* '-
CIVIL LAW-PART
TWO
PROPERTY Vicente -4bad SantosO
I. INTRODUCTION The year under review -1968 -produced a good harvest of decisions on the law of property. Most of the decisions merely repeat previous applications of the law so that the judgment could be anticipated in the light of the given facts. It is not possible to be critical with decisions of this type because, like a pair of old shoes, Ithey give comfort and support the stability of the law so essential in the field of property. We have criticized a few of the decisions. One deals with coownership, which we think was not correctly decided. Another deals with public property, which we think was decided wrrectly but left something to be desired in the process of reasoning. We shall be happy to know the reaction of our readers to our criticisms.
As before, the present survey has been delimited by the editor this publication to cases, if any, applying the provisions of Book of the Civil Code (excluding trademarks, trade-names and registry property) and the titles on occupation, donation and prescription Book I11 of the same code.
of I1 of of
11. CLASSIFICATION OF pRopwTy There are two basic classifications of property in the Civil Code. Accorlng to its nature, property is classified into immovable or real and movable or personal. Depending on ownership, property is classified into public and private. To be sure, thcre are other classifications of property but they are less important than those already mentioned, e.g., corporeal and incorporeal, fungible and non-fungible, present and future, divisible and indivisible, urban and rural, generic and specific, and principal and accessory. A. The nature of property Article 415 of the Civil Code does not define what is real property. Instead, it lumps a number of seemingly unrelated items and dubs them as immovable property. Thus, we find in the list not only proper-
* Professor and
Dean, College of Law, University of
the Philippines.
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ties which are real by nature (land) but also others so considered by attachment (paintings), by destination (machinery) and by analogy {contracts for public works). I
In Government Service Insurance System v. Calsons, Inc.,l the Supreme Court held that machinery permanently placed on land became real property. In that case, the corporation borrowed from the System a sum of money secured by a real estate mortgage on several parcels of land, together with improvements then existing or which may be placed thereon later. The contract provided, inter alia, that the mortgagor shall not sell, dispose of, mortgage or encumber any of the mmtgaged properties without the consent of the mortgagee. The mortgagor removed and disposed of the machinery installed in the building, which was standing on the mortgaged properties. The m’ortgagor justified its action by contending that the machinery was not included in the mortgage. But the Supreme Court held the contention groundless. It said: “The mortgage was on the lands ‘together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter be constructed’ thereon. And the machineries, as found by the trial court, were permanently a t k l i e d to the property, and instalIed there by the former owner to meet the needs of certain works or industry therein. They were therefore part of the immovable pursuant to Article 415 of the Civil Code, and need not be the subject of a separate chattel mortgage in order to be deemed duly encumbered in favor of appellee.”Z
To the same effect, see, among other cases, Bischoff v. P o ~ n a r , ~ Cu Unjieng v. hfaba1aca-t Sugar CO.,~Berkenkotter Cea v. ViIlan~e2;a,~ v. Cu Unjiens; Davao Sawmill Co. I ) . Cmtillo, Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. C a r t of Appeals,q and People’s Bank and Trust Co. ”u. Dahican Lumber C O . ~ B. The ownership of properLy Among properties of public dominion are shores.” And the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 stipulates: “By shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the tides are not appreciabIe, the G.R. No. 1986’7, May 29, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 891. l I d . at 897-898. 12 Phil. 690 (1909). 418 Phil. 538 (1911). 58 Phil. 439 (1933). 61 Phil. 663 (1935). €3 Phil. 709 (1935). 96 Phil. 70 (1954). QG.R. No. 17500, May 16, 1967, 20 S.C.R.A. 84 (1967). CIVILCODE,art. 420.
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shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms and tempests.”ll
In Cagmpang v. Morano,’2 the plaintiff sought to recover a parcel of land abutting on the sea, which, he claimed, had been forcibly entered by the defendant who, in turn, pleaded occupancy by virtue of a foreshore grant from the government. At a pre-trial, it was agreed:
“. . . Should the lot in question be reached by the ordinary highest tide, then the plaintiff shall concede that the lot rightfully belongs to the defendant and will relinquish any of his claim and interest in the same. Should the hdings of the court be the other way, then the defendant should abandon the lot in question in favor of the plaint8 . . .” At an ocular inspection conducted by the trial court? it was found:
“. . . [T]bat the lot in question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest ordinary tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest tide during the months of May,- June and July or during the months when the highest tide of the year will occur.” It gave judgment for the defendant but despite the pre-trial agree. ment the plaintiff appealed, urging reversal. In affirming, the Supreme
Court said: “As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and there is no showing that these. tides are due to abnormal conditions, the land i s obviously part of the shore and public property. Hence, legal possession thereof appertains to the national government or its grantees. No error was, therefore, oommitted in holding that appellee Mvrano, being such a grantee, has the supedor right to possession as against the plaintiff who exhibited no State grant.”la
It should be noted that the quality of being a shore is not necessarily an original condition. Thus, a piece of land? though privately owned, can become a shore if it is eroded by the ebb and flow of the tide and the owner makes no attempt to stop the advance of the sea so that the land becomes submerged in water in ordinary tides. If such should occur, the land becomes part of the shore and the owner loses ownership over it. It i s a de f case of eminent d0main.l“ The Civil Code divides the property of provinces, cities and municipalities as either property for public use or patrimonial property.15 Their property for public use consist of roads and streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service *l?irt. 1. l’G.R. No. 25738, March 14, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 1040. 13Zd. at 1042-1043. l4 Government v. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112 (1929). l5Art. 423.
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paid for them. All other property by them possessed is patrimonial, which shall be governed by the Civil Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.le The case of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga,” shows how the Supreme G o u t used the phrase “the provisions of special laws” to arrive at a classification of provincial properties different from that given in the Civil Code. The municipality of Zamboanga used to be part, in fact the capital, of Zamboanga province. In 1936, the, municipality of Zamboanga became a city and in the charter creating it was included the provision that “Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon u p n the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be &ed by the Auditor General.”’*
In 1952, Republic Act No. 711 divided Zamboanga province into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. After the division, the City of Zamboanga started to pay to Zamboanga del Norte its share of the value of the abandoned properties but in 1961, the charter of the former was amended by providing that“All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the mid City of Zamboanga.”la
Zamboanga del Norte then filed a complaint against the City of Zamboanga which sought, inter alia, that the amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 3039, “be declared unconstitutional for depriving the plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation.” The issue, as stated by the court, was: Were the abandoned properties owned by the province in its public and governmental capacity or were they owned in its private or proprietory capacity? In the case of the first, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it; in the case of the second, the property is patrimonial and the owner cannot be deprived of i t without due process and payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court held that under Articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code, municipal corporations have only two kinds of properties: property for public use and patrimonial property. These articles provide: l6Art. 424. G.R. No. 24440, March 28, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 1334. Corn. Act No. 39 (1936), sec. 50. l8 Rep. Act No. 3039 (1961), sec. 1.
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“Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
Art. 424. Property for public use, m the provinces, cities and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid €or by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property po-ssessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.”
The test, it said, as to whether property is for public use is its free and indiscriminate use by anyone. The Supreme Court held that, under the Civil Code classification, two lots used as high school playgrounds were property for public use whereas the rest of the abandoned properties were patrimonial property. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites and the school sites will be considered patrimonial property, said the court, for they are not for public use. They fall, added the Court, under the phrase “public w-orks for public service” for, under the e j u s d m generis rule, such public works to be for public use must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone just like the preceding enumerated properties in Article 424, paragraph 1. But the Court did not rely on its interpretation of ,the Civil Code to determine the plaintiff‘s right to compensation. It relied instead on the “principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations” because Article 424, paragraph 2, provides that the applibation of the Code shall be “without prejudice to the provisions of special laws” and citing Hinunangan o. Director of and Municipality of Batangas v. Cantos,21 Tantoco c. Municipal Council of Iloilo,” held that property devoted to public service is deemed for public use and under this norm, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like lccal administration, public education, public health, etc. As a result, of the 50 lots that had been abandoned by the province, 24 were declared by the court to be property for public use because they were devoted to governmental purposes and noncompensable, and 24 were declared patrimonial in nature and therefore, compensable. This case can stand some criticism.
(1) If, under the Civil Code, the test for determining whether property is for public use is its free and indiscriminate use by anyone, then a high sohool playground, contrary to the court’s holding, i s not 2 0 2 4 Phil. 124 (1913). 21
91 Phil. 514 (1952). 49 Phil. 52 (1926).
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1969J
property for public use because its use is not open to everyone but to high school students only. A high school playground is therefore patrimonial property.
(2) According to the Supreme Court, “[flor purposes of this article (424), the principles obtaining under the laws of municipal corporations can be considered as ‘special laws’.’’ It is believed, however, that the Civil Code refers to statute law for it speaks of “prmisions” which cannot include “principles” constituting the law of Municipal Corporations. This is not to say that it was wrong for the court to apply said principles for, as it said, “[tlhe controversy here is more along the domains of the law of Municipal Corporations-State v. Province - than along that of Civil Law.” The point we wish to make is that it was not necessary to torture the coda1 provisions in order to justify a different classification. 111. OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
A. The jus windicandi One of the rights included in the ownership of property is the jus vindicandi-‘“The owner has . . . a right of action against the holder and possessor of the d i n g in order to recover it.”23
It is hornbook law that in the recovery of real property, the owner, depending on the cause of deprivation, has the following actions available to him: “(a) the summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from the filing of the complaint under Article 439 of the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; ( b ) the accion publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) acci6n de reivindicaci6n7 which seeks the recovery of ownership, including the jus u t d i and the jus fmendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance.” This was pointed out in Emilia v. Budo,“ In that case, the plaintiff prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from continuing with the construction of a house on a piece of land which the former claimed to belong to her. The trial court issued an ex-parte preliminary injunction but after a summary hearing on a motion to dismiss, it dissolved the preliminaq- injunction and dismissed the complaint. In 2 3 C ~ CODE, v ~ art. 428, par. 1. G.R. No. 23685, April 25, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 183, 189.
24
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that hearing, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of a surveyor that the house under construction was outside the plaintiff‘s hand. The plaintiff appealed. In dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court said: “The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicial pronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the wellingrained precept that injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been establi~hed.’~5
The Court then pointed out the three kinds of actions available to the plaintiff, supra. The reason why injunction is not the proper remedy has been given in the case of Santos v. De as follows: “This court, on more than one occasion, has held that injunction will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it in that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. (Devesa us. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273; Palafox us. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444; Evangelista vs. Pedrehs, 27 Phil. 648). The doctrine proceeds on the familiar rule that the writ of injunction is an equitable relief, and that the determination of title is a legal remedy. In jurisdictions where courts of equity are separate and distinct from courts of law, such distinction is by no means a matter of indifference. Indeed, it is a matter of jurisdiction, for courts of equjty, by their nature, can only administer equity. Thus, following this principle, this court has further held that, where the defendant raised the question of title, injunction is not the pmper remedy. (Asombra vs. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil. 883; Liongson vs. Martinez, 6 Phil. 948.)”
Nonetheless, even if a case had been initiated as one for injunction, it can be treated by the court as an ordinary action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits between the same parties considering that Philippine courts administer both law and equity.2’ In the EmiZia case, both parties claimed ownership over the same portion of land. Clearly, as the Supreme Court pointed out, “a legitimate issue of ownership emerges.” The plaintiff‘s suit should properly have been an accion rdnvindicatoria. And in line with the Santos and other cases, the court, instead of dismissing the complaint, could have remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to amend the complaint so that the question of ownership could be raised. But the court did not remand because it was afraid, in view of the voluminous record of the case, that confiision might arise. Id. at 187. Phil. 573, 574-575 (1934). 27 Santos v. De Leon, supra.
25
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CIVIL LAW
An owner’s right to recover possession of his property may, in certain cases, have to give way to public interest. This is illustrated in City of Legaspi v. A. I;. Ammen Transportation Co., Znc.,as In that case, the defendant had earlier successfully reconstituted its title to a piece of land situated in the. now City of Legaspi. It afterwards sought to eject the occupants on the land, including the City of Legaspi which had constructed a public road thereon. From a judgment ordering the city to vacate the road, appeal by certiorari was made by the city.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but made the following
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reservation:
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“Such a problem thus gives rise to a matter of public interest. Fortunately, it is not a new one m this jurisdiction. The appmpriate solution was indicated in the leading case of Alfonso w. Pasay City, where this Court, through Justice Montemayor, held: ‘In the present case, Mfonso remains up to now, the owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4388 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, ‘becanse Wig registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As registered owner, he could bring an action to w v e r possession at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither &venient nor feasible because it i s now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensstion, wllich it could and should have (106 Phil. 1017, 1022 [1960].) done years aso since 19F.”’ 7 , 1. ’ ’ C’ P 1-r f’l ’ P i I ’ I
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B. Limitakm dn ownership
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The owner of property has, among other rights, its enjoyment and disposal, “without other limitations than those established by 1aw.’7p8 An example of a limitation on the right of ownership is given in the twin cases of Director of Foreshy, c. A ~ u i i 0 2 ,and ~ ~ Pinugcamuligan I n h A g r o Development Corp. v. Peralta?’ whose facts and issues need not here be stated. Under Section 1829, paragraph 1 of the Revised Administrative M e , “[elvery private owner of land containing timber, firewood and ohex minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry.” If the title is not registered, the crwner is made to pay charges for cutting, gathering and removing forest products from his own Zand and he must, moreover, have first secured a license from the 28G.R. No. 22377, November 29, 1968. a e C CQDE, ~ art. 428, par. 1. 30G.R. No. 24796, June 28, 1988, 23 S.C.R.A. 1183. alG.R. No. 25159, June 28, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 1184. . .
.
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Director of Forestry otherwise his cutting, etc. are illegal and subject to the payment of a penalty.32 Accordingly-
". . . [Rlegistmtion of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption 'from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.' If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code. . . . However, as provided in Section 266, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from his land. he may 'secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest law and regulations.' If he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products from public forest produds 'shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases.' And this would bring into play Section 267, where the charges on forest products 'unlawfully cut and gathered, in any public forest without license, or, if under license, in violation d the terms thereof . . . shall be increased by three hundred per centum.' "33 IV. RIGHT OF ACXXSSION In industrial accession, the law pays particular attention to the good or bad faith of the builder, planter or sower. Subject to a few exceptions, he who acts in bad faith has no rights but, on the contrary, the law vents on him its full retributive justice. On the obher hand, he who acts in good faith is treated leniently by the law and is given certain rights. Thus, a person who builds, plants or sows in good k i t h on the land of another is entitled to indemnity from the owner of the land if the latter does not choose the other options given to him.34 But h e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemni,tys5
. . Good faith, or the lack of it, i s in its last analysis a question of intention; but in ascBTtau11 * 'ng the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, with safety, be dezermined. So it is that 'the honesty of intention,' 'the honest lawful intent,' which constitutes good faith implies a 'freedom fmm knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry,' and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of proof to the oontrary. 'Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind ' I .
azTax CODE, sea. 266 and 267. of Forestry v. Muiioz, supra note 30 at 1200-1201. "CIVIL CODE,art. 448.
33 Director
3
5
C CODE, ~ ~ art. ~ 449.
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which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.’ (Wilder US. Gihan, 55 Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas us. Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Bream-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. us. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-u)98; Pinkerton Bros. Co. us. Bromley, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.)”3”
The case of 1 . M . Tuason & Co. v . L~rnanlan,~~ answers the question as to whether or not a person can be a builder in good faith on a piece of land registered under the Torrens system. In that case, Lumanlan had built a house on the registered property of the plaintiff and in her counterclaim to the ejwtment suit, she contended that she was a builder in good faith. But the Supreme Court, relying on its previous decision in Tuascm & Co. v. Macalindong,88 held that there being presumptive knowledge of the Tarrens titles issued to Tuason 8- Co. and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914, the builder cannot, in good conscience, disregard the plaintiffs registered title and was therefore a builder in bad faith. The Tuason cases have reversed the decision in Labajo v . EnriqUez,39 where a person who had occupied by mistake another’s Torrens registered land, was deemed to be a possessor in good faith, and sustained the dissenting opinion of Justice Sabino Padilla in .the same case, as follows: “It appears that the parcel of land acquired by purchase by the defendant and the one adjoining it owned by the plaintiffs are registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). The fact that the defendant found it unoccupied or abandoned and that he was made to believe that the parcel of land he had acquired by purchase included the adjoining parcel of land owned by and registered in the name of the plaintiffs, does not render him a possessor in good faith. Were this a matter of a few square meters and with a standing wall pointing out the boundary of the parcel of land acquired by the party who claims to be a possessor in good faith of a small adjacent strip of land within the area of an adjoining registered parcel of land belonging to another, good faith of the f o m r might be accepted and believed, as held in Co Tao us. Chan Chim, 46 off. Gaz. 5514. But one who purchases a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system must be presumed to know the area and boundaries of the acquired parcel of land. Assuming that he was told that the adjoining parcel of land owned by another, also registered under the same system, was included in the parcel of land he had acquired by purchase, that does not make him a possessor in good faith of the p d of land belonging to the other. . . . .”4 0
The case of Lumango bad faith.
F.
Usrnan,‘l also dealt with accession in
a s h u n g Yee v. F. L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644, 651-652 (1918). G.R. No. 23497, April 26, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 230. 38G.R. No. 15398, December 29, 1962. 39102 Phil. 908 (1958). 4oZd.
at 911-912.
G.R. No. 25359, September 28, 1968, 25 S.C.R.A. 255.
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In that case, the plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendant several parcels of land. The trial court gave judgment to the plaintiffs but Jose Angeles, an intervenor, claimed reimbursement for the coconut trees planted by him on the property in litigation. Presumably, the trial court made no findings as to whether or not Angeles was a planter in good faith and presumably also, it failed to take into account the case of Rernardo v. Bata~lun,’~which recognizes the primacy of the landowner’s right but on equitable grounds, entered the following judgment: “On the other hand, the plaintiffs are ordeed to reimburse to the defendant-intervenor, JOSE ANGELES, the sum of 84,500.00 representing the value of the 3,000 coconut trees introduced by him and his predecessors in interest on Lots 892, 893 and SQ4. Should plaintiffs fail to do so within ninety (90) days from the date this decision becomes M,the three lots shall be ordered sold at public auction, the prooeeds of which shall be applied to the 84,500.00 herein adjudged to Jose Angeles, and the balance to be delivered to the plaint%.’’
The Court of Appeals found that the intervenor had bought the lots in question with knowledge that they were rhe subject of a litigation between plaintiff‘s predecessors and the defendants but on grounds of equity, affirmed the lower court’s judgment with the sole modification that the indemnity was reduced from 14,500 to €2,500 despite this statement: “The [trial] Court found for a fact that around 3,000 coconut trees wem planted on those lots aforementioned, some of them already fruitbearing. It appears f m the records that not an, but a portion, of the 3,000 were planted by intervenor Jose Angeles. The value placed by the lower couit of F’1.50 per fruit-bearing coconut tree is reasonable enough, inasmuch as the lower court w a s in a better position to make the assessment, it being more closely in contact with the alnditiolls and circumstanC e S of the locality. We are not prepared to disturb such &ding for lack of evidence to warrant such an action on our part.”
Is the intervenor a planter in good faith? The Supreme Court, on the basis of the Court of Appeals finding that he had knowledge that the lots in question were under litigation, held him to be a purchaser and a builder in bad faith. It held: “. . . The praision applicable to this c898 is, accordingly, Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides that, ‘(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. loses what is built, planted or sown u < t h t right to indemnity.”’ . “Obviously, (the alleged equity in favor of Jose Angeles, on which the lower courts have relied, cannot prevail over the aforementioned express statutory provision to the contrary, apart from the fact that he who seeks equity must come with dean hands.” 42
66 Phil. 598 (1938).
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19691
Despite bad faith, a builder, planter or sower is entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses. “In this connection, it should be noted that said trees are improvements, not necessary expenses of preservation’, which a builder, planter or sower in bad faith may recover under Articles 452 and 546, first paragraph, of the Civil Code.” In Angela Estnte, Inc., c. Court of First I~wtance,’~one of t h e defendants, a sugar central company, had been granted a conventional right of way over the plaintiffs’ haciendas. After the expiration of the contract term, the ceatral claimed that it was a possessor in good: faith of the right of way traversing the haciendas and invoking Article 44.8 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that, “[tfie owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity. . .” argued that its railroad tracks, locomotives and cane cars may not be removed with, out payment of their value. The Supreme Court, relying on the case of Alburo v. ViZZanuev~,’~ held that the central could not validly claim to good faith because it knew and recognized that the strip of land traversed by its railroad tracks was owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. In the Alburo case, the Supreme Court held that Art. 361 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 448 of the Philippine Civil Code, “is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds or sows or plants on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title. . .’‘45 However, this principle was not applied in Jacia v. J a ~ i e r where , ~ ~ a person who built a house on his father’s land with the consent of the latter, was held to be a builder in good faith; and in Bernard0 c. Bdaclan,” where a person who was allowed by the owner of the land to clear the same and make improvements thereon, was held to be a possessor in good faith.
v.
CO-OWNERSHIP
1. The nature o# a co-ou~ncr’sinterest It is axiomatic that the interest of a person common with others is spiritual or intangible or concrete. True, he is the absolute owner of do as h e pleases with it, but he cannot point to 43
G.R. No.
2i084, July 31, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A.
4 4 7 Phil. 27i (1907). 45Id. at 280. 497 P hil. 261 (1907). 4 7 Supra note 42.
in property owned in rather than physical his share and he can any particular portion
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of the property owned in common as his. Accordingly, while he has the right to freely sell and dispose of his individual interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the property. “If he is the owner of an undivided half of a #tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bo~nds.”‘~ Supposing a co-owner violates the injunction stated above, what would be the effect of the sale? The answer was given in Lopez u. Cuagcmg4@where a co-owner of an hacienda sold to a third party a portion thereof designated as Lot 178-B measuring 10,832 square meters where the buyer subsequently erected a distillery and other buildings. To the question, what rights did the buyer acquire in the sale, the Supreme Court said that it transferred to the buyer an abstract share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the hacienda. “The fact that the agreement in q tion purported to sell a concrete r the sale void, for it is a wellportion of the haci established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. ‘Quado res non valet ut ago, valeat quontum oalere potest.’ (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have).”’O
Estoque v. Pajim~la,~‘deals with a sale by a co-owner of a definite portion of the common property. In that case, a piece of land became the common property of On October 28, 1951, one of the coowners w1d her share to the plaintiff, definitely identifying it as the 1/3 portion located on the southeastern part of the property and specifically bounded on the north by De Guzman street, on the east by P m d a s street, on the south by Perez street, and on the west by the remainder of the lot, with an area of 840 square meters. three persons through inheritance.
On October 29, 1959, the day following the plaintiff‘s acquisition, the plaintiffs vendor acquired the shares of the other co-owners, which she in turn sold on December 30, 1959, to the defendant. Plaintiff sought to exercise a right of redemption from the defendant on the basis of Art. 1620, Civil Code, which reads: “A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the diemtion is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. the shares
*8 Lopez v. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, 568-56Q (1906). 4974 Phil. 601 (1944). 50Id. at 609. slG.R. No. 24419, July 15, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 59.
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Should two or more cecmmers desire to exercise the riglit of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may rerpectively have in the thing owned in common.”
The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and appeal was made directly to the Supreme Court which affirmed the order of dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff never .became co-owner with her vendor after the latter had acquired the shares ,of the others for what was sold to the plaintiff was a clearly specified portion and not a mere undivided interest. This unusual decision, to say the least, disregards the principle enunciated in the Impez cases mentioned above. For these cases already hold that a co-owner can sell only his ideal share in the property owned in common even when he purports to sell a concrete portion. The criticism on the Estoque case is reinforced by the case of Diversified Credit Corporation v . Rosado,52 where a lot awned in common by thirteen persons was by them sold to the plaintiff. Prior to the sale, one of the co-owners and her husband had built a house on a portion of the lot with conjugal funds. In an action to eject the builders from the lot, the defense was that 1/13 of the lot had become conjugal property because of Article 158, paragraph 2, Civil Code, which reads: “Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.”
It was contended that as the building of the house at the expense of the conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share of the co-owner (the wife) into community property, the sale made in favor of the plaintiff was void insofar as said 1/13 share is concerned because the wife had ceased to own such share from and after the building of the house. Rut the Supreme Court found this contention untenable, saying:
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“We find appellant’s thesis legally untenable. For it is a basii principle in the law of mwnership, both under the present Civil Code as in the code of 1889, that rn individual co-owner can claim title to definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this court. In Lopez vs. Ilustra. 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common. ‘If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to sell 52G.R. No. 27935, December 24. 1968.
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and convey an undivided half, but lie has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and m v e y the whole of one part by metes and bounds.' The doctrim was reiterated in Mercado us. Liwunag, L-14429,June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey a physicit1 portion of the land o w i d in c o r n . And in Suntos u. B w m c o ~ ' o L-20136, , June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a co-owner may not even adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in common.
"Since the share of the wife, . . . was at no time physically determined, it cannot be validly claimed that the house c o t u t m d by her husband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code cannot apply. Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undiviM share, no house could be erected. IGecessarily, the claim of conversion of the wife's share from paraphema1 to conjugal in character as a result of the ~0mtmct.1 'on must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis."
2. Prescription in facor of a co-oumm
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. He may, at any time, demand patition insofar as his share is concerned. And no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-owner~hip.~~ The reason why prescription does not ordinarily run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against the others is because the former's possession is not adverse." And even where a co-owner acquires a Torrens title in his own name to property owned in Common, he can be compelled to stmmder to each of his co-owners his appropriate share and a proceeding for partition is an appropriate remedy by which to enforce the right."5 St8, as the law indicates, a co-owner may acquire the share of another by prescription provided he has ceased to recognize the ownership. But the repudiation must be clear, complete, conclusive and leave no shadow of d ~ u b t . "And ~ the co-owner must be in possession for there can be no prescription without possession.s7 Sun Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,58 was gn action filed by
Crisanta San Buenaventura in 1962 against her sister, Julia, for the partition of a pi of land inherited from their grandfather in 1937. The defense was adverse possession since 1944. The trial court dismissed the complaint, the Court of Appeals reversed, and review was sought in the Supreme Court which, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals 5 3 c k I L CODE, art.
494.
54Codova v. Codova, 102 Phil. 1182 (1958). 53 Ca&o v. Castro, 57 Phil. 675 (1932). 5'3Bargay0 v: Cammot, 40 Phil. 857 (1920). 57 Pmcho v. Villanueva, 99 Phil. 611 (1956). 58G.R. No. 23980, January 31, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 462
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on the ground that Julia had acquired ownership of the property through Prescription. Said the Supreme Court: “This is borne out by the fact that, admittedly, she [Julia] had not only held it since 19.44, but, also, built and maintained thereon a house as early as 1947; that she resided therein continuously, since then up to the presenc that on June 8, 1952, Julia had caused the land to be surveyed in her name; that on March 31, 1958, she applied for a free patent thereto; that she mortgaged the land . . . ; that she objected, in her name, to the inclusion o€ said land in the application for registration Eled by a third party; that Crisanta did not oppose said application; that Crisanta had d, since 1944, either for the pussession of the land, or for the enjoyment of any of the derived therefrom; that she did not d e any demand for its partition; until March, 1962, or on the eve of the institution of this case; and that such one and only demand for partition was evidently preparatory to the filing of the complaint herein.”
VI. SERVITUDES
1. Acquisition Servitudes are acquired either by title or by prescription. M y continuous and apparent servitudes can be acquired by prescription whereas any kind of servitude can be acquired by title. A servitude of way has been held to be discontinuous so that it eannat be acquired by pres~ription.’~ It can be acquired by title only which is the juridical act which gives birth to the servitude. “Son, pues, titulos, corlstitutivos de Eos smidumbres cudquiera que sea su clme, la ley, la donmidn, el contrato y el tmtamemto.’”o There are also equivalents of title, namely: a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate, a final judgment, and an apparent sign between two estates established by the owner of both.“’ In Angela Estate, Znc. 2). Court of First the central claimed that it had “acquired a legal easement. . . through 45 years of continuous use of the railroad tracks under the. . . contracts.” The Supreme Court did not discuss this contention, which is presumably grounded on prescription. But in the light of the Ronquillo case, supra, the central could not have acquired a right of way as claimed. Moreover, even assuming $&at a right of way can be acquired by prescription, it is manifest that the central’s possession was not adverse so that it could not ripen into a real right. -___
Ronquillo v. Row, 103 Phil. 84 (1958). 4 MANRESA,COD~GOCrvr~, 594-595 2nd ed. 1890, North Negros Sugar Co , Inc. v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 664, 696 (1936). CIVIL CODE, arts. 623, 624; Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403 (1943). 62 Supra note 43. (on accession). 59
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The central also contended that it had a right to a compulsory right of way under the provisions of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court observed: “By express provision of articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code, the onmer of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highw-ay; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor‘s own acts; and ( 4 ) the right of way claimed is ‘at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.’ The onus is upon the owner of the dominant estate to show by specific averments in his complaint the existence of the requisites or pre-conditions enumerated. . . .”
And the court rejected the contention because the central was in fact easily accessible from various points through existing provincial roads The court also noted that in one crop year, most of the cane milled was hauled to the central by the use of trucks and truck-trailers. Finally, the court said: “It may be true that the railroad tracks provide an economical and convenient means of transportation to and from the mill sites. Unfortunately, our Civil Code speaks of necessity and not of comfort and c~nvenience.’’~~ This case reiterates the ruling made in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., lnc. o. Capitol Subdivision, I ~ C To . ~the ~ same effect, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. o. Q ~ e r u b i n . ~ ~
2. Extinction Servitudes are extinguished, according to Article 631 of the Civil Code: * ‘ ( l ) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates; ( 2 ) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
( 3 ) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the use becomes possible, s&c;ent time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number; e31d. at 511-512. 64 G.R. No. 25887, Tulv 26. 1966. 17 S.C.R.A. 731.
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( 4 ) By the expiration of the term or the
[email protected] of the condition; if the easement is temporary or conditional;
( 5 ) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6)By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates.”
In the case of a right of way, it is also provided that: “If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be neoessary because its owner has joined it to another abutting on a public mad, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the easement be extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement.”SS
dealt with a claim The case of Benedicto v. Court of that a servitude of way had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation Q€ the necessity for a passageway. The servitude came about as follows: Miriam Hedrick owned a parcel of land abutting on San Marcelino St. in Manila on which were constructed two chalets of equal size and similar shape. Between the two buildings was a passageway for reaching the rear portion of the land. In 1917, Hedrick sold part of the land including one of the houses to Claro Recto. In the deed of sale, the following was stipulated: “‘SEXTO. Que entre la porcion vendida a Claro M. Recto y la que queda en poder de Miriam R. Hedrick hay un pas0 para vehiculos, de unos tres a cuatro metros de anchura proxjmamente mnstituido por mitad o iguales partes sobre cada una de dichas porciones, y ambas partes de esta escritura se obligan cada una a respetar el derecho de la otra a usar de toda la extencion de dicho pas0 para todo el tiempo y todas las necesidades de cada UM de las & propriedades, la vendida por la presente a Clam M. R e d o y la que queda en poder de Miriam R. Hedrick, siendo obligatorio este pact0 para todos 10s que con posterioridad adquirieran por cualquier titulo las fincas mencionadas.”
The above covenant was inscribed in Recto’s title as well as- in those of his successors, the latest being Salvador Benedict’o. The portion retained by Hedrick was in turn sold to successive vendees, the latest being Vicente Heras. In 1941, Heras demolished the house on his land. In 1946, Benedicto walled h e passageway by constructing a fence. And in 1955, Heras filed action to demand the reopening of the passageway between his property and that of Benedicto. 6 6 C r v ~CODE, ~ art. 655, par. 1. 67G.R. No. 22733, Sepember 25, 1968, 25 S.C.R.A. 145.
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The trial court found that the right of way was entirely within the property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in the HedrickRecto deed of sale tha’t it should be between their properties, with each contributing an equal portion of his property. The trial court rejected Benedicto’s claim that the servitude had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for a passageway and ordered that it be maintained. From a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the lower court’s, Benedicto sought a review in the Supreme C h r t . To the Benedicto claim that when Heras demolished his building in 1941, the property gained direct access to San Marcelino Street with the result that since then there has been no need for the passageway, the Supreme Court said that as inscribed in the titles, the servitude is perpetual in character and its continued existence must be upheld and respected although its necessity might have ceased. .4nd to the other Benedicto claim that the servitude had been extinguished by nonuser for 10 years, the court pointed out that there was no indubitable proof of nonuser. And even if nonuser be conceded, said the court, it could have started only in 1946 when the passageway was walled and since the present action was filed in 1955, the pre-lapsed. scriptiyh,g . db-4,
VII. DONATION A person cannot be obliged to received anything against his will. It is for this reason why the Civil Code is so repetitious on the need for acceptance in respect of donations inter vivos. Thus, Articles 725, 738, 741, 742, 745, 746, 747, 748 and 749 of the Civil Code mention acceptance of a donation. Article 745 of the Civil Code provides that “[tlhe donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a s p i a l power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void.” In Gennto 2;. Lol.enzu,ps Simona Genato was the owner of two certificates of stock, Nos. 7 and 18 each for 265 shares in Genato Commercial Corporation. On December 24, 1942, she delivered the certificates of stock to Florentino Genato and told him to “transfer them.” Each of the certificates had been endorsed by Simona Genato to Florentino Genato and Francisco Genato and upon receiving the certificates, Florentino, who was then Assistant Secretary-Treasurer of t%e Corporation, cancelled them and in lieu thereof, issued certificate “8G.R. No. 24983, May 20, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 618. ~
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No. 118 for 265 shares in his favor and certificate No. 119 also for 265 shares in favor of Francisco Cenato. From a judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that there was no valid donation of the shares of stock to Florentino and Francisco Genato and ordering the issuance of a certificate of stock for the. shares in the name of !the Administrator of the Estate of Simona Genato, appeal was taken to the Supreme Court which affirmed,. saying: “The key question, therefore, is whether there has been a valid donation as appeIhts claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was none, and we find no reason to overturn the opinion thus reached. Assuming, ,ad wg&, that the late simona Vda. de Genato gave the certificates of Stock Nos. 7 and 18 to Florentine with instrudtions to transfer the same to him and his brother, thii act did not wnstitute a valid manual donation in law for lack of proper acceptance. (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 630). Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato, had authorized bis brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries to the Civil Code of 1889 (Vol. V, f3th edition, pp. 131-132, 141-142), the delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case. Since by appellants’ own version, the donation intended w a s a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently of his milonee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided (k. 637) or unless they be husband and wife.”
VIII. TRADITION Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by, among other modes, tradition in consequence of certain contracts. -4 contract alone will not be effective to transfer ownership or other real rights over the subject matter thereof for “non nudis pactis sed traditiione dominia rerum tr~nsferentur.”~~ Tradition is nothing more or less than delivery. But Sanchez Roman describes it as “un modo dmivatiuo de adquirir el dominio zi &TO$ dererchos reaks, pm el cual, cancudendo voluntd y capacidad en en tramitente y adquirente y preexistencia de dqu&Uos en el patrimonio del primero, se tranmiten a1 segundo por la nzdiacJdn de un just0 titulo.”70 Tradition can take various forms. Sanchez Roman speaks of species of tradition as consisting of tradicicin real, tradicidn fingida ( simbdlica, eeFidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51 (1967). CIVIL,238 (1900).
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Zonga manu, brevi mnnu, constiticturn poissesorium ), cuasi tradicidn, ministerio de la ley.” The case of Yuliongsiu v. Philippine National constructive delivery is sufficient to validate a pledge.
holds that
, the plaintiff borrowed a sum of morney from the defendant anmdas security, executed a contract of pledge over its vessels which were not actually delivered to the creditor but remained in the debtor’s possession “who shall hold said property subject to the order of the Pledgee.” When the debtor defaulted, the crediter took possession of the vessels and pursuant to the terms of the pledge contract, sold the same. In questioning the defendant’s actuations, one of the arguments advanced by the plaintiff was that the pledge was not effective because there was only constructive and not actual deIivery of the vessels to the defendant. It should be noted that according to Article 2093 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the co,nstitution of a pledge is ‘‘that the thing pledged shall be placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person by c a m o n agreement.” Plaintiff ~~ it. was held “that the cited the case of Betita v. G n n ~ o n ,where delivery of po erred to in article 186374 implies a change in the actual of the property pledged and that a mere symboiic delivery is not sufficient.” However, the Supreme Court said:
“. . . But then there is also Banco Espdol-Filipino v . Peterson, 7 Fhii. 409 ruling that symbolic delivery would suffice. An examination of the d in the two cases will readily dispel peculiar nature of the things p the apparent contrad ‘between the two rulings. In Betita 0. Ganaon, the objects pledged -carabaos -were easily capable of actual, manual delivery unto the pledgee. In Bunco Esp&LFiZipino D. Peterson, the objects pledged -goods contained in a warehouse -were hardly capable of actual, manual delivery in the sense that it was impractical as a whole for the particular transaction and would have been an unreasonable requirement. Thus, for purposes of showing the transfer of control to the pledgee, delivery to him of the keys to the warehouse sufficed. In other words, the type of delivery will depend upon the nature and the peculiar circumstances of each case. The parties here agreed that the vessels be delivered by the ‘pledgor to the pledgor who shall hold said property subject to the order of the pledgee.’ Considering the circumstances of the case and the nature of the objects pledged, i.e., vessels used in maritime business, such delivery is sufficient.” at 239-240. G.R. No. 19227, February 17, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 585. 73 49 Phil. 87, 93 (1926). 74 Now 2093. 711d.
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1. Extinctive prescription and laches The Civil Code provides for both acquisitive and extinctive prescription.” Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession; extinctive prescriptioa as limitation of action. It is sometimes said that the two kinds of prescription are in their operation, correlative. This is not so. The Civil Code itself provides, for example, that “[alctions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period. . . .”76 This shows that the operation of t,he two kinds of prescription is not correlative. And the reason lies in the fact that they are based on different considerations. Thus, a writer has said: “usucaption and prescription cortinued to exist concurrently until the time of Justinian but were essentially different in theory if not in operation. Prescription was a statute of limitations. Whereas usucaption expressly ‘vests the property’ and raised a new title in the occupant, prescription did nothing more than bar the right of action The concept most fundamental to a system of title by possession is that the relationship between the occupant and the land in terms of possession is capable of producing legal consequences. In other words, it is the possessor who is the ador. Under a statute of limitations, however, one does not look to the act of the possessor but to the neglect of the owner. In the former the important feature is the claimant in possession, and in the latter it is the owner out of possession which controls.”T7
Because of the similarfty between extinctive prescription and laches, they are often confused with each other. But they should not be because “Laches is m e r e n t from the statute of limitations. Prescription is ooncemed with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. P d p t i o n is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be e n f o d , this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.?*
The above was the explanation given in Nielson & Co., Inc. w. Lepanto Consolidded Mining CO.,’~and quoted in MigueE v. CataZino.80 75Art. 1106. 1140. 7 7 Montgomery, The Historical Development of the Prescriptive Acquisitioti of Land Titles, 26 PHn.L. J. 353, 356-357 (1951). 7 8 3 0 C.J.S., p. 55 .%; See also 2 POMEROY’S EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE, 177 (5th ed.).
[email protected]. 21601, December 17, 1966, 18 S.C.R.A. 1040, 1053. 80G.R. No. 23072, November 29, 1968. 78Al.t.
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In the Miguel case, a non-Christian named Bacaquio was the owner of a piece of land covered by an original certificate of title issued in 1927. He sold the land in 1928 without the written approval of the provincial governor of the Mt. Province, contrary to bhe Administrative Code of Mindanar, and Sulu, made applicabla to the Mt. Province and Nueva Vizcaya by Act3 Nos. 2798 and 2913. In an action by the heirs of Bacaquio to recover the heir of the vendee, the Supreme Court said that was technically invalid and Bacaquio remained owner of his death in 19.13 but nonetheless, ruled against the
the land from the 1928 sale the land until plaintiffs:
“For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapm, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller die4 and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, witbout taking any step to revindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants’ proposition that no prescription lies against their father‘s recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffsappellants must be considered barred and the court below correctly so held. Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, deIay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessctr’s efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.”
To the same effect, Arcuino 21. Aparis.81 Both the Miguel and Arcuino cases cited Lucas o. Gamponia.RZ Cases on acquisitive and extinctive prescription decided during the year under review have not been novel so they are here summarily reported. Fabian c. F ~ b i a n , 8was ~ an action for reconveyance of a piece of land on the ground that the defen ts acquired and registered the same through fraud. Held, the cause of action accrued in 1928 and it was only in 1960 when the action was commenced so that it is barred by laches and by prescription. The defendants have, moreover, acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession. Quetulio ‘~j.De la Cuesta,s‘ was an action to recover a piece of land which was allegedly usurped by one of the defendants in 1948. **G.R. No. Phil. a3 G.R. No. a4 G.R. No. a2 100
23424, January 31, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 40‘7. 277 (1956). 20449, January 29, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 231. 25083, January 31, 1M8,22 S.C.R.A. 420.
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Held, the complaint was filed only in 1964 and it has prescribed because “the law applicable is Section 40 of Act 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for a ten-year prescriptive period for actions to recover title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, counted from the date of the amrual of the cause of action.”
Cunrto v. L ~ n n was , ~ ~an action by a widow to recover her half of alleged conjugal properties which the husband had sold under an allegedly fictitious and simulated contract in 1947 to one of the defendants. The action was commenced in 1963 and the defendants pleaded prescription of action. HeZd, it is well settled, not only in our jurisprudence, but also by specific legal provisions that “the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not Municipality of Opon v . Caltex (Phil.) Z ~ C . ~was ’ an action to recover municipal taxes which had been illegally imposed. The defense was the lapse of the two-year prescriptive period provided in section 306 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Held, the period for prescription of action to recover municipal license taxes in six years under article 1145(2) of the Civil Code for the National Internal Revenue Code clearly refers exclusively to claims for the refund of national internal revenue taxes. R i d Surety & lnsurnnce Co. v . Macondray & Co., Znc.,s8 was a suit commenced on February 10, 1%4 by an insurer against a carrier for insured cargo which should have been discharged on or before November 4, 1962 but was not. Defendant invoked the prescriptive period provided in section 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, which stipulates one year in respect of claims for loss or damage as opposed to the plaintiff‘s claim for the application of the general statute of limitations. Held, the failure to discharge the cargo was a loss within the purview of the Act and the action has therefore prescribed.
Pahang v. S o t t ~ ,was ~ ~ an action for compulsory recognition as a natural child. One of the defenses was prescriptiun of the action because plaintiff commenced the suit when she was already over 47 years old. Held, an action for recognition, if brought within the lifetime of the presumed parent, is impresciptible for the status of persuns is outside the commerce of man and cannot be acquired or lost by prescription. G.R. NO. 232i9, January 31, 1968. 22 S.C.R.A. 459. v. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 (1906);Corpus v. Bel.h.an, 97 Phil. 772 (1955); Quetulio v. Ver, 99 Phil. 1048 (1956); CIVIL CODE,art. 1410. E7G.R. No. 21853, February 26, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 755. 88 G.R. No. 26064,February 29, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 902. 8*G.R. No. 211i5, July 15, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 33. 85
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Philippine Natimal Bank v. O~ete,~O was an action upon a judgment whiah became final and execufory on January 23, 1953. The suit upon the judgment was commenced on January 30, 1963, beyond the 10 years provided in Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. But the bank invoked Article 1155 of the same code which provides, inter alia, that prescription of actions is interrupted when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor and the bank pointed to partial payments made on the judgment. Held, Article 1155 of the Civil Code refers to actions to collect not based on a judgment sought to be revived. Moreover, that provision requires a written acknowledgment so that payment, if not complied with a communication signed by the payor, would not interrupt the running of the period of prescription. Veluz v. V e l u ~ was , ~ ~ an action for reformation of an instrument commenced in 1958, based on fraud alleged to have been discovered in 1953. In Carhta v. Benare~,~’it was held that such an action prescribes in four years but in Con& u. Ciiencq9’ the period was fixed a t ten years. Held, the Conde case which is of a later date should prevail. The court said also that the Cadotn case is different because it referred to annulment and not reformation of contract. But in that case, it was said: “. . . the remedy of plaintiffs is either annulment on the ground of fraud, or reformation ‘of the contracts to make them express the parties’ true intention and agreement. In either case, the action should be filed within four years from the time the cause of action accrues, i.e., from the discovery of the fraud.” Moreover, the period of prescription of action on a written contract as in the CarZota case appears to be ten years under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code. Davao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd. v. L a ~ r e n t e ,dealt, ~ ~ among other things, with a petition by Laurente for the revocation of an order directing the cancellation of an encumbrance over a piece of land over which “he might possibly have an interest as a purchaser” but which interest was not shown by primary or even secondary evidence. Held, Laurente’s claim is too vague and unsubstantial to give him a standing in court. “What is worse is that Laurente allowed more than 20 years to elapse without asserting the alleged conveyance in his favor, when a period of 10 years sufficed under Act 190 (then in force) to bar any claim to or over real property. Nor has Laurente adequately explained such laches on his part.” gOG.R. No. 24997, July 18, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. €8. g1 G.R. No. 23281, July 31, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 559. 82G.R. No. 6.432, June 30, 1955. 9599 Phil. 1056 (1956). 94 G.R. No. 20075, November 27, 1968.
19691
CIVIL LAW
Y9
Nielson & Co., lnc. c. Imnnto Consolidated Mining C O . , ~was ~ a resolution on a motion for reconsideration by the defendant of the decision rendered on December 17, l%6,sson laches. To the contention that the Supreme Court erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that Nielson’s action had prescribed by considering only the first claim and ignoring the prescriptibility of the other claims, held: “In our decision We stated that the claims of Nielson are based on a written document, and, as such, the cause of action prescribes in ten years. Inasmuch as there are different claims which accrued on difFerent dates the prescriptive periods for all the claims are not the same.”
__._ 95G.R. No. 21601, December 2.8, 1988. g6 Supra.