Idea Transcript
ARISTOTLE ON FREEDOM IN THE PO L IT IC S Daniel H. Frank
‘Freedom ’ is a slippery term and a tricky notion. It has both positive and negative connotations. Freedom is opposed to slavery, but it is also opposed to any constraint whatever. I believe that Aristotle was well aware of this, and in this essay I should like to discuss A ristotle’s multi-faceted use of the word ‘ελευθερία’ (and its cognates) in the Politics. In so doing I shall, of course, not be merely presenting a lexical study, for behind the word stand the phenomena upon which it rests. And it is these phenomena, the way people use the word as well as the situations and events which account for the linguistic practice, which Aristotle is at pains to point out. Finally, a note of caution. There is no a priori reason why we should expect Aristotle to use the word (and understand the notion of) ‘ελευθερία’ exactly as we do. Indeed, as we shall see, there is overlap, yet if Aristotle will seem to us to be describing something foreign to our (normal) concep tion or notion o f what the word connotes, let us be prepared to free our selves of our conception o f the word and try to understand his. I. FREEDOM vs. SLAVERY The first kind o f freedom which I would like to demarcate is quite general in scope, applicable in fact to any o f the good constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) which Aristotle describes. This conception o f freedom is not found exclusively in democratic contexts. Furtherm ore, this ‘transconstitutional’ freedom is the only one which Aristotle does not describe pejoratively. These last two points are connected as we shall see. The pejorative content which Aristotle attaches to freedom in the context of democracy is intimately connected with his antipathy toward democracy, the democratic man, and the democratic mode of life. Aristotle was no more enamoured o f democracy than was P la to .1 But more of this later. Now let us turn to what might be called the political notion o f ελευθερία. For Aristotle there are many kinds o f rule (αρχή). One is the rule which a master has over his slave. Another is what he calls political rule (αρχή πολιτική). It is this latter kind o f rule which will concern us now, for, according to Aristotle, political rule is ‘rule . . . over free m en.’2 At once the distinction between free and slave is manifest. A slave is incapable of 1. C f. Republic 557 b-558 c. A ristotle’s ‘dem ocratic’ conception o f freedom (discussed in Part II o f this paper) is heavily indebted to this Platonic passage. 2. Politics 1255 b20, 1277 b7-8. A ll translations are my own and depend upon the Oxford Classical Text o f A ristotle’s Politics, edited by W . D. Ross (O xford, 1957).
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being ruled politically, for to be ruled politically entails a subject who can learn3 from this subjection and can later apply the acquired knowledge (of ruling). This a slave cannot do, for he cannot reason.4 Contrarily, free men can, and thus political rule is applicable to them. The free m an (= ό πολίτης) is the one who has the capacity to participate in the political life, now and in the future. He is the man who knows how to obey and how to rule.5 For our purposes, then, this distinction between slave and free is vital. In this regard we can understand A ristotle’s rem ark that ή πόλις κοινωνία των ελεύθερων έστίν.6 As man is by nature a π ολιτικόν ζωον7, a creature born and bred for life in the πόλις, he will live up to his nature if, and only if, he lives in a society which guarantees his political and constitutional rights. Again, a constitution which looks to the well-being o f all its members is one which is consonant with a society of free men—men who, unlike slaves, can partake of the life o f the city/constitution. Entirely opposite to the correct sorts of constitution are those which, like masterships (δεσποτείαι), are concerned with the ruler(s) alone. These con stitutions and types o f rule are degenerations (παρεκβάσεις) of the correct forms, for they are a sort o f rule befitting a slave, not a free man. Slaves, who by their very nature cannot partake of society and government, are fit to be ruled; unlike free men who must at first and then in turn be ruled, the rule o f a master over a slave is not at all to the latter’s advantage8; such a type o f rule is by no means a pedagogical device for future reference. Here again the Aristotelian notion o f freedom or free men is to be understood in contraposition to that o f slavery or the slave. This, then, is the political usage of έλευθερία. In a word, ελευθερία means ‘political capability,’ which, in turn, implies human rationality. And this a (natural) slave does not possess. Finally, let us note that έλευθερία in such contexts is used trans-constitutionally; it does not refer to the citizens o f any particular constitution or perversion thereof. II. THE DEM OCRA TIC CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM а. Free-Born vs. Well-Born For the remainder o f this paper I shall discuss έλευθερία as it is found in the context o f democracy, a particular form o f constitution. This immed iately distinguishes this type o f freedom from the trans-constitutional type of freedom just discussed. As we shall see, in the context of democracy 3. 4. 5. б. 7. 8.
N . B. μ α θεΐν at Politics 1277 blO. 1254 b l6 -2 3 , 1280 a32-34. 1277 b l3 -1 6 . 1279 a21. 1253 a3, 7-8. 1278 b32-37 esp. 34-36.
Politics Politics Politics Politics Politics
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A ristotle’s discussion o f ελευθερία is less dominated by constitutional rights and politics narrowly conceived than it is by sociological considerations. His discussion o f freedom in the context o f democracy is inextricably bound up with his appraisal o f the specific type of individual who constitutes a democracy, viz. the democratic man. A ristotle’s discussion o f democratic freedom and the democratic m an is not flattering; moreover, it is full of interesting prejudices. Let us now turn to A ristotle’s democratic conception of ελευθερία. Democracy, for Aristotle, is a perversion of πολιτεία in its specific, not generic, form .9 As all the παρεκβά σεις for Aristotle aim at the advantage o f the group in power, so too does democracy. It aims at the advantage o f oi άποροι, the poor. In response to the query that democracy is in fact not rule of oi άποροι but rather rule of τό πλήθος or οί πολλοί, Aristotle asserts that rule of τό πλήθος is not o f the essence o f democracy; rather it is an accident or concomitant o f it, albeit a universal one. The essence or defini tion o f democracy is rule of the poor. In so defining democracy, Aristotle takes a view o f it rather different from our own. We tend to think of democracy as a system o f government or type o f constitution wherein all citizens have equal rights, legal and political, and the m ajority rules. Now indeed for Aristotle το πλήθος or oi πολλοί is sovereign, yet this is not the essential aspect o f democracy. For him democracy is not best understood as the rule by the m ajority so much as the rule by a specific, albeit large, class, viz. oi άποροι. To the extent that democracy is viewed as the rule by a depressed economic and, as we shall see, social class, I do not think that it is far from the truth to equate A ristotle’s democracy with a ‘dictatorship o f the pro letariat.’ This is Richard R obinson’s view, and I think that much can be said for it.12 ‘P ro letariat,’ if understood in a certain way, captures much o f the flavour of οί άποροι. In saying this I am thinking not of Engels’ 1888 definition o f the proletariat as ‘the class o f wage labourers who, having no means o f production o f their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live’; rather I am thinking in terms of W ebster’s Dictionary definition of proletariat as ‘the lowest social or economic class o f a com m unity.’ Again, let us not think that for Aristotle ‘the poor’ describes merely an economic class; it has a richer connotation than that. N or let us equate the poor with the working class, unless we think of the working class not only as Politics 1279 b8-9. Politics 1279 b9-10. Politics 1280 a2-3. 12. A risto tle’s Politics, Books III and IV, translated with introduction and com m ents by
9. 10. 11.
Richard R obinson, O xford, 1962, p p .24-25, 82.
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those who must work for a living, but also as those who have ‘working class,’ i.e. blue collar, values. We say e.g. ‘he is working class’ and we mean more than that he goes to work in the morning; after all, so do doctors and lawyers and they are not ‘working class’! It is not so much the occupations o f oi άποροι13 or even their lack o f wealth that Aristotle has in mind as much as the social class to which they belong, or, alternatively, the type of person which they are. Let us, then, keep before us these (so far unsubstan tiated) remarks about the group which is sovereign in a democracy, for A ristotle’s ‘dem ocratic’ notion o f freedom, the ultim ate explanandum, is inextricably bound up with his appraisal of a certain type of person and the members of a certain social class. We must now substantiate our claims regarding the class structure inherent in A ristotle’s thought. It is in this context that the democratic no tion o f ελευθερία appears. The usage I have in mind occurs in contexts where ‘freedom ’ (and its cognates) is offered as a defining characteristic of οι άποροι or το πλήθος or oi πολλοί, the sovereign group in a democracy. Aristotle says: εύποροΰσι μέν γάρ ολίγοι, τή ς δέ έλευθερίας μετεχουσι πάντες. δί ά ς αιτίας άμφισβητοΰσιν άμφότεροι τής πολιτείας (tr. ‘the few are well off, but all partake o f freedom; and for these reasons both sides [viz. oligarchs and democrats] make their [respective] claim for rule’) .14 Both sides in the struggle for power, oligarchs and democrats, make a claim for sovereignty, but their claims are radically different. The oligarchs, ‘the few,’ assert that because they are wealthy (εύποροΰσι) this inequality gives them the right to rule. On the other hand, the democrats, ‘the m any,’ assert that because (as they put it) ‘all partake o f freedom ’ they have as good a right to rule as do oi ολίγοι.15 Indeed ‘freedom ’ is the watchword o f the democrats. It is equality in this regard which gives them their claim to take part in the constitution. But what sort o f ‘freedom ’ is upon their lips? It cannot be the ‘political’ freedom which we earlier discussed, because participation in the constitu tion is what they are claiming they deserve (i.e. do not already possess) as a result of the ‘freedom ’ which they already possess. W hat then is the freedom upon which the democrats base their claim for political participa tion and sovereignty? I do not think we are yet in a position to answer this question; in fact we will not be able to answer it until we have asked and answered a few others. 13. Politics 1289 b32-33, 1291 b l8 ff. 14. Politics 1280 a4-6. 15. The phrase τής έλευθερίας μ ετεχου σι π ά ντ ες, ‘all partake o f freed om ,’ is clearly a slogan shouted by the dem ocrats, viz. ‘the m any’ assert ‘all partake o f freedom .’ Our job ultimately will be to understand this phrase, that is, the freedom which is upon the dem ocrats’
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W ho are the democrats? They have been specified as οί άποροι and to πλήθος. This characterization is, at first glance, essentially an economic one, but it becomes much more than that when Aristotle equates τό πλήθος and οί άποροι with ελεύθεροι.16 ‘The m ultitude’ and ‘the p o o r,’ thus, are also specifiable as ‘the free.’ And these, in turn, are όσοι μήτε αξίωμα έχουσιν αρετής . . . (tr. ‘all who are not wealthy and have no claim to vir tue’) .17 What is interesting here is the description, or equation, of οί ελεύθεροι with those ‘who have no claim to virtue.’ A ristotle’s prejudice is laid bare. Virtue (άρετή) is not, and cannot be, a possession o f the democrat; in fact it is one o f the defining characteristics of the oligarch." The point now being urged is that democracy, originally characterized in (apparently) economic terms as rule o f the poor, is further describable in non-economic term s.19 Not only is the dem ocrat poor, but he is also lacking in virtue. Let us not lose sight o f our goal. We are intent on explicating the notion of freedom in the democratic slogan τή ς έλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες (‘all partake o f freedom ’), for it is on the basis of this freedom that the democrats make their claim for participation in the constitution. We have gone some distance in resolving our worry by beginning to understand the type of person who shouts the words. The democratic man is poor and, moreover, bereft of virtue. And we can say still more. In Book IV chapter 3 another specification of the democrat is forthcoming. He is in this passage delineated by various jobs or occupations which he may hold, viz. agricultural, mercantile, and menial.20 Straight away the dem ocrat is contrasted with οί γνώριμοι, the nobles (= the oligarchs); not, as we might expect, in terms of occupation, but in terms o f what we might broadly call social standing, viz. wealth, birth, and virtue.21 This contrast between, say, being a day-labourer and being virtuous, between being a salesman and being of high birth may seem a bit bizarre to the modern reader, but once we are alive to the constant interplay between economic and social categories in A ristotle’s political thought it may begin to appear less puzzling. The democrat must work for his living, and, for Aristotle, this toil means that he is poor, of low birth, and boorish.22 16. Politics 1281 b23, 1290 b l8 , 1294 al6-17. 17. Politics 1281 b24-25. 18. See esp. Politics 1291 b29. 19. In this light a close look at Politics 1291 b28-29 reveals that οί γνώ ριμοι, the nobles, are delineated by the follow ing properties: π λ ο ύ τ ο ς (rich), ευγένεια (well-born), άρετή (virtue), παιδεία (education)— a matrix o f econom ic and socio-cultural properties. 20. Politics 1289 b32-33. 21. Politics 1289 b40-1290 a l. 22. C f. The Politics o f Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, O xford, 1962, p .301 note 4; Μ. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, Berkeley and Los A ngeles, 1973, p p .35-61.
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But in what sense is he ‘free’? In what sense is the democratic man, a man poor, common, and brutish, free in a way in which the oligarchic man, a m an wealthy, exclusive, and proper, is not? A part from slaves, aren’t all people free? To finally answer the question let us turn to Book IV chapter 4. In this chapter we start o ff with the usual dichotomy: we have democracy when oi έλεύθεροι κύριοι ώσιν, ολιγαρχία . . . οΐ πλούσιοι (tr. ‘[we have democracy when] the free are sovereign, oligarchy [when] the wealthy [sc. are sovereign]’).23 Furtherm ore, Aristotle goes on to make his (by now redundant) observation that the number o f people who share power in a democracy (oi πολλοί) and the number who share power in an oligarchy (oi ολίγοι) are accidental. In this passage, as in others we have seen, the free are opposed not to the enslaved, but rather to the rich. Thus, it is tempting to construe the free as the poor, something which we have seen Aristotle do. But this does not help us at all with the question as to why Aristotle uses this word, ‘free,’ to describe the poor. We have, however, a strong hint further in the chapter. At 1290 b l7 ff. Aristotle says: ‘There is a democracy whenever the free and poor, being in a m ajority, are in command of the government; and [there is] an oligarchy whenever the wealthy and well-born, being few, [sc. are in com m and].’ The usual remarks?—not quite. In this case note that the pairings are ά πορ οι/ πλούσιοι, πλείους/όλίγοι, and έλεύθεροι/εύγενέστεροι. It is this last which is of interest for our purposes now. The contrast free/well born makes it plain that we are to think of οι ελεύθεροι as base-born (opp. well born) or, more charitably, as free-born, i.e. born free but with no pedigree whatsoever. The free have their birthright, their ‘free’ birth, and nothing else. Freedom is here to be thought of as opposed, on the one hand, to slavery, a condition where no birthright exists whatsoever; but it is also opposed to pedigree. In this latter context we must understand the demo cratic m an, the sort of man who is prom inent in a democracy, as doomed from, and indeed because of, his birth. He was, alas, not well-born. He shares a free birth with the nobles, but that is all. Where we may wish to say that if οί άποροι become wealthy, then they enter the class of oi πλούσιοι, Aristotle precludes this social mobility by his severely class-conscious remarks related to birth. No m atter how much money one may accrue one cannot, according to Aristotle, become a member of the monied-class, and so forth. We are now in a position to answer the question we previously raised: what is the ‘freedom ’ which is upon the lips o f the democratic man in his slogan ‘all partake o f freedom ’? Again, what is the meaning o f the predicate ‘free’ when applied to those people who are also described as oi άποροι, oi πολλοί, and τό πλήθος? I would suggest that freedom in these 23.
Politics 1290 b l-2 .
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contexts refers to freedom of birth24; but to maintain the pejorative flavour which Aristotle attaches to it we must fill out the sense to something like ‘freedom o f birth and that is all' or ‘menial, boorish, impoverished, yet free in birth.’ We can now readily understand the slogan of the democrats, ‘all partake of freedom .’ As the oppressed and disenfranchised storm the Bastille they will shout ‘man is born free, yet he is everywhere in chains.’ Indeed the watchword o f democracy is ‘freedom .’ Free birth is the one thing that democrats, oligarchs, aristocrats, etc. share. No doubt the disenfranchised will fasten on this equality to make their case for enfranchisement, and, given their numerical m ajority, for ultimate sovereignty. Aristotle makes the point explicitly at 1280 a22-25: oi μέν γάρ αν κατά τι άνισοι ώσιν, οϊον χρήμασιν, δλω ς οϊονται άνισοι είναι, οί δ ’ άν κατά τι ϊσοι, οΓον ελευθερία, δλω ς ϊσοι (tr. ‘the [oligarchs] believe in complete inequality because of a certain inequality, namely money; but the [democrats], on the other hand, believe in complete equality because of a certain equality, namely freedom ’). The dem ocrats’ claim is based upon the only equality which they share with οί πλούσιοι, namely the right to take part in political life, a right which befits all free (born) men. Com mon humanity enjoins common rights. b. Free Life Style vs. Aristocratic Life Let me finally demarcate a second Aristotelian conception of freedom as found in the context of democracy. This notion o f freedom is closely linked with our notion of license or anarchy.25 In no other discussion, I think, is Aristotle’s negative appraisal o f democracy and the democratic man so manifest as in his remarks o f the life-style, the modus vivendi, o f the demo cratic man. As the sovereign (κύριον) will o f the m ultitude is capricious26, so this ‘free’ and unfettered attitude is paralleled by the life of the ‘dem ocratic’ man. For the democratic man, as for the sovereign assembly, ελεύθερον δέ τό δ τι άν βούληταί τις ποιεΐν. ώ στε ζη έν τα ΐς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις έκασ τος ώ ς βούλεται . . . (tr. ‘to be free is to do whatever one wishes, the result of which is that in such democracies each man lives as he wishes’).27 The democratic m an’s life is free and unrestrained. And Aristotle comes down very hard on this notion· o f freedom and this way o f life. It is φαύλου.28 24. C f. R. G. M ulgan, Aristotle’s Political Theory, O xford, 1978, p p .63, 73. 25. C f. R. G. M ulgan, ‘Aristotle and the Dem ocratic C onception o f F reedom ,’ in B. F. Harris (ed.), Auckland Classical Essays, Auckland and O xford, 1970, p .104; Barker (ed.), op. cit., p .257. 26. 27.
δ τι α ν δόξη at Politics 1310 a30-31, 1317 b5-6.
Politics 1310 a 3 1-33.
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Now undoubtedly Aristotle was a man o f moderate sensibility, yet I think we would be wrong to assume that he condemned ‘free-living’ solely because it differed from his own predilection. I cannot help but think that Aristotle also condemned this ‘free’ life-style because it was the life-style of the democratic m an. Let me clarify my point here. In the immediately preceding section o f this paper I attem pted to lay out A ristotle’s description o f the democratic man. We saw this specimen of hum anity to be poor, of low birth, and lacking in virtue. Such was his character, and Aristotle loath ed it. Thus, we may well believe that the mode o f life which this ‘character’ led would be equally loathsome. For Aristotle, being vulgar and being of low birth entailed that you acted in a vulgar and unrestrained manner. Action turns out to be a function o f the social class to which the individual belongs. A certain person will act in a certain way because o f the type of person he is, because of the class to which he belongs. Stereotypes come to mind: are not Orientals sly, Jews niggardly, and Blacks shiftless? For Aristotle ήδιον τοίς πολλοΐς τό ζην ά τά κ τω ς ή τό σωφρόνως (tr. ‘for the masses to live without discipline is more pleasant than to live m oderately’).29 A ristotle’s point should not be missed. The point is not that John or Peter lives the life o f a libertine, but that a whole class (οί πολλοί), the class sovereign in a democracy, is assumed to do so. Now surely Aristotle did not conduct a check o f all democrats and then draw the (let us suppose) induct ively valid conclusion that for them ‘to live without discipline is more plea sant than to live m oderately.’ Rather, I would suggest that Aristotle had a prior conception o f οί πολλοί, a view which I have tried to explicate in sec tion Ha, and was led by that conception to the outright condemnation of their life style. And this is nothing more, and nothing less, than prejudice.30·31 28. Politics 1310 a34; the word is as bad as it sounds. 29. Politics 1319 b 3 1-32. 30. O ne final point: it may be urged (and was by my colleague T. M . Olshewsky) that if, as I suggest, A ristotle views the m any as base and consequently dem ocracy as an inferior form o f governm ent, then how can he praise as one o f the good form s o f constitution, polity, defined in III.7 as the rule o f ‘the m any’ for the com m on good (1279 a37-39)? A gain, if ‘the m any’ are base by nature, then how can any constitution in which they rule be good? M y answer is that when A ristotle gets to work in IV .8 on describing the actual polities nothing more is said about rule by the m any or for the com m on good . A s Mulgan (Aristotle's Political Theory, p .77) points out in regard to the polity as described in III.7 as the rule o f ‘the m any’ for the com m on good: ‘it is a constitution which has rarely if ever existed in its true form and is an abstract ideal which serves as a standard for the deviant form s o f oligarchy and dem ocracy.’ Actual polities (as described in IV .8) are som e sort o f mixture o f oligarchy and dem ocracy, rich and poor, well-born and base-born (1293 b33 ff.). There is in fact no society or constitution in which ‘the m any’ rule for the com m on good . Because o f what Aristotle believed about ‘the m any’ his ‘good dem ocracy,’ the polity, was a contradiction in terms. 31. This paper has profited from discussion by audiences at the universities o f Pittsburgh, D ayton, ancj. Kentucky.