Idea Transcript
Rocky Intan joined CSIS in January 2014. His research mainly concerns geopolitical developments and global political economy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He has been involved in numerous research projects such as the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), Human Security in Southeast Asia, Maritime Security in East Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, he has assisted various activities of Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Indonesia. He has also assisted the coordination of Bali Trade and Development Symposium, cooperating with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) of Geneva. He received his B.A. in International Relations from Pelita Harapan University, focusing on global political economy and international trade. In his undergraduate days, he participated in various national and international Model United Nations competitions such as Indonesia MUN and Harvard National MUN. His thesis was on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the framework of American foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
Rocky Intan joined CSIS in January 2014. His research mainly concerns geopolitical developments and global political economy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He has been involved in numerous research projects such as the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), Human Security in Southeast Asia, Maritime Security in East Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, he has assisted various activities of Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Indonesia. He has also assisted the coordination of Bali Trade and Development Symposium, cooperating with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) of Geneva. He received his B.A. in International Relations from Pelita Harapan University, focusing on global political economy and international trade. In his undergraduate days, he participated in various national and international Model United Nations competitions such as Indonesia MUN and Harvard National MUN. His thesis was on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the framework of American foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
Since the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia has been struggling against the threat of violent terrorism. As the Indonesian government has developed a counterterrorism strategy, it has sought to address both the immediate threat and underlying causes of terrorism. Indonesia's multipronged approach to counterterrorism and continued efforts to thwart radicalism provide valuable examples for other nations. Terrorism in Indonesia Radicalism, spurred by extremist religious teachings, has become the primary challenge of Indonesia's counterterrorism campaign. Given Indonesia's social diversity, radical preachers often deliver messages of hate and violence. With the growing threat of religious intolerance and radicalism, the Indonesian government is coordinating and developing coherent counterradicalization programs in order to revitalize "national resilience" against venomous radical ideology. No longer do terrorist groups affiliate themselves with a global cause or ideology; rather, they mostly emerge from the splinters of Jemaah Islamiyah (http://magz.tempo.co/konten/2010/03/24/LU/20449/A-Nationwide-Terrorist-Network/30/10) and Darul Islam (http://magz.tempo.co/konten/2011/05/04/LU/22728/Web-of-Terror/36/11). The current generation (http://magz.tempo.co/konten/2011/03/23/HK/22498/-TERRORISM--The-Student-Terrorist-fromBuntalan/30/11) of Indonesian jihadists also comes from ordinary public schools rather than Islamist boarding schools (pesantren), and they often form from small but radical religious study groups (pengajian) in different parts of the country. Similarly, the main bases of terrorist operations in the country have also shifted to Poso region in central Sulawesi. Alongside these transformations, notable trends have emerged in recent terrorist threats in Indonesia. First, the police have become the main target of terrorist plots and attacks. In December 2012, for instance, a police patrol was ambushed by gunmen in Tambarana, Poso, causing the deaths of four officers. Recent incidents have also taken place in areas outside Poso, including Jakarta. These include the violent attack (https://yosefardi.biz/police-shot-todead-at-front-of-kpk-office/) against a policeman in front of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) building on September 11, 2013. Second, despite their ideological distinctions, relationships between jihadist fighters and religious vigilante groups have emerged. The Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)—a militant Islamist organization has allegedly served (http://magz.tempo.co/konten/2010/03/24/LU/20446/-Deadly--Recruitment-Drive-/30/10) as the liaison among the likeminded radicals through lectures by radical preachers who instill in their audience a commitment to jihad. In recent years, violence against minority groups has taken place in various parts of Indonesia. Attacks against Ahmadiyya and Shia believers have claimed lives and displaced hundreds, and Christian communities continue to experience intimidation by radical Islamists. These incidents provide opportunities for the jihadist groups to recruit new operators and enhance their influence in society. Indonesia's Counterterrorism Regime In light of these threats, the Indonesian government has sought to broaden the scope of its counterterrorism campaign, including the involvement the Indonesian military (TNI). Currently, however, the responsibility for counterterror operations remains under the Indonesian police, particularly the unit Detachment-88. As of 2012, this elite counterterrorism unit has successfully captured hundreds of terrorist suspects and confiscated their weapons across the Indonesian archipelago.
Source: adapted from a presentation by Muhammad Tito Karnavian, former Deputy of National Agency for CounterTerrorism (BNPT) at the Focus Group Discussion on "Indonesia's Security Index" organized by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), 14 August 2012. More recently, the newly appointed TNI Chief, General Moeldoko, put forward the military's plan to establish a counterterror taskforce. The new unit will be assembled (http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/09/04/055510203/TNI-toEstablish-Anti-terror-Squad) from troops with relevant skills for special operations on ground, sea and air, and each respective division of the armed services will retain command of these soldiers during peacetime. The National Coordinating Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT) will also take advantage (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/06/army-play-bigger-role-combating-terrorism.html) of the army's extensive territorial structure for counterradicalization and intelligence gathering purposes. While improving the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations, Indonesian authorities have also been working on deradicalization and counterradicalization strategies. A recent report (http://www.academia.edu/4419321/Prison_Problems_Planned_and_Unplanned_Releases_of_Convicted_Extremists_in_Indonesia) suggests that many convicted Indonesian terrorists are due for release after serving time in prison. Given the grave danger of terrorist recidivism, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights seeks to reform the correction system and improve the physical condition of many prisons in Indonesia as part of its deradicalization program for terrorist inmates. As the terrorist groups are also adapting to the new environment and beginning to update their operations and targets, Indonesia has developed a comprehensive counterterrorism approach. The capture of ex-terrorist convicts, including Lutfi Haedaroh (aka Ubaid) and Abdullah Sunata in 2010 shows the importance of addressing the overall environment that breeds religious extremism and terrorist activities. In that sense, the Indonesian government has begun incorporating persuasive measures to tackle the dissemination of radical religious doctrines and discriminative sentiments at the grassroots level. Indonesia's Experience: Lessons for Global Counterterrorism Indonesia has come a long way, but still faces the threat of terrorism in the future. The country's porous land and sea borders, endemic criminality and residual radical views continue to provide an attractive logistical and operational theatre for terrorist networks. Weaknesses are also looming from the suboptimal interagency cooperation, especially between the police and military, due to conflicting spheres of jurisdiction and functional confusion arising from the laws mandating domestic security role for the military. Nevertheless, Indonesia's experiences in tackling the threats of religious radicalism and terrorism are invaluable and relevant for other nations. As a result of its counterterror offensive, Indonesia today is less susceptible to major terrorist attacks than it was in the early 2000s. In particular, there are three lessons from the country's counterterrorism that can be applied at the global level. First, Indonesia addresses the threats of terrorism through the lens of law enforcement. With this approach, the Indonesian government seeks to try terrorist suspects according to the existing laws while modestly using coercive measures against violent terror attacks. To its credit, the police's counterterror squads have been successful in conducting raids, capturing terrorist suspects, and canceling their plots in recent years. Second, given the sensitivity of military force employment, the Indonesian government carefully engages the TNI in the counterterrorism campaign. To date, the military has played a crucial role in intelligence gathering. It also contributes to counterradicalization programs through civic missions in conflict-prone areas. Third, as the threat of terrorism evolves, the Indonesian government enhances its counterterrorism strategy. In addition to counterterror operations, it undertakes a persuasive approach—including prison reform, rehabilitation programs and counter-propaganda. The purpose of these measures is to disengage terrorist convicts from future terrorism activities and prevent or disrupt the radicalization process of Indonesian society. In a nutshell, an overarching focus of counterterrorism strategy is critical for all nations to address the evolving threats of terrorism.
Iis Gindarsah a Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta. He holds a Master degree on Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (2010). He also earned a Master degree on International Relations from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia (2009). His research interests includedefense transformation,military technological innovations, civil-military relationsand regional security complex in East Asia. His essays and commentaries on these subjects have been publishedin edited volumes, peer-reviewed journal and media outlets—includingContemporary South East Asia, Defense and Security Analysis,and The Jakarta Post.
Iis Gindarsah a Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta. He holds a Master degree on Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (2010). He also earned a Master degree on International Relations from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia (2009). His research interests includedefense transformation,military technological innovations, civil-military relationsand regional security complex in East Asia. His essays and commentaries on these subjects have been publishedin edited volumes, peer-reviewed journal and media outlets—includingContemporary South East Asia, Defense and Security Analysis,and The Jakarta Post.
Yose Rizal Damuri, Head of the Department of Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research activities focus on international trade, regional integration and globalization of value chain. He is active in several research and advisory networks both in Indonesia and in East Asia, such as Indonesia Service Dialogue (ISD) and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). Yose also teaches International Economics courses at the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia. In addition, he occasionally writes in local and national newspapers. He received his Bachelor of Economics from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. He continued his study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra and got his Master of Economics of Development (MEcDev). He received his PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, Switzerland.
Yose Rizal Damuri, Head of the Department of Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research activities focus on international trade, regional integration and globalization of value chain. He is active in several research and advisory networks both in Indonesia and in East Asia, such as Indonesia Service Dialogue (ISD) and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). Yose also teaches International Economics courses at the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia. In addition, he occasionally writes in local and national newspapers. He received his Bachelor of Economics from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. He continued his study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra and got his Master of Economics of Development (MEcDev). He received his PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, Switzerland.
Rocky Intan joined CSIS in January 2014. His research mainly concerns geopolitical developments and global political economy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He has been involved in numerous research projects such as the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), Human Security in Southeast Asia, Maritime Security in East Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, he has assisted various activities of Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Indonesia. He has also assisted the coordination of Bali Trade and Development Symposium, cooperating with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) of Geneva. He received his B.A. in International Relations from Pelita Harapan University, focusing on global political economy and international trade. In his undergraduate days, he participated in various national and international Model United Nations competitions such as Indonesia MUN and Harvard National MUN. His thesis was on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the framework of American foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
Every year, during the anniversary of the Asian-African Conference (AAC), there are calls for more South-South cooperation and solidarity. Every year, there are calls for more trade between Asian and African countries and, every year, such aspirations don’t get very far. This year is no exception. During the 60th anniversary commemoration of the AAC, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo called for the revival of cooperation between Asian and African nations, within the framework of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), which marked the 10th anniversary. Support for Palestinian independence, regarded as one of colonialism’s last remnants, was also loudly voiced. And this year, Indonesia will not do much to follow through on this. This is not because Indonesia does not believe in South-South cooperation and solidarity. But not all noble goals have a place in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Geography, not level of development or solidarity, defines foreign policy. As such, Indonesia’s relations with countries in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific as a whole will continue to matter more than its relations with fellow developing countries. This is best articulated in the concentric circles formula for Indonesia’s foreign policy. As explained by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, the formula bases the importance of countries within the country’s foreign policy on their geographical proximity. Countries with similar geographical importance to the country are grouped into the same concentric circle. In turn, each concentric circle is put into hierarchical order. The first concentric circle is Southeast Asia, as the home region of Indonesia, consisting of the 10 countries of ASEAN. The second is the South Pacific, namely Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, Australia and New Zealand. The third is East Asia, consisting of China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. Within this framework, Indonesia’s other relationships are also recognized. Indonesia’s bilateral relationships with the United States and European countries should be nurtured due to their importance in the global order. So should legacy and multilateral relationships such as the AAC, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation, the Group of Twenty, etc. A case might be made that East Asia deserves the second circle rather than West Pacific. Yet, the insight from the framework holds: Geographical proximity must be the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This is not to say the goals of the AAC and Indonesia’s national interests are apart. As part of its legacy relationships, Indonesia should ensure the AAC and its goals are achieved. As shown by President Jokowi’s speech, it can be a useful forum to shore up the support of developing countries to collectively advocate for the reform of the global economic order. But it should be no wonder that Indonesia does not spend as much time and energy on the AAC as it does on ASEAN. There might be individual initiatives here and there, but necessity will correct such deviations. To illustrate the point, one should compare the NAASP and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Even though the AAC took place in 1955, it was only in 2005 that the NAASP was founded, a gap of 50 years. In contrast, ASEAN was founded in 1967, yet AFTA was already signed in 1992, a gap of 25 years. Also bear in mind the deeper integration efforts with the arrival of the ASEAN Economic Community this year. It is clear where the country’s priorities lie. It is more important for Indonesia that the sea-lanes of communication in the South China Sea remain open than assisting the Palestinians to gain independence. It is more important for the country that tension in the East China Sea is subdued than ensuring Boko Haram is defeated. It is more important for the country that the Chinese economy keeps growing than helping the poor in Zimbabwe. The AAC does not go very far because in international politics, neither does solidarity. This article originally appeared in the Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/04/why-asian-africansolidarity-goes-only-so-far.html).
Rocky Intan joined CSIS in January 2014. His research mainly concerns geopolitical developments and global political economy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He has been involved in numerous research projects such as the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), Human Security in Southeast Asia, Maritime Security in East Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, he has assisted various activities of Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Indonesia. He has also assisted the coordination of Bali Trade and Development Symposium, cooperating with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) of Geneva. He received his B.A. in International Relations from Pelita Harapan University, focusing on global political economy and international trade. In his undergraduate days, he participated in various national and international Model United Nations competitions such as Indonesia MUN and Harvard National MUN. His thesis was on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the framework of American foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
The Pacific and Indian Ocean (Pacindo) region is in flux. The on-going geopolitical transformation is plagued with uncertainties. The final outcome of the process is still subject to speculation among academics and policymakers. That process, however, could lead to more tension in major power relations in the region, before a new regional order emerges. Ensuring peaceful strategic adjustments has become a key challenge for the region. The current trajectory in the relationship between the US and China has not been encouraging. They might fall into a “Thucydides’ trap” of a power struggle between a rising power and a ruling power. We have seen some indications that the US-China relationship will become more and more competitive. The good news is that both sides are also trying hard to prevent strategic rivalry from becoming a dominant element in their bilateral relationship. The ongoing geopolitical transformation also has its own regional dynamic. The relationship among regional major powers is also undergoing some fundamental changes. China and Japan are still finding it difficult to reach a modus vivendi in their relationship. The relationship between Japan and South Korea has not been an easy one. The emergence of India as a regional power might also create some difficulties in its relationship with China. Indonesia’s determination to become a global maritime fulcrum will also have some impact on the region. Amid rising concerns over the future of regional order in the Pacindo region, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activities to manage the changing geopolitical landscape. For one, ASEAN has begun to see the need for reform and greater institutionalization in order to maintain its centrality. ASEAN is also reviewing the East Asia Summit (EAS) with a view to strengthening it so that the EAS can become more relevant to future challenges. The region needs an EAS that is well equipped to withstand the challenges stemming from shifting power relations. The major powers themselves are also taking some steps to address issues among them. The US and China, for example, clearly recognize the importance of having a positive relationship. India and China have taken steps toward improving their cooperation. Japan and South Korea are in the process of thawing their bilateral relationship. China and Japan, after the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the Asia-Africa Commemorative Summit in Jakarta in April, have also maintained some level of communication among their leaders. All these diplomatic initiatives clearly suggest that regional powers do recognize the importance of managing the ongoing strategic transition in a peaceful manner. Despite the goodwill and such recent encouraging initiatives, one should not be complacent. The future of the Pacindo region is still far from certain. Three challenges still require careful handling. First, the relationship among major powers is still marred by the difficult problem of territorial disputes. Second, as their economies are on the rise, nationalism has also become visible. Third, with growing wealth comes national pride, and the desire to expand a nation’s influence in regional and global affairs. These three challenges, if not managed well, could serve as a recipe for conflict and rivalry. Consequently, the promise of an Asian century of peace and prosperity could be derailed. There is a need for four Asian powers to sit together and find a mechanism through which they can cooperate to shape the future of regional order. Indonesia, as a middle power in the Pacindo region, is well placed to undertake more active steps toward that goal. We have good relations with all the major regional powers. Indonesia, therefore, should not be a bystander waiting for others to decide on the future of the region. We must come up with fresh ideas and exercise intellectual leadership on this issue. One idea that Indonesia should consider is to convene an informal gathering of China, Japan and India, with Indonesia as the host, to discuss the future of the region. These four countries constitute the fulcrum of Asia’s stability and prosperity. Whether Asia will become a region of peace or a region of turmoil will rest on the ability of regional powers to work together. The promise of the Asian century is too valuable to be missed. The article originally appeared in the Jakarta Post. (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/15/insight-it-s-time-asian-fulcrum-four.html)
This week, Muhammadiyah, the oldest and second-largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, will hold its 47th congress in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The congress is significant for at least two reasons. This will be the first congress it has held since it turned 100 years old. For Muhammadiyah, it also means it needs to discuss the key challenges it is likely to face and what sort of institution-building steps it needs to take in order to overcome these challenges. In other words, during the congress, Muhammadiyah will have to decide what direction it will take over the next 100 years. During the congress Muhammadiyah will elect new 13 leaders, of which the position of chairman always attracts the most attention. The current chairman, Din Syamsuddin, cannot run again as he has served for two consecutive periods. Finding someone with the same qualifications as Din to lead Muhammadiyah will be a huge challenge. Din has indeed had a huge impact on the organization. In fact, under Din, Muhammadiyah has played a role beyond its traditional domain of education, health, social welfare and da’wah (preaching of Islam). It has expanded its role from a national player to an international actor. That international role has served as an important aspect that has not only shaped Indonesia’s international identity but has also defined the country’s international standing within the community of nations over the last 10 years. Indeed, the last decade was a difficult period for Indonesia. In the post-9/11 world, many in the West increasingly saw Islam as the source of the problem. Mutual suspicion ensued. As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia was faced with a set of complex challenges. The key challenge at that time was how to prevent a “clash of civilizations” and present Indonesian Islam as a moderate voice seeking to bridge the perception gap between the West and the Muslim world. The Indonesian government embarked on a foreign policy that sought to project the image of a moderate, tolerant and progressive Muslim country. Together with democracy, then foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda presented moderate Islam as a key asset in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The use of public diplomacy has been instrumental in projecting Indonesia as a moderating voice within the Muslim world and between the Muslim world and the West. Without the support of Muhammadiyah leaders, it would not have been possible for the Indonesian government to achieve such public diplomacy objectives. It was Muhammadiyah leaders, together with other moderate Muslim leaders in other organizations such Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) who played an instrumental role in presenting the moderate face of Indonesian Islam in the international arena. It was Muhammadiyah leaders who traveled around the world, engaged in many interfaith dialogues with various religious communities abroad and explained about Islam. Muhammadiyah’s role in shaping Indonesia’s international identity, however, went well beyond active participation in government-sponsored interfaith dialogues. There are two other areas where Muhammadiyah’s international engagement has been visible. First, on its own initiative, Muhammadiyah played an active role in peace-building initiatives in the region. For example, Muhammadiyah is active in contributing to the peace process in Mindanao in the Philippines and in southern Thailand. These sort of activities and involvement abroad have clearly strengthened the image of Indonesian Islam as rahmatan lil alamin (blessing to the world). Second, since 2005, Muhammadiyah has started to strengthen its capacity in disaster relief and management. Its expertise in this area has improved tremendously since then. Muhammadiyah has been involved in disaster relief efforts outside the country, most recently in Nepal. For Muhammadiyah, helping those in need in a post-disaster environment is a duty. Again, from this kind of work, Muhammadiyah is seen as an embodiment of Indonesia’s Islam strongly anchored in the tradition of respecting universal humanitarian values. Din has been the key mover in these three areas of international engagement. Without his personal interest and engagement — with the support of growing numbers of young Muhammadiyah leaders such Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, Abdul Mu’ti, Rahma Hussein, Hilman Latief, and Fajar Ul-Haq — it would be difficult to imagine how interfaith dialogue, peace-building and disaster relief could have become a new core of Muhammadiyah’s contribution to Indonesia and the world. Chairman Din will soon hand over the leadership of Muhammadiyah to a new leader. We hope the next leader will demonstrate the same passion and vigor to preserve Muhammadiyah’s role as the bastion of moderation in Indonesia and the world. We salute chairman Din and welcome the next new chairman. This article originally appeared in the Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/04/insightmuhammadiyah-and-indonesia-s-international-identity.html).
On Sept. 5, negotiators from 12 countries in the Pacific Rim agreed to a trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Although a free trade agreement, it also covers a wide range of issues beyond trade, such as investment, government procurement and intellectual property rights. The agreement can be influential to world trade, as the economy of its 12 member countries accounts for around 11 percent of the world population and 37 percent of the global economy. These 12 countries are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States. The pact promises to usher in closer economic relations between members and become a benchmark for future trade deals. Although Indonesia has at times expressed interest, it has never been a part of the negotiations. And unlike Japan, neither did it join at later negotiating stages. Indonesia is paying a price for excluding itself from the TPP. First is the lost chance to shape the agreement. The TPP is an open-accession agreement; countries can join it later on. Given its benefits, Indonesia has expressed interest in joining the TPP on separate occasions. But countries that do will not be able to shape the agreed provisions. By not being a member since the TPP’s inception, Indonesia deprived itself of the ability to mold the provisions according to its national interests. For example, there are reports that some countries were pushing for provisions that afford 12 years of data exclusivity for pharmaceutical patent holders. As a developing country, Indonesia has an interest to lower this data exclusivity period in order to produce cheaper generic drugs for its populace. Indonesia lost the opportunity to influence this provision by not becoming a TPP negotiating member. Second is the potential trade diversion from the agreement. A free trade agreement tends to increase trade between members, called trade creation. Conversely, it tends to decrease trade between members and non-members, called trade diversion. The threat of trade diversion looms especially large between countries of similar profile in their export products. Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam are exporters of manufactured goods, such as textiles, automotive parts, tires and electronics. With Vietnam and Malaysia being members of TPP, producers of such manufactured goods there will gain preferential tariffs and better access to markets in the US and Japan. Better access translates to more orders and production. Such a threat to textile exports is especially alarming, as the US textile market is the largest for Indonesian exporters, accounting for 36 percent in 2014, according to data from the Indonesian Textile Association. By being excluded from the TPP, Indonesia’s manufacturing exports might stagnate and lose out to its peers in Vietnam and Malaysia. This also runs contrary to the goal of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to reorient Indonesia’s exports from commodities to manufactured goods. Considering the price Indonesia is paying, one might wonder why the government was not a TPP negotiating member. The perception that Indonesia ‘is not ready’ is often cited as the reason. TPP will require high standards in areas such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, government procurement and investor-state dispute settlement. Yet this argument can be easily reversed. The TPP can be used as an impetus for furthering Indonesia’s domestic reforms. It can be used as an opportunity to accelerate Indonesia’s service liberalization, strengthen its intellectual property rights regime, ensure efficiency and transparency in government procurement and spur much-needed foreign investment. The recent announcement by Trade Minister Thomas Trikasih Lembong that the country could join the pact in the next two years is welcome news. However, as explained in the first point above, Indonesia has lost the opportunity to shape the agreement. This calls for the government to pay attention to the timing of entering a pact and its negotiations. Yet, on the second point, the government can still prevent Vietnam and Malaysia from grabbing Indonesia’s market share in the US by joining the agreement. Indonesia could still reap the benefits from the TPP. This article originally appeared in the Jakarta Post. (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/20/trans-pacificpartnership-indonesia-s-lost-opportunity.html)
Rocky Intan joined CSIS in January 2014. His research mainly concerns geopolitical developments and global political economy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. He has been involved in numerous research projects such as the South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), Human Security in Southeast Asia, Maritime Security in East Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, he has assisted various activities of Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Indonesia. He has also assisted the coordination of Bali Trade and Development Symposium, cooperating with the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) of Geneva. He received his B.A. in International Relations from Pelita Harapan University, focusing on global political economy and international trade. In his undergraduate days, he participated in various national and international Model United Nations competitions such as Indonesia MUN and Harvard National MUN. His thesis was on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the framework of American foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
Of late, there have been suggestions that Indonesia under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is tilting toward China. Some have even suggested that the growing relationship between Indonesia and China constitutes a drastic departure from Indonesia’s long-standing position of maintaining equal relationships with all major powers. This new reading of Indonesia-China relations is generally based on three factors. First and foremost, President Jokowi’s efforts to attract Chinese investments to Indonesia, often cited as evidence that Indonesia is indeed gravitating toward China. Second, the accusation grew stronger when Indonesia supported and eventually joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Third, the decision to favor China over Japan for the high-speed train project connecting Jakarta and Bandung is seen by some as a final confirmation of the trend. This is a completely false reading of President Jokowi’s foreign policy. Indeed, critics often read his decisions and views regarding China in a simplistic way. President Jokowi, like all previous presidents, fully understands the sanctity of the principle of bebas-aktif (free and active) as the basic tenet of Indonesia’s foreign policy. At an operational level, the manifestation of the bebas-aktif principle in Jokowi’s foreign policy, and policy toward China in particular, seems to reflect two organizing principles: Economic/diplomatic “rebalancing” and “hedging” based on realistic calculations of national interests. Indonesia needs to integrate China, the world’s second largest economy, into the interface of Indonesia’s national and regional strategic interests. President Jokowi’s attempt to woo foreign investors is not unique to China alone. His messages to Indonesia’s partners and business community around the world have been consistent: This is the time to invest in Indonesia. This is the message to Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the European Union, Iran and so on. This is driven by clear national interest, namely the need for foreign direct investment to boost Indonesia’s development, especially in infrastructure. Regarding China, there is an additional dimension to the whole undertaking. Indonesia needs to convince China to participate more in its development so that it can match other partners’ contributions. In terms of investment, for example, there is still a huge gap between pledges and realized investment. According to Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) head Franky Sibarani, the implementation rate for China’s investment pledges stands at only 7 to 10 percent, far below Japanese and South Korean rates, both of which exceed 70 percent. In fact, only recently did China make it onto the list of Indonesia’s top 10 investors. China’s investment in Indonesia remains far behind that of other Indonesian partners. At the same time, Indonesia is not yet the main destination for Chinese investment. China’s investment in Indonesia is still far behind its investment in other East Asian countries. If Indonesia and China are serious about their comprehensive strategic partnership, this “double gap” needs to be corrected. Therefore, Jokowi’s overture to China should be seen as an attempt to encourage it to tilt more toward Indonesia; hence an economic rebalancing. The accusation that Indonesia is becoming increasingly “pro-China” is unfounded for two more reasons. First, Indonesia’s stance on the South China Sea dispute has been clear and consistent, always asking China to clarify the nine-dash line (NDL). In fact, the Indonesian government has made it clear that the NDL has no legal basis in international law. Also, Indonesia, along with fellow ASEAN countries, has expressed the view that the construction of artificial islands by China in the South China Sea is problematic. At the same time, Indonesia continues to work with China and ASEAN partners to speed up work on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. This position is clearly in line with Indonesia’s own strategic interests. Second, while security and defense cooperation with China is improving, Indonesia is doing the same with other strategic partners, especially the US and Japan. In fact, Indonesia’s political and security ties with the US and Japan are deeper than its ties with China. President Jokowi’s visits to Tokyo in March and to the US in October have strengthened those ties even further. Here, as a manifestation of diplomatic “rebalancing”, political and security cooperation between Indonesia and China needs to be further enhanced as well. All these developments reflect Indonesia’s strategy of diplomatic “hedging” in the face of strategic uncertainty in the region. In short, those who think that Indonesia is moving toward China should not underestimate Indonesia’s commitment to preserving its own strategic autonomy. As the region is increasingly fraught with uncertainty due to strategic transformations taking place in East Asia, it would be foolish for Indonesia to become a pawn in the game of great powers’ rivalries and quests for influence. The article originally appeared in the Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/12/11/insightis-indonesia-tilting-toward-china.html).
Yose Rizal Damuri, Head of the Department of Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research activities focus on international trade, regional integration and globalization of value chain. He is active in several research and advisory networks both in Indonesia and in East Asia, such as Indonesia Service Dialogue (ISD) and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). Yose also teaches International Economics courses at the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia. In addition, he occasionally writes in local and national newspapers. He received his Bachelor of Economics from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. He continued his study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra and got his Master of Economics of Development (MEcDev). He received his PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, Switzerland.
Haryo Aswicahyono is a researcher in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia. He is specializing in trade and industry issues. Haryo Aswicahyono received his Civil Engineering degree at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1983 and joined CSIS in 1985. In 1990, he continued his study at the postgraduate study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. He received his doctoral degree in 2000, with a thesis, ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia Manufacturing, 1975-1993’. After finishing his postgraduate study, he returned to work at CSIS.
A researcher in Department of Economics. Prior to rejoining CSIS in 2006, she worked in Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN) from 2000-2002 and as a consultant in SRW Asia, an HR consulting firm based in Jakarta. Her current works in CSIS mainly focus on regional integration and macroeconomics.
Haryo Aswicahyono is a researcher in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia. He is specializing in trade and industry issues. Haryo Aswicahyono received his Civil Engineering degree at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1983 and joined CSIS in 1985. In 1990, he continued his study at the postgraduate study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. He received his doctoral degree in 2000, with a thesis, ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia Manufacturing, 1975-1993’. After finishing his postgraduate study, he returned to work at CSIS.
Yose Rizal Damuri, Head of the Department of Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research activities focus on international trade, regional integration and globalization of value chain. He is active in several research and advisory networks both in Indonesia and in East Asia, such as Indonesia Service Dialogue (ISD) and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). Yose also teaches International Economics courses at the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia. In addition, he occasionally writes in local and national newspapers. He received his Bachelor of Economics from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. He continued his study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra and got his Master of Economics of Development (MEcDev). He received his PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, Switzerland.
Haryo Aswicahyono is a researcher in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia. He is specializing in trade and industry issues. Haryo Aswicahyono received his Civil Engineering degree at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1983 and joined CSIS in 1985. In 1990, he continued his study at the postgraduate study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. He received his doctoral degree in 2000, with a thesis, ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia Manufacturing, 1975-1993’. After finishing his postgraduate study, he returned to work at CSIS.
David Christian is currently a research assistant in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He received his Bachelor of Economics from Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia in 2013, having completed his undergraduate thesis on structural transformation process in Indonesia. At this moment, he is currently working on several projects, mainly regarding development economics, international economics, and economic integration issues.
Haryo Aswicahyono is a researcher in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia. He is specializing in trade and industry issues. Haryo Aswicahyono received his Civil Engineering degree at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1983 and joined CSIS in 1985. In 1990, he continued his study at the postgraduate study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. He received his doctoral degree in 2000, with a thesis, ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia Manufacturing, 1975-1993’. After finishing his postgraduate study, he returned to work at CSIS.
Yose Rizal Damuri, Head of the Department of Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research activities focus on international trade, regional integration and globalization of value chain. He is active in several research and advisory networks both in Indonesia and in East Asia, such as Indonesia Service Dialogue (ISD) and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). Yose also teaches International Economics courses at the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia. In addition, he occasionally writes in local and national newspapers. He received his Bachelor of Economics from the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. He continued his study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra and got his Master of Economics of Development (MEcDev). He received his PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva, Switzerland.
David Christian is currently a research assistant in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He received his Bachelor of Economics from Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia in 2013, having completed his undergraduate thesis on structural transformation process in Indonesia. At this moment, he is currently working on several projects, mainly regarding development economics, international economics, and economic integration issues.
Haryo Aswicahyono is a researcher in the Department of Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia. He is specializing in trade and industry issues. Haryo Aswicahyono received his Civil Engineering degree at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1983 and joined CSIS in 1985. In 1990, he continued his study at the postgraduate study at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. He received his doctoral degree in 2000, with a thesis, ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesia Manufacturing, 1975-1993’. After finishing his postgraduate study, he returned to work at CSIS.
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