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Toolkit for. Public Policy Prescription and Action. PAL-110. Fall 2003. Developed for the Kennedy School of Government b

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Toolkit for

Public Policy Prescription and Action PAL-110 Fall 2003

Developed for the Kennedy School of Government by Professor Brian Mandell.

Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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Fall 2003

ACTION CHANNELS -- POLICY ANALYSIS TOOLKIT JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT FALL 2003 AN EIGHT-STEP ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRESCRIPTION AND ACTION 1. Public Interests • The centrality of values – the policy actor’s most fundamental aspirations. • Non-operational stakes – ultimately provide concrete guidance for other steps in framework. • Categories of interests: vital, important, peripheral – prioritized to promote core values and effective use of time and resources. 2. Threat/Opportunity Assessments • Identifying and weighing importance of elements that can have a negative or positive impact upon public interests; threats/opportunities can be categorized as significant, medium range, none or negligible. 3. Operational Objectives • Prioritized action agenda with specific and concrete policy goals to serve public interests, meet threats or exploit opportunities. • Allow policy success or failure to be clearly measured. • Force policy actors to choose between competing interests. • Remind policy actors what they are trying to accomplish and why it’s important. 4. Strategy • How operational objectives are meant to be achieved by influencing other actors. • If/then theory of persuasion/coercion (if clause posits individual/organizational/governmental action; then clause predicts anticipated policy outcome). • Identify central assumptions that underpin the strategy. • Means by which policy actors can persuade or coerce another policy actor. 5. Design • Blueprint for implementation. • Answer detailed questions (who does what? when? where? for how long? to/with whom?). 6. Implementation • Putting the design into action. • Coping with “friction” caused by divergence between the design and the actual course of events. 7. Maintenance • Routines, doing the necessary “gardening.” 8. Policy Review • Have core public interests been accurately identified? • Have threats and opportunities been accurately assessed? • Have the operational objectives been achieved? • Did something go wrong?

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ACTION CHANNEL ANALYSIS PLAYERS’ CHOICES, CONSEQUENCES AND TRADE-OFFS Core Assumptions 1. Action channels are grounded in the notion of “players” in a competitive game of politics within a particular issue/policy domain. 2. Politics doesn’t happen randomly; certain processes structure the play of the game. These processes are regularized action channels for bringing issues to the point of choice (i.e. electoral; legislative; legal; administrative/regulatory; international; media; grassroots; ad hoc, informal indirect channels). 3. Players’ stands (positions), influence, and moves combine to yield decisions and actions. 4. Deadlines/mandates/routines force issues to the attention of players. 5. Several action channel games may be played simultaneously; a particular issue may be played out across several domains at once. 6. A process of bargaining takes place among players along regularized action channels – each with its own set of norms, rules and procedures. 7. Players use action channels to advance their issues as well as to resolve intraorganizational/institutional issues. 8. Each player in the action channel acts in accordance with a broad set of strategic objectives grounded in contending conceptions of political, policy and personal goals. 9. Players in the action channel bargain over conflicting preferences; priorities and perceptions are shaped by players’ organizational/institutional position. The latter constitutes the face of the issue. 10. Unequal power and resources among players in the action channel produce a political resultant that is a function of groups/players pulling in different directions. 11. What advances or blocks “progress” on an issue in a particular action channel is the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question. Power is an elusive blend of: bargaining advantages, skill and will is using bargaining advantages, and other players perceptions of the first two ingredients. 12. The sources of bargaining advantage in an action channel include: A. formal authority and responsibility (stemming from a player’s organizational position); B. actual control over resources necessary to carry out action; C. expertise and control over information that enables players/decision-makers to determine whether and in what form actions/decisions are to be implemented: D. the ability to affect other players’ objectives in this and other action channels/games; E. personal persuasiveness with other players; and F. access to and persuasiveness with players who have bargaining advantages drawn from the above. Therefore, each player must pick carefully the issues on which s/he can play with a high probability of success. 13. Political advocates fight for their respective outcomes since the advantages and disadvantages of each player differ substantially from one action channel to another. And, the mix of players and each player’s advantages shift not only between action-channels but also along action channels. 14. The political resultants that emerge from action channel games rarely follow from an “agreed doctrine” in which all players concur. 15. “Solutions” to issues/policy problems are not discovered by detached analysts focusing coolly on the problem. The problems for players in action channels are both narrower and broader than the overarching strategic issue/problem. Each player focuses not on the total strategic problem but rather on the action/decision that must be made today or tomorrow. 16. Games in action channels are not played under conditions of perfect information. Each game is infused with a good deal of misperception, miscommunication, misexpectation and reticence – each of which, in turn, is affected by the styles of play portrayed by individual players. Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING ACTION CHANNELS 1. Action channels are the institutional (or informal) locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given policy issue. 2. The task of a policy actor is both to manipulate the dominant understanding of the policy issue and to influence the action channels that exert jurisdiction over them. 3. Policy actors hoping to have their policy issue accepted may find their arguments unsuccessful when raised in one action channel, but successful in another. Similarly, those policy actors seeking the attention of a given group of actors may find that arguments successful with another group have no success there. 4. Some policy issues are firmly within the jurisdiction of a single action channel, while others face the competing influences of a number of jurisdictions. As a result of this competition among action channels, the assignment of policy issues to action channels may change over time. Dramatic changes in policy outcomes are often the result of changes in the action channels that exert control. 5. While some policy issues are firmly part of a particular policy and action channel jurisdiction, the institutional/action channel authorities in charge of other policy issues and policy problems are not so clearly defined. This may be because the problems are new and societal responses to them have not become routinized, because there are many possible solutions but no clearly superior ones, or because policy issues are extremely complex and pose many contradictory or unrelated questions, each of which may interest different groups and action channels. 6. The generation or the avoidance of controversy surrounding a policy issue is closely related to the action channel within which it is considered. Where there is no controversy, policy issues in action channels can become very secure. Where controversy increases, the venue of decision-making authority (i.e. the action channel) is likely to change. Similarly, where jurisdictional boundaries are changed, previously secure niches for policy issues can be destroyed, and policy issues which had once been consensual may suddenly become the objects of increased controversy and public scrutiny. Action channel changes, in short, are influenced by, and influence in their turn, the generation or the containment of controversy. 7. Many action channels with only vague or ambiguous constraints on their jurisdictional boundaries create opportunities for strategically minded policy actors to shop for the most favorable action channel “location” for their policy issue. Fewer available action channels with tighter or more explicitly defined boundaries limit the opportunities for action channel shopping and discourage entrepreneurial behavior. 8. Policy issues may be accepted or rejected depending on the institutional arena or action channel in which they are raised. Policy issues with multiple faces may fall within the jurisdictions of several action channels. 9. Each action channel is home to a different face of the same policy issue. History, constitutional arrangements, cultural understandings, and the performance of these action channels on similar policy issues in the past, all affect the current assignment of policy issues to action channels. Differences in policy issue assignment or placement create differences in policy outcomes as different groups are favored or disadvantaged by different institutional arrangements, norms and values within action channels. Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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BUILDING A HIGH PERFORMANCE LEARNING COMMUNITY AND A CULTURE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE We will work with three kinds of teams in order to: ♦ Practice policy analysis “on the fly.” ♦ Strengthen framework and template skills for leadership competency in strategic thinking. ♦ Provide strategic prescriptive advice and operational guidance to busy senior decision-makers engaged in crafting and implementing public policies. 1. First Responders Team Arrive first on the scene to scope out and situate the “presenting problem.” Where are we in the life-cycle of the policy issue – emerging, developing, maturing, decaying, intractable policy controversy? Team Responsibilities and Tasks Uncovering public interests, trends and values. ♦ Iceberg analysis. ♦ Gap analysis. ♦ Cross-cultural Values analysis. 2. SWOT Team Provides individual stakeholder analysis, network and relationship mapping. Team Responsibilities and Tools ♦ Individual stakeholder SWOT analysis, relationship mapping and coalitional analysis. ♦ Key policy actors’ operational objectives. ♦ Key policy actor’s strategy, tactical choice of action channel(s) and policy design (detailed blueprint for action). ♦ Barriers analysis (strategic, psychological, institutional). 3. “Lessons Learned” Team Offers “reflective practitioner” debrief of major strategy, design and implementation challenges derived from cases with a view toward improving our capacity for public policy prescription and action. Team Responsibilities and Tasks ♦ Diagnostic analysis of outcomes: explaining success, failure or deadlock among different dimension of policy development and implementation. ♦ Assessment of missed opportunities for leveraging resources, stakeholders, constituencies and policy issue linkages. ♦ Counter-factual “what if” analysis for strategic sequencing and backward mapping of policy actors and issues.. ♦ Envisioning alternative futures.

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CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRESCRIPTION AND ACTION The Big Ten 1. Goal Definition: Identifying Core Public Interests ♦ What is the policy actor’s goal in the public arena? Over what time period? ♦ What would society look like if it were achieved? ♦ What is the scope of the policy goal (local, regional, national, transnational)? ♦ Which cultural values (equality, liberty, efficiency, democracy) are embedded in or associated with the policy goal? ♦ Who will the policy goal appeal to? 2. Sources of Power: Locating Influential Actors ♦ Who has the (in)formal power to move society toward this particular policy goal (the “people” themselves, non-governmental institutions, such as businesses or religious institutions, a local, state or national government, a particular branch of government, a particular agency within a branch)? ♦ Who can influence those who possess power (political parties, interest groups, media, individuals)? ♦ How can these people or groups with influence be reached and mobilized? 3. Stakeholders: Identifying Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats ♦ Who cares about this policy issue and why? ♦ Is a committed constituency willing to dedicate resources to the furthering of this policy goal? What resources are they willing to devote to it? ♦ Who are the opponents of this policy and why? What can policy actors do to predict obstacles they may pose, overcome, circumvent or diffuse their resistance? Is there any common ground between policy supporters and opponents? 4.

Agenda-Setting: Shaping the Policy Debate ♦ Who shapes the action agenda on this policy issue? ♦ Who shapes the decision agenda? ♦ How do specific options for decision-makers get formulated?

5. Timing: Identifying Windows of Opportunity ♦ Is the timing favorable to the pursuit of the policy actor’s goal? ♦ What are the predictable institutional routines (electoral cycles, legislative sessions, etc.) through which this policy issue can be moved? ♦ Which focusing events can be imagined that would put this policy issue on the agenda? Is there a “window of opportunity” upon which a policy entrepreneur can capitalize to move this policy issue onto the agenda? 6. Coalition-Building: Mobilizing Resources, Stakeholders and Constituencies ♦ Who are the policy actor’s potential allies, and what will be required to forge a coalition with them? ♦ What natural coalitions (based on shared interests, common history, etc.) could be mobilized to support this policy issue? ♦ How can supportive bystanders be converted into stakeholders and how can potentially active opponents be kept out of the game? ♦ What resources do the coalitions bring to bear on this policy issue? How committed is the policy actor’s constituency? How educated are they? How motivated are they? Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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-27. Framing the Policy Issue: Operational Objectives ♦ What position should the policy actor adopt publicly to advance his/her issue most effectively? Is it a technical problem? Is there a villain? ♦ What symbols can be employed? ♦ What alternative frames (historical, allied, oppositional) are available? 8. Action Channels: Strategies, Tactics and Policy Design ♦ Which action channel (electoral, legislative, legal, administrative, media, grassroots) or combination of channels offers the greatest chance of success? ♦ What are the costs and benefits of using these channels? For future positioning? ♦ Which channels are most likely to work against the policy actor and how should he/she keep the policy issue off the agenda there? 9. Action Steps: Policy Implementation ♦ What concrete short-term actions and tactics will advance this strategy right now? ♦ What long-term steps can be taken to achieve the policy actor’s goal? ♦ What strategies or mechanisms should the policy actor employ to produce the desired result? ♦ Are the policy actor’s strategies flexible to account for unanticipated contingencies? ♦ Will they build momentum and add to the policy actor’s resources? ♦ Will they have positive long-term consequences for the policy actor’s issue? 10. Benchmarking Progress: Policy Maintenance and Review ♦ How should the policy actor measure progress or failure? Which values or standards will the policy actor employ as measurement tools? How will policy reviews be embedded in the policymaking process? ♦ What contingencies might arise that would require a shifting in strategy? ♦ What alternative courses of action would be available? Is the policy actor flexible enough to make “adjustments on the fly?”

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ICEBERG ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING THE DEEPER NARRATIVE OF PUBLIC INTERESTS, TRENDS AND VALUES Core Assumptions 1. There is an underlying socio-economic and political structure for all events. 2. Events do not just happen at random, but they are related to each other through a structure where causes drive effects and one event leads to another. 3. We can look at issues at three levels: events; patterns; and structure. Relatedness occurs as we start to see trends over time in the playing out of events. 4. Many events (or the “surface” component of issues) seem to display some form of “organized behavior.” For example, something may be going up with some consistency, or a growth path may be checked and starts turning down. 5. In order to get at the underlying structure, we need to look for interrelatedness between multiple trends. By examining trends, ideas for underlying structure present themselves. If variable “a” is going up and variable “b” is going up simultaneously, we then ask if they are in some way related. Our perception of causality is based on patterns we think we recognize in the events around us. Structure is based on our perception of causality. We use such patterns as cues for causality. Linking History with the Future  Five Steps for Constructing the Deeper Narrative

1. Specify important events (around an issue), things we can see happening. 2. Identify trends leading to the conceptualization of variables. 3. Infer patterns from variables based on cues for causality. 4. Develop a “map” of the underlying structure which connects the system (i.e. the relevant political system and issue domain) together through causal links. 5. Use the underlying structure(s) to project future behavior in a given policy issue domain.

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CROSS-CULTURAL VALUES ANALYSIS 1. Control over environment vs. fate/destiny. 2. Change as positive vs. stability/tradition/continuity. 3. Control over time/urgency vs. close human interaction/social time. 4. Equality/fairness vs. hierarchy/rank/status. 5. Individualism/dependence vs. group harmony, welfare/dependency. 6. Self-help/initiative vs. birthright/inheritance. 7. Competition vs. cooperation. 8. Future orientation vs. past orientation. 9. Action problem-solving/work orientation vs. “being”/contemplation orientation. 10. Informality vs. formality. 11. Directness/openness/honesty vs. evasion/indirectness/ritual/”face.” 12. Practicality/efficiency vs. idealism/theory. 13. Materialism/acquisitiveness vs. spiritualism/detachment. 14. Conflict avoidance/negotiation/resolution vs. conflict engagement/enlargement/escalation. 15. Individual expertise/written words/agreements/law vs. collective community will/working trust.

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SWOT ANALYSIS THE POLICY ACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE Core Assumptions 1. A major objective of the SWOT analysis is to identify and analyze the key trends and forces having a potential impact on the formulation of options and strategies for advancing a policy actor’s goals and issues. 2. The SWOT emphasizes the importance of explicit and systematic assessment of internal and external environmental impacts. The more a policy actor systematically perceives changing forces in his/her environment, the more likely surprise will be avoided. The ultimate purpose of the SWOT is to exploit and leverage opportunities. 3. Policy actors make calculated estimates about their own SWOT in relation to: A. political, socio-economic, legal and technological trends on this issue (favorable or not); B. potential linkages to other issues; C. availability of potential allies/coalition-partners; D. availability of internal organizational support and resources for sustained engagement on the issue (relative to other players); E. intensity and scope of opposition; F. consequences of delay, inaction, or losing. SWOT Analysis Checklist For a policy actor seeking to advance an issue, strengths and weaknesses may be conceived in terms of: 1. material resources (the power of money and organizational capacity). 2. symbolic and cultural resources (the power of widely shared values). 3. underlying structural resources (the power of patterns, trends and the narrative). 4. action/decision agendas and timing resources (the power of focusing events and windows of opportunity). 5. action channel resources (the power of positioning). 6. coalitional and constituency resources (the power of commitment-building, leveraging, networks, and public opinion). For a policy actor seeking to advance an issue, opportunities and threats may be conceived in terms of: 1. Tactical (short term) and strategic (long term) opportunities for: shaping preferences; hedging bets; locating decisive leverage points; issue linkage and greater maneuverability; and strategic surprise. 2. Tactical and strategic threats that: undermine organizational cohesion; undermine the prevailing frame(s) of the policy issue; block and prevent the issue from advancing on to action and decision agendas; marginalize the issue in a key action channel; raise resource barriers to further advancement of the policy issue; compel “vulnerable” proponents and allies to drop out of the game. NOTE: Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats may accrue to policy actors as a direct result of engagement with their issue or these may be accrued indirectly through ongoing and simultaneous engagement with other issues across numerous action channels. Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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Relationship Mapping 1. Map all relevant players (policy actors). 2. Identify who is/are the final decision-maker(s). 3. Identify those players who influence the final decision-maker(s). 4. Identify who will be affected by the decision and how. 5. Identify relationships among the players. What is the nature of each relationship (e.g., deference, influence, antagonism)? Operational Objectives

Identify key policy actors’ prioritized action agenda with specific and concrete goals (as distinct from wishes and preferences) to serve public interests, meet threats and exploit opportunities. Strategy

1. For a given policy actor(s) identify the operational objective(s) the strategy is meant to accomplish. 2. Identify those policy actors and institutions the strategy is intended to act upon. 3. Identify means/instruments of persuasion (potential inducements or incentives) or coercion (potential penalties or punitive actions) to accomplish operational objectives, i.e., to get other policy actors to act in the desired manner. 4. Identify requirements for the successful use of the strategy. Why should other policy actors comply? Policy Design

For a given policy actor(s) identify detailed requirements for action to accomplish operational objectives.

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COALITIONAL ANALYSIS COALITION BUILDING AND BREAKING – MOBILIZING RESOURCES AND STAKEHOLDERS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ACTION 1. Identify “natural” coalitions based on: shared interests; shared positions; valuable trades; common history (friends/enemies); and capacity to extract value from others. 2. Identify potential blocking coalitions and intractable opponents – divide and conquer; appeal to higher goals; manipulate the number of players and the agenda for action/decisions 3. Analyze patterns of deference, influence and antagonism through backward mapping of influence networks; use sequencing to expand a coalition. 4. Move to change the game by: (A) Understanding the history of players’ interactions. (B) Framing the terms of the debate. (C) Setting the agenda. (D) Anticipating interactions. (E) Promoting joint or separate meetings. (F) Using coordinated action to cement core coalition. (G) Controlling the decision-making process – consensus, majority, unanimity. (H) Adding/subtracting parties and issues. (I) Thinking strategically and acting opportunistically. 5. Break coalitions (based on relationships, shared interests and trades) by: (A) Introducing “wedge” issues. (B) Creating incentives for vulnerable parties to defect. (C) Manipulating information and signals regarding concession-making. 6. Apply multiple sources of power: (A) Shared interests (existence, awareness, agreement). (B) Carrots and sticks (interactions of offers, power of unilateral options). (C) Information (control, access, media). (D) Framing (appeals to interests, experience, emotion, ambiguity). (E) Commitments (obligation, consistency, commitment tactics). (F) Relationship networks (bridging, blocking, leveraging, mapping). (G) Time (relationship building, entanglement, readiness, sequencing).

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THINKING ABOUT TACTICS 1. Tactics are the specific activities through which the policy actor’s strategy is implemented. 2. The effective use of tactics depends heavily on well-defined targets and a strong sense of appropriate timing. 3. Targeting is figuring out how to focus limited resources on doing what is likely to yield the greatest result. It means deciding who exactly it is within the policy actor’s constituency that is the focus of initial effort. This usually means identifying specific decision-makers whom the policy actor wants to act in ways that can solve the problem being addressed. 4. Timing is about sequencing the activities the policy actor undertakes to keep the initiative, build momentum and take advantage of particular moments or windows of opportunity. 5. Another timing consideration has to do with when to confront the opposition and never doing it until the policy actor can win. The policy actor’s opposition always needs to be challenged convincingly so as to avoid a “losing” confrontation. 6. A good tactic is consistent with the policy actor’s overall strategic goal and resources, but exposes the opposition’s lack of resources. Therefore, good tactics build on the policy actor’s own strength and the opposition’s weakness. 7. Good tactics should be inside the experience of the policy actor’s constituency, but outside the experience of the opposition. 8. Good tactics can unify the policy actor’s constituency and its supporters while dividing the opposition. 9. The policy actor’s goal is to apply those tactics likely to yield the quickest results first. In turn, these results give greater capacity to take subsequent steps. Each tactical success contributes resources which make the next increment of “success” more achievable. The policy actor maintains momentum by expecting every action to produce a reaction to which he/she has already considered how to respond.

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BARRIERS ANALYSIS* WHAT FACTORS ARE PREVENTING POLICY ACTORS FROM ADVANCING THEIR POLICY ISSUES AND GOALS? Strategic Barriers 1. Inaccurate information about one’s own/other(s) goals, priorities, preferences, resources and opportunities. 2. Strategic displays of deception/intransigence and a willingness to walk away from a beneficial deal rather than accept less than one’s total objective(s). (The latter is driven by a belief that “time is on our side!”)

Perceptual/Psychological Barriers 1. Frames of reference/worldviews limit and shape what decision-makers see and don’t see. 2. Contending groups’ distorted views of each other contribute to self-fulfilling prophecies which infer subtle, devious and strategic moves on the part of one’s adversary. As a result, decision-makers are likely to make unwarranted inferences about their opponents’ good faith, character or intent. 3. Proposals for changing the status quo violate one or more actor’s sense of fairness and equity. What political opponents seek is not an equal advance over the status quo but rather an advance that is proportionate to the weight and legitimacy of their respective claims. 4. Cognitive and motivational biases – These reflect the tendency of people to “see,” and remember, what their theories, beliefs, and expectations on the one hand, and their needs, wishes and self-interest on the other hand, dispose them to see. At the same time, they fail to recognize the influence of such biases on their own views, believing that they see things as they are in objective reality and that it is only those who fail to share their views who are subject to such biases. Thus all policy disputants feel: they have acted more honorably in the past; they have been more sinned against; their interests are the ones that most require protection in any future agreement; they are seeking no more that that to which they are entitled. 5. Reactive devaluation of compromises and concessions – The evaluation of specific proposals, compromises and deals may change as a consequence of knowing that they actually have been offered by a adversary on the “other side.” For example, concessions may be offered unilaterally with the explicit/implicit suggestion that they should be reciprocated. The recipient of the unilateral concessions is apt to believe its adversary has given up nothing of real value and therefore is likely to resist the suggestion that it should offer something of real value in return. 6. Loss aversion – Decision-makers tend to attach greater weight to prospective losses than to prospective gains of equivalent magnitude. 7. Judgmental over-confidence – Unwarranted confidence in one’s predictions about future events, and more particularly, for political contestants to overestimate the likelihood and probable extent of success in achieving their objectives. Each side tends to have greater access to the factors that strengthen its position or would promote its success than to the factors that would weaken its position or promote its adversary’s success. Political contestants often adopt an “insider’s” rather than an “outsider’s” perspective, one that focuses too much on what they know or assume about the particular issue at hand, and too little on the type of base-rate information or historical precedent that ought to alert them to the possibility of miscalculation and protracted costly struggle. *

Source: Arrow, Mnookin et al, editors, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, W.W. Norton & Co., 1995.

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1. Dissonance reduction – Decision-makers try to minimize the amount of “psychic regret” or “cognitive dissonance” to which they are subject. Political contestants are continually motivated to rationalize or justify both their past failures to settle/advance their issue/goal and whatever costs they are bearing in continuing the struggle. This objective is accomplished by convincing themselves (and telling others) that the projected proposals were even more one-sided, or that those offering them are even more untrustworthy, or that the causes for which they are struggling are even more noble, or that the prospects for better terms in the future are even more favorable than they had seemed prior to the decision-maker’s decision not to settle. Rather than embracing today what could have been achieved yesterday without any additional financial, economic, human, or political costs, it is enormously tempting to “stay the course” and to convince oneself (and others) that more advantageous terms (terms that could truly justify one’s past expenditures and sacrifices) can be won in the future.

Institutional and Organizational Barriers 2. Restricted channels of information and communication – Political actors have limited or no opportunity to air their grievances or to provide each other with the information about priorities and interests necessary for them to frame effective proposals. 3. Bureaucratic decision-making – Internal decision-making involves multiple agencies (reflecting divided or even conflicting responsibilities and areas of expertise) and hence may be more likely to reach compromise decisions or be inflexible. 4. Governmental politics – Agencies pursue their own interests, agendas and constituencies. 5. Competing priorities – Competing internal/external demands and limits on organizational capacity complicate efforts to respond to crises, opportunities and to manage the daily “adaptive challenge” of building more effective public policy. 6. Multiple interest groups and the management of complexity – Political intractability is compounded when very different interests and stakes are involved for multiple parties and their respective constituencies. In such cases, a small well-defined set of individuals stand certain to gain or lose a great deal, while larger and less easily defined groups of individuals face prospective gains and loses that are less certain and may involve less concrete matters. 7. The principal/agent problem – The personal interests of an agent (institutional employee, diplomatic representative, etc.) serving as a negotiator may be quite different from the interests of the principal party that agent represents. The very process of aligning such interests may prove very difficult and may, in itself, constitute a barrier to effective political mobilization and the advancement of joint interests. 8. Linked systems of negotiations – Policy-issue negotiations are linked to other negotiations and these linkages strongly constrain and influence negotiators’ alternatives, preferences and attitudes. Linkage is made even more complex due to the decision-makers’ need to play “two-level games,” negotiating outside (the organization) while building support inside. At the same time, “outside” or external negotiations are constrained and shaped by: past negotiations; anticipated future negotiations; and concurrent sets of negotiations. Linkage is competitive if agreement in one negotiation (around a policy domain) precludes agreement in other linked negotiations. Linkage is reciprocal if agreement must be reached in all the linked negotiations for overall agreement to be possible. Linkage is synergistic if it enhances negotiators’ opportunities to make mutually beneficial trades and reach agreement. Linkage is antagonistic if it diminishes negotiators’ opportunities to make mutually beneficial trades and reach agreement. Public Policy Toolkit Brian Mandel & David King

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Lessons Learned Counter-Factual Analysis Strategic Sequencing, Backward Mapping and Alternative Futures Discussion Questions 1. How might stakeholders have reframed their opportunities, operational objectives and strategy so as to ensure a more successful outcome? 2. What kinds of embedded values and cultural assumptions are preventing stakeholders from breaking out of “the box” and playing a different game? How might these stakeholders have signaled a willingness to re-think their cultural/values assumptions? 3. How might the major stakeholders have done their SWOT analysis more accurately/effectively so as to capture more gains or prevent unwanted outcomes more forcefully? 4. Using the technique of backward mapping, how might stakeholders have sequenced the mobilization of their resources, constituencies/coalitions/networks policy issue-linkage and use of time differently to produce a more successful outcome? 5. How might the use of different action channels have maximized leverage and reduced vulnerabilities for various stakeholders? 6. How might stakeholders have coupled or linked their policy issue to a broader set of policy issues in order to ensure greater political momentum and success?

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