chapter two the kantian morality - Shodhganga [PDF]

Kantian morality emphasizes on the purity of motive unlike the principle of utilitarianism. ..... The principle of auton

3 downloads 10 Views 467KB Size

Recommend Stories


questionnaire - Shodhganga [PDF]
The main objective of the study is to find out the effect of advertising on spending pattern, decision making, value system, attitude and ... Color. Model. Appeal. Vulgarity. Impact of advertisements on ,sludents: An Empirical study of students frorr

bibliography - Shodhganga [PDF]
Janice Reynolds, The Complete E- Commerce Book Design,. Build, & Maintain a Successful Web- based Business, CHM book publishers, 2nd edition 2004. ❖ Kamlesh K. Bajaj, Debjani Nag, E-Commerce- the Cutting Edge of business, Tata Mcgraw-Hill publishin

Chapter 5 Precipitation of Calcium Carbonate Using ... - Shodhganga [PDF]
industrial applications require precipitated calcium carbonate (PCC) powders, with narrow particle size distribution, uniform shape, and crystallinity [3]. Pure calcium carbonate has three crystalline forms, calcite, aragonite and vaterite. The conve

the philosophy of hind swaraj - Shodhganga [PDF]
his famous book Hind Swaraj, or. Indian Home Rule, in. 1909. He worked day and night over the manuscript, from. November 13 to November 22, and wrote it on the steamer's stationery, in all 271 pages consisting of 30,000 words. Gandhi was perturbed by

theasis.pdf - Shodhganga
What you seek is seeking you. Rumi

Untitled - Shodhganga
Your big opportunity may be right where you are now. Napoleon Hill

MICHAEL KOHLHAAS AND THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW by
Do not seek to follow in the footsteps of the wise. Seek what they sought. Matsuo Basho

morality
Be like the sun for grace and mercy. Be like the night to cover others' faults. Be like running water

k.pdf - Shodhganga
Be grateful for whoever comes, because each has been sent as a guide from beyond. Rumi

r.pdf - Shodhganga
If you are irritated by every rub, how will your mirror be polished? Rumi

Idea Transcript


45

CHAPTER TWO THE KANTIAN MORALITY

In the introductory chapter, we have briefly discussed some of the normative ethical theories, namely, utilitarianism, contractarianism, virtue-ethics and deontological ethics which deal with ethical issues in the realm of business. Besides, we have attempted to establish the relationship between business, society and ethics. This chapter focuses solely on Kantian morality in order to show how Kantian morality can be relied upon as a foundation for ethical analysis in the realm of business to maximize sustainable profit which is the goal of all sorts of business. Immanuel Kant, a famous philosopher of the European Enlightenment, was born in 1724 in Konigsberg. He is known for his Critical Philosophy. He is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western Philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. Kant’s writings in 1750s and 1760s were mostly in the field of natural sciences. However, during these periods, thinking in the direction of ethical question was not devoid of it. The so-called Prize Essay: “An Inquiry into the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals” 1 published by the Berlin Academy in 1764, is the first of his works which deals more than incidentally with questions of moral philosophy. Kant’s most significant works in the 1

Kant, I., (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Beck, Lewis White, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 5

46

realm of ethics are Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Critique of Judgment (1790), and Metaphysics of Morals (1798). These texts deal with the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy, mostly focusing on morality and action. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement. The grounds of morality, he says, are located in the form of reason itself. Accordingly, he undertakes an intensive examination of the nature of thought to show how we can have universal and objective moral obligations or duties. Most of Kant’s work on ethics is presented in two works: The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and The Critique of Practical Reason (1787). The former is one of the greatest and most influential achievements not only in the realm of ethics but also in the history of philosophy wherein Kant attempts to identify and establish the fundamental principles of morals on which a system of ethics can be based. It also unifies his account of practical reason with his work in the Critique of Pure Reason. The latter described the moral law as divine and described it as an essential a priori law of every free will in itself.

THE GROUND OF MORALITY Kant is one of the most prominent figures in the philosophical history of dutybased ethics. He is responsible for the most important and well known form of deontological ethics. Kant endeavours to lay a strong foundation of ethics that do not rest on contingencies and that defines human action as inherently right and wrong

47

irrespective of any particular circumstances. He regarded all such references to consequences as morally irrelevant because for him the rightness and wrongness of an action cannot be determined by looking at the results of the action; rather it is the nature of the intention which determines the action. It is not required of us to wait for the result to see whether the action of, say, telling lies to parents, is or is not morally right. The rightness and wrongness of an action is not judged by the result of action but by the motive behind the intention of that action which determines the action as morally worth or morally worthless. What it means from the point of view of Kant is that the moral reasoning is not based on contingent knowledge. Reason itself reveals the basic principles of morality. Kant’s moral theory is based on his concept of human being as having the unique capacity for rationality and emphasizes on acting in accordance with and for the sake of duty. Kant says that everything in nature works in accordance with the laws and that only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws, that is, in accordance with principles and only so has he a will.2 The will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practical necessity. According to Kant, a free will and a will under moral laws are identical.3 His definition of free will is almost related to the explication of a priori knowledge: the freedom of the will is being determined according to laws of its own making, as opposed to being determined to act by external causes. For Kant, practical reason and

2

Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, p. 80 3 Kant, I., (1969) The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: Text and Critical Essays, trans., Beck, Lewis White, ed., Robert Paul Wolff, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, p. 74

48

the will is the same thing. He says a free will is one that acts on a priori practical principles rather than empirical ones and thus, makes possible to think that the validity of morality depends on the freedom of the will. Kantian morality is grounded on the concept of dignity of a rational being. It emphasizes not only on the respect for individual’s rights and the equal worth of human beings but also on the idea of a moral community in which the ends of all rational beings must form a unity to be pursued collectively. His ethical theory has been derived from the ordinary moral consciousness, which supports the view that a good will alone is unconditionally good. It asserts that a good will is the only intrinsically good thing and that an action is only good if performed out of a sense of duty and not out of a desire for the result. This was based on Kant's emphasis on reason for developing moral laws and his belief in the need to be able to universalize moral decisions, which led to the principle of the categorical imperative.

THE IDEA OF GOOD WILL AND DUTY Immanuel Kant makes a critical analysis of the commonly accepted “good” things, like health, wealth, power, honour, riches, friendship and happiness. He asks the question under what condition these things may be considered good and comes to the conclusion that they are not good under all circumstances. They are good only so far as they are related with something else that is unqualifiedly good- a good will. He clearly says that it is impossible to conceive anything in the world, or even out of it that can be

49

called “good” without qualification.4 It is important here to clarify the meaning of the terms “good will” and “good” without qualification. To Kant, a good will signifies the effort of a rational being to do what he ought to do, rather than to act from inclination or self-interest. He says to act from good will means to act from duty. 5 In other words, good will is that which spontaneously expresses itself in duty, not under any influence by external circumstances derived from the goodness of the results, which it produces. “Good” without qualification he means that which is intrinsically good or has unconditional value. Good will is not good because it achieves good result. Good will is good because of its own account, that is to say, good will is good in itself. For Kant, good will alone is good in all circumstances, and in this sense, is an absolute or good in itself without qualification. The good will is not good because it produces good result but because it is based on its intrinsic values. All other claims for an intrinsic good are short of qualification, for example, courage and wealth are good in so far as they are used with a good motive. They become bad when they are used for ill purposes, and therefore, cannot be said to be intrinsically good. Happiness also cannot be said to be intrinsically good because even being worthy of being happy, Kant says, requires that one possesses a good will. The good will that Kant talks about is the one that still remains undisturbed even though the misfortune may render someone incapable of achieving one’s goals. However, Kant does not intend to say that health, intelligence, courage, and other things are not good and desirable. What he believes is that their goodness depends on a good will. Courage, for example, is not good when being used by an evil person. 4

Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 17 5 Ibid., p. 19

50

The concept of highest good is the concept of the unconditioned for practically conditioned, i.e., the concept of a supreme end which unites all other ends without which there could be no system of ends.6 There are three important questions to ask about the highest good interpreted as bonum consummation: 1. Is highest good the determining ground of the moral will? 2. Is there a moral necessity (duty) to seek and to promote it? 3. How is it possible? Repeatedly Kant points out that the first tells us that only the moral law is the determining ground of the moral will; any other makes for heteronomy. The second tells us that the concept of it and the idea of its existence as possible through our practical reason and likewise the determining ground of the pure will. But this is only because the moral law is included and thought in the concept. That is, it is only the law as a necessary component of the highest good that is the determining ground.7 What is the relation of the highest good to the moral law with respect to practice? Kant tells us that we are commanded by reason to seek to realise the highest good. If the highest good were not possible, the moral law would be null and void. It is for this reason that it seems to him to be so essential to show the highest good to be possible.8 The moral law, Kant says, is in no need of ‘justifying grounds’, for it speaks with authority even to the commonest intelligence. Human being, he believes,

Kant, I., (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Beck, Lewis White, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 242 7 Ibid., p. 243 8 Ibid., p. 244 6

51

acknowledges its validity even when they could not begin to state it in formally exact terms.9 A good will, according to Kant, is a will moved by the idea of the good. He argued that goodwill is intrinsically good; its goodness is not at all conditioned by any end or desire. It is good in itself and hence, goodwill is good without any qualification. Kant says a good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty. 10 It is the motive of duty, not the motive of inclination that gives moral worth to an action. Kantian morality emphasizes on the purity of motive unlike the principle of utilitarianism. His morality focuses on a person’s interior motivations and not on the consequences of one’s exterior action. It is an intention behind an action rather than its consequences which determines moral worth of the action according to Kant. When Kant says this, it does not, however, mean that the idea of good will is incompatible with the idea of good result. The reason is that the idea of good will does not necessarily preclude the idea of good result from it, and hence, they may go hand in hand. It only means that good will is not grounded on good result, which the action produces. To say this does not mean that good will and good result of the action cannot be conjoined. There is no logical connection between good will and good result. If at all there is a relation between them, it exists only as a matter of fact, not as a matter of logic in Kant’s view.

9

Ibid., p. 244 Ibid., p. 244

10

52

An action is dutiful if it is not merely in conformity with a rule but performed with a certain motive, that is, for the sake of duty.11 Kant used the term "duty" to differentiate it from selfish motives, or motives to attain a certain goal. Kant believed that all human behaviour is based on maxims, the reason and principles behind a moral action. For Kant, in order to have moral worth, an action must be motivated independently of inclination. Because morality emerges as an objective, universal, and necessary structure grounded on our nature as rational beings and therefore dependent neither on empirical, including facts of human psychology, nor on the super-sensible reality of transcendent metaphysics, as in theological ethics. 12 Kant’s analysis of moral goodness rules out any Consequentiality or Aristotelian foundation for morality, mainly because these so called afore-mentioned principles assign priority to merely conditioned goods which are contingent. Moral goodness, in Kant’s view, can neither be analysed nor justified in terms of any concept derived from experience nor a law that is valid for all rational beings can be based on condition that are specific to the constitution of human agent but a law that is valid for all rational beings must be based on the condition of reason alone. In Kant’s view the will is the faculty of acting according to a principle of law. When a moral person acts, whether or not one achieves what one intends with ones actions is of less concern since the morality of the actions does not rely upon their outcome. What we can control, however, is the will behind the action. That is, we can will to act according to one law rather than another. The morality of an action, therefore, must be measured in terms of the motivation which causes the action. If two people Gardner, S., (1998) “Kant” in Philosophy 2, ed., A. C. Grayling, Oxford University Press, oxford, p. 574-662 12 Ibid., p. 618 11

53

perform the same act, from the same conception of the law, but events beyond A’s control prevent him from achieving his goal, A is not less praiseworthy for not succeeding. We must consider them on equal moral ground in terms of the will behind their actions. Kant expounded three types of proposition concerning duty, which are as follows: First proposition: “A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination- still less because it is done from self- interest- but because it is done for the sake of duty.”13 Kant holds that morally good actions spring out from the sense of duty and neither from immediate inclination nor from self- interest action. It follows that the motive of duty makes an action morally good or morally bad. An action performed out of the impulse of immediate inclination can apparently seem good but such action cannot qualify to be called morally good. Even a generous action performed out of generosity, cannot be accorded a morally good action. The point is that from Kant’s point of view, it is the motive of duty; not the motive of inclination, that gives moral worth to an action. Actions are morally right by virtue of their motives, which must derive more from duty than from inclination. Kant says in passing a moral judgement, I do not pass on the success of an action in leading to the object of some desire. I need not await the issue of an action to decide whether it was good or bad; I need only know the motive which led to it. In 13

Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 18-19

54

making moral decision, I do not first need to know whether the action I undertake will succeed or not; I do not even need to know whether, in fact, I have the power to produce the effect.14 Second proposition: “An action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the results it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim- the principle of doing one’s duty whatever that duty may be.”15 Kant’s second proposition is the formal principle of duty. He holds that an action done out of inclinations and its effect are not worth the name “good” morally. In other words, all consideration of inclinations and its effects is excluded. From Kant’s point of view, an action must be based on duty. Duty, as Kant says, must be defined not in terms of its contents, but as a purely formal requirement. It is the requirement of acting out of respect to the moral law or maxim. Any idea of duty involves that of acting from a principle (maxim and principle are the same). A maxim is a principle upon which we act. And the law or maxim is not something merely imposed from without but a law or maxim of our own choice or making and the obedience to such law is possible only to rational human being. And such maxim in Kant’s language is called a formal maxim. Third proposition: “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.”16

Kant, I., (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Beck, Lewis White, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 113 15 Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral, trans., H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 20 16 Wolff, R. P., (1973) Autonomy of Reason, A Commentary of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Harbour Torch Books, New York, p. 81 14

55

Kant says: “Respect for moral law is not the incentive to morality, but is morality itself.”17 A law is always a product of reason and such rational capacity or autonomy of reason is endowed with rational beings and thus only human being can follow laws of their own choosing. Hence, obeying the moral law only amounts to obeying one-self and following one’s own will. Morality is simply the expression of our own free will. Morality is not something, which is imposed upon rational beings from without, but it is rather a self- imposed law that ought to be obeyed. Kant holds that obedience to moral law is simply obedience to one’s conscience or will. One who respects law is one who acts from duty and duty is the necessitation, which commands simple law- abidingness to every rational beings. In obedience to such commands, one is simply obeying to one’s own will or law or choosing and therefore, to act on the maxim of doing one’s duty for its own self is to act out of reverence to duty.

THE FORMULATION OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE In the book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant classifies imperatives into two types which are expressed by the word “ought”: hypothetical and categorical. All imperatives, whether categorical or hypothetical, always prescribe actions to be done. He clearly says that all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The categorical imperative prescribes actions to be done because of the moral worth of the maxim, and not for the sake of some consequence that may result. 17

Kant, I., (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Beck, L. W., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.113

56

The supreme principle or law of morality which the good man must follow is the “categorical imperative”. Human beings, to the extent that they act rationally, Kant believes, will always be guided by categorical principles. A principle which is not conditioned by any end gives rise to categorical imperative. A categorical imperative represents an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary. By contrast a hypothetical imperative is one which declares a possible action to be practically necessary not as an end in itself but rather as a means to the attainment of certain desired goals. That is to say in other words, a hypothetical imperative is a conditional directive which tells us what ought to be done if a desired goal is to be realised. If an action is simply taken as a means to obtain some particular result, it is a hypothetical imperative. This is so because an action done by rational agent is not one performed in the sense of duty for duty’s sake but rather taken as a means to achieve something else already set to attain. A principle which is conditioned by an end gives rise to hypothetical imperative. It represents an interest contingently. A hypothetical imperative, therefore, only enjoins upon an agent to perform an action for its effect. A hypothetical imperative represents an action as means to something else that is willed or might be willed. When a rational agent performs an action, and the end is one that every rational being wills by virtue of its very nature, the imperatives are pragmatic. A rational being by virtue of its very nature wills his happiness. The actions enjoined by a pragmatic imperative are good in the sense of being prudent. The “good” in this sense does not amount to unconditioned good because the very act of performing action is not in

57

conformity with the objective principle. Kant says there is no difficulty in discerning the possibility of hypothetical imperatives. Granted that men have desires that may be satisfied only the application of their knowledge of the world and granted that they are not sufficiently rational in the pursuit of their aims always readily to do those actions indicated by their knowledge as being, it is obvious that they will experience a constraint to do them, the constraint being expressed in a hypothetical, conditional, heterogonous imperative.18 In moral concern there is a felt constraint to do a certain action, and this constraint has a quite different tone from that which I experience when called upon to do some action for the sake of some even long range goal I have before me. The latter is a constraint predicated upon a desire I have; the former seems to be independent of and often in conflict with all my desires. This kind of constraint is called “duty”, the objective necessitation of an action that is not subjectively necessary but subject to my free choice to commit or omit.19 To be obliged to do something means that, to accomplish a given purpose, I have to do something I don’t particularly want to do, or dislike doing it. To be obligated to do something means to be under necessity of choosing to do something without consulting my desires. In each case my cognitive intelligent (for Kant, reason) must decide what is it that I ought to do; but in the former case, one of reason’s premises is a desire, while, in the latter, desire is not a premise.20

Kant, I., (1960) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Beck, L. W. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 113 19 Ibid., p. 113 20 Ibid., p. 113 18

58

Kant’s morality centres on the categorical imperative and its formulae. There are some objective principles, which Kant believed, are unconditioned under any circumstances and therefore, represents actions as objectively necessary. This is what Kant calls practical law which commands obedience. The validity of Practical Law is derived neither from inclinations nor from self-interest. The law in itself is unconditioned and absolute; it is good in itself, which gives rise to categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are the forms (and not the contents) in which the commands of the moral laws are expressed. Kant believes that there is just one command that is categorical which necessarily binding on all rational beings irrespective of any other considerations. The categorical imperative is the ultimate norm of morality, a command that prevails whatever the circumstances. Its validity stems from reason and also from our nature as free and rational moral agents with inherent value, that is, the autonomy of reason. For Kant, moral principle or categorical imperative commands obedience and the fundamental principle of ethics is a requirement of reason, which is binding on all rational beings irrespective of any influence. In the book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant called the ultimate moral norm the “Categorical Imperative”, a command that prevails regardless of what the circumstances and the validity of which stems from the reason and also from our nature as free, rational moral agent with an inherent value. According to Kant, a rational agent is one who acts autonomously. Kant holds that everything in nature works in accordance with law. He defines law or the faculty of practical reason as the ability to act according to a conception of

59

law. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant identifies ‘will’ with practical reason. Kant believed that every action has a maxim. A Maxim is a personal or private rule and therefore, it is a subjective principle which applies merely to oneself. Moreover, if it is to be rational, it must be based on the objective principle which equally applies to all rational beings. The objective principles may be described as a command, which necessitate the will, and the formula of such a command is called the imperative. An imperative is a linguistic form in which a command is expressed. All imperatives are hence expressed in the form of a judgement that something ought to or appears in a descriptive form. The principle of autonomy takes a descriptive or prescriptive form as it applies to perfectly rational beings or those whose rationality is imperfect. An action of an imperfect rational being is confronted between reason and desire. And often desire or inclination supersedes the faculty of reason. The prescriptive form “ought” expresses the relation of an objective principle and a subjective principle. These objective principles remain a moral compass that guides and obligates rational beings to obey one’s law and for which reason can be the sole determining factor. This is possible because we are considered as free moral agent. Kant offers four formulations of the categorical imperative: the first in terms of universal law; the second in terms of treating persons as end in themselves; the third in terms of the autonomy of will or self-legislation; and fourth in terms of that alone which can render the kingdom of end possible, which are briefly mentioned below.

60

1.

THE FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW

In the Groundwork I, Kant states the first formula in the negative way. He states: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”21 In Groundwork II he gives the same formula in a positive way: He states: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”22 Kant also gives a subsidiary formulation of the formula of universal law in terms of the concept of a law of nature thus: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” 23 Kant's first formula of universal law requires an individual to obey a maxim which can, without contradiction, be willed to be a rule for everyone. That is to say in other words, that the essence of morality lies in acting on the basis of an impersonal principle which is valid for everyone, including oneself. Thus, Kant insists that a moral rule be consistently universalized because for him the moral rules command categorically and not hypothetically. The former is a command that is necessarily binding to all rational agents whereas the latter is an imperative that tells us what if we desire a particular result. The moral laws are commands that need no consideration of subjective desire. Take, for example, ‘speaking the truth’. There is no situation where truth speaking is not relevant. This means that the principle of action should be applied consistently. The first formula is based upon the principle of non-contradiction. Kant

Wolff, R. P., (1973) Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Harbour Torch Books, New York, p. 88 22 Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 88 23 Ibid., p. 89 21

61

believed that the maxim (or principle) upon which one acts should be without contradiction. I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.

2.

THE FORMULA OF TREATING PERSONS AS END-IN THEMSELVES

The second formula Kant explicates in terms of the idea of humanity as an end in itself thus: “Act only in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same as the end.”24 This formula requires that persons should be treated as end themselves and not as means. Actions should not be used as means to subjective ends. And to say this does not mean that the second formula of the categorical imperative presents actions as end in themselves. It does relate actions to persons and prescribes that they ought to be treated as objective ends. When Kant says that actions ought to be done for the sake of action, it does not mean that persons do not constitute the objects of morality or persons do not figure in the centre of moral consideration. If it were so, he would have not have said that persons ought to be treated as end in themselves, which he says. He suggested if there were objective ends given to us by reason, ends which in all circumstances, a fully rational agent would necessarily pursue as an absolute and unconditioned value. They would also be ends which an imperfectly rational agent ought to pursue if he were irrational

24

Ibid., p. 27

62

enough to be tempted to do otherwise.25 Only rational agents can be ends in themselves according to Kant, because they alone can have an unconditioned and absolute value and therefore, it is wrong to use them simply as means to an end. Kant’s doctrine of end-in-itself follows from the very essence of the categorical imperative. As rational beings would act inconsistently if they did not treat every human being the way they themselves would want to be treated. If the categorical imperative was the end in mind when actions were performed, then only those who wish to achieve the categorical imperative would be obligated to act morally. Therefore, he argued that the basis of the categorical imperative must be an objective end, which Kant referred to as an "ends in itself". In this formula of categorical imperative we see clearly its social implication. It requires we should respect all human beings impartially and avoid exploiting anyone.

3.

THE FORMULA OF THE AUTONOMY OF WILL

The third formula of the categorical imperative Kant explicates in terms of selflegislation or giving oneself rule which he calls the autonomy of will. He states: “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.”26 To Kant, the formula of autonomy is the most important maxim of morality since it leads straight to the idea of freedom. According to him, freedom constitutes the foundation of morality. The third formula expresses the idea that it is a rational will which obliges an agent to act from the categorical imperative, rather than any other 25 26

Ibid., p. 28 Ibid., p. 34

63

outside influence. Autonomy of the will for Kant is entirely self-legislating: The moral obligations by which it is perfectly bound are those which it has imposed upon itself while simultaneously regarding them as binding upon everyone else by virtue of their common possession of the same rational faculties. All genuinely moral actions, Kant believes, spring from the freely chosen dictates of an autonomous will. Kant thought that any moral law which was based on fulfilling some other interest would deny the categorical imperative, leading him to argue that moral law must only arise from a rational will. This principle requires us to recognise and respect the right of others to act autonomously and since moral laws must be universalizable what is required of a person is required of all. We are subject to the moral law only because it is the necessary expression of our own nature as rational agents. Moral obligations and moral responsibilities always presuppose freedom of the agent. Persons are evaluated in terms of good and bad because they are believed to be having the faculty of reason and freedom consists in the exercising of one’s own reason.

4.

THE FORMULA OF THE KINGDOM OF ENDS

The fourth formula Kant explicates in terms of that alone which can render the kingdom of end possible. There is another sub-formula of the kingdom of ends which springs directly from the formula of autonomy. It is this: “So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of end.”27

27

Ibid., p. 35

64

Kant’s idea of the "kingdom of ends" suggests that actions should be performed as if the maxims would provide laws for a possible "kingdom of ends." This formula is developed directly from the formula of autonomy. According to this maxim, people have an obligation to act upon principles which would be accepted by a community of rational agents. In such a community, each individual would only accept maxims which could govern every member of the community without treating any member as a means to an end but rather every member in such community will equally be treated as members of the kingdom of ends. A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is made possible by the freedom of will. Kant says, so far as rational agents are all subject to universal laws which they themselves make, they constitute a kingdom, that is, a state or common wealth. These ends cover, not only persons as ends in themselves, but also the personal ends which each of these may set before himself in accordance with the universal law.28 To Kant, morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of end is possible. This implies that laws are not instruments to kingdom of ends but are the parts of a kingdom of ends and action is only the means by which objective ends or a kingdom of ends can be realized. The moral community is a union of different rational beings under common laws that relate them one to others. Thus, humanity for Kant constitutes as an end of moral actions and the imperative to seek it is independent of desire.

28

Ibid., p. 31

65

THE JUSTIFICATION OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND MORAL LAW Kant offers justification of categorical imperative in his book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. He distinguishes “perfectly rational agents” from “nonperfectly rational agents” and uses the distinction in order to define the term “imperative”. After explicating an imperative, he then proceeds to the possibility of categorical imperative by way of questioning as to how imperatives are possible. In order to investigate this possibility it is important to peruse again the distinction of analytic and synthetic propositions; and priori and posterior propositions which he had given in the introduction of the first Critique. According to Kant, analytic propositions are a priori propositions since they are independent of experience. In an analytic proposition, the predicate merely repeats and does not add any new information to whatever is contained in the subject. As a result it does not pose much problem. Kant uses a priori concept in a wider sense. According to him, all analytic propositions are a priori propositions but all a priori propositions are not analytic propositions, for example, synthetic a priori propositions. All hypothetical imperatives are analytic practical propositions as they assert analytic means-end relationship. All categorical imperatives are synthetic a priori propositions. They are called synthetic propositions because they assert synthetic means-end relationship. They are called a priori because their validity is independent of experience. Kant introduces two types of end: subjective and objective. The subjective ends are those whose values are conditional and relative. The objective ends are those whose values are unconditional and absolute. An imperative that represents actions as means to

66

the attainment of objective ends is objectively valid for all persons in the same way, irrespective of their caste, colour and creed, etc. Categorical imperatives are such kind of imperatives. Kant states in his first message that “Hypothetical imperatives are no problem because they are analytic judgments a priori of practical reason. But categorical imperatives require a transcendental deduction because they are synthetic judgment a priori of practical reason.”29 Then, Kant states, “Hypothetical imperatives are no problem because we can demonstrate their possibility by appeal to experience. But categorical imperatives require a transcendental deduction because no experience could suffice to demonstrate their possibility.”30 The intricacy of finding possibility of categorical imperatives leads to the question: How is a synthetic a priori proposition possible? Kant held that propositions or judgments can be either analytic or synthetic. In the analytic propositions, the predicate merely repeats what is already contained in the subject and the validity of analytic judgment entails that it is necessarily true. For example, “who wills the end, wills the means” is analytic proposition; whereas, in synthetic propositions or judgments, the predicate does not merely repeat but adds new information about the subject. For Kant, an absolutely moral agent is one who acts and thus, is analytically true. It is also analytically true to say that if human agents are free, they can act autonomously and the abidingness to the moral laws enacted by an absolute moral agent from the autonomy of reason is nothing more than obeying one’s own law, it is rather a self- imposed duty. Yet, an absolute moral agent, most of the time, acts

Wolff, R. P., (1973) Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Harbour Torch Books, New York, p. 143 30 Ibid., p. 143 29

67

quite contradictory to our own law and therefore, law appears to us as a categorical imperative, necessitating us to act accordingly and never to act contradictory to it.31 Kant holds that a finite rational being must regard himself first as a member of the intelligible world and secondly, as a member of the sensible world. From this, it follows that if a rational being is solely a member of the intelligible world, all rational actions would necessarily accord with the principle of autonomy and if solely a part of sensible world, they would necessarily be entirely subjected to the law of nature. 32 It appears that the two are contradictory to each other but once we grasp the distinction, the contradiction disappears. A Rational being must indeed consider himself as member of the intelligible world. We, rational beings, conceive ourselves as free in action and choice because we already recognised the freedom of autonomy. Only if we are free the moral law can bind us categorically. Imperfect rational being acts autonomously and is not under any law other than the moral law which is of our own making and the obligatoriness only amounts to obedience to our own will or practical reason. But, imperfect rational being most of the time are tempted to do otherwise than what we really ‘ought’ to do and therefore, in order to abide by the moral law which is of our own making, ‘I ought’ and ‘we ought’ becomes a categorical imperative so as to keep vigilance against such deviation from moral law. In the second argument, Kant continues to reflect on his defence of our right to believe in our own freedom. Though we have recognised the possession of free will as a member of the intelligible world, we are still left with the problem. But, trying to

31 32

Sullivan, J. R., (1994) An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 162 Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 45

68

comprehend as to how we can be free, how pure reason can be practical and, how categorical

imperatives

are

possible,

can

only lead

to

comprehension

of

incomprehensibility. Therefore, there is no option left to really comprehend them rather than defending the claim that we are free as there is no possibility or basis to locate freedom in the world of experience and moreover, there is also no evidence against the possibility of our freedom. Hence, Kant called the concept of moral freedom as ‘transcendental’, which means, it can refer only to reality that ‘transcends’ the world of experience.33 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant declares that, we can go beyond a defence as we have a positive and firm support for our own moral self- consciousness and through which we become aware of the moral law as ‘a fact of reason’, that is, we become aware of ourselves as bound by moral law and commands our obedience against our desires and inclination even in the midst of internal moral conflicts. This practical fact of the moral law is the sole sufficient ground for us to infer the autonomy of our will. Thus, this moral law is the sole condition under which freedom can be known though we cannot understand how we can be free. The reality of our freedom is just certain as that of moral law from the point of view of moral reasoning. The primary formulation of Kant's ethics is the categorical imperative from which he derived his other four formulations. Kant believed that an action can only be morally worthy if it is performed in accordance with the categorical imperative, meaning that it is performed out of a sense of duty to the moral law. For a maxim to be in line with the categorical imperative, Kant proposed that it must be universally 33

Sullivan, J. R., (1994) An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 164

69

applicable to all autonomous beings. Actions which are performed with some motive other than the sense of duty are referred to by Kant as, acting according to the hypothetical imperative, which he did not equate with moral worthiness. The maxims which could not be universally applied fell under the hypothetical imperative. Kant proposed five formulations of his ethical theory, namely, the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, the Formula of Autonomy and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. In brief, the Categorical Imperative, from which all other formulations were derived, states that moral actions should be done out of reverence to the moral law. The Formula of Universal Law asserts that the principles behind an action must be universalizable. The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself ensures that the motivation behind every action must be for the good of humanity; this was the base of the categorical imperative. The Formula of Autonomy expresses the idea that a rational agent is bound to the categorical imperative by their will, rather than by any outside influence. The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends suggests that moral agents should act as if their maxims will set the laws in a 'Kingdom of Ends'. Kant believed that inclinations, emotions and consequences should play no role in moral action. This means that the motivation for action must be based on obligation. Morality should provide us with a framework of rational principles (rules) that guide and restrict action independent of personal intentions and desires. In his view, the sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the consequence of the action that is achieved, but the motive that moves the action. And the only motive that can endow an act with moral value, he argues, is one that arises

70

from universal principles discovered by reason. The categorical imperative is Kant’s famous statement of this duty: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”34 In Kant’s morality freedom plays a significant role because the possibility of moral judgments presupposes it. Freedom is an idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function. Without the assumption of freedom, reason cannot act. If we think of ourselves as completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes, then any attempt to conceive of a rule that prescribes the means by which some end can be achieved is pointless. I cannot both think of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to act according to the conception of a principle that gives guidance to my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to accomplish the ends and understand the world.

BRIEF SUMMARY AND EVALUATION The Kantian morality is a duty-based ethics generally known as deontology, which in many ways is diametrically opposed to that of Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill’s theory of Utilitarianism. Kant identified his ethics as pure ethics or a priori Part of ethics, entirely based on the validity of the autonomy of reason. His a priori part of ethics may be called metaphysics of morals. Kant strongly believed that if there are moral principles in accordance with which man ought to act, knowledge of these principles must be a priori knowledge rather than merely basing on sensuous 34

Kant, I., (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. 88

71

experience. His ethics contains no empirical concepts of human nature and it is known only through the pure understanding. Kant’s Metaphysic of Morals is known as a canon of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, that is, a statement of the a priori principles of the correct employment of pure reason which is practical rather than speculative. The Kantian morality is based on the postulates of universality, humanity and autonomy of reason. Kant developed a satisfactory foundation for moral rights based on these postulates. According to him, there are certain duties, which bind all human beings irrespective of any caste, class, creed, gender and religion, etc., simply because of being a human. Duties should be done with good will. To act from goodwill means to act from duty. For him, morality is a dictate of reason. It is not a dictate of passion and desire. Being a dictate of reason, moral reasoning is objectively possible. In other words, moral disagreements can be resolved on an objective and rational ground. Kant distinguished between two kinds of imperatives: the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative. The hypothetical imperative pertains to actions performed out of certain inclination with a motive to attain some specific ends. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, is unconditional directives or commands for human behaviour. It is binding upon everyone because each rational person acknowledges his/her obligations to follow reason. It is the only basis for determining our duties. Duties springing from reason are not done for the sake of fulfilling one’s selfish end. They are done for the sake of humanity. Kant points out that moral rightness and wrongness are to be distinguished not by what a person achieves or gains but by the reasons the person has for what he does.

72

A charge is often levelled against Kantian morality by saying that it is purely formal and has little practical utility in business and hence, dogmatic and inflexible. For example, Mill challenges Kant’s emphasis on intention by asking: why do we praise good will, except that good will usually leads to good consequences? For Mill, the first thing we do is that we praise an act for its consequences and then we praise the intention of the person only in a secondary way to encourage him or her for further good consequences from such action. Kantian ethics has been severely criticized by different philosophers in different areas. Some of the criticisms are as follows: 1. Duty for duty’s sake is the maxim of Kant’s morality and an action done out of the sense of duty alone can be said to have moral worth. His maxims consider all kinds of actions done from inclinations as not being of any moral worth, and hence, exclude even acts performed from sympathy. 2. Even if Kant is justified in saying that the moral law requires universality, this condition being completely formal is at the same time completely empty. 3. Both Hegel and Mill have criticized Kant’s ethics on the ground that Kant is not able to make the transition from form to content. Duty according to Hegel must be willed not for duty’s sake, but “for the sake of some content”. 4. Kant does not justify as to why the highest good must be willed. He as well does not say why if it is not so willed, it would mean the

73

impossibility of doing one’s duty. This is the vulnerability of the postulates of practical reason.

In spite of all the criticisms posed against the Kantian morality, the validity of Kantian ethics as such would not be taken as a failure because what Kant had intended was to formulate the supreme law of morality based on the belief that moral rules must be universally binding if there is to be an adequate moral system to govern human actions. This belief arises from his understanding that human beings all share a common nature, that is, the structure of the human mind and the rules according to which the mind operates are common. The Kantian morality has shown how fallible human beings are and how weak the guide of desires and inclinations are when it comes to moral conduct. Human beings are known as rational beings by virtue of his capacity to reason and yet, it is no less the fact that, the so-called rational being most of the time acts irrationally against one’s own reason. Some philosophers, like Hobbes, regards that all rational conduct is motivated by self-interest. Moreover, Hume held that reason has only the function of serving our desires. Here, reason is taken just as a means to fulfil one’s desire and because desire varies from person to person and also varies from time to time, under such conditions nothing but lawlessness prevails automatically, and hence, the possibility of having a moral community is totally ruled out in such a condition. Therefore, knowing the fallibility of desire and its limited applicability Kant had endeavoured to established a supreme law of morality, which is also known as categorical imperative; a law that commands everyone’s obedience based on the autonomy of reason.

74

Kant connects the concepts of moral rules, duties and actions with the concept of reason. His morality emphasizes on how rational human being endowed with inherent value ought to mobilize reason as “moral compass”35 to guide us in all our decision-making. The Kantian ethics emphasizes on the virtues of humanity, dutifulness, integrity, justice, right, good intention, truthfulness, promise keeping, trust, consistency, commitment and autonomy, the relevance of which can hardly be ignored in our multi-faceted conducts irrespective of who we are and what we do. Business as one of the activities of human society can nonetheless be ethical and yet prosperous and successful in doing business. There are many relevance examples of business institutions whose reasonable services and responsibilities towards the society at large have shown to be praiseworthy and worthwhile. Though often, ethics is thought to be different from business because it is wrongly supposed that there is an inherent conflict between ethics and the self-interested pursuit of profit yet there is no valid reason that business cannot be ethical and profitable at the same time. We can cite a good example from Merck and Company, an American drug company whose courageous and challenging endeavour in discovering of a cure for river blindness, have ultimately saved millions of people who would otherwise have been condemned to a life of intense suffering and partial blindness. They did so despite knowing the fact that the project would involve a huge financial expenditure with little prospect of profit. The motive behind the execution of the project was based on the value of preserving human being which was explicitly stated thus ‘The potential human benefits of a drug for river blindness were too significant to ignore.’36 It is no surprise that the company is one of

35 36

Sullivan, J. R., (1994) An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, p.110 Velasquez, G. M., (2002) Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, Pearson Education, Inc., Singapore, p. 4

75

the largest pharmaceutical companies. More details about the issues of ethical responsibilities of business towards the societies will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters. Though, Kant’s moral laws are severely criticized by many ethicists and philosophers in general, like Mill, Hegel, etc., starting from his (Kant) time reaching its climax in this postmodern era, his insight in identifying and defending the doctrines like, respect for persons, autonomy of rational will, etc., can never be invalidated. The reason is that these doctrines as such are the very essence of morality and most of all; these doctrines are what the world needs the most. True to his doctrines, Kant’s greatest concern was with the human community as a whole and with ways that human community could live in peace.

Smile Life

When life gives you a hundred reasons to cry, show life that you have a thousand reasons to smile

Get in touch

© Copyright 2015 - 2024 PDFFOX.COM - All rights reserved.