Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared [PDF]

Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared Author(s): Jennifer Sterling-Folker Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 97-119 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013971 . Accessed: 31/01/2014 11:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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International StudiesQuarterly (2000) 44, 97-119.

Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivismand Neoliberal InstitutionalismCompared JENNIFER

STERLING-FOLKER

University of Connecticut

This articlecompares constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism and argues that in their reificationas paradigms in competition,the 10 theoreticalcommunityis making far too much of what are relatively small differencesbetweenthemin the metatheoreticalscheme of things. These claims are substantiated by comparing functionalism, neofunctionalism,neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Such an examination reveals that theyall depend on the same mechanism of functionalinstitutionalefficiencyin order to account forsocial change. Thus whenconstructivism has been utilizedas an explanationforchange and transformation, it has tended to reach many of the same conclusions, and in the same manner,as othervariantsof liberal IR theory.In addition, this comparison reveals that,despite its assumptionof exogenous interests,neoliberal institutionalism relies implicitlyon an idenin order to account for cooperation's maintenance. titytransformation Such a transformation is entirelyconsistentwithconstructivist expectations. The choice between neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism is not paradigmatic and is merely a choice between explaining behavioral cooperation in the moment or its development short-term, into communal cooperation in the future.The article concludes with some general observationsregardingwhythisparallel has occurred and what its implicationsare for our understandingof 10.

Since the end of the Cold War the study of international organization (10) has witnessed a renewed interest in subjects such as norms, ideas, learning, and identity-formation.' The accumulated study of these subjects has produced what one reviewer has called "the constructivist turn in IR theory" in which theorists open up "the black box of interest and identity formation," and argue that "state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction with structures"(Checkel, 1998:326).2 This constructivist turn has elicited a great deal of attention, and Author'snote:For theirinisights, commenits, anidhelpfulsuggestioins oniearlier draftsof thisarticle,I would like to thanikPatrickThaddeusJackson,Yale Fergusoni,the editors of International StudiesQuarterly, anid several anioniymous reviewers.Aniyerrorsor omissionisare myowni. I Several authors provide overviewsof prior theorizinigoni each of these suLbjects.For learninlgsee Levy, 1994:280, fin.2; forideas see Woods, 1995:163-66, anidJacobseni,1995; forniormssee Raymonid,1997:208-13, anid Kowertanid Legro, 1996; anid for ideintity see Kratochwilanid Lapid, 1996. 2 KowertanidLegro also use theterm"sociologicalturni" CheckelreviewsinicludeFinniiemore, (1996:453). The wor-ks 1996; Katzenisteini, 1996; anidKlotz,1995. For otherexamples of conistructivism see theworksof Adler (1997); Dessler (1989); Carlsniaes(1992); Kubalkova,Oniuf,anidKowert(1998); Kratochwiland Lapid (1996); Oinuf(1989); Ruggie(1998); anidWenidt(1987, 1992, 1994); as wellas theworkscited byCheckel in his footniote 28 anidthosecited byHopf (1998). C 2000 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF,UK.

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its rise among the ranksof IR theorieshas been so rapid thatit is now frequently assigned the paradigmaticspace once reservedfor Marxism.3It is being touted as a new and potentiallyfruitful theoreticalendeavor which offersa directchallenge to existingIR theoriesand even a "middle ground" between them (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998:327).4 This articlewillargue thatneitherclaim is correct.Constructivism is not a new field of IR theoreticalinquirybecause it fails to offera paradigmaticalternative to liberal IR theoryand neoliberal institutionalism in particular.This failurecan be tracedlargelyto theoreticalmisapplication.When the goal is to explain social change, constructivists have generallynot followed through on the historical indeterminacyimplied by the approach itself.As March and Olsen point out, if "identitiesand competencies are shaped by political activitiesand interactions ... arise partlyin the contextof politics and become embedded in rules, practices,beliefs,and institutions," then "historyis path-dependentin the sense that the characterof currentinstitutionsdepends not onlyon currentconditionsbut also on the historicalpath of institutionaldevelopment"(1998:959).5 Yet many constructivists have been unwillingto commit to this implied indeterminacy. When constructivism is utilized as an explanation for social change, there has instead been a noticeable proclivityto adopt the same functional-institutional causal logic presentin almostall variantsof liberal IR theorizing.Constructivism has tended to replicateliberalarguments,conclusions,and predictionsabout the futureof internationalrelationsas a result. This association is remarkable for a number of reasons. The firstis that constructivism has several theoreticalancestriesthatare decidedlynot liberal in theirorientations.While its practitionerstrace the originsof constructivism to a varietyof sources, postmodernism(or what is commonlyreferredto as critical theory) is almost invariablyon the list of theoreticalantecedents.6Clearly it would be incorrectto argue that the originsof constructivism may be found in liberal theory,since liberalism'sreificationof modernityis preciselypostmodernism'sintendedtarget.Yet Hopf's observationthatthereis a differencebetween "conventionalconstructivism" and criticaltheoryis pertinenthere (1998; see also shares many of the Ruggie, 1998:35-36). As he notes, "although constructivism 3 Lapid argues in a special 1989 issue of International StudiesQuarterly thatpost-positivism should be "the third debate in the field of initerniationial relationis"(1989:235). Alonigsimilarlinies,Walt argues that realism,nieoliberal are the field's three competinigparadigms(1998), anid Ruggie thatit is because inistitutionialism, anidconistructivism nieorealismanid nieoliberalinistitutionialism may be lumped togetheroni the basis of theirshared rationialchoice methodologythat anl alterniative perspectivesuch as conistructivism is so niecessary(1998:4-11). For conifirmation thatthisperspectiveoniconistr-uctivism is nlow widelyshared withinithe field,onienieedlook niofurtherthall the 501' anniiiversary issue of International Organization, which uses thejuxtapositioniof rationialism anidconistructivism as its organiizinig theme (Katzenisteini et al., 1998). 4 This is niotto say that conistructivism has niotbeeni withoutits critics.See, for example, worksof Checkel (1998:338-47); Copelanid(1998); Desch (1998); Haseniclever,Mayer,anidRittberger(1997:190-92);Jervis(1998:976); Lapid (1989:248-49); anid Mearsheimer(1994-95). Or as Taylorniotes,while there is some descriptivemeritin the claim thatactionianidstructuLre are mutually "as anl approach to explaininigsocial chalngeit is useless," because it "rules(s) out fromthe startthe conistitutive, overtime"(1989:149; emphasis in originial).See also possibilityof explaininigchanigein termsof their initeractioni discussioniof path-depenidenicy anidconistructivism KowertanidLegro, 1996:488-90, anidHoffmannii's (1991:15-19). 6 The termspost-structuralism anidpost-positivism are frequenitly a niumberof differenit substituted,anidconitaini Derrida'sdeconistructioni, epistemologiesinicludinig semiotics,anidfeminiist psychoanialytic theory.Whattheseapproaches have in commoniis a "dissatisfactioni withwhat the conistitutioni Enilightenimenit project has broughtabout" anldall attempt to challenige"the initellectualsuppositionisupoIn which Westernirationialismanid positivismare based" (Gregory,quoted in Der Deriani anid Shapiro, 1989:xiiv;see also Roseniau, 1990, anid Smith, 1996. While both Dessler anid Wenidttrace the originisof conistruLctivism to work by AnthoniyGiddelnsoln "structuLrationi theory" (Dessler, 1989:442; Wenidt,1987:356),Wenidtlatercited a niumberof other social theoriesas alntecedenits, ilncludilng rule theorists, "cogniitivists, poststructuralists, stanidpoinit anidpostmoderni feminiists, anidstructurationiists" (1992:393). set of theoristsinicludinig the EinglishSchool, Durkheim, Ruggie tracesthe "social conistructivist project"to a differenit as anitecedenits anidWeber,buLthe also ackniowledgesGiddenisanidpostmoderniism (1998:11, 28-32); see also Adler, 1997, anid Kubalkova,Oinuf,anid Kowert,1998.

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foundational elements of critical theory, it also resolves some issues by adopting

defensiblerules of thumb,or conventions,ratherthan followingcriticaltheory all the way up the postmodern criticalpath" (1998:181). Thus there is a split betweencriticalIR theorists,such as Ashleyand Der Derian, and constructivists, such as Wendtand Ruggie, regardingthe application of postmodernismto IR.7 The latter retain a shared "commitmentto the idea of social science" while criticaltheorydoes not (Ruggie, 1998:36), which means that "to reach an intellectuallysatisfying point of closure, constructivism adopts positivistconventions" and that"whereconstructivism is most conventionalis in the area of methodology and epistemology"(Hopf, 1998:183, 182).8 The splitbetweenthe twois even more fundamental,however,because one of the conventionsmanyconstructivists have tended to relyupon in order to explain social change in world politicsis functionalinstitutionalefficiency. The resultis thatwhen it has been utilized as causal explanation,"conventional"constructivism has been farfromagnosticabout change in worldpolitics.Because it adopts the same causal mechanism that neoliberal institutionalismdoes and neofunctionalismdid before it, it reaches the same sortsof conclusions about social change. Yet many constructivists have insisted that neo-functionalismplays no role in theircausal arguments,whichis the second reason whythe constructivist parallels withneo-functionalismare so remarkable.9It is because constructivist explanations relyon a "logic of appropriateness"ratherthan a "logic of consequences" thattheysupposedlyavoid the demand-driventrapthatneo-functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism (as well as realism) fall into.10However,despite intention(and perhaps unconsciously"), a close comparison revealsstrongparallels with prior liberal theorizing.And what this suggests,in turn,is that the foundationalinsightsof postmodernismare being transposedinto the field of IR in order to reifythe project of modernity.'2Constructivism has indeed become "conventional"because its argumentshave tended to be (neo-)functionalistin orientationand thus confirmliberal expectationsabout the futureof the international system. It is difficult,as a result,to sustain the claim that constructivism can provide for the a neutral alternativeto both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism 7 Hopf listsas critical IR theoristsCampbell, Walker,anid Weber. RuLggielabels the former"post-moderniist" conistructivism (addinigPetersonito the list),his owInwork(alonigwithHaas, Kratochwil,Oniuf,Adler, Finniiemore, Katzenstein,anid Elshtaini)as "n'eo-classical"conistr-uctivism, anid Wenidtanid Dessler "niaturalistic" colnstruLctivism (1998:35-36). 8 Or as Checkel put this,because "conistr-uctivists do niotrejectscience or causal explaniationis; theirquarr-elwith mainistream theoriesis onitological,niotepistemological"(1998:327). Of course the extenitto which these coinveintionisare "defenisible"is highlyquLestioniable froma postinoderniper-spective. See, for example, Der-Derianl anld Shapiro, 1989; Folker,1996; Roseniau,1990; anidSmith,1996. Ruggie does recogniizeanidgrapple withthisissue to some extenit(1998:38-39). 9 Ruggie claims,forexample, that conistructivism "has niodirectanitecedelnt in ilnterniationial r-elationis theory," anid although he ackniowledgesa personialtheoretical debt to nieo-funictionialism, he also inisiststhat his ownl collectioinof conistructivist argumenits effectively jettisonisitscor-eassumptionis (1998:11, 42, 46-47, 131). In a similar veini,Finniiemoreis careftulin National Interests in InternationalSociety(1996) to differenitiate her conistructivist or demanid-driveni explaniationi for the diffusioni of norms froma funlctionialist explaniationi. As she puts it, "in the cases I inivestigate, state officialswere niotresponidinig to aniypressingdemanidsor obvious crises. They were niot lookinigfor a solutionito a problem" (1996:12). Oni the other hanid,some conistructivists explicitlyconniiecttheir workto nieo-ftinctionialism and liberal theory,forexample, W\lelndt (1992:425; 1994); Dessler (1989:468-73); Zacher anid Matthew(1995:136); anid Carlsniaes(1992:263). 10March anidOlsei, 1998:948-54; Finniiem-iore, 1996:28-31; anid Finniiemore anid Sikkinik,1998:912-13. 11Ruggie himselfraises this issue whenihe niotes:"It is truLethat nieo-funiictionialism embodied maniyof the methodological anid philosophical precepts thatwe now recogniizeto be social conistruLctivism, but it did so largely unconsciously" (1998:11; my emphasis). Sinice Ruggie ackniowledgeshavinigbeeni schooled in nieo-funictionialism (1998:xii,42), oniemightinifer fromhisowInstatemenit thatitconitiniues to inifluenice his argumenits albeituniconisciously. 2As one studenitof postmoderniism 12 in its literaryconitexthas puLtit, "I was chagriniedto discover that,to the extenitthat post-structural techniiqueshad made their-way initoIR theoryproper, theyhad beeni imported ... to affirmsomethiniglike the millenniiial enidproduLct of the liberal project" (Folker, 1996:12-13).

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Competing P'aradigmsor Birds of a Feather?

explorationof internationalpoliticalphenomena. Nor is it possible to sustainthe asserteddistinctionbetweenconstructivism and neoliberal institutionalism which has been takenforgrantedbypractitionersand criticsalike. Constructivists have tended to reifythis distinctionby arguing that theirprimarytargetis "systemic rationalism"or "neo-utilitarianism" rather than realism.'3 Yet in emphasizing theirdifferenceswith neoliberal institutionalism, constructivists have made far too much of whatare relativelysmall distinctionsin the metatheoreticalscheme of things.Not only do constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists relyon the same functional-institutional logic to explain social change, theyactuallyshare the same ontologyso that neoliberal institutionalismis "rationalist"only to a point. Ultimatelyconstructivism makes explicitan assumed but unexplored step in situationallystrategicliberal argumentswhich accounts for the maintenance of cooperation. Thus when the metatheoreticalcommitmentsmade by constructivistsand neoliberal institutionalists are closelycompared, one discoversthat the epistemologicaland ontological differencesdisappear, and theyturn out to be complementarytheorieswithinthe largerframeworkof liberal IR theory. These argumentswill be explored in the sections that follow. In order to establishthe theoreticallinksbetweenconstructivism and neoliberal institutionalism, the argumentproceeds on twoseparate although interrelatedfronts.The firstis to focus on constructivism and trace out its reliance on the same logic of whichservesas a mechanismto promote coopfunctionalinstitutionalefficiency erativechange in neo-functionalismand neoliberal institutionalism as well. The in order to demonstrate second frontis to focus on neoliberal institutionalism that its theoreticaldifferenceswith constructivismare not as definitiveas the constructivist literaturewould lead one to believe. Presentedin thismanner,the argumentsof thisarticle could serve as a critique of neoliberal institutionalism, since theydemonstratethat it fails to hold its own methodologicalchoices constant by smugglingin an identitytransformation consistentwith constructivist expectations.The implicationsof this are left unexplored, however,since the article'sgoal is to serve as a correctiveto the flawed but increasinglyaccepted wisdom that constructivismand neoliberal institutionalismare paradigms in competition.

Interestsand Identitiesin Functional,Neo-functional,and Neoliberal InstitutionalTheorizing As theoriesof IR, functionalismand neo-functionalismdeveloped afterWWII in association with the studyof the EU. One of the most influentialscholars of functionalismwas David Mitrany,who argued for the "functionalselection and organizationof internationalrelations,"which meant "the binding together[of] those interestswhich are common" (1943:32). Functionalismfurtherassumed that "followingthe selection of an area of common interestor concern comes the organizationof the internationalwill and effort"so thatobtainingcommon interestsserved as the primarymotivationfor institutionalcreation and adaptation (Sewell, 1966:23). Thus the extent to which a set of institutionsor social practiceseffectively obtained interestsalso determinedthe extentto which individuals and groups would find those institutionsdesirable. There was, as Sewell observed,a clear "utilitarianstrandwoven into the functionalistconception of obligation,"yet much of the functionalistliteratureput thisutilitarianisminto the language of problem-solving(1966:50). Mitranycomplained about a propensityduring"periods of transitionthatreformersare more ready to fightover a theorythan to pull togetheron a problem,"and captured the tone of the functionalistliteraturewhen he argued, "I do not representa 1'3Weindt (1994:386, 1992:393); Ruggie (1998:11); Katzensteii

(1996).

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theory.I representan anxiety"(1948:350). The anxietyto whichMitranyreferred, and the emphasison problem-solvingratherthan interestfulfillment, was due to functionalism'santi-statistorientations.Its proponents were firmlyconvinced that the nation-statewas the problem that prevented common interestsfrom and Mitranycharacterized "the principle of state being obtained effectively, equality" as "that most disruptiveand intractableof internationalprinciples" (1943:29). 14

Implicitin much of the functionalistliteraturewas the idea thatthe condition of interdependencewas an environmentalcircumstancethat demanded institutional innovation.15 The nation-state'sinabilityto obtain common interestsin interdependentconditions manifesteditselfas problems, dysfunctions,or the incomplete satisfactionof interests,thus generatinga demand for new institutional arrangements.'6And because common interestscould not be obtained withthe existingterritorialdivisionsreifiedby national institutionalstructures, those institutionshad to be transcended.'7Institutionalformwould instead follow functionbecause "the organizationalcomponent of each functionalunit is intimatelyrelated to the need which it is to satisfy"(Mitrany,1943:35), and the new institutionswould be "functionallyefficient"because theymatched a pregiven collectiveinterestto demands for how to best obtain them in the interdependent, environmentalcontext.The functionalapproach was hopeful rather than "debilitating"in this regard, because "the separation of functionalneeds into specifictasksand theirreassignmentto new structureswillitselfpresumably ease the strain wroughtby the present disparity"between "functionalassignmentsand 'outgrownadministrative divisionsand instruments"'(Sewell, 1966:33). According to functionalism,then, institutionsand social practices are ultimatelyselected by the environmenton the basis of their abilityto effectively obtain pre-givencollectiveinterests.Functionalismis, at its heart, a storyabout institutionalevolutionaryadaptation in which common interests,needs, or purposes are the motivationfor institutionalcreation,but the institutionalparticulars are determinedby environmentalcircumstances.Thus a functionalaccount of the historicaldevelopmentof institutionsnecessarilyinvolvesan evaluationof institutionsaccording to theirefficiencyat obtaininga giveninterestin the given circumstances,a point March and Olsen's schematic of institutionalhistories underscores(1998:957). Because, as Wendt notes, collectivesocial practices"cannot change identities and interestsifthe latterare takenas given"(1992:393), a functionalexplanation for social change does not involvea storyof interestformation.What functionalism is concerned withinstead is institutionalpreference formation.Interests,such See, for example, Mitrany'sintroductionito his 4th editioni(1946:9). It remainisuniclearin thisliteraturewhetheriniterdepenidenice was a nlew pheniomenioni or had alwaysexisted and human beinigswere onilyjust becominigcogniizanit of it. Reiinschprovides a typicalexample in arguinig that withother civilizedniationsof the world"meant recogniizingthat"thereis a broader "recogniizinig initerdepenidenice activitiessurrounidinig niationial life in which it mustparticilife; there are broader interestsanid more far-reachinig pate in order to develop to the full its own niatureanidsatisfycompletelyits maniynieeds"(1911:8, 4). Other early discussionisof initerdepenidenice inicludeRappard (1927:818) anid Bailey, who argued that "the moder%n state is brought initoconitactwith other states in almost everyaspect of its niationial existenlce," anid that "the stranldsof moderniiniterniationial of the governimenit relationisspread to everyniookanidcranniiy machinie"(1930:273). 1 would like to thanikJoeGrieco for callinigmyattenitioni to the Bailey article. 16 Accordinigto Mitrainy, was "hamstriinginlg the "fidelityto outgrowniadminiistrative divisionisanidinistrumenits" nlew goals" which "clamors for theirbeiniglinikedtogetherin the most suitable practicalway" (1945:10), anid that to while "we are favoredby the nieedanid habit of materialcooperationi,we are hampered by the genieralcliniginig political segregationi"(1948:351). 17 Henice the fuLnctionial approach could move global affairs"beyonidthe niationi-state" (Haas, 1964), because "conitenit anidworkinig... could be modifiedby ... inlconlspicuous anidpartialtranisfers of authorityto sovereignity's initerniationial fuLnctionial in time brilngs organis"(Mitrainy, 1943:29), anid "the accumulationiof such partial tranisfers about a tranislationi of the true seat of authority"(Mitrainy, 1946:9). 14

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as the maximizationof economic wealth or retention of political office,are frompreferencesas the particularpolicies and practicesan actor differentiated mightadopt in pursuitof those interests.18 One mightargue thatfunctionalism is interestedin the "social construction"of preferenceswithina given set of collectiveinterestsand contextualcircumstances,yetclearlyfunctionalismis not "social constructivism" as the latterhas been described by itsproponents.It does not recognize "the fact that the specific identitiesof specific statesshape their perceived interestsand, thereby,patternsof internationaloutcomes" (Ruggie, 1998:14), "that throughinteraction,states mightformcollective identitiesand interests"(Wendt,1994:384), or that"interestsare notjust 'out there' waitingto be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction"(Finnemore, 1996:2).19In fact,the relationshipbetweensocial practices,identity,and interests is inverted.The functionalcreation and innovationof institutionsdepends on the extentto which a set of pre-giveninterestsare obtained, and identityis not an antecedent to interestsbut is itselfa result of functionalinstitutionalefficiencyrelated to interestand environment.Individualswant to obtain the pregiven interestsmore than their identitiesare shaped by the social practices in which theyhave been engaged. Thus functionalismassumes that new identities will be supplied (or "sociallyconstructed")as circumstanceswarrant. Small wonder,then,thatfunctionalismassumed a relativeease in the ability"to breed a new conscience" in "non-political"tasksonce the functionalwayrevealed thatit"wouldpromisesomethingforthe purseof necessity"(Mitrany,1943:40,29). had spawneda neo-functionalist Bytheearly1960sfunctionalism variantwhichrecin definingan interestas "non-political,"as well as the neognized the difficulties cessityforpersuading"politicalactorsin severaldistinctnationalsettings. .. to shift theirloyalties,expectations,and politicalactivitiestowarda newand largercenter" (Haas, 1961:366-67). Yet even with its greater sensitivityto these issues, neofunctionalismcontinued to assume thatonce the cooperativeregional effortbegan to reap greaterbenefits,loyaltyto the regional institutionswould gradually develop (Lindberg,1963:6; see also Haas, 1958:16).20 The continued reliance on and identity led neo-functionalists functional assumptions aboutinterests, institutions, to overestimatethedegree to whichelite identitiesand loyaltiescould be changed bystrategicinteraction.It assumed thatthe desire to maximizetheirassigned interestwas whatmotivatedelites,and so the transferenceof loyaltyand identificationin neo-functionaltheorywas liketheloyaltya consumermightgiveto thestore withthe mostcompetitiverateson its charge card.2' 18 "Initerests are the stable founidationi oniwhichactors' Milimer providesanlexample of thiscommonidistiniction: are preferenices over policyshiftas theirsituationianid the policy areniavary.Preferenicesare a variable; initerests niot"(1997:15, fin.4). Kratochwilanid Ruggie poinitouLtthat this separationiis basic to what they refer to as which presumes"thatit is alwayspossible to separate goals (presumablyexpressed in priniciples "inistrumenitalism," anid niorms)frommeans (presumablyexpressed in rules anid procedures),anid to order them in a superordiniatesubordiniaterelationiship" (Ruggie, 1998:99). 19 Or, as Kratochwilanid Ruggie put it, "social inistitutionis, before theydo aniythinig else-for example, act as rule-likepractices ... that make routiniesocial initeractioni possible by makinlgit mutually in-junictionis-express 1999, Kratochwil,1982, anidKubalkova,Olluf, comprehenisible" (Ruggie, 1998:91; see also Adler, 1997, Hoffmannii, anid Kowert,1998). 20 As Haas put it, initegrationi was to be "coniceivedniotas a coniditioni but as a process" which "relies oni the in the process" so that"initerest will be redefiniedin termsof . .. by the actors participatinig perceptioniof initerests would (Haas, 1958). Loyalty-shiftinig anid initerest-redefiniitioni regionialratherthania purelyniationial orienitationi" occur firstamonigniationial eliteswho would finidthemselves"sucked in" to cooperativeeffortsanid"would tranisfer in returnifor the authoritiestowardsthe CommuLniity inistitutionis theirsupport anid loyaltiesaway fromniationial of vital interests"(Webb, 1983:17-18). satisfactioni 21 Or as Webb put it, neo-functionalism of claims aniddemanidsin return conitiniued to assume that"the stakinig the authorityof the systemas a whole," anidit "regarded thispatterni forexchanigesof politicalloyaltiesreiniforced of politicalactivityas directlytransferableto an internationalsetting"(1983:17). It neverstrayedfarfromMitrany's originalassumptionthat"each of us . . . is in effecta collectivityof functionalloyalties;so thatto build up a world community... is merelyto extend and consolidate it also as between national sections and groups" (1959:647).

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Because functionalisttheorizingcontinued to engage in whatSewell noted was "soft-pedaling thehumanaspectsinvolved"withsocialchange(1966:38),itwashardly surprisingthatneo-functionalism failed to accuratelydescribe or predictthe process of cooperationin Europe.22Not onlydid it become the subjectofwidespread criticism,itsown proponentseventuallysuggestedthatthe pursuitof other theoreticalapproaches mightbe morefruitful (Haas, 1975, 1976). 3 And one of thebest knownrevisionsof neo-functionalism was whatlaterbecame knownas neoliberal institutionalism, whichincluded the studyof internationalregimesas well as the condition of interdependenceupon which regimecausalitywas explicitlypremised.24Althoughinterdependencehad alreadyplayeda role in earlyfunctionalist theorizing,it did not attaintheoreticalprominenceuntilafterneo-functionalism had run into troubleand its firstmanifestations were the studyof "transnational relations"(Keohane and Nye,1971).25Keohane and Nyelateradopted theterm"complex interdependence" and specifically acknowledged their "debt" to neofunctionalism (1989),26as did Keohane (1984:7-9,66-67),whohelpedadd hegemonic decline to the rosterof pertinentenvironmentalcircumstances. What markedneoliberal institutionalism as a theoreticalancestor to Mitrany's functionalismwas its reliance on that same functionalinstitutionallogic. Neoliberalinstitutionalism assumed thatwhile the major industrialsshared a number of common interests,chief among them was the capitalistpursuitof profitand thereforethe motivationto adopt whatevermethodswould mostefficiently maximize it (Keohane, 1984:79, 209).27Hence neoliberal institutionalism assumed,as withother functionalvariantsbefore it, that institutionalinnovationwas based on abilityto effectively obtain given collectiveinterestsin given environmental circumstances,and thatas circumstanceschanged, so too would institutions. was different, Neoliberalinstitutionalism however,in itsattemptto hold notonly issues as well. Constructivists have interestsconstantbut identitytransformation tended to harp on the theory'sassumptionof exogenous interestsas its primary weakness.28Wendthas even asserted thatthe "nascentsociologyof international community"in neo-functionalthoughtwas somehow"lostin the economics of internationalcooperation developed by realistsand rationalists"(1994:394). This is simplya misrepresentation of the historicaltheoreticalrecord. While it was true thatpriorfunctionaltheorizingwas not as careful(or self-conscious)about making its assumptionsexplicit(and oftenadded to the confusionby referringto the redefinitionofinterestsratherthanpreferences), exogenousinterestshad clearlybeen presentin liberal functionaltheorizingall along. And while neoliberal institutionalists were certainlymore overt in theirsubscriptionto thisassumption,thiswas only because theybelieved theycould tap into a potentialadvantage of exogenous interestsoverlooked by prior functionalists. If interestswere held constantand identitya functionof interests,then 22 Even a cursoryglance at the studyof identityin psychologyuinderscoreshow "soft-pedaled"it was, and reviewsof this literaturemay be fouLndin Bloom, 1990; Druckman, 1994; and Mercer, 1995. 23JeppeTranholm-Mikkelsen providesa good reviewof the criticisms,revisions,and eventualabandonment of ieo-funictionalism (1991; see also HIaggard,1991:427-29, and revisionsin Carlsnaes, 1992, anid Corbey, 1995). 24 Thus I have included under the neoliberal institutionial rubricstandard regimeworks(Krasner,1983; Keohane, 1984) and interdependence workssuch as those by Keohane and Nye (1977); RosenaLl (1976); -lanrieder (1978); and Rosecrance (1986). 25 Transnationalrelationswe-ceargued to have grownsince the nineteenthcenitury, thuscreatinga new context in which "cooperativeaction is likelyto create new internationalinstitutionsto cope withincreasinginterdependence" (1971: 375, 395). 26 Keohane and Nye expressed their belief that "manyof the insightsfromintegrationtheorycould be transeconomic interdependence"(1989:247-48), and in ferredto the growingand broader dimensionsof initernational thisendeavor theywere encouraged by HIaas himself,who suLggCsted that neo-functionalismbe "both included in and subordinated to the studyof changing patternsof interdependence"(1975:86). 27 See, for example, Keohane, 1984:24, 27; Keohanie and Nye, 1977:40; and Rosecrance, 1986. 28 Wendt (1992:393; 1994:384); Ruggic (1998:ch. 1); Hlasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger(1997:ch. 5).

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Paradigmsor Birds of a Feather? Competing

logicallyone could treatidentityas constantas well.29This avoided the "nascent who, despite theirgreaterattention sociology"ascribed to by neo-functionalists to identitytransformation issues, had never reallyconsidered the complexities involved.The adoption of exogenous interestswas thus believed to be a real improvementat the timesince, as Keohane noted, it avoided the impressionthat (1984:67). the theorist"must'smugglein' idealisticassumptionsabout motivations" could also reject neoBy holding identityconstant,neoliberal institutionalism functionalteleologywhichhad envisioneda particularinstitutionalend-pointfor the functionalprocess.30When, in the mid-1960s,the European nation-state reasserteditselfagain in the formof Charles de Gaulle, it was that teleological tendencythatproved so visiblydamaging to neo-functionaltheorizing. Neoliberal institutionalism attemptedto salvage the logic of functionalinstifromthe teleologicalorientationsof itsimmediateancestorby tutionalefficiency positingthatenvironmentalcircumstanceswere constantlyevolving.This meant that more diffuseinstitutionalpatternsand collectivesocial practices could be explained withthe same functionallogic. And the beautyof it was thatit allowed liberal scholarsto workwithinthe nation-stateparadigm ratherthan opposed to it, thusside-steppingthe issue of the nation-state'scontinuedviabilitywhichhad posed such a problem for neo-functionalism.In this neoliberal institutionalism was rejecting the original "functionalistconception of 'state' as a static and uncreativeentity"(Sewell, 1966:34), and arguinginstead thatstateelites could be partnersin a process that would not, at least in the short term,displace the nation-statebut ratherassistit in meetingits own interests.31 Thus the nation-statewas still the primarybarrier to effectively obtaining collectiveinterestsin new environmentalconditions,but neoliberal institutionalism now posited thatits inhibitingeffectswere feltonly at the level of strategic of the strategiesthey perceptions.Elites failed to recognize the ineffectiveness employed, because their strategicjudgment was clouded by an unquestioned reliance on unilateralismheld over fromthe days when the nation-statecould obtain its interestsautonomously.32The offendingperceptionswere treated as by-productsof behavior,rather than of identityor interest.And as with functionalism,neoliberal institutionalismderived a hopeful prescriptionfrom its analysis of these dysfunctionsbased on the nature of interdependence itself, which it argued would promote a process of simple learning among state elites instead.This was an interestingtwist about the greaterefficacyof multilateralism on functionallogic, but ultimatelya theoreticallyuntenable one since neoliberal institutionalismretained functionalism'santi-statistorientations(a point also observedby Little[1996:82]). Thus it continued to assume thatthe desire on the part of state elites to obtain a given collective interestcould be causally privileged over the domestic social practices and institutionsin which elites were already involved,which give their activityits meaning in the firstplace, and which,as Ruggie puts it, "specifywhatcountsas that activity"(1998:22). 29 This was also implied by the distinctionbetween "simple" and "complex" learning which ineoliberalsfrequentlyutilized. See, for example, Nye, 1987:380; Keohane and Nye, 1989:34-36, 232-34, 240-41; and Keohane, 1984:97-101; see also Hlasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger,1997:146;Jonsson, 1993:218; and Levy,1994. 30 1991:8-9. Keohane and Nye, 1989:248; Keohane, 1983:149, fn. 22; and Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 31 In this it may actually have been closer to Mitrany'soriginal formulationthan neo-functionalism.Each functionalsectorwas to be organized "according to its nature,to the conditionsunder whichit has to operate, and to the needs of the moment" (Mitrany,1943:34), anid as a result the institutionswere supposed to be "flexible emanations of the need in question, integrallyand uniquely related to the statusof thatnieedover time" (Sewell, 1966:10; see also p. 68). Thus Mitranyentertainedthe idea thatsome interestsmightindeed be best obtained via local and national functionalorganizations,while others could prove to demand regional, intra-regional,anld global organization. 32 See Keohane and Nye, 1971:371, 375, 1989:161; and Rosecrance, 1986:22-24. As Keohane and Nye put it, the "illusion"of "totalconitrol"reproduced "well-entrenchedpatternsof governmentalbehavior"whichwould "have to be discarded" (1989:232; see also Keohane, 1984:115, 258-59; and Rosecrance, 1986:190).

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Functional Institutional Efficiency in Constructivist Arguments

could not appear to be more differenttheoretically, Given that constructivism how is it possible to assert that the same functionallogic that binds neoliberal theoto prior functionaltheorizingis present in constructivist institutionalism recognize that the two are inherentlyincomrizingas well? Most constructivists patible and are thereforecarefulto distance theiraccounts fromfunctionalism. Ruggie argues,forexample, thatin an effortto examine more diffusepatternsof ratherthan the expectationallylimitingoutcome of "inte"institutionalization," gration,"he 'jettisoned the neofunctionalistexpectation that political community among states necessarilyimplied organization abovestates,as well as the assumption that functionalcontexts possess inherent logics which affectthat outcome" (1998:42). Similarly,Finnemore and Sikkinkargue thatconstructivists can avoid being labeled functionalistswhen they reject "argumentsabout the intrinsiccharacteristicsof the issue" and emphasize institutionalcontradictions "as a barrierto any sortof teleological argumentabout theireffects"(1998:908). Yet these caveats reflect a basic misunderstandingover what constitutesa neo-functionalargumentand what makes an argumentnecessarilyfunctionalin demonstrates,it is quite possible to the firstplace. As neoliberal institutionalism logic fromteleologyif one assumes thatenviseparate a functional-institutional ronmentalcircumstancesare evolvingas well.33It is the coupling of pre-given collectiveinterestswithexternalcircumstancesthat distinguishesa functionalist account of institutionalinnovationand change, because the combination leads almost inevitablyto an argument that the functionof institutionsand social achieve particulargoals fora collectivewithinthe larger practicesis to efficiently context. Any argumentthat adopts this basic formula,even if careful to avoid pre-specifiedinstitutionalend-points,is going to produce a storyabout institutional selection based on "functionalinstitutionalefficiency."It is going to end up positing, as March and Olsen observe, that the "rules, norms, identities, organizationalforms,and institutionsthat exist are the inexorable products of an efficienthistory,"and that "survivinginstitutionsare seen as uniquely fit to the environment,thus predictable from that environment"(1998:958). And in this regard March and Olsen are certainlycorrect to use the label "functional arguments(1998:958).34 to characterizeconstructivist institutionalism" accounts thatwillbe reviewedhere This is because in each of the constructivist some sortof collectiveinterestis assumed as pre-givenand hence exogenous to social interaction.Alternativetermsare utilized to describe the pre-givencollective interest,and theyalso take a varietyof forms.Accordingto Wendt,forexample, "corporateneeds" or "appetites"include traditionalconcernswith"physicalsecurity"and "aspirationsfora betterlife,"as wellas with"stablesocial identities,"and "recognitionas an actor byothers"(1994:389, 385). In some of Ruggie's workthe interest is described as a "social purpose" or "task" and it involves "international

production"or "freetrade"(1998:64,48, 66). But elsewhereitis a "problem"or need to "deal withthose dimensionsof collectiveexistence that[are] irreduciblytranin character"such as "genericformsof international'collectiveaction sterritorial Finnemorerefersto "duty" problems"'(1998:118-19,189,190-91,266).Alternatively, "to or "obligation,"and her pre-givencollectiveinterestinvolvesthe need simrply be appropriate"to the social practicesin whichothersare engaged (1996:29; see also Finnemoreand Sikkink,1998:901-3). explanation has sometimesbeen thoughtto be a kind of teleological explana33 As Scruton notes, "functionial tion, but this seems wrong,"because a teleological explanation is "any explanation of some event or process in termsof its end rather-than its origins" while "a function is not a condition which necessarilypostdates the occurrence of what it explains" (1982:459; see also Nagel, 1961). 34 Along similarlines, Zacher and Matthew'sreviewof the strandsof liberal IR theoryincludes constructivism as an example of "institutionalliberalism,"along withMitranyand lIaas (Zacher and Matthew,1995:133-37).

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Competing Paradigmsor Birds of a Feather?

Yet despite the differencein terminology, and at least in some cases the untraditionalcontentof thesecollectiveinterests,in each account theylie outsideor beyond social interactionto change. They are then coupled withan examinationof shifting environmentalcircumstancesand withintheanalysisserveas themeans by whichactorscan recognizeabsent interests(and dysfunctions) thatare not being effectively obtainedwithexistingsocial practicesand institutions. It is because these collectiveinterestsare exogenous thatactorswillinglyaccept innovationin their social practicesand institutions. And in each case the typeofstoryproduced about thoseinnovationsinvolveshowinstitutional preferences, butnotinterests, havebeen sociallyconstructed.In other words,each of the constructivist examples scrutinized here adopts the same explanatoryformulathatcan be found in functionalism,neo-functionalism, and neoliberal institutionalism. Wendt's "pre-theory"of collective identityformationand the international state is a case in point (1994). His corporate appetites "provide motivational energyforengagingin action at all and, to thatextent,are priorto interaction,but in rnmsense, which is an inherentlysocial phetheydo not entail self-interest nomenon" (1994:385; myemphasis).3 When he does laterreferto "self-interest," what he reallymeans are institutionalpreferences(and the identitiesassociated with them) for "how a state satisfiesits corporate interests,"which, he argues, "depends on how it defines the self in relation to the other,which is a function of social identities"(1994:385; myemphasis). When Wendt then turnsto the possible formationof collectiveidentities,the desire to obtain pre-givencorporate interestsis the reason why actors accept change in theirexistingidentities,whileenvironmentalcircumstancesdetermine the extent to which and in what way identityinnovationwill evolve. Given his frankenthusiasmfor prior integrationtheory,it should come as littlesurprise that "risinginterdependence"is the firstof two systemicprocesses with "direct causal impacts":36 As theabilitytomeetcorporate needsunilaterallydeclines,so does theincentive tohang ontotheegoistic thatgeneratesuch politics,and as the degree of common identities fateincreases,so does the incentiveto identifywithothers.As interdependence rises, in other words, so will the potential for endogenous transformations of identity.(1994:389; myemphasis)

Similarlythe "transnationalconvergence of domestic values," by which Wendt means capitalismand democracy,increases the likelihood thatcollectiveidentities and institutionsmightbe formed,because, "as heterogeneitydecreases, so does therationaleforidentitiesthatassume thattheyare fundamentallydifferent from us" (1994:390; my emphasis). In both instances Wendt adopts the same assumptions about institutionsand identities that functionalism and neofunctionalismhad relied upon as well. Identityis a functionof whicheverinstitutionand set of social practicesbest obtains a set of exogenous interestsin the givensystemiccircumstances.37 Given the structureof thisargument,it is impos31 -is own distinctionin another context, that "social life is 'ideas all the waydown' (until you get to biology and natural resources),"suggeststhat corporate interestsmightbe biological ratherthan social (Wendt, 1995:74). 36 As forothercauses, structural contexts"merelyinhibitor facilitate,"and it is onlyafterthe necessarysystemic processes have had their effectsoni corporate needs that strategicinteractionthen acts as a "sufficientcaulse" (Wendt, 1994:389-90). 37 Wendt's treatmentof the initernationial state is just as fascinatingsince he replicates (almiiostverbatim) Mitrany'soriginal formulationof functionalism.Because, as Mitranyhad put it earlier,"we cannot have a world formationi is an governmentbeforewe build a worldcommunity"(1948:84), Wendtargues that"collectiveidenitity essentialaspect of ... a process"involvingthe "structuraltransformation of theWestphalianstatessystem"(1994:392). Creationiof an internationalstate requires an "identificationwith respect to some state function"so that "state actorswould regardit as normal or routinethatcertainproblemswill be handled onian internationalbasis,"which would "relocate individualstate actors' de factosovereigntyto transnationalauthorities"(1994:392-93).

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sible to avoid the conclusion that in attemptingto "build a bridge" between integrationtheoryand constructivism (1994:385), Wendt has simplyrediscovered in the process. functionalismand abandoned constructivism In severalinstancesRuggie also adopts pre-giveninterestsforthe sake of analysis and, because he thenmatchesthemto shiftingenvironmentalcircumstancesin orderto explainsocial change,hisconclusionsultimately depend on thesame functional institutionallogic. His claims regarding"embedded liberalism,"forexamassumptionthat"as long as ple, are premisedon the decidedlynon-constructivist purpose is held constant,thereis no reason to suppose thatthe normativestructureof regimesmustchange as well" (1998:65). The "legitimatesocial purpose" to whichhe refersis "freetrade"(1998:65-66),whichimpliesthemaximizationofcapitalistprofitas an ongoing collectiveinterest.From thisRuggie produces a story about howprofithas been pursued, thatis, he documentshow institutionalpreferences evolvedgiventhe pre-givencollectiveinterestand shiftingenvironmental circumstances.Ruggie's conclusions that"in most cases the new instrumentsare not inimicalto the normsof the regimesbut representadaptationsto new circumstances"are hardlyunexpected in thisregard (1998:83).38 ElsewhereRuggie speaks in termsof "problems"ratherthan "social purposes," which is, of course, highlyreminiscentof Mitrany'sown language derived from at Millennium's orientations."Territoriality functionalism'sinherentlyanti-statist End" tracesout the originsof "territorialrule" as the "chiefcharacteristicof the modern system"(1998:180). When turningto the subject of its transformation, Ruggie connects the subject to the issue of problem-solving:"havingestablished fixed stateformations.. . whatmeans were leftto the new territorial territorially rulers for dealing with problems of that society that could not be reduced to territorialsolution?"(1998:189). He refersto these problemslater as "the 'social and defines them defects' thatinhere in the modern constructof territoriality," "as genericformsof international'collectiveaction problems"' (1998:195, 266). A number of examples are provided and discussed more extensivelyin "Multilateralism at Century'sEnd" (1998:114), and must representexogenous collective interestsbecause Ruggie's premise is that nation-statesproved unable to effectivelyobtain them as circumstanceschanged and so more appropriate institutions were supplied. On thissame basis Ruggie goes on to argue that the "explorationof contemand "the place wherein any rearticulation poraryinternationaltransformation" of internationalpolitical space would be occurringtoday"is in the "negation of the exclusive territorialform"and in "the terrainof unbundled territoriality" (1998:195). He has in mind a particularset of institutionsthatreflectthisunbundling,including"regimes,common markets,politicalcommunitiesand the like," whichwere developed to resolvecollectiveproblemsand hence obtain collective intereststhe nation-statecould not: In sum, nonterritorialfunctionalspace is the place in which territorialrulers situateand deal withthose dimensionsof collectiveexistencethattheyrecognize in character.It is here thatinternationalsociety to be irreduciblytransterritorial is anchored, and in which its patternsof evolutionmay be traced. (1998:191) 38 The functionallogic is most obvious in Ruggie's discussion of the "collectiveresponse" to the demise of withthe expectationsof original regime design BrettonWoods which,he argues, "reflectsan even greateraffinity than did the arrangementsthat held in the interval"(1998:84). In other words,nation-statesdeveloped a floating exchange rate systembecause it was actuallymore efficientin post-hegemoniccircumstancesthan was the original BrettonWoods system(1998:81). 39 The examples include use of common spaces such as oceans and waterways, the maintenance of communication lines, and the maximizationof profit.He argues, for example, that "withthe intensificationof trade,"the defined communicationlinksled to "costsin profitslost, opportunitiesforegone,and adminoriginal territorially istrativeresources expended," and produced a situationin which "the incentivesare high for states to organize theirrelationson the basis of generalized principlesof conduct" (1998:114-15).

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Competing Paradigmsor Birds of a Feather?

In other words,the nation-state'sinabilityto meet a set of nonterritorialcollectiveinterestsin shiftingcircumstancescontinuesto manifestitselfas dysfunctions which then generate a demand for new institutionalarrangements.In thisway the nation-statemightbe "unbundled" (or as [neo-] functionalistswould have phrased it, "transcended")because it remains inherentlyincapable of obtaining these interests.This may be a legitimateconclusion to reach if one is using a functionallogic, but it is certainlynot constructivismas Ruggie himself has described it. A functionallogic can also be found in Finnemore who posits that actors internalizenew social practices "not out of conscious choice, but because they understandthese behaviorsto be appropriate"(1996:29). It is "a new understanding of necessaryand appropriatestatebehavior"thatis "the drivingforcebehind adoption of .. . innovation"(1996:65). Ultimatelynation-stateswant to be like a point Finnemoreand Sikkinkunderscorewhen theyutilize other nation-states, the term "peer pressure"as a coveringexplanation for the acceptance of new norms (1998:903). Because the nation-state'sidentityis shaped "by the culturalinstitutionalcontext withinwhich states act," they argue that all nation-states share a collectivedesire to be appropriateto thatcontext(1998:902). And because the pre-givencollective interestis the need to institutionally conform to what other nation-statesbelieve to be important,the shiftingcircumstanceswhichwill demand institutionalinnovation to obtain this interestnecessarilyinvolve the extentto which"enoughcriticalstatesendorse the new norm"(1998:902).Whether or not the nation-statewillactuallyinternalizethe new norm also depends upon ongoing interactionacross nation-stateswhich encourages "iterated behavior and habit" (1998:905). Such an argument clearly depends upon a logic of functionalinstitutional efficiency.The pre-givencollectiveinterestin "being appropriate"ensures that institutionalinnovation across nation-stateswill be virtuallyautomatic as the definitionof what constitutes"being appropriate" changes. That is, the new social practices will be adopted because those practices are more efficientat obtainingthisexogenous collectiveinterestin the new circumstances.The entire argumentrestsupon basic functionalassumptionsthat "man's behavior is best understoodas the overtmanifestationof a configurationof internalizednorms," that "man's obedience to [the state] restsupon a foundationof habit,"and that the "transplantation of man's obedience (w)as a matterof planned re-habituation" to new norms (Sewell, 1966:48-49). In producing functionalistarguments,the most basic tenetsof constructivism is about identityand are violated. Despite repeated assertionsthatconstructivism interestformation,none of the constructivistexamples scrutinized here are actuallyabout interestformation.In each case an exogenous interestis posited and whatfollowsis a storyabout the social constructionof institutionalpreferences derivedfroma functional-institutional logic. This necessarilyleads constructivist accounts onto the same post hoc explanatoryand predictivetrackas functionalism.40Institutionsand social practices exist because they fulfilla particular collectiveneed, ergo those that exist must fulfillthe need or will be changed accordingly.For such a formula to work, the institutionsand practices that already exist and that do not fulfilla transnationalcollective need must be treatedas if theyhad less causal weight.Institutionalinnovationoccurs because actorswantto obtain the pre-givencollectiveinterestsmore than theiridentities, interests,or preferencesare shaped and constrainedby the nonsystemiccollectivesocial practicesin which theyhave been engaged. 40 That is, a functionalexplanation"enfoldseverything in a vaguLeformula:need, ftunctional response,modified need, functionally modifiedresponse.We see an agencyand assume, in posthocfashion,a prioror concurrentneed; we sense a need and presume an agency or a structuralextension will be along shortly"(Sewell, 1966:249-50).

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The resultis that domestic social practicesand institutionsare either bracketed in constructivist arguments,or theyare pertinentonlyin the initialstage of institutionalpreferenceinnovation.41This bracketingis, as Checkel observes, "odd, since it is the constructivists, with their attentionto practice and interaction, who should be keyingupon process and mechanisms" (1998:332). It becomes less odd, however,in lightof the functionalratherthan constructivist logic upon which these constructivist argumentsrely.It is because the nationstate and its associated institutionsremain the antithesisof the collective that domestic institutionsmust be treated as less causal if the pre-givencollective interestsare to be obtained, the appropriateinstitutions prevail,and social transformationoccur. It is no accident that theories of functionalinstitutionalefficiencyhave routinelybeen advisedto paygreaterattentionto domesticvariables,42 and that afterexaminingseveral constructivist arguments,Checkel has to offer constructivism similaradvice (1998). Yet the problem of inclusion is an intractable one. Any theory that begins with an inherent bias against the potential and social practicescannot theninclude causalityof domesticpoliticalinstitutions theircausalityin any neutralfashion thereafter. There is in addition the violation of constructivist tenetsabout identityitself in each of the constructivist accounts of social change examined here. Far from being created and instantiatedthrougha process of social interaction,identity followsfrom the combination of exogenous interestand circumstancesand so remains a component of the social constructionof institutionalpreferences. Thus the same (neo-)functionalperspectiveon identitytransformation is replicated. While identitymayindeed serve as an initialbarrierto the recognitionof more efficaciousinstitutions, the causal prioritizationof interestsmeans thatthe transferenceof identitiesand loyaltiesto those alternativeinstitutionsis (despite protestationsto the contraryin the literature)theoreticallyoverdetermined. Because functionalism, neo-functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and now constructivism all adopt the same liberal functional-institutional logic, each produces a similarstoryabout how institutionalpreferencesevolve over time.They also reach relativelysimilarconclusions about which institutionswill be created. All of them argue that in currentsystemicconditions,multilateralismis functionallymore efficientin obtaining collective intereststhan is unilateralism. While functionalismhad been relativelymore sanguine about this process, the other three recognize that the primarystumblingblock to internationalcooperation lies in the realm of cognitionand perception.Thus each posits that the reason cooperation has not been automatic,despite its obvious efficienciesto the practitionersof each of these theories,is because the pertinentstate actors have failed to perceive the new systemicconditions in which theyoperate and cooperation's greaterefficiencyin its context. As a result,all three theoriesposit thatchanging perceptionsand beliefswill make cooperation more likelyand thatinteractionis partof the formulathatwill do so. For neo-functionalismthe cognitiveproblem is existingelite loyaltiesto national institutionswhich can be overcome or shiftedif regional cooperation the problem is that the begins to reap benefits.For neoliberal institutionalism, strategicjudgment of elites is clouded by an unquestioned reliance on unilateralism, but greater contact and informationalexchanges have the capacity to 41 Bracketing occnLrs in Wendt, 1994:388, and Fininemore,1996:3, 65-66, while initial stage nLseoccnLrs in Ruggie, 1998:72, 126-27, and Finnemore and Sikkiink,1998:896-99. Fiinnemoreand Sikkinkeven go so far as to argnLethat"a government'sdomesticbasis forlegitimationand consent and thnLsits abilityto stayin power"derives legitimate,thus implyingthatdomesticgovernancestructureshave nlo froma domesticdesire to be internationally independent cauLsalweightof theirown, absent theirrelation to collectivesystemicinterests(1998:903). 42 Sometimes even by theirown practitioners, for example, Keohane and Nye (1989:260; see also HIoffmann, 1996:371-72; and cites by HIopf[1998:194, fn. 78]). 1995:239; HIaggardand Simmons, 1987:513-14; GouLrevitch,

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reveal multilateralism'sgreater efficiency.43 For constructivismthe problem is existingnational identities,and the solution is not only the greaterefficacyof collective identitiesbut also successiveacts of cooperation and engagement in discursiverhetoricwhich equate national-selfand collective-selfas synonymous (Wendt, 1994:390-91). Because neoliberal institutionalismparts methodological company with the other two in its attemptsto hold identityconstant, its claims appear to be relativelymodest in comparison.It is concerned only withwhatWendt refersto as "behavioralcooperation" (1994:384) and not the developmentof international communityor collective identities.Yet their reliance on the same functionalinstitutionallogic makes constructivismand neoliberal institutionalismmore similarthan not. While theymaydifferin theirambitions,theydo not differin how theyaccount forchange in the internationalsystem,or in the notion thatit is stillpossible to sneak up on and transcendthe nation-statewiththe "functional approach." IdentityTransformationin Neoliberal Institutionalism Their common process-based ontologyis another way in which constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism are similar.Here the focus is not on constructivism per se but on how neoliberal institutionalism explains internationalcooperation.Ruggieand Kratochwil haveobservedthatin regimeanalysisits"epistemology contradictsontology"(Ruggie, 1998:95). Constructivists take this as a point of departure to argue for the re-introductionof interactionand identitytransformation into the theoreticalmix. Yet contraryto both constructivist and neoliberal assertions,a closer examinationof neoliberal institutionalism reveals thatit does not actually exclude the possibilityof collective identitytransformation from its analysis. In fact, it concurs with constructivismthat identitycan be transformedthroughinteractionand that collectiveidentitieswill formaround the norm of cooperation itself.Thus Ruggie and Kratochwilare correctonly to a point because, at some unspecified link in the neoliberal causal chain, the contradictionbetweenepistemologyand ontologyis resolvedin favorof ontology. What is meant by a process-based ontology is the meta-theoreticalcommitment to human interactionas the sole component to social reality.44 All liberal IR theory,whetherit is (neo-)functionalism,constructivism, or neoliberal institutionalism,makes this commitment.The terms "institution,""structure,"and "process"are frequentlyused interchangeablyin the liberal literatureto denote the "particularhuman-constructedarrangement(s)"that "involvepersistentand connected sets of rules (formaland informal)that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity,and shape expectations" (Keohane, 1989:162-63, 1990:175). Processes are the collectivepractices,both formal-material and ideational, that human beings create and practice in order to interactwith one another and achieve particulargoals (Keohane, 1989:10, 1990:175). A process-basedontologyallows for the possibilitythatchanges in the nature of interactioncan also change identity,interests,and hence behavior. It directs the scholar's "attentionto the institutionsand patternsof interactioncreated by human beings that help to shape perceptions and expectation,and therefore alter the patternsof behavior thattake place withina givenstructure"(Keohane, have taken neoliberals to task, 1990:175). It is on this point that constructivists of identitytransformasince exogenous interestsexclude not simplythe necessity Keohane and Nyc, 1977:34-36, 232-34, 240-41; and Keohane, 1984:97-101. This may be compared to the environmentally based ontologyof realismwhich treatsanarchyas a physical realityseparate fromyetaffectingsocial reality(Mearsheimer,1994-95:41; Sterling-Folker, 1997; Frankel,1996:xiii). 43 44

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at least in the short tion in order forcooperation to occur, but also itspossibility, term.As Wendt puts it: Interestsare formed outside the interaction context, and then the latter is treatedas thoughit onlyaffectedbehavior.This can be merelya methodological presumption,but given its pervasivenessin the currentdebate it may also be seen as an implicithypothesisabout world politics:systemicinteractiondoes not transformstate interests.(1994:384; see also Adler, 1997; Ruggie, 1998)

One of constructivism'scontributionsto IR theoretical debates has been to highlightthe inherenttensionbetweena process-basedontologyand the assumption of exogenous interestswhich lie beyond the scope of social interactionto effect. neoliberalinstitutionalism ascribes Yetdespiteitsepistemologicalcommitments, actor'sfreedomof to the same process-basedontologyas well.The self-interested choice is always initiallyembedded in a set of larger social practices,which typicallyinclude capitalist-market economics and the shared norms and institutionsthatare associated withit. Keohane and Nye'sargument,forexample, "that a set of networks,norms, and institutions,once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drasticallyto rearrange"is premised on the assumption thatexistingsocial structuresdo have an impact on individualchoice (1989:55). This impactis also impliedbythe definitionof regimesmostcommonlyemployed in the neoliberal institutionalliterature.Actor expectationsin a given issue-area convergearound principles,norms,rules,and decision-makingprocedureswhich have relevance becausetheyare the social practices in which elites are already engaged when the regime analysis begins (Krasner, 1983).45 Thus neoliberal institutionalism alreadyrecognizeswhatWendtlabels the "fundamentalprinciple of constructivist social theory... thatpeople act towardobjects,includingother actors,on the basis of the meanings thatthe objects have for them"and that"it is collectivemeanings thatconstitutethe structureswhich organize our actions" (1992:396-97). The agency-structure balance does appear to be askew in neoliberal institutionalism,since it initiallyholds embedded practices and their transformative capacitiesconstantin itsargumentwhileprivilegingagencyin the moment.46Yet effectson ultimatelythe theoryallows social interactionto have transformative interestsand identity,because successive acts of cooperation actuallyhave the potential to affectintersubjectivemeanings. The theory only holds interests constantin order to explain whycooperation is initiallychosen. It assumes that state elites are motivatedto cooperate in conditions of interdependence and declining hegemonybecause doing so allows them to maximize capitalistprofit more efficiently than unilateralstrategies.Thus statesare motivatedby the disbehaviorcan resultin undesircoverynot only that"independentself-interested able or suboptimaloutcomes,"but also thatjoint decision-makingdoes produce "the optimal nonequilibriumoutcome" (Stein, 1983:120, 139). States are willing to develop regimesand adjust theirbehavior accordinglybecause theycome to recognize that regimes "can correct institutionaldefectsin world politics" and See also Keohane, 1984:56, 1993:289. As Hasenclever, Mayer,and Rittbergerputt it, "while it appears to be accepted that states are ultimately constitutedby the fundamentalnorms and rtilesof an internationalsociety ... socialization sets states free to engage in rational behavior when it comes to solvingcollectiveaction problems.As lonigas the deep normative structutres of an internationalsociety remain unchanged they will not have any furtherimpact on particular choices" (1997:161). In yetanother theoreticalparallel,criticshave noted thatthissame sequential causal ordering can be observed in constructivist argutments as well (Kowertand Legro, 1996:457, fn. 11, 469; Checkel, 1998:332, 335). 45 46

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"maybecome efficientdevices for the achievementof statepurposes" (Keohane, 1983:154).4 However,in order to explain whycooperation is maintained,which has been the primarysubject of interestto most regime theorists,it actuallystops holding interestsconstantand allows cooperative interactionto affectidentity.Because regimesare themselvessocial institutions,Keohane and Nye argue that "in the long run, one may even see changes in how governmentsdefine their own self-interest in directionsthatconformto the rules of the regimes"(1989:259; see also pp. 54-56). More specifically,"the principlesand normsof regimesmaybe internalizedby importantgroups and thus become part of the belief systems which filterinformation"as well as "alters the way key participantsin the state see cause-and effectrelationships"(1989:266). Along similarlines,Keohane asserts it is a "fact that people adapt their strategiesto reality,"and that "adaptive strategiesof institution-building can also change reality,therebyfosteringmutually beneficialcooperation" (1984:30). In other words,once cooperation is associated withefficientinterestmaximization,the incentiveto continuecooperating is reinforced,and iteratedcooperative acts produce a progressivelyexpanding commitmentto the cooperative effort.This means that long-termparticipation in regimes has the potential to induce more than simple learning involving perceptual changes about strategicbehavior. Iterated acts of cooperation can lead to an internalizedcommitmentto the social practice of cooperation itself. Indeed, this is preciselyKeohane's argument in AfterHegemony (1984). The value of existingregimes lies not in their efficiencybut in the difficultiesof havingobtained some level of multilateralismto begin with.Thus "international regimesembody sunk costs,and we can understandwhytheypersisteven when all memberswould prefersomewhatdifferentmixturesof principles,rules, and institutions" (1984:102; see also pp. 210, 215, and 254).48 As a result,regimescan "make a differenceto actors' beliefs by helping to 'lock in' and to further develop the learning that had prompted their creation" (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger,1997:147-48). Successive acts of cooperation create what both Krasner (1983:361-62) and Jervis(1991-92:51) have called a reinforcing"feedback" loop which is inexplicable if the specified exogenous interestswere actually being held constant. In arguing that elites commit to the practice of cooperation in this way, neoliberal institutionalism straysfromits own attemptto hold identityconstant. Elites were assumed to commit to cooperation on the basis of its ability to efficientlymaximize their utilityfunctionwithina given systemiccontext. At some point in time, however,it appears that continued interaction has the in whatever formit has taken capacityto induce a commitmentto multilateralism and regardless of its efficiency.Economic elites continue to committo the multilateral practicesnot because theybelieve theyare the most efficientmeans for maximizingeconomic interests,but because the practicesare themselvesaffectAn identityand interesttransformation is being ing how elites define efficiency. implicitlyassumed here, and it is occurring as a direct result of interaction among state elites. Thus neoliberal institutionalism activelyimpliesa possibilitythat,according to Wendt,is consistentwitha constructivist explanation for cooperation: Even if not intended as such ... the process bywhichegoistslearn to cooperate is at the same timea process of reconstructingtheirinterestsin termsof shared See also Keohane, 1984:10-11, 49-50; and Bergstenand Henning, 1996:144. Stein also argtiesthat"regimesactuallychange actor preferences,"because actors develop vestedinterestsin themand so "theirveryexistencechanges actors' incentivesand opportunities."As a result,actors "who previously may come to acceptjoint interestsas an imperative"(1983:138-39). agreed to bind themselvesout of self-interest 47 48

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commitmentsto social norms. Over time, this will tend to transforma positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive interdependence of utilitiesor collectiveinterestorganized around the norms in question. (1992:417; see also Hopf, 1998:191)

As a social practice in its own right,cooperation begins to re-shape intersubjecelite identitiesand interestsaccording to tivemeaningsand hence re-constitutes cooperative norms. There is no practical differencebetween neoliberal instituas a result,because in order to explain whycooptionalismand constructivism simplydropsitsinitialcommitment erationis maintained,neoliberalinstitutionalism to exogenous interestsand identityin favorof its ontology. While one could quarrel with the way in which neoliberal institutionalism relationship,the theorycannot be chronologicallyarranges the agent-structure to agents. faultedforignoringthe preconditioningrelevanceof social institutions critiqueof neoliberal institutionalism, It is for thisreason that the constructivist as well as its insistence that it offersa fundamentallydifferentperspectiveon internationalaffairs,misses the mark.Because theyshare a process-basedontolthatsocial ultimatelyconcurs withconstructivism ogy,neoliberal institutionalism identitiesand interests.The theorycan, of practicehas the capacityto transform course, be faulted for having muddied its own methodological watersand for constantwhen clearlyit does not. But choosclaiming thatit holds self-interests amounts to explainand constructivism ing between neoliberal institutionalism behavioral cooperation in the moment or its developmentinto ing short-term, in the future.The choice communal cooperation and systemictransformation depends not on paradigmaticdifferences,but upon the theorist'sown ambitions in delineating the time-frameof the cooperative phenomenon under scrutiny. WhyHave Birds of a Feather Flocked Togetherand WhyDoes It Matter? If constructivismand neoliberal institutionalismdo not offercompeting paradigmatic choices, why has constructivismbecome the "third debate" on the research agenda of American 10 theorists?Althoughsuch a question should be subject to more systematicscrutiny,here I can only offerad hoc, subjective observationsinformedbyworkon prior"greatdebates" in the field.49One of the obvious patternsin these prior debates is the extentto which the rise and fallof As Kahler observes,"some theorieshave theoreticalalternativesis events-driven. been buried and othersprivileged,not by carefultestsinternalto the discipline but by apparent anomalies thrownup by recent history"(1997:42; see also Waever, 1998:691). This patterntends to give the field what Kahler calls "a peculiar volatile quality" (1997:42) or what Rochesterobservesis a "faddish"appearance in its "lurch fromone research agenda to another in response to the ebb and flowof currentevents"(1986:803). And in thiscontext,the end of the Cold War, as Waever puts it succinctly,"reads time to leave neorealism" (1998:691-92). Yet while empiricaleventsmay have provided a necessaryor permissiveopening for the development of alternativetheories,it does not explain why it is constructivismthat has been the post-Cold War's chief beneficiaryof the IR theoreticaltendencyto lurch withinternationalaffairs.Why not an alternative informedbybiopolitics,as Somit and Peterson have called for(1999), or a world systemhistoryapproach as described by Denemark (1999)? Whywas it constructivism,which at least as its practitionershave tended to use it amounts to yet another variantof liberal functionalIR theory,that filled the theoreticalvoid? One possibilityis thatit was a matterof chance and thatthe tendencyto relyon 4 For example, those of Kahler (1997); Hoffmann(1995); Jervis(1998); Schmidt (1998); Alker and Biersteker(1995); Rochester(1986); Strange (1983); and Waever (1998).

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is accidental. It seems functionallogic in order to operationalize constructivism almost inevitablethat postmoderninsightsdeveloped earlier in the humanities would eventuallyfind theirway into IR theorizingproper, and the end of the Cold War served as the triggeringevent in that regard. But applyingpostmodernismis trickybusiness,since it demands thata daunting theoreticalbalance be struckbetween agent and structurethat recognizes (Wendt and Duvall, 1989:59).50This creates their"codeterminedirreducibility" what Hoffmannhas referredto as "an apparent analyticalnightmare,"since it means that "neither agents nor structureshave ontological priority"(1999:5). Constructivists have remained optimisticthat this nightmarecan be addressed withoutabandoning the social-scientificproject altogetherand so have relied logic.51 upon conventionssuch as pre-giveninterestsand functional-institutional But the optimismis purchased at too high a price since these conventionsare ultimatelyantitheticalto the entire enterprise.This may be underscored by notingjust how farafield frompostmodernismthe adoption of such conventions takes constructivism. Because postmodernismeschews the prioritizationof one discourse over another,Bierstekervoices a common concern that its application of relativismto IR will "not offerus any clear criteriafor choosing among the multiple and competing explanations it produces" (1989:265). Constructivismdoes not have this problem, as it turnsout, because it doesadopt a criterionthat is derived from existingliberal IR theories. What is produced out of this bizarre amalcritique of essengamation is the argumentthat there is "in the post-structural tialistidentitya valuable opportunity,an unproblematicemptyspace in which a peace-lovinghumanitycan be erected" (Folker,1996:13).52The systemicspace beyond existingnational identitiescan apparentlybe filled with a more rational discourse based on collectiveproblemsas theyexist "out there"ratherthan as theyexist "in here" where our identitiesactuallyoriginate.Thus constructivists have taken postmodernismto mean that there is a space empty of realist self-helpthinkingin which a liberal world politymay finallytriumphover the would recoil fromsuch an argumentis obvious. nation-state.That postmodernists This suggests,in turn, that an alternativepossibilityfor the rapid rise of and its relationto liberal functionalismis thatit was not accidenconstructivism tal at all, but instead an inevitable outcome of the nature of post-Cold War eventsand the dominance of liberal theorizingin the field of AmericanIR. Prior decades provided a mixed empirical record in which neitherrealism nor liberThe post-Cold War period differsin that alism could declare complete victory.53 no empirical event has occurred yet to contradictJervis'sclaim regarding the 50 Dessler providesan insightfuldiscussionof the difficultiesin developing theorythatsuccessfullymeets both demands (1989:443). Kratochwiland Ruggie also discuss a number of epistemological options and ultimately recommendthatone adopt interpretiveepistemologicalmethods,such as privilegingconsensual knowledgeor the shiftingintersubjectiveframeworksof human discourse and practice (Ruggie, 1998:96). Yet these methods are drawn fromcriticaltheoryin the humanities,and much could be said about the potential pitfallsof utilizingits methodsin the field of IR. See, forexample, worksby Rosenau (1990); Hasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger(1997); given thatcriticaltheoryderivesfromthe Lapid (1989); and Biersteker(1989). One of the mostglaringdifficulties, studyof texts,is determiningwhatconstitutesa "text"in the contextof IR (other than the workof fellowtheorists). For essaycollectionsthatattemptto applydiscourseanalysisto IR, see Der Derianiand Shapiro, 1989, and Beer and Hariman, 1996. See also Onuf's discussion in Kubalkova,Onuf, and Kowert,1998. 51 For an approach to the agent-structure problem that does not relyon ftinctionalismand thus holds out greaterpromise,see Jacksonand Nexon's "p/r"approach (1999). 52 Schlesingerhas observed this tendencyas well, noting that "in the recent vogue for 'postmodernity'... proponentshave been apt to thinkthatthe old collectivitiesmayno longer conferidentitiesthatcommand special attention,"thus "opening up potentialnew spaces of tolerance of the 'stranger"'(1994:316-17). 53 See worksbyKeohane and Nye (1989:xi); Krasner(1983:vii-ix); Keohane (1984:9); and Grieco (1990:9, 27); as as Northedge(1976) andJones anidWilletts'sdiscussionof the Americanattachmentto interdependencefi-om wvell a Britishperspective(1984).

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major industrials:"withno disputes meritingthe use of force and with such instrumentsbeing inappropriate to the issues at hand, we are in unmapped territory"(1991-92:55). Much of the American IR theoreticalcommunityhas interpretedthisunmapped territory as the finalvindicationof liberal IR theory.54 The extent to which American theorizingabout 10 is and alwayshas been liberaltheorizinggoes a long wayin explaininghow constructivism could become so quickly popular in this post-Cold War empirical context.55Constructivism would be attractiveto a theoreticalcommunityalready predisposed to a liberal perspectivewhich assumes that because the major industrialsshare a particular normsin capitalismand democracy,relationsamong themare set of constitutive motivatedmore by absolute rather than relativegains. The widespread acceptance of these assumptionswould then pave the way for an approach such as constructivism which Haggard notes "is likelyto carrymore explanatoryweight in thosemore limitedareas wheresome common normativestructuresexistthan in those in which theyare absent or extremelybroad" (1991:415). Thus the growingenthusiasmforconstructivism maybe accounted for,at least to some extent,byjervis's observationthat"the kindsof theorieswe find attractiveare influenced not only by eventsbut also by our general political orientations"and "normative considerations" "normative (1998:973).An underlying agenda" that is liberal in orientationwould also explain why,as Jervishas noted, "constructivists and pay littleattentionto normsand ideas thatare both revolutionary evil" (1998:974). Liberal IR theorizinghas also had an historical tendency to co-opt new approaches, with constructivism being perhaps the latest example. Integration,transnationalrelations,interdependence, and regimes were each touted in turn as new ideas and approaches. As this reviewhas demonstrated, however,each contained the same functionallogic thathad simplybeen dressed up in new, albeit sometimesremarkablyfascinating,feathers. The resulthas been a homogenized field of JO inquiryin which theoretical choice remainslimitedto eithermore modestor more ambitiousliberal research programs.This homogenizationpresentsfewproblemsifliberalfunctionalexplanations for the internationalsystemand its transformations are accurate. But normativeagendas have a way of skewingexplanation for global political phenomena. This charge has frequentlybeen leveled at realism,but liberal functionalismhas neverbeen objectivein the causal factorsit chooses to privilegeor denigrateeither.This is most obvious in its biased treatmentof domestic political variables,which leads it to account for institutionalcreation and innovation as if it were "problem-solvingwithoutpolitics as a conditioningfactor"(Sewell, 1966:38). This antipathytowarddomestic political institutionshas informedall variants of liberal IR theory,leading criticsto repeatedlycharge thatliberalismcontains no theoryof politics.56And the extent to which liberal theorydominates the studyof JO suggeststhat the field will continue to move steadilyawayfromthe studyof foreignpolicyand actual decision-making(Haggard, 1991:405, 416-22). Liberal theoristscannot be entirelyblamed for this,since it was neorealism that popularized systemictheorizing,but such an emphasis is actuallyconducive to liberal theoriesof social change. Because liberal theoryhas alwaysbeen less an explanation for what policymakersactuallydo and more a prescriptionof what For example, Goldgeier and McFaul (1992);Jervis(1991-92); Kegley(1991); Lebow (1994); and Zacher (1992). Hoffmannargues that theorizingabout IR has been affectedby America's "ideology of progress"all along (1995:219). Winnerstigbacks up these claims witlha content analysisof IRjournal articlesand finds that it is not pro-realisttheorizingthat dominiatesthe field but pro-liberaltheorizing(1999). Even realisttheorizinghas been affectedby the liberal, optimisticbeliefs that dominate the American social milieu (Shimko, 1992:299; Waever, 1998:721-22). 56 See Sewell, 1966:43, 44; Gilpin, 1984:299; anidLittle, 1996:69. 54

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theyshoulddo, theorizingat the systemiclevel allowsit to avoid havingto explain ongoing,empiricalanomalies. That is, it avoids having to explain whythe identities,interests,and behaviorsof policymakerscontinue to be informedmore by the parochial and myopicpulling and hauling of domesticpoliticsand electoral cyclesthan by the far-sightedpracticesrequired of internationalcollectiveinterests and practices. This is where constructivism could have made a contributionand perhaps still can if it sheds its functionalistfeathers.As long as it relies on a logic of funcwill continue to provide tional institutionalefficiency,however,constructivism explanationsin which political institutionsdo not serve as conditioningfactors but instead remain instrumentsfor collectiveproblem-solving.Thus it deserves the same cogent criticismthat Sewell leveled at functionalismin 1966, and for that reason I give him the last word: The perversityof realityturnsus again to the functionalistargument.By what process does it anticipate an elevation from the level of convergingad hoc interestsof independent political units to one characterizedby a foundationof obligation?We must conclude that it hardlyconfrontsthe question. (1966:327)

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