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AD-752 883 CONCEPT FORMULATION STUDY FOR AUTOMATIC INSPECTION, DIAGNOSTIC AND PROGNOSTIC SYSTEMS (AIDAPS). VOLUME II. AIDAPS DESIGN AND TRADE STUDIES

Northrop Corporation

Prepared for: Army Aviation Systems Command September 1972

DISTRIBUTED BY:

National Technical Information Service U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield Va. 22151

r~o

air

9,jAVSCOI •.

EMCINICAL REPORT 72-20

CONCEPT FORMULATION STUDY

FOR AUTOMATIC INSPECTION, DIAGNOSTIC AND

PROGNOSTIC SYSTEMS (AIDAPS) FINAL S.....REPORT- VOLUME II SEPTEMBER 1972 U.S. ARMY AVIATION SYSTEMS COMMAND ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI CONTRACT DAAJ01-71-C.O5P3(P3LJ PREPARED BY NORTHROP CORP, ELECTRONICS DIVISION 1 RESEARCH PARK PALOS VERDES PENINSULA CALIFORNIA 90274 NAATIONAL. 1•UCLINCAL' 11HF /AAIIM W 'TrV'rIcr. \

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribut;on Is unlimited

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PAGES ARE MISSING IN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

NORT 71-Z9-A SEPTEMBER 1972

CONCEPT FORMULATION STUDY FOR AUTOMATIC INSPECTION, DIAGNOSTIC, AND PROGNOSTIC SYSTEM (AIDAPS) FINAL REPORT VOLUME II - AIDAPS DESIGN AND

TRADE STUDIES PART I PREPARED FOR U.S. ARMY AVIATION SYSTEMS COMMAND

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

UNDER -ONTRACT: DAAJO1-71-C-0503 (P3L)

APPOVED BY A. R. VOGEL, CHIEF SYSTEMS STATUS MONITORING GkOUP

-

.- NORTHROP -Fr

CONTENTS PART 1 Section 1.0

INTRODUCTION 1.1 1.2 1.3

2.0

3.0

2-1 Artay Requirements AIMAPS Alternatives Design Considerations AIDAPS Candidate Configurations AIIMPS Configuration Selection AIIMPS Coniiguration Cost Effectiveness Operational Preferences Selected System Cost Effectiveness Conclusions anO Recomendations Recommendations

2-7 2-8 2-8 2-10 2-11 2-11 2-20 2-22 2-32 2-34 3-1

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basis-. Trne altimste SCOIS Of tbe

To realizz- rbe zB=..P cijerzuzre zd 1ordiMe C~jectiw&S is reqf red;:

W al= !MýKcatie

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Ibis report isc~c-cer~ed with autciatic irsDec-tion, PZ-CZstk&equiPnen.

diagm~sti amd

:n the past deceade, =any oaintezaon..e systeý:s hava been

de-.eloped for &:.epurpa.se of aAidig o=aiote~axe action-s. Scoe ofA6these have been~aeal ys Lens., scme have been designed purely for test or troubleshoctizcg pzrposes, and others were developed to sixisfy specific maintenance ..r=ctiozs. The scope of AMIA Systema capabilitiez is more extensive than thest. previ1ozus systens in that it must autenatically perform ii~spection, diagnosis and prcgnosis en a Lc.pIete aircraft. Specific AIDAPS appirikations. are exa~ized for the A!H-l, CH-47, CH-54, CH-6, OH-58, OV-l, VEl-i, U-21, Uri-AS znd ELE aircraft.

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rctpr of 1-Ae 9-I~dp~ 1P-Eb led to the zem~z~.

abrief s==-= S!le he c

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systes e~alved &i

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et:3~fe~l

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sizes do Mota agree

=Magamd syst3

uter

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section 4.0 conta-ins a rewlew of rine t

state of ftbe art ZssOciateA dama callecti=

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zesf ora anis cse

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test ---d maintename

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in Section

dis~cssed in Section 4.0. a series of AMA-1n5 witc fthese ~

cc=-fi&=ati==-, were de7eiooez-ý ror a~yi.~ sj-tess is described in Section 5.0.

zot

!he epra

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poeniause, zad Constrit ofte-~dt

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aracteristics,

~ss tens

apoDear in

Sect!on 6.0. Sectioni 7.0 describes the back~r,,rnd jn-foa2tion re,,nizc. to accannllsh t~je cost effectiveness. ewaltation of the syste=, and Section 8.0 sbois the tLradeoffs accoroIished-.

Section 9.0 describes the effects of the reco~mended

AHi&F System on the operations and costs of the ap~plicable Arry aircraft. 7,ecaase of limitations en the availability of C~

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6.2.2

IM2ACT ON ARMY. MATNTLWINCE AND LOGISTIC PROGRAMS

The general purpose of an AIDAP System is to improve the maintainability and supportability of an aircraft.

Since this objective is identical to the

objectives of the Army programs organized under the Logistic Offensive Program (Section 3.0),

the AIDAPS will enhance their overall achievement.

The employment of an AIDAPS will allow more accurate and iore detailed information to be gathered.

This data, when properly processed, can provide

a realistic basis for the studies, actions and decisions involved in these Army programs.

In addition, AIDAPS can provide basic information required

for experimental and developmental programs for maintenance equipment.

ci

9

1

(_)

Specifically, AIDAPS is a tool by which many of the objectives of the Army

logistics programs can be accomplished.

The contributions AIDAPS can make to these program objectives are listed in Table 6-2.

TABLE 6-2

POTENTIAL IMPACT (O AIDAPS ON ARMY LOGISTIC PROGRAMS Impact

Logistic Program Maintenance Assistance Instruction Team (KM1T)

Improved workload allocation provided by data from the AIDAPS printout Positive diagnosis of malfunctions

Enhanced repair capabilities at lower maintenance levels

Selective Item Management

More accurate TAMMS data from AIDAPS

System (SIMS)

printout Provides data usable for updating

Maintenance Allocation Charts (-AC)

L

More accurate component repair

frequenc ies

More accurate spare parts demand rates Direct Exchange (DX)

Positive diagnosis of malfunctions Fault isolation below module level More accurate aircraft status reports More accurate stockage predictions Spare parts Fuel (from flight time)

1

Standard Army Maintenance Reporting and Management

~

~Subsystems (SAlMS)

Better information for MAC updating More accurate TA1MS data and component usage data uaedt

More accurate reportin)g of operating time More accurate CS3 data

More accurate aircraft status reports Maintenance Support Positive

Diagnostic/prognostic capability to

(MS+)

modular level and belao Positive diagnosis Reduced inspection and troubleshooting

=aintenance man-hour requirements Reduced una.rranted removals aReduced tize change redcr-.t

is

xRedutced ajiicraft caintenance dowent ize

U

6-20

)

010

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6.4

AIDAP OPERATIONAL PREFERENCES This discussion analyzes the major operational factors which affect AIDAP These factors include the ability to deploy and operate

system selection.

aircraft equipped with alternative AIDAP system candidates.

The operational

advantages and disadvantages of each AIDAP system are determined by its operational requirements.

The major differences due to the operational requirements

of the candidate AIDAP system are presented below: a)

The Ground System requires approximately thirty minutes to check out an aircraft.

b)

Flight-rated personnel are required by the Ground AIDAPS to put the aircraft in hover.

This is

in addition to the need to have nonrated persons

k-

to operate the AIDAPS. c)

Safety considerations dictate that the aircraft not be raised beyond ground effect and convention limits the hover to about three feet. since it

conditions,

is

presumed the aircraft is not loaded,

50 percent of rated power could be drawn.

Under these only about

Under such limited loading,

there are many engine and cransmission malfunctions or degradations which would not be revealed.

Examples are malfunctions of the fuel control at

the damage of the compressor,

rated power,

to previoiis foreign object damage,

power turbine or nozzles due

abuse, or wear (shown by high gas

generator output temperature or abnormal fuel flow at approximately rated power),

and wear in the power train.

It

is not reasonable to assume

that an aircraft would be fully loaded before runup and ter; reasonable doubt that the aircraft could be dispatched. evident if d)

i.e., with a

This is particularly

the load consists of personnel.

The complete absence of horizontal motion conceals a series of malfunctions or maintenance requirements which involve the aerodynamic surfaces.

Examples

are low and medium frequency vibrations due to forward air speed over aerodynamic surfaces such as main rotors, stabilizers, e)

If

tail rotors, etc.

nonrazed personncl run up the aircraft, oniy about 20 percent of rated

peoer could be drawn (AR's prohibit the uionrated man from moving the collective from the down/locked position).

L

11I

6-2!a

f)

Further,

if a limited number of AIDAPS are available; weight, balance and

safe lift-off (W, B and SLO) can only be performed once per flight-day. This would be of little

service in operations involving multiple flights,

or those in which the task is pick up a load,

to depart home base,

and deliver that load to a still

The major advantage of the Ground System is less numbers than the number of aircraft it

land at another location,

different location.

its ability to be procured in

services.

If

one Ground System is

procured for five aircraft, a total of 2.5 hours is required to process the AIDAPS daily inspection on all five aircraft.

In addition, unscheduled air-

craft maintenance during flying activities will require its use. With the Hybrid II

_.¢stem,

additional aircraft operation. The tape is

the daily inspections can be accomplished without The tape cartridge is simply removed and replaced.

then processed by the ground portion of this system providing accurate

diagnostic and prognostic indications of the status of the aircraft.

It

estimated that this operation will consume approximately seven minutes.

is The

aircraft will not necessarily be out of service during this time since normal lop

and unload ýtivities can continue.

not required.

In addition,

rated personnel are

The data gathered during the preceding flight provides a much

better data base than can be acquired in a ground runup or short duration flight. Weight,

balance and safe lift-off calculations cannot be performed with this

system. The Hybrid I System has substantially the same operational characteristics as Hybrid II,

except that an onboard status light is provided to indicate the

presence of a malfunction, and air safety data is

provided to the aircraft

warning system. The Airborne System performs the equivalent of the Hybrid I daily inspections ct"

inuously in flight.

A prognostic printout is provided at the end of each

f! ght. Both the Airborne and Hybrid I systems

are capable of accomplishing weight and balance and safe lift-off calcula:ions prior to takeoff. In addition, they

possess the zo=putational capability for providing safety of flight information to a warning systema during flight.

iOL

11

6-25

A situation can occur such that the elapsed time for use of any of the systems might be approximately the same.

If an aircraft has not been flown

for long periods of time, this could result in a special request for a full report on vehicle health which requires a flight just to obtain the information. Under normal circumstances, however, the Airborne or Hybrid I systems would provide this data at liftoff/hover via voice warning to the crew if an incipient failure had occurred in the interim. Table 6-4 presents a summary of the operational advantages and disadvantages of the alternative systems.

The listed environmental factors include Army

doctrinal considerations which enable equipment to "live with the troops" under worldwide environmental extremes throughout the conflict intensity spectrum identified under U.S. Army tasks. is

presented in Table 6-4.

-1.

I

VOL II

6-26

Further discussion of each item

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6.4.1

DEPLOYMENT

The AIDAPS equipment must be capable of worldwide deployment.

Further, the

deployment of the AIDAPS equipped aircraft must be enhanced rather than degraded. All AIDAP systems are capable of this deployment, although costs and transportation requirements are somewhat greater for the ground systems because of their size and weight. 6.4.2

LIGHT, NOISE AND DUST DISCIPLINE

The requirements for concealment .nd constraints.

dispersion are historical battlefield

The most significant requirement influenced by AIDAPS is the

requirement for light, noise and dust discipline.

Most operational aircraft

are committed to missions or standby status during the day.

In addition,

they may be committed to selected missions at night, such as battlefield illumination and surveillance, For this reason, hours when it

it

is

long-range patrol implants and extraction,

etc.

desirable to conduct much maintenance during the twilight

is particularly desirable to avoid noise, dust or light signatures.

The Ground System requires a daily runup and/or hover for inspection purposec. This is avoided by the other three systems since the data recorded on the previous flight constitutes a better test than can be achieved by ground runups or short duration hovers.

This is due to the larger data samples as well as

the high system stresses encountered during wartime or peacetime missions. When a ground runup or hover is required,

the generation of dust, noise and/or

the exposure of light sources at night cannot be eliminated. 6.4.3

TACTICAL DISPERSION

Two modes of dispersion can be considered,

one is

tactical dispersion

wherein the aircraft are deployed to alternate landing areas,

the other is

base dispersion wherein the aircraft are located on or near a single base which provides the logistic support. When aircraft are dispersed for extended periods to alternate landing sites, the ground portions of appropriate AIDAPS muit likewise be dispersed if to fulfill its mission.

(Dispersements of a few days do not require the

accompaniment of the ground based portion of the Hybrid I System.)

VOL II

it

6-29

In the

is

case of a pure ground based system, the total complement of equipment must be For the hybrid systems only a portion of the hardware needs

transported. dispersement.

The ground portion of the AIDAPS hardware becomes easier to

deploy for Hybrid II

and Hybrid I due to the smaller size and weight of the

equipment and its inherent increase in portability.

The Hybrid I system has a

portable unit for display of the information and is

very small,

the three systems to deploy in the field.

In addition,

the easiest of

only one display per

fifteen aircraft is required whereas a ground based system is

required for every

five aircraft. to trans-

For the hybrid systems, an alternative to deploying equipment is

port the tape cartridges and thus maintain a high degree of effectiveness. only degradation is the time associated with troubleshooting.

Alternatively,

the Airborne System maintains full effectiveness at any location. if

The

In addition,

a malfunction warning occurs during flight, the air warning provided by the

Hybrid I and Airborne systems allows pilots to land at the nearest or most suitable maintenance facilities. 6.4.4

BASE DISPERSION

None of the AIDAP systems have any effect upon the requirement to disperse aircraft around a base for concealment or avoidance of concentrated target areas.

However,

such dispersal increases the time required to accomplish

daily inspections or troubleshooting actions for all AIDAP systems except the airborne system.

Dispersal doctrine will, however,

be defined by the tactical

situation. 6.4.5

USAGE

Although all AIDAP systems reduce the total maintenance requirements of an aircraft,

the Ground System requires an additional 15 minutes of aircraft

operating time per inspection or troubleshooting action.

This is accompanied

by the additional aircraft operating cost for this period of time. rated personnel are required for this test. scheduling problems,

VOL II

In addition,

This increases maintenance

especially under dispersed operating conditions.

6-30

6.4.6

MOBILITV

The helicopter has revolutionized battlefield mobility. can now move quickly over and around the battlefield.

Combat coamanders

The ground frontages

that an infantry unit can control have been expanded ten-fold. tactical or air mobility is

Inherent in

a requirement that logistic equipment possesses

the same mobility as a tactical unit being supported.

All AIDAP systems will

enhance aircraft mobility by providing easier maintenance and by improving the ability of the aircraft to operate independently from it: However,

support base.

only the Airborne AIDAP system inherently possesses the same mobill.ty

as the aircraft which it

services.

The Hybrid I System is only slightly less mobile than the Airborne System as it

requires the use of a portable ground display and storage device.

-Hybrid II

System equipment is larger and less portable.

which is designed as normal aerospace ground equipment,

The

The Ground System, is

the least portable of

the three. As an alternative,

the two hybrid systems can employ transportation of

tape cartridges to any AIDAPS equipped field for diagnosit They must,

however,

and prognosis.

be transported to the ground portion dedicated to the

particular aircraft for full prognostic capability. is only as mobile as the aircraft support unit.

The Ground AIDAP System

Either a Ground AIDAPS must

be transported to the aircrafc or the aircraft must be flown to a Ground System if

it

is

to be used at all.

In addition,

the prognostic capability as well as

some diagnostic capability is only applicable on the five aircraft to which each Ground System is dedicated. 6.5

SUMMARY OF AIDAPS OPERATIONAL PREFERENCES The ranking of operational desirability of the candidate AIDAP systems

is as followý.: a)

Airborne System *

VOL II

Superior in all operational factors considered except deployment.

6-31

)) Hybrid I 0

Equal to airborne system in usage,

light, noise and dust discliline

and effectiveness. 4

Inferior to airborne system in tactical and base dispersion and mobility.

0

I

c)

Better than the airborne system in deployment.

Hybrid II 0

Equal to Hybrid I in usage; light, noise and dust discipline, and deployment.

*

Sd)

Inferior to Hybrid I in tactical and base dispersion, mobility and effectiveness.

Ground System *

VOL 11

Inferior to all candidate systems in every respect.

6-32

I

SECTION 7

,II,

7.0

AIDAPS COST EFFECTIVENESS INPUTS

The assessment of the cost eifectiveness of an AIDAP System requires the processing of large amounts of data related to maintenance actions as well as detailed costs.

To accurately process this data, three models were developed

as shown in Figure 7-1.

The AIDAP System Procurement Cost Model develops the

AIDAPS hardware development and procurement costs and certain cost factors The AIDAPS/Aircraft

such as AIDAPS maintenance index and spares requirements.

Maintenance Analysis Model computes the differences in resource requirements between an AIDAPS equipped aircraft ard one without AIDAPS.

The AIDAP System

Cost Benefit Model computes the life cycle costs of the AIDAPS and the savings The sum of and benefits due to the reduced aircraft resource requirements. .-

the cost savings plus the value of the effectiveness benefits less the AIDAPS

life cycle cost equals the net benefits.

The following discussion describes For a complete nwodel des-

the basic cost effectiveness relationships used. cription, see Appendix C. AIDAP SYSTEM COST EFFECTIVENESS RELATIONSHIPS

7.1 7.1.1

AIDAPS PROCUREMENT COSTS, COST FACTORS AND WEIGHTS

The AIDAPS Procurement CosL Model is used to develop cost factors which are dependent upon hardware characteristics and are used as inputs to the AIDAPS life cycle cost.

These fa-tors are divided into tvo groups, those

which show significant variatio1i, t(9

for different AIDAPS and those which are

relatively independent of AIDAPS configuration.

These variable aod constant

cost factors are showa on Figure 7-2.

The configuration dependent cost factors were calculated for the following AIDAPS applications:

AIRCRAFT

UNIQUE AIDAPS

GROUPED AIDAPS

UNIVERSAL AIDAPS

AH-I

Airborne, Hybrid i, Hybrid II, Ground

Group II Airborne Group II Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

CPF-47

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group III Airborne Group III Hybrid I

Basic Airborne + RDAU Basic Hybrid I + RDAU

VOL II

7-1,'_

UNIQUE AIDAPS

AIRCRAFT

GROUPED AIDAPS

UNIVERSAL AIDAPS

CH-54

Airborne, Hybrid I, Hybrid II, Ground

Group III Airborne Group Ill Hybrid

Basic Airborne + RDAU Basic Hybrid I + RDAU

OH-6

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group I Airborne Group I Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

OH-58

Airborne, Hybrid II

Hybrid I

Group I Airborne Group I Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

OV-I

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group II Airborne Group II Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

UHLI

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group II Airborne Group II Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

U-21

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Groun

Group II Airborne Group II Hybrid I

Basic Airborne Basic Hybrid I

HLH

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group III Airborne Group III Hybrid

Basic Airborne + RDAU Basic Hybrid I + RDAU

UTTAS

Airborne, Hybrid I Hybrid II, Ground

Group III Airborne Group III Hybrid

Basic Airborne + RDAU Basic Hybrid I + RDAU

The cost factors for the above systems were computed from the following con::iderations: DDTE

-

Comparison with similar programs, particularly the UH-I Test Bed, and Army Flight Safety System program.

Sensors

-

Detailed list of sensors required plus manufacturers' quotes.

Installation

-

Detailed cost estimate of material and man-hours required using standard cost estimating procedures.

Hardware

-

Comparison with similar programs for similar equipmeat. Modified by complexity factors associated with each AIDAPS configuration and aircraft application.

Maintenance Index

-

Developed from design reliability figures of similar equipment degraded by field experience.

VOL 11

7-2

` 8 i2 ca 4

A-

so

1

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H~ C4

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0

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HH

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UO

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-3

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0

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-

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VOL 11

7-4

Spares

-

Based on maintenance and equipment condemnation races, 120 days initial supply plus replenis~eint spares.

Operations

-

Based on maintenance index and consumables.

For the cost estimates of the AIDAP systems,

see paragraph 7.3.

AIDAPS/AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS MODEL

7.1.2

This model has the following basic inputs for each maintenance task which is

(9

influenced by AIDAPS:

a)

Frequency

b)

Task duration (time)

c)

Number of men required

d)

Frequency reduction due to AIDAPS

e)

Time reduction due to AIDAPS

f)

Reduction in number of men required due to AIDAPS

(crew size)

The means by which the maintenance tasks are selected are described in paragraph 7.2,

and the input data for all aircraft are contained in Appendix C.

The formulas used for calculating the man-hour savings are shown in Figure frequency,

7-3.

This figure also shows the particular maintenance parameter,

time,

and number of maintenance men which are affected by AIDAPS for each basic

maintenance task.

An AIDAPS set can reduce the frequency of unwarranted remov-

als and scheduled removals. intermediate,

It

is also possible that the frequency of daily,

and periodic inspections can be reduced.

AIDAPS can only perform a part of these inspections,

However,

since the

this study assumed that

the only inspection items accomplished by AIDAPS would be eliminated, reducing the inspection time but not the frequency.

The time required,

thus as

well as the number of men required for troubleshooting, also can be reduced. Only on• man is required to read the AIDAPS printout, while frequently two or more men are required for conventional troubleshooting. *,rue when engine run-up is required.

VOL II

7-5

This is particularly

AIDAPS FUNCTION

MAINTENANCE ACTION

INSPECTION

INSP

FREQUENCY

MAINTENANCE PARAMETERS TIME

NO. OF MEN

TROUBLE

DIAGNOSIS

SHOOTING UNWARRANTED REMOVALS

SCHEDULED PROGNOSIS

REOVALS

AIRCRAFT WITHOUT AIDAPS FREQ.

x TIME x NO.

OF MEN

-

MANHOURS WITHOUT AIDAPS

AIRCRAFT WITH AIDAPS (FREQ.-DFREQ.)x(TIME

-

DTIME) x (NO.

MEN-DMEN)

MANHOURS WITH AIDAPS EQUALS

SAVINGS IN MAWIOURS

FIGURE 7-3

VOL II

MODEL LOGIC RESOURCE CALCULATIONS

7-6

In addition to maintenance man-hours,

the following maintenance factoro

(resources) are also affected. a)

Aircraft downtime (availability)

b)

Number of LRU's packaged and shipped to higher echelons for benchchecks

c)

N'mber of LRU's packaged and shipped to depot for overhaul

d)

Number of aircraft accidents

e)

Number of mission aborts

The 'ife are

cycle value of the reduction in the preceding maintenance factors

nompvited in the AIDAP System Cost/Benefit Model.

7.1.3

AI)AP SYSTEM COST/BENEFIT MODEL

This model accepts t!" inputs from the AIDAPS Procurement Cost Model and computes the AIDAPS life cycle cost. on Table 7-1.

The cost elements computed are shown

It also accepts the zcsource savings from the AIDAPS/Aircraft

Maintenance Analysis Model and computes the aircraft life cycle savings using the same methodology, life cycle costs.

t,

Appendix C.

and same computer program as is used for the AIDAP sysThe formulation of the cost elements is described in

The cost items affected by the outputs of the AIDAPS/Aircraft

Maintenance Anaisis Mode] are shown below: Cost Item Affected

Resource Saving

1

jMaintenance

Man-hours

Personnel Costs

Packaging & Shipping

Logistic Support Costs

Number of O,ýrhauls

Depot Labor & Material

Number of Accidents

Accident Costs

In addition to the actual cost savings, parameters are also influenced.

These parameters are:

a)

Aircraft downtime (availability)

b)

Aircraft abort rates

c)

Aircraft av'erage payloads

VOL 11

certain aircraft effectiveness

7-7

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pertinent maintenance data from the 370 character DA Form 2410 were extracted These data were transcribed into a standardized data

from the raw TAMMS data.

format to allow compilation of the data on a common basis.

In addition, all

identically reported individual records were summarized to a single record with the reported units and man-hours summed Lo reduce the number of records to be processed. In accordance with procedures outlined in TM 38-750, only certain maintenance activities associated with a specific identifiable component require identification of the component by its federal stock number (FSN) or its manufacturer's part number.

However,

in order to accumulate the total maintenance all other maintenance activities require

history against a particular component, this component identification.

Since the data were accumulated over an exten-

sive period of time, a number of different Federal Stock Numbers (FSN) were used to identify a single component type because of product improvement, erent manufacturers,

etc.

diff-

Also included in the data base were maintenance

actions containing erroneous FSN's.

To correct these three conditions,

two

procedures were used depending upon the number of data records received for a specific type, model, 7.2.1.2

and series aircraft.

Records Without a Reported FSN

All data records,

regardless of record count,

punched onto standard IBM key punch cards.

not containing a FSN were

Using the nomenclature as a guide,

these records were matched to data with FSN's and the appropriately identified FSN was manually added to these records.

System codes were developed to allow

accumulation of the reported maintenance data that could not be identified to a specified component.

A miscellaneous service code was added for those

records which could not be identified, accomplished

This was

in order to retain all reported maintenance labor performed

on a particular type, model, 7.2.1.3

even to a system level.

series (Il.)

aircraft.

Components With Several Reported FSN's

Maintenance records were punched onto standard IBM key punch cards for those components with maintenance records which were within the capability of

VOL II

7-12

of manual processing.

The appropriate -35P's manuals (Direct Support, General

Support and Depot parts) were consulted to acquire the most recently valid FSN being used.

All other reported FSN's for the same component were then manually

changed to this FSN to allow development of the total maintenance history for this component. For TMS aircraft with a large amount of reported maintenance records, a single IBM card was punched with the reported FSN; the valid FSN was then manually added to this card.

Correction of the reported FSN to the valid

FSN was then accomplished through use of a conversion program written for the IBM 360 computer. 7.2.1.4 *

Records With Erroneous Reported FSN's

These records were punched either in their entirety, or as a conversion If

card depending on total record count. to a valid FSN,

the nomenclature could be identified

this FSN was manually added to the card or cards.

record could not be identified to a specific FSN, it Federal Stock Class (FSC) as reported,

If

the

w.s .identified to the

or to the syst=m code if

identifiable

to that level by the reported nomenclature. 7.2.1.5

DA Form 2410 Records

A number of records existed for a specific maintenance action, depending on the level of repair and the number of copies of the basic 2410 Form that may have been transmitted to the TAMMS data center. tj

For this rt-ason,

the

Form 2410 document control number was usea to identify the occurrence of a maintenance activity.

Pertinent data from each of the various records con-

taining the same document control number were then transcribed to a single record.

This procedure was accomplished through use of a computer program.

A survey of these composite DA Form 2410 records revealed that man-hour requirements had not been included,

and that action taken codes and/or malfunction

codes were missing in different proportions from many of them.

It was there-

for- necessary to transcribe these records onto IBM key punch cards for correcti,±ns and additions.

The percentage of action taken code to the total number

.eCpc:ted was determined.

VJL II

Each type of reported action taken code was then

7-13

manually added to the remaining records in this same proportion.

An estimate

in man-hours for each action taken category was determined based on previous experience on like components,

personal knowledge or similarity to other com-

ponents with a known maintenance history. manually added to the punched cards.

These man-hour values wre also

No attempt was made to add failure code3

to the records without such codes, as there was no justifiably valid manner to make such corrections. 7.2.1.6

Depot Level Maintenance Requirements

To satisfy the basic maintenance data requirements of the AIDAPS study, it

was necessary cc extract depot level requirements from the total mainten-

ance data base.

This was accomplished by using the Directory of Authorized

Support Organizations to identify specific depot codes.

The maintenance data

identified with these codes were extracted from the DA Form 2407 data. similar procedure was used with the DA Form 2410 data; however, did not,

A

these data

in all cases, contain the organizations associated with the main-

tenance recorded.

In these cases,

were consulted to determine,

the Maintenance Allocation Charts (MAC)

by reported component, which maintenance activi-

2ies involved depot participation.

By using the action taken codes,

depot

level requirements were identified and manually coded on the key pLnch card. These depot cards were separately accumulated and removed from the basic maintenance data base to allow development of the maintenance requirements consistent 7.2.1.7

4ith the naintenance levels identified in FM 101-20.

Man-Hour Per Flight Hour (MH/FH) Determi:-ation

With the maintenance data base for each TMS aircraft completed,

the main-

tenance analysis computer program was exercised using the aircraft flight hours reported for the data time period.

Initial results reflected MH/FH values

lower than what should normally be expected.

An aircraft serial number count

indicated fewer aircraft than were reflected with the reported flight hours. As a result,

a computer program was developed which extracted the flight hours

associated with the basic DA Form 2408-3 records.

This was accomplished by

taking the ficsL reported record and the last reported record for each aircraft .-d determining the individual aircraft cumulative flight hours.

VOL II

7-14

)

In addition, a maintenance record count was made by aircraft serial number. The number of records reported and the total flight hours were compared for each aircraft.

In those instances where the number of reported records indi-

cated incomplete maintenance data, based on the =eported flight hours for the same aircraft, the flight hours were igrored but the maintenance data was retained because the negligible bias to the data base did not justify the effort involved to extract the data.

The adjusted flight hours were then

summed for all legitimate aircraft serial numbers and used as the flight hour base for the maintenance data assembled.

The resulting direct man-hours per

flight hour obtained compared favorably with those published in FM 101-20. 7.2.2

UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

An AIDAP system has the capability of inspecting an aircraft, either on the ground or in the air, of diagnosiing the status of the aircraft systems and compornents,

and of predicting the remaining time to failure of systems

and/or components (prognosis). To determine the impact of these capabilities upon maintenance, a detailed analysis of maintenance data is necessary.

This analysis is conducted in three

major steps: a)

Candidate components for monitoring are selected from rank ordered component lists.

b)

The detailed maintenance records are examined for maintenance actions which can be affected by AIDAPS and appropriate data transcribed to the work sheets.

c)

The results of the examination are transferred from the work sheets to the computer input format sheets.

,.2.2.1

Candidate Components

Table 7-3 shows a portion of a listing of CH-54A components and general aircraft maintenance actions rank ordered by maintenance man-hours.

Similar

listings are available with the components rank ordered by maintenance frequency and job average.

Job average

is the average number of man-hours con-

sumed per maintenance action.

VOL 11

7-15

-

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The candidate components are coded onto a computer input format sheet (see Table 7-4), along with their Federal Stock Number, and are assigned a J and K index which is used by the computer to identify each component. J index is

The

the functional group to which the component belongs, and the K index

is arbitrarily assigned. Table 7-5 shows an example of the detailed printout of the CE-54 engine maintenance data.

It

shows the maintenance rate per 1000 flying hours for each

type of maintenance action, the man-hours expended per 1000 flying hours for each maintenance action, "INDEX", "AVG",

the average manhours per action (job average)

and the percentage of total actions due '-

:t particular type of malfunction.

The actions which can be substantially eliminated by AIuAPS are circled, and those which can be reduced are marked with an X. The primary benefits of AIDAPS are: a)

Reduction or elimination of "Unwarranted Removals" coded as "No Defect." These codes am found under Remove/Replace,

A, L and R.

"No Defect Removals"

are considered unwarranted removals. b)

Elimination of Scheduled Removals "SR".

Incorporation of "On Condition

Maintenance" will eliminate the necessity of periodic removals for overhaul or inspections.

"No Defect--Removed Time" and "No Defect Rmvd Scheduled"

are considered scheduled removals. c)

Reduction of the incidence of airborne failures.

Specifically,

codes such as Flameout, Slow Acceleration, Surged,

(-)

Bearing Failure,

Seized, Burned and Overheats,

estimated overall 10 percent. 0.128 and 10 percent thereof is

failure

Internal Failure,

can be reduced by an

The sum of these codes under Code A is .013.

This is summed with the Unwarranted

Lemovals. d)

The reduction or elimination of the "On Aircraft" tests and checks.

These

actions are listed under "Checked" and "Tested (J)" and the "Checked, Service (P)" subcodes thereunder.

Additional diagnostic time can be found

under the item "Checked, Serviceable so the job average is

VOL

II

(Code A)."

This code is a shop code,

inserted into Table 7-7 under MHBC (bench check).

7-17

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With regard to automatic inspections,

538.3

=

is

important to note that the

essentially continuous inspections which are perform-ed by the hybird or airborne AIDAPS will yield information about the condition of a component or subsuperior to the information which can be secured by a "cold

system that is

aircraft" inspection or even a ground runup.

7.2.4

WEIGHT AND CENTER OF GRAVITY CAICUATIONS

During the course of the study, it

was recognized that the computational

capabilities of the AIDAP system could be used to accomplish the wiight and balance calculations presently done by hand.

AMRDL efforts in

support consideration of this technique for AIDAPS. Flight Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, accidents on liftoff

this area

Personnel at the Army

estimated that at least 50% of the

were due to an unbalanced load or an attempt to lift

load greater than that allowed by the ambient altitude-temperature

off a

conditions.

Many of these accidents can be prev nted by a timely warning of excessive locations outside the acceptable limits.

weight or c,3.

Airborne AIDAP systems can provide such warning if instrumented.

appropriately calculations

In

addition,

The Hybrie I and

the alighting gear is

the time required to perform the

can be greatly shortened.

The number of accidents which could be eliminated were calculated in the accident study. be eliminated.

Considerably less than 50% of the pilot caused actions could Many accidents due to weight and c.g. are coded as "rotor struck

object" or similar notations.

Since the number of such codings which were really

weight and balance problems is

unknown,

only the accidents actually listed as

weight and balance problems were used.

VOL II

7-29

7.2.5

AIDAPS W-S

ACCURACY

"he differences in the monitoring actions of the various AIDA?_S config;.nm tions result in diffezent levels of effectiveness in the performance The monitoring of a

of autmatic inspection, diagnosis and prognosis.

component varies fron continuous sampling for the Airborne and Hybrid I system, through a six-second saiple every three minutes for the Hybrid i-, to a fiveminute sample once a day for the Ground system.

In order to quantify this

effect, Northrop has introduced the concept of "test accuracy, TA'V and defined it as "a measure of the probability that an AIDAP! will recognize that a malfunction or degradation exists if a malfunction or degradation actually does exist, and, conversely, will recognize that a malfunction or degradation does not exist when a malfunction or degradation does not actually exist."

follows that I-TA is either the probability that a

Further, it

malfunction or degradation will be indicated when no malfunction or degradation exists or the probability that a malfunction or degradation will not be correctly recognized when they do exist.

The first condition may be called the

"false alarm" probability, and tre second condition may be called the '"miss" probability.

The TA then becomes the "detection" probability.

These terms

are shown graphically in Figure 7-4. Test Accuracy is

directly related to the data sampling schedule since

deleterious events may occur during periods of nonobservation. would leave permanent,

all events

AIDAPS-discernible traces, a malfunction or degradation

would always be discovered upon the next sampling, period.

If

In such an instance,

irrespective of the time

the test accuracy would be the accuracy of the

instrumentation and the test accuracy would be the same for the Airborne, Hybrid I,

Hybrid II and Ground Based systems.

All events do not leave

discernible traces, however, although they can be important to inspection and of even greater importance to diagnosis and prognosis. The TA, the "confidence factor" is,

therefore,

composed of accuracy of

instrumentation and the probability of missing an event which would leave no trace.

In actual practice,

to which AIDAPS is

the failure and degradation modes of each component

applied will be known, and a TA will have to be computed

or measured so limits and decision levels can be established.

VOL II

7-30

However,

as an

)

EVEMNT OCCURRED? NO

YES [! DEETOFASALRI YESSPROB.

PROB.

I

EVENT DETECTED?

Ll

TA.

FIGURE 7-4

DEFINITION OF TEST ACCURACY

input to the cost effectiveness models of this study, a generalized Test Accuracy was necessary.

In examination of the printout for each component,

in the manner described in paragraph 7.2.2 and in subordinate paragraphs, the assumption of perfect performance in inspection, diagnosis and prognosis was initially assumed; i.e., on aircraft inspections, and scheduled and

()

unwarranted removals would be eliminated for any component to which AIDAPS was applied.

-his ideal situation, in reality, would not exist and the actual

performance would be degraded by some factor which reflects the uncertainty of the decisions, the Test Accuracy, TA. The determination of TA for each component is beyond the scope of a concept formulation study.

However, the method which is described in the

following paragraphs was used to determine the necesspry factor for the models.

VOL II

7-31

Components of TA

7.2.5.1

is a function

The failure to detect a malfuaction or degradation (1-TA)

of the systemic errors and errors due to the frequency of data acquisition. These are composed of the following: 7.2.5.1.1

Systemic Errors (with estiz-xes of realizable accuracies)

a)

Transducer or sensor errors (±0.5 to ±1.0%)

b)

Conversion error (±0.2%)

c)

Aliasing errors (0.5%)

d)

Computational errors (±1.8%)

-

The digital computation circuitry is essentially error free, but the computation of a quantity in which each ot the factors have an error will result in a possible error in that quantity which is errors of the factors.

the RSS value of the

the quantity is ,.omposed of five factors,

if

each of

which has a possible ±0.8% error, the computational error would be a possible .

=

1.8%.

The systemic error would then be the RSS of the error elements or approximately ± v44.17 = ±2.1%. controlling factor.

It

can b

seen that the computational error is

the the

In order to approximate a "worst case" condition,

(Section 4.2.5 discusses

following computations assume a systemic error of 5%. sensor and system accuracies.) 7.2.5.1.2

Frequency-.of-Sampling Errois - Since Lhe Airboine and Hybrid I con-

figurations sample essentially continuously, there is an event will be missed.

However,

possibility that

little

the Hybrid I. and the Ground configuration

can experience considerable degradation of data due to missed events; i.e., events which leave no discernible trace.

This is

shown graphically in

Figure 7-5 where the "A" type event results in a permanent condition which can be discovered at any subsequent time,

and the "E" type event is

recoverable condition which leaves no trace. sampling periods of the Hybrid II

the

.je~use of the relatively short

and Ground systems,

it

can be shown that

the probability of a Type B event being recognized by the Ground system is virtually zezo, and only about one in nine forthe Hybrid II

system.

(It

is

assumed that a Type B failure would occur for a 15-20 second duration in flight before returning to normal.) That is, the miss probability is 100% for the Ground system and about 88% for the Hybrid II system. VOL II

7-32

B

PARAMETER

TIME

T1ME FIGURE 7-5

TYPES OF MALFUNCTIONS

Estimate of a Numerical Value for TA

7.2.5.2

In order to estimate a value for the possible degradation of the instrumentation data, the parameter list for the UH-l was examined and for each parameter an estimate was made of the relative frequency of the Type "A" to assuming the parameter I-ad experienced

the Type "B" occurrences.

That is,

100 meaningful excursions,

how often would it

leave a permanent trace (Type A)

or leave no trace (Type B). While the concern of AIDAPS is with the behavior of the components of the aircraft,

(9

test accuracy must be determined via the parameters.

Decisions which

are made about a component can only be based upon the observation of the associated parameters of that component with full knowledge of the degree of uncertainty in the observation; i.e., TA. These estimates and a brief rationale for each estimate are given in Table 7-10.

To illustrate, consider items 15 and 16.

In the case of item 15,

fuel

flow may surge due to malfunctions of the fuel control or due to improper It also may be less than normal due to reduced fuel pressure.

operacion. Therefore,

it

was estimated that 50% of tne excursions would be of Type "A"

and 50% would be of Type "B".

In the case of item 16,

it

was judged that

reduced fuel pressure would ususally be due to worn fuel pump parts and, therefore, would be 90% of Type "A" and only 10% of Type "B".

VOL II

7-33

The "A's" and "B's" were summed and divided by the total t-umber of parameters to determine average values for "A" and "B":

A

=

A average

=

42.9/63

=

68%

ZB

=

B average

=

20.1/63

=

32%

r

r The estimation of the relative values of A and B for each parameter was performed completely independently by three engineering specialists who wl.re all knowledgeable regarding AIDAPS and the UH-I. in the A/B value for some parar.teters,

While there wcre some differences

the average values for "A" and "B" were

as follows:

Specialist I

A

68%

B

32%

Specialist II

A

71%

B

29%

Specialist III

A

68%

B

=

=

32%

Combining the instrumentation or systemic errors, the "miss probability" due to short sampling and the average of values "A" and "B" yields the following tabulation: AiLrborne

Hybrid I

Hybrid 11

Ground

32 x 88% = 28.2

32 x 100%

Errors due to "miss"

0

C

Systemic errors

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

33%

37%

Test Accuracy (TA)

95%

95%

67%

63%

Test Accuracy used for all costs/benefits eva luat ions

95%

95%

80%

75%

Total Errors (1-TA)

In the operation of the cost benefits models,

Paragraph 8.3.4

discusses the senbitivity of the models to variation in TA tor inCpection,

7-34

32

TA values )f 80% for the Hybrid II

systeiii and 75% for the Ground system were actually employed.

diagnosis and prognosis.

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•HY•.,---. BRID II 20

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

- 10

'. -20.

• '

-30 -L u•

•:•FIGURE

8-5

m • • AH-1 SYSTEM NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED

(STANDARD CONDITIONS)

18-12

• m

• m

40

30

4.9 YEARS BREAK EVEN POINT AFTER PROGRAM INITIATION

/ /

z/ 1-4

20 4-2.4-YEARS A.T I,/ FL EET

g_ m

[~NSTALLATIOb

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3

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10

11

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YEARS

D&0

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FIGURE 8-6

VOL

i1

0 YEARS OPERATION

1 YEAR PROCURE4ENT

All-I HYBRID IJUNIQUE AIDAP SYSTEM TIME PHASED PROGRAM COST, SAVINGS & BENEFITS (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-13

-

Figures 8-7 and 8-8 show the effects of a 20-hour aircraft utilization on net savings.

The total 10-year net savings are reduc-d from $37 million to

$17.5 million and the break-even point is

increased from 2.4 years to 4.1 years.

Figure 8-9 shows the effect of varying aircraft utilizatioi, on system net savings.

The standard estimate achieves a $37 million savings.

The expected

utilization based on periods of tension, but no Vietnam size conflict is 40 flying ho.rs per month.

This achieves a net savings of approximately $57 million.

Thie combat environment (70 flying hours per month) yields a savings of nearly $140 million.

V8. VOLJ

8-14

20 HYBRID I

15

itz

AIRBORNE

5

•- 0 0 -

06 10

20

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED ,

z

U

GROUND BASED ......

HYBRID II

-15

-20.

-25 FIGURE 8-7

AH-I SYSTEM NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION -

VOL II

8-15

20 FLT HRS/MO

22 20 'd -

/

6.6 YEARS BREAK POINT' AFTEREVEN PROGRAM

18 1o

/

.a 16 16INITIATION

/

$1

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741

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10 YEARS OPERATION

-18_ Drlr&E

S4-

FIGUIE 8-8

VOL l1

1 YEAR PROCUREMENT

AH-I HYBRID I UNIQUE AIDAP SYSTEM1 - TIME PHASED PROGRAM COST, SAVINGS & BLNFFITS (AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION = 20 FLT HRS/MO) 8-1b

14

/

140

120

0

C

80-C

6

z

20 •co

n

40

20

0

20

60

40

80

100

UTILIZATION (lIRS/MO) FIGURE 8-9

VOL If

NET SAVINGS VS AIRCRAFT AH-1 HYBRID I - SYSTLN OPERATION) UTILIZATION (10 YEA-'.

8-17

8.1 .22

C*-47 Tradeoffs

Figures 8-1O through 8-15 present the sane type of cata as was presented ior the A!S-1 and the sae coents It

apply.

See paragraph 8.1.2.1.

shou!d be noted that all AmA? syste=s achieve greater effectrF:eness oa-

this =ore conplex a-ircraft and the cost effectiveness of the Airborre and H--fbrid ! sVste-s is

substantiallv equal.

The break-ever point under the standard

conditions is 2.1 years (Figure 8-15) Figure 8-16 and 8-17 show the effects of a 30 flying hour per month utilization.

""b

'zui

I

bl

NET

M~T SAVINGS

!0 061

OXk-P,.MER) -

300

AIRBORNE ---

400020.0 -

H

ID 1

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r=3500

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1000 '-4

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20

30

40

50

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

SFIGIURF

VOL I I !

ý-I0

CH-47 PFPSONNEL SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS) 8-19

60

AIRWOR.ZL.E &HYBRID

I

15

01

S~HYBRI

D !I

S~GROUND

1

20

BASED

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS M0ONITORED 8-11

SFICUrRE LOCWiSTICS

SAVINGS VS COMPON.ENTS MONITORED (STANDARD

Vol.

,

8-20

CONDITION)

6

5

Z -...

& HYBRID I

- -AIRBORNE

o~4

L' :1

ZO

3

3

HYBRID II

( ' 0-

GROUND BASED

z <

0

10

30

20

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED FIGURE 8-12

VOL II

CH-47 ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-21

35. AIRBERNE 7HYBRID I

30 6

25HYBRID II <

ii

GROUND

-

S20-

r.jzz 0

400

~ 0

~

15

3

lo 0 z 5-.

0

0 10

20

30

40

50

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

FIGURE 8-i

rih-47 EFFECTI'-

'IRCRAFT VS COMPONENTS MONITORED

":_,DARi, CONDITIONS) VO-1I

-22

60

60. HYBRID I

50

AIRBORNE

40

GROUND

30 o.•

11

20HYBRID

0

O0

0 U)

z

10

4:

10

E46

CA

V>4

50 40 30 20 NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

60

-10

- 20-

-30 FIGUI•E 8-14

VOL II

CH-47 SYSTEM NET SAVINGS I'S COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-23

50

40

o•

4.6 YEARS BRFA1C EVEN POINT

AFTEP PROGRAM INITIATION 30 C-42.1 Pd

YEARS

~AFTER FLEETNTLTIr, 20TLLTO

I

/

10

/ /

-10

u

DDT&E/

-20

-10

YEARS OPERATION

1 YEAR PROCUREMENT FIGURE 8-15

VOL I1 4--2

CH-47 HYBRID I UNIQUE AIDAP SYSTEM TIME PHASED PROGRAM COST, SAVINGS & BENEFITS (STANYDARD CONDITIONS)

8-24

I 110 100

HYBRID I

90 S80

z 0

70_

,.4,-J

HYBRID II

60.

GROUND BASED m

40

30 S20 z

O

10 um

0

-1020

-20

30

40

NUMBER OF COMPONENTrS MONITORED50

-3o FICURE 8-15

CII-47 SYSTM NET SAVINGS & BENEFITS 3NE-T UTILIZATION a 30 FLT HRS/MO)

MONITORED (AIRCRAFT

VOII8-25 SVOLAl

-Smmmm

60

A100

"o S0

,

3.6 YEARS-BREAK EVEN POINT AFTER PROGRAM INITIATION

1

0

.

2

W

60-

,

401.1 YEARS AFT ER FL EET INSTALLATION

0&'

/

;2

20-

'Iz

0

op n 1/

2 3 I'

0

5'5

6' !

7

18

9'

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A1

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18 MO 20-2DIYII&E

PROC, 10 YEURS OPERATION -40 FIGURE 8-17

VOL II

CH-47 HYBRID I UNIQUE AIDAP SYSTEMI TIME PHASED PROGRAM SAVINGS & BENEFITS (AIRCRAFr ULTILIZATION - 30 FLT HRS/MO)

8-26

13 14

8.1.2.3

CH-54 Tradeoffs

Figures 8-18 through 8-28 show the effects of applying the Unique AIDAP System candidates to theCH-54 fleet.

Figures 8-18 fhrough 8-21 indicate that

there are significant savings in manpower,

logistics, and accident as well as

a significant increase in the aircraft effectiveness.

However,

Figure 8-22

shows that the net savings after subtracting AIDAPS development,

investment and

operating costs, are very small for the Airborne and Hybrid I systems and are negative (net loss) for the Hybrid II

and Ground Systems.

Further, Figure 8-23

indicates the break-even point is almost nine years after the investment funds are expended.

The reason for the low net benefits is

the low number of aircraft

in the CH-54 fleet and the resulting high cost of prorating the DDT&E cost fo: a unique AIDAPS across this small fleet.

( 4

The AIDAPS developmental cost is

approximately $6.5 million for the Hybrid II across 75 aircraft,

system.

If'this is distributed

the result is almost $90,000 per aircraft.

Obviously, an

AIMJP system designed and developed uniquely for the CH-54 is not an economically viable program.

Figures 8-24 through 8-28 show the sensitivity of cost savings

and benefits for the CH-54 as a function of aircraft utilization. savings to be achieved,

the aircraft utilization must be approximately 10

flying hours per month or more.

V

1

For net

N~r COST SAVINGS 5 2800

-.

1.5

20

240D0

HY4RID Ii 0OU

1.0

1

410

10

0.5

~

1200

0

800

z 4000

NUMBR~ OF COPNET

FIGURE 8-18 VOL(STANDARJD VOL i~8

-28

MONITORED

CH-54 PER~SONNEL~ SAVINGS VS CO4PONEUTS MONITORED CONDITIONS)

2.8

2.81AiIRBORNE

0'

2 HYBRID I

S2.0

1.6

1.2 z

F-.

w 5

0.

1020

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED FIGURE 8-19

VOL It

CH-54 LOGISTICS SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-29

70

1.401

1.20

SAflrORNE

&HYNID

I

S1.00z

b-4

S0

.8

HB

=-7

IDI1

ol

0"

.6 .400 2

2

L" .20.

0

10

20

30

40

50

'50

NUMBER OF COMPONEN1TS MONITORED FIGURE 8-20

VOL II

CH-54 ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS CCMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-30

70

12 1Li.

0

0

z

10MBER

FIGURE 8-21

VOL II

OF COMONENITS MONITORED

6

CH-54 INCREASE IN EFFECTIVE AIRCRAPT VS COM1PONENTS M0NITRED (STANDARD CCtNDITICINS)

-3

IHMI DI

so

20

30

SNLQ

OF-BCR C'

40

50 -W. S NONITORED

L

70 '

-4

<

HYBRID Il

I!

-10.

FIGUPE 8-22

VOL II

CH-54 SYSTEMS NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-32

YEARS

=10.9

0.

E&EA

-

IAFTER

EWE-% ?oi~rl -PROC.LkAf 1L'-7Y!ATION YEARS

28-4

-

I_-7-

'1

1-2

<

FL--T

4

3

5

7

6

8

9

10

11

12

YEARS

z

-4

.

u

Z.

S18

-1

SCIGURE

SVol,

mO DDT& E

•-I

SI

8-23

if

10 YEARS OPERATION

YEAR PROCURFE1EN--

CH-54 HYBRID IUNIQUEAIDAPSYS-E24 TIME PHASED PROGRAM COST, SAVINGS & BENEFITS (STANDARD COND1IYIONS)

8-33

13

3.5 45

3-0

40.

z 0

35

7-

2.5

-i

22 1.0

,--30 z

.1.5

5

x

5

zz

0

10 UTILIZATION -AIRCRAFT

FIGU'RE 8-24

VOL 11

CH-54 HYBRID I PERSONNIEl

8-34

20

30

FLIGHT HOURS PER MONTH SAVINGS VS AIRCRAFT I" TILIZATTON

z0

F.-

0

>" 0

P-4

z 24-

L)

83

VOL

11TILIZATION FIGURE 8-25

V

2b

10

0

-AIRCRAFT

30

FLIGRf HOURS PER MNT~H

CH-54 HYBRID I LOGISTICS SAVINGS VS AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION

3 z

0 -/3

).a

0 C-)

z

0

3-4 02

o

a UF

0OL0 UTILIZATION FIGURE 8-26

VOL II

-

20 AIRCRAF'P FLIGHT HOURS PER MONTH

30

CH-54 HYBRID I ACLIDENT SAVINGS VS AIRCRAFT'. UTILIZATION

8-36

10:

7 9

8

/

6

75 -

F

6

0

o

4

3

z

3

z

2

-

V1 1

0

FIGURE 8-27

VCL

1l

10 20 30 UTILI7ATION - AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS PER MONTH CH-54 HYBRID I INCRFASE IN EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT VS AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION

8-37

14

12

to

z/

0

6

z E-4 (n)

z 2;

>4

0 20

10 FIGURE 8-28

VOL II

30

CH-54 HYBRID I SYSTDIJ NEt SAVING VS AIRCPAFT UTILIZATION

8-38

q.: .2.4

OH-6 Tradeoffs

Figures 8-29 through 8-33 show the results of applying the candidate AIDAP sytemrs to the Oit-6 aircraft.

Since this is

a lightweight,

s.mple, and rela-

tive~y inexpensive aircraft, the savings achieved per aircraft are smaller then for tkae heavier =re ccmplex aircraft.

For instance,

Figure 8-29 shows that

the savings in canpower achieved by the ground system never quite equal the acditicna. manpower required for operation and maintenance of the AIDAP Ground Systen.

Figure 8-30 shows that neither the Ground nor the Hybrid II AIDAPS

achieve savings 4n logistic costs sufficient to equal the logistics costs of the Hybrid I and Airborne syste-us do

supporting these AIDAP systems.

However,

achieve some logistics savings.

Likewise, neither the Ground System nor the

IFy rid II systems achieve accident savings.

This is

due to their lack of an

zIrwarning capabiiity. Figure 8-32 shows that the increase in aircraft effectiveness barely compentsates for the additional weight installed in

the aircraft.

Hence,

savings as shown on Figure 8-33 never achieve a positive value.

the net

Altho•igh the

application of a non-unique system may reduce the AIDAPS development and procurement cost- sufficiently to achieve slightly positive savings,

it

is apparent

that these savings will probably not be sufficient to justify procurement of a device which would justify the automatic inspection and prognisis generic classification.

Figures 8-31 and 8-32 indicate that an extremely simple,

device, dedicated primarily to reducing accidents,

lightweight

but capable of inspection and

diagnosis for s very few components may be cost effective.

Consideration of such

a non-automatic and non-prognostic device is beyond the scope of this study.

VCM.

it

8-39

NET COST SAVINGS ($ 106) (MANPOWER) 30

600

2.0 •

20

AIRBORNE

1

400

1.00 1.0

HYBRID Il

200

10

0-0-

0 0

5

)

10

15 20 25 30 NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

-200 z

GROUND BASED

z

0

i-

"400

-600

I

FIGURE 8-29

OH-6 PERSONNEL SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

I SVOL

II

8-40

35

40

i

.8HYBRI

D I

~c1

44

xAt I-

.6

AIRBORNE

'--4

S:•

.4 .6-

5

Ln

i0

15

20

25

30

35

40

NUMNBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED) 2-.

z0

HYBRID iII

0

0

S~GROUND

BASED

1.0

ael -. 8

-1.0 FIGURE 8-30

VOT

I1

01H-6 LOGISTICS SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STA4DARD CONDITIONS)

8-41

3.0.

"2.0 0

AIRBORNB E & HYBRID I

00

E-

Ao

En

0

z

-HYBRID

0

10

20

(ESSENTIALLY ZERO) 11 & GROUND BASED

30

40

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

FIGURE 8-31

OH-6 ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONII ORED (STANDARD

VOL II

8-42

CONDITIONS)

L

< . .2

P0 .

O0

S•0 5

•

AIRBORNE

/2

10

........

30354

NISEMBR OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

4.

HYR DI

1-4

!

~-7.

!

FIGURE 8-32

OH-6 INCREASE IN EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT VS COMPONENTS MONITORED

(STANDARD CONDITIONS)

"OL

II 8-43

0

4

10

20

30

40

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

-2 z 0 '

HYBRID I -4

ARBORNE

S-6

HYRD 11

z

-8 GROUND BASED -10

-12

FIGURE 8-33

VOL II

OH-6 SYSTEM4 NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-44

8.1.2.5

0H-58 Tradeoffs

Figures .S-34 through 8-39 show the results of the tradeoffs for the 0".-58 aircraft.

-In general, the discussion of the curves for the O-6 applies to the

curves for the 01-58. 40th components.

Figure 8-36 shows a large upswing between the 30th and

This is

due to the inclusion of a number of components that

are not troublesome from rhe maintenance standpoint, but have high accident

pv-tentials.

Such components have a significant impact on air safety.

Figure 8-38 shows that net savings are accrued for the 01-58 as contrasted to a net deficit for the OH-6.

This is due to the reduced DDT&E and procurement

costs on a per aircraft basis because of the large number of 0H-58 aircraft in the inventory. -ime basis.

Vol, I I

Figure 8-39 shows the expenditures, savings and benefits on a

NET COST SAVINGS

($10o6) pwlo,- ) 300

*

20.0

1.5.0

-IJRBOE

1 200 o

HYBRID I

0°

10.0

RYz-LUD II

400

10 - 200 2000

-4

]

0

0 __o

1. 0

20

30

NUIER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

GROUND BASED

Cc

~-400

z

-60017 FIGURE 8-34

VOL II

OH-58 PERSONNEL SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED 'STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-46

40

.-i

6

11DlI

Ig

I

AIRBEME

2 2

0

'"4

-izNUMB

~-2

S[-'GROUND z M

OF CORNMEi S

M•' ITOR ED

YBIDI

BAE'D -4

-2

0 _--•

>

Z

-8

FIGURE 8-35 L(STANDARD

VO

1-84

OH-58 LOGISTICS SAVINGS VS COMPONENTIS MONITORED CONDITIONS)

0,.'

24 S22

~20. 18.

<

14

z

12

z

HYEID I & AIRBORW

E

IG o

8

£26

4. S22

HYBRID II & GROUND BASED

0

0

0 10

20

30

40

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED FIGURE 8-36

VOL 11

OH-58 ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITO0ED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-48

o

to

•< 1010

0,

,HYBRID I

0

1AMER <

140ITORE

~AIRBORIIE

10

'-20

2~

2

<

0 C-4 u

VS~~GLN

CBPOENSSONTOD

-50.

-60, FIGURE 8-37

VOL 11

OH-58 INCREASE IN EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT VS COMPONENTS M~ONITORED

8-49

HYBRI D I

10

NM•BER f -lO • OF •a•MONITORED / AIRBORNE) cn-0

1

t-to

~03'=4-20

U)

co~z•iHYBRID S-30

11

z

S-.40. GROUND B,ýSED

>4

-50

-60 J FIGURE 8-38

VOL II

OH-58 SYSTEM~ NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-50

10. 1 YEAR BREAK EVEN POINT

-4

PROGRAM INITIATION S20

2AFTER

"-"

6.6 YEARS IROGRAM INITIATION

0AFTER

zz

2

3

4

5

7

6

8

9

10 11

U)

-10.

z

-20

18 MO o 30 DDT&E E'

0

-40

---2YRS PROCURE 10 YEARS OPERATION

FIGURE 8-39

V

SVOL

OH-58 HYBRIDI UNIQUE AIDAPS SYSTEIM TIME PHASED PROGRAM COST SAVINGS & BE•'(EFITS

1 II

8-51

2

1314

8.1.2.6 -

OV-1 Tradeoffs -41a i,,lr sOf th..ompu-ter

-Figures 8-40 thr-eugh-8-45-show---th--e

OV-1 aircraft.

for tho

Application of AIDAPS to this aircraft produces significant

savings resulting in a break-even point only 3.4 years after the system is procured.

See Figure 8-45.

Much of the savings for this aircraft is due to

the ability of the AIDAPS to reduce downtime, and the high value of that downtime due to the high cost of the aircraft (see Figure 8-43). It should be pointed out that the ground and Hybrid I systems may achieve higher engine test accuracies on fixed wing aircraft than oa helicopters.

On

fixed wing aircraft, it is possible to run the engine at higher power settings than is possible for partially loaded helicopters during ground run-up.

However,

it is unlikely that dhe test accuracy for these systems could be significantly higher than .75 and .80, respectively. the OV-1.

Therefore,

these values are used for

Additionally, since this aircraft is not subject to the hazards of

excessive loads and imbalance that is peculiar to helicopters, no weight and ialance benefits were allowed for any AIDAPS aystem on this aircraft.

Even on

fixed wing aircraft, the Ground and Hybrid I systems require long times for removing and processing the maintenance data and lack airborne warning capability.

Figure 8-44 contains a dotted curve showing the results which

could be achieved by an idealized, ground-based AIDAPS if it could attain the same test accuracy as an airborne system (.Q5) condition maintenance are included.

and if full benefits of on

The following table shows a comparison

of the idealized Ground system with the Airborne for the OV-l.

Savings/Cost Category

Airborne

Personnel

6.8

5.6

Logistics

4.0

4.0

Other Maintenance & Operations

0.7

0.7

Accidents

0.9

0.5

16.1

11.5

28.5

223.

13.4

10.5

15.i

i1.8

Effective Aircraft Total Savings Life Cycle Costs Net Savings

VOL II

Idealized Ground

8-52

cmr S-AvixES

I

1600

1400

AIRBORNE

I

]YBRID

.

HYBRID II

5.0. !

'ta•

GROUND BASED

800

3.0-

.t-0<

k

-

600

2.0 8-00 20

: 0

200

0

0

5 I

10

15

20

25

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

20

400 Fjr- RF 8-40 •

OV-1 PERSONNEL SAVINGS VS, COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS) OL 218-53

30

35

4

HYBRID I

AIRBORNE z

0

(3

cn

z

,

2

r-

In

1-4

z

GROUND BASED

0o

0

0

Iv

HYBRID II

0Z En C-)

0

I U) o

5

10

t5

20

22

30

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

z

¶11

FIGURE 8-41

VOL 11

OV-1 LOGISTICS SAVINGS IS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS) 8-54

35

AIRBORNE t

0.9"

S0.8. '-

0.7_

U)

*0.& -4

n0.c

z0 Fo.

0. 0.3.

U)

z

0.

0

`

2.5-

AIRBORNE

4•••.

0

2,0

HYBRID 11

z " 1.5z 0

GROUND BASED

U

]

F-4

t1.0-

.5-

0

0

to

20

15

15

25

30

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED FIGURE 8-57

VOL II

U-21 ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-72

2.

05

15

10

20

25

30

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

z

-6

AIBON

-8*

-101 FIGURE 8-58

VOL Li

U-21 SYSTEM NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS NIONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-13

8.1.2.9

HLH the results of the unique AIDAP system

Figures 8-59 through 8-64 sho 'radeoffs for the HLH aircraft. aircraft in the Army inventory, However,

Since this will be the moF.

sophisticated

the potential savings due to AIDAYS are large.

the cost of a Unique AIDAP System for this aircraft is also large

primarily due to DDT&E cost. The logistics cost savings shown on Figure 8-60 are exceptionally large considering the probable small number of aircraft to be procured.

This is

primarily due to the high cost of the components of aircraft produced in small quantities.

4

these

High cost parts create excessive costs for filling the

logistics pipeline as well as for overhaul. The net savings due to reduction in accidents sbown in Figure 8-61 are also 'large. '?Y

This is

due to the high cost of this aircraft,

resulting net savings,

candidates.

estimated at $9 million.

Figure 8-63, are significant for all AIDAP System

The Airborne System shows a slight advantage over the Hybrid I

due to the shorter processing time.

The difference, however,

to justify a selection on a cost effectiveness basis.

is not sufficient

Variations in development

or procurement costs may reverse the relationship. The large potential savings result in a very short break-even period (see Figure 8-64).

The savings and benefits exceed the cost of development and

procurement before the end of the procurement period. to the long procurement program. I

X'VOL II

8-74

This is

partially due

A

NET COST SAVINGS

1.504000

AIRBORNE--X HYBRID I

..25

3500

o•

f

HYBRID II

_

.L5 xo S3000

1.00

-

GROUND BASED

oo

2500

10

.75

S2000

150

<

1500

5

1000

.25 S500

0

0

0 zO

20

30

40

50

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED -500 FIGURE 8-59

HlfH PERSONN11 SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITOR(E

8-75

60

10

ro

/ S8

AIRBORNE & HYBRID I

6 01-

4 C4

0U.

HYBRID 2

-4

1\

GROUND BASED

2

C

0

0 10

20

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED -2J

FIGURE 8-60

VOL 11

HLH LOGISTICS SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-76

z 0

P-

'4

0 E-4

o

3

:Z)

50

,.

1-41

0

0

to

SNUMBER -.

i i

20

30

40

50

OF COMPONENTS MONITORED

:FIGURE '

8-61

,8-77

tLH ACCIDENT SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

60

AIRBORNE

1.6

HYBRID I HY BRI D, I,

3 .54

3.5

BASED

iGROUND

3.0

- •

~1.2

A

t-)

2.5

• t.1.o

S *

2.0

o

~'1.5 z c

1.0 *

CL)

z'-4

.5

.2

0 -t t0

20

30

40

50

60

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED -. 2

FIGURE 8-62

VOL

MI

HL1 INCREASE IN EFFECTIVL AIRCRAFT VS COMPONENTS MONITORED CONDITIONS) (STANDAR!

8-78

25

AIR BO RUNE--

20]

IsI

i5 HYBRID II

10

7.

GROUND

BASED

5

0

-n

10

20

30

40

50

60

"NUMBER OF COMPONENITS MONITORED -5

4.

-10 FICGURE 8-63

'•Oi, II

HL1I SYSTEM NET SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD CONDITIONS)

8-79

70

1

22

j

20. 18

C~16-

12

,

.•

~5.8

•

YEAi3.. BREAK EVEN POINT SI2 AFTER PROGRAMS10

INITIATION 8

V)14 24

1 -2-

2

3 468 YARSAB

9

10

11

12

13

-40

V

z

-8 --oo 18 M0

-10-

DDT&E 5.5 YR PROCUREMIENT

FIGURE 8-64

VOL V8-80

-0

.HLH AIRBORNE UNIQU~ AIDAP SYSTEMI COST SAVINGS & BENEFITS

TIME PHASED PROGRAM

14

8.1.2.10

UTTAS

Figures 8-65 through 8-70 present the unique AIDAP system tradeoffs for '-he IJTTAS aircraft.

All AIDAP systems are unusually effective on this aircraft.

Although this aircraft is programmed as a replaLement for the U11-1, more sophisticated aircraft in terms of number of engines,

Ihe

missions, and flight controls.

it

is a much

complexity of trans-

This, coupled with the high programmed inventory

and resulting low AIDAPS development and procurement costs, provides a unique •pportunity

for the application of the AIDAPS/Aircraft technology.

In addition,

high estimated costs of the aircraft and its components permit unusual savings due to accident prevention and logistics cost, as well as increased value from the increase in aircraft effectiveness. Figure 8-70 shows that as a result of these high expected savings, after the production program is

initiated even though only actual dollar savings

are considered.

'1

If

the break-even point occurs shortly

3-81

NEf COST SAVINGS

($ 10 6) (MANPOWER) AIRBORNE

3000

120 1500

HYBRID I SHYBRID

n1

2500

100 -250 R

o 80

GROUND BASED 2000

2

000 o CI

60 -

1500 750

1

40 -

S-500

•

1000,

H

z 0

20-250

500

Sz 0

I

j0

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS MONITORED 0

FIGURE 8-65

10

20I

VOL II

40

50 I,

UTTAS PERSONNEL SAVINGS VS COMPONENTS MONITORED (STANDARD

.

30 I

8-82

CONDITION)

60 I

ICII

0

4

?Ibu

255

~

I

__________7_s

2-50

I

200]

AIRBORNE & HYBRID I

150-

rag 100-

co~ 0

59]

i0

40

39

20

M--M -

N0 wCM-11 smC

FLF:--: S-6~7

MMAIT

I!S WIMS

50

-SV*S.

60

175

150' 6

GROUND BASED

-

5

0

I

En0

E 04 cn~

(En

c4n enr~

VOL 13.

(s~rrT~w~)S1IAiIN3I GtNV SOt4IAS 13M RAUIMV1 8-192

M~l

-

:

8.4

SELECTE AMA] SYSTEH The Hybrid I is

the most cost effective AIDAPS configuration for the

Unique, Group and Universal system designs.

This configuration has the same

capabilities and capacities regard'less of whether it Group or Universal system.

is designed as a Unique,

Therefore, differences in cost effectiveness are

entirely due to differences in costs.

Table 8-17 shows the net savings achieved.

by the Hybrid I configuration on each of the study aircraft and each system design type.

Both the Group and Universal design types show large cost effec-

tiveness improvements over the Unique systems.

These differences are due to

spreading the DDT6F costs across larger numbers of aircraft/AIDAPS programs, and due to larger scale production of identical or similar AIDAPS sets. The difference in cost effectiveness between the Group and Universal systems cost effectiveness is not large except for the aircraft with small fleet sizes. OH-58,

However,

it

is not'recommended that AIDAPS be installed on the OH-6,

nor the U-21 aircraft.

This leaves the CH-54 as the only aircraft with

a really significant difference in net benefits between the Universal and Group AIDAPS. The differences between the Group and Universal systems are due to the commonality of all electronics modules for the Univesral system except the RDAU.

ti

The RDAU is used only on the CH-47, CH-54,

HLH~ard UTTAS aircraft.

The group systems require three DDT&E programs,

one for the OH-6,

OH-58

and U-21 systems at a cost of $3.8 million, arother for the UH-I, AH-I and OV-l aircraft at a cost of approximately $5.2 million, and a third for the CH-47, If

CH-54,

the OH-6,

HLH and UTTAS aircraft at a cost of approximately $7.2 million. OH-58 and U-21 program is eliminated,

the $3.8 Million DDT&E

expenditures as well as the procurement costs for these programs are also eliminated. For the Universal systems,

however,

an initial DDT&E program of approxi-

mately $4.0 million i3 required with later adaptation to other aircraft and dvvelopment of an RDAU at an additional cost of approximately $4.0 -lllion.

VOL II

8-193

TABLE 8-17

SYSTED NET SAVINGS PER AIRCRAFT (IN T0O1ISAMIS OF DOLLARS)

HYBRID I - EXPECTED CONDITION 10 YEARS OPERATTION AIDA2S qYSTEK UNIQUE

GROUPED

UNIVERSAL

O0-6

-7.6

8.1

14.1

OH-58

12.2

17.5

18.9

UH1-1

37.8

45.1

46.1

U-21

-3.6

46.2

51.0

AH-1

93.6

104.6

106.1

333.0

358.4

362.0

86.0

123.4

126.0

CH-54

102.6

237.3

253.3

CM-47

202.0

252.1

257.3

HIM

954.9

1348.8

1376.7

AIRCRAFT

UTTAS OV-1

VOL II

8-194

The elimination of the OH-6, OHl-58 and U-21 programs will cause the prorated DDT&E costs to increase by approximately $200,000 per aircraft type on the remaining aircraft.

This is negligible in respect to the total AIDAPS life

cycle costs. Additional savings in procurement cost are realized by the Universal system due to the larger production quantities of all system modules except the RDAU.

The production quantities of the RDAU are the same for both the

Group and Universal systems although its size and cost is

slightly less for

the Universal application. The reduction in procurement costs while maintaining the same system effec-

C)

tiveness results in the modular Universal Hybrid I system achieving the greatest cost effectiveness. It

is recognized that exigencies of the procurement progr&m, as well as

design improvements which may be desirable during the long production life of such a system, may prohibit a truly Universal system from being achieved. However,

the savings in DDT&E and production costs will be sufficient to

justify this choice as the preferred system.

V 1

SVOL

II

8-195

SECTION 9

I.I.

9.0

AIDAP SYSTEN JUSTIFICATION

The validity of incorporating an AIDAPS concept into che aircraft noted in

this study, and the cost savings associated with implementing such a program are summarized for each of the subject aircraft in this section. The AIDAPS configuration presented is the modular Universal Hybrid I System for the expected operating conditions.

While the HLH Universal Airborne System provides a slightly

greater net savings than the Hybrid I, the difference is so small that savings can be considered essentially the same. The discussions are centered on the various cost savings elements which comprise the total aircraft system net savings.

9. 1 EXPENDITURE VS. SAVINGS AND COST ThADFJOFFS The costs of procurring an AIDAPS inclcde the expenditures for DDT&E, investment and a 10-year operation of the AIDAP System. The total expenditures required per aircraft for acquiring and operating the AIDAP System by aircraft type are presented in Figure 9-1.

The use of the AIDAP System results in savings

These gross savings are also presented in Figure 9-2 along with total AIDAPS life cycle cost and net savings. The difference between the expenditure in incorporating AIDAPS and these gross savings provide the in aircraft support costs.

system net savings that can be realized. EFFECTS ON LOGISTIC CfSTS

9.2

The following paragraphs describe the individual effects on logistics cost elements using the selected AIDAPS configuration. 9.2.1

AIRCRAFT INSPECTIONS (MAN-HOURS)

The use of an AIDAP System will generate man-hour savings in the performance of aircraft inspections by reducing or eliminating the time spent in certain portions of the inspections. These savings, expressed as man-hours per 1,000 flight hours, are presented by aircraft type in Figure 9-3. associated with these man-hours ,re also included.

VOL II

j-i,

The dollar savings

90-

80-

70 JWBMER OF

601

10 YEARS QPEPATION

50.

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RALKED IN ORDER OF 4IRCRAFT EMPTY WEIGHT FIGURE 9-1

VOL Ii

AIDAPS TOTAL LIFE CYCLE COST HYBRID I - UNIVERSAL EXPE"TED CONDITION

9-2

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FAULT ISOLATION (DIAGNOSIS)

The savings attributable to improving fault isolation through the reduction or elimination of unwarranted removals and troubleshooting are presented in The portion of spares inventory

Figure 9-4 in both man-hours and dollars.

and logistics support cost savings which result from improved diagnostics capabilities are provided in Figure 9-5.

The sum of these cost savings due to

improved diagnostic capability is presented in Figure 9-6 by aircraft type. Savings in accidents due to the diagnostic capability are described in paragraph 9.2.8. 9.2.3

PROGNOSIS

The cost sa•ings

associated with the improved prognosis capability are related

to the reductions in depo: overhaul requirements and in aircraft accidents. the accident reductions due to long-term prognosis are included here. of accidents due to short-term prognosis is

Only

Prevention

re included under diagnosis because it

impossible to separate the effects of short-term prognosis from diagnostic

capability and because the compution techniques associated with short-term prognosis are similar to diagnostic techniques.

An AIDAPS designed to accomplish

diagnosis can also accomplish most short-term prognosis.

The savings in both

man-hours and labor dollars due to reduction of scheduled removals at organizational and DS maintenance levels are presented in Figure 9-7. savings associated with overhaul,

including material,

The total cost

are presented in Figure 9-8.

Savings in accidents due to prognosis are included in paragraph 9.2.8.

The sum

oi these cost savings (less accident savings) attributable to the improved prognosis capability is 9.2.4

preseted in Figure 9-9.

AIRCRAFT DOWNTIME AND MAINTENANCE MAN-HOURS

The improved maintenance capability results in a reduction in the downtime characteristics of the aircraft and thereby reduces maintenance personnel reacirements.

The downtime savings expressed as elapsed hours per 1,000 flight

hours are presented in Figure 9-10.

The total cost savings associated with

the reduction in maintenance personnel are presented in ?igure 9-11. include man-hour savings due to inspection,

VOL II

9-5

diagnosis,

and prognosis.

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L0M111IM

MUM SKDIS

Vith the incorporation of an AIDA

SysterL in the study aircraft, the mrsber

of mintenance personnel required will be reduced in proportion to the muhours savings generated.

While maintenance skill proficiency required to

perform troubleshooting actions may be reduced by LIMPS, the availability of high proficiency naintenance .ersonnel be limited.

;vthin the Army will still

probably

The net result will be that skill levels will not change, but the

maintenance persoanel will be able to perform rore efficiently. 9.2.6

AIRCRAFT AVAIIABILIfY

The use of the AIMWP System will improv. -the downtime characteristics of the aircraft as previously noted.

As a result, aircraft availability expressed as

precent operationally ready will increase.

The impact of the selected AIMAP

System on aircraft availability is presented in Figure 9-12. 9.2.7

HAINMU,-dCE FILCW

The increase in aircraft availability can also be interpreted as effectively increasing the number of aircraft available to perform the specific mission requirements.

This potential increa3e in aircraft directly effects the number

of aircraft categorized in the maintenance float, as shown in Figure 9-1?. This is

identical to the decrease in the maintenance float.

It

is also

closely associated with the increase in effective aircraft, as presented in Figure 9-14.

Average payload, AIDAPS weight, and the aircraft abort ratio

also affect the increase in the effective nurýber of aircraft; however, effects are usually small compared to the effect of increased aircraft availability.

VOL It

9-14

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9.2.8

mA*i*AG

ACDUS (SEMOMM

The TANS data coatained substantially no inforrtion on secondary damage to comsenta.

the accideat reports do relate accident causes tc

However,

components or functional groups by air

warning

EbA-rever applicable.

of impending failures,

Accidents caa be prevented

or by warnings of a hazareus compoent

status wihich is associated with a diagnostic capability. They caa also be prevented by eli~inating comonent fadklures during flight through the prognostic Figure 9-155- sws the reduction in accidents due to prognostic capability. The curves for prognot tic and diagnostic capability and diagnostic capability. show the results of using eithor. of these capabilities alone. Bowever, since air

warning cannot eliminate accidents which are already prevented by the

prognostic capability,

these curves are not additive.

The total curve shows

the results of concurrently using both capabilities. 9.2.9

(ROM

SUPRIT BW

Ir

(GS1)

System on existing Army aircraft GSX.

AIDA .

7_i

the required nurer

the decrease in the

Based on this analysis,

significant reduction ia the requirements for other GSE.

"would be

there is

no

The usage rate of GSE

reduced but would not warrant eliminatior cf specific items of GSE.

The cost savings associated with the reduction in hand tools i_ ?quipment and supplies cosc factor that was included in NI

of an

The only effect was the redaction in

of mechanic's hand tools resulting frM

number of maintenance personnel required.

any,

if

A separate analysis was performed to determine the ivact,

parr of the

zhe developmen,

of

personnel downtime cost savings presented in paragraph 9.2.4. 9-2.10

RELIA-LITY

The improvemcnt its -ne reliability rhe selected AIDAP System is ra.es.

This improvement

characteristics

demons-ratei by 'he r,!ductior, in aircraft abort

in mrission completion ca~ability is

Figure 9-16.

VOL II

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9-i8

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Realized net savings and benefits would have to be considerably smaller than those predicted in this study for a zero net savings to occur; however,

since

most of the estimating errors that occur in computing net savings are likely to result in an under estimate,

this is highly unlikely.

are 10 percent of those predicted,

If

the realized savings

they will more than ekq~l AJDAPSJ4 fc ..ycl*

costs for most of the aircraft for which AIDAPS application is reconmended. Although the savings due to AIDAPS are large compared to AIDAPS procurement costs, they represent only a small portion of the total aircraft operating costs.

Tables 9-2, 9-3, and 9-4 compare the operating cost savings achieved

by AIDAPS with the total aircraft operating costs, the accident cost savings with the total accident costs, and the total cost savings with the total aircraft systens' tj

costs.

AIDAPS benefits,

due to incteased aircraft effectiveness,

have been excluded from these figures to make the AIDAPS savings categories comparable with Army cost categories.

9.2.13

COMPARISON OF SAVINGS FOR THE AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM TO SAVINGS ON REMAINDER OF THE AIRCRAFT

Table 9-5 shows the net savings and benefits derived from AIDAPS applied to avionics and from AIDAPS as applied to the remainder of the aircraft systems (less armament and GSE).

As can be seen from the figures,

the savings from

avionics rarely exceed 3 percent of the savings on the rest of the aircraft. The single exception is

the application to the OV-l,

is approximately 10 percent.

where the avionics savings

Since the avionic savings are not considered

significant, they have been omitted from most of the savings figures in this volume.

However,

application of AIDAPS to avionic systems is advantageous

for certain items of equipment and should be considered for the ultimate AIDAP System design. 9.2.14

TIME PHASED COST SAVINGS

Previous discussions related to the total realized cost savings have assumed a constant force size and a short production program.

In order to report the

effects ot practical AIDAPS procurement programs, as well as a phase-out of aircraft; a time phased implementation of the selected AIDAP System and the cost benefits gained is shown in Figir& 9-17.

VOL TI

9-23

TABLE 9-2 IMPACT OF AIDAPS ON 10 YEAR OPERATIONS COST (EXPECTED CONDITIONS)

10 YEAR OPERATIONS COST SAVINGS ** ($ MILLIONS)

PERCENT SAVINGS

AIRCRAFT

10 YEAR OPERATIONS COST ($ MILLIONS) *

AH-1

156.98

5.20

3.3%

CH-47

274.29

49.70

13.1%

CH-54

46.80

4.00

8.5%.

UI{-1

959.08

60.50

6.3%

U-21

79.25

1.00

1.3%

OH-6

25.83

-. 40

OH-58

237.87

3.60

1.5%

OV-1

120.86

8.00

6.6%

-1.5%

BASED ON FM 101-20 PLANNING FACTORS EXCLUDING POL COSTS

**

VOL II

INCLUDES AIDAPS DDT&E, INVESTMENT AND OPERATIONS COST, EXCLUDES ACCIDENTS AND INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS

9-24

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TOTAL ACCIDENT AND 10 YEAR OPERATIONS Cf110vfMJTA5

IACCIDENT

AND 10 YEAR OPERATIONS COST SAVTHQ

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PERCENT SAVINGS

fCR(

AH-1

31R.42

55.60

17.5%

CH-4/

457.23

60.90

13.37.

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114.33

9.40

8.27.

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1359.18

119.80

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87.60

3.80

4.3%

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46.55

3.10

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363.88

34.30

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SECTION 10

I4(.

10.0

ARKI"ENT AND GSE

AVIONICS,

Avionics and armament subsystem maintenance data did not appear in TAM4S data in s-ifficient quantities

for reliable analysis.

on these two subsyste-es were accomplished In a

addition,

to compensate

for this lack of data. (GSE)

The result of these analyses are presented

required

in this section.

AVIONICS

10.1

The application output signals

of AIDAPS to avionics is

for existing aircraft.

avionic equipment is candidates avionics,

limited to monitoring input and

To modify the avionics

not economically nor practically feasible,

tj

Separate studies

the effects of AIDAPS on ground support equipment

separate analysis.

the

for AIDAPS is

particularly since most of the

used on a variety of aircraft some of which are not

for AIDAP systems as defined by the scope of the study. however,

Future

could be designed to be compatible with AIDAPS systems. Supplying self test

Some avionics are already designed for self test. signals to the AIDAPS in addition to, or in

lieu of,

the plannedj use of con-

ventional indicators would seer, to be of limited value.

Hence,

AIDAPS applica-

tion would be limited to only a few avionic systems. AVIONICS INSTALLED ON STUDY AIRCRAFT

10.1.1

The avionic systems employed on the study aircraft are presented

in Table

Many of the systems are used on more than one aircraft.

10-1.

10.1.1.1

Avionic System Candidates

A detailed examination of th- avionic equipment designs was made to determine

those systems which might be candidates for monitoring by AIDAPS.

The

basic criteria tised to select candidate avionic systems are that they must be multi-box systems, hazard.

be amenable

to diagnosis,

For many of the systems,

no AIDAPS benefits can be derived.

cally, most equipments are essentially "one little mode,

VOL II

service

or constitute a significant

in avoiding unwarranted

Specifi-

box" systems in which AIDAPS is

removals.

second only to mistuning or misoperation,

-I,

safety

Further, is

of

the common failure

catastrophic which cannot

be trended or predicted by simple input or output measurements. have two boxes.

The control box is

included but,

Some systems

short of a parallel unit,

there is generally no economical way tc inspect or vionitor the operation of the control box. Table 10-1 also presents comints concerning the application of AIDAPS to each avionic system.

These comments indicate that the following four systems

.-an be effectively monitored by AIDAPS.

Doppler Navigation System

AN/ASN-64 AN/ASN-64A

Automatic Flight Control System

AN/ASW-12(V) ! AN/ASW-12(V) 2 AN/ASW-12 (V) 3

AN•ASW-12-(V)

10.1.2

Gyromagnetic Compass System

AN/ASN-43

Radar Altimeter

AN/APN-22 ANIAPN-II,

1

AVIONICS DATA REVIEW

The Army maintenance data on these systems were not available for this study. ined.

As a result, Navy FU3 maintenance data on similar systems were examThese data pertained to similar avionics systems but different part

numbers.

The appropriate Navy avionics data were applied to the correspond-

ing selected Army avionics systems. 10.1.2.1

Ground Rules Used For Data Review

The ground rules used for the maintenance data evaluation are simila' the ones employed for aircraft subsystems.

AIDAPS application t

Lne candidate

avionics systems reduces the time required for diagnosis and the number of unwarranted remove and replace actions.

VOL II

10-2

_

TALE 10-i

&viMuCS SYS= AXI/A-44

AVIOICS AFFLICATIC

TO AIMPS

cammum coNCuumcN AmIDS APPLICATICE An old Vr-FM set. One box but dynamotor could be monitored. Single box - not amenable to A IMPS.

AR/ARC-51 & 51BX

MH

AN/ARC-54

FM set

A/ARC-55

UHF set

- Single box - not menable to AIDMS. single box - not amenable to AIMPS.

-

Single, old box - 70 lbs. - unlikely still

used,

not amenable to AIMAPS (same as AhI/AkC-27). AN/ARC-73

VHF-AM - An old set but amenable to AIIMPS. Discretes could monitor power, receiver AGC voltage, push-to-talk and RF output.

AN/ARC-102

11

ANIRC-114

FM set - single box - panel mounted, not amenable to AIDPS.

AN/ARC-115

VHF set - Single box - panel mounted, not amenable to AIPS. UHF-AM - Single box - panel mounted, not amenable to

AN/ARC-116

j

set - Single box - not amenable to AIDAPS.

AIIMPS. AN/ARC-30

VHF Nay.

AN/ARN-32

Marker Beacon Receiver - very old set, not cost effective to design for AIMPS since probably not still in use.

AN/ARN-59

ADF - No information avilabj.e at this time.

AN/ARN-82

VOR and Clide Slope Receiver to AIDAPS._ _

set - No information available at this time.

_

Vol, II

10-3

-

Single box - not amenable

TIALI

10-1

AVIWICS LPPL1Cl

AVIcOICS SYSTI ai94,LAW

COWNn omEMS

TO AXAMP

(Cotiiaed)

L

PS hrFlATIC

Marker Beacon Rec- - not amenable to AIMPS.

AN/APX-44

1FF Transponder

-

Single box - Not amemnble to AIMPS.

AR/APX-72

IF? Transponder

-

Same coments as for the APX-44.

ANIASN-43

Qyromag Capass

-

Possible LIMPS application.

AN/ASH-64

Doppler hlv. - Possible ALIMPS application.

AN/ASN-72

Position Fixing Nay. Set. - Probably will not use AIMPS. We do not have sufficient data at this time.

ANARA-54

US receiver - Not amenable to AIDMPS.

AN/APN-22

Radar Altimter - Multi-box can be functionally monitored. Possible AIDMPS application.

AN/AJN-12

Marker Beacon Rec. - Not amenable to AIM1PS.

T-366A/ARC

VHF Emergenzy Transmitter - Single box - Not

menable

to AIDMPS. C-653:,IAk.

Intercom - Single box - Not amenable to AIDAPS - Malfunction made most likely would be switch/contact failures.

TSEC/KY28

No information available at this time.

AN/ARN-83

ANE - Multibox system but not amenable to AIMPS.

AN/ARN-89

ADF - Multibox system, but not amenable to AIMPS.

AN/ASW-12(V) 1,2+3

AFCS - Assume application of AIMPS - Assume 3 proporcional and 2 discretes.

VOL 11

10-4

10.1.2.2

Avionics Maintenance Data Analvsis Results

TUble 10-2 lists

the savings in decreased down time,

maintenance nan-hours,

inventory spares, and packaging and shipping costs for each of the systems. From this tabie,

the 10 year savings for each aircraft

is determined based on

the monthly flight hours ard the avionics system instalied.

The avionic syst

associated with each aircraft are indicated in Table

10-3.

The savings for a ten year period are shown for each aircraft in Table

10-4.

These savings assuwe that each aircraft is

equipped with the avionic

systems shown in Table 10-3. 10.1.3

COST OF MONIT•tING AVIOKICS

The cost of monitoring each avionic system depends almost exclusively on t.e

parameters monitored.

T-h

parameters selected will,

late the system .ailure to the failed component.

in moct cases,

iso-

The selected parameters

are presented in Table 10-5 together with the associated signal type and the coiponents being monitored wiLhin each system. The cost of monitoring each system is determined by examining the parameter signal types and assigning a weighted sensoc count (WSC)

to each.

The

cost of monitoring and signal processing for electronic systems is estimated at $10.00 per WSC.

The cost calculated

for each system is

presented in Table

10-6. '0.1.4

AIDAPS COST EFFECTIVENESS FOR AVIONICS

The cost of monitoring the avionic systems on each aircraft

is

caompared

against the cost savings for a 10 year operating period in Table 10-7. criteria

for determining the cost effectiveness of monitoring the avionics;

the expected savings over a

10-year period should be twice the initial

ment.

Tnis is

year.

A return of less than

tomparable

to an investment retur-, of approximately this would not be practical.

can be seen that the only aircraft on which it the avionics are the OV-I,

CH-47,

CH-54,

cation being the most effective.

VOL II

As a

10-5

UTTAS,

is

7.0% per

From Table

cost effective

and ILH,

invest-

10-7 it

to monitor

with the OV-1

appli-

TABLE 10-2

AVI0MCS SAVDIN&

DUE TO AIMPS

AVI0M!S SYSTEM

RAM ALTITR SYSTEM

S&VINIGS

TIME ($/1000 PH)

AUTIMATIC FLIGIT COUf L SYSTEM

GYRON&%QIEflC COWPASS SYSTEM

LOPPLER l&]ME NAVIGATION SYSTEM

65.72

54.63

97.88

535.02

9.92

16.24

61.11

226.10

355.66

2990.46

280.95

28.35

33.51

361.39

33.45

MAINTEACE MAN-HOURtS ($/1000 FH)

7.9

INVENTORY SP'ARES ($/AIRCAFT)

PACKAGING SHIPPING

($/10,000 FH)

I

ii'

VOL II

10-6

TABLE 10-3

RADAR ALIMETER SYSTEM

AIRCRAFT

UJc.• 1

AUTGITIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

GYROMAGNETIC COMPASS SYSTEM

011-6

X

OH-58

X

UH- 1

x

AU-i

X

U-21

X X

X

X

CH-47

X

X

X

x

xx X

TABLE 10-4

x

x

cH5

DOPPLER RADAR NAVIGATION SYSTEM

X

Ov-1

•x

AVIONICS 10-YEAR LIFE CYCLE SAVINGS (MILLION DOLLARS) OPTIMISTIC

EXPECTED

PESSIMISTIC

0H-6

.081

.052

.043

0H-58

.657

.425

.347

UH-1

1.374

.776

.652

AH-1

.201

.130

.107

U-21

.038

.027

.023

OV-1

3.260

2.254

2.086

CH-47

1.587

1.013

.872

54 CP•-

.158

.101

.079

UTTAS'

9.031

6.183

5.201

.165

.086

.068

AIRCRAFT

HLH

VOL II

AVIONICS INSTALLED ON EACH AIRCRAFT

10-7

TABLE 10-5 AVIONICS PARAMETER LIST

"AVIONIC SYSTEM

PARAMETER

SIGNAL TYPE

RELATED CO•IPONENT

DOPPLER NAVIG.TION SYSTEM (AN/ASN-64 & AN!ASN-64A

OUTPUT POWER

(13.325 GHz) 240 MILLIWATTS MINIlHiM

DOPPLER RECEIVER/ TRANSMITTER

RECEIVER IF

3.3 M HZ SIGNAL

ANTENNA, DOPPLER

PRESENCE OF

AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AN/A SW- 12(V) 1,2,3 & AN/ASW-12A(V) 1

FREQUENCY TRACKER,

RECEIVED SIGNAL

DISCRETE

DOPPLER

PRESENT POSITION

DC VOLTS

INDICATOR/CONTROL, DOPPLER

POWER ON

DISCRETE

DOPPLER SYSTEM

ROLL ANGLE

SYNCHRO

DISPIACFr4ENT GYRO

ACCELEROMETER ODTPUT

ELECTRIC CHARGE

AIRCRAFT ACCELEROMETER

STEERING COMMAND

SYNCHRO

NA IGATION COUPLER

ROLL CONTROL

SYNCHRO

AUTOMATIC PILOT CONTROL

DISCRETE

ACCELEROMETER MONITOR

DISCRETE

AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

OUTPUT SIGNAL

800 CPS

COMPASS TRANSMITTER FLUX COMPENSATOR

YAW SIGNAL

SYNCHRO

DIRECTIONAL GYRO

HEADING ERROR

SYNCHRO

COMPASS CONTROLLER

POWER ON

DISCRETE

COMPASS SYSTEM

INPUT TO HEIGHT INDICATOR

SYNGHRO

CONTROL AMPLIFIER, RADAR ALTIMETER

AUTOMATIC PILOT POWER ON GYRO MAGNETIC COMPASS SYSTEM (AN/ASN-43)

RAIDAR ALTI1"WTER SYSTEM (AN/APN- 117)

VOL II

13-8

TABLE 10-5

AVIONICS PARAMETER LIST (Continued)

SIGNAL TYPE

PARAMETER

RELATED COMPONENT RECEIVER/TRANS-

OUTPUT TO

VARIABLE

MITTER, RADAR

AMPLIFIER

FREQUENCY

ALTIMETER

DISCRETE

RAWAR ALTIMETER SYSTEM

POWER ON

V

VOL II

10-9

TABLE 10-6 AVIONICS AIM&PS COST

DOPPLER N&VIGATION SYSTEM

I

Output Parameter Receiver IF Presence of Signals Present Position TOTAL

AUTCRATIC FLIGHT CON-h.OL

"SYSTEM

GMRO-MAQIETIC

SYSTEM

Roll Angle Accelerometer Output Steering Control Roll Control Auto Pilot Power On

$100

8 5 8 8 1

$310

1

Output Signal

4

Yaw Signal

8

Heading Error Power On

8 1

$210

21

Input to Indicator Output to Amplifier Power On TOTAL

VOL II

4 4 1 1

31

TOTAL

RADAR ALTIMETER

COST

10

ToTAL

SCOMPASS

WSC

8 10 1 19

10-10

$190

TABLE 10-7

AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT AVIONICS COST VS.

AVIONICS COST (DOLLARS A/C)

10-YEAR SAVINGS

AVIONICS SAVINGS (lDOLIARS A/C)

NET SAVINGS (DOLLARS/AC)

OH-6

210

223

13

0H-58

210

223

13

UH-1

210

217

7

All-1

210

223

13

U-21

210

264

54

Ov-1

850

9756

8906

CH-47

710

2208

1498

CH-54

520

1352

832

UTTAS

710

2625

1915

HIE

710

1999

1289

VOL II

10-11

I0.2

ARMY AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SUBSYSTEMS Except for the: Bell AH-lG gunship,

were initially

all

Army aircraft now in the inventory

designed without gither defe"Isive or offensive armament.

tionally; Army aircraft have fulfilled the roles of cargo, and training services.

utility,

With the advent of the Vietnam operation,

armament onboard Army aircraft became evident.

Tradi-

observation the need for

As a result, a number of strap-

on systems for existing aircraft were developed along with the gun ship concept as represented

by the Bell AH-IG.

Table

10-8 presents a matrix of the. more

commonly used armament subsystems versus the aircraft' that they are used on. Except for the XM 28 chin turret designed spectfically for the AH-IG, these armament subsystems are designed to be In addition,

all of

installed on existing aircraft.

a number of these devices are designed to be self-supporting and

to be used on several different aircraft. Because of the strap-on nature of most of these devices, amount of instrumentation

is

installed.

An AIDAPS installation on:these arm-

ament devices provides a direct contribution

to combat safety by providing

the combat crew with indications of armament

subsystem health,

to complete a mission before entering the combat area. servicing of the equipment analysis is

gathered

in

is

addition,

flight while the weapons are being fired.

ability ground

Elimination

for diagnostic purposes also contributes to

ground safety of maintenance personnel and equipment.

V

VOL II

In

and its

simplified since maintenance data for ground

of weapons firing on the-ground

f

only a minimum

10-12

40

x

x

a904

3

x N PdNx

'A4

UlN

N

gn(

Nz

VO

11101

ad

For purposes of the armament portion of the AIDAPS study the armament systems listed in Table 10-8 were divided into six categories according to type as follows: I.

Guided missiles

II.

Combinations of 7.62mm machine gun and 2.75" rocket launcher

III. Pod-mounted large caliber machine guns IV.

Turret-mounted automatic guns and grenade launchers

V.

Grenade launchers

VI.

Other systems not applicable to AIDAPS

Representative systems chosen for detailed analysis from each of the first five categories are shown in Table 10-9.

Category VI was not represented

because these systems consist of simple hand-held machine guns and gun mounts considered impractical for interface with an AIDAPS. chosen from each of Categories I,

A single system was

III, IV and V, while three systems were

chosen to represent Category II. Table 10-9 lists and describes the selected systems. 10.2.1

SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS

The analysis of the selected subsystems is presented in paragraphs 10.2.1.1 through 10.2.1.7.

Each analysis contains the following:

a)

A list of major subsystem components

b)

A list of common subsystem failure modes.

Of primary importance are those

failure modes that contribute to a lack of combat safety.

For example,

the potential failure of a rocket to fire due to a lack of continuity in a firing circuit should be known before entering the combat zone.

Advanced

knowledge of armament subsystem performance capability should be a basic goal of an armament AIDAPS. The various failure modes listed for the seven subsystems are taken from the mechanical and electrical troubleshooting charts found in the organizational maintenance manuals. most probable components at fault are also listed.

VOL II

10-14

The

TABLE 10-9

REPRESENTATIVE ARMY ARMAMENT SY1..WJ'-

SYSTEM I-1.

DESCRT.7l iON

1422

Six AM2B wire .-±ded missiles launched and guided

from UH-IB hel .:opter. 11-2.

XM18/XMl8El

Pod moun Ad 7.62mm machine gun carried by either helic -;cers or high speed fixed wing aircraft.

11-3.

M21

;jmbination of M158 2.75mm rocket launchers and M134 7.62mm machine guns installed on UH-lB and C helicopters.

11-4.

XM27E.1 -

111-5.

.M35

M134 7.62mm machine gun installed on the OH-6A helicopter. XM195 20mm automatic gun installed on the AH-IG gun ship.

IV-

XM28/XM28EI

Various combinations of the M134 machine gun and XM129 40mm grendade launcher installed in a hydraulically operated chin turret on the AH-lG helicopter gun ship.

V-7

M5

M75 40mm grenade launcher installed in a remote controlled turret attached to the nose of UH-lB and C helicopters.

VOL II

10-15

c)

A list

of recommended subsystem performance parameters.

The parameters

are also selected on the basis of their ability to i-sc:ate a subsystem fault to the rmajor line replaceable units (IRU's) at the organizational level. For example, where a subsystem includes a gun or grenade launcher drive motor, drive motor lead (current) along with feed-bus voltage.

If

is monitored during operation

a gun or launcher jams,

these parameters

should allow a determination of a basic mechanical fault in the gun or launcher mechanism or a defect in the drive motor itself. In a similar manner, the monitoring of basic electrical signals from the weapon sights, servo ampiifiers, and feedback loops provide insight into the overail electrical operation of a subsystem.

Monitoring of gun and

grenade launcher mount vibrations provide an indication of an impending mechanical

'A

failure.

j

iV

SVOL

II

10-16

10.2.1.1

M22 Armament Subsystem

The 122 armament subsystem consists of six AQM22B wire guided missiles which are transportud on, and fired from, duzl launcher assem...ies attached to the Bell Uli-IB helicopter.

The missiles are fired and guided :o t!e tar-

get by the helicopter gunner using an optical sight and control stick to command missile maneuvering. in Table 10-10. the parameters,

Major components of the subsystem are shown

Table 10-11 lists the failure modes, Table 10-12 presents and Table i0-13 shows the recommended sensors.

TABLE 10-10

VOL II

M22 MAJOR COHPONENTS

1.

Missile airframe

7.

Booster motor

3.

Sustainer motor

4.

Launcher zupport assembly

5.

Housing assembly

6.

Fixed housing

7.

Missile launcher

8.

Missile control stick

9.

Remote firing switch

10.

Missile selection box

11.

Guidance control unit

12.

Gunner's sight

13.

Pilot's sight

14.

Cabling and connectors

10-17

TABLE 10-11

1122 CGIOHM FAILLF MODES

FAILUE NODES

AT FAULT

flare or booster

.1.

No ignition of explosive cartridge,

.2.

Ignition of explosive cartridge,

.3.

Explosive cartridge ignites, but release hook does not disengage

7.

Ignition of explosive cartridge 3nd flares, but no ignition of booster

2.

4.

release hook disengages,

1, 10,

14

5.

Missile flies a ballistic path

6.

Missile flies a spiraling path

7.

Missile flies down and right

1,8,11,14

8.

Missile flies hard left or right

1,8,11,14

9.

Missile flies hard up or down

1,8,11,14

Missile flies hard up and hard left or right

1,8,10,11,14

10.

TABLE 10-12

VOL 11

1.

M22 SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

1.

Explosive bolt circuit continuity (6)

2.

24 volt main power

3.

Missile jettison power (6)

4.

Pitch signal in

5.

Pitch signal out

6.

Yaw signal in

7.

Yaw signal out

10-18

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10.2.1.2

2(18 and X1M8EI Armament Subsyste.

The IN18/XMI8El aroament subsystem consists of an H 134 7.62 millimeter machine gun and supporting equipment incorporated into an aerodynamically clean pod that can be carried externally on an aircraft up to Mach 1.2.

The pod

contains its own power source (battery) that drives the gun at a high firing Differences between the XH18 and XH18EI are as follows:

race. a)

Early models of the XM18 had a fitting in the top of the drum assembly to accommodate a single (NATO)

b)

suspension lug.

The XM18El incorporates increased starting torque,

greater clearing

reliability and circuitry which permits dual rates of fire. Major components of the subsystem are shown in Table 10-14.

Table 9-15

presents the failure modes, Table 9-15 the parameter and Table 9-17 the sensors.

TABLE 10-14

VOL II

XM18 AND XM18E1 MAJOR CIPONENIS

1.

M 134 7.62 millimeter machine gun

2.

Electric gun drive assembly

3.

Recoil adapter assembly

4.

Automatic gun feeder

5.

Pod front fairing assembly

6.

Loader assembly

7.

Exit unit assembly

8.

Counter and drive assembly

9.

Pod aft fairing assembly

10.

Battery and control assembly

11.

Gun support assembly

12.

Drum assembly

13.

Cabling and connectors

14.

Cable adapter assembly

10-20

TABLE 10-15

FAILURE MODES

COMPONENT~ AT FAULT

1.

Gun fails to rotate or fire

1,2,10,13

2.

Gun stops firing

4,7,10,12,13

3.

Low firing rate

4,10

TABLE 10-16

VOL II

XH18/XM18El COMMON FAILURE MODES

XM!8/XMI8El SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERb%

1.

Battery voltage

2.

M134 drive motor load (current)

3.

Battery charge load (current)

4.

Battery temperature

5.

Gun mount vibration

10-21

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10.2.1.3

M21 Armament Subsystem

The M21 armament subsystem consists of two M134 two M158

7.62mm machine guns and

2.75 inch seven tube rocket launchers installed on Bell UH-lB and C

helicopters.

Major components of the subsystem are shown in Table 10-18.

Tablc 10-19 presents the failure modes.

Table 10-21 lists each parameter,

required to monitor these parameters. the required sensor type,

Table 10-20 defines the sensors

number needed per aircraft installation,

location,

cost of the added equipment both in weight and dollars and WSC - a factor used to rate the overall sensor complexity.

TABLE 10-18 O

58

M21 MAJOR COMPONENTS

tMl

1. Rack and support assembly (includes components using hydraulic power from helicopter). 2.

2.75 inch rocket launcher (M158 or M158AI/E/M158E1).

3.

Intervalometer

4.

Reflex sight (XM60 or XM60El) gun and rocket launcher.

5.

Sight mount.

6.

2.75 inch rocket (14)

7.

Cabling and connectors

8.

Mount Assembly

9.

M134

-

same sight used for both machine

M134

7.62mm machine gun assembly (including electric drive assembly).

10.

Ammo chute.

1I.

Ammo box assembly.

12.

Confrol box assembly.

13.

Control panel.

14.

Cabling and connectors.

VOL II

10-23

TABLE 10-19

M-21 CORSON FAILURE MODES

Cr*4PONENr AT FAULT

FAILURE MODES 1.

Rockets fail to fire

2.

Rack and support assembly cannot be adjusted in

3.

Mount assemblies fail to follow elevation and deflection comiands from sight statio-.

4.

5.

9

14134 will not rotate or fire

9

M134 stops firing

TABLE 10-20

VOL Ii

1,7,13

M21 SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

1.

Aircraft to M421 power (voltage).

2.

Left and right M134 gun motor load (current)

3.

Rocket ignition circuit continuity (2)

4.

Sight elevation signal out

5.

Sight deflection signal out

6.

Servo amp. elevation signals out (2)

7.

Servo amp. deflection signals out (2)

8.

Left and right gun mount accelerations (Vibration) (2)

9.

Mount elevation feedback signals (2)

10.

Mount deflection feedback signals (2)

10-24

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10-2.1.4

XM27E1 Armament Subsystem

The XM27El armament subsystem consists of a'single rapid fire M134 7.62 millimeter machine gun that mounts on the left side of the OH-6 helicopter. Major components of the subsystem are shown in Table 10-22. presents the failure modes,

Table 10-13

Table 10-24 shows the paramreters recommended,

and

Table 10-25 lists the suggested sensors.

TABLE 10-22

XM27E1 MAJOR COMPONENTS

1.

M134 gun assembly

2.

Gun electric drive assembly

3.

Delinking feeder assembly'

4.

Fairing assembly

5.

Mount assembly (includes control box assembly)

6.

Reflei sight

7.

Control panel

TABLE 10-23

XM27EI COMMON FAILURE MODES

FAILURE MODES

COMPONENT AT FAULT

1.

Gun does not rotate

1;2,5,7.

2.

Gun rotates at slow rate but will not change to fast rate

2.

3.

"Gun Not Cleared" light remains on after firing1to clear

2.

4.

Gun rotates for excessive time after trigger release during fire to clear

5.

5.

Gun elevation motor operation faulty

5.

6.

"Ammo Low" light inoperative '(bulb okay)

5.

VOL 11

10-26

TABLE 10-24

X127El PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

1.

Aircraft to XM27E1 power (voltage)

2.

Gun drive motor load (current)

3.

"Amno Low" warning

4.

"Gun Not Cleared" warning

5.

Sight elevation signal out

6.

Elevation motor drive signal in

7.

Gun mount vibration

8.

Mount elevation feedback signal

(9

*VOL

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10.2.1.5

XM 35 Armament Subsystem

The XM35 armament subsystem consists of an X1495 six-barrel 20 millimeter automatic gun and its supporting equipment.

The gun and the bulk of the support

equipment are housed in fairings which are attached to the fixed wings on the AH-lG helicopter.

The gun is

fixed in relation to the aircraft and is bore-

sighted to the pilot's M73 reflex sight. however,

the gunner can fire the weapon by using the existing override on the

gunner's control panel. 10-26.

The pilot normally fires the guns;

Major components of the subsystem are shown in Table

Table 10-27 defines the failure modes, Table 10-28 the parameters,

Table 10-29 the recommended sensors.

TABLE 10-26

XM35 MAJOR CGIPONENTS

1.

XM195 20 millimeter automatic gun assembly

2.

Gun electric drive assembly

3.

Delinking feeder assembly

4.

Gun mount aErtembly

5.

Ammo feed and storage assemblies

6.

Gun firing control unit

7.

Pilot's control panel assembly

8.

Copilot's control panel assembly

9.

Cabling and connections

TABLE 10-27

(including aerodynamic fairings)

COMMON FAILURE MODES COMPONENT

FAILURE MODES

VOL II

AT FAULT

1.

Gun drive does not rotate

2,9

2.

Gun rotor does not rotate

1,

3.

Gun fires slow or erratically

1,2,6,9

4,

Gun does not fire

1,6

5.

Erratic dispersion pattern

4

6.

Excessive vibration

1,4

10-29

and

TABLE 10-28

VOL II

XH35 SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

1.

Gun drive motor load (current)

2.

Aircraft to XK35 24 VDC

3.

Aircraft to XM35 28 VDC

4.

Amno 330 VDC firing voltage (DC to DC converter performance)

5.

Gun mount vibration

6.

Number of rounds cycled through gun

10-30

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10.2.1.6 Thit

XM 28 and XM28E1 Armament Subsystem XlM28/XM28EI armament subsystem consists of a hydraulically and elecAny

trically operated dual weapon package installed on the AH-1G helicopter. of the lollowing combinations of weapons may be used in a)

the chin mounted turret:

One left-hand 7.62 millimeter M134 machine gun and one right-hand 40 millimeter XM129 grenade launcher.

b)

One right-hand M134 gun and one left-hand XM129 launcher.

c)

Two M134 guns.

d)

Two XM129 launchers. Also included in

this subsystem are four stub wing stores position~s that

can accommodate a number of different

combinations of 2.75 millimeter rocket

launchers and pod-mounted machine guns.

These weapons will not be discussed

here since they are covered elsewhere in

this report.

Several differences exist between the XM28 and XM28E1 as follows: a)

Armament subsystem XM28E1 uses a two-speed M134 machine gun drive assembly; while XM28 is

supplied with a single-speed

gun drive.

trollers are also different and non-interchangeable

The weapons con-

between the two sub-

systems. b)

Either subsystem may use either of two M134 gun ammo storage ammo boxes with crossover assembly or 7.62 millimeter ammo,

containers, magazine

assembly. Major components of the subsystem are shown in Table 10-30. presents the recommended

VOL II

failure modes,

Table

10-32 the parameters,

sensors.

10-32

Table

10-31

and Table 10-33 the

TABLE 10-30

XM28 AND XH28El MAJOR C(POlNENTS

M134 1.

M134 machine gun assembly

2.

Gun electric drive assembly

3.

Delinking feeaer

4.

Ammo chute

5.

Flexible shaft assembly

6.

Ammo storage containers

XH129

)

7.

X4M129 grenade launcher

8.

Gun cradle assembly

9.

Gun drive assembly

10.

Gun drive shaft assembly

11.

Ammo chute

12.

Ammo magazine

Support Equipment

VOL I1

13.

Weapon turret and chute separator assembly

14z

Weapons controllers (left and right hand)

15.

Electronic components assembly

16.

Intervoloineter (2)

17.

Gunner's reflex sight assembly (turret sight)

18.

Gunner's control panel

19.

Pilot's reflex sight assembly

20.

Pilot's control panel

21.

Pilot's wing stores control panel

22.

Cabling and connectors

10-33

TABLE 10-31

XM28 AND XK28El COMMON FAILURE MODES COMPONENT AT FAULT

1.

A turret weapon does not respond to pilot's firing commands.

2.

System does not remain in stowed position when operated correctly by pilot.

2 or 9, 14,15,2. 15,20.

J.

Turret does not respond to data inputs from pilot's reflex sight.

15.

4.

Rarnge adjust control inoperative

15,17

5.

Turret does not respond to positioning commands (azimuth and/or elevation).

15,17,22

6.

Turret assembly response to positioning commands is or erratic.

15,17.

7.

A turret weapon does not respond to gunner's firing commands.

sluggish

2 or 9, 14,15,17, 18.

8.

M134 gun operates but does not fire.

3,15,22.

9.

XM129 launcher operates but does not fire.

9,12,15.

TABLE 10-32

XM28/XM28E!

PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

1.

Aircraft to XM28/XM28Fl power (voltage)

2.

M134 gun drive motor load (currenit)

3.

XM129 launcher drive motor load (current)

4.

Turret hydraulic system oil pressure

5.

Airspeed

6.

Sighting statio,, elevation signal out

7.

Sighting station azimuth signal out

8.

Turret elevation signal to elevation servo valve

9.

Turret azimuth signal to azimuth servo valve

10.

Turret elevation position feedback signal Turret azimuth position feedback sigrnal

S11.

12.

VOL II

Turret mount vibration

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10.2.1.7

M5 Armament Subsystem

The M5 armament subsystem consists of a 40 millimeter grenade launcher installed in a remote controlled turret attached to the outside of the UH-1 B or C helicopter electric equipment compartment (nose). system are shown in Table 10-34. 10-36 the parameters,

Major components of the sub-

Table 10-35 presents the failure modes,

Table

and Table 10-27 the sensors. TABLE 10-34

M5 MAJOR COMPONENTS

1. M75 40 millimeter grenade launcher. 2.

Turret support assembly

3.

Gimbal assembly

4.

Saddle assembly

5.

Elevation and azimuth powered trunnion assemblies

6.

Launcher drive assembly

7.

Ammo handling assemblies (chutes, booster, can)

8.

Servo amplifier junction box assembly

9.

Turret control panel assembly

10.

Sight assembly

11.

Sight mount bracket assembly

12.

Cabling and connectors

TABLE 10-35

M5 COMMON FAILURE MODES COMPONENT

SFAILURE MODES

AT FAULT

1.

Launcher will not cycle

6,9,12

2.

"Operate" indicator light does not illuminate when "Main Power" switch on turret control panel assembly is moved to "ON".

8,12.

3.

Turret assembly runs to either an azimuth or elevation limit when turret control panel assembly and sight assembly switches are on.

8.

4.

Turret assembly will not follow sight assembly in azimuth and/or elevation.

8,10,12

5.

Turret assembly oscillates in either azimuth or elevation.

8.

VOL 1I

10-36

TABLE 10-35

M5 COMMON FAILURE MODES((Continued) COMPONENT AT FAULT

FAILURE MODES

6.

Sight reticle image does not flash when turret assembly is at an azimuth or elevation 1lmit, when turret assemably position is more than 35 mils in error with psoition of sight assembly, or when sight assembly is in operating position but mount assemb;.,, control switch is not closed.

8.

7.

Launcher drive motor does not apply braking force properly to grenade launcher

7,9,9.

TABLE 10-36

VOL II

L

M5 SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

m..

Aircraft AC and DC power (voltage to M5 --.ubsystem)

2.

Launcher motor load (current)

3.

Azimuth and elevation motor loads (current)

4.

Sight azimuth signal out

5.

Sight elevation signal out

6.

Servo ap., azimuth signal out

7.

Servo amp.

8.

Airspeed

9.

Launcher wount vibration

elevation signal out

10.

Turret azimuth feedback signal

11.

Turret elevation feedback signal

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-4

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'Li .0 0W

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CJ040

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[-.

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S.0 14 w

C.)

-4

-

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>~ 0

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44 0

10.2.2

ARMAMENT COST BENEFITS

Although no maintenance data were available to allow quantification of the cost effectiveness of AIDAPS application to armament systems, itative benefits can be achieved. a)

significant qual-

Some of these are:

The frequency of misfires will be reduced.

This is particularly important

during combat engagement of targets of opportunity. b)

Selection of alternate weapons in the event of primary weapon failure can be accomplished on a more timely basis.

c)

Fault isolation can be accomplished without extensive ground testing.

10.2.3

)

AIRCRAFT-ARMAMNT INTERFACE

It is recognized that most of the Army armament systems are not a permanent part of any particular aircraft. As was shown in Table 10-8, several of the systems can be installed on more than one aircraft, and most can be removed from the aircraft when the need arises.

Selection of AIDAPS parameters is

made with this interface problem in mind.

The bulk of the parameters selected

are represented by electrical signals and can be taken from equipment installed, within the aircraft or by wiring that already exists between the aircraft and the external store location.

Some new wiring must be added as is the case with

vibration sensors mounted on guns installed in external poles. routing can follow existing paths.

New sensors required,

However,

wire

such as vibration

pickup, load shunts, etc., can be permanently installed and become a part of the armament system and not the aircraft. 10.2.4

StWARY

Results of the AIDAPS analysis on the seven representative armament systems indicate that many key performance parameters are commion to similar equipment. Specifically,

the study has shown the following ground rules should be followed

when AIDAPS parameter selection is made: a)

Remotely fired automatic single and multi-barrel machine gun mounting • , , 1. monitored during gun operation as an aid in sensing early deterioration of gun components.-----

VOL II

10-39

--

__

I

b)

Automatic guns,

grenade launchers,

II

turreý mountings and elpctric drive

motor loads should be monitored to deeect motor deterioration and excessive' drag buildup of ammunition feed systems and aiming linkages. c)

Sighting station output signals,

amplifier signals (where applicable)

and mount po'sition feedback signals should be simultaneously monitored to aid in d)

the diagnosis of sighting subsystelm faults.

Armament system power supply bus voltage (either aircraft armament feed bus or internal battery bus) should be monitoredduring firing to detect degradation of the power supply.

e)

Rocket and guided.missile circuits (ignition, frequently-verified

ejection, etc.) should be

to confirm the weapons subsystems are in working order,

and to permit rapid fault isolation of a misfire or hang-fire occurs.. In addition. to the five basic parameter selection ground rules listed above, other equally important special parameters' wiich are unique to gach spedific armament system should be included In summary,

parameters were selected primarily on the basis of their ability

to determine the safety and reliability of components Parameters were also selected so that if

for the next missiont.

a failure does occur,

the defect can

be rapidly isolated, to a line replaceable unii without the need to 'operate the system on the ground.' 10.3

AIDAPS

-

SPECIAL TOOLS AND GSE STUDY

This report pre.3ents the results of a study: conducted to determine the extent to which the ground support equipment (GSE) Army aircraft maintenance

inventory at the various

levels can be reduced or eliminated.

is

made that an Automatic' Inspection,

is

installed on each of the aircraft being maintained.

study, a representative detailed examina:tion.

Diagnostic and Prognostic System (AIDAPS)

As part of this effort the Army's TAMMS data for the the aircraft subsystems

the bulk of the maintenance being performed.

VOL II

For purposes ,of this

ailcraf,t (the Bell UH-lH helicopter) was-chosen for

UH-lH were analyzed, :o determine

then compiled

The assumption

from maintenance publications,

that accoubted for

Lists of special UH-IH GSE were and a survey was conducted to

10-40

I

I

~determine locations of this equipment within the Army's mtaintenance structure.

:

Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning AIDAPS effect on the GSE inventory. Examination of the UH-1 TANKS data indicated that the engine and powertrain * ,subsystems

account for over 80 percent of the maintenance performed on the

vehicle as shown in Figure 10-1.

In order to analyze the most important main-

tenance areas in more detail, and to determine those components requiring the most ground support equipment, only the engine and the transmission/rotor were analyzed in depth. 10.3.1

BASIC TOOLS

The Army aviation maintenance system is

supported by a number of different

tool sets, each used for a specific purpose at a specific maintenance level. Basic hand tool sets are issued to the individual mechanics at the organize-

of

tional level. *

These tool sets include hand wrenches, hammers, screw drivers,

elementary socket vets, etc., that are not peculiar to any specific aircraft. In addition to these basic tools, each organization is also authorized supplemental tool sets based on the type of aircraft being serviced *.nri repaired. ,Although these tool sets are issued on the basis of aircraft type, :hey still fall into the category of multi-purpose equipment. Direct Support (DS) an,: 1!eneral Support (GS) maintenance units are issued basic too, kits similar to organizaticnai level kits.

They also receive main-

tenance s!ýop sets that reflect special functions such as working with sheet

C) -

metal, hydraulics, avionics, etc.

The )S shop sets are considered to be port-

able and are easily naved frop site to site. 10.3.2

SPECIAL TOWS

Otrer groups of zal-tesaasce tcols fall t-to the category of special, sizglepurpos

Zevices desi&xbt for use oa a s-ecific aircraft type,

(MnS)_

The grorps that

=s&, or'aaizations zm

_e issmd tbse special, single-p~xposee tools are the

theiES ad

Izatina are daplitated at the ID

GS &=nits. Special WoIs issmd " to a,""-

C6 S lerels if Zbe W3and GS tzits do reguiar

=a!:e~~e on the sane a1izcrift.

-

-Ž,#

-

"~,.,

acdel, a:nd series

-,-

4

-.

Oi3

p

40

DATA BASED Oil PAINTU~ME Ha PER IWOO FLT. MRS.

~F1ME 10-1 UIJE-laIUL&TM~EXANCZAPS

-

TM

u10-42

10.3.3

GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMEN

Specific ground handling, test and service equipment, more commonly known as ground support equipment (GSE),

is authorized at the DS and GS levels as

well as the organizational level.

Equipment in this category ranges from a

simple, hand-held material hardness tester to an engine fuel control test stand.

More specifically, GSE consists of equipment in the following groups.

a)

Ground Handling and Servicing

b)

Electrical and Instruments

c)

Structural Repairs and Flaw Detection

d)

Power Plants and Propellers

e)

Hydraulic and Pneumatic

f)

Fuel, Oil and Oxygen None of this GSE is unique to a specific type model or series of aircraft

Instead, adapters are supplied where required when using being maintained. the equipment to test or service two or more different models or series of For example, a full control test bench can be used to test more hardware. than one model of fuel control by simply using different drive plate adapters. 10.3.4

Wd-lH SPECIAL TOOLS AND GSE

UH-IH special tools and GSE for the organizational, DS and GS levels are shown in the following tables: tools.

Table 10-38 lists UH-lH organizational special

Table 10-39 lists special tools used on the engine subsystem.

Table

10-40 lhsts test and ground support equipment for use in maintaining the engine subsystem. Table 10-41 lists organizational special tools, and Table 10-42 lists special tools to be used in =aintaining UH-lai transoission and rotorz.

Exa:inatlon of the preceeding tables showbs that the usage of the Multimeter (AVIP5±v'B) and the Ohb=eter (NV-77E) cculd possibly be reduced it an AIDAP Syste= were installed to monitor tUe UE.-IH engine.

instruczts would still All of tkh

other special tools a--

actual -aintezmanc s;zi

a-

=,

be required ir the special tool and GS

tuase t--o Choer, =E in-.entory.

listed -ould aLso be required to support

actions that am AID~n iz icapable of aZCCoPlL-sbiv&

in a

ezam=i=atinn of the 1isits of specia! tools needed for tS-12

transmission and rotor maiLtenance (Tables 10-41 and 10-42) indicates that none of the tools can be eliminated from stock as a result of an AIDAPS installation. 10.3.5

CONCLUSIONS - SPECIAL TOOLS AND OSE STUDY

Army policy dictates that a complete set of special tools and GSE as outlined in the Army TH 55 manuals be available at cach working site. a maintenance section doing repair work on the UN-l.

For example,

helicopter is allowed one

full set of special tools as called out in TM55-1520-210-20. Installation of an AIDAPS on the UH-iH would result in the fault isolation and identification of a number of LRU's on the aircraft at the organizational level, but could not reduce the number of special tools required for fault repair after fault isolation.

The basic reason for this conclusion centers

around the Army's need to do the bulk of its aircraft repair work in the field and, where necessary, under battle conditions.

AIDAPS will reduce the amount

of maintenance recuired due to its ability to automatically perform inspection, diagnosls and prognosis.

However,

it

cannot reduce the need for special tools

and GSE used to accomplish need repairs in the field. identify the maintenance problem, it

An AIDAPS can only

cannot actually perform the maintenance

action required.

0

Qj)

TABLE 10-38 ENGINE SUBSYSTEk2 UH-lH ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIAL TOOLS REF: Amy TH55-1520-210-20

PART, MODEL OR MIL'DES

NOMENCLATURE

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

LTCT99

Installation & Removal Tool

Accessory drive gearbox maintenance

LTCT100

Oil Seal Installation & Removal Tool

LrCT270

Acces,_ ory Gearbox Seal Installer

LTCT501 & 511

Seal Installation Tool(s)

LTCT 3648

Seal Removal Tool

AN/PSM6B

Multimeter

Check continuity of 6-probe exhaust thermocouple

W-77E

Ohmneter

Check continuity of 3-probe exhaust thermocouple assembly

LTCT2051

Fuel Harness Wrench

Maintenance-engine fuel manifold

LTCT4174

Alignment fixture for atomizer parts

SPTIO7

Clea;ning Fixture-Oil Fixture

LTCT215

Face Spanner Socket

oil system naintenance

Wre--ch LTCr4457

Socket Adapter

Ignitinm System

SID-63557

Puller

Fuel Corolaintenance

L=C"6763

L=C4174

L 461

Cold Weather Trim

Cmbmztioca cbamer

"FtI

TABLE 10-39

ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-1H DS AND GS SPECIAL TOOLS REF:

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35

"PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

"PART, NO4ENCLATURE

MODEL OR MIL DES

.LTCT100

Installing Tool

LTCT2079

Tool Socket and Pilot

LTCT107

Accessory Gear Spanner Wrench

LTCT208O

Face Spanner Wrench and Pilot

LTCTUl09

Face Spanner Socket Wrench

LTCT2086

Removing Tool

LTCTll5

Holding Fixture

LTCT2694

Staking Tool Assembly

LTCT1218

Mechanical Puller

LTCT2099

Backlash Gage

LTCT1409

Wrench

LTCT2l2

Mechanicai Puller

LTCT143

Mechanical Puller

LTCT2142

Mechanical Puller

LTCT153

Pcwer Turbine Locating Button Bar

LTCT215

Face Spanner Socket Wrench

LTCT1643 replaces LTCT385

Compressor Blade Drift Assembly

LTCT2161 replaces LTC=213

Gearshaft Nut Spanner Vrench

LTCT1644 replaces LTC090

Compress Blade Drift Assembly

LTCT231

Bearing Removing Tool

LTCT256

Compressor Rotor Disc Pin Installer

LTCT2020

ae c oe First 3tege Turbine Nozzle Maintenance Kit

ii

LTCT•58

NOMENCLATURE

IDriver

Wrench

LTCT270

Accessory Gearbox Seal installer

LTC-1021

Puller Mechanical

LTCT2037

Sha ftgear Assembly Holding Device

LTC13039

Power Shaft Bolt Measuring Tool

LTCr2O44

Overspeed Gearbox golding Device

LTC3167

Power Turbine Vibration Pick-up Mount Assembly

3LTCrO67

Mechanical Plaler

L=ET3492

Ll'iCI20 reaces

Stakim& Fixxt=e Assemibly urbimne

I2C=3636

LTCZ548

Wbeels

12104

ushimg Sleevre ftshing

-

)

TABLE 10-39' ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-ili DS AND GS SPECIAL TOOLS REF:

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35 (Continued)

PART, MODEL

PART, MODEL

OR MIL DES

;

NOMENCLATURE

OR MIL DES

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT2073

Mechanical Puller

LTCT3637

Seal Removal Tool

LTCT2075

Sun Gear Holding Fixture

LTCT3638

Output Shaft Seal Removal and Installation Tool

LTCT2076

Mechanical Puller LTCT3640

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3658

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3648

Seal Removal Tool

LTCT3659

Sleeve Bushing

SLTCT3654

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3660

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT4174

Combustion Cha-ber

LTCT3661

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3663

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3664

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT3665

Combustor Hoisting

replaces LTCT2089

Adapter

LTCf36F,5

LTCT3738

Alignment Fixture

LTCT4179

Compressor Rotor Blade Installation Tool

LTCT4181

Face Spanner Wrench

Socket Reduction Gear Assembly Lifting Fixture

Adapter and Guide

LTCT4182 replaces LTCT892

Power Turbine Rotor

LTC=4190

Spanner Wrench Assembly

Staking Tool Assembly

replaces LTCT719

LTCT3813

Kit

LTCE3833

Gearshaft Holder

replaces LTCT2039

LTCT433

Adapter Assembly

Asserbly

LTCT434

Aircraft Engine Maintenance Stand

LTCF393

Wrench

LTCT4

Holding Fixture

L-43938 rep laces LC1•463

Wrench

LTCT4533 rep laces LTC1576

Shaft Holding Fixture

Compressor Sbaft_

LTC14553

Torqueing Holdin.. Fixture

Installimg Tool

L--L=4560

Gear Ali&n2ez-t Fixture

LTC=4013

jFomazrd

Co-neI

_

_____i

TABLE 10-39

ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-Ili DS AND GS SPECIAL TOOLS REF:

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35 (Continued)

PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT4018

Gear Holding Fixture

LTCT4019

Ring Assembly

LTCT4044

Forward Seal Instal-

LTCT4568 LTCT4571

I

LTCT4155

Diffuser Housing Forward Seal Puller Compressor Rear Shaft Arbor

ling Tool

LTCT413

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT4572

Fuel Injector Disassembly Fixture

FtLTCT4576

Diffuser Housing Forward Seal Installing Tool Drive Gear Installation Tool

Metal Seal Ring

Compressor

LTCT4602

First and Second Stage Turbine Flange Finishing Adapter Kit

Retainer to Sun Gear Guide

LTCT461

Cold Weather Step Assembly

LTCT4677 replaces LTCT786

Removal Tool

LTCT4650

Turbine Rotor Hand Crank

4.TCT4670

Gearshaft Bearings Mechanicil Puller

LTCT4680

Mechanical Puller Locating Pin Removal Tool

I.TCT4b76 replaces LTC-T786

Nut and Cone Remo-al Kit

LTC74692

LTCT4696

Removal Kit

1,TCT509

Locking and Ujnlocking Cup T~ol Set

LTCT4718

Loop Clamp

LTCT4726

First Stage Turbine Rotor Removal Kit

LTGr511

Instailation Tool

LTCT5I9

Installer and Rerwler

LTC14172

I 'LTCT531

LTC.4800

Exhaust Diffuser

replaces

Assembly Mechanical

LTC12023

Puller

LTCr4809

Bearing Mechanical Puller

LTCL482

Installing Tool

VOL 1l

Removal Fixture ILTCT535

o

LTC5T

l

Ring Assezbly Blade

o-

2

Inlet Housing Vibration Pickup Adapter

Punch and Drift Kit

TABLE 10-39

ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-lH DS AND GS SPECIAL TOOLS REF:

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35 (Continued)

PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT675

Accessory Gearbox Mechanical Bearing Puller

LTCT68

Sleeve Bushing

LTCT891

Mechanical Puller

LTCT716

Overspeed Tachometer Drive Backlash Gage

LTCT716

Internal Wrenching Bolt

LTCT722

Seal Installation Tool

Holding Fixture

LTCT752

Planet Gear Rear Bearing Mechanical Puller

Output Gearshaft Holding Fixture

LTCT773

Engine Lifting Sling

LTCT4842 replaces LTCT4045

Spacer Mechanical Puller

LTCT4846 replaces LTCT4700

Seal Ring Mechanical Puller

LTCT/A895 replaces

Pin Removal Tool

VL£CT468 and LTCT504 Starter Drive Shaft

LTCT4904,

LTCT496 LTCT4947

replaces LTCT334

Removal and Installation Tool Bushing and Base Assembly

LTCT501 •:•LTCT863 LTCT505

°--•

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT79l

Seal Installing Tool

Interstage Airbleed

Face Spanner Socket Wrench

Actuator Test Stand

IZCTC910

ILTCT506

Compressor Shaft Rear Bearing Installing Tool

Face Spanner Sozket Wrench

LTCT9i5

Bracket Face Spanner Wrench

Assembly

I IXCT916

Mechanical Puller

XC1T962

Torque Adjustment

TQ-l

Torque Wrench

Fixture

TQ-6

Torque Wrench

]C40C

Ring Coqrersor

42M76

Stand

LTCI58

Power Turbine Assembly Fixture

uasm

Anchor nit Installation Tool

VOL 11

10-49

'I

"TABLE 10-40

ENGINE: SUBSYSTEM UH-lH DS AND GS TEST-AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REF:

"'PART,'MODEL OR MIL DES

ARMY TM- 55-1520-210-35

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

NOMENCLATURE

BHI12JA-16

Portable Jetcal Analyzer

Provide a means of checking exhaust thermocoup le

LTCT1452

Thermocouple Temperature Bulb Test Unit

To functional-test oil temperature bulb

LTCT2029

Reduction Gear Assembly Pressure Test Fixture

To aid in pressure checking output reduction carrier and gear assembly

LTCT2052

Test Fixture

To flow-check oil transfer tubes

Gearbox Test Fixture

To pressure-test accessory drive

replaces

LTCT425 LTCT207

gearbox LTCT216

Filter Test Fixture Assembly

To functional-test throttle assembly

LTCT313

Oil Flow Stand

To functional-test throttle assembly, and to flow-test oil supply nozzle assembly and output reduction carrier and gear assembly

LTCT3l5

Ignition Components Test Unit

To functional-test the lead and coil assembly, igniter plugs, oil tempera"ture bulb and exhaust thermocouple

LTCT3l6

Anti-Icing Components Test Stand

To functional-test hot air solenoid valve

LTCT317

Test Set

To functional-test wiring harness

LTCT340

Lube and Scavenge Pump. Test Stand

To functional-test power-driven rotary (oil) pump

BH361-5

Junction Box

To aid in functional testing of erizst thermocouple

BE3I6-8

Junction Box

To aid in functional testing of exhaust thermocouple

VOL

1113-50

L)

TABLE 10-40

ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-Hi DS AND GS TEST AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REF:

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35 TECHNICAL

PART, MODEL

DESCRIPTION

NOMENCLATURE

OR MIL DES LTCT415

Heater Probes Test

To provide a means of inducing heat

replaces BH996-40

Fixture

to thermocouple probes for test

LTCT421

Compressor Bleed Valve

To perform functional test of air-

Test Stand

bleed actuator

LTCT422

Torquemeter Oil Pump Test Stand

To functional-test lubrication Components

LTCT423

Test Fixture Adapter Assembly

To aid in functional test of powerdriven rot-ary (oil) pump

LTCT434

Vibration Check Tool

To check engine vtbration and identify the system which may be exceeding

vibration limits

(

I

aid in flow test of output reduccarrier and gear assembly

LTCT713

Support Assembly Test Fixture

LTCT744

Mobile Engine Test Unit

1, , cform ground operation or testing of engine

LTCT859

Valve Assembly Test Fixture

To aid in functional testing of combustion chamber drain valve

LTCT865

Pressure Test Mounting Stand

To mount oil filter to test stand for functional test

LTCT896

Holding Fixture

To hold igniter plug during functional test

T-12061

Water Tower Trailer Assembly

To provide facilities for extensive ground testing of engine after maintenance

TE12063

Mobile Engine Test Trailer

To provide f.scilities for extensive test of engine after maintenance-

LTCr2169

Union

't functional-test throttle assecbly

LICT2I7O

Handle

To functional-Lest throttle

VOL II

"'

10-51

assenbly

TABLE 10-40

ENGINE SUBSYSTEM UH-UtH DS AND GS TEST AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPME. REF:

PART, MODEL OR MIL DES

ARMY TM 55-1520-210-35

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

NOMENCLATURE

LTCT318

Console TesTer

'To functional-test exhaust thermocouple

BH/434-40

Heater Probes

To aid in functional-test of exhaust thermocouple

LTCT9271

Lead

*To aid in functional testing of lead and coil assemably

WV-77E

Ohmmeter

To perform continuity check of engine electrical system

11-6532

Adapter

To aid in functional-test of ignition unit

VOL II

10-52

TABLE 10-41 TRANSMISSIOh & ROTORS UH-lH ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIAL TOOLS REF: Army TM55-1520-210-20

PART,

MODEL DESCRIPTION

OR MIL DES.

NOMENCLATURE

TECHNICt

T100220

Lifting Slings

Remove - Install main rotor, hub and blade assembly, and stabilizer bar assembly.

T101358

Wrench ".dapter

T101402

Grip Positioning Link Splined Wrench

ST101306 k

"'10 1419

Alignment Tool Set

TtO1420

Holding Fixture

T]01400

Leveling Jacks

Tl)1452

Maintenance Hoist

TI01414

Wrench

T101402

Grip Positioning Links$

VOL II

4

Remove elace• ) - repair main drive shaft.

Remove main rotor blade

10-53

TABLE 10-42

TRANSMISSION & ROTORS UH-IH & GS SPECIAL TOOLS REF:

PART MODEL OR NIL DES

Army TM551-1520-210-35

NOMENCLATURE

Remove-install transmission

SWE13855

Stand

SWE13855-40

Adapter

T100929

Jack Screws

T101488

Wrench

T101308

Jack Screws *

T101304

Adapter

T101303

Socket

T101965

Power Wrench

T101068

Anchor Plate

T1014J'

Wrench

T101338

Jack Screws

T101307

Wrench *

T101455

Fixture *

T101336

Wrench *

T101388

Jack Screws

T101365

Fiuxture

T101449

Wrench

T101486

Trim Tab Bending Tool

T101402

Grip Positioning Links

T101356

Buildup Bench

VL II"-__

VOL 110-,-

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

Ii

Remove-install intermediate gearbox drive, quills

*Remove-instaUl gearbox

I

ta.il rotor

Repair main rotor blades

I

TABLE 10-42

TRANSMISSION & ROTORS IJH-lH & GS SPECIAL TOOLS (Continued)

PART MODEL OR MIL DES

NOMENCLATURE

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

T101400

Supi 4ort Assembly

T101401

Scope Assembly

T101474

Grip Spacing Gage

7A050

Hoist Support Structure

Repair main rotor blades

IFit TI01424

Bearing Removal Bar

T101392

Wrench Assembly

T101382

Ram Adapter

T101369

Support Assembly

T101407

Seal Bearing Tool

7HEL065 7HEL153 7A050

Kit, Blade Balancing

7HEL053

Kit, Balancing

(.j)

VOL II

Assemble-disassemble-sc issc rs and sleeve assembly

Tail Rotor Hub and Blade Remove-Rep lace

i0-55

i

U

11.0

FUTURE AIRCOAFT DESIGN CRITERIA

This section presents the design criteria for providing an efficient AIDAPS installation in the HIM and UTTAS air,:raft.

The selected AIDAPS for these air-

the modular, Universal Hybrid I AIDAPS described in Section 5.

craft is

It was requested that, in addition to the ten aircraft selected for detailed evaluation in this study,

the AH-56A helicopter be examined briefly and a pre-

liminary judgeLent be made regardi.ig the application of an AIDAPS to this The results of this effort are also presented in this section.

vehicle.

HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER (HLI)

11.1

I11.1.1

DESIGN CRITERIA

AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION

Throughout the course of this study the HLH was assumed to have the following characteristics.

The HLA wiil

be powered by three gas turbine engines of

advanced design mounted on cop of the fuselage to minimize the visibility of engine exhaust to ground observers,

and to reduce ingestion of sand, dust, grass

and other foregin objects into the engine air induction system.

The HLH will be

capable of maintaining forward flight in the event of a loss of a single gas turbine.

A gas turbine auxiliary power plant will provide ground starting of

the engines and ground operation of the hydraulic and electrical systems. Engine torque will be L.:ansmitted through a system of gear boxes and drive shafts to the rotors.

The main gear box will reduce the engine RPM and interconnect the

engines to the tandem rotor system. transporting the heavy load. as Figure 11-1.

A cargo hook assembly will be provided for

The anticipated general HLH configuration is

shown

Any alterations to the assumptions outlined above will obviously

affect the details of the selected AIDAPS and the associated parameter list. 11.1.2

RECOMMENDED PARAMETER LIST AND HARDWARE DESCRIPTION

A tentative list of sensors and their general location is

The estimated weight of the sensor and wire, as well as the estimated

11-1.

incremental costs and the Weighted Sensor Count (WSC), summed.

II

are also tabulated and

The suggested hardware physical characteristics and estimated equip-

ments costs are indicated i,- Table 11-2.

VOL

provided in Table

[--251-6"--- 29'-6"

/

ri

Rotors

23'

1 5Fully K position I Normal Ground Line

'Extended Gear Ground Line

FIGURE 11-1 VOL II

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TABUl

11-3

Si]GGESTm VOICE iARNIN] MESSAGES FOR THE HLM

PRIORITY

MESSAGE

1*

LOAD ERROR

2

FIRE, ENGINE FIRE

3*

HOT START

4*

ENGINE ONE OUT

5*

ENGINE TWO OUT

6*

(3 position switch either excessive C.G. shift or overload, as function of total weight, pressure aititude and ambient temperature, before liftoff, yields warning light. Pilot determines which condition by witching either direction from neutral position, similarly to chip switch for 420/920 gearbox and transmission on UK-!). (any engine actirates)

(a-.y engine activates)

ENNE THMEE OUT

7*

ECT ONE HIGH

8*

ECT TWO HIGH

9*

ECT THREE HIGH

10*

NI ONE LOW

11*

N1 TWO LOW

12*

N1 THREE LOW

13

SPARE

14*

SAS OUTI

15*

TRANSMISSION SHIPS

16*

ENGINE CHIPS

17*

TRANSMISSION OIL PRESSURE IOW

18*

ENG TNr, ONE OIL PRESSURE LOW

19*

ENGINE TWO OIL PRESSURE LOW

VOL II

(3 position switch which differentiates between basic rotor transmissions and common transmissions (see "Load Error" above).

(any engine)

11-13

(any transmission)

TABLE i1-3

PRIORITY

(Continmdf

MESSAGE

20*

EMGI-

21*

TOt.E JENGINflE OWERTORQUE

22*

HYDRAULIC PRESSRE LOW

23*

FUEL P3ES513E LOWI

24*

BO ST ONE OUr

25*

FUEL BOOST 1WO OUT

26*

FJEL BOOST THREE OUT

27*

"F"

28*

FUEL FILTER OKE CLOGGED

79*

FUEL FILTFR TWO CLGED

31fr

FUEL FILTER THRE CLOGGE

31*

AC GENERATOR ONE OUT

32*

AC GIERAIOR TWO OUT

33*

EXTERNAL POWER ON

34*

ICING

35*

ICE DETECTOR OUT

36*

AIR FILTER ONE CLOGGED

37*

AIR FILTER TWO CLOGGED

38*

AIR FILTER THREE CLOGGED

39*

1F

40*

CHECK CAUTION PANEL

THREE OIL PRESSUE LOW

(3-poitios

taiy eflginti)

FIJEL REKAfE k rD

FA ILURE

*Will be used by AII3APS

VOL II

(any esgine)

11-14

witch, 1, 2 am

utility)

11.2

V•SA

11.2.1

DESHX

MER2A

AIRCRAFT DESCZMICK

The Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft Syiten (UIrA)

is asssmd to be

a twin engine aircraft with one main rotor &adone anti-torque rotor. The gas turbine engines each have a separate tranmissicu. The output torque from eech engine transaission is transmitted to the rotor via a combining tranmission.

A drive shaft from the combini4 transmission drives an inter-

modiate gear box which in turn drives a 90" Sear box for operation of the rotor system.

Additional information available from the PM

ail

has also been

utilized in definiog this vehicle for application of an AIDAPS. 11.2.2

2F

M0

ED PARAITERS AND AIDAPS lhAARE DESCIR'rITO

R/ecomended system parameters for the UlmrAS, the sensors involved ar4 their general locations are shown in Table 11-4.

The estimated weight of the rensor

ad necessary wiring as well as Che incremental cost and the WSC are also naed. The last colmn designates whether the parameter is one that is usually instrumented on an aircraft, or is one that woul- be primar.ily necessary for AIDAPS. The estimated cost columns reflect only a mall incremental cost if

the sensor

would be found on the aircraft, while the full procurement cost is assumed if the sensor will be added axclusively for AIDAPS. Table 11-5 gives the airborne hardware physical charcteristics for both airborne and hybrid systems, and a preliminary estimate of costs.

VOL II

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