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CONSOLIDATING

DEMOCRACY report on the undp technical assistance programme for the 2004 indonesia elections

report on the undp technical assistance programme for the 2004 indonesia elections

Acknowledgements Principal Author Kendra Collins Principal Contributors Karla Dalimunthe Paul Guerin Mieke Kooistra Lu’lu Muhammad Fida Nasrallah Menil Poerwatma Rudiarto Sumarwono Andrew Thornley This report would not have been possible without the support and valuable contributions of the UNDP Election Programme Team. Reviewers Gwi-Yeop Son Iwan Gunawan Editor John McBeth Design Concept and Production DesignLab Published by United Nations Development Programme, Indonesia Kav. 3, Jl. M.H. Thamrin, P.O. Box 2338 Jakarta 10250, Indonesia

Abbreviations AEC

Australian Election Commission

ANFREL

Asian Network for Free Elections

APC

Advisory Committee on Procurement

AusAID

Australian Agency for International Development

CAPC

Contracts, Assets and Procurement Committee

CEIA

Center for East Indonesian Affairs

CETRO

Centre for Electoral Reform

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

CGI

Consultative Group on Indonesia

CSO

Civil Society Organization

CTA

Chief Technical Adviser

DPD

Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah)

DPR

National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

DPRD I

Provincial Level National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tk.I)

DPRD II



Regency/city Level Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tk. II)

EMO



Election Monitoring Organization

EU

European Union

EUEOM

European Union Election Observation Mission

GoI

Government of Indonesia

IFES

International Foundation for Electoral Systems

INSIDE

Indonesian Society for Democracy and People’s Empowerment

IORC

International Observer Resource Centre

IT

Information Technology

JAMPPI

Indonesian People’s Network of Election Observers



(Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia)

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

JPPR

People’s Observers and Voter Education Network (Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Rakyat)

KIPP

Independent Election Observer Committee (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu)

KPPS

Voting Station Officials (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara)

KPU

National Election Commission of Indonesia (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)

LP3ES

Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information



(Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial)

KPUD

Local Elections Commission

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MPR

People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)

NDI

National Democratic Institute

NGO

Non Governmental Organization



PAC

Project Appraisal Committee

PANWAS

Election Supervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan)

PERFIKI

Indonesian Mobile Film Cinema Company



(Persatuan Perusahan Pertunjukan Film Keliling Indonesia)

PPK

Sub-District polling staff (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan)

PPS

Kelurahan/Village polling staff (Panitia Pemungutan Suara)

PSA

Public Service Announcement

PVT

Parallel Vote Tabulation

TAF

The Asia Foundation

TI

Transparency International

TNP

National Tally Centre (Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu)

TPS

Polling Station (Tempat Pemungutan Suara)

UNEAD

United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNDPA

United Nations Department of Political Affairs

UNV

United Nations Volunteer

USAID

United States Agency for International Development



FOREWORD

In the year 2004, five years after the successful democratic elections in 1999, Indonesia held both legislative and presidential elections. The legislative elections on 05 April, in which the Indonesian people elected representatives to the DPD for the first time in addition to the DPR and provincial and district DPRDs, using a new open candidate list system, was considered to be the most complex set of elections ever conducted on a single day in one of the world’s most populous countries.The first and second round of the presidential elections were held respectively on 05 July and 20 September, when Indonesians voted directly for a president and vice-president for the first time in their history. The holding of peaceful multiparty and presidential elections was an impressive achievement, accomplished in the face of immense logistical challenges. In the span of six months, more than 150 million people voted in three elections in over 550,000 polling stations across the archipelago. UNDP with donor assistance provided direct support to the electoral process in a number of areas: a training programme reaching more than 5 million pollworkers; an extensive voter information campaign and support to civil society organizations for a more grass roots approach informing voters of the new changes to the electoral system and the process of punching the ballot correctly. Support was also given to Panwas and local monitoring groups which resulted in more complaints being recorded and a more transparent process. The IORC provided a forum for different monitoring groups to discuss issues and coordinate observation activities. This report not only reflects the activities implemented through the UNDP-coordinated electoral assistance programme, but the cooperation with national and international partners which was critical to ensuring a smooth and sustainable process. On behalf of UNDP, I would like to thank everyone who participated in this significant year of elections and who helped make this programme’s contributions to the process a success: the election programme team, UNDP colleagues, our partners in the international community, and our Indonesian colleagues in government, the General Elections Commission, and civil society. However, the real value of these elections was the participation of the citizens themselves, whose commitment and enthusiasm made the events truly historic.

Bo Asplund Resident Representative United Nations Development Programme Jakarta, Indonesia



Content

5

Context

17

Programme Development and



Implementation

31

Election Management

47

Voter Information Campaign

59

Voter Education

69

Election Monitoring and



Observation

83

Lessons Learned and



Recommendations

95

Annexes

1

Context



1

Context

The 2004 elections in Indonesia were nationally and internationally recognized as a remarkable success.Three national elections held over a period of six months helped to institutionalise a political system in which the will of the people is now accepted as both a necessary and desirable prerequisite for political leadership. In doing so, the elections represented a further step in the country’s convincing process of democratic consolidation, thereby providing a compelling model of how countries with an authoritarian past can make a peaceful transition to democracy. A significant first step in the transition process took place in June 1999 when 86% of Indonesians voters turned out to participate in the first truly democratic elections since 1955. The 1999 elections, which followed the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998, set in place a process of change that went beyond the elections themselves. The national parliament began to play an active role in questioning the executive branch, which no longer was



Figure One: Political History of Indonesia at a Glance

1945

Indonesia declares independence.

1949

The Dutch recognize Indonesian independence after four years of guerrilla and other warfare.

1955

First Parliamentary Elections for House of Representatives and Constituent Assembly.

1959

President disbands Constituent Assembly as part of the return to the 1945 Constitution. This change marks the beginning of the period of “Guided Democracy”.

1960

President dissolves House of Representatives and then appoints people to fill both a new House of Representatives and the People’s Consultative Assembly.

1966

Sukarno hands over emergency powers to General Soeharto, who becomes acting president in March 1967 and is then appointed as president in 1968. This period marks the beginning of the “New Order”.

1997

Asian economic crisis begins; Indonesian rupiah plummets in value.

1998

Widespread protests and rioting lead to fall of President Soeharto. Former Vice-president B.J. Habibie becomes president.

1999

Free national level elections are held in Indonesia for the first time since 1955. Abdurrahman Wahid is elected by the duly inaugurated People’s Consultative Assembly.

1999-2002

Legislators pass constitutional changes seen as a key step towards democracy, including provisions for Indonesian voters to be able to elect their president and vice president and establishing a second chamber to the national parliament, the House of Regional Representatives (DPD).

2001

Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and incompetence. VicePresident Megawati Sukarnoputri is sworn in as his replacement.

5 April 2004

Parliamentary and local elections: Golkar wins greatest share of vote, with PDI-P coming second.

5 July 2004

First-ever direct presidential elections; first round narrows field to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri.

20 Sept. 2004

Former general Yudhoyono wins second round of presidential elections, unseating incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri.

20 Oct. 2004

Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla sworn in as president and vice-president respectively.



all-powerful. Television and other media became

armed forces in parliament as of 2004. That mean the

increasingly open and brought information as never

2004 elections, for the first time in Indonesian history,

before to millions of homes. NGOs expanded their

produced parliaments with no appointed members.

networks. The police and military were separated. A processofdecentralizationresultedinthedevolvement

With this phase of constitutional review completed in

of power to the regions. All these reforms were

August 2002, consideration of the new political and

emerging evidence of a new pluralism and resolve for

electoral laws by the legislature started in September

more transparency in Indonesia.

2002. There were four core pieces of draft legislation: • the law on general elections • the law on political parties

Electoral Framework

• the law on the structure and composition of state representative institutions, and

The 2004 elections were staged in the context of

• the law on presidential elections.

constitutional amendments and new electoral laws. These resulted in a greater balance of power

In addition, a new Constitutional Court with the power

between the legislature, the executive branch and

to adjudicate disputes relating to election results was

an independent judiciary.

a critical constitutional reform achieved during this period.This also required implementing legislation.The

During its August 2002 session, the People’s

laws were all passed between March and August 2003.

Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) approved an amendment providing

Among important reforms manifested in the new laws

for the popular election of the president and vice-

included the use of a restricted open list proportional

president beginning in 2004. Amendments also led

system for the National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan

to the establishment of a regional representatives

Rakyat or DPR) and for regional parliaments at

council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) as a second

the provincial and kabupaten/kota levels. More

chamber with limited oversight powers. And finally

importantly, the laws also provided for much smaller

the amendments terminated the representation of the



electoral districts than in 1999 with multi-member

chairman and vice-chairman) replaced the previous

districts of between three and 12 seats. Within

53-member Commission, which included 48

districts, voters were able to vote for one party and,

representatives from each of the political parties

if they wanted, also one candidate from that same

standing for election and five representatives from

party. The participants in elections for the DPR were

the Government. Its independence is clearly stated

required to be from political parties, while for the new

in the amended Constitution, while its appointment

DPD candidates were required to run as individuals.

process is regulated in Presidential Decree 70/2001.

The latter were elected on the basis of a “first past the

The KPU and the newly-created permanent

post” system, with four members being elected from

provincial and regency/city election commissions

each province. The law also sought to get more women

(Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah or KPUD) have

elected through a quota system established as a non-

members with terms of office of five years from the

binding moral imperative for the parties.

time of their inauguration. In addition to the permanent bodies, temporary sub-

General Elections Commission

district election committees (with five members) were appointed by the regency/city election commission

The General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan

and they in turn appointed village election committees

Umum or KPU) was responsible for conducting the

(with three members). The term of office of the sub-

2004 elections. The new independent, permanent

district election committees ended three months after

and non-partisan KPU of 11 members (including

voting day. The term of office of the village election committees ended one month after that day.

Figure Two: Number of KPU Personnel Elections Entity

Level

April

July

September

Personnel

KPU

National

1

1

1

+ 500

KPUD Provinsi

Provincial

32

32

32

+ 1,500

KPUD Kabupaten/Kota

District/City

440

440

440

+ 8,800

Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan

Sub-district

5,110

5,109

5,108

+ 15,000

-

71,057

70,669

+ 210,000

579,901

567,511

565,515

+ 5,000,000

(PPK) Panitia Pemungutan Suara

Village

(PPS) Kelompok Panitia Pemungutan

Community

Suara (KPPS)



Umum - Panwaslu), formed by the KPU. The Election Law describes the following duties and

This national committee appointed provincial

powers to the KPU:

supervisory committees, which in turn chose

• Planning the election;

kabupaten/kotasupervisorycommittees.Thosebodies

• Determining the organization of and procedures for

then appointed kecamatan supervisory committees.

the election; • Coordinating, conducting and controlling all stages of the election; • Determiningwhichparties/candidatesareeligibleto contest the election;

The national supervisory body was responsible to the KPU and lower levels were responsible to the level of supervisory body above them, in a strict hierarchy. Supervisory committee members were drawn from police, prosecutors, media, higher education institutes

• Determining the election date;

and public figures. The national committee has nine

• Determining the boundaries for the electoral

members, province and regency/city committees have

districts and the number of MPs to be elected at

seven members, and sub-district committees have five

national, provincial and regency/city levels;

members.

• Determining the time period and the procedures for election campaigns; • Determining the results of the elections and

The role of the supervisory committee is to accept complaints, resolve disputes of a non-criminal

announcing the successful election candidates at

nature, and pass unresolved issues to the appropriate

national, provincial and regency/city levels;

authorities for investigation. Citizens, accredited

• Conducting an evaluation of the election and

observers, contesting political parties and DPD

reporting on the conduct of the election; and • Having other duties and powers as stipulated by law.

candidates can lodge complaints to the supervisory committee. The District Court is the first and final court for criminal offences (as defined in the Election

Dispute resolution relating to the elections, in the

Law) punishable by less than 18 months imprisonment.

first instance, was conducted through the Election

For offences punishable by more than 18 months

Supervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan

imprisonment, decisions of the District Court can be

10

appealed to the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court is the first and final court for disputes about election result.

A total of 24 political parties participated in the elections, having satisfied the following main requirements:

The 2004 Elections

• A recognized existence under Law 31/2002 on Political Parties;

Indonesia held its 2004 legislative elections on

• A complete board of administrators in at least 2/3

Monday, 5 April and the first and second rounds of its

(two thirds) of the provinces;

direct presidential elections on Monday, 5 July and

• A complete board of administrators in at least 2/3

Monday, 20 September respectively.

(two thirds) of the regencies/cities in each of the provinces. • A minimum of 1000 (one thousand) persons or at

Legislative Election

least 1/1000 (one thousandth) of the total number of residents as members in each administrative

The parliamentary elections were hailed as the single

area, substantiated by party membership cards;

biggest and most complex ever conducted on one day. On 5 April, close to 82% of eligible voters, from an electorate of about 150 million, cast their ballots at 579,901 polling stations. They could choose between nearly 350,000 candidates competing for more than 15,000 legislative seats. The elections required the printing and distribution of close to 650 million newspaper-sized ballots, in over 2,000 separate elections.

The elections were affected by administrative setbacks in some locations, largely caused by the logistical challenges that faced the KPU. There was widespread concern that the difficulty in delivering materials would lead to delays in the conduct of several elections. The final result was that elections were delayed in less than 2,000 polling stations across the country or around 0.3% of the total.

Figure Three: Number of Polling Stations, Electorate and Actual Voters Legislative Election 579.901

Number of Polling Stations (SK KPU 23/2004)

124.449.038

Number of Actual Voters (No. 44/SK/KPU/2004) First Round of Presidential Election



Number of Polling Stations (SK KPU 39/2004)



574.945 121.292.844

Number of Actual Voter (No. 79/SK/KPU/2004) Second Round of Presidential Election

565.515

Number of Polling Stations (actual, 98/SK/KPU/2004) Number of Actual Voter (No. 79/SK/KPU/2004)



116.662.705

11

Figure Four: Results of Legislative Elections No 1

Party Marhaenisme Indonesian National

Votes

%

Seats 2004

%

Seats 1999

%

906,739

0.80

1

0.18

0.00

634,515

0.56

0

0.00

0.00

2,965,040

2.62

11

2.00

839,705

0.74

0

0.00

9,226,444

8.16

58

10.55

1,310,207

1.16

4

0.73

0.00

669,835

0.59

0

0.00

0.00

1,228,497

1.09

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme) 2

Social Democratic Labor Party (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat)

3

Crescent Star Party

13

2.84

(Partai Bulan Bintang) 4

Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka)

5

United Development Party

0.00 58

12.66

(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) 6

United Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan)

7

New Indonesia Alliance Party (PartaiPerhimpunanIndonesiaBaru)

8

Freedom Bull National Party (Partai Nasional Banteng Kemeerdekaan)

9

Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)

8,437,868

7.46

55

10.00

10

Indonesian Justice and Unity Party

1,420,085

1.26

1

0.18

4

0.87

844,480

0.75

1

0.18

2

0.44

890,980

0.79

0

0.00

5

1.09

(Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia) 11

Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia)

12

Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah)

12

No 13

Party National Mandate Party

Votes

%

Seats 2004

%

Seats 1999 34

%

7,255,331

6.41

53

9.64

7.42

2,394,651

2.12

2

0.36

12,002,885

10.61

52

9.45

51

11.14

8,149,457

7.20

45

8.18

7

1.53

2,944,529

2.60

14

2.55

20,710,006

18.31

109

19.82

2,424,319

2.14

13

2.36

24,461,104

21.62

128

23.27

1,178,738

1.04

0

0.00

677,259

0.60

0

0.00

656,473

0.58

0

0.00

0.00

896,603

0.79

3

0.55

0.00

(Partai Amanat Nasional) 14

Concern for the Nation Functional

0.00

Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa) 15

National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)

16

Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera )

17

Reform Star Party

0.00

(Partai Bintang Reformasi – PBR) 18

Indonesian Democratic Party of

151

32.97

Struggle(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia Perjuangan) 19

Prosperous Peace Party

0.00

(Partai Damai Sejahtera) 20

Golkar Party

118

25.76

(Partai Golongan Karya) 21

Pancasila Patriot’s Party

0.00

(Partai Patriot Pancasila) 22

Indonesian Unity Party

3

0.66

(Partai Serikat Indonesia) 23

Regional United Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah)

24

Pioneer’s Party (Partai Pelopor)

0.00 Total

113,125,750

100.00

550

100.00

12

2.62

458

100.00

KPU Decree N0/44/SK/KPU/2004 13

Presidential Elections

4. Susilo BambangYudhoyono and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla (nominated by the Democrat Party)

The results determined which parties, or coalitions of parties, could nominate candidates for the presidential

5. Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar (nominated by the United Development Party - PPP)

election in July. Under Law 23/2003 on Presidential/ Vice Presidential Elections, parties or coalitions of

There were two additional parties that attained

parties, can only nominate candidates if they obtain

the threshold for fielding candidates: the National

15% of seats in the DPR or 20% of the national votes

Awakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice

for the DPR. However, there was a specific clause

Party (PKS). The PKB candidate, Abdurrahman Wahid,

applying only to the 2004 presidential election which

was declared medically unfit to contest the presidential

lowered the threshold for party nominations to 3% of

election, based on the requirement in the law that

the seats in the DPR or 5% of the national votes for

candidates must be “physically and mentally able to

the DPR.

perform their duties and obligations as the president and vice-president”. PKS stated that it wanted to

Based on that provision, five pairs of candidates were

remain a significant opposition party in Parliament and

participated in the first round of the first-ever direct

therefore did not field a candidate.

presidential election in Indonesia.The candidates were: The first round of election took place on 5 July, 2004, 1. Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid (nominated by the Golkar Party) 2. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Ahmad Hasyim

casting their ballots in 574,945 polling stations across the country. The elections were peaceful and many of

Muzadi (nominated by the Indonesian Democratic

the logistical problems faced in the legislative elections

Party of Struggle - PDI-P)

had been largely overcome. The only issue to mar on

3. AmienRaisandSiswonoYudhohusodo(nominated by the National Mandate Party - PAN)

14

with 121,292,844 of the 155,048,803 registered voters

the elections was the estimated 40 million voters who rendered their votes invalid by mistakenly punchingthe

ballot paper twice. The Elections Commission quickly rectified this oversight, issuing a decree that declared the double-punched ballots valid.

1. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi 2. Susilo BambangYudhoyono and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla

As no candidate received more than 50% of the votes in the first round of the presidential election, the two

The second round of the presidential election was held

candidate pairs who received the highest and the

on 20 September, 2004. Of a total of 153,312,436

second highest number of votes contested a second

eligible voters, 116,662,705 (76%) cast ballots in one

direct election for president and vice-president. The

of the 567,511 polling stations. The election was once

two pairs of candidates were:

again peaceful with no significant incidents being reported.

Figure Five: Results of First Round of Presidential Election No

Candidate Pair

Votes Obtained

% of Votes

1

Wiranto and Solahuddin‘Gus Solah’Wahid

26,286,788

22.15

2

Megawati Sukarnoputri and

31,569,104

26.61

Hasyim Muzadi 3

Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo

17,392,931

14.66

4

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and

39,838,184

33.57

3,569,861

3.00

Jusuf Kalla 5

Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar

Total Valid Votes Total Invalid Votes Total Votes Cast

118,656,868 2,636,976 121,293,844

KPU Decree No. 79/SK/KPU/2004

15

Figure Six: Results of Second Round of Presidential Election No

1

Candidate Pair

Megawati Sukarnoputri and

Votes Obtained

% of Votes

44,990,704

39.38

69,266,350

60.62

Hasyim Muzadi 2

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla

Total Valid Votes

114,257,054

Total Votes Cast

116,662,705

KPU Decree No. 98/SK/KPU/2004

On 20 October, 2004, retired general Susilo Bambang

cated as the 2004 elections were, they were a remark-

Yudhoyono was sworn in as Indonesia’s sixth president,

able success and represented an historic victory for

together with his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, who was

Indonesian democracy.

sworn in as the vice-president. As vast and compli-

16

Programme Development and Implementation

2

17

2

Programme Development and Implementation

Programme Development For the 1999 General Elections, the UNDP was responsible for mobilizing and coordinating foreign financial and technical assistance amounting to close to US$90 million, of which US$60 million was channeled directly through the UNDP, representing the largest-ever support programme to a nationally-run election. In September 2002, the Government of Indonesia (GoI), through the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, again formally requested the UNDP to coordinate international assistance for the 2004 Elections1. In accordance with the standard pre-requisite to the United Nations (UN) providing electoral assistance to any member state, the

1 See Annex One

18

UN Elections Assistance Division of the Department

Accordingly, the programme activities not only

of Political Affairs undertook a Needs Assessment

related to the short-term objective of conducting

Mission to Indonesia in December 2002. The mission

successful legislative and presidential elections,

recommended a positive response, noting (1) the

but also to the longer-term objective of building a

appropriateness of UN assistance, based on the

sustainable institutional capacity within relevant

support of the main stakeholders to UN involvement

institutions to ensure successful future elections.

and potentially positive impact and (2) the necessity

Activities were grouped into four main categories:

for international support given the current capacities of the main stakeholders and the importance of

1. Providing technical support to the KPU and KPUDs

the upcoming elections. This recommendation was

to assist in the management and implementation

approved by the UN Focal Point for Elections in New

of the elections. This included supporting the

York and was formally communicated to the GoI.

KPU in providing training to staff within the KPU

A memorandum of understanding reflecting this

and KPUDs to help build long-term institutional

agreement was subsequently signed between the

capacity.

GoI and UNDP on 25 April 2003 . The memorandum 2

outlined the following:

2. Supporting the KPU in conducting voter information campaigns and supporting voter education activities in close collaboration with the

1. That the UNDP will assist the Indonesian Government in organizing the 2004 elections. 2. That external assistance will be based on the

CSOs to ensure not only the availability of factual orientation regarding voting procedures, but also to convey to the public the value of voting and the

consent, request, priorities and relevant laws of the

right of individuals to vote according to their own

Republic of Indonesia.

convictions.

3. That all foreign technical assistance for the

3. Supporting KPU-accredited CSOs in monitoring

electoral process will be coordinated through,

the election process and the elections themselves

and/or channeled by the UNDP.

to establish an integrity safeguard, discourage fraud, intimidation and violence and reinforce the

Based on this, the UNDP, working in close cooperation with the KPU and the GoI, drafted a programme

legitimacy of the final result. 4. Providing support for the coordination and

document “Support to the elections”. A key principle

management of international resources to the

of the programme strategy was the recognition that

election process, including the facilitation of

the conduct of the elections was within the domain

international observers.

of the internal affairs of Indonesia: the 2004 Elections were to be run by newly-established independent

Although the programme provided support to

electoral commissions at the national and sub-national

national election monitors and facilitated support to

levels. Core activities of the KPU were expected to be

international observers, the UNDP was not engaged

primarily funded by the state budget and assistance

in the substantive task of passing judgment on the

through this programme, largely focused on strategic

conduct of the elections.

technical inputs. Funding was also to be channeled to civil society organisations (CSOs) who would be

The programme was approved on 17 June, 2003 and

actively involved in the electoral processes.

was given the number INS/03/A11. UNDP funding for

1 See Annex One

19

theprogrammewaschanneledthroughINS/03/011and

ministersandambassadors.Thesewouldbechaired

Swedish funding was channeled through INS/03/U11.

and convened by KPU and/or the GoI. No high level policy consultations were convened

Donor Coordination

during the implementation period of the programme, due to the fact that no critical issues arose among the

TheMOUandtheapprovedprogrammedocumentgave

donors which required the involvement or intervention

the UNDP the mandate to coordinate all international

of high-level actors.

assistance to the election process. The document included activities related to “supporting meetings

The donor coordination meetings were held regularly,

between the KPU, the Government and donors at

on 17 January, 16 April, 30 July, and 20 October in

various levels for effective and timely coordination

2003 and on 28 January, 14 May, and 13 October

of activities”. The overall aim of the coordination was

in 2004. The meetings were chaired jointly by the

to establish mechanisms to help ensure that donor

Coordinating Ministry of Economy and the UNDP.

assistance was consistent in meeting the priorities

The main purpose of the meetings was to share

of the Election Commission in administering the

information on a broad level. The principal agenda

elections. This unity of priorities was important for the

item for each of the sessions was a briefing by the

following reasons:

chairmain of the Election Commission, giving donors an update on the progress of election preparations.

• to optimize the efficient use of resources

Also featured as a regular agenda item was an update

• to reduce or eliminate double allocations of funds

on the UNDP Elections Programme by the national

to projects and initiatives • to minimize potential conflicts of interest among donors and other electoral stakeholders

programme director, who also concurrently the deputy secretary general of the KPU, as well as updates from other donors implementing funds on a bilateral basis. Finally, the meetings provided a forum for

At the first meeting of donors on 17 January, 2003, the

presentations from invited guests on a range of issues

participants agreed on three different mechanisms for

relating to the election process.

donor coordination. 1. KPU/GoI/donor subject working groups focusing

most useful means of ensuring a harmonization of

would be convened and chaired by the KPU and/or

donor-supported activities and minimizing conflicts

GoI (with UNDP assistance as required);

of interest. These meetings brought together the

2. Donor coordination group meetings that would

KPU with those donors directly providing support

be chaired by the UNDP and to which the GoI,

for specific activities. While the UNDP represented

the KPU and all donors, regardless of their level

those donors contributing funds through the UNDP

of involvement, would be invited. These would be

Trust Fund, other participating donors included the

convened on a bi-monthly or quarterly basis to

Partnership for Governance Reform, USAID (together

ensure a broad level of information sharing on the

with its implementing partners), JICA and AusAID. The

election; and

following are some of the working groups established:

3. High-level policy consultations, as needed, which would involve participation at the level of

20

The subject working group meetings were the

on specific areas of assistance. These meetings

• Training: A committee on training was established,

understanding between the monitoring agencies

chaired by a member of the KPU and involving

and the Panwaslu, to clarify mutually supporting

UNDP, AEC, JICA, and IFES. One overall training

roles and responsibilities.

strategy was developed and approved by this committee into which each donor, as well as the

In addition to this, and to ensure that donors and

KPU, provided specific and coordinated inputs.

other partners were continually kept informed about

This greatly contributed to the effectiveness of the

programmes activities, a regular newsletter was

funds available for training and eased the pressure

produced electronically, and shared with all donors,

on the KPU in trying to manage the various donor

as well as being posted on the UNDP Website (http:

inputs.

//www.undp.or.id/elections2004/).These newsletters,

• Voter Information and Education: This meeting

together with the donor meetings, helped to

involved the key donors working in the voter

ensure transparency and accountability of donor

information and education field, specifically USAID,

funding, making donors aware at all stages of the

JICA, UNDP and the Partnership for Governance

programme implementation of ongoing activities and

Reform. While the KPU did not participate in the

developments.

meetings on a regular basis, the outputs of the meeting were continuously shared with the KPU.

Finally, donor coordination also took place in relation

The main objective of the meetings was to ensure

to a number of specific activities. Examples included

coordination on priority information messages,

collaboration between the KPU, UNDP and IFES

as well as coordination on CSO approaches and

on the establishment of the National Tally Centre,

geographic coverage. A common database of

collaboration between UNDP, NDI and local civil

CSOs was established, including information

society organisations on the post-election “quick

on the proposals they had submitted, to which

count”and collaboration between the UNDP, IFES, NDI,

donor agency they had been submitted, the time

and TAF on the establishment of the IORC to assist

at which they were submitted, and the budget.

international observer.

This mechanism helped to prevent double or multiple funding of the same programmes and to ensure that no geographic area in Indonesia was

Programme Funding

neglected and marginalized. • Monitoring: The purpose of these meetings

At the first Donor Meeting on 17 January, 2003, UNDP

was to encourage sharing of deployment plans

presented a number of options for programme funding

and the development of common reporting

to interested donors. These included (a) cost-sharing

formats. Participants included those donors

for projected assistance, (b) in-kind assistance, or (c) a

providing support to monitoring activities (The

dedicated trust fund for contributions.

Asia Foundation, Partnership for Governance Reform, UNDP), as well as the recipients of the

Following consultations with the main donors, it was

support (JAMPPI, JPPR, CETRO and Forum Rektor).

agreed that the most appropriate funding mechanism

Collaboration with the Election Supervisory Body

for the programme would be the establishment of a

(Panwaslu) was encouraged by inviting Panwaslu

trust fund. The reasons for this were the confidence

members to join the meetings at regular intervals.

and acceptance that donors had gained in the use

This resulted in the signing of a memorandum of

of the UNDP trust fund mechanism. The trust fund

21

allowed for the easy pooling of resources in an open

strategy. Also as a result, two additional project

and transparent manner for all donors, while also

documents had to be developed to incorporate

allowing the possibility of earmarking funds for

EU activities: INS/03/A14 (Support to the PANWAS)

specific activities. It also ensured that administrative

and INS/03/A15 (Support to the Voters’ Information

costs were kept at a minimum for donors, while also

Campaign in Indonesia: C-VICI). It also resulted in a

incorporating established accounting and auditing

number of implementation difficulties, particularly

procedures, making it fully transparent to both donors

concerning INS/03/A15.

and beneficiaries. The trust fund was established by UNDP New York on 7 July, 20033. The programme document presented an indicative budget requirement of US$32 million. This was based on the estimated cost of activities as presented in the programme document and agreed on by the KPU and GoI. Discussions with donors concerning resource mobilization had been initiated in a first donor meeting in January 2003. Once completed, donors were all sent a copy of the draft programme document with the detailed budget in April 2003. The document was also presented to the donor coordination group meeting held on 16 April, 2003. Anumberofdonorspledgedfundingtotheprogramme following this initial call for funds. The first donor agreement to be signed was from the United

Figure Seven: List of Contributions Donor

Contributions

Australia

AUD 9,000,000

agreements signed with Australia and Sweden.The first

Canada

CAD 5,000,000

contributions entered the trust fund in October 2003

European Union

EUR 7,000,000

Kingdom on 21 August, 2003. This was followed be

Finland The funding received from the European Union

Netherlands

followed a different mechanism. Prior to finalizing

New Zealand

its contribution to the programme, the European Union conducted its own programme development mission, which resulted in the drafting of a contribution agreement. The activities as outlined

EUR 100,000 USD 8,184 ,352 NZD 650,000

Norway

NOK 3,500,000

Sweden

SEK 16,000,000

Switzerland

USD 50,000

in the agreement were not fully consistent with

United Kingdom

GBP 1,500,000

the activities and management set-up as indicated

UNDP

USD 1,51 7,000

in the UNDP programme document and required

Republic of Korea

a number of amendments to the programme

3 See Annex Three

22

USD 50,000 (in kind)

Figure Eight: Breakdown of Funds Committed/Received Donor

Australia

Commitments In original currency

US Dollar equivalent

Amount received

Funds received

AUD 8,000,000

USD 5,532,000

USD 5,532,000

20-Oct-03

AUD 1,000,000

USD 702,800

USD 702,800

18-May-04

USD 6,234,800 Canada

CAD 5,000,000

USD 3,888,775

USD 3,888,775

23-Dec-03

European Union

EUR 5,500,000

USD 6,707,317

USD 6,707,317

18-Mar-04

EUR 1,500,000

USD 1,829,268 USD 8,536,585

Finland Netherlands

EUR 100,000

USD 124,720

USD 124,720

2-Jan-04

USD 2,074,420

USD 2,074,375

USD 1,340,000

12-Dec-03

USD 734,420

21-Jul-04

USD 3,329,955

6-May-04

USD 2,779,977

7-Oct-04

USD 3,330,000

USD 3,329,955

USD 1,113,355

USD 1,113,355

EUR 1,500,000

USD 1,666,667 USD 8,184,352

New Zealand

NZD 150,000

USD 100,853

USD 100,853

4-Feb-04

NZD 500,000

USD 314,200

USD 314,200

27-Apr-04

USD 415,053 Norway

Sweden

NOK 500,000

USD 74,621

USD 74,621

9-Dec-03

NOK 3,000,000

USD 442,089

USD 297,581

22-Dec-03

USD 516,710

USD 144,508

26-Apr-04

SEK 8,000,000

USD 942,285

USD 942,285

1-Oct-03

SEK 8,000,000

USD 1,085,482

USD 1,085,482

1-Feb-04

USD 2,027,767 Switzerland United Kingdom

USD 50,000

USD 49,980

USD 49,980

21-May-04

GBP 1,000,000

USD 1,776,199

USD 829,187

7-Oct-03

GBP 500,000

USD 829,187

USD 1,776,199

14-May-04

USD 1,217,000

USD 1,217,000

18-Nov-03

USD 300,000

USD 300,000

21-Jun-04

USD 34,101,128

USD 32,271,859

USD 2,605,386 UNDP

Total Amount

USD 1,517,000

23

Figure Nine: Breakdown of Use of Funds Budget

Expenditure / Commitment

($)

($)

Personnel

1,099,887

1,055,473

Office cost

475,241

345,084

Media Centre

1,023,063

1,022,964

KPU Information Campaign

6,980,002

6,995,659

KPU Training Material

3,676,446

3,721,694

KPU Training Activities

2,246,446

2,269,596

Vote Tally Centre

971,397

979,228

Voter Education

6,833,988

6,805,155

C-VICI

3,577,293

2,993,237

Election Monitoring

4,132,701

4,059,879

450,511

296,033

2,181,959

1,983,408

452,195

415,280

34,101,128

32,942,689

Evaluation & Audit PANWAS Training EU Visibility Campaign Total

A total of US$26.6 million was mobilized by the UNDP

Government and the UNDP on 8 December, 2003. The

for the legislative elections held on 5 April, 2004.

final funding for the programme therefore totaled

A further US$7.5 million was set aside for the two

US$34.1 million. Of this, almost US$33 million or 97%

rounds of the presidential election, following a second

was expended and/or committed as of 31 December,

formal request for funds issued by the Indonesian

2004.

24

A number of donors earmarked funds for the

of the UNDP. The Netherlands made two further

programme, based on their own country priorities and

contributions for the first and second rounds of the

work plans, as follows:

presidential election totaling US$6,109,977, both of which were non-earmarked.

• Australia: committed, under the first contribution

• European Union: Committed a total of Euros7

agreement, a total of A$8 million, of which A$2

million, which was earmarked for KPU training

million was enmarked for training programmes,

materials, PANWAS training, support to C-VICI, EU

A$3 million for voter information and education

visibility activities and operational costs.

and A$3 million for election monitoring. The

• Switzerland: committed US$50,000, all of which

second contribution of A$1 million was non-

was earmarked for voter education activities.

earmarked. • Canada: committed a total of C$5 million, all of

The United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and

which was earmarked for voter education, with

New Zealand did not earmark funds. While all of the

a focus on women, first-time voters and conflict

listed contributions were in cash, South Korea made

areas.

a contribution in kind of 93 fax machines, valued at

• Netherlands: committed US$2,074,420 under the firstcontributionagreement,whichwasearmarked

$50,0000, which were provided to the KPU for the election preparations.

for personnel, audit, and international contracts. However, following the submission of the midterm report to the Netherlands Embassy, a total of USD 809,534 of previously earmarked funding was changed to non-earmarked funding, at the request

Figure Ten: Breakdown of Expenditures

Personel (3%)

Vote Tally Centre (3%)

Office Cost (1%)

Voter Education (21%)

Media Centre (3%)

C-VICI (9%)

KPU Information Campaign (21%)

Election Monitoring (12%)

KPU Training Materials (11%) KPU Training Activities (7%)

Evaluation and Audit (1%) Panwas Training (6%) EU Visibility Campaign (1%)

25

Programme Management

State Secretariat, and the National Planning Board and chaired by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic

The programme was nationally executed through

Affairs. This committee was tasked with feeding inputs

the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs. All

to the executing agency on the reports and proposals

activities under INS/03/A11 were implemented by

submitted by the implementing agencies. The KPU

the General Elections Commission, as stated in the

was also frequently asked to provide technical inputs,

programme document. The Government established

especially for activities relating to the KPU bodies.

an inter-departmental working group, chaired by the coordinating ministry and members from Ministry of

Under the overall direction of the national programme

Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat, Ministry of Finance,

director and the management of the programme

the National Planning Board (Bappenas) and the KPU.

adviser/manager, the programme opened a number

The working group acted as an advisory body to the

of different offices to ensure the most responsive

coordinating ministry in the conduct of its duties as

and practical mechanism possible. While the ideal

executing agency of this programme.

situation would have been to have the majority of staff located at the KPU, this was not possible due to the

A letter of Aagreement between the UNDP and the KPU

limited space available. As a result, only those staff

was signed in May 2003. The agreement specified

related to the training component of the programme

that the UNDP was willing to provide support services

were based permanently at the KPU, in an office that

for assistance, based on a request from the KPU, for

accommodated a total of four persons.

4

the following activities of the programme: The main programme office was established at the 1. Identification and/or recruitment of project personnel and technical expertise 2. Procurement of services of contractors to undertake agreed activities

Surya Building, in close proximity to the main UNDP office. This was deemed necessary due to the fact that the letter of agreement signed with the KPU meant that UNDP had the main implementing role.

3. Procurement of goods related to agreed activities

This therefore required very close and regular contact

4. Disbursement of other expenditures associated

between the programme administration and the

with project-related activities

UNDP’s administration, to ensure a fast and efficient implementation of KPU decisions. A total of 22 staff

TheprojectdocumentssupportingEU-fundedactivities

members were stationed at the main programme

were also executed by the economic coordinating

office, including the programme adviser/manager.

ministry, but were assigned different implementing partners. INS/03/A14 - Support to the PANWAS was

In addition, an office was established at Panwas

implemented directly by the PANWAS and INS/03/

headquarter, located in the Aspac Building. The

A15 - support to the Voter Information Campaign

Panwas team consisted of five full-time staff as well

in Indonesia was implemented by the Consortium

as a number of shorter-term consultants, and was

for Voters’ Information Campaign in Indonesia. The

responsible for supporting the implementation of the

Government established a committee, consisting of

Panwas training component, for which the Panwas

the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

itself acted as implementing agent. Finally, one

3 See Annex Four

26

staff member was also posted in the offices of the

and SSA contracts for the following positions:

Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs to assist in

programme officer, media advisers, poll worker training

its function as executing agency.

officer, manager for International Observer Resources Center, website manager, finance officer, graphic

Forty staffers were employed throughout the duration

design officer, procurement expert, grant assistants,

of the programme. Of these, 10 were international

finance assistants, translator, contract assistant,

staff who were recruited under ALD (Appointment for

secretary, and driver.

Activities of Limited Duration), SSA (Special Service Agreement) and UNV (United Nations Volunteer)

All recruitments, at the request of the KPU, followed

contracts for the following position: programme

UNDP rules and regulations concerning personnel and

adviser, training advisers, voter education adviser,

all contracts were based on UNDP standard terms

communicationadvisers,evaluationadviser,monitoring

and conditions. Selection of staff followed open

officers, and information officer.

competitive processes, and involved the KPU in the selection process of all senior staff. For the recruitment

The other 30 were national staff members (12 persons

of administrative staff, the KPU generally requested the

at professional level and 18 persons at administrative

UNDP conduct the selection process, while forwarding

level). They were contracted under Service Contracts

the decision to the KPU for endorsement.

Figure Eleven: List of Staff Positions Programme Adviser

Secretaries

Voter Education Adviser

Training Advisers

Communication Adviser

Media Advisers

Voter Education & Information Adviser

Poll Worker Training Officer

Monitoring Officers for Programme Grantees Finance Assistants Grant Assistants Electoral Adviser

Programme Officer

Communication Adviser for IORC Manager for IORC Translator Website Manager Finance Officer

Contract / Personnel Assistant

Admin. Assistants

IT Programme Staff

Editor

Drivers

Reporters

Office Boys

27

As with staffing matters, the majority of other

as contracts determined by a waiver of competitive

work implementation was also managed by the

bidding. Spesific UNDP regulations on waivers meant

programme directly, based on discussions and

that any grant over US$30,000 had to be sent to

approvals from the KPU. This included the contracting

New York for approval. Since New York cannot accept

of all private suppliers and service providers, as well

documents in bahasa Indonesia, this also meant that

as the contracting of all grantees conducting both

large amounts of documentation -including legal

voter education and election monitoring activities.

papers- had to be translated from bahasa Indonesia

All contracting processes were conducted in close

to English prior to being sent to New York. While

coordination with the UNDP administration and were

UNDP headquarters made much-appreciated efforts to

subject to UNDP rules and procedures. Notably, such

approve these contracts on a fast-track process, the

procedures require the review of all contracts valued at

various additional steps involved led to many delays

over US$30,000 by an internal contracts, procurement

in the contracting of grantees and disruptions to their

and assets committee (CAPC), and the subsequent

approved work plans.

review of all contracts valued at over US$1 million by the Advisory Committee on Procurement (ACP) based

The second notable exception to the generally smooth

in New York. In the majority of cases, this process

implementation process was the methods involved

worked smoothly and efficiently, responding well to the

in extending and amending contracts. Due to the

tight deadlines imposed by the impending elections.

slow and sometimes uncertain commitment and

However, there were some notable exceptions.

receipt of donor funds, contracts had to be awarded to larger service providers on a piecemeal basis,

The first was the contracting of all grantees under the

based on available funds at the time of contracting.

UNDP programme, which represented a substantial

Despite the fact that it had been foreseen that

portion of the programme’s resources. While

contracts would be increased as more funds were

proposals were formally solicited through a “request

received, each subsequent amendment was treated

for proposals”, posted on the website and widely

by UNDP headquarters as a waiver of competitive

distributed, the activities called for were varied in

bidding and therefore had to be sent to New York for

scope and general in terms of geographic location.This

clearance. Again, while every effort was made by New

was a specific strategy of the KPU and the programme

York to review submissions as soon as possible, the

to ensure space for local ideas and initiatives arising

additional steps often meant significant delays in the

from to the direct needs of communities. It resulted in

responsiveness of the programme to the priorities and

proposals varying from nationwide media activities to

needs of the election process.

much more localised face-to-face education activities. All were evaluated according to the criteria laid out in

At the request of the KPU, all financial management

the “request for proposals” and their coherence with

and reporting was managed by the programme,

the KPU’s own needs and priorities. Proposal budgets

together with the UNDP administrative and finance

were evaluated based on standard cost scales prepared

divisions. This required that financial management

by the programme and approved by the KPU.

followed UNDP standard rules and regulations.

However, given that proposals could not be evaluated

For the management of grantee finances, the

directly in comparison to one another, UNDP

programme was required to establish its own

headquarters decided that they had to be treated

accountability mechanisms, given that such

28

mechanisms are not available within the UNDP. The

Final Evaluation and Audit

programme therefore drafted the Guidelines for



Grantees which acted as the main reference for both

As was stated in the programme document, an

election monitoring and voter education grantees for

independent and external evaluation and audit was

their financial reporting. The guidelines contained

required.

standard operating procedures, financial reporting formats and other formats for monitoring both

Based on agreements with the Dutch Government, in

activities and finances.

addition to an end-of-programme audit, a mid-term audit was conducted in May 2004. The audit was

The grantee financial reporting formats were

undertaken by the independent auditor, KAP Grant

designed to ensure three key principles: (1) internal

Thornton. The full audit report is available from the

control (completeness of financial administration

UNDP. An end-of-programme audit was conducted

documents pursuant to standard stipulation of the

in December 2004. This was conducted by the

UNDP Election Programme), (2) compliance to with

independent auditor, KAP Paul Hadiwinata, Hidajat,

the programme’s finansial administration procedures,

Arsono & Rekan. Again the full audit report is available

and (3) accountability (financial responsibility to the

from the UNDP.

UNDP programme). The grantee financial reporting procedures included providing proof of payments,

In October 2004, an independent team of four persons

disbursement vouchers, cash disbursement vouchers,

conducted the final evaluation, with two focusing

bank reconciliations, detailed financial reports,

specifically on the EU component, according to

percentage expended reports and advance requests if

requirements laid down in the EU agreement. The

relevant.

evaluation found that “the programme was well designed, managed and implemented and met most of

With the election monitoring and voter education

its immediate objectives in areas where assistance was

grantees spread through most of Indonesia’s provinces,

provided”. The full text of the evaluation is available

it made sense for the UNDP Election Programme to

from the UNDP or alternatively can be obtained

give financial report training to all grantees by bringing

from the UNDP Website (http://www.undp.or.id/

them to Jakarta for two-day training sessions. All new

elections2004/).

grantees received training. Grantees having problems in reporting were invited to repeat sessions. The training gave the grantees an understanding on the financial reporting process, answered questions and problems associated with the preparation of financial reports, and ensured financial report standardization for all grantees, without exception. During the project implementation, four training sessions were organised.

29

Election Management

3

31

3

Election Management

The existence of effective, transparent, adequately funded, and accountable election management bodies are critical to ensuring elections are credible and fair. Successful elections cannot happen without appropriate preparation and planning. Electoral management essentially refers to the administrative infrastructure required to support the democratic process of elections which, in Indonesia, comes under the responsibility of the KPU. The UNDP programme document identified the need for technical support for the KPU as a priority objective. Specifically, the document outlined support for the national and sub-national election bodies to assist in the management and implementation of the elections, as well as to help the in the establishment of internal processes and procedures that were sustainable, effective and efficient. This included supporting the KPU in providing training

32

to staff within the national and sub-national election

ultimately implementing a training programme

commissions to help build long-term institutional

over three elections in six months, improving on

capacity and establish of a training unit in the KPU to

each one through monitoring and evaluation.

ensure the sustainability of training initiatives. Other activities included support for the KPU’s institutional

Underpinning technical assistance was the ethos

efforts to uphold the integrity of the electoral

to work in collaboration with the KPU and increase

process through a transparent organization of the

training as a priority through positive results,

2004 legislative and presidential elections and to

evaluation and ownership as part of the institution

maintain a professional relationship with national and

building objective.

international media, political parties and the general public.

UNDP training activities were conducted in close coordination with the KPU, as well as other donor agencies, specifically IFES, AEC and JICA. Though all

KPU Training Activities

agencies had different levels of funding and varying programme objectives, it was thought best practice to

The legislative elections were considered to be the

coordinate activities, dividing tasks where necessary

largest, most complex set of elections ever conducted

and designing a single training work plan leading up

on a single day in the world. Four elections with

to each election. In order to facilitate collaboration

numerous parties and candidates were held on that

with the KPU, the election commission established

day, followed three months later by the country’s first

a training committee chaired by Hamid Awaludin, a

direct presidential election and a further two months

member of the KPU, as a forum for donor agencies to

after that by a second round of the presidential

discuss all training issues.

election. New voting procedures and forms were developed in Decrees 1 and 2 (legislative), 37 and

The training committee had representatives from

38 (presidential first round) and 45, 46 and 47

each bureau in the KPU, as well as representatives

(presidential second round). The challenge of the

from AEC, IFES, UNDP and JICA. Coordination saved

training programme was to ensure that more than

the KPU valuable time in dealing with training issues

five million poll workers could conduct three credible

with separate agencies. In addition to the training

elections in six months, based on new laws and

committee, a new training sub-division was created

procedures.

in the KPU’s human resources department. These two bodies -one ad hoc and the other permanent- provided

The UNDP training team included an international

a mechanism for UNDP, IFES, AEC and JICA to provide

training adviser, a national poll worker training officer,

training assistance to the KPU and seek approval for all

a finance officer and an administrative assistant. Its

training activities.

office was established at the KPU for the day-today running of the training programme. Technical assistance was aimed at:

Training Work Plan

• developing training strategies for managerial and

A training work plan was approved by the training

operational levels, • producing and distributing materials and

committee and endorsed by a plenary session of the KPU. It included the following stages:

33

1. Election management training for KPU provincial and district secretariat staff. 2. Operational training for sub-district and villagelevel KPU staff.

the attendance at the training sessions, which probably explains the nearly 100% turnout of trainees noted in the survey conducted by the UNDP at the end of the process.

3. Poll worker training. The KPU stressed that the latter two of these training

Training Strategy

levels should be prioritized and urged the team to conduct face-to-face training whenever possible,

All KPU training activities from October 2003 to April

given the complexity of the new election system.

2004 were funded and conducted jointly by the UNDP,

The available budget from the donors specifically

IFES and AEC. The strategy consisted of developing

for training was less than US$5 million. This would

training materials, conducting a “training of trainers”,

not have been sufficient for a fully realized cascade

then cascading the training from provincial to

training programme reaching all five million poll

sub-district level depending on the programme.

workers in the time available. However, with additional

From May to September 2004, for the two rounds

local government funding, in most provinces the

of the presidential election, a different approach

cascade worked at least down to district level.

was adopted. The UNDP funded a national training programme, conducted by the KPU in 27 provinces.

The first two stages of the training plan were organized

AEC and IFES targeted specific provinces which had

centrally, but as part of the capacity-building

been identified by KPU as needing a more intensive

objective, the funding and organization of training

training.

were gradually decentralized and led to the formation in January 2004 of KPUD provincial training host

The training budget and the available time and human

commitees.The responsibility of these committees was

resources (trainers/presenters) dictated the strategy.

to organize training events, inform participants of the

Fourimplementationmethodswereused,rangingfrom

schedule and venue, provide refreshments, equipment

small workshops to public information sessions:

andadministration,reimbursetransportationcostsand prepare a financial report with receipts and attendance

1. Cascade workshops for provincial and district

lists. An agreement was made between the UNDP and

levels for professional development in election

the KPU that funds would be sent to the KPUDs, with

management or planning and logistics (pre-

the UNDP providing assistance in financial reporting.

election) 2. Cascade training-PPK to train PPS to train KPPS

As was clearly indicated when the work plan was being developed, participants expected to be paid to attend a training session. It was agreed up front that the UNDP would not make such a payment and would only fund items such as transportation costs, refreshments,

(legislative election) 3. Mass briefings at district level for PPK, PPS and KPPS chiefs (presidential rounds one and two) 4. Self-instruction by reading the manual or watching the training video on TV (all elections)

accommodation, materials and the venue. To pay the trainees, the KPU requested funds from the

Small workshops of less than 30 participants were

state budget and the KPUDs sought funds from local

possible when running courses for provincial and

governments. These incentives contributed greatly to

district staff, but they costly due to transportation

34

and accommodation costs. As the cascade moved

The topics included dealing with local media, press

down to PPK, PPS and KPPS level, the sheer number of

conferences and making statements to the Press and

staff made it difficult and unrealistic to hold smaller

the main, clear messages for socialization through the

workshops. As a result, the objective became to

media.

train as many people as possible in as short a time as possible.

For the legislative elections, UNDP, AEC and IFES jointly supported the cascade training of PPK and PPS personnelfrom March 16–28, 2004. They then

Training Activities

proceeded to train KPPS workers. For the first round of the presidential elections, the UNDP supported

An election management programme was run from

training en masse (PPK, PPS and KPPS chiefs) in 27

November to December 2003 for 32 provincial KPU

provinces from June 24-July 2. It also produced and

members and 440 district KPU members. The topics

included the legal framework and the use of the law

distributed training materials to all provinces. AEC

to solve disputes, verify party candidate nominations,

funded assistance in five provinces-Papua, West Irian

campaign management and deal with stakeholders.

Jaya, North Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Aceh. IFES assisted training in South Sulawesi, Gorontalo,

A planning and logistical training programme was run

Central Kalimantan, Central Java, Lampung and North

from December 2003 to January 2004 for 32 provincial

Sumatra, with funding from the UNDP.

KPU secretariat staff and 440 district KPU secretariat staff. The topics included election planning, risk

For the second round of the presidential election, using

analysis and logistical planning and tracking.

a similar strategy to previous elections, the UNDP supported training en masse in 27 provinces from

A public relations training workshop was run in

September 4-15, and distributed training materials

December 2003 for 32 provincial secretariat staff.

to all provinces. Two poll workers (KPPS) from each

35

polling station (one million trainees), two PPS workers

the legal meaning. Additional procedural steps,

from each village (140,000 trainees) and two PPK

not outlined in the decree, had to be formulated to

personnel from each sub-district all attended a

facilitate their work. Graphics, including the layout of

training session held at the district level (kabupaten/

the polling station and samples of voters card, voters

kota) by the KPU. AEC funded and assisted training in

cards and voters list, were necessary to enhance the

six provinces-Papua, West Irian Jaya, Nusa Tenggara

comprehension and familiarity of procedures.

Timur, North Maluku, Maluku, and South East Sulawesi. IFES assisted training in Gorontalo, West Java, West

A manual for the first round of the presidential

Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Central Kalimantan, with

election was considered important, not only to

funding provided by the UNDP.

disseminate the new information and different forms but also to correct procedures lapses from the legislative election and improve the performance of

Training Materials

poll workers. Based on assessments of observer teams and internal feedback and evaluation, a list of issues

Training materials were based on the KPU decrees. In

was drawn up which could be improved upon in the

addition, all election forms had to be designed by the

next election. Poll workers were generally commended

KPU, based on these decrees. Decrees 1 and 2 for the

on their commitment and neutrality and for running a

legislative elections were only approved on 23 January,

smooth election day without any major incidents. All

2004, with the legislative elections scheduled to be

observers were impressed with the transparency of the

held on 5 April. Decrees 37 and 38 for the first round

counting process.

of the presidential election were approved on 26 May, 2004, and the additional Decrees 45, 46 and 47 for

Someprocedureswhichneededimprovement,however,

the second round of the presidential election were

included closer checks of ink-stained fingers to prevent

approved on 20 August, 2004. The lead-in time was

double voting, the wider spacing of voting screens

very short to conceptualize the training manual and

to ensure more secrecy, ang greater care in filling

video, as well as to draft, design, film, edit, approve,

out forms and making copies available to witnesses

reproduce and distribute the materials.

or for posting on result boards. As poll workers had already the experience of the legislative election,

For the legislative elections, the aim was to produce

considerable attention was paid in the manual and

a training manual which would provide a legal base

video to improving performance and achieving more

and reference point for all poll workers to carry out

consistency and accuracy in implementing procedures.

their tasks. This election required different procedures

As a result there were more instructions on filling in

and forms from those used in 1999, reflecting the

forms and more graphics depicting the steps to be

complexity of running four elections at the same time

followed in voting and counting.

and using a new system that involved an open list of candidates. The decree was published at the end of

Because it was not known if there would be a second

January, leaving only 10 weeks before election day

round of the presidential election until after July 5,

to create the manual, the video and other training

no plans had been made for a third manual. When

materials. The approach adopted was to summarize

a second round was announced, additional funding

relevant aspects of the poll workers’ tasks and make

provided an opportunity to focus again on improving

the formal language more accessible without losing

performance and consolidating the knowledge and

36

experience of the poll workers. During de-briefings

Three videos were produced, one for each election. A

with provincial trainers, it was suggested that more

KPU editing committee was established to approve

graphics, more colour and a simpler text should be

the script, particularly the technical aspects and the

used. The concept was to provide a “refresher” booklet

tone. For the legislative election video, the script took

which, rather than simply repeating information from

two weeks to develop and the production and post-

the first round, would remind poll workers of the

production took a further two weeks. The stars of the

importance of following procedures consistently. The

first video were from two popular television shows-

booklet had pullout task cards for each poll worker and

Rano Karno and Maudy from “Si Doel” and Mats Solar

a separate sheet to be given to witnesses explaining

and Nany Wijaya from “Bajaj Bajuri”. Deddy Mizwar is

their rights.

another film and TV star who presented instructions with an air of authority on the second and third videos, and Cici Tegal, a well-known comedian, joined for the

In addition to the manual, it was agreed that a training

last of the three videos to add a humourous touch. KPU

video would be produced to broadcast on television

Chairman, Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin opened each video

as well as to use in training sessions. A 30-minute

with a speech offering encouragement to poll workers

video was considered long enough to explain the

to conduct a smooth election and finally thanking

preparations, voting and counting procedures and

them for their commitment.

forms. To achieve maximum impact, the video was styled on the popular sinetron, or “infotainment”

Copies of the VCD were distributed to all districts with

format, using television celebrities. The focus of the

one copy per PPS/village. The video was used in many

video was directed as much at the voters, informing

training sessions where equipment and electricity

them of what documents to bring and how to vote, as

were available. The video was broadcast 21 times

the poll workers.

on 7 TV stations in the week before the legislative election, 14 times on seven TV stations for first round

37

of the presidential and 12 times on five TV stations

As part of its strategy, the KPU launched the training

for the second round. The airing dates and times were

materials at the media centre a few weeks before each

provided to monitoring organizations, political parties,

election. KPU members presented the training plan

election committees, polling station officials.

and the materials. They were joined by the celebrities while segments of the video were shown and materials

The video had the additional function of informing

handed out to the Press. The strategy of using the

voters about the process of the elections, thereby

celebrities to advertise the training materials and

increasing transparency. It also helped witnesses and

the broadcast times worked well in promoting the

local observers their tasks of assessing the voting and

KPU’s national training programme and resulted in

counting.

positive press reports. It was very difficult to secure primetime slots on the popular TV stations, which

A complex distribution plan had to be devised to get

were either booked months in advance or overpriced.

the training materials to all districts and sub-districts.

Private stations tended not to give discounts, even if

Distribution companies were used to deliver the

the programme was considered to be national service.

materials in time for each election. For the legislative

According to the survey, 49% of respondents said they

elections, materials were delivered to provincial,

watched TV in the afternoon and 35% in the evening

district/city and sub-district levels. The idea was

SCTV, RCTI, and TVRI were the most popular stations.

for each polling station to receive two manuals and each village-level authority to receive a VCD. Remote areas and areas with security issues such as Papua,

Monitoring and Evaluation

Aceh and Maluku, were given priority for distribution. The training materials were also distributed to CSOs

Following the two presidential elections, UNDP carried

conducting both voter education and party witness

out an independent evaluation of the KPU training

training and to national observer groups. English

programmes covering all three elections. This was

versions of the manual and video script were also

done by the KPU Polling Center and involved in-depth

provided to international observer groups and donors.

interviews, focus groups and a quantitative survey.

38

The survey offered insights into what materials and

Predictably, poll workers passing judgement on

strategies proved to be most effective and to provide

the video particularly liked the famous actors,

recommendations to the KPU for future programmes.

the humour, the systematic explanations about errors, and the animation. They also suggested

Results from the survey showed that 100% of polling

more frequent broadcasts of the video with a clear

staff reported getting some form of training. Of these,

schedule that should be better advertised, and with

68% received what they considered to be a briefing on

more focus on troubleshooting and solving problems,

voting, counting of ballots and the filling in of forms.

briefer explanations, and an emphasis on positive

The other 32% considered what they had received to

achievements rather than just the mistakes.

be in-depth training. Generally the evaluation was positive. The training was considered well-organized

After every election, the UNDP, IFES and AEC

and effective enough to educate polling staff in their

participated in a debriefing of the trainers who assisted

roles and responsibilities.

in conducting the training programme in the provinces. The trainers, as well as national and international

The trainers were considered to have been clear

observer groups, raised several issues, regarding the

enough in their instruction, supported by simulation

performance of poll-workers:

and examples of problems. The training materials were seen to be easy to understand. Suggestions

• The need to check inked fingers more closely

for improvements from participants included: more

and to apply ink to the voter’s finger in a more

simulation exercises; fewer participants in each

consistent manner;

training session; prioritization of administrative and

• The need to respect the secrecy of the voter’s

transportation issues, either first or separately, so they

ballot, including not having poll-workers or anyone

don’t distract from the training; earlier announcement

else behind the voting screens unless assisting a

of training schedules; and the use of more interactive

disabled voter;

training techniques. However, 50% of participants said there was nothing to improve in the training they had received.

• The need to avoid the late opening and early closing of polling stations; • The need to ensure that no political propaganda is left near or around the polling station;

The manuals were considered a successful tool in the

• The need to count ballots according to procedures

smooth running of the elections, with 97% of those

and to fill in forms accurately; while providing

surveyed describing them as useful and 73% saying

copies for witnesses and posting the election

they didn’t need improvement. Based on feedback

results.

and the evaluation, there were some suggestions for

• The need to speed up the recapitulation of results

improvement such as to use local printers, print more

by ensuring fewer errors in the filling out of forms.

copies, and ensure that distribution is made well ahead of training. Other ideas were to increase the font size,

All comments relating to the performance of poll

check that the graphics clearly represent the tasks,

workers were noted by the KPU and the UNDP and

provide a better explanation on how to fill out the

helped shape each video and manual, with the

forms and to be careful not to try to cover too much

intention of improving on shortcomings.

because it discourages poll workers from reading.

39

UNDP staff also visited polling stations and completed

and in identifying and understanding violations and

standard checklists related to the effectiveness of

other fraudulent acts. This was therefore the focus of

the training and materials for each, as well as to

the training that was provided by the UNDP in support

gather information related to voter information

of the Panwaslu. The training was funded from an

and education. The majority of all polling stations

earmarked contribution from the European Union, and

monitored by UNDP staff in each of the elections had

was implemented through a sub-project (INS/03/A14)

received the manual and found it useful. Almost all

executed by the Coordinating Ministry of Economy

poll-workers had seen the training video on television.

and implemented directly by the Panwaslu. The role of the UNDP included offering technical expertise for the training sessions, providing training materials and

Training Programme of the Supervisory Committee for General Elections

books, as well as administrative support.

While all were striving to make sure the 2004 elections

Training Activities

were held in an effective, non-partisan and timely manner, it was assumed these elections would be

Training started in November 2003 and by the end

under much closer scrutiny. The public, the media

of January 2004, the Panwas, with UNDP support,

and outside observers had been rather accepting of

had completed the training of all Panwas staff at the

shortcomings in 1999, mainly because of the novelty

provincial, district, and sub-district level. The UNDP

and the restricted time frame under which they

team and Panwas decided to limit the number of

took place. The 2004 elections would not have this

participants to all trainings to 30-35 people, which

advantage. It was therefore important the whole

translated into about 760 training sessions. The

election process would be submitted to a form of

participatory approach required a team of skilled

effective and independent supervision to guarantee its

trainers, who were then teamed up with Panwas staff

overall quality.

at the local level. Each participant was presented with a package of key materials. In developing the

Law 12/2003 on Elections, Article 122, prescribes the

training materials, UNDP advisers looked into the

formation of an Election Supervisory Body (Panitia

recommendations from the 1999 elections. Criticism

Pengawas Pemilihan or Panwaslu) at the national,

at that time included a lack of clear guidelines for

provincial, regency/city and sub-district levels. The

the handling of complaints and a lack of standards by

Panwaslu, while established by the KPU, was tasked

which to evaluate complaints.

with supervising every stage of the election, including receiving reports on violations of election laws, settling

The training team opted against using complex visual

disputes where possible and forwarding findings

aides because the bulk of the training was held at

and reports which could not be resolved to relevant

sub-district level where electricity can be unreliable.

institutions. To do this successfully the Panwaslu

The primary visual aide produced was a high-quality

had to be able to manage its own affairs with

(thick stock) flipchart, given to each facilitator. These

demonstrable autonomy from the KPU.

flipcharts proved popular, but at the provincial level participants argued for the use of power-point. In

Critical to the success of Panwaslu was the capability

addition to these materials, the Panwas produced a

and skills of Panwaslu members in managing disputes,

training video and a manual on dispute resolution, with

40

UNDP support. About 6000 copies of the video were

internet.The lack of a comprehensive public awareness

distributed to all provincial and district offices after it

programme about the Panwas also restricted the

was completed in February 2004. While the VCD was

ability of the organization to advertise its website to

considered useful at the provincial and district level,

the general public. Advertisements were placed on

to be effective at the village level, it needed to be

detik.com to great effect – as witnessed by the spike in

incorporated into the training programme, rather than

hits following placement of these advertisements. But

as a stand-alone training material.

the cost involved was relatively high.

Website

Case Reporting

Developed with UNDP programme support, the

A team of reporting staff, supported by UNDP, assisted

Panwas launched its website www.panwaspemilu.org

Panwas members in compiling data on reported

in January 2004 and received about two million hits

violations during the presidential election. From 15-16

– an average of 70.000 a day - during the period of

April, the training programme supported a workshop in

the legislative elections. The website offered a range

Jakarta for all of Panwas national members to review

of information on Panwas and the electoral complaint

and discuss interpretations of regulations relating to

process. By allowing users to report violations on line,

the election process, evaluate their own performance,

the general public was invited to actively participate in

discuss reports received during the polling and

supervising and monitoring the elections.

counting process, and determine formats for final reporting for this period. At a second workshop some

The website received hundreds of readers’comments.

weeks later, representatives from all Panwas provincial

Surveys showed 89% of respondents thought Panwas

offices completed their reporting and discussed

was effective in supervising the elections and

improvements to the reporting mechanism for the

82% thought it effectively handled disputes. More

presidential election period.

importantly, the website received several hundred case reports of possible violations, providing an alternative

UNDP considered support for case reporting to be a

means for reporting possible electoral abuse.

priority, because the time and resources invested to explain the case reporting mechanisms at all levels

The website is the clearest example of an aspect of

during the national training programme depended on

the programme that exceeded its originally-intended

efficient case management in Jakarta. The staff – who

output. The website developed a readership that was

remained at the Panwas office around the clock during

far in excess of original expectations and was a useful

the election periods – performed an invaluable task in

tool for provincial PANWAS offices to submit reports

providing timely and comprehensive case information.

and information quickly to the national office.

As a result, Panwas was able to provide valuable information at press conferences on the day of and the

Use of the website, however, varied widely among

day following the national elections.

Panwas offices – some provincial staff checked it several times a day and made regular submissions, others used it infrequently, often because there was only one office telephone line, limiting access to the

41

National Election Monitors

successfully mediated over 1,000 cases, but saw few results from the more than 12,000 administrative

As it is impossible for the staff of Panwas to be present

violation cases referred to the KPU for resolution. One

everywhere and at any given time, it had to rely on

of the main problems that faced Panwas was its lack

volunteers, the general public and national election

of enforcement authority. It compensated for that

observers to submit reports on election violations.

somewhat by effectively using its good relations with

With the Panwas training programme was taking

the Press to publicize problems, but if the Panwas

shape in October 2004, there were several discussions

mechanism is used for future elections, this is an area

about promoting and intensifying cooperation with

that needs to be addressed.

national monitoring groups, That led to the signing of a memorandum of agreement at the national level between the Panwas and several of the groups.

KPU Media Centre

Relations between national monitors and the Panwas were strong at the national level, but unfortunately

The programme’s objectives included providing

this did not translate to effective relations at the

support to the KPU in its efforts to ensure a

provincial and district levels. Regrettably election

transparent organization of the elections and to

monitors filed very few case reports with the Panwas.

maintain a professional relationship with national and international media, political parties and the general public. Programme support therefore included

Monitoring and Evaluation

the establishment of a full-service KPU Media Centre managed by a public relations company called

The UNDP programme undertook ongoing monitoring

BamboedoeaCommunications,whichwonthecontract

and evaluation of training courses and visited nearly

in a competitive bidding process.

all provinces at least once during election preparations. This included attending training events, conducting

The KPU chairman officially opened the media centre

in-depth interviews with Panwas members and

and media-monitoring unit on 29 September 2003.

with other election stakeholders, poll observers in

The centre was used by more than 100 journalists

particular. In addition, the UNDP programme finance

on a daily basis and had more than 500 registered

officer and finance assistant visited all provinces that

journalists overall. Its aim was to (1) provide quick,

were considered negligent in transmitting financial

convenient and accurate information on 2004

reporting and helped them complete financial reports.

elections to the media and public and (2) establish

Trip reports were written following each field visit

good relations between the KPU and the mass media.

and results were discussed with the Panwas whenever

To meet these objectives, the centre organized two

issues of concern arose.

sub-programmes:

One of the success indicators for the Panwas was the

1. Media Monitoring and Analysis: included

number of cases of election violations reported and

monitoring all election coverage, particularly

processed, which was significant. More than 900 cases

where it related to the KPU. From this, the centre

were sent to district courts, with more than 600 of

assisted the KPU in formulating an information

these already decided by November 2004 (compared

strategy to respond to various issues as they arose.

to only four in the 1999 elections). Panwas also

42

2. Press and Information: included providing

information to the Press and public on all matters related to the elections.

KPUDs and other interested parties. f ) An election information database including a compilation of all data, old and new, on the

Specific activities undertaken under each of these sub-

2004 elections, was made available to journalists

programmes are summarized below:

through an intranet in the KPU Media Centre. g) An election information database was copied and distributed on CD-Rom. All regional KPUDs were

Media Monitoring and Analysis

among teh recipients.

a) Daily summaries of news coverage, focusing on key issues relating to the elections and the KPU. These

Press and Information Centre

were distributed to all KPU Members. b) Minutes of meetings, including all KPU plenary

a) Provision of media centre services, including

sessions and other important gathering. These

17 computers, one scanner, one printer, two

were also distributed to all KPU Members.

photocopiers, six telephones, one fax machine and

c) Analyst recommendations centered on issues requiring priority attention, and were provided

four television sets. b) SMS services, including SMSs sent to about 250

by the media centre to KPU Members. The

recipients on a daily basis containing urgent news

recommendations included strategies on how to

about the elections and/or the KPU.

deal with upcoming issues. d) Daily press releases on KPU activities and electionrelated issues were prepared and distributed to the mass media. All releases were pre-approved by the KPU before distribution. e) A bi-weekly newsletter, Suara KPU, covering the work of the KPU, was distributed to the media,

c) Fax services, including faxes sent to 137 institutions also containing urgent news about the elections and/or the KPU. d) A call centre responded to calls received through a free-phone number related to the elections and/or the KPU. e) Press conferences were organised in the media

43

centre as often as required by the KPU. f ) Press backgrounders were organized to provide the

n) Presidential candidates signed a similar declaration prior to the first round of the presidential election.

Press with detailed information on various events. g) Editors’ forums were organized to provide an

The media centre also worked with 40 civil society

opportunity for the KPU Members to meet with

organizations to assist the KPU in distributing

the editors of major media concerns to build up a

socialization materials and organizing events in

better understanding about the work of the KPU.

support of the elections.These organizations consisted

h) Press tours were frequently organized so journalists

of professional institutions, such as teachers’ and

could accompany KPU members on visits to the

doctors’ associations, artists and celebrities, womens’

regions to observe election preparations.

organizations, religious and minority groups. Other

i) Journalist workshops were organized to cover

media centre activities included providing assistance

detailed issues related to election technicalities. j) Print and photo competitions were held to

to the KPU in situations during the electoral process. This proved particularly valuable when a large number

encourage excellence in reporting on the elections

of double-punched ballots were discovered duirng the

process.

first presidential election. The media centre assisted in

k) Regular coffee mornings were organized and hosted by the KPU chairman. These were attended

contacting all KPUDs to inform them of the subsequent decree which validated the ballots.

by different groups at different times, including university deans, religious leaders, youth leaders,

Despite the seeming dominance of negative news, an

and political observers.

analysis of overall media coverage on the elections

l) Balloting simulation was conducted, at the request

from January to September 2004, shows that 76.2%

of the KPU, to brief international and national

was either positive or neutral. In addition, according

observers on the balloting process.

to IFES tracking surveys, the public opinion of the KPU

m) Representatives of all political parties signed

44

was largely upbeat throughout the election process,

a “peaceful campaign” declaration prior to the

rising from 60.2% positive in January 2004 to 82.2%

legislative elections.

positive in October 2004. Of all the election-related

news in the Press, 71.72% is estimated to have resulted

materials (posters, flyers, T-shirts and PSAs) and other

from information received by the media through

related election resources.

releases or from events at the KPU Media Centre. One of the final activities of Bamboedoea

National Vote Tabulation Centre

Communications, prior to the end of its contract on 31 October 2004, was the handover of the media

As a further way of assisting the KPU in ensuring

centre to the KPU public relations bureau, whose

transparency in the organization of the elections, the

staff had been continuously involved in its activities

UNDP Programme supported the KPU in setting-up

and decisions, but had not been responsible for the

a national tally centre, the Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu

day-to-day implementation. The handover provided

(TNP). The TNP was initially established on a temporary

an opportunity for direct training and on-the-job

basis for two weeks following the 5 April legislative

training of the KPU staff throughout September and

elections. The TNP was set up at the Borobodur Hotel

October, while gradually reducing the staff presence of

and served as a focal point for the collection and

Bamboedoea. On 1 November, 2004, the bureau staff

dissemination of KPU election results and provided

took over the management of the media centre.

a venue for daily presentations and discussions on election issues for the Press.

Bamboedoea also assisted the KPU in establishing the KPU Election Documentation Centre within the

The results displayed in the tally centre were gathered

media centre, which is open to the media and the

from the KPU’s newly-established information

public and provides access to a wide range of archived

technology system, designed to enable results to be

information concerning the elections. This includes

quickly communicated to the national level, while

election materials (ballot boxes, ballot booths and

the slower process of manual counting was being

ballot papers), socialization materials (posters, videos

conducted. The IT-gathered results could not be

and recordings of PSAs, leaflets and flyers), training

considered as the formal count, but they provided a

materials (manuals and videos), political party

valuable source of early information for the media and the public at large. The data presented at the tally centre could be accessed using a drill down approach all the way national to individual polling station level for each of the four elections-DPR, DPD, DPRD Provinsi, and DPRD Kabupaten/Kota. This on-line vote count presentation provided a significant degree of transparency in the vote-counting process and also proved to be a very accurate. The Tally Centre was established and managed by an external public relations company called AAJ Komunika. The company was selected following a competitive bidding process. The TNP was officially opened on April 4, 2004, with a

45

press briefing attended by 220 domestic and foreign

the first round of the presidential elections, the

journalists and 75 non-media visitors. Following the

presidential and vice-presidential candidates were

opening session, press conferences were organized on

invited to a debate, with two pairs of candidates

a daily basis, as well as daily discussion sessions on

featured on one evening and three pairs on the

subjects of topical interest. A media working room was

next. The debates were broadcast live throughout

established, with computers, internet access and easy

Indonesia. Prior to the second round of the

downloading of election results as they were received.

presidential elections, a series of three dialogues were organized on consecutive evenings, with

Based on the success of the TNP for the legislative

the two remaining presidential candidates facing

elections, the KPU requested support for the

questions covering a range of social, economic and

establishment of a similar centre for the first and

political issues.

second rounds of the presidential elections. This activity was cost-shared between the UNDP and IFES,

KPU was supported by IFES for the concept and

which proved to be an effective partnership. For the

organization of the debates and dialogues. At the

first round of the presidential elections, the event was

request of the KPU and IFES, the UNDP provided

again managed directly by AAJ Komunika. However,

support for the venue and set-up costs for the second

for the second round, the event was more directly

round presidential dialogues. The KPU Media Centre

managed and implemented by the KPU, with technical

was also fully involved in these activities, providing

input from AAJ Komunika. This was intended as a

advisory and administrative support.

capacity-building measure and as such was highly The debates and dialogues were popular, with just

successful.

over 50% of the voters seeing or hearing them at least once1. However, the concept of a debate was

KPU Debates and Dialogues

new to Indonesia and some commented that it was contrary to the culture of Indonesia to enter into direct

For the first time in Indonesia’s history, the KPU

confrontation on issues. Only a quarter of Indonesians

organized a series of debates and dialogues

thought that candidates should be allowed to criticize

between the presidential candidates. Prior to

the platforms or policies of other candidates, while a majority (51%) was opposed to the idea2.

Figure Twelve: Satisfaction of Users with TNP Presidential Elections: Round One Total

%

Total

Excellent

39

24.2%

22

19.3%

Good

88

54.7%

56

49.1%

Satisfactory

26

16.1%

30

26.3%

8

5.0%

6

5.3%

Poor

1 IFES Tracking Survey, 19 October 2004 2 Ibid

46

Presidential Elections: Round Two %

4

Voter Information Campaign

47

4

Voter Information Campaign

The area of voter information was identified as a priority of the KPU in the early stages of the election process and during the development of the objectives for the UNDP election programme. While some state funds had been allocated for this activity, the KPU was concerned that the significant changes in the election process would demand a higher level of information dissemination than their resources would allow. An initial survey on voter knowledge and attitudes was conducted by The Asia Foundation between June and August 2003. This showed that, while there was a high intention to vote in the upcoming elections, Indonesians had a poor understanding of the new electoral procedures and were unfamiliar with the role of elections and representatives, as well as core democratic principles and values. Specifically, the survey showed that more than 90% of the electorate did not know when the legislative elections would take place, that almost two thirds had not heard anything about

48

the DPD or were unsure if they had heard anything,

requirements of the KPU and the election process.

and almost half had not heard of the KPU. A further

Of these, the company with the lower price proposal

31% had heard of the KPU, but did not know what the

was selected. This company was PT Fortune Indonesia,

organization did, and 75% were confused about the

an established communications agency in Indonesia,

procedures for the legislative elections.

working in advertising, public relations and social marketing.

In an effort to rectify the situation, the UNDP worked with the KPU on recruiting an experienced

The UNDP worked closely with the KPU in its

advertising agency to help with the development and

implementation of a nationwide voter information

implementation of a voter information strategy and

strategy. It was agreed that the overall goal of the

campaign. The selection of the advertising agency was

information campaign would be to ensure that the

done through an open competitive tender involving a

process and results of the elections were perceived as

number of different stages. Interested agencies were

fair and honest and accepted by the Indonesian people

first asked to submit proposals to the UNDP based

as reflecting the true will of the people. To do this, the

on a detailed “terms of reference” which had been

key theme of the campaign was identified as: “Suara

developed by the KPU and the UNDP. Following an

Anda Menentukan Anda: Gunakan Hak Pilih Anda

initial short-listing process conducted by the UNDP at

Dengan Bijak” (Your Voice Counts: Use Your Voting

the request of the KPU, a committee was established,

Rights Wisely). The strategy was divided into three

comprising KPU, UNDP and external experts, to review

phases:

the remaining and responsive proposals in detail. Phase One: Pre-election period (September-December The committee selected a final four companies to

2003) focused on registering voters, introducing the

present their concepts and proposals to the KPU

public to the new electoral process and balloting

plenary-meeting of all the KPU members. A final two

procedures, and promoting the KPU as an independent

companies were selected, both presenting concepts

and non-partisan organization.

which were considered to meet the needs and

49

Phase Two: Legislative election period (January-April

on the date and system of the elections and how to

2004) focused on making voters more knowledgable

cast a valid vote.

so they could actively and effectively participate in the legislative election. This included an awareness of

The KPU information campaign was formally launched

the electoral process, of participating political parties

by the then President Megawati Soekarnoputri on

and their candidates and of the need to exercise voting

27 October, 2003, introducing the “Milih Langsung”

rights in a friendly, peaceful and safe environment.

(“Vote Directly”) logo and mascot to the Indonesian public. The logo was used throughout the campaign.

Phase Three: Presidential election period (April–

The campaign produced and distributed millions of

October 2004) focused on encouraging voters to

posters, flyers, booklets, stickers and print ads and

register for the legislative elections and to participate

aired radio and television PSAs throughout the country.

in the presidential elections. Emphasis was also placed

A summary of the total products used in the campaign is included in figure thirteen.

50

Figure Thirteen: Summary of Voter Information Materials Produced by Fortune Activity

Message/Details

Quantity

Phase One TV Spots

Three versions: Voter Registration, New Election System, KPU Image

699 insertions on 4 TV stations

Telops and Running

Two versions: Voter Registration, Election

Texts

Schedule

Radio Spots

Two versions: Voter Registration, Election

9,176 insertions on 2

Schedule

network stations and 3 Jakarta stations

Print ads

Three versions: Voter Registration, Election

54 insertions in 5

Schedule, KPU Image

newspapers, 2 tabloids, 4 magazines

Booklets

Question and Answers on the Elections

10,000 copies

Posters

Two versions: Voter Registration, Election

10,000 of each version

Schedule Leaflets

Nine versions (each in both bahasa Indonesia and English): Election Schedule, Voter

30,000 of each version in

Registration, KPU Image, DPD, DPR, Party

bahasa Indonesia and 2,000

Verification, Panwaslu, Election Districts, and

in English

Women in Elections Giant Banners

Vote Directly

126 Banners

VCD

All socialisation materials for the KPUDs

500 copies

51

Activity

Message/Details

Quantity

Phase Two: Legislative Elections TV Programmes

Six programmes, including talk shows and quiz shows

TV Spots

Three versions: Election Schedule, DPD, How to Punch the Ballot

TV Filler

Two Versions: Use Your Right to Vote, Seek Information on the Parties

TV Telop

Valid and Invalid Votes

Running Text

Four versions: Election Schedule, Voters Card, Use Your Right to Vote, Election Time

Radio Spots

Four versions: Election Schedule, How to Punch the Ballot, Use Your Right to Vote, Seek Information on the Parties

23,560 insertions

Five versions: Election Schedule, How to Punch the Ballot, Valid and Invalid Votes, Peaceful Elections, Voter Card

213 insertions

Four versions: Election Schedule, How to Punch the Ballot, Political Parties, Layout of the Polling Station

1,460,000 posters

Leaflets

Two versions: Voters Guide, Political Parties

400,000 leaflets

Flyers

Voters Guide

2,000,000 flyers

Giant Banners

Two versions: Election Schedule, How to Punch the Ballot

5,004 banners

Stickers

Two versions: Election Schedule, How to Punch the Ballot

520,000 stickers

Print Ads

Posters

52

61 episodes in total on 5 different TV channels

1,359 insertions on 13 different national and local TV stations

Activity

Message/Details

Quantity

Phase Three: Presidential Elections Round One TV Spots

Two Versions: Election Schedule and Use Your Right to Vote 2,709 insertions on 9

TV Fillers

How to Punch to the Ballot

different national and local TV stations

TV Telops

Two versions: Voter Registration, How to Punch the Ballot

Radio Spots

Print Ads

Five Versions: Voter Registration, Voter

15,912 insertions on 92

RegistrationExtended,ElectionSchedule,How

different radio stations

to Punch the Ballot, Use Your Right to Vote

across Indonesia

Two versions: Voter Registration, Election

69 insertions in national

Schedule + How to Punch

and local newspapers and magazines

Posters

Three versions: Election Schedule + How to Punch, Profile of Candidates, Layout of Polling

552,000 Posters

Station Leaflets

Voters Guide

200,000 Leaflets

Flyers

Voters Guide

500,000 Flyers

53

Activity

Message/Details

Quantity

Phase Three: Presidential Elections Round Two TV Spots

Use Your Right to Vote 1,721 insertions on 9 different national and local TV stations

TV Fillers

How to Punch to the Ballot

Radio Spots

Two versions: How to Punch the Ballot+ Use

24,930 insertions on 92

the Ink, Use Your Right to Vote

different radio stations across Indonesia

Print Ads

Posters

Two versions: How to Punch the Ballot+ Use

17 insertions in national

the Ink, Use Your Right to Vote

newspapers and magazines

Two versions: Profile of Candidates, Election

400,000 posters

Schedule + How to Punch the Ballot Flyers

500,000 flyers

Voter Guide

In order to track both the effectiveness of the

Langsung campaign messages directly correlated with

campaign and the emerging information needs of

this increase. By January-February 2004, 52% said that

the public, UNDP provided cost-sharing support for a

they had seen, heard or read this message, and 57% by

series of tracking surveys, which were managed and

February-March 2004 (see figure fourteen).

implemented by IFES. The series of 20 tracking surveys focused on key aspects of public knowledge of the electoral environment as a means of assessing specific voter information and election management needs,

Figure Fourteen: Exposure to ‘Milih Langsung’ Messages

and to fine-tune resulting public information and educationcampaigns. Questions included in the survey included those related to awareness of the dates of the elections, understanding of the election process, awareness of the voter registration process, and

47%

52%

57%

awareness of the Milih Langsung campaign messages. The knowledge and awareness of the elections dates

Dec 2003

and processes increased steadily over time (See figure *from IFES tracking survey). Exposure to the Milih

54

*from IFES tracking survey

Jan-Feb

Feb-Mar

2003

2001

The KPU identified first time and young voters as

to vote, with student groups initially being the most

a particular target for their information campaign.

vocal in calling for a boycott of the general elections

While this was incorporated into the campaign

process. The target audience of MTV also represented

messages conducted by Fortune Indonesia, it was

the largest demographic segment in Indonesia. Of

also supplemented by an activity conducted by MTV

a voting population of 150 million people (out of a

Indonesia. The MTV activity was contracted on a sole-

total population of 220 million), 85 million voters

source basis, with both the KPU and UNDP considering

were between the ages of 15 and 34 years old. This

that there was no comparable provider to be

represented close to 60% of the eligible voters.

considered. MTV already had experience of producing successful campaigns and advocacy of development-

Thecampaigninformedyoungvotersonwhenandhow

related matters in collaboration with various United

to vote with a series of PSAs and “vox pops”, in which

Nation agencies, such as the UNFPA, UNICEF dan

young voters shared their views on why democracy

UNAIDS in the United State, India and the Philippines

and elections are important.The campaign covered the

among others. MTV is also the only television station in

three elections, with specific and different messages

Indonesia which specifically targets the youth market.

being highlighted during the process. The highlight of the campaign was a live Rock-the-Vote concert held

The MTV “Rock-the-Vote” campaign was aimed at

in Senayan in Jakarta in June 2004, bringing together

first-time voters as well as at encouraging a peaceful

some of the biggest names in Indonesian pop music. It

election. There were initially many indications that

was attended by over 30,000 people and was aired a

young voters were more likely to be disenchanted

number of times on MTV.

with the election system and more likely therefore not

55

Figure Fifteen: Summary of Voter Information Materials Produced by MTV Indonesia

Activity

Message/Details

Quantity

Legislative Elections (March-April 2004) TV Fillers

Two versions: Election System, Election Schedule

TV Filler

Hitting the Heart: MTV interviewed people all over the country and some Indonesians living abroad for their opinions and to gauge what they knew about the elections, especially the new electoral system (Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Medan , Makassar, Yogyakarta, Balikpapan, Bali, London)

Each shown 6 times a day for 72 days

Shown 12 times a day for 17 days

TV Spots

252 insertions

Ad Libs

5 times a day for 65 days

Presidential Elections (April-July 2004) TV Fillers

Four versions: Voter Registration, Election

Two shown 6 times a day

System, Election Schedule, General

for 72 days and two shown

Information

6 times a day for 121 days

TV Spots

228 insertions

Ad Libs

5 times a day for 35 days

Presidential Elections (August-September 2004) TV Fillers

56

Three versions: Peaceful Campaign, Use Your Right to Vote, Election Schedule

Each shown 20 times a day for 20 days

TV Spots

120 insertions

Ad Libs

5 times a day for 20 days

In addition to the above, UNDP assisted the KPU in a

the legislative elections (10,000 of each of the four

number of ad hoc information dissemination activities.

different types of ballots: DPRD kabupaten/kota, DPRD

This included the printing of 50,000 compilations

provinsi, DPD and DPR) that could be used by the KPU

of the five election laws, which were distributed

and KPUDs, as well as other interested partners, for

to KPUDs, political parties, CSOs, and the media. It

balloting simulation activities.

also included the printing of mock ballot papers for

European Union Visibility Campaign

As part of its contribution to the Election Programme Trust Fund, the European Union allocated 360,000 Euros to conduct a visibility campaign. The aim of the campaign was to inform the Indonesian public about the role of the European Union, its relations with Indonesia and its commitment to the democratization process. Since the money allocated was part of the EU contribution to the trust fund, the UNDP was tasked with the implementation. This project was distinctly different from all the other activities and projects under the umbrella of the UNDP Elections Programme. Although it required the approval of the institutional Indonesian bodies involved in the elections, it was implemented and developed independently. Moreover, the expected results were to reflect the interest of the single donor – the European Union - as this was a project aimed solely at its promotion and greater visibility in Indonesia. The Specific Objectives To provide more information about the European Union and issues related to democratization, stress the links between the European Union and Indonesia and improve the understanding of European Union amongst young people. The Target University students were chosen as the target group because first or second time voters typically form the driving force behind any struggle towards democracy. The TimeFrame The project, initially designed for a six-months period, was later extended to eight months.

57

The Activities: The campaign focused on three major types of activities: • Media campaign • Public relations and cultural events • Seminars on democracy in Indonesian universities Media Campaign Through a bidding process, the advertising agency JWT was selected to conduct a media campaign. The agency produced 2,000 posters, 3,000 diaries and a television commercial. The posters were distributed through the VICI Consortium, the KPU network, universities (distribution by the UNDP) and embassies (through the EU delegation), while the diaries were handed out to students at seminars. The diary contained a message from the EU ambassador, a map of the European Union and general information about EU institutions. The 60-second TV commercial and the 30-second reminder were aired on national television in May 2004. Public Relations and Cultural Events The UNDP contracted the agency One Comm to assist with this aspect of the project, which included: 1. A pantomime play by the well-known theatre group Sena Didi Mime, who produced an hour-long performance on aspects of democracy in Indonesia. The play was shown to the public on 23 and 24 of April, at Gedung Kesenian in Jakarta and received many positive reviews. 2. A photo exhibition of work by non-professional photographers who were asked to combine the themes of democracy, Europe and the Indonesian society.The exhibition ran at the Goethe Institute, the gallery of Taman Ismael Marzuki, and the lobby of Wisma Dharmala. 3. Public relations events, which included a radio programme and several advertorials and ads in selected nationwide newspapers written by Wimar Witoelar. His writings on democracy and Europe, in relation to the political momentum in Indonesia, were printed in the daily Kompass and the weekly Tempo. Press conferences and media releases on these activities assured a wider coverage of the campaign topics in the Indonesia media. Seminars A series of one-day seminars for university students and lecturers were held in Jakarta, Banjarmasin, Medan, Makasar and Jogyakarta.These seminars consisted of a series of presentations from local university lecturers and European Union diplomats on themes related to democracy and European Union-Indonesia relations. They offered an opportunity for open discussion, sharing of information and exchange of knowledge, especially for the university students. Attendance as well as participation was overwhelming, with many questions and comments raised by the students.

58

5

Voter Education

59

5

Voter Education

The largest area of support under the Election Support Programme was assisting the KPU in voter education activities, in close collaboration with civil society organizations (CSOs) to ensure the availability of factual orientation regarding voting procedures, to underscore the value of voting and the right of individuals to vote according to their own convictions. The Election Support Programme approved USD 6,950,000 to support voter education for the legislative elections as well as both rounds of the presidential elections of which USD 6,805,293 was actually spent. The funds were disbursed to 40 civil society organisations, 19 of which were supported for both the legislative and presidential phases of the elections.

60

Role of Project Appraisal Committee

felt that such methods ought to take precedence over proposals that concentrated on holding seminars and

The Project Appraisal Committee on Voter Education

workshops, considering that such methods tend to

was established on 17 September, 2003. The PAC was

‘preach to the converted’ and target society’s elite.

chaired by the KPU (Ibu Valina Singka Subekti) and

Equally, the number of target beneficiaries that such

comprised two voting KPU members, two members

programmes can reach is very low. More importantly,

(one voting) of the Coordinating Ministry for Economic

however, they also rely on a limited number of national

Affairs and two voting members of the UNDP. In

instead of foresting the development of local and

exceptional circumstances, and at the discretion of the

regional expertise.

Chair, observers were invited to attend the meetings. The UNDP Programme established a rigorous As the chair of the PAC, the KPU was concerned that

mechanism by which proposals were selected. All

all the activities of selected CSOs were in accordance

proposals were given a first screening to determine

with the prevailing regulations and technical

whether the organization actually existed and to

stipulations. The KPU was equally aware of the

ascertain that all the requirements for the submission

importance of involving civil society organizations in

of proposals were fulfilled. Proposals that looked

the dissemination of voter education down to the level

interesting were set aside until the references of

of the grassroots to a country as large and far flung as

the CSO were investigated. This involved discussions

Indonesia.

with local and international partner donor agencies, PANWASLU branch offices and KPUD offices in the

The PAC tried very hard to be as geographically

regions the CSO proposed to work in. Efforts were

diverse as possible, selecting CSOs spanning from

also made find out whether the CSO had worked with

Aceh to Papua. It did not encourage the disbursement

donors or other relevant partners before, and whether

of block grants; however, it tried to accommodate

they had encountered problems with this CSO. If the

various techniques and methodologies used by CSOs

CSO was newly established, then the task was to find

in reaching a wide number of target beneficiaries.

out whether it brought with it experienced people and

Indeed, programmatically, it felt more disposed to

whether it had the capacity and human resources to

supporting a participative methodology encouraging

undertake the prescribed work. Preference was given

face-to-face field-work and maximum contact with

to bigger proposals with a large number of target

the people, rather than placing emphasis on workshops

beneficiaries and to CSOs working together as a

and seminars.

consortium or through joint collaboration.

The PAC was in broad agreement that face-to-face

Proposals that passed this initial test were then sent

methodologies that go down to the grassroots are the

to the PAC for evaluation and decision. The assessment

best way of spreading information and ensuring that

was made according to a matrix comprising several

such information is understood and absorbed. This

criteria – namely, the organization’s expertise, its

conviction was borne out despite the fact that such

proposed work plan and approach, and its personnel. In

methods are labour intensive, time consuming and

evaluating the proposals and making its deliberations,

costly. From this philosophy the PAC supported mass

the PAC tried to determine whether there was a

organizations of various religions that were capable

need for the programme, what its objectives were,

of reaching a very wide audience. Moreover, the PAC

what is its impact and its inputs were, and whether

61

the methodology was sound and feasible and

30 were accepted, 215 were rejected and 127 arrived

appropriate for the target group. Attention was also

past the deadline so they were not considered. No

paid to whether the activities were in line with the

maximum limit was set for any one grant.

desired outputs and finally, whether the budget was realistic. Based on the recommendations of the PAC,

A total of 221 proposals were submitted for activities

proposals were then submitted to the UNDP Contracts

covering the presidential elections: 27 were accepted,

Committee for final review. The entire contracting and

168 rejected and 26 arrived too late. Some of the CSOs

funding mechanism was managed by the UNDP.

that had performed well during the legislative elections had their contracts extended to cover the presidential

Once a CSO was accepted, a number of specific

elections, bringing the total number of CSOs supported

measures were put in place to ensure its

for two-round presidential election to 40.

accountability, effectiveness and transparency. These included standard operating procedures developed by

The methodologies of the programmes were mixed

the UNDP, which required CSOs to abide by specific

and the mix reflected the target audience at which

regulations for financial management, work planning,

these programmes were directed.Women were usually

activity and financial reporting. They also demanded

targeted through face-to-face meetings, community

the continuous monitoring of all activities through the

discussions at grassroots level, interactive and focus

submission of periodic financial and activity reports,

group discussions using participatory approaches such

and through evaluations and financial audits.

as role-plays and simulations. First-time voters were targeted through peer education programmes held at

Activities supported by the Election Support

participating schools, voting simulations in schools,

Programme were constrained to some extent by certain

poem reading contests, seminar discussions, radio

parameters set by its donors. This was especially the

dramas and the dissemination of information through

case for the legislative elections where the majority

various print media. Some programmes targeted the

of funding available for voter education was tied to

general public - regardless of gender, socio-economic

specific target groups or areas. For example CIDA

class or degree of literacy - using alternative methods

funding, which formed the bulk of the funds available

that mixed information with entertainment. These

for the legislative elections, was tied to women,

methods included mobile cinema, mobile theatre

first-time voters, and conflict areas. The attention

shows, and drama gong performances.

devoted to those parameters did result in some good proposals being put aside because they did not meet

Some NGOs were working in areas of conflict and

the necessary funding criteria.

as a result had to design programmes to suit their particular circumstances. For example, mass rallies were not encouraged, and activities tended to focus

Voter Education Activities for Legislative and Presidential Elections

more on small-scale focus group discussions, candidate

A total of 593 proposals covering both the legislative

In rural areas where infrastructure was lacking and

and presidential phases of the elections were

entertainment was usually scarce, NGOs concentrated

submitted to the Elections Assistance Programme. Of

on mobile cinema to attract a very large audience

these, 372 proposals targeted the legislative elections:

and then used the event to distribute materials and to

debates, radio shows, and media distribution.

show voter education clips and hold an elections quiz. 62

CSOs supported a variety of target audiences. Of the

CSOs Supported during

CSOs working on the legislative elections, some for

The Indonesian elections 2004

example focused exclusively on women (PATTIRO; Aisyiyah; PGI/KWI; PD Politik; Wanita Syarikat Islam), whereas others concentrated on students and firsttime voters (LPAD Riau; YLBHK; Yayasan Kata Hati; POKJA Pedoman; UI; UK Ternate; Yabiku; YPK Aceh).

Name of Institution

Funds Committed (Rp)

AISYIYAH

3,258,840,200

BALI FORUM

1,069,625,000

CEPDES

1,335,985,000

Several targeted both (KP3 Bali; KPPIPP; Pesut

COMMON GROUND

3,504,900,000

Mahakam;YNWS Sorong). And still others had villagers

ELSAKA

4,636,775,000

(ELSAKA) or tribal settlement (Jembatan Pemilu)

FAKTA

399,305,000

as their main target audience. Two CSOs paid most

GMKI

276,880,000

of their attention to farmers, fishermen and small

GRAVITASI MATARAM

657,400,000

entrepreneurs (KL2SS; PKBHB).

IPCOS

751,594,400

In a number of cases, CSOs specialized in disseminating informationtotheirunionmembership(SBLLampung), whereas others looked for a wider and more general

JEMBATAN PEMILU

2,029,795,000

JIL

1,962,894,000

JPPR

2,687,500,000

KL2SS

1,962,225,000

KP3BALI

3,007,423,250

audience (Bali Forum; IPCOS; PERFIKI; PBHR-ST;

KPPIPP

929,488,250

and JPPR). Finally, some CSOs specialized in conflict

LAKPESDAM JOMBANG

224,427,150

prevention programmes or worked in areas of potential

LPAD - RIAU

631,667,000

conflict (CGI; YABIMU; Pokja RKP Poso).

PATTIRO

401,085,000

PBHR-ST

Of the CSOs supported during the legislative phase of the elections, it is estimated that 16,350,000 people were reached directly or indirectly through face-toface meetings. This is excluding the extensive use of

398,808,000

PD POLITIK

1,572,916,000

PERFIKI

4,376,750,000

PESUT MAHAKAM

1,185,520,000

PGI/KWI

3,252,685,000

PKBHB-BENGKULU

920,005,000

POKJA PEDOMAN

362,410,000

community radios on a national scale, tabloid

POKJA RKP- POSO

176,177,500

newspapers and leaflets as well as the large-scale

PSAPP

1,810,480,000

production and distribution of printed materials such

RADIO 68H

3,112,000,000

as posters, banners, and stickers.

REMAPPALA

the media, including national and private television,

For the presidential elections, the approximate number of target beneficiaries reached directly or indirectly through face-to-face meetings was 15,980,000. Again, this excluded programmes using national and private

465,757,500

SBL LAMPUNG

1,477,190,500

SORAK ACEH

1,192,849,000

UNI INDONESIA

3,758,352,500

UNI KHAIRUN TERNATE

1,453,225,000

WANITA SYARIKAT ISLAM

505,037,500

YABIKU

533,135,000

television, national and community radio and the

YABIMU

360,862,000

production and distribution of printed media.

YAYASAN KATA HATI

314,475,000

YLBHK

269,525,000

As was the case for the legislative election, the CSOs

YNWS SORONG

selected a variety of audiences for the presidential

YPK ACEH BARAT

1,412,658,800 710,597,500

63

election. Some focused on women (CEPDES; Aisyiyah;

Monitoring and Evaluation

ELSAKA; PD Politik; YABIKU), some on first-time voters (GMKI; Pokja Pedoman; LPAD Riau; Pesut Mahakam)

The UNDP Programme set in place several mechanisms

and others targeted both (Bali Forum; Gravitasi

by which to monitor the activities of the CSOs.

Mataram; KL2SS).Tribal settlements (Jembatan Pemilu;

In addition to the submission of regular financial

Yayasan Remappala) and labourers and farmers (SBL

and activity reports, full-time monitoring officers

Lampung) also came in for special attention, but most

(MO) were deployed. MOs were responsible for

of the CSOs went for the wider general public (JIL;

ensuring that the organizations met their financial

FAKTA; KP3 Bali; Lakpesdam Jombang; PBHR-Sulteng;

and programmatic commitments – both in terms

SORAK Aceh; PERFIKI; Radio 68H; PSAPP; UI; UK

of implementation and reporting. They conducted

Ternate; YNWS Sorong; YPK Aceh; and CGI).

spot checks and field trips to ensure that the work proposedby theCSOs wasactually being implemented.

Some of the most interesting types of activities

MOs regularly submitted monitoring reports and

undertaken in the voter education programme for both

assessments, offering recommendations and making

the legislative and presidential elections were those

follow-up visits when required.

that adopted alternative methods of voter education, mixinginformationwithentertainment.Thesemethods

In addition, two evaluation workshops were held

were successful because of their wide appeal to a

in order to assess the work of the CSOs. The first

broad audience. They attract the literate and the

workshop covered the CSOs working on the legislative

illiterate and various socio-economic classes, and

elections. It resulted in recommendations for all

appeal to rural and urban audiences and the old and

parties concerned to ensure that the process was

young alike.

streamlined and smoother in the following phase. The second workshop, covering the period of the

Bali Forum, for example, used an approach that was

presidential election, looked at the extent to which

very culture-centric to Bali. It employed drama gong

such recommendations had been taken into account,

performances to spread voter education messages to

discussed the experiences of the new CSOs, and

the public, then ended with an election simulation

deliberated on the future of on-going, sustainable and

by the KPUD Bali. Each performance attracted up to

longer-term voter and civic education.

8,000 people. PERFIKI’s approach was to use mobile cinema – an excellent approach for the dissemination

An internal evaluation of the voter education

of information in rural areas. Mobile cinema was used

programme was also conducted through the conduct

in 12 provinces for this programme.

of a national survey and focus group discussions, by the Indonesian research organization, The Polling

In addition to other more conventional approaches,

Centre. The survey was undertaken in order to obtain

CEPDES staged wayang performances, as well as

quantitativeresultsregardingvotereducationactivities

ketoprak and ludruk to spread voter education

in general, whereas focus groups were more intensive

messages; YABIKU organized a music and art

and therefore more qualitative in nature, yielding more

performance and Pesut Mahakam a theatre

in-depth insights into specific programmes in targeted

performance – all having democracy and the elections

areas.

central themes.

64

Preliminary feedback from the survey and focus group

of election proceedings and the technicalities of

discussions was positive. It showed that in all the areas

voting. Moreover, the stickers were properly displayed.

where the NGOs had been deployed, people had either

‘I saw them every day because they were posted along

received training directly, or were aware of training

roads over which I pass by every day’ note one North

programmes being conducted. Participants confirmed

Maluku voter.

that face-to-face methodologies proved to be most effective, especially amongst women and semi-literate

Radio programmes received equally mixed reviews.

people because it enabled them to ask questions.

Respondents had either not heard any voter education

Indeed, the timing of face-face sessions was obviously

messages (South Sulawesi), had heard them only

very important. Sessions were held in the afternoon or

briefly (Bali) or rarely listened to the radio at all

evening at times that were most suitable in order to

(North Sumatra). In North Sumatra and North Maluku,

increaseattendancerates.Althoughsomerespondents

respondents suggested a greater usage of local

still had to leave their jobs to attend, their respons was

language in future.

most encouraging. Said one North Sumatran voter:“In terms of business, I lost, but in terms of knowledge, I

The unpopularity of radio was in stark contrast to

benefited.”

what respondents said about television. All had heard election information programmes either on national

Face-to-face activities were crucial in explaining the

TV or on private television channels. Respondents

new election system, but although respondents were

considered that the information-dissemination

generally satisfied, some expressed a desire for more

programmes on TV were quite effective because of

time given the novelty and complexity of the electoral

the extensive coverage and visual appeal. Those in

exercise. They considered the facilitators or trainers as

Buleleng, Bali, considered TV more effective because

both competent and neutral. Results also confirmed

most people own a television set and prefer to watch

the cascading potential of face-to-face methodologies.

TV rather than to listen to the radio. However, some

Indeed respondents felt the need to share information

respondents stressed the importance of face-to-face

with relatives, friends or neighbours because they

encounters, given the fact that not all members of a

considered it to be important in ensuring that they

community can watch television. ‘In remote areas, not

exercised their voting rights free from errors.

everybody has a television set, so for the next election, training or direct meetings will be more appropriate’

Posters and brochures received a mixed assessment.

(North Sumatra).

In Bali many believed that the printed media were ineffective in rural areas where literacy rates are low

Programmes targeted at women were well received

and where reading habits are not established. Some

in some areas. In North Sumatra, for example,

questioned the design of posters and stickers, claiming

attendance was very high and respondents felt proud

that they seemed too busy and contained too much

to present the females perspective. In Bali they were

information which could not be properly seen by the

less successful, mainly because the men usually far

elderly and which could not be understood at a glance.

outnumbered the women.This situation was overcome by holding face-to-face activities for housewives

The assessment from North Maluku, however, was

through PKK meetings. In Bone, South Sulawesi, a

different. Respondents said that stickers and posters

lot more men were present at the education sessions

served to increase their awareness and understanding

because the women were too busy either attending to their household duites or working in the platations. 65

Respondents in various research areas said

community. ‘For me, after participating in the

that their understanding of the meaning and

programme, [I feel that] democracy is the most

importance of democracy was increased after

important principle in communal life because it

participating in the voter education programmes.

teaches us that sovereignty is in the hands of the

In Ternate, North Maluku, respondents understood

people, so let the people decide who will represent

democracy as an important principle within the

and lead them’ (North Maluku).

Consortium for Voters Information Campaign in Indonesia (VICI)

The EU approved a Euro 3 million grant to support a one-year voter education and information programme run by the Consortium for Voters Information Campaign in Indonesia (C-VICI). C-VICI consisted of four local NGOs including CEIA (Centre for East Indonesian Affairs), Solidaritas Perempuan (Women’s Solidarity for Human Rights), KIPP (Independent Committee for Electoral Monitoring), and INSIDE (Indonesian Society for Democracy and People’s Empowerment).The consortium was assisted by an international NGO, the Friedrich Neumann Foundation (FNF), for financial management and monitoring. This activity was an earmarked requirement of the grant provided by the EU and specified in the contribution agreement signed between the EU and the UNDP. In the early phase of project implementation, Stamstag Café, a television talkshow broadcast live every Saturday morning on Metro TV, took the centre stage of C-VICI activities. Featuring political analysts, NGO activists, and party executives as guest speakers, it touched on various issues regarding the elections and was implemented collectively by the consortium. Within the overall project, CEIA’s role was to ensure the widest possible dissemination of election-related information in three eastern provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Maluku and Papua through workshops, seminars and public discussions, television and radio talk shows, at regional, sub-regional and village level. CEIA also produced and distributed posters, stickers and banners, as well as information through press releases, articles, and radio jingles broadcast on local radio stations. By March 2004, CEIA had produced and distributed a total of 45,000 posters, 117,000 stickers and 113,400 leaflets in the three provinces. CEIA also organized 100 village discussions, in addition to 26 sub-regional seminars and public discussions in 29 districts. For the presidential election, CEIA produced to produce and broadcast five episodes of television talk shows entitled “Kafe Presiden”, which featured four of the five vice-presidential candidates. The programmes were produced in collaboration with Trans TV and TVRI. Solidaritas Perempuan’s (SP) activities focused on women voters. Starting with a national consultative meeting in November 2003, SP organised a series of workshops and training courses to support voter

66

information in 23 regions. SP also produced three booklets in five local languages on female political education, posters and stickers, and other print materials. By January 2004, SP had completed training in 16 regions-Kendari, Mataram, Ambon, Padang and BukitTinggi, Palembang, Lampung, Makassar, Manado, Palu, Yogyakarta, Kalet-Solo, Jakarta, West Java, Deli Serdang, East Java and Salatiga. As of the end of March 2004, SP had initiated 1,147 village discussions, 25 public discussions and 56 radio talkshows in 25 provinces across Indonesia. Prior to the presidential elections, SP selected eight regions-Jakarta, Karawang, Kendari, Pekanbaru, Bojonegoro, Makassar, Klaten, and Aceh- in which to implement radio, village and public discussions. In each region, four village discussions, two radio discussions and two public discussions were conducted. SP also organised television talk shows in Jakarta and Makassar which focused on the theme “Choose a President with an Agenda for Women’. Prior to the legislative elections, KIPP conducted regional training workshops for the local branches of KIPP in Lampung, Semarang, Makassar, Pontianak, and Surabaya. The workshops featured public discussions, involving the members of KPUD, Panwas and the media. Following these workshops, local KIPP staff initiated village discussions on 25 March in most regions. The goal of the KIPP village discussions was to give the electorate at the village level adequate information regarding election procedures so that voters would be able to self-monitor the election process. About 400 village discussions were held by KIPP before the 5 April elections. INSIDE mainly focused on media activities, and produced a series of PSAs, of which only two were approved to be broadcast: “valid-invalid votes” and “peaceful campaign”. INSIDE also prepared a documentary film, which, though never approved by the necessary authorities, was aired on SCTV, Metro TV and TVRI on 4 July, 2004. Based on an independent evaluation that was conducted at the request of the EU, it was noted that while the C-VICI planned activities were generally implemented, the process itself was difficult and some activities, mainly relating to the media component implemented by INSIDE, remained questionable. One of the key problems encountered was the relationship between C for VICI, government institutions and the KPU, which seriously impacted upon the effectiveness of the overall project. Another issue raised in the evaluation report was that C-VICI was created merely as a vehicle to receive the grant. The creation of the consortium appeared to have been driven more from the knowledge that funds were available than a genuine willingness to work together. This was evident from the continual difficulties among the four organizations, which severely hampered the ability of the Consortium to meet programme demands, particularly in the area of financial and activity reporting.

67

68

6

Election Monitoring and Observation

69

6

Election Monitoring and Observation

One of the main objectives of the UNDP programme was to reinforce the transparency of the election processes in Indonesia through the introduction of good practices. Election monitoring is seen as a means of establishing an integrity safeguards and discouraging fraud, intimidation and violence on election day, as well as increasing the legitimacy of the final result. The presence of election observers reassures voters they can safely and secretly cast their ballots and that vote counting and tabulation will be conducted transparently. Monitors note the successes and achievements of elections and identify issues, circumstances or practices that are contrary to accepted national and international standards.

70

Programme activities involved providing support for

At its first meeting, the PAC decided to select one

the training and mobilization of national election

organization, which could effectively implement

monitors. They also included the establishment of an

election monitoring activities on a nationwide scale. In

International Observer Support Unit with facilities to

order to do this, a total of six proposals were reviewed

support the work of international election observers.

with particular attention paid to the experience of

As stated clearly in the programme document, while

each organization, its track record, organizational and

UNDP supported monitoring-related activities, it was

networking capacity and credibility.

not in any way engaged in the substantive task of passing judgment on the conduct of the elections.

After careful deliberations, the PAC finally chose Forum Rektor to carry out the monitoring activities. The reasons for this decision included the fact that

National Election Monitoring

Forum Rektor has an extensive network in Indonesia and could provide clear evidence of a source from

Based on these stated objectives, the programme

where monitors will be recruited. It also helped that

aimed at training and mobilizing national election

the UNDP had prior and positive experience of working

monitors. As with voter education, a project appraisal

with the organization in 1999.

committee (PAC) was established to review CSOs proposal. The call for proposals was issued prior to

Forum Rektor was responsible for deploying about

both the general and presidential elections. The PAC

160,000 short-term monitors on the day of the

was chaired by the Partnership for Governance Reform,

legislative elections, and 2,000 long-term monitors

with members from both the UNDP and the Indonesian

two months prior to election day. In addition, Forum

Government. The KPU did not have a presence on the

Rektor, in collaboration with the National Democratic

PAC to ensure an appropriate ethical relationship

Institute, trained 20,000 of its volunteers to collect

between the KPU and agencies selected to monitor the

vote results directly from 10,000 polling stations. The

election.

results of the parallel vote tally were made public just after election day, in addition to Forum Rektor’s

71

qualitative assessment of the elections and a report

at the district (PPK) level. CETRO is an organization

on the long and short term electoral monitoring

that enjoys a good reputation in the advocacy and

campaigns. Forum Rektor’s final election statement

electoral observation community, and has a proven

was presented to the media during a formal press

track record. it had also gained valuable experience

conference on 10 April, 2004.

in tn the USAID-funded monitoring of the legislative elections. Based on the successful implementation

For the presidential elections, the PAC again reviewed

of poll watch activities for the first round of the

five proposals for monitor the voting and also to carry

presidential election, CETRO was again contracted for

out research and survey tasks. One of these was a

the second round, deploying 19,000 short and longer-

follow-up proposal submitted by Forum Rektor. The

term monitors.

PAC discussed the possibility of extending the contract with Forum Rektor. However, in stark contrast to the

Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia

experience of UNDP with Forum Rektor in 1999, it

(JAMPPI) was also selected by the PAC. JAMPPI

was agreed that Forum Rektor had not performed at a

observered the election in 29 provinces, recruiting

high enough standart during the legislative elections.

and fielding more than 12,000 monitors at the polling

The management at Forum Rektor’s headquarters was

stations, 725 at the sub-district counting centres and

considered weak, and also appeared to be weak links

145 at the district level. JAMPPI is an experienced

between the centre and the regions. The quality of

organizations that worked with the Partnership in

training monitored by the UNDP was rather low, with

a successful observation of the 1999 elections-an

a lack of teaching aids and a focus on “lecture” style

experience the UNDP had shared in. As with CENTRO,

pedagogy. In addition, one month after the legislative

JAMPPI’s performance in the first round of the

elections, there were still concerns over the financial

presidential election led to an invitation to mobilize

reporting because of poor accountability at the

16,500 monitors for the second round.

regional level. The proposal from FRI for the presidential elections

Monitoring Related Activities

did not address any of these concerns that had been previously raised with it by the UNDP and the PAC and

Voter Registration Audit

it was therefore decided not to consider its application

In addition to the activities of Forum Rektor during

any further. The two proposals finally selected by the

the legislative elections, the PAC also recommended

PAC were those submitted by CETRO and JAMPPI.

the selection of Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan

CETRO observed not only the counting process at the

Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES) to implement

polling station (TPS) level, but also at the PPS and at

a voter registration audit, aimed at verifying the

the PPK levels. This was in line with the public’s vocal

accuracy of the voter registration list and evaluating

concern regarding the counting in the last election.

the quality of the process. This was intended as a means of building public confidence in the voter

The electoral observation covered a total of 11

registration process and in turn the KPU. It was also

provinces, and involved the deployment of 10,000

intended that the results of the VRA could provide an

observers to monitor the polling and counting process

opportunity for the KPU to make correction the voters

at the TPS level, 5,000 observers to monitor at the

list if it was deemed necesssary. Finally, the VRA was

sub-district (PPS) level, and 2,000 observers to monitor

there intended to provide valuable benchmark data for future voter registration programmes.

72

The voter registration audit process required the

performance, and in particular about claims that an

recruitment of 400 observers, each of whom randomly

inordinate number of persons eligible to vote had been

selected three voters from the list and went to

left out of the list.

the registered address of each voter to verify the information provided on the list. Each observer also

The voter registration audit conducted in July 2004

randomly interviewed three voting-age citizens in a

indicated an increase from 91% to 95.3% in the

given locality and confirmed that their names and

number of registered voters, when compared to the

information were on the voter list. This was termed

first audit. However, given that 4.7% translates into

a “two-way audit”. The whole audit, covering nearly

more than seven million voters, this still demonstrated

6,000 eligible voters and 400 randomly-selected

a need for a process to update the voter registration

villages, was conducted by LP3ES with the technical

list prior to the second round of the presidential

support of NDI, an important partner in this process.

election. One key finding of the audit was that

Additional support on information dissemination was

about half of all villages surveyed had not placed

provided by the Japanese International Cooperation

the registration list in a place which could be easily

Agency (JICA).

accessed by the public.

The voter registration audit, held in February 2004 following the registration process, indicated that 91%

Parallel Vote Tabulation

of eligible voters were registered-although 27% didn’t

For the first presidential elections, the PAC also

actually realize they were. Researchers found that

approved a proposal submitted by LP3ES to conduct

gender, marital status, age and physical disability had

a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). It was considered

no particular influence on registration rates. Of the

that LP3ES was in a good position to conduct the PVT

91% already registered, the audit showed that the data

based on a similar, highly successful and publicized

did contain flaws, with inaccuracies noted in dates

exercise that it conducted at the time of the April 5

of birth (30%) and names (9%). These results were

elections, with technical support received from the

submitted to the General Elections Commission.

NDI. The PVT had proved in the legislative elections to be a valuable early prediction of the election outcome.

For the presidential elections, the PAC approved a

This information helped to diffuse potential disputes

follow-up voter registration audit because as it was

which threatened to occur as a result of the KPU’s

believed that the comparison with the results yielded

slower compilation of both the electronic and manual

by the first audit would provide valuable data on the

counts. The PVT also provided a tool for comparison

steps taken by the KPU to re-register voters prior

with the final results, thereby helping to ensure

to the presidential elections. While the first voter

their acceptance by political parties and the general

registration audit was conducted by LP3ES, the audit

public and offering an independent verification of the

for the presidential election was conducted by JAMPPI,

election results.

again with significant technical support from the NDI. At the time of conducting the audit, there continued

The PVT for the first round of the presidential election

to be a lot of misinformation and confusion concerning

was jointly funded by the NDI and the Freedom

the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the voter list.

Institute. Funds from the Freedom Institute originated

The VRA for the legislative elections had proved to be

from the private television station, Metro TV. Some

a good tool to counter public concerns about the KPU’s

concerns were initially raised over this arrangement,

73

given the fact that Metro TV had exhibited some bias

The PVT drew some criticism from political parties

towards specific political interests. This concern was

and their candidates and even from the KPU

addressed through the signing of a memorandum

initially, mostly because of a lack of knowledge and

of understanding between all parties which clearly

understanding of the methodology. This however did

stated that the information originating from the PVT

change as the accuracy of the “quick count” became

would be made equally available to all media. The

increasingly evident following each election. Indeed,

only concession given to Metro TV was that it could

the media came to rely on it as primary indicator

receive, although not broadcast, the data two hours

of the election outcome and the public increasingly

before the press release to allow it to prepare its own

accepted it as a trusted source of information.

programming accordingly. It was agreed that it could only go ahead with its broadcast after the data had been made publicly available.

Monitoring and Evaluation The programme recruited a monitoring officer to check

Due to the efficient network system that LP3ES had

on the activities of the election monitoring grantees.

put in place, the PVT results were available on the

This included attending training sessions for trainers,

evening of election day for the first round of the

financial officers and observers, observing the PVT and

presidential election on 5 July. Despite the agreements

VRA courses and monitoring events on actual election

established in the MoU, Metro TV went ahead and

day. The officer also sat in on a number of meetings

released the results prior to the official press release by

held by monitoring organizations to prepare final

LP3ES. This caused additional problems because it did

statements on the quality and conduct of the pre-

not allow sufficient time for LP3ES to formally submit

campaign, campaign and polling day. Under UNDP’s

the results to the General Elections Commission-

mandate, however, no attempt was made to participate

a spesific requirement of the election monitoring

in or shape in any way the final statements of the

accreditation process. While the involvement of the

monitoring organizations. To ensure the UNDP was

private sector was considered in a positive light, it was

not seen to be passing judgement on the quality of

however made clear from this incident that stricter

elections, monitoring organizations were not required

procedures concerning equal access to information

to display a UNDP logo at any point in the course of

needed to be put in place in the future.

their work.

As in the legislative elections, the results of the PVT

The UNDP programme worked in very close

were remarkably accurate, when compared to the

collaboration with other donors in this area. USAID and

final results of the KPU’s own electronic count and

the Partnership both supported a limited number of

its official manual count. A final PVT was conducted

electionmonitoringorganizations.Alldonor-supported

for the second round of the presidential election,

election monitoring groups, including CETRO, Forum

with support from Metro TV directly, NDI and the TIFA

Rektor, JAMPPI and the JPPR Network, were asked to

Foundation. Again, the results proved to be extremely

work together to ensure that there was no duplication

accurate. A Voter attitude survey was held at the

in the coverage of polling stations and that similar

same time as the so-called “quick count” to gather

standards were applied. For example, similar rates for

information on the election process.

expenses were paid to volunteers and similar reporting formats were used.

74

The election monitoring groups were also asked to

visit : “Indonesians have voiced a clear commitment

work in collaboration with the Panwas. One of the

to the democratic process. When voters cast their

lessons learned from the 1999 elections was that

ballots, they should do so with confidence that the

reports received by the Panwas from the monitoring

international community is watching this process with

groups were not in a practical format that allowed

interest.” The Carter Center deployed over 60 long-

it to take effective action. Accordingly, Panwas

term observers across Indonesia.

representatives were invited to coordination meetings, the monitoring organisations participated in Panwas

Other large missions included the European Union

training activities at the kecamatan level, and Panwas

Election Observation Mission, led by European

reviewed the proposed reporting formats before they

parliamentarian Glyn Ford. The EUEOM fielded

were set as standard.

the largest number of observers, followed by the US Embassy Observation Team and the Japanese

While relationships at the central level between the

Election Observation Mission. Many diverse

Panwas and the monitoring groups were positive, this

countries took an active interest in the elections,

unfortunately was not reflected at the lower levels of

including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Taiwan and

both organizations. As a result, the monitors were not

Sudan.

considered to have effectively contributed to reports on election violations. While, there is little doubt that the monitoring groups did act as an important integrity mechanism for the 2004 Elections through their broad presence at the polling stations, there is a need for a systematic look at the monitoring and observation efforts within Indonesia.

International Election Observation Building on the experience from the 1999 elections, when more than 600 international observers came to Indonesia, the Indonesian Government again invited the international community to send observers missions to the 2004 elections. During the six-months election period, Indonesia welcomed a total of 16 international missions, which together deployed an average of 550 observers in all of Indonesia’s 32 provinces. In July, the former US President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, led an international team to observe Indonesia’s first direct presidential vote. The 80-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner said about his

75

IORC Briefing Kits and Materials The IORC distributed a total of 749 briefing kits to international observers. The kits consisted of a custommade cotton bag with the IORC label and included background information on the laws and regulations governing the election, the people and culture of Indonesia, maps and other geographical information on the regions, contact information for coordination and emergencies, and an election observation manual. The kits contained: • Indonesian Electoral Map, print and CD-Rom • Election Laws and Decrees, book and on CD-Rom •

List of Political Parties

•

Health and Security Information

•

Election Acronym

•

List of International Observers, Contacts and Deployment,

•

Provincial contacts: national and international observers (JPPR, Yappika Forum Rektor, UN-staff and EU)

•

Media Reports on Aceh, Maluku, Papua, and on the 2004 Indonesian Elections

•

A guide for International Observers of the 2004 Indonesian National Election

•

The KPU manual on Polling Station, Voting and Counting Procedures

•

IORC notebook

In the final round presidential election, IORC compiled observer statements from both the legislative elections and the presidential elections and distributed these together with an updated KPU election manual, updated KPU regulations and degrees, an updated contact and deployment list and a set of

In February 2004, at the request of the donors, a

international observer groups and the national

decision was taken to set up a facility to assist the

monitoring groups to share experiences and to

international observers arriving for the elections. As

prevent a duplication of their efforts. During its seven

a result, the UNDP, with technical support from IFES,

months of operation, the IORC provided support to 11

NDI and TAF, established the International Observer

governmentsthatparticipatedthroughtheirembassies

Resource Centre (IORC). Less than three weeks before

or aid missions, eight international organizations,

the legislative elections, the IORC was formally

several national monitoring groups, and local media

launched by the UNDP Resident Representative before

and government representatives.

an audience of the partners, donors, observers and the media. The first IORC observer meeting was held on 19

The support included weekly meetings, production of

March, 2004.

briefing kits, briefing sessions with presentations by a variety of different informants, up-to-date information

The IORC’s principal role was to serve as a

on issues related to the elections, and essential

clearinghouse for all information related to election

contacts, tools and information, most of which was

observation and to bring together the different

made available on IORC’s own website. IORC services

76

to observers also included ensuring regular liaison

the process. Particular to the role of IORC was the fact

with national monitoring groups to assist in the

that there were three consecutive rounds of elections

coordination of observation coverage. In addition, the

in six months. This meant that many international

IORC set up an office, meeting room and newsroom,

observers did not parachute in for a couple of weeks,

and provided computer and other facilities to observer

but remained throughout the six-month election

groups.

period. This gave the IORC the opportunity to define its role and adjust its services to meet the demands and

In this early period, the IORC made a concerted

expectations of the various observer missions.

effort to contact those embassies planning to send observers to inform them about available services and

The extended period in which the elections took

to invite their representatives to attend meetings.

place, coupled with the presence of a large number of

These missions included Russia, Thailand, Bosnia and

election professionals, made it possible for the IORC

Herzegovina, Mozambique, South Africa and Sudan,

to undertake a number of additional activities. Several

all of whom sent observers for the legislative elections

workshops and presentations were held to share

and actively participated in the IORC. The same effort

election expertise with national election monitoring

was made with the national monitoring groups, such

groups.Topics addressed were: election standards and

as Forum Rektor, JAMPPI, LP3ES, KIPP, JPPR, Yappika

principles, election observation, media monitoring and

and CETRO. In view of the increasing importance

the legal basis of election observation. The UNDP/KPU

of the role of domestic election monitoring, it was

training team conducted the workshops. In addition,

expected that by providing a forum for domestic and

as it was clear that many Indonesian opinion makers

international observers to share information, the work

and politicians were unfamiliar with the role played by

of both would be enhanced.

surveys and parallel vote tabulations in a democratic election process, the IORC also arranged a panel

The elections in Indonesia were unique in more than

discussion on the topic of opinion polls in which

one way, and many superlatives have been heaped on

national and international experts took part.

77

Legislative Elections

Australian MP Margaret May, and senators Natasha Stott-Despoja and David Johnston

On the 5 April, 2004, 518 international observers

and ALP Senator Ruth Webber attended a

joined 400,000 domestic monitors in overseeing

second debriefing, held on 8 April, where

the Indonesia’s legislative elections. The various

a special invitee was Panwas Chairman

observationmissionstogethercoveredallofIndonesia’s

Komaruddin Hidayat. Representatives of the

32 provinces. Despite efforts at coordination,

IRI, the Bosnian and Netherlands embassies,

international monitoring was not evenly distributed,

Interband, UNDP, NDI, IFES, JPPR and The Asia

but this was balanced by the large number of national

Foundation attended the meeting.

monitors. Subsequently, many observation missions Following election day, the IORC held 2 post-election

made their findings known through an

sessions to allow monitoring groups to compare notes

official statement or a press release. The

on their polling day experiences. In these sessions,

IORC collated the comments made during the

monitoring groups expressed overall satisfaction

two sessions and the public statements from

with the smooth handling of the ballot. The first

domestic and international observer groups

post-election session took place on 6 April and was

that were made public, in order to present

chaired by Glyn Ford, the head of the EU Electoral

a synopsis of opinion on the elections. This

Observer Mission. Among the 37 participants were IFES

outcome was presented at the donor meeting

President Mr. Richard Soudriette (Washington), The

in May 2004.

Asia Foundation Head of Delegation Syed Mohammed Zakaria, of Bangladesh, and other prominent delegates from embassies and organizations.

78

Presidential elections, first round

92.8% of respondents considered the IORC forum for information sharing was useful, and 85.7% expressed

In the run up to the first presidential election, the

satisfaction with the frequency of the meetings.

IORC hosted seven meetings and nine briefings for

As one delegate put it: “The IORC provided a place

international observer missions. On 5 July, a total of

for an exchange of views and information between

577 international observers joined about 160,000

delegations small and large. The meetings became a

national monitors. During the legislative elections,

comfortable habit for all of us.” When asked whether

the IORC’s deployment mapping had identified gaps

the IORC was a useful model for replication in other

in some areas and over-representation in other Using

countries, 92.9% responded positively.

that as a guide, observer groups made an effort in the first and second rounds of the presidential election

The IORC was considered to have fulfilled its role

to spread their resources more evenly. After voting

as a clearing-house. The international observation

day, two post-election sessions were held to allow

delegations quickly accepted it as their main forum

observers to compare notes before making their

for the exchange of information, views and ideas. The

findings public.

regular coordination meetings saw a high turnout. Out of 19 international organization/embassies, 14 were active participants and attended every IORC

Presidential elections, second round

meeting. Because the format was adaptable to needs and circumstances, the attendance-rate of the regular

Three specialized pre-election meetings were held

meetings remained high all through the elections.

at the IORC prior to the final round of the direct presidential vote. There was no fixed agenda, but

The IORC had the privilege of working with excellent

rather a sharing of reports on all observation topics:

election observation teams from many different

secrecy of vote, issues of intimidation or election

countries. The IORC partner organizations - IFES,

violation, TPS lay out and environment, preparedness

NDI and TAF – brought extensive experience to the

of staff, respect for rules and regulations, the presence

IORC, thereby greatly contributing to its success. The

of national monitoring groups, the counting process

partners were consulted on major decisions and played

at PPS and PPK levels, and general observation on the

an active role in the meetings, in the presentations and

principle of ‘free and fair.’ Two post-election briefings

briefings, and in the dissemination of election-related

were also called, with one of these also serving as the

material for the briefing kits.

closing meeting of the IORC. From monitoring and observer statements, the overall impression is that the monitoring and observation

Monitoring and Evaluation

efforts went very well and, with the exception of Aceh, there were no places where election observation was

IORC initiatives were met with mostly positive

obstructed or interfered with. In most area, election

responses and comments from individual delegates.

observers were well received at the polling stations,

Questionnaire showed that all delegations had a

by the KPPS staff as well as by voters. The concluding

great appreciation for the centre and the way it had

impression of the observers was that the election

served observers’ interests. The IORC questionnaire

process was largely free and fair and that the results

distributed to all regular participants showed that

from the election process accurately reflected the

79

will of the people. The problems observers noted at

expressed appreciation for the process and called the

the polling station were mainly procedural and many

elections ‘surprisingly well-run’.

experts and analysts with lengthy election experience

Election Observation Results

Former US President Carter praised the country’s transition to democracy and said he was “greatly impressed with the orderly and very well planned procedure.” His remarks were shared by many of the international observer missions, who were unanimous in calling the election “peaceful”, “historic” and “a significant step in Indonesia’s democratic transition.” A new electoral framework made the whole process a challenging task. This was true in particular for the legislative elections when voters had to deal with four different ballots, each the size of a doublespread newspaper. Despite experts’suggestions that the elections would be among the most complex ever attempted, observers agreed that they were conducted in line with international standards. An exception was Aceh – where violence and fraud was reported and where the presence of excessive security/military personnel around polling stations intimidated voters. During the legislative elections the province was still under martial law. The movement of observers was restricted and no conclusions could be drawn. Observation only became possible during the presidential elections and the results are included in this overview. In their statements, international observer teams have expressed gratitude to the KPU for allowing them to see this democratic process at work and for providing them with timely accreditation, welcoming their participation as well as their recommendations. Legislative elections: • The legislative polls were lauded as fair and transparent with polling taking place in an orderly, peaceful and festive manner. • Early concerns that there would be major delays in various localities due to insufficient supplies of materials did not come to pass. Only a few districts in remote or strife-torn areas had short delays. • A lack of uniformity at the polling station and minor technical problems were registered, but the electoral process was not compromised as a result. Violations were often the result of administrative flaws, such as the size of the ballot papers in relation to the size of the voting booth. • Observers were generally impressed by the dedication of polling staff and the high voter turnout but did signal the need for additional voter registration.

80

First Round Presidential: • While the elections were peaceful and took place without violent incidents, several irregularities seem to have dampened the success, such as the large number of invalid votes caused by the incorrect use of the ballot sheet. The last minute decision by the KPU to change the status of these ‘double-punched’ ballots from ‘invalid’ to ‘valid’ was welcomed by observers as pragmatic and helpful. Still, the issue managed to cast some cloud over an otherwise successful election. • The KPU regulation on a candidate’s health excluded one candidate from the presidential race. This did not conform to international standards. • The Constitutional Court established its credibility in handling several cases, -including the petition by the Wiranto-Wahid team - and gained significant public confidence. Final Round Presidential: • Observer groups praised the first direct presidential election in Indonesia as genuinely democratic and peaceful. The Jakarta Post quoted Douglas Peterson of the Carter Center as saying: “This election has been a tremendous success and a huge accomplishment”. • Significant improvements were noted in electoral logistics and administration. • Irregularities in procedures by election authorities –such as late opening and early closing of polling stations - did not affect the legality of the process or the outcome. • The media played a positive role, but the state television displayed a pronounced bias for the incumbent. Overall The KPU generally managed its difficult task well and maintained the trust of all parties. Observers highlighted a number of points to be taken into consideration by the election authorities such as: • The limited campaign time for the last two candidates in the final round of the presidential election. • The risk of invalid voting associated with the use of the nail punch. • Granting election stakeholders the right to appeal KPU decisions. • Free TV slots for voter education purposes. Overseas observers expressed concern that domestic monitoring organizations were still needed strengthening.

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82

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

7

83

7

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The Indonesia Elections 2004 offered a very specific set of challenges for the General Elections Commission (KPU). Not only was the election schedule very tight, with three sets of national elections to be organized over a space of six months, but each of the elections involved new or amended procedures, which had to be communicated to the staff working to conduct the elections and to the voters themselves. In addition, the Election Commission faced tremendous

84

logistical challenges, having to organize elections

The following part of the report outlines a number

over an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands,

of lessons learned related to the implementation

with the legislative elections involving more than

of the UNDP programme, which it is hoped can

2,000 individual elections, almost a billion ballots, five

contribute to the design and implementation of

million poll workers and more than 150 million voters.

efforts of international donors to continue electoral

Despite these challenges, Indonesia held credible

support, both in the elections field, both in Indonesia

legislative elections in April and two presidential

and elsewhere. These lessons have been drawn

rounds in July and September.

from suggestions from the KPU, the UNDP Election Programme staff, from the independent programme

The 2004 elections in Indonesia have further

evaluation and from other monitoring and evaluation

consolidated the democratic electoral process

exercises. For voter education, the evaluation

that started with the elections in 1999. They were

workshops held in May and October were extremely

implemented by a new, independent KPU that, despite

useful for gathering recommendations.

its inexperience and the complexities of the new electoral system, was able to hold elections which 96% of the population thought were well organized

KPU Training Support

and 90% regarded as free and fair. The KPU also 1

emerged with its credibility intact, with more than

Training Strategy and Methodology

80% of the population seeing the institution as honest, fair and transparent.2 Given that this was

While cascade training is the most common strategy,

the first ever successful transition of power from one

it has the drawbacks of time, cost and difficulty in

democratically-elected administration to another,

ensuring consistency in quality. However, it does

and given the peaceful atmosphere that prevailed

provide a forum for questions and answers and

throughout the election process, these elections were a

a chance to distribute materials and the latest

historic milestone for Indonesia.

information and updates. It is also motivational and creates solidarity among trainees. In the case of this

The UNDP Elections Programme was designed to

programme, the cascade could not be fully completed

assist the KPU in meeting some of the key challenges,

because of a lack of time and money. What resulted

through training, voter education and monitoring.

was a semi-cascade en masse training ,involving

The evaluation of the programme conducted by

hundreds of staffers gathered in huge halls. Alternative

an independent team in October 2004 found that

strategies that could be implemented in the event of

it was “well designed, managed and implemented

limited funds or time in the future include targeting

and met most of its immediate objectives in areas

provinces or areas for a more intensive approach.

where assistance was provided” . The evaluation did

The programme strategy of utilizing a self-learning

however note that the programme’s objectives relating

approach through manuals and videos also proved

to capacity building were only partially achieved,

successful. Poll workers were able to read, watch and

indicating the need for longer-term and sustained

learn the necessary information to run the polling

efforts by the international community.

stations, even if they were not able to attend training

3

sessions directly.

1 IFES Survey for the first and second round presidential elections, August and October 2004 respectively. 2 IFES Surveys. Of respondents who knew of the KPU. 3 Programme Evaluation Final Report: October 2004

85

Concerning the methodology used for training,

The training programme benefited considerably from

there was a tendency to rely on traditional passive

the establishment of the ad hoc training committee,

training methods which involved long speeches

which brought together experienced KPU personnel

with a microphone. It is recommended that in the

from relevant bureaus to check and approve training

future a more interactive methodology be integrated

strategies or material content. The committee also

with assistance from professional trainers. It is

involved all international agencies working on training

recommended that trainers be seconded from various

activities with the KPU, including IFES, AEC, JICA

educational institutions to enhance the training

and UNDP. This ensured the development of common

methodology in the future. While the KPU should

strategies, and the use of common methodologies

be present at the courses as the election authority,

and materials. As indicated in the evaluation report,

professional trainers can make training more effective.

the integrated nature of the training programme was considered a best practice.

Training Management Training Materials The elections programme succeeded in working with the KPU in the setting up of a training sub-division.

Manuals: The manual proved to be a useful reference

However, the sub-division remains small and without a

in explaining the KPU decrees. From feedback on

specific budget for future activities. Continued capacity

the first two manuals produced by the programme -

building of the KPU at the central and local levels,

legislative and first presidential- poll workers preferred

which will be necessary for future national and local

the use of graphics, concise information, samples

elections, will require the training unit to be expanded

of the forms with examples of how to fill them in,

in terms of organizational structure and staff capacity.

and pullout task cards for each worker. The booklet

It also needs to be less dependent on donor funding.

produced for the second round of the presidential elections was preferred in style, being smaller, lighter, less daunting to read, and lighter to transport,

86

although this was made possible by the fact it was

Training Monitoring

only intended as a refresher to previous manuals. Monitoring of the training activities was weak, One of the challenges in producing the manuals was

made difficult by the fact that personnel were not

the need for all text to be approved at various levels

specifically recruited by the UNDP for this purpose and

in the KPU. Last minute changes/decisions in policy

the fact the KPU staff at the central level were too

caused confusion and could only be included up to

busy with election preparations to undertake this task.

the point the manual went to print. The existence of

It is recommended in the future that the KPU Training

the training committee helped significantly in the

Division should train monitors on quality assessment

approval process, although the tight timelines would

and how to report back both administratively

have benefited from a process for immediate approvals,

(financial accountability and attendance) as well as on

particularly where last minutes changes were

substance (accuracy and currency of information) and

concerned. A related issue was the late completion

methodology (effectiveness).

of relevant decrees leaving very little time for the development and production of training materials. In some cases, this meant that materials could not be

Panwas Training Support

used in training sessions, although they still remained useful as stand alone self-learning materials.

Training Strategy and Methodology

Videos: While the manuals provided a valuable

The Panwas training strategy followed a cascade

reference tool, it was not expected that poll workers

method, which proved to work effectively and

would go over them from cover to cover. The use of

efficiently in imparting much-needed information to

video proved far more popular as a form of passive

lower levels of the Panwas structure. This was because

training/learning, particularly with the integration of

the funds for the Panwas training were earmarked

a sitcom style using celebrities. One major success

by the European Union and were generous, thereby

proved to be the broadcasting the video on popular

allowing a full-scale programme to be implemented.

TV stations nationwide. This provided a cost-effective

The programme was able to hire a core of 40 dedicated

means to reach poll workers, 80% of whom said they

and trained facilitators at the outset, which was

had seen the video and 65% of whom had seen it

perhaps the single most important reason why the

more than once. As more than 80% of Indonesians

cascade training was conducted so successfully. The

receive their news from television it also served as an

programme was much helped by the commitment of

integrity mechanism, informing the public on polling

the Panwas members, who saw the implementation

day procedures and enabling citizen monitoring.

of the training courses as integral to their overall

The use of the video as a training tool would have

mandate.

4

5

benefited from even greater dissemination. From airtime reports, the best time to broadcast was the

While the Panwas training programme included

afternoon and then the evening. The most popular

elements of how to interact with monitoring

channels were SCTV, RCTI and TVRI.

organizations, it became clear that this dealt with

4 Polling Center, Final Report on Training, p 122 5 IFES, Waves I through IV Tracking Survey. March 2004

87

only one side of the coin. Insufficient attention was given to the training for election monitors, resulting in

KPU Media Centre and Vote Tabulation Centre

a lack of knowledge of monitors on how to report to Panwas – or, indeed, why reporting to Panwas was in

The establishment of the KPU Media Centre and the

their interests. Since Panwas has staff only to the sub-

Vote Tabulation Centre contributed successfully to the

district level, they had to rely on national monitors,

transparency of the activities of the General Elections

as well as the public, to be their eyes and ears in the

commission’s activities. The tally centre became the

polling stations. If they did not receive reports from

focal point for obtaining credible election results and

the monitoring organizations, they missed out on a

the media centre was able to provide regular updates

potentially key source of information.

on the election process to the media and maintain effective channels of information to the public, political parties and observers.

Training Materials One lesson learned from the implementation of these The Panwas training programme included a

two activities was the need to encourage national

component for the production of training manuals

ownership at all levels of the election administration

and videos. However, the amount of money set aside

to ensure long-run sustainability. While both had the

by the contributing donor for video production was

full support of, and continuous direction from, KPU

substantial and represented a mismatch between

members and senior secretariat staff, this did not

earmarking and actual needs, as identified by the

always translate into support and inputs further down

Panwas members. As a result, while a video was made,

the chain.

it was not fully supported by the members and was therefore not optimally effective. Funds which were

Activities conducted by Bamboedoea, the company

not used could have been diverted to other activities.

contracted to establish and run the KPU Media Centre, were intended to be managed directly by the KPU’s Public Relations Bureau. It was also

Additional Support Activities

intended that the staff of the PR bureau would be integrated into the media centre, to learn from the

The support provided for the development of the

experts running the centre and also to be able to

Panwas website went far beyond original expectations,

monitor the company’s activities. There was a strong

as detailed in the Panwas project document. The

reluctance on the part of the bureau staff to work

establishment of an on-line reporting system proved

alongside the private contractors, despite the good

to be popular and ensured that local Panwas offices

relations that had been established between the

could quickly submit reports to Panwas headquarters

two organizations. This stemmed in part from the

for processing. It was also an inexpensive means

difference in salaries between the private sector staff

of encouraging the public to play an active role in

and the civil servants, which caused tension. It was

monitoring the election process. This could be further

only at the end of the electoral process, and with

improved by widely disseminating information about

Bamboedoea’s contract near completion, that the

the Panwas and the reporting process; no funds for an

bureau became motivated enough to learn more about

information campaign were available, either through

the media centre. Following the implementation of a

the project or through the Panwas budget.

specificallydesignedtrainingprogrammeconductedby

88

Bamboedoea, the staff began to assume management

the content and style of the campaign were approved

of the centre in November 2004.

by the KPU Plenary and extensions to the contract of Fortune Indonesia, the private company responsible

The KPU Media Centre and the Vote Tabulation Centre

for implementing the campaign, were also subject to

were established and run for the legislative elections

plenary approval. All materials produced by Fortune

and the first round of the presidential elections by

Indonesia required the prior approval of the KPU. This

AAJ Komunika, a private company. While the KPU

very strong ownership of the campaign by the KPU

directly oversaw this activity, the involvement again

significantly contributed to its success.

was mostly at the KPU member and senior secretariat staff level. For the second round of the presidential elections, it was decided that the vote tabulation

Implementation

should be directly managed and run by the KPU itself, under the direction of a KPU member. As AAJ Komunika

The KPU and UNDP decided early on that it would be

provided technical advice and logistical support during

best if the information campaign was implemented by

the second round, this strategy worked well in ensuring

one selected private sector service provider.The reason

that the KPU staff developed the knowledge and

for this was to ensure continuity and consistency in

capacities to run the centre and to deal directly with

messages, as well as to make the management of the

the media.

campaign easier for the KPU. A further advantage of this implementation decision was that the selected agency could bulk-buy airtime and lower overall costs.

Voter Information

The professionalism of Fortune Indonesia, together with its flexibility in meeting the changing priorities of

Strategy and Activities

the election environment, also proved to be invaluable.

The KPU voter information strategy was shaped considerably by information on voter attitudes from

Voter Education

agencies such as The Asia Foundation and IFES. UNDP support to the voter attitude tracking surveys

Activities and Methodologies

conducted by IFES throughout the election process was important in ensuring that the KPU’s voter information

From the survey undertaken by the polling centre, it

strategy received continuous input and feedback. This

was clear that face-to-face activities were the most

was helped by the fact that IFES included specific

effective in explaining the new election system. Not

questions on the“Milih Langsung”campaign and other

only did participants learn the most through these

areas of KPU interest, and frequently discussed and

methods, but it also resulted in a cascading effect with

analysed the findings with all those involved in the

respondents feeling the need to share information

implementation of the information campaign.

they received with relatives, friends or neighbours. Therefore, while considered expensive when valued on

The KPU voter information activities funded through

a cost-per-voter basis, particularly in comparison to

the programme were managed throughout by

media activities, these activities did prove to be cost-

commission members.The initial decisions concerning

effective.

89

Alternative methods of voter education that mixed

limited timeframe for disbursement and the need to

information with entertainment were as important

ensure accountability for donor funds. However, local

and as effective as face-to-face methods These were

outreach would be improved through a longer-term

successful because of their wide appeal to a broad

project at a decentralized level to build relations with

audience – the literate and the illiterate, all socio-

grassroots organizations and to provide them with the

economic classes, rural and urban audiences as well as

necessary technical and administrative capacities to

the old and the young and old alike.

implement voter education programmes.

While media activities, such as the use of television

The UNDP programme also tended to favour those

and radio, were successful in transmitting voter

CSOs that had come together as consortiums for

education messages, the survey showed that printed

the implementation of activities over a broader

materials (posters, brochures) were not so effective.

geographical area. In terms of implementation, this

That applied particularly in rural areas where literacy

strategy worked well. However, experience showed

rates were low and reading habits not well established.

that these Consortiums tended to exist only for the

In these areas, direct face-to-face training was more

term of the activity, and they disbanded soon after

effective.

the elections were completed. This caused significant difficulties in trying to complete the final reporting,

Most CSOs programmes responded directly to the

as many of the partners could no longer be contacted.

voter information needs of the elections in terms of

The existence of legal documentation establishing the

the materials, methods and media used. Due to time

consortium, which was required by UNDP in all cases,

demands, however, the broader demands of voter

did not prove to hold a lot of weight.

education were not adequately covered. Longer term planning would have allowed for voter education

It was discovered some time into the implementation

activities that were pedagogic, rather than being

of the voter education activities that a number of

exclusively informative in nature.

CSOs were being hindered by various authorities. This was particularly the case in Aceh where freedom of

In the course of the programme, there was

movement was not possible. In the end, the KPU issued

considerable difficulty in identifying CSOs that worked

an authorization letter (surat jalan) to all the UNDP

in remote areas, where people have arguably the

voter education grantees, which they were able to

most needs. Special attention, therefore, needs to be

show when required. This should be considered in the

devoted to inaccessible geographic locations, which

implementation of any future voter or civic education

require specific budgetary allocations and longer term

activities.

planning.

Technical Assistance to Grantees Voter Education Grantees The technical assistance provided to CSOs focused Smaller and newer civil society organizations were

mostly on reporting and financial accounting. This

less likely to be selected due to their lack of previous

increased the CSO’s familiarity with international

experience and the smaller size of their programmes.

donor requirements and strengthened their ability

This strategy was considered necessary given the

to produce necessary financial and administrative

90

reports. However, the UNDP programme recommends

The number of monitoring officers put in place by the

that a component for technical assistance to CSOs

UNDP to monitor the activities of the CSOs should be

should be provided in the future. This need became

increased in the future. This will allow the officers to

particularly in taking their dealings with issues that

provide better feedback to the CSOs after their visits

are inherently difficult, such as encouraging women

and for the CSOs to subsequently make improvements

to get more involved in politics and inter-acting wtih

and adjustments to their programmes, should there be

an illiterate audience. CSOs tended to be traditional in

a need to do so.

their teaching approaches; a capacity building project could assist them in programme design and train them

CSOs were encouraged to work closely with local

in adult learning methodologies.

KPUDs in the implementation of their activities. This proved valuable in strengthening of KPUD/CSO voter information strategies at the local level and served as an ongoing monitor on CSO voter education activities

Monitoring and Evaluation

and materials

The UNDP programme put in place what proved to be an effective method of monitoring voter education.

Election Monitoring

However, the monitoring served the purpose more of informing the UNDP management of whether

Mobilising Monitors

the activity was being implemented as planned and approvinginstructionmaterials.Therewouldhavebeen

There was a direct correlation between the number

value in giving the CSOs funds to conduct their own

of domestic monitors mobilized and the amount of

internal monitoring and evaluation, which would have

donor funding available. As funding decreased for

served the purpose of promoting institutional learning

each election, so did the number of monitors due to

and adapting activities to changing conditions.

the fact that, although observers are often labeled as “volunteers,” most are paid. While payment was

91

deemed necessary in order to mobilize very large

without it being directly involved in coordination or

numbers of monitors in a short timeframe, it cannot

mobilization of observers, or in the reports presented

be described as a sustainable practice. One monitoring

by the observer missions. One simple but effective

organization attributed this “bad habit” of relying on

means of emphasizing the facilitation role was that as

funding to 1999 when large amounts of donor funding

a rule, the UNDP did not chair the IORC meetings.

went in search of large numbers of observers.

Involvement of Partners Technical Assistance to Grantees The IORC benefited considerably from its partnership The organizations that were selected to conduct

with three other international organisations, IFES, TAF

election monitoring activities were experienced

and NDI. Incorporating the technical expertise and

monitoring organizations, which had all had a role

experience of these organizations contributed greatly

the 1999 elections. Technical assistance, however,

to the IORC’s success. The partners were consulted

would have been valuable in introducing international

on major decisions and played an active role in the

monitoring standards and procedures to these groups,

meetings (rotating chairmanship), in the presentations

to ensure that reporting was objective and bias-free.

and briefings and in the dissemination of electionrelated material for the briefing kits.

Links with Panwas As noted previously, links between with national

National Monitors and International Observers

monitoring groups and international observer groups were limited. The reporting process would have been

The IORC was established specifically to help

strengthened if the monitoring groups had been

international observers. There was broad agreement,

encouraged to include more information on the

however,thattheinternationalobserverswouldbenefit

Panwas and its role in their training activities, as well

from greater interaction with national monitoring

as details on how and what to report.

groups, who could share their own expertise on the country and the results of their own monitoring exercises. While significant efforts were made by the

International Observation

IORC, the involvement of the national groups faced some barriers, particularly relating to language.

UNDP’s Role in Facilitating Observers During the election process, some tensions arose The IORC performed well in fulfilling its role as a

between the national monitoring groups and

clearing-house,withinternationalobserverdelegations

international observers, which largery from a

accepting the organization as their main forum for the

misunderstanding over the role of the observers.While

exchange of information, views and ideas. One of the

monitoring groups were mobilizing poll watchers in

initial concerns of the UNDP was to ensure that its

their thousands, their reports did not receive the same

neutrality was maintained throughout. This was done

kind of press attention as those of the significantly

through limiting the role of the IORC to facilitation,

smaller international observer teams. These tensions

92

may have been alleviated through better interaction

success of the programme. However, it was hampered

and information sharing between the two groups from

by the many exceptions to this delegation, which

very early on in the elections process.

included any waiver of competitive bidding over $30,000. As both grants and contract extensions were considered as waivers, a large part of the programme

Programme Management and Implementation

implementation was subject to direct approval by authorities from New York. Despite significant support and assistance from New York, these additional steps

Contracting Procedures

took time and delayed the implementation, and therefore the effectiveness of various programmes.

As stated in the report, a number of difficulties were encountered in the process of contracting civil society organizations to support the voter education and election monitoring process. The method of soliciting

Commitment and Disbursement of Donor Funds

proposals was considered by the KPU and UNDP programme to be the most effective in developing

Despite the fact that the initial donor meeting was

innovative ideas and matching priority needs and

held in January 2003, the first commitment to the

was therefore built into the programme document.

programme was made in August 2003, with the first

However, this method did not appear to be compatible

disbursement of funds occurring in October 2003.

with UNDP procedures, which apparently do not

This affected the ability for to plan and to commit

include any privision for grant making. This however

contractually to activities beyond the immediate term.

was not communicated to the programme until five

It is recommended that donors be made more aware

months after the signing of the programme document,

of the impact of late commitments and disbursements

when the first of the grantee contracts was submitted

on the effectiveness of programme activities. Deadlines

to the local CAPC. This, together with the fact that

shouldbeprovided,beyondwhichUNDPwouldnotfeel

contracts then had to be submitted to the New York

it possible to disburse funds effectively and efficiently.

ACP for approval, caused significant delays in critical activities and hindered the proper implementation of many activities.

Earmarking of Donor Funds While donors were encouraged to earmark funds,

Speed of Contract Approval

this frequently occurred without reference to the current status of programme funding. As a result, the

Elections programmes are by nature strictly time-

programme strategy had to adapt to the available

bound. Any delays resulting from administrative

funds, rather than letting the funds work to support it.

procedures can have a direct and irreversibly negative

One example of this was the money provided by CIDA

impact on the support that is being provided by the

and earmarked for voter education.While significant in

UNDP. In recognition of this fact, UNDP New York

size, the funds were earmarked for activities related to

granted a special US$1 million delegation-of-contract-

women, first-time voters and conflict areas. However,

signing authority to the Resident Representative

the size of the funds represented almost the entire

in Indonesia. This was an important element in the

voter education budget for the legislative elections,

93

resulting in the strategy having to be adapted

of service providers for the vote tabulation centre

accordingly.

(KPU, UNDP and IFES) and the signing of MoUs with partners for specific activities (UNDP and NDI, UNDP

A further example was the money provided by the

and IFES).

European Union which was specifically based on the needs assessment of the EU, rather than on the

The evaluation report noted that the donor

strategy laid out in the UNDP programme document

mechanisms put in place ensured that “actors had a

and agreed on by both government and KPU partners.

commonunderstandingandapproach,knewwhateach

This meant a significant amendment in the programme

other was funding and obtained better geographic

strategy, bringing in a focus on the Panwas which had

coverage.” The evaluation also noted that the donor

not been specifically included in the original document.

coordination “was notable for the lack of turf battles

It also resulted in a total of Euros 3 million being

which so often mar election assistance efforts,”

directed at one specific consortium of CSOs, rather

with one bilateral donor stating that coordination

than being allocated through the project appraisal

ensured a “seamless mesh” of its bilateral aid with the

committee mechanism.

multilateral UNDP programme.

Bearing that in mind, attempts should be made to actively involve donors from the very start to ensure that donor-specific requirements are built into the programme design and strategy.This would also ensure that donors are fully in concurrence with the objectives and activities of the programme at its onset. It would also avoid the need for amendments to strategies and subsequent planning, after agreement by all partners, and would therefore avoid any misunderstandings or delays.

Donor Coordination One significant lesson learned from the programme has been the value and benefits of donor coordination. While the formal donor meetings provided for information sharing at high levels, the most valuable mechanisms for donor coordination were seen at the working level. All programme activities involved coordination with donors to one extent or another. This worked in a range of different ways, including the development of a shared strategy and work plan for KPU training activities (KPU, IFES, AEC, JICA), the joint issuance of bidding documenta and the joint selection

94

Annexes

95

Annex 1: Request from GoI to UNDP to coordinate elections assistance

96

Annex 2: MoU between GoI and UNDP

97

98

99

Annex 3: Trust Fund Approval from New York

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Annex 4: Letter of Agreement between KPU and UNDP

108

109

110

111