 118 Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War", Guardian, 29 March 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐secret-‐dirty-‐war 119 “Pakistani Fears are Not Baseless”, BBC Urdu, 7 August 2013. 120 “India Financed Problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan, Says US Defense Secretary Nominee Chuck Hagel”, The Times of India, 26 February 2013. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-‐financed-‐problems-‐for-‐Pak-‐in-‐Afghanistan-‐says-‐US-‐ defence-‐secretary-‐nominee-‐Chuck-‐Hagel/articleshow/18694475.cms?referral=PM
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evidence.121 The relative diminutive stature of the Baloch movement has led to doubts of whether it is sponsored by neighboring powers, like India. The weaponry instead is claimed to be purchasable on the black market, or funded by Baloch compatriots in Persian Gulf states.122 However, revelations made by a retired Army chief in 2013 have been more telling; India had reportedly “sponsored bomb blasts in Pakistan and doled out money to the separatist elements in Balochistan.”123 Activities, apparently sanctioned by Tactical Support Division – an Indian army unit created in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks – in order to “perform a particular task to secure borders and internal situation in the country.”124 Given the marred history of Balochis and decades of economic and social neglect – it can be presumed that it would be susceptible to outside elements. The Balochistan Republican Army has openly stated in an interview that it would welcome aid from India, Afghanistan and Iran in order to defend Balochistan.125 In similar vein, pro-‐ autonomy Baloch activists claim that they would welcome foreign help so as to bolster their cause.126 This openness to foreign interest means it is not implausible to suppose or expect outside engagement. The activists draw on the open wounds of the Baloch people that render them easily “exploitable”: “Punjabis don’t suffer our problems; so they won’t be preyed on nor will they play into the hands of any outsiders. But we will because we are weak and have been deprived”.127
121 “US Bails Out India from Balochistan Wrangle”, Times of India, 31 July 2009. Available at:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-‐07-‐31/news/28482721_1_india-‐and-‐pakistan-‐ balochistan-‐af-‐pak-‐envoy-‐richard-‐holbrooke 122 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009. Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/pakistan_the_state_of_the_union.pdf 123 Umar Cheema, “Ex-‐Indian Army Chief Admits Sponsoring Terrorism in Balochistan”, The News, 21 October 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐2-‐209274-‐Ex-‐Indian-‐Army-‐chief-‐ admits-‐sponsoring-‐terrorism-‐in-‐Balochistan 124 Ibid. 125 “Bugti’s Grandson Ready to Accept Help From India”, News One India, 24 July 2008. Available at: http://news.oneindia.in/2008/07/24/bugtis-‐grandson-‐ready-‐to-‐accept-‐help-‐from-‐india-‐ 1216875825.html 126 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014. 127 Ibid.
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The Sectarian Ensnare In recent years Balochistan has been engulfed by a tide of sectarian violence. While the phenomenon is not entirely new it has undergone a steady rise since 2002.128 Some see this rise in sectarianism – chiefly operated by groups such as the Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi – as a state-‐sponsored effort to radicalize Balochis: LeJ is presumably “artificially planted” in the region and especially in areas surrounding Quetta.129 Although officially banned by the government, the group is said to run two outfits in Balochistan – the Usman Kurd group and the Qari Hayi group.130 The LeJ agents are believed to be targeting Hazara Shias as well as Baloch separatists. A number of local leaders or groups turned renegade or presumably “bought” by the agencies are working to this end: For example, Baloch leaders like Shafiq Mengal are allegedly running a death squad in the Khuzdar district and is rumored to be working in cahoots with the establishment – receiving arms and bulletproof cars from ISI officials – to carry out targeted killings of Baloch separatists.131 In fact five of the most prominent leaders of the LeJ in Balochistan are said to be Baloch.132 “Kill and dump” activity is said to often target Baloch who refuse to be bribed by the agencies and become “sectarian.”133 The Pakistani establishment has arguably employed Islamization and ethnic-‐ization as a tool to prevent nationalism amongst the different provincial people. In the first of such endeavors, Pakistan in 1971 incorporated Pashtun areas into Balochistan; this was followed by Zia ul-‐Haq’s Islamization policies and later through Musharraf’s “implanting” of religious parties in Balochistan, as well as the use of Ministry of
128 Huma Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan Greatest Security Threat?” Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Center report, July 2012. Available at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Asia/Pakistan/Publications/Sectarian-‐violence-‐Pakistan-‐s-‐ greatest-‐security-‐threat; “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan”, South Asia Terrorism Portal. Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-‐killing.htm 129 Journalist, personal communication, February 2014. 130 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowent for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 131 Journalist, personal communication, February 2014. 132 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowent for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 133 Baloch activists, interview, London, February 2014.
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Religious Affairs to establish a madrassa network across the province.134 In present times, a Baloch Senator is known to have claimed that, in all intent and purposes, Balochistan was being run by the Inter-‐Services Intelligence for all practical purposes for the last 15 years.135 As for some pro-‐autonomy Baloch leaders, the “Pak Army/ISI is a fascist Taliban” that uses Islam to justify its “colonialism.”136 However, there is little prospect that the policy will prove effective or be able to create inroads in Baloch society or polity, given its inherently secular nature that has remained relatively resistant to Islamic forces (including the presence of Quetta Shura/Taliban as well as sectarian groups).137 Moreover, the Zikris, a Baloch religious grouping that numbers to over one million, practices a form of Islam that opposes Salafism.138 A former member of the Pakistani parliament, Sanaullhah Baloch, has accused the Pakistani establishment of over-‐emphasizing tribal differences and militants’ presence as a ruse to divert attention from Balochistan’s history of progressive nationalist political parties.139 Baloch nationalists appear proud of their distinct tribal codes and values, one of which enshrines the respect of women. In the aftermath of the alleged rape of a female doctor in Sui that sparked a fresh battle between Pakistani SFs and Baloch rebels, Akbar Khan Bugti stated: “I did not know about her ethnicity until somebody told me that she was not a Baloch, but hailed from Sindh. But it is beside the point. The Punjabi cannot
134 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowent for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 135 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Bizenjo Alleges: Baochistan Being Run by ISI”, Dawn, 21 February 2012. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/697017/bizenjo-‐alleges-‐balochistan-‐being-‐run-‐by-‐isi-‐2 136 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 137 Journalist, personal communication, February 2014. 138 Selig S. Harrison, “Pakistan: The State of the Union”, Centre for International Policy, April 2009. Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/pakistan-‐harrison-‐policy-‐recommendations 139 Sana Baloch, “The Real Balochistan”, The News, 23 March 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐9-‐99110-‐The-‐real-‐Balochistan
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understand our culture and codes. What respect we give to a woman, irrespective of her caste, religion or ethnicity, no Punjabi can understand.”140
The sectarian or ethnic violence is not entirely one-‐sided. Increasingly since 2006, when eminent Baloch leader Akbar Bugti was killed by the Pakistani military, Baloch extremists are known to target Punjabi settlers in Balochistan.141 According to an ex-‐ BSO separatist: “We want all settlers, particularly the Punjabis and the Urdu-‐speaking, to leave our land. They are colonialists and our enemies. We don’t want collaborators of the Pakistan military on our soil”.142 Thousands of settlers are reportedly killed, including provincial education minister, Shafique Ahmed, in 2009, as well as a number of college teachers, professors who were Punjabi or who spoke Urdu or Hindko and hailed from Karachi or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.143 Conclusion Although home to an intricate tapestry of unresolved conflicts and issues, Balochistan remains a relatively under-‐researched subject matter, even though the Baloch separatist movement is time-‐tested phenomenon – dating back to the creation of Pakistan and resilient even today. Laden with longstanding grievances, Baloch nationalism, in its moderate to radical contours, essentially sees itself a victim of state prosecution – militarily, politically, socially, and humanely – and demands equitable political and economic reforms or in some cases independence. Continued attacks by Baloch separatist rebels against Jinnah’s residence and against gas pipelines signal that their struggle grows unabated. Both attacks are symbolic representations of the separatists “anti-‐Pakistani” stance, distancing themselves from a Pakistani identity, and a claim to what they see as their natural resources being “exploited” by Pakistan. Furthermore, retaliatory attacks against the perceived monopoly of the Punjabi State/Army and its subjugation of Baloch people also continue: Claiming responsibility of the 6 February 2014 bomb blast on a main railway track targeting bogies of a Lahore-‐bound train, BRA fighters said “it was a reaction to the 140 Quoted in Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Tribals Looking Down a Barrel in Balochistan”, Asia Times Online, 15 June 2005. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GA15Df07.html 141 “Settlers Caught in Cross Fire”, Dawn, 28 June 2011. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.
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killing of political activists and dumping their bodies in Tootak area of Khuzdar district. […] We will target more trains taking passengers to Punjab.”144 Reports from advocacy groups highlight the grave human rights situation – including the aforementioned enforced disappearances and wanton killings – in Balochistan has invariably worsened the already resentful province. Such actions build on the prevailing grievances related to dispossession, marginalization, expropriation, and militarization of the region. As a precondition of any negotiations, Baloch insurgents have called for an end to the Pakistani Government’s military operations and activities of intelligence agencies in the province.145 Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, including recently retired Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, have accused the paramilitary forces in Balochistan of being responsible for many enforced disappearances in the province. However, there is indication that the political establishment is taking notice: In an unprecedented in move in 2012, the National Assembly Standing Committee on Defense asked the country’s spy agencies to “not overstep their authority.”146 Skeptics argue that such moves are inconsequential since the “intelligence agencies never pay heed to directions and orders issued by the committee.”147 Such suspicion is corroborated in light of recent statements – in December 2013 – by Balochistan Chief Minister Dr Abdul Malik Baloch who acknowledged that state agencies were responsible for “illegal confinement” of Baloch activists; allegedly including the Secretary-‐General of his own Balochistan National Party, which is currently part of Balochistan’s coalition government.148
144 “BRA Claims Train Attack", Dawn, 6 February 2014. Available at:
http://www.dawn.com/news/1085223/bra-‐claims-‐train-‐attack 145 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 146 Kamran Yousaf, "Balochistan Unrest: Spy Agencies Asked Not to Overstep Authority", The Express Tribune, 1 March 2012. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/343838/balochistan-‐unrest-‐spy-‐ agencies-‐asked-‐to-‐not-‐overstep-‐authority/ 147 Ibid. 148 “Pakistan: Mass Graves a Stark Reminder of Violations Implicating the State in Balochistan”, Statement by Amnesty International, 5 February 2014. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/001/2014/en/ba0b4870-‐bbb7-‐4bd0-‐bfbc-‐ 13dbdbbbc0c3/asa330012014en.pdf
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Furthermore, the solemn state of human rights abuses is anticipated to continue in the future: From 5 December 2013, the GoP enforced the controversial Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) that legalizes the custody of missing persons.149 Under the PPO, security agencies are permitted to keep any suspect for up to three months without due process or up to six months in the cases of suspected terrorism. Rights groups view this as providing protection for crimes committed by the security forces by giving enforced disappearances a legal cover.150 The Long March – a walk of protest (and the longest march of its kind in Pakistani history) from Balochistan to Islamabad by disaffected Baloch whose family members had been subjected to enforced disappearances or extra-‐judicial killings – that was scantly covered by global media (and obtained limited coverage in domestic and regional news outlets as well) is another example of the disfranchisement felt by the Baloch people. In October 2013, relatives of missing persons from Balochistan embarked on a 2,000 km peaceful long march.151 The March is being led by representatives of the Voice of Baloch Missing Persons, including a 70-‐year-‐old Mama Qadeer Baloch, whose son was killed during his detention by the military and whose cousin has been missing since 2001, a woman named Farzana Majeed whose brother (a senior BSO member) has been missing since 2009, and the seven-‐year-‐old son of Jalil Reki who was extra-‐judicially killed after a year of disappearance reportedly by ISI.152 According to the VBMP, there have been 19,200 enforced disappearances and over 2,000 dead bodies have been recovered (including that of women and children in the hundreds).153 Majority of the victims hail from Kohlu, Bugti or Marri tribal areas.154 149 “Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013: Govt Puts PPO Into Force”, The Express Tribune, 30 January
2014. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/665234/protection-‐of-‐pakistan-‐ordinance-‐2013-‐govt-‐ puts-‐ppo-‐into-‐force/ 150 “Pakistan: More than 100 Dead Bodies From Three Mass Graves were Found in One District in Balochistan”, Asian Human Rights Commission, 27 January 2014. Available at: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-‐news/AHRC-‐STM-‐023-‐2014 151 “Pakistan: Long March Against Disappearances and Extrajudicial Killings in Balochistan Commences”, Asia Human Rights Commission, 28 October 2013. Available at: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-‐news/AHRC-‐STM-‐195-‐2013 152 Ibid. 153Interview with Mama Qadeer, BBC Urdu radio, 28 February 2014. 154 Ibid.
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The March has been portrayed on Baloch media sites as a democratic protest against state-‐sponsored kidnappings and killings in Balochistan.155 With the inculcation of middle class support to Baloch nationalist movement, including students and (otherwise, secluded) women, the sentiment can be said to have possibly spread deeper into Baloch society – that is, it no longer consists of “the usual suspects.”156 However the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that participants of the Long March were threatened and intimidated by the unknown persons over the phone. Moreover, the federal and provincial governments have “not taken any notice of the Long March and made no effort to assure the participants that they would help in the recovery of the disappeared persons.”157 In the past, VBMP has conducted hunger strikes – which it continues to date – as well as smaller scaled marches. However the organization maintains that GoP had ignored all previous protests.158 It therefore endeavors now to bring its struggle to the notice of the United Nations and the international community at large.159 The perceived role of the GoP and Pakistani Army in perpetuating the status quo through its discriminating policies/actions needs to be addressed and mitigated in order for a political solution to materialize. Inclusive economic policies and overseeing their practical implementation, as well as integrating Balochistan into mainstream politics through greater representation, could work towards this end. The accompaniment of the Chief Minister of Balochistan on the Prime Minister’s maiden visit to China to discuss the expansion of the “economic corridor” between China and Pakistan was a positive step in this regard.160 Given that a significant number of Baloch arguably favor
155 See for example, Monthly Bolan Times, December 2013 and Baloch Samarchar blog. 156 Daily Times editor Rashed Rehman, quoted in Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War", Guardian, 29 March 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐ secret-‐dirty-‐war 157 “Long March Against Disappearances and Extrajudicial Killings in Balochistan Commences”, Statement by Asian Human Rights Commission, 28 October 2013. Available at: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-‐news/AHRC-‐STM-‐195-‐2013 158Interview with Mama Qadeer, BBC Urdu radio, 28 February 2014. 159 Ibid. 160”Nawaz Talks Business on Maiden China Visit”, Express Tribune, 4 July 2013. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/572376/pm-‐nawaz-‐talks-‐business-‐on-‐china-‐visit/
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autonomy, as opposed to independence, and the Baloch nationalist movement is fragmented,161 Islamabad reserves the option to forge a political solution. However, the paradox prevails that while the political elite and the nation appear animated in the debate about a dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban, there appears little or no interest in opening talks with Baloch nationalists.162 Even if advances were made it is unclear if that would provide an answer as some Baloch leaders claim it is “too late” for a political agreement.163 The sentiment among nationalists appears to be suspicious of any true representation even if they did form government. 164 The Baloch youth who feel their voice is being stifled and turning to arms may “now be our only defense.”165 The recent conflagration of sectarianism – particularly in Quetta where the Hazara Shia population is concentrated – is seen as part of the security apparatus’ Islamization policy geared at suppressing nationalistic trends. However, causing sectarian cleavages not only threatens to further attenuate an already frail security situation in the country, but by adding fuel to the Baloch sense of victimization – seeing its relatively secular social fabric threatened and its people targeted via a divide-‐and-‐conquer strategy – these “oppressive policies”166 further alienate the Baloch people. It should be noted, however, that human rights violations are committed on both sides: since the Pakistani military’s attack on celebrated Baloch leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, in August 2006 – that led to the latter’s demise – Punjabi settlers in Balochistan have
161 Frederic Grare, "Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation", Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/11/balochistan-‐state-‐versus-‐ nation/fz4a 162 Ahmed Rashid, “The Untold Story of Pakistan’s Other War”, BBC, 22 February 2014. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-‐asia-‐26272897 163 Harbyair Marri, interview, London, February 2014. 164 Asad Hashim, “Baloch Nationalists Fight Pakistan at Polls”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 5 May 2013. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/201354155123504533.html 165 Asad Hashmi, “Pakistan’s Unending Battle Over Balochistan”, Al-‐Jazeera English, 16 April 2013. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/2013415113250391656.html 166 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, quoted in “Despite Increase in Violence, Balochistan Hopeful of New Govt.: HRCP", The Express Tribune, 25 June 2013. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/568170/despite-‐increasing-‐violence-‐balochistan-‐hopeful-‐of-‐new-‐govt-‐ hrcp/
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increasingly fallen victim to target killing by Baloch extremists.167 This has arguably created an indelible cycle of retaliatory accusations and killings that severely endangers a lasting political reconciliation. The powerful Pakistani army – both military and economic terms – is well equipped to sustain a protracted war in Balochistan. However, it is unlikely that this will serve to wane Baloch nationalism.
While the Baloch insurgency cannot claim a substantial amount of external support, some foreign involvement in the backing of Baloch insurgencies is likely 168 – a prospect enhanced by the receptiveness of the separatist groups in the area. At the same time, there has hitherto been little evidence supporting such assertions. Outside interference or not, overplaying the “foreign hand” card glosses over the reality on the ground, effectively obstructing any political gains to be made by recognizing the Baloch nationalist movement as indigenous in lieu of a peg in foreign proxy wars.
167 “Settlers Caught in Cross Fire”, Dawn, 28 June 2011. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/640059/settlers-‐caught-‐in-‐crossfire-‐2 168 Umar Cheema, “Ex-‐Indian Army Chief Admits Sponsoring Terrorism in Balochistan”, The News, 21 October 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-‐News-‐2-‐209274-‐Ex-‐Indian-‐Army-‐chief-‐ admits-‐sponsoring-‐terrorism-‐in-‐Balochistan; Jonah Blank, RAND Corporation, quoted in Palash Ghoush, "Pakistan's Dirty War in Its Poorest, Most Lawless, But Resource-‐Rich Province", International Business Times, 14 September 2013. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/balochistan-‐pakistans-‐dirty-‐war-‐its-‐ poorest-‐most-‐lawless-‐resource-‐rich-‐province-‐1405620
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