MICHAELA PELICAN University of Zurich
Complexities of indigeneity and autochthony: An African example A B S T R A C T In this article, I deal with the complexities of “indigeneity” and “autochthony,” two distinct yet closely interrelated concepts used by various actors in local, national, and international arenas in Africa and elsewhere. With the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2007, hopes were high among activists and organizations that the precarious situation of many minority groups might be gradually improved. However, sharing the concerns of other scholars, I argue that discourses of indigeneity and autochthony are highly politicized, are subject to local and national particularities, and produce ambivalent, sometimes paradoxical, outcomes. My elaborations are based on in-depth knowledge of the case of the Mbororo in Cameroon, a pastoralist group and national minority recognized by the United Nations as an “indigenous people” although locally perceived as “strangers” and “migrants.” For comparative purposes, and drawing on related studies, I integrate the Bagyeli and Baka (also known as Pygmies) of southern and southeastern Cameroon into my analysis, as they share the designation of indigenous people with the Mbororo and face similar predicaments. [indigeneity, autochthony, identity, United Nations, Cameroon]
n September 2007, after 23 years of negotiation between nationstates and indigenous peoples’ organizations, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly finally adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Among its most significant assertions are indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination; to lands, territories, and natural resources; and to free, prior, and informed consent. As expressed in the UN Guide for Indigenous Peoples, “[The declaration] breaks new ground by addressing collective rights to a degree unprecedented in international human rights law. The rights cited in the draft are those generally taken for granted in dominant societies: rights to survival, political and cultural identity, and control over resources” (n.d.c:1). Activists and organizations concerned with human and minority rights see the adoption of the declaration as an important step toward the improvement of the precarious situation of many minority groups. They hope that, although the declaration is not legally binding and does not impose obligations on governments, it will carry considerable moral force. In this article, I complement this genuinely positive view with a more skeptical perspective. Taking the Mbororo in Cameroon as an example, I engage with the complexity of the concept of “indigenous people”—a concept that, as I argue, is highly politicized, is subject to local and national particularities, and whose application has ambivalent, sometimes paradoxical, outcomes. My contribution ties in with the anthropological debate on the validity and usefulness of this concept, particularly with regard to Africa. As Dorothy Hodgson (2002) and Adam Kuper (2003, 2005) point out, the term indigenous peoples is decidedly political and may refer to different kinds of subjects in different contexts. Whereas in North, Central, and South America indigenous activism has a long history and the status of first peoples is generally uncontested, the situation in Africa is different. Here defining which groups may count as indigenous is much more problematic and controversial, as there are long and ongoing histories of migration, assimilation, and conquest. Furthermore, as Igor Kopytoff (1987) has convincingly demonstrated, African societies tend to
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AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 52–65, ISSN 0094-0496, online C 2009 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 1548-1425. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1425.2008.01109.x
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reproduce themselves at their internal frontiers, thus continuously creating and re-creating a dichotomy between original inhabitants and latecomers along which political prerogatives are negotiated. This recurrent process does not allow for a permanent and clear-cut distinction of first nations versus dominant societies, as implied by the universal notion of “indigenous peoples.” Whereas some anthropologists have argued that the concept of “indigenous peoples” is not applicable to the African context, others have claimed that the difficulties alluded to above are effectively reflected in current working definitions applied by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UN, which emphasize cultural distinctiveness, political marginalization, and selfidentification as fundamental criteria. As the example of the Mbororo of Cameroon illustrates, the ILO and UN working definitions run counter to local understandings of autochthony; that is, although internationally recognized as an indigenous people, the Mbororo are locally considered strangers, migrants, and latecomers with limited rights to land and resources. Many African governments have been opposed to the concept of “indigenous peoples” and their entitlement to land, arguing that all Africans are indigenous and should have equal access to natural resources (Lutz 2007). Most outspoken on this issue, Namibia, in 2006, successfully postponed the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Conversely, Cameroon is one of the few African countries that, early on, supported the UN declaration and that has adopted the notion of “indigenous peoples” in its national constitution—although without providing clear definitions. Despite its apparent compliance with UN standards, the Cameroonian government avoids implementing the regulations regarding the rights of indigenous peoples. Paying only lip service to international agreements, the government pursues a course that has destabilizing effects on Mbororo society. The focus of this article is academic and political debate on indigeneity and autochthony. I first present anthropological perspectives on the debate, followed by a brief overview of the historical evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Subsequently, I discuss divergences in local, national, and international understandings of indigeneity and autochthony in Cameroon. Here I draw on my own research on the Mbororo and also engage with the arguments of Tania Li (2000, 2002), for whom the articulation of indigenous identity requires the conjunctures of specific group-internal and external factors. Li (2002) also points at the socially disruptive potential of discourses of indigeneity and autochthony when directed against others, nonindigenes—a feature further elaborated by Peter Geschiere (2004, 2005; see also Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). In the ensuing discussion, I consider the benefits the Mbororo have enjoyed from their status as an indigenous people. For comparative purposes, and drawing
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on the work of Alec Leonhardt (2006), I also engage with the situation of the Baka and Bagyeli (also known as Pygmies) in southeastern and southern Cameroon, who share the designation of indigenous people with the Mbororo and face similar predicaments. I conclude with a critical note on discourses of indigeneity and autochthony and the precarious implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Anthropological perspectives on the concept of “indigenous peoples” Concurrent with UN deliberations, anthropologists engaged in an academic debate over the validity and usefulness of the concept of “indigenous peoples.” The debate was initiated by Kuper’s provocative article “The Return of the Native” (2003), in which he argues that the concept of “indigenous peoples” is based on an essentialist ideology of culture and identity. In his reading, the term indigenous has replaced the earlier use of primitive and evokes romantic ideals of hunter-gatherers and nomadic pastoralists in tune with nature. Moreover, the concept asserts privileged rights to land and natural resources on the basis of descent from the original inhabitants of a country or—in the case of hunter-gatherers—representation of the original human population of the world. These criteria, however, are highly contentious, both historically and ideologically. Kuper criticizes activists and anthropologists for employing the concept of “indigenous peoples,” thereby promoting essentialist ideologies and fostering new inequalities.1 Kuper’s article generated considerable response. Exchanges have been published in Current Anthropology (44[3], 45[2]), Anthropology Today (20[2], 20[5]), and Social Anthropology (14[1]). At the 2006 European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) biennial conference, Kuper’s oeuvre was honored by a workshop entitled “Culture, Context and Controversy” with several contributions to the indigenous peoples debate.2 Whereas some anthropologists share Kuper’s concern, others argue in favor of “indigenous peoples” as a notion of relational identity (similar to “ethnicity”) and as an effective political and legal tool in the struggle against discrimination and dispossession of historically marginalized groups (e.g., Kenrick and Lewis 2004a; Ramos 2003; Saugestadt 2001, 2004). They also point to the 20-year-long history of the concept as debated by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, and they emphasize the generally peaceful character of the indigenous peoples’ movement. In their view, Kuper’s criticism of the concept of “indigenous peoples” is unjustified and counterproductive, both to the anthropological endeavor and to “indigenous realities” (Kenrick and Lewis 2004b:8). A reconciliatory approach is suggested by Alan Barnard (2004, 2006), who questions the validity of “indigenous peoples” as an anthropological concept while recognizing its
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utility as a political and legal tool in the struggle for collective rights. He points to the imaginary and construed character of indigenous identity, which, nonetheless, may be real and meaningful to its proponents. He suggests that anthropologists focus on local understandings of indigenousness and land ownership as a way of supporting indigenous causes (Barnard 2004).3 In my reading, the indigenous peoples debate reflects the divide between purely academic and applied anthropology, which, in this particular instance, may be difficult to reconcile. Moreover, it reiterates arguments similar to those applied by traditionalists versus revisionists in the Great Kalahari Debate (Barnard 2006). If I were to position myself in this debate, I would rather side with Barnard and Kuper—not out of purely academic concerns but grounded on the analysis of the Mbororo case. As I argue below, the Mbororo’s international recognition as an indigenous people has been facilitated by their nomadic past, whereas farming minorities from the same region have been unable to achieve this status. Justin Kenrick and Jerome Lewis (2004b:6) contend that, as long as one deals with huntergatherer groups locally considered indigenous, no problem arises in applying the concept of “indigenous peoples” to Africa. However, in the case of the Mbororo, these preconditions are not given, and the group’s claims to indigeneity are at variance with local connotations of autochthony. Finally, I agree with Barnard (2004, 2006) that, although “indigenous peoples” is not a valid concept in anthropological analysis, it nonetheless has reality and meaning for those who identify themselves as indigenous. This applies to the Mbororo in Cameroon, whose situation cannot be ignored merely because their claims to indigeneity may be arguable. The global indigenous rights movement and the related role and activities of the UN is another valid field of anthropological investigation, which I integrate into my analysis. Besides the debate on the concept of “indigenous peoples,” a second anthropological approach is relevant to this study, namely, what Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh (2000) have called “discourses of autochthony” or “the politics of belonging.”
Distinguishing discourses of indigeneity and discourses of autochthony Whereas the English version of the UN declaration refers to “indigenous peoples,” the French version—because of the negative connotations of the colonial term indig`ene—uses “peuples autochtones.” The English idiom (and also the Spanish) is derived from the Latin indigenae, whereas the French autochtone has Greek roots; both terms entail the idea of priority in time (Daes 1996). The reason for the terminological variation in the declaration is the terms’ different historical and value connotations in the respective languages (Bowen 2000:14).
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Autochtone and its opposite, allog`ene, are also employed in local discourses in francophone Africa and elsewhere to denote similar, yet diverging concepts (Bayart et al. 2001; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). They center on ideas of priority in time (“first coming”), emphasize spiritual bonds with the land and political supremacy, and are used by local actors to substantiate claims to land and power. In countries like Cˆote d’Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cameroon, the majority population or dominant groups claim to be autochthonous to exclude more recent immigrants. Minorities like the Mbororo and Baka are denied the status of autochtones. The English equivalents to autochtone are native and son or daughter of the soil, coupled with the negative opposites stranger and migrant. Both autochtone and native are terms originally introduced by the French and British colonial authorities that have entered local parlance in francophone and anglophone Cameroon, respectively. As Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) argue, the concepts these terms denote have gained prominence over the past two decades in the context of Cameroon’s democratization. As a means of excluding part of the population, namely, migrants or nonindigenes, from the electoral roles, the government has exploited the concept of “indigeneity” and significantly contributed to predicating political competition within discourses of autochthony and belonging. Geschiere (2005) has developed this argument further as discourses of autochthony have become widespread in other parts of Africa and Europe. In his view, this new emphasis on “autochthony”—a concept much more elusive and flexible than “ethnicity”—and the related politics of inclusion and exclusion are a corollary of globalization, which is characterized by both flows and closures (Meyer and Geschiere 1999). So far, I have argued for the distinction between discourses of autochthony and discourses of indigeneity. Whereas the former refer to local or emic notions of “first coming” and “autochthony,” the second refer to the concept of “indigenous peoples” as defined by the UN and ILO. Local actors, however, may well use both discourses in attempting to secure their interests vis-`a-vis the state and neighboring population groups. Before analyzing Mbororo appropriations of these discourses, I pay closer attention to the processes of policy making and identity construction at the UN.
Brief history of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples The process that culminated in the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was long and complex. In this section, I briefly outline the major events, introduce UN bodies crucial to the process, and discuss the intervention of the African Group in 2006. Because my
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elaborations are based on UN documents and those of the indigenous peoples’ movement, maintaining a neutral tone is somewhat difficult.4 To produce a balanced account, I take the concerns of the African states seriously rather than, as has been suggested elsewhere, linking their objection to the lobbying efforts of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which consistently opposed the adoption of the declaration. The process began in 1971, when Jos´e Martinez Cobo, the special rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, was asked to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations (UN Guide for Indigenous Peoples n.d.a). He completed his report in 1986 and introduced the following, widely accepted working definition of the concept of “indigenous peoples”: Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with preinvasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system. [Cobo 1986:5, para. 379] In 1982—before Cobo’s report was completed—the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), consisting of five independent experts who were members of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The sessions of the WGIP were open to representatives of indigenous peoples and national governments and were generally attended by several hundred participants (UN Guide for Indigenous Peoples n.d.b). In 1985, the WGIP began drafting the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for eventual adoption and proclamation by the UN General Assembly. The draft was completed in 1993 and accepted by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights the following year. It was then submitted to the subcommission’s parent body, the Commission on Human Rights, which, in 1995, established an intersessional working group to consider and revise it for submission to the General Assembly. This working group was composed of representatives of member states of the Commission on Human Rights and included nongovernmental organizations with ECOSOC consultative status as well as indigenous organizations with observer status. Thus, more than 100 organizations representing indigenous peoples participated in the drafting pro-
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cess (UN Guide for Indigenous Peoples n.d.c). Whereas the Commission on Human Rights had set the end of the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (1995– 2004) as a target for the declaration’s adoption, this goal could not be achieved; the process lasted until 2007. When, in June 2006, the UN Human Rights Council, with a strong majority, adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples proposed by the working group, the general expectation was that the declaration would finally be adopted by the General Assembly in November of the same year. However, it soon emerged that a group of African states (in particular, Namibia, Botswana, and Nigeria) took exception to some formulations of the declaration. Thus, during the General Assembly’s 2006 session, Namibia called for the vote on the declaration to be deferred to allow more consideration. Although many African states had limited their participation in the process of drafting the declaration, and although some countries (including Cameroon, South Africa, and Zambia) supported its adoption, all African member states agreed to maintain a united position and to support Namibia’s intervention. The African Group (2007) issued a draft aide memoire, specifying members’ concerns regarding the definition of indigenous peoples and the issues of self-determination, ownership of land and resources, establishment of distinct political and economic institutions, and national and territorial integrity. Moreover, they stated that, for some member states, the declaration might pose fundamental constitutional and political problems, rendering its implementation impossible. In the view of the African Group, the absence of a legal definition of indigenous peoples in the text of the declaration could “create tensions amongst ethnic groups and instability within sovereign states,” taking into account that “Africa is still recovering from the effects of ethnic based conflict.” Furthermore, group members argued, the principle of self-determination applied only “to peoples under colonial and/or foreign occupation,” and they expressed their concern that the right to self-determination could be misinterpreted to justify secession, “thus threatening the political unity and the territorial integrity of any country” (African Group 2007). Finally, they pointed out that indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources contradicted constitutional provisions of African countries where “control over land and natural resources is the responsibility of the State” (African Group 2007). In concluding its statement, the African Group emphasized that compliance with the declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights hinged largely on the declaration’s compatibility with national legislation. As Paul Oldham and Miriam Anne Frank (2008:6) rightly note, the objections of the African Group go to the center of the anthropological controversy over the concept of “indigenous peoples.” As James Suzman (2002) and
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others argue, the adoption of the declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights has been particularly problematic for southern African states, such as Botswana and Namibia, which— as a way of distancing themselves from apartheid politics— excluded the provision for differential treatment of their citizens on the basis of race or ethnicity.5 In Cameroon, by contrast, the concept of “indigenous peoples” is much less problematic, as ethnic and regional favoritisms have long been vital features of national politics (Bayart 1984; KofeleKale 1986; Mehler 1993). Faced with the objections of the African Group, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) of the African Union issued an advisory opinion in 2007. It contended that, in the African context, the concept of “indigenous peoples” differed considerably from its meaning on other continents and that a universal definition was neither useful nor required. Instead, the ACHPR considered it “much more relevant and constructive to try to bring out the main characteristics” of indigenous peoples in Africa, which include self-identification, a special attachment to and use of their traditional lands, and a state of marginalization because of cultural difference from the national dominant model (ACHPR 2007). Furthermore, the ACHPR stated that the entitlement of indigenous peoples to self-determination and land rights ought to be read in conjunction with article 46 of the declaration, which guarantees the inviolability of the integrity of nation-states. Alongside these recommendations, further negotiations took place between the African Group, the cosponsors of the declaration, and the indigenous peoples’ movement, represented by the Global Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus. Eventually, the African Group agreed on nine amendments to the declaration, two of which addressed the issue of definition and the possible misinterpretation of the right to self-determination (para. 23 and art. 46). The next crucial step entailed securing the consent of the indigenous peoples’ organizations to the proposed amendments (Oldham and Frank 2008). Finally, in September 2007, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted during the 61st session of the General Assembly with a majority of 143 votes in favor, 11 abstentions, and four negative votes by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Defining “indigenous peoples” According to the estimates of the nongovernmental organization Cultural Survival, there are 350 million indigenous people distributed all over the globe (Lutz 2007). Yet, as the above elaborations illustrate, defining “indigenous peoples” as a universally applicable concept has been a contentious issue both for anthropologists and for policy makers. In 1995, Chairperson–Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes of the WGIP was asked to prepare a working paper on the con-
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cept of “indigenous peoples” (Daes 1996). The paper includes a historical review of international practice, starting with the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884–85 and ending with current working definitions used by the UN and ILO. An early legal definition was provided in the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107). It was characterized by the language of integration and assimilation and was replaced in 1989 by the definition of the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169; Hodgson 2002:1038). Similar to the current declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights, it recognizes the “aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the frameworks of the States in which they live” (ILO 1989:preamble). After a careful analysis of the various interpretations of “indigenous peoples,” Daes concluded that no single legal definition could account for the complexity and regional variation of the concept, and she, therefore, recommended focusing on key factors identified by international organizations and legal experts as constitutive of indigenous peoples. These include priority in time, voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification, and a historic or present experience in subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination (Daes 1996:22). Daes thus confirmed the working definition that Cobo had introduced in 1986.6 As it turned out, this working definition is not fully applicable to the African and Asian contexts, where the key element of priority in time poses a problem. Accordingly, in its advisory opinion to the African Group, the ACHPR excluded the element of priority in time from the catalogue of main characteristics of indigenous peoples, arguing that, “in Africa, the term indigenous populations does not mean ‘first peoples’ in reference to aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere. . . . Therefore, the ACHPR considers that any African can legitimately consider him/herself as indigene to the Continent” (ACHPR 2007:4). In my opinion, the advisability of stripping the concept of “indigenous peoples” of its original connotations of priority in time and historical continuity is debatable. It might have been more useful to develop alternative concepts appropriate to the African and Asian contexts, as suggested, for example, by John Bowen (2000). In the meantime, however, many groups in Africa and elsewhere have adopted an indigenous identity—a development that merits further anthropological inquiry. In the following section, I consider the case of the Mbororo of northwest Cameroon, who, alongside the Baka, Bagyeli, and Bedzang (also known as Pygmies) of southeastern Cameroon and the Kirdi communities of the Mandara Mountains, have been recognized as an indigenous people by the UN (Tchoumba 2006). In
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particular, I focus on diverging local, national, and international connotations of autochthony and indigeneity.7
The Mbororo of northwest Cameroon: From strangers and migrants to an indigenous people The Mbororo belong to the ethnic category of Fulbe, whose members are dispersed over the Sahel and Savannah belt from West to East Africa. The term Mbororo refers specifically to (agro)pastoral Fulbe. Groups who identify themselves as Mbororo are found primarily in Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon (Bocquen´e 2002; Burnham 1996; Dupire 1970). In Cameroon they live in many parts of the country but congregate mostly in regions favorable for cattle grazing. In the North West Province, they constitute an ethnic and religious minority accounting for 5 to 10 percent of the total population (Boutrais 1984:230, 1995–96:548). The majority of the region’s inhabitants are Grassfielders, who belong to linguistically distinct communities but share common features of economic and sociopolitical organization. They are largely subsistence farmers and are organized in centralized chiefdoms and confederations. Whereas the settlement history of most Grassfields groups dates back several centuries, the Mbororo only began entering the area in the 1910s. Originating from the Kano region in present-day Nigeria, they slowly migrated southward during the course of the 19th century, in search of favorable ecological and political conditions (Boutrais 1995–96, vol. 1:15–210; Dognin 1981). Attracted by the fertile pastures of the Bamenda Highlands, many families settled there and gradually adopted a more sedentary lifestyle. In the first half of the 20th century, the population density was still low, and the Mbororo were welcomed by both local Grassfields chiefs and the British colonial administration. The Grassfielders treated them as guests on their land and subjects of their rulers. The British colonial administration—applying the policy of indirect rule— endorsed this system of accommodation, classifying the Mbororo as “strangers” and as subordinate to “native” Grassfields authorities. Subsequently, under the regime of Cameroon’s first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the Mbororo qualified as Cameroonian citizens (Njeuma and Awasom 1990). However, because of their Muslim identity and Fulbe ethnicity, they were subsumed under the cultural category of “northerners.” Consequently, Mbororo who were born and grew up in northwest Cameroon still counted as strangers to the area, with limited rights to the region’s natural and state resources. With Cameroon’s democratization in the 1990s came a new era characterized by party-political struggles as well as ethnic and minority politics (Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998; Takougang and Krieger 1998). Encouraged by newly gained freedoms and govern-
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ment policies, many population groups began to establish ethnic or regional associations that acted as their representatives to the state. This novel political avenue was also explored by young, mostly educated Mbororo, who, in 1992, founded the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA). MBOSCUDA soon became the most vocal and effective organ of Mbororo self-representation both to the Cameroonian state and to international development organizations. Because of MBOSCUDA’s continuous lobbying, the Mbororo eventually attained the status of a national and regional minority with claims and rights to natural resources and political representation in their home area (Pelican 2008). These developments also led to a change in Mbororo self-understanding. Initially associated with backwardness and superficial Islamization, and considered insulting, the ethnonym Mbororo has gained new, positive meanings. As Mbororo informants explained, they no longer saw themselves as marginalized pastoralists but as an empowered Cameroonian minority. Moreover, thanks to personal connections of MBOSCUDA activists with European researchers and development workers, contacts were established with the IWGIA that, in the long run, led to the Mbororo’s international recognition as an indigenous people.8 Whereas Mbororo identity and legal status have undergone considerable transformation since the group’s establishment in northwest Cameroon, Grassfielders’ perception of the Mbororo was and still is informed by ideas of historical continuity and political supremacy. Grassfielders consider themselves natives, or autochtones, of the region and claim political control over the lands, territories, and natural resources covered by their chiefdoms. In this context, the argument of priority in time, that is, of being firstcomers to a certain area, plays a crucial role (see also Lentz 2006). Moreover, on the basis of ancestral ties and links with the land’s ritual topography, Grassfielders entertain strong religious bonds with their settlement area and deem themselves “sons and daughters of the soil” and “guardians of the land.” In contrast, they view the Mbororo as a prime example of a stranger and migrant population.9 The Mbororo are a minority, thought to have emerged from somewhere else in Africa. Having settled in the region only in the 20th century, they are considered latecomers. Furthermore, they are seen as religiously and culturally different. Finally, as cattle pastoralists they are perceived as nomads, that is, people constantly on the move and with no permanent home. Discourses of autochthony have long been relevant on the local level, and during Cameroon’s democratization they also entered the national arena. As Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) argue, the introduction of a multiparty system raised significant problems regarding criteria of electoral entitlement and eligibility. Taking into account the high degree of internal mobility and labor migration that
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have characterized Cameroon’s economy since the precolonial period (Konings 2001; Warnier 1985), multiple conflicting interpretations of citizenship and belonging emerged. The interpretation endorsed by the government defined belonging in terms of “roots” and “origins” (Geschiere 2001). Political priority was given to “autochtones” and “indigenous minorities,” meaning members of local ethnic groups. “Strangers,” or “allog`enes,” were instructed to vote or stand as candidates in their home area because they were thought to represent primarily the interests of their group of origin. The upsurge of autochthony in national politics further amplified existing discourses on the local level. Regarding relations between Grassfielders and Mbororo, Nicodemus Awasom (2003:411) gives several examples of conflicts over land in which Grassfielders aggressively accused Mbororo of encroaching on “their ancestral land.” Similarly, my own research showed that many Grassfielders are generally sympathetic to the Mbororo and supportive of the idea that they should equally benefit from state resources and development programs. Their approach is based on the consideration that many Mbororo families have settled in the area for several decades and have significantly contributed to the region’s economic development. However, when it comes to issues of land, Grassfielders categorically refuse granting them the same rights as natives, emphasizing the Mbororo’s status as strangers and migrants. The question emerges how the Mbororo, locally perceived as strangers or allog`enes, qualify on the international level as an indigenous people. To answer this query one can draw on the ILO report “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and Poverty Reduction Strategies in Cameroon” by Belmond Tchoumba (2006). He describes the situation as follows: In Cameroon, as elsewhere in Africa, the concept of indigenous peoples is somewhat controversial. No community in Cameroon is legally recognized as an indigenous people, although the National Constitution provides for the protection of minorities and the rights of the indigenous peoples. However, based on the principle of self-identification, our work will focus on the so-called “Pygmies” and Mbororo who identify themselves in Cameroon as indigenous peoples. These two ethnic groups share a common attachment to their cultures, lifestyles and their marginalization in political life and the development process. Their cultures and lifestyles differ significantly from those of the dominant society and their survival depends on the recognition of their rights and access to their traditional land and natural resources. They suffer from discrimination insofar as they are considered as being “less developed” and “less advanced” than the other more dominant groups of the society. These groups have been identified by the working group of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as indigenous communities in Africa and the principle of respect for the lifestyle, customs, cultures and institutions as well as the self-
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identification of the indigenous and tribal peoples is recognized by ILO Convention No. 169 as fundamental for these peoples. [Tchoumba 2006:6–7] The characteristics mentioned by Tchoumba correspond to those ratified by the ACHPR and actually apply to the Mbororo. One can also consider Kuper’s (2003, 2005) argument that the UN has tended to give precedence to hunters and nomadic herders, viewing them as representatives of the original human populations of the world. Thus, Mbororo, in particular qualify as an indigenous people, although most of them are no longer nomadic herders but sedentary agropastoralists. Nonetheless, it is somewhat paradoxical that the Mbororo qualify as an indigenous people but that the Grassfields groups, who in local understanding and parlance are the natives, or autochtones, of the area, do not. In this situation, international and local interpretations of indigeneity are irreconcilable. So far, there has been little discussion or questioning by Grassfielders of the Mbororo’s international recognition as an indigenous people, probably because the concept of indigenous peoples as minorities with special rights has hardly been publicized. A Mbororo acquaintance of mine, who has participated in meetings of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, was asked by UN colleagues to assist in assessing the case of the Moko’oh, a Grassfields group that claimed indigenous status on the basis of historical subjugation and dispossession by colonial and postcolonial oppressors.10 Their application was eventually denied on the basis of insufficient cultural distinctiveness from the dominant society. Incidents like this could potentially become a source of rivalry and disagreement between the Mbororo and Grassfields groups. On the occasion of Indigenous Peoples Day in August 2007, MBOSCUDA North West organized a press conference in the provincial capital, Bamenda, to raise public awareness of the situation of the Mbororo as an “indigenous people.” In preparing for the event, the MBOSCUDA staff tried to anticipate awkward questions and were particularly concerned with preventing possible misinterpretations of the term indigenous as equivalent to native. Yet to their (and my) surprise, no objections were raised to identification of the Mbororo as indigenous. Instead, several journalists addressed the issue of Mbororo refusing to intermarry with Grassfielders, allegedly because of religious reasons. Whereas, from a Mbororo perspective, their reluctance is a measure of their desire to preserve their cultural and ethnic distinctiveness—an approach explicitly accepted if not encouraged by the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (art. 34)—the journalists interpreted this attitude as a sign of the Mbororo’s disrespect for Grassfielders and their disinterest in social integration. Finally, as concerns the position of the Cameroonian government, varying approaches are observable. As
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Tchoumba rightly points out, the government has not legally recognized any ethnic group as an indigenous people. However, in 2003, representatives of the so-called Pygmies were enrolled along with the Mbororo to participate in government programs for the development of indigenous and autochthonous peoples in Cameroon (Atelier de Planification 2003). No development measures have resulted from these meetings.
Articulations of indigenous and autochthonous identities: Comparative considerations To situate the Mbororo case in a broader perspective, I discuss Li’s findings regarding the articulation of indigenous identity in Indonesia. Li describes two communities in the Sulawesi hills that could qualify as “indigenous and tribal peoples” (Li 2000:149) but that follow different avenues of access to development and political representation. On the one hand, the Lauje, living in remote hill settlements, manage their community development via daily negotiations with state representatives; on the other hand, the lakeside Lindu vocally claim the status of an indigenous people and oppose a dam project endangering their livelihood. As Li points out, the various options adopted by the two communities result from the conjunctures of different factors. Thus, the Lauje’s articulation of their indigenous identity was not a natural process but was prompted by the conjuncture of such crucial factors as competition for resources, the existence of a local political structure and educated individuals to speak on the group’s behalf, and the interest of outsiders in supporting exemplary indigenous subjects. The same argument is applicable to the case of the Mbororo in Cameroon. Here, as well, the articulation of an indigenous identity resulted from the conjuncture of similar factors (local antagonisms, personal relations and skills of MBOSCUDA leaders, international concern for the protection of nomadic pastoralists), some of which were absent in the case of other marginalized minorities, such as the Hausa of northwest Cameroon (Pelican 2006:293–301). In a later article, Li (2002) adopts a much more serious and concerned tenor in analyzing the articulation of indigenous identities in Indonesia. She bases her argumentation on an act of ethnic cleansing in 2001, in which a busload of Madurese refugees was killed by a Dayak mob. Li points to the dilemma of anthropologists who tend to be sympathetic to the people they study but who may be confronted with the reality that the knowledge they generate may be used by people not only to their own benefit but also to the fatal detriment of others. She also draws attention to the “sedentarist metaphysics” (Malkki 1992) that is expressed in hierarchies of belonging and ethnic exclusion and that, in her view, seems closely linked to indigenous identities.
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Li is certainly right in highlighting the possible political implications of our work as anthropologists. Similar concerns have been raised in the anthropological debate on the concept of “indigenous peoples,” regarding both the moral responsibility of anthropologists toward “their people” and the potentially negative effects of biased research. As concerns the relationship of ethnic violence and indigenous identity, the situation in Cameroon seems more complex than the Indonesian case. In Cameroon, discourses of belonging and ethnic exclusion are tied to local understandings of autochthony, whereas the international concept of “indigenous peoples” has been disentangled from notions of historical continuity and priority in time. However, Li’s cautious note on the potential for violence inherent in claims to indigenous identities is reflected in Geschiere’s analyses of discourses of autochthony in Cameroon and elsewhere (Geschiere 2004, 2005; see also Bayart et al. 2001). Geschiere argues that the new emphasis on indigeneity and minority rights, promoted by the Cameroonian government as well as by international development and global rights organizations, is geared toward surpassing national citizenship. This development he considers precarious, as, in many African countries, the idea of formal equality of all citizens in the face of the law is still weakly institutionalized (Geschiere 2005:13). As outlined above, similar concerns have been raised by the African Group in its objection to the declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights.
Mbororo benefits of their status as an indigenous people As outlined above, the approach of the Cameroonian government toward indigenous peoples is ambivalent. On the one hand, the concept of “indigenous peoples” is integrated into the preamble of the revised national constitution; on the other hand, no community has officially been recognized as indigenous. The Mbororo, although invited to participate in national programs for indigenous and autochthonous peoples and, most recently, to open the civilian march-past on National Day (May 20, 2008), have not benefited from any special rights conferred by the state. On the contrary, their claims to self-determination and rights to land have largely been ignored. For example, in summer 2007, government representatives forcefully intervened in a case of Mbororo leadership succession in Sabga, the main Mbororo settlement in northwest Cameroon. Through the influence of a wealthy and well-connected entrepreneur, the community-elected leader was administratively deposed and replaced by a Mbororo ruler of the entrepreneur’s choice. Members of the Sabga community protested against this interference, to which the government reacted with military intervention. The Mbororo elite in Sabga eventually decided to use its international connections to pressure the government.
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In fear for their lives, the deposed leader and his supporters sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Yaound´e. Mbororo women staged a protest at the prime minister’s office and demanded the deposition of the imposed ruler and the reinstatement of their rightful community leader. Moreover, with the help of MBOSCUDA, they reported the case to national and international human rights organizations as well as to the UN Human Rights Council. For a short while, the Cameroonian government seemed willing to reconsider the case. On the initiative of the prime minister, an official investigative team was sent to Sabga. Its members reported their findings to the presidency, but no action was taken. Mbororo human rights’ activists further publicized the issue and solicited national and international bodies to issue official letters of concern. The Cameroonian government, however, failed to respond to these reports and concerns, and, in spring 2008, the situation in Sabga was still unresolved. This conflict illustrates the government’s willful ignorance of international agreements. Although Cameroon has supported and acknowledged the UN declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights, it refrains from its implementation—with destabilizing effects on Mbororo society. The question of the declaration’s implementation has also been addressed in the African Group’s draft aide memoire. As this document rightly points out, although the declaration is not legally binding, it raises high expectations among those who identify themselves as indigenous: It must be appreciated that for the common people in the street of Africa, there is no difference between a politically non-binding Declaration and a Treaty. What is important to them would be the fact that Governments or the United Nations have committed themselves to specific actions. Moreover, after adoption the Declaration would form part of international customary law and Member States would be expected to abide by it. Political Declarations are in themselves important because Member States should make political pronouncements which they intend to implement. In this respect, it would be inappropriate to adopt the Declaration with its shortcomings simply because it is considered to be a Declaration and therefore not legally binding. Member States must be concerned about how they can give concrete meaning to the Declaration. [African Group 2007:sec. 9.2, 9.3] The Cameroonian government seemingly does not concern itself with these considerations. Accordingly, on the national level, the Mbororo have enjoyed little if any benefit from their status as an indigenous people. Conversely, new opportunities have opened for those Mbororo individuals who are cognizant of international development and rights’ discourses and have the intellectual
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and social capital to act as representatives of their community. Thus, members of the educated elite have benefited from considerable opportunity for advanced training and international travel. For example, thanks to their organization’s special consultative status with the ECOSOC, MBOSCUDA officials have been invited to participate in indigenous fellowship programs and in regular meetings of the WIPO in Geneva. Besides generous remunerations, these trips also entail status increase and possibilities for further networking.11 In response to these unequal openings, critical voices have emerged from within Mbororo society. For example, in 2005, Mbororo community leaders submitted a petition to the British high commissioner accusing Mbororo intellectuals of misappropriating international aid, a conflict that resulted from internal frictions between the less educated, traditional elites and their modern, younger counterparts (Nsom 2005; Pelican 2008). In addition to rivalries between different sections of Mbororo society, there has also been contention within MBOSCUDA. In 2005, a serious conflict occurred in relation to a development project intended to benefit the indigenous peoples of Cameroon, including the Mbororo pastoralists in the northwest, the Kirdi mountain dwellers in the north, and the Baka and Bagyeli forest people in the east and south of the country. The project was designed by Village Aid, a British nongovernmental organization that had been collaborating with MBOSCUDA for several years. The aim of the project was to establish a female literacy program as well as organize training in paralegal counseling and advocacy.12 Although the funding had already been secured, internal rivalries within MBOSCUDA disabled the project’s realization. The decisive moment occurred when a MBOSCUDA leader forcefully interrupted a preparatory workshop, bringing in the police to arrest three participants—among them, the project coordinator of Village Aid, himself a Mbororo from northwest Cameroon. In consequence, the project was called off, and no further attempts were made at joint development projects for the indigenous peoples of Cameroon. At the heart of this conflict lay three sets of concerns. First, there was individual contention over issues of status and power. Although originally created on the initiative of Mbororo students and traders, many of MBOSCUDA’s current leaders are now civil servants. Consequently, diverging and somewhat conflicting visions of MBOSCUDA and Mbororo development have emerged, some informed by the ideals of democratization and human rights, others by personal interests within the government nexus. Second, the conflict has been fueled by rivalries over project funding; that is, MBOSCUDA leaders have repeatedly opposed the prospect of sharing funds with other organizations, both Mbororo and nonMbororo. Third, Mbororo notions of racial superiority may have played a decisive role in dooming the project. The Fulbe (including the Mbororo) are renowned as a proud
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and exclusive people who tend to look down on other ethnic groups (Burnham 1972). This characterization perhaps applies to the Mbororo in the northwest to a lesser degree than to Fulbe in northern Cameroon. Nonetheless, observers familiar with the situation might have foreseen that Mbororo ethnic pride would overshadow collaboration with “the Pygmies,” whom Cameroonians generally rank lower on the ethnic scale. The ideology underlying the concept of “indigenous peoples” suggests the shared burden and the equality of indigenous groups. The above conflicts, however, illustrate that the shared identification of the Mbororo, Kirdi, Baka, and Bagyeli as indigenous peoples could not overcome preexisting notions of difference and inequality. Jim Igoe (2006) and Alpa Shah (2008) have reported similar findings with regard to discourses of indigeneity appropriated by pastoralist communities in Tanzania and by adivasi (Scheduled Tribe) leaders in India. As these authors argue, critical analyses of local appropriations of such discourses are crucial in revealing the possible perpetuation and intensification of class differences. They recommend paying special attention to those marginalized groups and sections of society whose voices are unheard because they lack the social capital required to access structures of international aid. In line with their recommendation, I now take a critical look at the situation of the Bagyeli and Baka and their varying appropriation of discourses of indigeneity. I base my analysis on the testimony of Jacques Ngun (2001), a Bagyeli Pygmy of southern Cameroon, and on the work of Leonhardt (2006), an anthropologist with considerable research experience among Baka in southeastern Cameroon. My explorations are guided by the hypothetical question of the impact the planned development project for the indigenous peoples of Cameroon might have had on those communities.
Critical considerations of the Baka and Bagyeli case Ngun’s (2001) article on the situation of the Bagyeli in southern Cameroon is part of a conference volume on Africa’s indigenous peoples and represents one of the two indigenous perspectives included in the publication. Ngun’s contribution is not a scholarly but an advocacy piece. In describing the precarious situation of the Bagyeli, he emphasizes their dependence on forest products, and claims that, “indeed, all the Pygmies live in the forest and therefore have a strong relationship with this environment” (Ngun 2001:32). He characterizes the interaction of the Bagyeli with their Bantu neighbors as one of disregard and exploitation of the former by the latter and criticizes the government for its paternalistic approach to the socalled Pygmy problem. Ngun highlights the need for integrating the perspectives of Pygmy communities in national
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and international development projects and, to this end, recommends collaboration with Pygmy nongovernmental organizations. Although echoing some of these issues, Leonhardt provides a much more complex picture of Baka society in southeastern Cameroon. In his recent article entitled “Baka and the Magic of the State: Between Autochthony and Citizenship” (2006), he critically engages with local ideas of identity and autochthony as shared by the Baka and their farming neighbors. Several ethnonyms refer to the Baka and other forest dwellers. Baka refers to the people and their language and is recognized by the Baka themselves as well as by their farming neighbors. The most widespread term, however, is Pygmies, which is frequently used in French-speaking contexts. Yet “Pygmy” is a racial concept with evolutionist implications, and, when used locally, it has an objectifying and somewhat derogatory touch. Nonetheless, it is the term commonly used in policy circles. Another criterion of Baka identification is the group’s economic specialization as hunter-gatherers. Yet, not all Baka are forest dwellers; some also live in villages and practice agriculture. As Leonhardt (2006:70) argues, the ways in which the Baka are construed as a social object impact their citizenship status. Their perception as Pygmies by policy makers confers on them the status of an indigenous people, as they represent “the first Cameroonians.” Conversely, their status as autochthones is ambiguous. Leonhardt distinguishes two types of autochthony: One is symbolic and refers to what I have called “indigeneity.” The other is substantive; it derives from a people’s intimate relationship with the soil and entails special rights conferred by the state. Yet the Baka, in contrast to their farming neighbors, do not relate to the soil but to the forest. Thus, their situation is similar to that of the Mbororo, as both groups are denied autochthony by their farming neighbors, who consider themselves “sons and daughters of the soil” and perceive the Baka and Mbororo as “wanderers” and “vagabonds” (Leonhardt 2006:74). Accordingly, in both cases, indigeneity (or symbolic autochthony) is at variance with (substantive) autochthony. In the second part of his study, Leonhardt engages with economic and political variation within Baka society and its impact on Baka notions of identity. He portrays three different communities, two of which are Baka who live in villages and are mainly agriculturalists. Depending on ecological transformations and their ethnic composition, these communities, to varying degrees, have lost their relationship with the forest. Whereas they see the hunter-gatherers in the forest as the “real” Baka, these village Baka consider themselves Baka by ancestry, or residual Baka. Similarly, the forest Baka regard the village Baka as spoiled by the amenities of modern life and corrupted by structures of authority. Among the main characteristics of Baka forest communities
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is their egalitarianism. Although they may wish for educational and health facilities, they prefer the absence of the state, a source of authority and inequality. Curiously, forest Baka are hardly considered in research and policy circles. National and international development projects focus on Baka communities settled along roads, who face considerable social and economic hardship. Thus, those Baka communities doing well on their own are excluded from the general picture of a hunter-gatherer society affected by grave societal transformation. As an acephalous society, the forest Baka lack political structures that allow for legitimate leadership and collective representation. Baka opinion leaders have persuasive power but not the legitimacy to act authoritatively for the group. Yet, to actively engage in national and international politics, they need delegates and educated representatives. Thus, the development activities of national and international organizations may “eventually result in the disappearance of Baka political culture” (Leonhardt 2006:91). Leonhardt’s analysis is also telling with regard to the involvement of the Baka and Bagyeli in the indigenous rights movement. Their participation requires the formation and mobilization of an articulate elite, for which Ngun may be exemplary. Yet, taking into account the Baka’s egalitarian structure and their socioeconomic variation, one may be tempted to question their representatives’ legitimacy and constituency. One may also wonder about the impact the planned Village Aid project, particularly its civil-society component, might have had on the political organization of the communities involved.13 Moreover, as Leonhardt (2006:91–92) rightly points out, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not adequately provide for the case of an acephalous people. The societal transformation effected by their integration into hierarchical international structures is contrary to the original intention of the indigenous rights movement of protecting indigenous peoples against the loss of their identity, culture, and basis of livelihood: a paradoxical outcome without apparent solution.
Conclusion The focus of this article is the concepts of “indigeneity” and “autochthony” and their varying applications in international, national, and local discourses. One might argue that, despite the 23-year process of refinement and diversification of the concept of “indigenous peoples,” its application still yields ambiguous results. A crucial factor contributing to the complexity is the terminological convolution and intertwining of discourses of indigeneity and discourses of autochthony, which, as I have argued, refer to distinctly different concepts. As illustrated by the cases of the Mbororo, Baka, and Bagyeli, these concepts are not necessarily com-
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patible. Paradoxically, a group may internationally qualify as an indigenous people while being locally perceived as strangers and migrants. Analysis of the Baka situation further demonstrates the mixed effects of discourses of indigeneity when applied to an egalitarian society that lacks political structures allowing for legitimate leadership and collective representation. In addition to conceptual complexities, the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rrights of Indigenous Peoples generates expectations that national governments may be reluctant to fulfill. In the Cameroonian case, the constitutional definition of indigeneity is couched in such ambiguous terms as to be legally amorphous. However, the adoption of the concept of “indigenous peoples” has enabled the Cameroonian regime to gerrymander electoral codes with the effect of diluting if not neutralizing democratization. At the same time, internationally recognized indigenous peoples, such as the Mbororo, Baka, and Bagyeli, have been denied national recognition of their rights. The Mbororo believe that, with international support, they will be able to enforce the declaration’s implementation and secure their rights to land and self-determination, an outcome that may, however, exacerbate relations with their sedentary neighbors. Meanwhile—with regard to Cameroon and other countries—the degree to which and the means by which the UN may be able to enforce governments’ compliance with its resolution remains an open question.
Notes Acknowledgments. This article resulted from a presentation de´ livered in the S´eminaire Commun du Centre d’Etudes Africaines, l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, February 2008. I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Warnier and Jo¨elle Rostkowski for their insightful comments. I am also grateful for suggestions from Billy MacKinnon and the anonymous reviewers for American Ethnologist. I am indebted to the Mbororo community of northwest Cameroon and to Aliou Sali, Nuhu Salihu Jafaru, Sarli Sadou Nana, and Musa Usman Ndamba for supporting my research. The arguments of this article are based on 14 months of fieldwork carried out between 2000 and 2002 and complemented by six weeks in 2007. Research grants were provided by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle (Saale), Germany, and the Swiss National Science Foundation. 1. A revised version of the article is also found in Kuper 2005:ch. 10. 2. For workshop and paper abstracts, see EASA 2006. 3. A discussion of Barnard’s position with contributions from various anthropologists has been published in Social Anthropology 14(1):17–32. 4. Most of these documents are available at International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IGWIA) 2007. For anthropological analyses, see also Hodgson 2002, Keating 2007, and Oldham and Frank 2008. 5. See also the special issue on “Minorities and Citizenship in Botswana” in the Journal of Southern African Studies 28(4). 6. In 2004 the Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues prepared a background paper on “the concept of indigenous
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peoples,” that reiterates the major findings of Daes (1996) and equally confirms Cobo’s (1986) working definition. 7. For a comprehensive analysis of Mbororo history in northwest Cameroon and the transformations in Mbororo self-understanding and political strategies, see Pelican 2006, 2008. 8. On the history of MBOSCUDA, see also Burnham 2005, Davis 1995, Duni et al. 2005, and Pelican 2008. 9. In Pidgin English, the lingua franca in Anglophone Cameroon, the term stranger can be used to refer to a foreigner (or nonnative) as well as a guest. 10. On the situation of the Moko’oh, see Association for the Reconstruction and Development of the Moko-oh Peoples Cameroon (AFTRADEMOP) 2005. 11. Jean-Franc¸ois Bayart (2000) uses the concept of “extraversion” in analyzing the (unequal) relationship of African actors with their external environment. Similarly, one could interpret the international networking of indigenous peoples’ representatives as strategies of extraversion. 12. For detailed information on Village Aid projects in Cameroon, see Duni et al. 2005 and Village Aid Africa 2008. 13. In his comments on this article, the Africa project coordinator of Village Aid, himself a Mbororo, confirmed that the impact of the aborted project could only be guessed at. In his view, the female literacy program would have benefited some of the already empowered Baka women, giving them a tool by which they could analyze their world and discuss possible ways to voluntarily participate in development. Interestingly, he initially did not consider rivalries within MBOSCUDA a threat to the project but did remark on the possible reactions of Cameroonian society and government, which might fear an alliance between the two communities and the support lent by the international community. However, taking into account the failure of the Cameroonian government to respond to UN queries regarding the Mbororo leadership succession in Sabga, I question the impact that such an alliance might have had on the human rights situation of the Mbororo and Baka.
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