International Political Science Review (2003), Vol 24, No. 1, 51–66
Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation FRANZ KOHOUT
ABSTRACT. Comparison of hegemonic stability theory, transition theory, long cycle theory, and power cycle theory places this assessment at the heart of the contemporary debate over the dynamic understanding of international relations. Pluralistic versus hegemonic assumptions provide the key organizing principle for this examination of embedded implications. Keywords: • Hegemonic
stability • Long • Transition
cycle • Power
cycle
“All is in a state of flux” (Heraclitus) Despite great progress in theorizing on the causation of war during the second half of the 20th century, the weaknesses and limits of the explanatory attempts created a sense of pessimism. As Jack Levy (1983: 1) described it: “Our understanding of war remains at an elementary level. No widely accepted theory of the causes of war exists and little agreement has emerged on the methodology through which these causes might be discovered.” Is such a pessimistic view still appropriate, or have the social sciences made noticeable progress in explaining war? After two decades of intense theoretical debate and empirical testing, some scientific contributions have been made which are able to bring greater clarity into the complex subject, and at the beginning of a new century some optimism is permissible. In times of rapid economic, technical and ideological changes, the issue of war causation becomes even more crucial. Can we use organizational patterns such as a cyclical interpretation of world history to bring about a better understanding on the causation of war? Or do we require an organizational model which depends on a hegemon (dominant state) as the main organizer of the international system? 0192-5121 (2003/01) 24:1, 51–66; 028610 © 2003 International Political Science Association SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
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Or do we find more explanatory power in a pluralistic view of the world system? The aim of this essay is to answer these questions by comparing different theoretical approaches and putting them into the larger framework of international relations theory. Of course, there are many causes for war; here the main focus lies in a macro analysis, or in other words in a structural analysis of war causation. The defining characteristic of structural analysis is recognition that an “international system” exists. When realism refers to anarchy as the “organizing factor” of the international system, it is now widely recognized that we can find some structure in the international system. In such a system, the whole is not only more than its individual parts, the system itself must be seen as its own entity. “The whole might be symmetric in spite of its parts being asymmetric, the whole might be unstable in spite of its parts being stable in itself” (Jervis, 1979: 213), and vice versa. So the relations between two actors depend in part on the relations between them and on their relations with all other actors in the system, and they also depend in part on the shape of the system itself. The structure of the system will help us to understand the system. Most of the theoretical approaches discussed follow such a meta theory either implicitly or explicitly. Following this systemic interpretation, the main focus is on the great world powers or leading states which are able to shape the international system, and on major or systemic wars. Such an approach conforms to the assumptions of the discussed authors, although there is no exact agreement on “great powers,” “major powers” or “world powers,” just as there is no exact agreement on the terms “major wars” or “systemic wars.” For the time-framework, most of the theories start their fact finding at the dawn of modernity at the end of the 15th century and discuss historical events through World War II. In addition, the different theories have a comparative basic framework in terms of a systemic view, as well as in the understanding that valid conclusions can be derived from recurring historical events.
Organizational Patterns For our purpose here, I will follow an organizing pattern which, in a general manner, is shaped by the dichotomy of hegemony and pluralism. The older term “cyclical theories” is not used as an organizing scheme because the cyclical view does not qualify as the main organizational factor. Rather we refer to cyclical theories of international relations within the framework of hegemonic and pluralistic theories. Whether the structure of the system is hegemonic or pluralistic depends upon how “hegemon” is defined. Emphasizing violent conflict leads to omission of theories not related to the evaluation of war. It thus is legitimate to leave out theories which aim only to investigate economic cycles, i.e. the Kondratieff and Kusnetz cycles. However, when such cycles are linked to violent conflicts, as in a Wallersteinian perspective, we must include them in our enquiry (Kondratieff, 1926; Wallerstein, 1974; Bousquet, 1980; Värynen, 1983). In older cyclical theories (Toynbee, 1954; Wright, 1942), the implication was that wars occur at periodic intervals that are more or less regular or irregular when several clearly identifiable contributing conditions converge. This restrictive rule would leave only two true cyclical theories. Periodicity is thus emphasized in Modelski and Thompson’s (1989) “long cycles and global war” and in Wallerstein’s (1974) neo-marxist model of a capitalist world economy. But there is no reason to be so restrictive concerning the notion of
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cycle. The theory of world systems and the long cycle theory are actually hegemonic theories. Hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1981), which gave its name to the organizational form of these theories, falls into this category, as does transition theory (Organski and Kugler, 1980). When, because of their unipolarity, we subtract hegemonic forms of organization, among the theories that remain are those involving bipolarity, multipolarity, and various types of balance (Rosecrance, 1966). Balance of power theories are the oldest form and come in different styles, but it is hard to classify them as a unique theory (Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose, 1989). The polarity schools of interpretation deal with the question whether a bipolar or unipolar system is preferred (Waltz, 1979; Wohlforth, 1991) and whether an equilibrium for longrun stability (Midlarsky, 1989) can be found. A rather different path is taken by power cycle theory (Doran, 1971, 1991). Here the cyclical aspect occurs in the changing capabilities (in terms of power and role) of states compared to other states in the system. Power cycle theory is pluralistic in that it does not give preference to any organizational form, unipolar or bipolar or multipolar. The explanatory value of this theory comes from its ability to identify dangerous junctures on the states’ power cycles that, in fact, are critical trend shifts in the structure of the system itself. Such a classification of the different theories makes it possible to determine the common grounds and the uniqueness in a comparative manner.
Hegemonic Theories Theories of World Economic Cycles If we assume that cycles of output, employment, income, and investment are linked to war, we need a political explanation for that linkage. One explanation could be seen in overproduction. In a military industrial complex, enormous amounts of money are invested in arms and the arsenals of arms may eventually be used. Then a destroyed economy has to be built up again, and thus war can be seen as a precondition for reconstruction. Another explanation could be that the contradictions of the capitalistic economy such as high unemployment lead to uprisings and revolutions which would eventually end up in war. But is there a cyclical pattern involved? When Lenin (1939), relying on Hobson’s (1965) studies, explained imperialism as the highest form of capitalism, he took the inevitability of imperial war for granted. In these earlier theories, such patterns of the cyclical recurrence of war were linked to rather non-economic common-sense explanations, such as psychological differences in the understanding of war between different generations, e.g. one generation being tired of war, and on the fact that due to the high costs of war societies would need a certain time for reconstruction (Wright, 1942). Kondratieff (1935 [1926]) does link the recurrence of war to economic factors in a cyclical fashion. He argues that war would most likely occur in the late phase of an economic upswing because of the stronger international competition regarding resources and markets leading to interior and exterior tensions. Small and Singer (1982), Goldstein (1988) and Mansfield (1988), however, have found only weak empirical evidence in favor of such a hypothesis, especially in terms of exact periodicity or a link to war between the great powers. A mere economic interpretation of international conflict, weak on empirical
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grounds, also excludes other variables of war causation, such as power or other national factors. Wallerstein’s (1974, 1984) neo-marxist view uses a mixture of economic and political variables to link the rise and fall of (hegemonic) powers with phases of expansion and contraction in the world economy. But his cyclical view does not present an explanation of a regular (periodic) occurrence of war. However, Wallerstein’s interpretation has value in a different area. The combination of political and military preponderance leads to the emergence of a world hegemon (Wallerstein, 1984). Wallerstein does not link crises of capitalist production and redistribution to war. Where such linkage is found, the theoretical explanation of war causation is far from perfect (Thompson and Zuk, 1982). For our purposes here, the theories of world economic cycles are classified as hegemonic theories with weak linkage to the causation of war.
Long Cycle Theory A rather clear linkage with war, however, is shown by Modelski and Thompson (1989). They present a mixed economic, political and cultural explanation of world dominance, but with an emphasis on the autonomy of political factors. A key assumption is that the world system is structural or systemic and not necessarily anarchic. Sometimes there is no global management of the system, but usually it is in the hands of a single state, the “world power” (Modelski, 1987). Modelski and Thompson, in their view of the modern world system, identify global wars as giving birth to new world leadership. Out of warfare emerges a new dominant state whose military preponderance makes it possible to provide public goods such as military security, world organization, and a set of rules for international economic relations. Their study identifies five powers which were able to shape the international system since 1500. Each succession consists of a cyclical rise and fall of such a world leader. The winning state not only possesses the necessary military power, which in Modelski’s understanding is sea-power; it is also backed by the economy that trades the most in each era. In Modelski’s chronology, which starts with Portugal in 1495, Portugal is succeeded by the Netherlands which in turn is succeeded by two British dominated periods, and finally the United States as the global leader. Paradoxically, it is not the continental challenging state which assumes the leading role, it is always a maritime trading state. In long cycle theory (Modelski and Thompson, 1989), each cycle is born in major warfare. Portugal emerges after the Italian and Indian Ocean Wars (1494–1516), the Dutch cycle after the Spanish-Dutch War (1580–1609), the first British cycle after the wars of Louis XIV, the second British cycle after the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and the American cycle after World Wars I and II. In its next step, the theory convincingly shows that the dominant state with its military power is able to support its economic goals, especially benefitting from world trade which it more or less monopolizes. But a third step will necessarily follow: questions are raised about the legitimacy of the world leader, and other states will also want to benefit from the monopolized economic system. In a new global warfare, the once leading state is so weakened that a new dominant state emerges which can again shape the system and bring stability to it, at least for some time. The system tends to be unipolar and this unipolarity functions as a regulative mechanism: the leading nation is capable of keeping order within the world system.
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War is seen as a selection process of finding a new leading power. The most astonishing and frightening effect of this system dynamic, driven solely by the uneven rates of development among members of the international system, lies in the almost unpreventable succession of wars. Although long-cycle theorists argue that such a logic is not inherent in the theory and that alternative mechanisms for transfer of global leadership may be found, this inevitability can be seen in a different light when we look at the issue of which wars it takes into account (Cashman, 1993). Other scholars question the validity of long cycles per se (Beck, 1991). Vis-a-vis the theoretical assumptions of the long cycle theory, the 100-year intervals which Modelski posited are reached only by dividing the British cycle into two. But when Modelski and Thompson emphasize the stability of a unipolar system, they invent unipolarity by introducing the sea-power point of view. The sea-powers Portugal or the Netherlands were never able to play a significant role on the European mainland. Therefore, the authors are unable to account for the most devastating war before World War I, the 30 Years War, or, effectively, for either World War I or II. Long cycle theory is not necessarily a theory of long cycles of war. It is basically a theory of world leadership which reveals, according to the authors, roughly a periodicity between 80 and 100 years (Modelski, 1987: 40). By positing the “monopoly of one world power,” long cycle theory turns out to be a hegemonic theory. And by focusing on the leading power and a challenger, long cycle theory remains a dyadic theory, not reflecting other structural factors of the overall system.
Hegemonic Stability Theory Independently, Gilpin has developed a concept of hegemonic stability sui generis. His realistic insight that “world politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy” (Gilpin, 1981: 230) is at once a theory of hegemonic war and a plea for hegemonic structure without war. Gilpin’s attention is focused on the dominant state in the system, the hegemon, whose ability to assist stability and leadership is based on its military and economic dominance. It can set the rules for economic transactions and secure his investments abroad. But the other powers also benefit from the maintenance of the status quo. The stability of the system is threatened when the hegemon loses its dominant position. We can count Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war as a cyclical theory, since a hegemonic state historically is bound to lose its dominant position due to the uneven growth of power among nations (Gilpin, 1981). Not merely economic, this unevenness has to be seen more broadly in terms of changes in transportation, communication, technology, population and military capabilities (Olson, 1982; Kennedy, 1987; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996). The cost–benefit ratio helps explain why a hegemon eventually declines and why a challenger can rise. The hegemon is interested in keeping the status quo and hence must put more effort into this than other members of the system. Thus decline is relative but virtually inevitable because the costs of maintaining the dominance of security in the system are high, including military spending, stationing of troops abroad, aid to allies, and the like. Together with a tendency to overemphasize consumption at the expense of investment, this situation leads to declining growth rates, and in the end the hegemon loses its economic and
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technological leadership. Whenever the hegemon’s resource base erodes, power shifts to other states. Gilpin uses a rational choice model of economic theory to explain political development. In his eyes, an integrated economic and sociological pattern that occurs throughout history is that individuals and societies try to achieve their interests and goals by the most efficient means possible. Therefore all states use increasing power for beneficiary purposes. As the relative power of rising states increases, they attempt to change the rules of the system, the division of spheres of influence, and the distribution of benefits and territories. Rising states try to change the hierarchy of the system if they perceive an advantage in doing so. Historically, war has been the primary method of resolving the disequilibrium in times of changing distribution of power. In Gilpin’s theory the rising challenger is most likely to be the one who initiates war in order to expand his influence to the limits of its new capabilities. But there is also the possibility that the hegemon itself may attempt to weaken or destroy the challenger in order to avoid a later defeat. The most important insight in Gilpin’s theory of war and change is his insistence that a hegemonic dominance by one state can bring to or maintain stability within the system but, due to change, the system cannot maintain its stability over a very long time. Is the theory of hegemonic stability founded on empirical proof? Gilpin illustrates his theory with only historical examples. So he is neither able to prove that all hegemonic wars have resulted from systemic disequilibrium, nor that a declining hegemon leaves a dangerous disequilibrium in the system. Empirical tests by other scholars (Spezio, 1990) do not come to a clear statement. Interestingly, using the British hegemony as the test case, wars involving great powers occurred even at the high point of Britain’s relative power. The prevailing problem in the model of hegemonic governance is the unclarity of the definition of a hegemon. Since the creation of the modern international system, Gilpin identifies only Britain (1815–1939) and the United States (1939 to present) as a hegemonic leader. But even here the question remains whether these states could establish a hegemony, and Gilpin never gives a clear definition. Such a definition would have to include at least military, economic, and technological factors. Furthermore, in a decentralized system, we have to question hegemony in general.
Transition Theory Power transition theory (Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1989) rejects three fundamental assumptions of the realist view of world politics. First, the international system had been conceived as a system without rules, a state of anarchy (Waltz, 1979). In contrast, transition theory sees the international order not as anarchical but as hierarchically organized in a manner similar to the domestic political system. Actors usually accept their position in the international order, based on differences in the power distribution among nations. Second, despite the absence of an enforceable code of international law, there are no major differences in the rules of governing the domestic and the international arenas. Nations, like political groups in the domestic system, are in continual competition over scarce resources in the international order. Third, transition theory conceives of international competition as driven by the potential net gains from conflict or cooperation.
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In transition theory, the way the international order functions depends on power distribution and on the degree of satisfaction within the hierarchical setup of the system. The elites of some nations are dissatisfied because they do not receive their due from the international order. However, only when the dissatisfied nation is also a great power that has managed to catch up to the dominant nation does this challenge lead to major conflict. Such a transitorial threat is caused by economic changes, accompanied by profound social and demographic changes that greatly increase the pool of human and material resources. Mobilization of growing domestic resources through industrialization and modernization can lead to one great power overtaking another in the international order. Organski and Kugler (1980) hypothesize that major wars are most likely to break out when the power distribution between the dominant state and the challenger is approximately equal. As the gap closes, each nation is likely to see the situation as threatening. The rivals become increasingly anxious about the situation and sensitive to changes in the distribution of power. The dominant state fears that the challenger will surpass it in power; at this crucial moment, the dominant state might inflict a preemptive strike against the challenger, hoping to prevent the inevitable. But this is not the case that Organski (1958) predicts, initially arguing that war would be waged as the challenger approached power parity with the dominant nation. Organski and Kugler (1980), however, try to show that the challenger attacks only after it has surpassed the power level of the dominant state. They argue that the faster the rate of transition, the greater the probability of war. According to Organski and Kugler (1980), nuclear weapons do not have any effect on deterring war. It is the relative loss of power on the part of the status quo power(s) in relation to the state(s) prepared to change the status quo that determines whether conflict escalates. This remains somewhat inconsistent, since Organski otherwise makes distinctions between the comparability of different eras. So he has to admit that balance of power theory, which he rejects, may have some validity in the pre-industrial era, but that in the 20th century, where rapid industrialization fuels rapid shifts in power, balances are too unstable to keep the peace. In their empirical testing, Organski and Kugler use gross national product as their indicator for power. They claim that all wars involving major powers in the 19th and 20th century—the Franco-Prussian War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I and II—occurred when a power transition was under way. Thus, power transition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for war. This conviction is shared by most tests of transition theory (Gochmann, 1990; Houweling and Siccama, 1988). Critique has to be applied on a different level. Transition theory is not a real systemic-level theory, for it operates at a dyadic interaction level. It is concerned with the interrelationship between two states. Transition theory has a certain face validity and the emphasis on change has enriched the scientific discussion. What transition theory cannot explain is how the international system in general copes with the uneven growth rates of its main members. Are there stabilizing or balancing factors within the international system for adjusting power and power aspirations? With transition theory, we must be satisfied with a dyadic explanation.
Balance of Power and Polarity Schools of Interpretation In contrast to theories which are hegemonic in nature are theories which are pluralistic, meaning that there is no organizational form of the international
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system which is shaped by one nation such as a hegemon. Only in a pluralistically organized world, where anarchy mixed with hierarchy exists, could a concept like the balance of power emerge. Balance of power theory is probably the oldest theory of international relations. Usually balance of power is associated with system stability and the absence of major war in the 19th century following the Congress of Vienna (Gullick, 1955; Kissinger, 1957). But the usefulness of the concept is debatable. The balance of power can be identified as a factual description of the distribution of power in the system at a given time; yet the term is used also to define a theoretical principle that acts as a guide to foreign policy-making so as to avoid the preponderance of any one state (Haas, 1953). Analysts disagree over whether the balance of power promotes peace or war. For some, war is an inherent part of the balancing process. For others, balances of power deter war, as risk-averse states are normally reluctant to initiate hostilities in situations where they face approximate power equality. Some (Waltz, 1979) assume that the balancing process is automatic. But do we need a “balancer” as Great Britain was considered in the 18th and 19th centuries, or do we depend on prudent statesmen like Metternich or Bismarck? Polarity and balance are closely related. Polarity, the number of autonomous centers of power in the international system, is a function of the distribution of power largely among major actors. Polarization is the process by which a power distribution is altered through alignment and coalition formation (Hart, 1985). It refers to the degree to which coalitions of states form mutually exclusive blocks of actors with friendly internal and hostile external relations. This most important distinction leads to a changed focus. But it is not mere change of formation which affects stability, as we discuss under power cycle theory. A long unresolved debate persists regarding polarity. Arguments for multipolarity state that the larger the number of major actors, the larger the number of potential allies that might be arrayed against an aggressor, which increases the flexibility within the system. Arguments in favor of bipolarity usually start with the hypothesis that the balance of power is easier to achieve in a bipolar system and that the adjustments and balance are automatic. Empirical findings differ widely. Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) find that in the 19th century diffusion of power was associated with low war magnitude, whereas a high concentration of power was associated with a high magnitude of war. The pattern for the 20th century was just the opposite. Bueno de Mesquita (1981) disputes this. Neither the concentration of power in the system nor the change in concentration seems to make a difference. The most important question regarding the polarity model is seldom asked: what are the causes of the shift from one type of polarity to another? What are the causes of polarization? Asking questions such as these brings us back into the heart of the cycle debate. The polarity model needs to be broadened theoretically, and an additional theoretical framework is needed. This is especially the case regarding alliance theory. More so, the overall debate of balance of power theory has to be opened. Polarization cannot be reduced to the building and changing of alliances. Polarization very often implies internal economic, technological and military change, in short: power change. This has severe implications both for individual states as well as for the system. For this purpose we now turn to power cycle theory.
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Power Cycle Theory Since the early 1960s, Doran has worked on a different conception of the cyclical aspects of power, generally known as power cycle theory (Doran, 1971, 1991). This conception goes beyond balance of power theory because, even if the balance of power is properly implemented, it alone is insufficient to prevent major war. According to Doran, the balance of power provides security in the short term by threatening the use of force (war). But it does not cope effectively with the rise and decline of states. Designed to bolster the weaker and to oppose the power of the stronger state, balance of power logic is often the structural opposite of a strategy necessary to maintain longterm equilibrium in the system. It belies the need for systemic adjustment of role (Doran, 1995: 183).
Therefore, a more dynamic view of statecraft and a more complete concept of foreign policy behavior (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981; Vasquez, 1993) is required involving power cycles that link structure and agency directly. In this theory, the cycle of nation state power and its role is the underlying dynamic of international politics. The power cycle explains the rise and decline of great powers as the changing structure of the international system. Moreover, for Doran, a state’s expectations and concerns regarding future security, foreign policy role, and hence international political economy, are based on the structural changes reflected in the state power cycle. What matters in this dynamic of international politics is the ratio of a state’s total power relative to others in the system at any given time. Each state’s trajectory is a function of the very different levels and growth rates of the various capability indicators across these major states, determining the structure of the system. But power is not a sufficient variable in the dynamic of international politics. The theory also focuses on the systemic (historical) role of each state and how this role is perceived by the elites of other nations. For Doran, foreign policy role is “foreign policy behavior that the system has allowed the state to achieve,” involving “an acknowledged niche in which the state can use its power to obtain legitimate ends” (2000a: 338–339). A change in relative capability determines the future possibilities of each nation, seen against the background of what is demanded in international politics. Power cycle theory examines the impact that changing state power has on the role and security outlook of the state and, in turn, the impact of the changed role and security outlook on the stability of the state’s foreign policy. Most importantly, a state’s power and role can get out of sync over long time periods “because actors and system do not adjust readily to changes in relative power” (Doran, 2000a: 339), leading to sizeable gaps between a state’s power and its role. For example, as a state’s relative power decreases, its role and interests should be adjusted, too. But in most cases states are reluctant to accept this reduction in status and influence. On the other hand, when a state’s relative power increases, its interests and role aspiration increase as well, but other members of the international system are frequently unwilling to accept this new role. Since role, like power, is necessarily systemic, a role deficit for one state is offset by an inverse role surplus for another state or states in the system. Thus, “the strains internal to each state” express the “structural disequilibrium within the system itself” (Doran, 1991: 116). This strain between power and role affects “the capacity to act in foreign policy” (Doran,
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2000: 339). Structural disequilibrium, according to Doran, is the issue fracturing world order during systems transformation. The key to war causation in power cycle theory is what happens to a state’s expectations of future security and role at critical times in its power cycle. Doran argues that governments project their expectations forward in a linear sense from past experience. In most periods of history, structural change “continues prior trends and hence is fairly predictable,” providing “a rather certain political setting” for foreign policy and international commerce (2001: 1–2). However, each of four critical points on the cycle (lower turning point, first inflection, zenith, and second inflection) represents a break in the previous trend. Because of its non-linear, relative nature, the occurrence of the critical points is unpredictable; the state’s leaders (and the system) are suddenly confronted with their false assumptions about the trend when such critical points are identified. The stark contrast with normal periods of statecraft deepens the sense of uncertainty. Existing gaps between power and role come to the surface of awareness and demand adjustment. Thus, “discordant messages” and “discontinuity of expectations” at critical points, together with a sense of threat and of perceived injustice regarding state demands and/or systemic response, make this interval of history highly unstable and provoke the movement to major war. “Concerns internal to the state ricochet across the system as states seek redress or redefinition of the systemic equilibrium according to their own perceived condition of internal disequilibrium between power and role” (2001: 2) But, Doran continues, understanding the bounds of the system may enable the system to adjust to rapid and monumental structural change peacefully. Elucidating the bounds on relative power growth, the theory shows the fallacy inherent in notions of machtpolitik and yet the sense of injustice that results when the rising state suddenly confronts the trauma of expectations foregone. The fact that power is so bounded, as explained by the principles of the power cycle, thus tempers the fears of declining states and the ambitions of rising states, inviting a resolution to the classical dilemma of peaceful change via timely efforts at systemic adjustment regarding power and role.. . . Agency exists independent of structure and structural change, but it cannot ignore the limits that structure imposes.. . . [Power cycle theory] invites a conception of agency that can constrain power itself (Doran, 2001: 2).
Doran presented his theory not only as an explanation of structural change, and of the wars that accompanied the historical examples of systems transformation, but as suggestive of mechanisms that might make “peaceful change” possible in the future (1971). Does the empirical research verify the hypotheses of power cycle theory? Investigating a period from 1816 to 1965, Doran and Parsons (1980) and Doran (1991) found 23 critical points and 26 wars were initiated during these critical periods. There were, of course, a number of non-critical periods associated with war, but the average magnitude, severity, and duration of wars were much more probable and higher during the critical periods. In fact, passing through critical points led to war 90 percent of the time. Looking back almost 200 years, the 19th century after 1815 was comparatively free of major war because there was little movement of actors along their power cycles, and the leading powers could adjust slowly to a new situation. On the other hand, world wars occurred in the first half of the 20th century because a large number of states passed through critical points
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and because new states entered the system, for instance Germany in the late 19th century, followed by the United States and Japan, while old members, like AustriaHungary, dropped out of the central system. Let us compare power cycle theory with the other theories examined above. Whereas each of the other theories explains major (or hegemonic) war in terms of a pair of states at the top of the hierarchy, power cycle theory deals with the general dynamic of all actors within the central system. Moreover, power cycle theory is able to cope with the complexity and nonlinearity of the system’s structural change, so that it can clarify long-standing puzzles. It concludes that bipolar and multipolar systems are equally stable or unstable; the decisive factor is not the difference in structure between two systems but the transformation between types of systems structure that jeopardizes stability. Such a transformational situation occurs when a number of the major actors in the system pass through critical points in the cycle of relative power (“shifting tides”) at about the same time in history. The “would-be hegemon” leads the system into massive warfare because these shifting tides have already pulled it into decline or otherwise altered its future outlook, as Doran (1971, 1989, 1991, 1995, 2000a, this issue) takes great care to explain theoretically and in history. Thus, it is the transformation from one form of system to another which is responsible for the onset of these massive world wars. Power cycle theory can be seen as a multi-systemic theory. It is not bound to presumptions like hegemonic stability theory, which depend so heavily on a correct definition of “hegemony.” Moreover, power cycle theory, as primarily a systemic theory, is open to inclusion of so-called soft variables, like role and national pride. And it recognizes the role of statecraft at a national and international level. These factors may be difficult to operationalize, but this openness prevents the theorist from seeing the world through deterministic glasses. Therefore power cycle theory does not see war as inevitable as most of the other theories do, and it emphasizes that a resolution to the “dilemma of peaceful change” is possible.
Power Cycle Theory in Contrast to Transition Theory The assumptions and the conceptualizations of transition theory and of power cycle theory are sometimes confused, but careful delineation of their arguments will reveal how very unique and different these two structural theories really are. Contrast in terms of Hegemony versus Pluralism. Transition theory is a hegemonic theory in that it assumes the presence of a dominant state capable of controlling the actions of other states regarding security and economic policy. Power cycle theory is a pluralistic theory; it insists that all of the members of the central system to differing degrees are relevant both to maintain peace and to start major war. Shifting trends in the power cycles of even the smaller states vying for role can plunge the system into major instability. Dyadic or systemic? Transition theory is a theory about the relationship between the largest state and a challenger, and hence is dyadic. Power cycle theory considers the relationship among all the members of the central system. “Power” is a ratio in which state A is in the numerator and the sum of power of all the states in the central system is in the denominator. “Role” is also necessarily systemic, since it is foreign policy behavior which the system accepts as legitimate and does not challenge.
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Cycle or transition? Transition theory focuses upon action at the “transition” where one state passes another in terms of power level. No cycle is hypothesized. Power cycle theory explicitly postulates that states pass through a cycle of relative power, a cycle described by the asymmetric logistic, which has specific properties that correspond to the growth of populations in a limited environment. On this logistic function (one on the rise, one during decline), there are four points of non-linearity (critical points) with enormous consequence for state foreign policy. It is failure to cope with altered future security projections at a critical point in a power cycle that causes governments to mishandle their foreign policies. Critical points or transition? They are not equivalent. Yet in transition theory, a transition must occur at or after the peak of power of the hegemon since it is in decline. Traced by the asymmetric logistic, the power cycle contains within it four points of non-linearity that in advance are totally unpredictable as to historical timing (which preserves the non-deterministic character of the analysis and the correspondence to real-world conditions). Thus, critical points and transitions are defined, operationalized, and indexed very differently. Most importantly, their causes are very different, as are their effects on war. According to empirical tests (Doran, 1989, 2000; Houweling and Siccama, 1991): (1) when a transition and a critical point occur simultaneously, war is likely; (2) when a transition occurs without matching a critical point, major war does not occur; and (3) when a critical point is crossed (but no transition), war is still highly likely. The conclusion is that the transition as cause is “misspecified.” System transformation or transition? In transition theory, a transition occurs and a challenger attempts to unseat a hegemon, causing major war. In power cycle theory, systems transformation occurs when several states pass through a critical point on their respective power cycles at about the same time in history. The structure of the system is strained by these shifting tides pulling so many states onto new trajectories. From the power cycle perspective, systems transformation is responsible for the worst wars in history. Equilibrium or absence of balance? Transition theory declares an equal distribution of power as the necessary condition for major war; balance as peace is a chimera. In total contrast, a quite elaborate theory of equilibrium involving state power and role is at the heart of power cycle theory. It focuses on the concerns that “ricochet” throughout the system regarding systemic adjustment to the structural shifts. Rationality or rationality-plus-nonrationality? Rationality is the basis of action by governments in transition theory. In power cycle theory, government foreign policy is rational most of the time. But at critical points on the power cycle, notwithstanding the effort of decision-makers to apply rational decision-making in this interval, excessive political uncertainty and discordant information can lead to nonrational responses regarding high-stakes issues. One dimension of power or a two-dimensional view? By focusing only on Gross National Product as a measure of power, the basic version of transition theory treats power as unidimensional. Drawing upon factor analytic results (Doran, Hill, Mladenka, and Wakata, 1974; Doran, 1991: 49–58), power cycle theory argues that state power in international affairs is composed of two dimensions, size and wealth. Economic and military factors contribute to each of these dimensions. Alliances, are they relevant or not relevant? From the outlook of transition theory, alliances are not relevant to war causation. They cannot be relevant from this point of view because inclusion of alliance would inevitably involve power balancing and the existence of a balance of power whose presence the transition
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notion denies. From the perspective of power cycle theory, in contrast, alliances are important as a means of preserving territorial security. Yet, while alliances often guarantee security, according to power cycle theory they often fail as a means of preserving peace, and when used improperly as a substitute for systemic adjustment, alliances can worsen systemic disequilibrium and result in massive warfare.
Critique and Conclusion First, the terminus technicus “cycle” is used in many different ways. Sometimes there is no differentiation between cycles of war and structural cycles. Some of the theoretical and empirical studies have led to the construction of rigid time intervals, which prevent the analyst from obtaining a proper understanding of social, political and economical components of the cyclical phenomenon. This critique applies especially to long cycle theory and to some degree to the cyclical variations of the Kondratieff type. In my opinion, long cycle theory must sort out the complexities of war causation, as Rosecrance (1987) also has noted. Here the regularity of war is mixed up with periodicity of war and there is weak theoretical backing of such periodicity and inadequate empirical evidence for such an interpretation. Second, a shortcoming can be seen in the fact that hegemonic and pluralistic theories do not incorporate a spatial aspect in their reasoning. The theories concentrate on the center of the system, neglecting the developments in the periphery. Power change has a spatial dimension too, as Choucri and North (1975) emphasize, which must be built into a reasonable model; otherwise such models cannot deal with such important processes as colonialism or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As Doran’s article in this issue shows, power cycle theory has taken up this challenge. A third shortcoming is that so-called soft variables have not yet been incorporated into the models of war causation. To establish a truly multi-variable model, domestic as well as foreign, socio-political and socio-cultural variables like the role of pressure groups and nationalism are essential as a determining variable for war causation. Only the puralistic theories are to some degree open to include other theoretical views in their reasoning. This is particularly true for power cycle theory which could be combined successfully with alliance theory (see article by Chiu, this issue). A last shortcoming can be seen in the fact that all theories, with the exception of world system theory, are bound to either realist or a neo-realist meta-theory. Regime theory and interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye, 1977) must be incorporated. The role of international organizations has not been incorporated into the theoretical model. The importance of the fact that two nations like Germany and France are not only at peace, but are also reconciled, otherwise is absent from the theoretical analysis. Only power cycle theory admits a cooperative view into its construction and avoids a deterministic interpretation of history. At the end we have to come back to the key question: can cyclical, hegemonic and pluralist theories explain war? The answer is, yes, to a certain degree, and, to a certain extent, some more convincingly than others. The theories of change, as I call them, can give us a much more sophisticated understanding of the causation of war than we would have without them. But there are still many aspects of war causation which we do not understand.
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The limitation in scope of some of the theories is due to an attempt to be rigorous. But they must incorporate other theoretical aspects into a larger model. Of course, the operationalization of such a model would become more difficult, but this would be necessary in order for these theories of change to remain at the apex of the international relations problematique.
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Biographical Note FRANZ KOHOUT is Professor for Political Science at the University of Munich. He has a BA in Taxation and Financial Controlling (Civil Service College of Bavaria), an MA and PhD in Political Science (University of Munich), and the State Exam in Law (University of Munich). Research topics include: Participation, Environmental Politics, the Role of NGOs in International Relations. Most recent publication: Partizipative Umweltpolitik, Lit Verlag, Muenster 2003 [Participatory Environmental Policies]. ADDRESS: Geschwister-Scholl-Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft der Universitaet Muenchen, Oettingenstrasse 67, D-80538 Muenchen, Germany [email:
[email protected]].
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