Idea Transcript
Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative
Final Synthesis Report Volume 2 – Annexes
February 2010
FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2)
COMPONENTS OF THE SYNTHESIS REPORT VOLUME 1: MAIN REPORT Executive Summary Main Report
VOLUME 2: ANNEXES1 AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Annex A Timeline Annex B Governance and Evolution of the FTI Annex C The Indicative Framework and UPC Annex D Summaries of Country Studies Annex F Monitoring and Evaluation of the FTI Annex G The FTI and Capacity Development Annex H The FTI and Fragile States Annex J Interviewee Analysis Annex K Financing Gaps Full Bibliography
VOLUME 3: APPENDICES I-IV Appendix I Statistical Appendix Appendix II Trends in Financing of Basic Education Appendix III The Catalytic Fund Appendix IV The Education Program Development Fund
VOLUME 4: APPENDIX V Appendix V Note on Approach and Methods
VOLUME 5: APPENDICES VI-VIII Appendix VI M&E Framework and Impact Analysis Appendix VII Reforming the Catalytic Fund Appendix VIII Findings against High Level Questions
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What was originally Annex E was later redesignated as Appendix VIII. Similarly Appendix VII was formerly designated Annex I. To minimise confusion, remaining annexes have kept their original letters.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2)
Acronyms and Abbreviations AA ACP AFD AMIS ANCEFA ARTF BEDP BETF CAR CAS CD CEDAW CF CFC CIDA CPV CSO CSR Danida DFID DP DPO DQAF DRC EC ECCE ECD ECF EDF EFA EMIS ENI EOC EPRDF ESD ESP ESSP ESWG ETF EU FASE FAWE FCFA FIF FPE FTI FTIS FY GBS GCE
Administrative Agreement African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Agence Française de Développement Aid Management Information System African Network Campaign on EFA Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Basic Education Development Project Bank Executed Trust Funds Central African Republic Country Assistance Strategy Capacity Development Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women Catalytic Fund Catalytic Fund Committee Canadian International Development Agency Communist Party of Vietnam Civil Society Organisation Country Status Report Danish International Development Agency Department for International Development Development Partner Development Policy Operation Data Quality Assessment Framework Democratic Republic of the Congo European Commission Early Childhood Care and Education Early Childhood Development Expanded Catalytic Fund European Development Fund Education for All Education Management Information System Education Needs Index Evaluation Oversight Committee Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front Education for Sustainable Development Education Sector Plan Education Sector Support Programme Education Sector Working Group Education Transition Fund European Union Education Common Fund (Mozambique) Forum for Africa Women Educationalists West African CFA Franc Financial Intermediary Funds Free Primary Education Fast Track Initiative Fast Track Initiative Secretariat Financial Year General Budget Support Global Campaign for Education
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) GDP GEQIP GER GFATM GHP GMR GNI GNP GOE GOK GON GOY GPRS HIPC HIV/AIDS HLG HLQ HQ IATT IBRD IDA IEG IF IFFIm ILO INEE JAR JICA KESSP LDG LEG LGEA LPERP M&E MDG MEBA MfDR MINEDUC MOE MOEST MOEYS MOU MTEF NARC NBEDS NER NESP NETF NGN NGO Norad NPF
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Gross Domestic Product General Education Quality Improvement Project Gross Enrolment Rate The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Global Health Partnership Global Monitoring Report Gross National Income Gross National Product Government of Ethiopia Government of Kenya Government of Nicaragua Government of Yemen Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome High Level Group High Level Question Headquarters Inter-Agency Task Team International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development Association Independent Evaluation Group Indicative Framework International Finance Facility for Immunisation International Labour Organisation Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies Joint Annual Review Japan International Cooperation Agency Kenya Education Sector Support Programme Local Donor Group Local Education Group Local Government Education Authorities Liberia Primary Education Recovery Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Millennium Development Goal Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy Managing for Development Results Ministry of Education Ministry of Education Ministry of Education, Science and Technology Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport Memorandum of Understanding Medium Term Expenditure Framework National Rainbow Coalition National Basic Education Strategy Net Enrolment Rate National Education Sector Plan Norwegian Education Trust Fund Nigerian Naira Non-governmental organisation Norway Agency for Development Cooperation Needs and Performance Framework
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) NSDP NTP ODA OECD OECD DAC PARPA PAU PBS PCR PD PDDEB PEAP PEDC PEEC PF PFM PIF PISE PM PNE POA PRS PRSC PRSP PRSP QSR RETF SBS SC SE Sida SIMBA SUBEB SWAp SWG SWOT TA TBS TF TFMF TOR TT TTL TTP TVET UK UN UNESCO UNGEI Unicef UPC UPE
National Strategic Development Plan National Targeted Programme Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD Development Assistance Committee Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty Programme Administrative Unit Protecting Basic Services Primary Completion Rate Paris Declaration The Ten Year Basic Education Development Plan Poverty Eradication Action Plan Primary Education for Disadvantaged Children Strategic Plan for Education and Culture Progressive Framework Public Financial Management Policy and Investment Framework Programme d’Investissement Sectoriel Education Partnership Meeting National Education Plan Annual Work Plans Poverty Reduction Strategy Poverty Reduction Support Credit Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan Quality Support Review Recipient Executed Trust Funds Sector Budget Support Steering Committee Supervising Entity Swedish International Development Association School Instructional Materials State Universal Basic Education Boards Sector Wide Approach Sector Working Group Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats Technical Assistance Targeted Budget Support Transition Fund Trust Fund Management Framework Terms of Reference Task Team Task Team Leader Task Team on Prioritisation Technical and Vocational Education and Training United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations Girls' Education Initiative United Nations Children's Fund Universal Primary Completion Universal Primary Education
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) US USAID USD VPF VPHD WB WG WHO
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United States United States Agency for International Development United States Dollar Virtual Poverty Fund Vice Presidency for Human Development World Bank Working Group World Health Organisation
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2)
Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations _______________________________________________________________ 3 Annexe A
FTI Timeline ___________________________________________________________ 1
Annexe B
The Governance and Management of the FTI _______________________________ 15
A.
Introduction ___________________________________________________________________ 15
B.
Overview of FTI Governance _____________________________________________________ 16 The FTI's approach to governance and management 16 Governance structures 17 National Government _________________________________________________________________ 19 Local Donor Group___________________________________________________________________ 19 Other country level elements (LEG, CSOs and the Coordinating Agency) ________________________ 19 The FTI Partnership Meeting ___________________________________________________________ 20 The FTI Steering Committee (SC) _______________________________________________________ 20 The FTI Secretariat ___________________________________________________________________ 23 Technical Meetings __________________________________________________________________ 23 Working Groups and Task Teams _______________________________________________________ 24
C.
Evolution of Governance Arrangements and Structures _______________________________ 25 2002–2004: from the launch to the FTI Framework 26 2005: Governance stocktaking – the first Buse review 27 2006–2007: Continuing review of governance, including country level 29 2008: further formulation and adoption of governance reforms 30
D.
Summary of Changes in Governance Arrangements over Time _________________________ 32
E.
The FTI Secretariat _____________________________________________________________ 32 Initial design 32 Staffing 33 Status 34 The Secretariat's roles and responsibilities 34 Funding 37
F.
The FTI Trust Funds ____________________________________________________________ 41 Legal and fiduciary responsibility 41 Organisation and decision-making 41 Links and relationship between the Trust Funds and the Secretariat 44 Strategic decision-making about how the funds can and should be used 44
G.
Governance at Country Level _____________________________________________________ 45 Country focus 45 Strengthening country level processes 45 Local Education Groups and Local Donor Groups 48 Country level governance in practice 49
H.
World Bank Roles and Responsibilities _____________________________________________ 50 Introduction 50 Origins 50 Current WB roles (as accumulated over time) 51 Concerns that have arisen 52 Modifications under the recent governance reforms 54
I.
The FTI as a Global Partnership___________________________________________________ 55 What makes for effective partnerships? 55
J.
Summary of Findings ____________________________________________________________ 60
K.
What are the issues that need resolution? ___________________________________________ 62
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Annexe C
The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target ____________________________ 83
A.
Introduction ___________________________________________________________________ 83
B.
The Indicative Framework: Origins and Purpose _____________________________________ 83
C.
Global Reporting of IF Indicators __________________________________________________ 86
D.
Technical Note: Derivation of the FTI Indicative Framework ___________________________ 86
E.
Use of the Indicative Framework in FTI Countries____________________________________ 88
F.
Universal Primary Completion (UPC) as the FTI indicator _____________________________ 94
Annexe D
Summaries of Country Case Studies_______________________________________ 99
FULL COUNTRY STUDIES _________________________________________________________________ 100 BURKINA FASO SUMMARY ________________________________________________________________ 101 Sector Context 101 Progress towards Education for All (EFA) 101 The FTI in Burkina Faso 102 FTI and the Education Sector 102 Overall Conclusions 104 Reflections 104 CAMBODIA SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________________ 107 Sector Context 107 Progress towards EFA 107 The FTI in Cambodia 108 FTI and the Education Sector 108 Overall Conclusions 110 GHANA SUMMARY ______________________________________________________________________ 111 Sector Context 111 Progress towards EFA 112 The FTI in Ghana 112 FTI and the Education Sector 113 Overall Conclusions 114 Reflections 115 KENYA SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________________ 117 Sector Context 117 Progress towards EFA 117 The FTI in Kenya 118 FTI and the Education Sector 119 Overall Conclusions 120 Reflections 121 MOZAMBIQUE SUMMARY _________________________________________________________________ 123 Sector Context 123 Progress towards EFA 124 The FTI in Mozambique 124 FTI and the Education Sector 126 Overall Conclusions 127 Reflections 128 NICARAGUA SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________ 131 Sector Context 131 Progress towards EFA 132 The FTI in Nicaragua 132 FTI and the Education Sector 133 Overall Conclusions 135 Reflections 135 NIGERIA SUMMARY _____________________________________________________________________ 137
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Sector Context Progress towards EFA The FTI in Nigeria The Education Sector Overall Conclusions Reflections
137 138 138 138 140 140
PAKISTAN SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________ 143 Sector Context 143 Progress Towards EFA 143 The FTI in Pakistan 144 FTI and the Education Sector 144 Overall Conclusions 147 Reflections 148 YEMEN SUMMARY ______________________________________________________________________ 149 Sector Context 149 Progress towards EFA (2002–2009) 149 The FTI in Yemen (2002–2009) 150 FTI and the Education Sector 150 Overall Conclusions 152 Recommendations and Reflections for the Overall Evaluation 153 DESK COUNTRY STUDIES _________________________________________________________________ 155 ETHIOPIA SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________ 157 Sector Context 157 Progress towards EFA 158 The FTI in Ethiopia 158 FTI and the Education Sector 159 Overall Conclusions 160 MALAWI SUMMARY _____________________________________________________________________ 161 Sector Context 161 Progress towards EFA 161 The FTI in Malawi 162 FTI and the Education Sector 163 Overall Conclusions 164 Reflections 164 MALI SUMMARY ________________________________________________________________________ 165 Sector Context 165 Progress towards EFA 166 The FTI in Mali 166 FTI and the Education Sector 166 Overall Conclusions 168 MOLDOVA SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________________ 169 Sector Context 169 Progress towards EFA 169 The FTI in Moldova 170 FTI and the Education Sector 170 Overall Conclusions 171 Reflections 172 RWANDA SUMMARY _____________________________________________________________________ 173 Sector Context 173 Progress towards EFA 174 The FTI in Rwanda 174 FTI and the Education Sector 175 Overall Conclusions 176 Reflections 177 UGANDA SUMMARY _____________________________________________________________________ 179 Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Sector Context Progress towards EFA The FTI in Uganda FTI and the Education Sector Overall Conclusions Reflections
179 180 180 181 182 183
VIETNAM SUMMARY _____________________________________________________________________ 185 Sector Context 185 Progress towards EFA 185 The FTI in Vietnam 186 FTI and the Education Sector 186 Overall Conclusions 187 ZAMBIA SUMMARY ______________________________________________________________________ 189 Sector Context 189 Progress towards EFA 189 The FTI in Zambia 189 FTI and the Education Sector 190 Overall Conclusions 192 Annexe F
Data, Monitoring and Evaluation ________________________________________ 193
A.
Introduction __________________________________________________________________ 193
B.
Background ___________________________________________________________________ 193 FTI guiding documents_______________________________________________________________ 194
C.
Data: availability and quality at global and country level _____________________________ 196 FTI activities – Indicative Framework ___________________________________________________ 196 FTI activities – Catalytic Fund and EPDF (Objective 1) _____________________________________ 196 Coverage of data ____________________________________________________________________ 198 Quality of data _____________________________________________________________________ 199 Conclusions _______________________________________________________________________ 200
D.
Data: use at country level ________________________________________________________ 201 FTI activities – education sector plan appraisal process ______________________________________ 201 FTI activities – EPDF (Objective 3) _____________________________________________________ 202 Use of data ________________________________________________________________________ 202 Conclusions _______________________________________________________________________ 204
E.
Monitoring and evaluation of the FTI _____________________________________________ 205 FTI activities – Reporting_____________________________________________________________ 205 FTI monitoring of inputs, outputs and outcomes ___________________________________________ 207 Conclusions _______________________________________________________________________ 208
F.
Implications for FTI impact evaluation ____________________________________________ 209
Annexe G
The FTI and Capacity Development ______________________________________ 211
A.
Introduction __________________________________________________________________ 211
B.
Factors influencing FTI contributions to addressing capacity gaps______________________ 212
C.
The FTI Capacity Development Guidelines _________________________________________ 214
D.
The Use of the Catalytic Fund for Capacity Development _____________________________ 215 Adaptability to Fulfil Country Requirements Beyond Primary Education ________________________ 215 Aid Modality Effects ________________________________________________________________ 215
E.
The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) and Capacity Development __________ 216
F.
Some of the positive aspects of the FTI's contribution to capacity development ___________ 217 Country Status Reports and Policy Simulation Models ______________________________________ 217 But Need for Comprehensive Coordination on Teachers _____________________________________ 217 Addressing Key Knowledge Gaps ______________________________________________________ 217
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) G.
Some of the limitations on the FTI's contribution to capacity development _______________ 218 CD Management by Country __________________________________________________________ 218 Uncoordinated Gap-Filling and Un-harmonised Approaches _________________________________ 218 Joined-Up Policy Support: Public Sector Reform, Holistic Approaches _________________________ 218 CD Management by Donors ___________________________________________________________ 219
H.
Picking Out Some Patterns across the Country Studies _______________________________ 219
Annexe H
The FTI and Fragile States _____________________________________________ 221
A.
Introduction __________________________________________________________________ 221
B.
Why are fragile states an important issue for the FTI? _______________________________ 221
C.
What has the FTI done about fragile states? ________________________________________ 221
D.
What is the current status of the FTI on fragile states? _______________________________ 230
E.
Reflections: what does the story of fragile states and the FTI highlight about the FTI? _____ 231 Capacity and incentives 231 Institutional identity and decision-making in change processes 232 Implementing change 233
F.
Issues facing the FTI concerning fragile states ______________________________________ 234 Are fragile states still a priority for the FTI? 234 The FTI's response to complexity in "fragile states" and others: what to support? 236 The FTI and fragile states: How to support them? 237 Donor incentives 239 Process issues 239
Annexe J
Interviewee Analysis___________________________________________________ 241
Introduction ___________________________________________________________________________ 241 Global interviews _______________________________________________________________________ 241 Interviews for country case studies ________________________________________________________ 245 Annexe K
Financing Gaps _______________________________________________________ 249
A.
Introduction __________________________________________________________________ 249
B.
FTI usage of financing gap_______________________________________________________ 249
C.
Conceptual issues ______________________________________________________________ 250
D.
Global estimates of the cost of reaching EFA goals & financing gaps ____________________ 252
E.
Basic/primary education financing gaps in FTI endorsed countries – FTIS estimates ______ 253
F.
Basic/primary education financing gaps in FTI endorsed countries – evidence from country case studies ____________________________________________________________ 256
G.
Financing gap as a Catalytic Fund criterion ________________________________________ 259
References ____________________________________________________________________________ 262
Tables, Boxes and Figures Table B1 Table B2 Table B3 Table B4 Table B5 Table B6 Table B7 Table B8
Chronology of selected key moments in FTI governance Donor contributions to the FTI Secretariat Trust Fund (USD) Disbursements from the FTI Secretariat Trust Fund 2004–2009 (USD) Determinants of success for global partnerships Governance arrangements for GFATM and FTI compared The GFATM and FTI Secretariats compared Main findings to key governance questions Co-Chairs of FTI Meetings
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22 39 40 56 58 59 60 64
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Table B9 Summary of FTI Task Teams (TTs) and Working Groups (WGs) Table B10 Key actors and responsibilities in FTI processes Table C1 FTI Indicative Framework Benchmarking Tool for EFA/ESPs Table C2 Regression Analyses of Primary Completion Rate Table C3 Use of Indicative Framework and UPC in Countries Table C4 How was the Indicative Framework used in the case study countries? Table D1 Summary Timeline of Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Events in Burkina Faso Table D2 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Burkina Faso Table D3 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Cambodia Table D4 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Cambodia Table D5 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Ghana Table D6 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Ghana Table D7 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Kenya Table D8 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Kenya Table D9 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Mozambique Table D10Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Mozambique Table D11Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Nicaragua Table D12Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Nicaragua Table D13Summary Timeline of FTI and Other Relevant Events in Nigeria Table D1 Summary Timeline of FTI and Other Relevant Events in Pakistan Table D2 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Yemen Table D3 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Yemen Table D4 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Ethiopia Table D5 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Ethiopia Table D6 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Malawi Table D7 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Mali Table D8 Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Mali Table D9 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Moldova Table D10Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Moldova Table D11Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Rwanda Table D12Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Rwanda Table D13Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Uganda Table D14Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Vietnam Table D15Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Zambia Table D16Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Zambia Table J1 Global Level Evaluation Interviewees Table J2 Global Interviews by Affiliation and Gender (completed as of Jan-2010) Table J3 Burkina Faso: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J4 Cambodia: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J5 Ghana: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J6 Kenya: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J7 Mozambique: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J8 Nicaragua: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J9 Nigeria: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J10 Pakistan: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table J11 Yemen: Interviewees by affiliation and gender Table K1 Mean financing gap, GNI, proportion of out-of-school children by financing gap group Table K2 Mean adjusted financing gap, GNI and proportion of out-of-school children by adjusted financing gap group Table K3 Country studies examples of the rationale for the CF allocation decision Table K4 Calculation of financing gaps in country studies.* Table K5 Use of allocation formulas by the CFC Table K6 Features of the current proposed model for prioritisation of CFs Box B1 Box B2 Box B3 Box B4 Box C1
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Governance issues highlighted in the Issues Paper for this evaluation Changes in functions of the FTI Secretariat The World Bank and Trust Funds World Bank-administered Trust Funds and related risks UPE vs. UPC – clarifying the concepts
67 81 84 87 89 92 101 102 107 108 111 113 117 119 123 125 131 133 137 144 149 150 157 158 161 165 166 169 170 174 175 180 185 189 190 241 245 246 246 246 247 247 247 248 248 248 254 255 257 258 259 261 16 36 42 54 95
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Box C2 Box F1 Box H1 Box H2 Box H3 Box H4
Primary Completion Rate – Issues of Definition and Data Country Status Reports Country Level Progress in Fragile States Endorsed by the FTI What is the FTI Progressive Framework? Timeline: the FTI and Fragile States Key capacities of an FTI funding mechanism for fragile states
97 203 222 226 228 235
Figure B1 FTI Governance Structure at Global Level as established by the 2004 Framework Document Figure B2 FTI Governance Chart 2004–2008
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Annex A: FTI Timeline
Annexe A Date
FTI Timeline
General Aid Context
International Developments in Education
FTI Main Meetings and Events
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
1954 Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in the Arab Countries of the Middle East, Cairo. 1960 Adoption of the Karachi Plan for the Development of Free and Compulsory Primary Education in Asia. 1960-1961 Regional conferences on compulsory education, Karachi, Beirut, Addis Ababa. 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly which for those that signed highlighted the importance of equity for women in, amongst other areas, education. pre 1999
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child – spelt out the rights that children should have internationally: to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural and social life. March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many southern nations and made a commitment to meet the basic learning needs of every citizen. Convention against discrimination in education, adopted by UNESCO in 1960. Set out that there should be no discrimination in access or quality of education.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Date
General Aid Context
2001
FTI Main Meetings and Events
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
The Fast-track Initiative (FTI) was established. It was started by 22 bilateral donors, development banks and international agencies active in supporting education in low-income countries. The FTI was originally co-chaired on a rotating basis by one G8 and one non-G8 donor. It was set up supported by a steering committee, and a secretariat housed in and managed by the World Bank.
2002: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, Nicaragua, and Niger are endorsed by FTI.
Education For All (EFA) Assessment: 19992000, involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.
1999
2000
International Developments in Education
United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.
World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.
G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. July 2001: G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada.
First Meeting of the High-Level Group on th th Education for All 29 -30 October 2001: created by the Dakar Framework for Action to sustain and accelerate the political momentum created at the World Education Forum and serve as a lever for resource mobilisation. Aid to basic education grew consistently between 2001 and 2004 from a low base.
2002
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Monterrey Consensus, forged at the International Finance and Development Conference, March 2002, Monterrey, Mexico. The consensus commits rich nations to boost trade and aid opportunities for countries with sound policies.
Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: developing countries and their external partners agree at a DutchWorld Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euros to set the process in motion.
G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community.
The Global EFA Action Week was started – it now occurs annually and is a worldwide annual campaign organised by the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) to raise awareness of the importance of Education for All. The campaign is actively supported by UNESCO.
G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to
EFA Global Monitoring Report was established based in UNESCO to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.
FTI Launch Washington DC, USA. July 2002: 18 countries are invited to join the FTI and become eligible for policy and financial support, based on two criteria: having a PRSP in place and an effectively implemented education sector plan. Five other countries with half the world's out of school population are also invited to receive technical and analytical assistance to help create an enabling environment (policies, capacity) for scaling up EFA efforts. FTI Donors Meeting, Brussels, November
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Annex A: FTI Timeline Date
General Aid Context work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI. Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, February 2003. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around a country‘s development priorities and to harmonising donor policies and priorities around country systems.
International Developments in Education
FTI Main Meetings and Events
Second Meeting of the High-Level Group on Education for All, Abuja, Nigeria 19–20 November 2002.
2002: Donors meet and endorse seven country programs (out of the 18 countries invited). Donors agree to ensure that adequate funding for these programs will be secured.
Third Meeting of the High-Level Group on Education for All New Delhi, 10 –12 November 2003.
FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI. The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2-3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
March 2003 - Gambia, Mozambique, Vietnam and Yemen endorsed. April 2003 CF country allocations agreed for 2003-2005 to Yemen (USD 20m), Niger (USD 21m), Nicaragua (USD 14m), The Gambia (USD 8m), Guyana (USD 8m), and Mauritania (USD 9m).
2003 FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors met together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened up to all low-income countries.
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General Aid Context
International Developments in Education
FTI Main Meetings and Events
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
Marrakech Round Table on Results, February 2004:
January 2004 - The World Economic Forum's Global Governance Initiative, Davos, Switzerland. Launch by UNESCO and the World Economic Forum (WEF) of a global review of existing multi-stakeholder partnerships for education (MSPEs).
Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI. It aimed to support low income countries to improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and programme development.
2004 Ghana and Ethiopia are endorsed by FTI.
Fourth Meeting of the High-Level Group on Education for All - Brasilia, 8-10 November 2004.
FTI Partnership Meeting, November 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.
Development agencies endorsed five core principles on managing for development results (MfDR). These were supported by a conceptual framework and a series of principles. The MfDR provides a coherent framework for development effectiveness in which performance information is used for improved decision making, it includes practical tools for strategic planning, risk management, progress monitoring and outcome evaluation. 2004
2004 – Aid to basic education reaches its peak.
At the Partnership Meeting, the first of two significant studies on the responsiveness of FTI-endorsed Education Sector Plans (ESPs) to HIV/AIDS was presented (Clarke & Bundy 2004). The study, which was commissioned by the Secretariat, was based on an assessment of the first 12 countries to be endorsed by FTI. It found that 11 had failed to offer a comprehensive strategic response to HIV/AIDS in their plans. Accordingly it made recommendations to FTI, which included the need to ensure access to quality technical advice on HIV/AIDS in the education sector at country level, the need to strengthen capacity of the local donor group, the need to establish a formal arrangement between the FTI and the Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) on Education, and the need for resources though the EPDF.
Yemen – Grant agreement was signed in April 2004 for USD 10m for 2004. A disbursement of USD 3.0m was made on 10 August 2004. The Gambia – The grant agreement for USD 4m allocation was signed on 11 November 2004. Niger – The 2003 allocation of USD 5m was disbursed in March 2004. Nicaragua – The CF agreement was signed on 17 August 2004; USD 3.5m was disbursed on 27 September 2004. Mauritania – Two grant agreements (one for the 2003 BNPP USD 5m allocation, the other for the 2004 USD 2m CF allocation) were signed on 23 April 2004. USD 3.5 million was disbursed on 31 July 2004. Guyana – The Trust Fund Administration Agreement was signed on 28 June 2004. The Catalytic Fund grant agreement was signed on 28 September 2004.
The synthesis and recommendations of the Donors Indicative Framework (DIF) pilot were presented. These aimed to support FTI partners in their harmonisation efforts and to monitor harmonisation practices and financial commitments at the country level.
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Annex A: FTI Timeline Date
General Aid Context
International Developments in Education
FTI Main Meetings and Events
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
March 2005, the Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management of aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.
The flow of aid to basic education declined for the first time since 2001.
CF Strategy Meeting, March 2005. It was agreed that donor orphans will be defined as countries with the presence of four or fewer bilateral donors contributing at least USD 1m to the education sector.
Madagascar, Lesotho, Moldova, Tajikistan, Timor Leste and Kenya endorsed by FTI in 2005.
UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates were accused of producing a "watered-down" outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges. 2005
The gender parity goal set for 2005 has been missed. Only 59 out of 181 countries with data have no gender disparities in primary and secondary education. Of these 59 only 3 eliminated gender disparities between 1999 and 2005. The 5th meeting of the High-Level Group on EFA - Beijing, China, 28–30 November 2005.
CF Strategy Meeting, July 2005. A modification of the CF grant agreement was agreed. Disbursement of the second allocation is now contingent on a satisfactory report on the utilisation of the first year‘s allocation. FTI Donors Technical Meeting, in Washington, DC, September 2005. The main objective of the meeting was to review comments received on the co-chairs consultation paper, and define the agenda for the Beijing Partnership Meeting in November 2005. A study was conducted on the integration of gender into FTI processes and ESPs (Error! Reference source not found.). It concluded that while FTI may have added value to the wider movement to support gender responsiveness, it had not systematically encouraged a proactive stance on gender, or provided support for in-country Donor Partners for it. The report recommended that the FTI Goals and Guiding Principles and the appraisal guidelines be revised to include explicit commitments to gender equality.
In 2005, a total of 28 country programmes received EDPF funds totalling USD 4.9 million. Catalytic Fund disbursed USD 4m to Ghana, USD 24.2m to Kenya, USD 4m to Guyana and USD 6m to Madagascar in 2005. The following allocations were pending at the end of 2005; Yemen, USD 10m, Niger, USD 8m, Nicaragua, USD 7m, Gambia, USD 4m, Mauritania, USD 2m, Ghana, USD 4m, and Madagascar, USD 4m. UK and Norway are the only donors that give to the EPDF trust fund in 2005.
FTI Partnership Meeting, Beijing, November 2005: the FTI Appraisal Guidelines are modified in accordance with UNGEI recommendations and there is discussion about FTI's role in fragile states. Also at the PM, Ireland and Canada take the lead on supporting a greater focus on HIV /AIDS within the Partnership with support from the UNAIDS Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) on Education.
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General Aid Context
International Developments in Education
FTI Main Meetings and Events
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.
Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.
FTI Donors Technical Meeting, Moscow, Russia, March 2006. The main objective of the meeting was to review the agreements made at the Beijing Partnership Meeting in 2005.
Mongolia, Cameroon, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan and Rwanda all CF eligible are endorsed in 2006. Albania, Cambodia, Mali and Senegal are also FTI endorsed.
The 6th meeting of the High-Level Group on EFA - Cairo, Egypt, 14–16 November 2006.
CF Strategy Meeting took place in Moscow in March 2006. It was agreed that where the World Bank has ongoing educational programmes in the recipient countries the Task Team Leader‘s will receive 50% of the full regional supervision coefficient, whilst those without will receive the full regional coefficient. The European Commission announced a financial commitment of 63m Euros to the FTI catalytic fund creating a financing window for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The closing date for the main Catalytic trust fund was identified as December 31, 2007.
2006
Allocations are made to five newly endorsed countries through the CF Djibouti, Lesotho, Moldova, Tajikistan and Timor-Leste. Disbursements made by the CF in 2006: Djibouti (USD 3m), Ghana (USD 10m), Guyana (USD 4m), Lesotho (USD 1.8m), Madagascar (USD 11m), Mauritania (USD 1m), Moldova (USD 0.25m), Nicaragua (USD 3.5m), Tajikistan (USD 3.1m), Gambia (USD 4m), Timor Leste (USD 1.5m), and Yemen (USD 10m).
FTI Donors Technical Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, October 2006. The main objective of the meeting was to advance the work of the Initiative in view of the decisions to be made at the upcoming Partnership Meeting in Cairo. The meeting also involved discussions regarding governance and the expanded financing mechanism. In 2006 two more seats for developing countries and two for civil society organisations were added to the FTI Steering Committee. CF Strategy Meeting, November 2006. Allocations are approved for newly endorsed countries (Mongolia, Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan and Rwanda). Top-up allocations are approved for existing countries (Ghana, The Gambia, Yemen, Kenya, Nicaragua and Timor Leste).
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In FTI Partnership Meeting, Cairo, November 2006, the second assessment of the responsiveness to HIV/AIDS of FTI-endorsed ESPs was presented (Clarke & Bundy 2007). The study looked at the ESPs of eight countries, six of which had generalised HIV epidemics, it concluded that the FTI appraisal and endorsement process was performing unevenly with regard to HIV/AIDS. The draft findings and recommendations of the report were presented to the FTI Partnership in Cairo in November, and were circulated to the eight countries for feedback. Also at the Cairo PM, the IATT presented a Toolkit for mainstreaming HIV /AIDS into education sector planning and implementation. Whilst not designed specifically for the FTI process, it was foreseen that it would be used in plan preparation. It was decided that in order to establish FTI as a true hallmark of quality the country led processes would need to be strengthened. These processes should inform the development of FTI over the next two years. Expansion of the Steering Committee to give a more balanced representation was proposed – including four seats to partner countries (at least two from Africa). Three seats for representatives from civil society coalitions including one from an FTI endorsed country, a donor country and one from the GCE board.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).
Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments to action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.
The FTI donors Technical Meeting, Bonn, Germany, May, 2007: review of progress since Cairo, and a discussion of ways to strengthen country-level processes.
2007 Benin, Sierra Leone, Liberia are endorsed by FTI.
Following country consultation, the recommendations of the HIV/AIDS Task Team were presented in Bonn. Priority areas of action were identified including strengthening the quality of plan preparation and the appraisal process with regards to HIV/AIDS, and further support to collaborations between FTI and the IATT and UNGEI. EPDF Committee Meeting, Bonn, May 2007 at which the monitoring and evaluation task force was set up. This was set up to help shift EPDF monitoring from an activities-driven exercise to a more systematic monitoring and evaluation against an established results framework for the EPDF.
Cameroon: The grant agreement for USD 22.5m was signed in May 2007 and the first tranche of USD 11.25m was disbursed in May 2007. Mongolia: The grant agreement was signed in March 2007. The first tranche of USD 3m was disbursed on 10 May 2007. Rwanda: the grant agreement for USD 26m was signed in May 2007 and the first tranche of USD 13m was disbursed in May 2007.
May 2007, EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy adopted to encourage each actor to focus its assistance on areas where it can add most value, given what others are doing.
2007
In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on ―Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice.‖ Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities. They also recommended that the FTI partnership consider how to work more effectively with UNESCO, the World Bank, and other agencies.
The Steering Committee met five times in 2007: January (audio), March (audio), May (audio). The expanded Steering Committee met in May 22–25 (Bonn, Germany), and finally in DC in September 2007.
The following countries received CF allocations in Bonn, in May 2007: Benin (USD 76.1m), Cambodia (USD 57.4m), Mali (USD 8.7m), Mauritania (USD 14m), Mongolia (allocated funds in Cairo), Mozambique (USD 79m) and Sierra Leone (USD 13.9m).
Information from the CF Strategy Committee meeting was provided showing that for those countries with strong sector plans and enough pooled funds, the value add of FTI was quality insurance. More emphasis needed to be placed on country level financing as opposed to just CF financing. A task team was established to take forward the proposed actions to strengthen country level processes, which was a clear focus of this meeting. The secretariats‘ work plan and communication strategy were presented to the SC showing the need for an improvement in the collaboration between the Secretariat and the GMR team.
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The 7th meeting of the High-Level Group on EFA - Dakar, Senegal, 11–13 December 2007.
Concept Note for the Expanded Catalytic Fund (ECF) was finalised in April 2007. This enabled CF money to be given over a longer period than the original three years to countries with FTI-endorsed plans but insufficient domestic or external aid resources. The CF guideline for allocation based on donor orphan status was replaced with a new guideline based on the size of the funding gap as a proportion of existing donor funding.
At the EPDF Bonn meeting, bridge funding was approved for E. Asia and Pacific Regions totalling USD 500,000.
CF Committee (CFC) met in September in Washington, DC, and in December in Dakar, Senegal.
In Washington, Sept 2007 a Special Committee Meeting approved USD 7.5m for four of the World Bank regions. The following four countries became new CF recipients at the CF Committee Meeting in Dakar (Senegal) in December 2007, with commitments totalling USD 270 million: Ethiopia, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal.
September 19, 2007 in Washington, the Catalytic Fund (CF) Committee decided to clarify the rules regarding countries' eligibility to receive CF funding. It was decided that only IDA low-income countries would be eligible. 2007 (cont)
A draft of the Administrative Agreement (AA) of the CF was presented reflecting the newly proposed understanding that the AA would define the governance of the CF. There was a focus on strengthening joint country-level processes and CF operations. Agreement was reached on the merging and consolidation of country level processes with those of CF operations into a single FTI process chart. At its September 2007 meeting in Washington, the EPDF Committee decided that EPDF could be used to fund thematic activities, either global or cross-regional and could be used to finance activities at other levels of the education system, as long as links were made with Universal Primary Education. In 2007, a review was conducted of the national education sector plans of all endorsed countries in order to analyse their disability policies and strategies (Bines 2007). It concluded that
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September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries agreed to end the fragmentation of aid.
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FTI Endorsements and Expenditure
although FTI took into account disability, ―having an explicit policy on disability is not identified as a critical aspect of endorsement of education sector plans.‖ The review recommended that the guidelines be strengthened. CF Committee Meeting, December. Four new countries were allocated grants (Ethiopia, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Senegal). In November 2007, representatives of UNGEI, UNAIDS IATT, the Global Task Force on Child Labour (ILO), EFA, UNESCO EFA flagship on the Right to Education for Persons with Disabilities and the FTI attended a meeting of the Global Advisory Committee of UNGEI. During a joint working session on collaboration for mainstreaming equity and inclusion issues in country-level processes, participants agreed to collaborate on the development of a simple, user-friendly Equity and Inclusion Tool, to be prepared for the FTI Technical Meeting in Tokyo in April 2008. The overall purpose of the tool would be to support ministries of education and other stakeholders to address the inclusion of commonly excluded groups.
2007 (cont)
2008
FTI Main Meetings and Events
Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects. Donors will also give earlier statements of their giving, so that recipients can draw up
During the 2008 US Presidential Election Campaign, Barrack Obama called for a Global Education Fund, with an annual commitment of USD 2bn from the US. In a speech to the Clinton Global Initiative in September, Obama reasserted his interest in a Global Fund for Education and in signing the Education For All Act. The 8th meeting of the High-Level Group on EFA - Oslo, Norway, 16–17 December 2008.
In early 2008 the FTI published its Guidelines for Capacity Development in the Education Sector within the Education for All Fast Track Initiative Framework, as a result of the German (BMZ) funded Capacity Development Task Team. FTI Donors Technical Meeting, in Tokyo, April 2008. The main items on the agenda were to promote a holistic approach to EFA, to continue the discussions on strengthening country level processes, mobilising additional
In 2008, Central African Republic, Haiti and Zambia were endorsed by FTI. Eight countries received new allocations from the CF in the 2008 committee meetings: April: Madagascar (USD 85.1m) and Sao Tome and Principe (USD 25.6m); September: Guyana (USD 20.5m); December: Zambia (USD 60m),2 Burkina Faso (USD 102m), CAR (USD 37.8m), The Gambia (USD 20m) and Timor Leste (USD 4.9m).
For which, unusually, the Netherlands was designated Supervising Entity and allocated a budget of up to USD 100,000 a year.
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General Aid Context balanced budgets. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better. The 2008 Survey of Monitoring the Paris Declaration was published in November 2008. Prepared under the framework of the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, it was undertaken in 55 countries between 2nd January and 31st March 2008 and includes where it is available – sector level monitoring.
The Second Global Conference on Financing for Development was held in Doha, from November 29th-December 2nd 2008. A key focus of the agenda was a review of progress on the 2002 Monterrey Consensus commitments. 2008 (cont)
The resulting Doha Outcome Document failed to make substantive progress on global aid issues, merely restating the long-standing 0.7% of GNP for ODA commitment of the Monterrey consensus, and failing to make significant contributions to the aid effectiveness agenda beyond those devised in Paris and Accra.
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FTI Main Meetings and Events
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resources for education.
In 2008, USD 142.2m of Catalytic Funds was disbursed to 13 countries, which included first disbursements to Cambodia and Mali. As a result, cumulative disbursements reached USD 396.4m by November 2008.
Development of the Equity and Inclusion Tool took place during February and March 2008, however the result of these efforts was not presented in Tokyo as had been planned. The development work was reported to the FTI Steering Committee and plans for field testing including in some FTI countries were made. The Steering Committee met twice in April 2008, to update on progress since the December CFC meeting in Dakar. There was a report on strengthening country level processes, a discussion of governance and management issues, and a presentation of the FTI Secretariat‘s work plan and budget. The external evaluation of FTI was also discussed.
The Steering Committee and the Trust Fund Committees met September, 2008, at UNESCO's Headquarters, Paris, France. The CF transfer agreement was presented allowing the World Bank to transfer resources to an alternative supervising entity. The CFC turned down the proposal that the CF should be modified in order to provide financing to fragile states. September 2008 the Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI began. At the September 2008 Steering Committee meeting, in Paris: a presentation by Canada on behalf of the Fragile States Task Team generated committee support for the development of a Transition Fund, as an interim mechanism for funding fragile states. It is to be positioned within the FTI Framework and managed by Unicef. The design of the Transition Fund would reflect that of existing
CF disbursements included Cambodia (USD 1m), Cameroon (USD 11.2m), Kenya (USD 48.4m), Kyrgyz Republic (USD 4.9m) Lesotho (USD 3m), Madagascar (USD18m), Mali (USD 2.2m), Moldova (USD 3.4m), Mongolia (USD 5m), Niger (USD 4m), Rwanda (USD 35m) Tajikistan (USD 2.2m) and The Gambia (USD 4.1m).
Australia pledged USD 4.41m to the EPDF over the period 2008-2009, bringing the total number of donors to the fund to 11. Total pledges to the EPDF reached USD 96.12 m by October 2008, of which a total USD 58.5m had been allocated, and USD 28.8m disbursed. In the Oslo EPDF Committee Meeting, December 2008 – up to USD6.5 million was earmarked for a GCE proposal to strengthen CSO support for EFA at country level. The April 2009 status report for EPDF indicated that the grant agreement between Global Coalition for Education (GCE) and the Bank was likely to be ready by May 2009.
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FTI Main Meetings and Events Netherlands/ Unicef programme.
FTI Endorsements and Expenditure 3
The Netherlands also presented a key visioning paper (Netherlands MOFA 2008b) on governance which led to the creation of a Governance Task Team. They were tasked to take the recommendations made forward, and to prepare a revised governance document for approval in Oslo in December. The Steering Committee and the Trust Fund Committees met December, 2008, in Oslo, Norway.
2008 (cont)
SC Meeting, Oslo, December 2008: Governance Task Team presented a governance document (FTI 2009g) to the SC this led to a number of governance changes st scheduled for July 1 2009. These included the transfer of decision making power from the Partnership Meeting to the Steering Committee, the evolution of the Steering Committee into a Board of Directors and its expansion to 17 members with two extra bilaterals and one extra multilateral representative. A two-thirds majority rule would be applied to all decision making, and the two co-chair system replaced by a single, independent non-voting chair. It was also agreed that Unicef would develop a process action plan for integrating the Education Transition Fund under the FTI umbrella, for discussion in January 2009, and SC agreement by the April meeting in Copenhagen. CF Committee Meeting, Oslo, December 2008: an update on the FTI replenishment strategy lead to the creation of a Replenishment
3
The ongoing Netherlands and Unicef funded programme Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transitions.
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Task Team, lead by the UK, to provide a proposal for moving forward on a replenishment mechanism. The task team held its initial meeting on December 14, 2008. A pledging conference was also planned for the second half of 2009. EPDF Committee Meeting, Oslo, December 2008: draft proposals for EPDF Guidelines were presented. It was agreed that a follow up trust fund would be implemented to replace the EPDF when it closes in June 30th, 2010. Australia was appointed head of a team tasked to design the new EPDF by building on the good practices and lessons from the current EPDF. It was also agreed that the World Bank and FTI Secretariat would develop a report framework for monitoring and reporting on EPDF activities, finances and capacity development, by the end of January 2009. It was intended that this would improve the transparency of EPDF activities, and enhance the monitoring of activities against planned results.
2008 (cont)
2009
In the April 2009 London summit, the G20 agreed to provide USD1.1 trillion of extra finances to International Financial Institutions, of which USD 50bn was earmarked to ―safeguard development in low-income countries‖. It was agreed that USD 750bn would be channelled through the IMF, USD 500bn of which was to provide New Arrangements to Borrow and USD 250bn through Special Drawing Rights .
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The UNESCO World Conference on Education for Sustainable Development took place from 31st March – 2nd April 2009 in Bonn, Germany. Being half way through the UN Decade, it aimed to highlight the relevance of education for sustainable development (ESD) to encourage international exchange on ESD, carry out a stock-taking of the implementation of the UN Decade and to develop strategies for the future. At the end of the conference, a declaration was adopted that proposed guidelines for the implementation of the second half of the UN Decade.
FTI Partnership Meeting, April 2009, Copenhagen: focused on the theme Road to 2015, to correspond with the theme of FTI's 2008 Annual Report. Following the completion of piloting in Lesotho, Kirgizstan and Malawi, the mechanism of the Equity and Inclusion Tool was presented at the Partnership Meeting, in conjunction with a World Vision paper on FTI and disability (Lei 2008). SC meeting, April, 2009: the revised Education Transition Fund (ETF) Concept Note was presented by Unicef to the SC. Concerns were raised by the committee over programmatic accountability at the countrylevel, and consequently the Secretariat was
Lao PDR has its ESP endorsed by FTI. It is expected that by the end of the year, a further six countries will be endorsed, Bhutan, Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, South Sudan and Togo. As of March there was only one new CF allocation in 2009 of USD 35m to Rwanda. As of March 20th, CF disbursements in 2009 had reached USD 23.4 m. The largest amount went to Benin, in its first CF disbursement of USD 21.3 m. Smaller amounts totalling USD 2.1m went to Cambodia (USD 0.3m), Kyrgyz Republic (USD 1.3m), Moldova (USD 03.m) and Sao
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tasked with working with Unicef, under the guidance of the SC Co-Chairs Italy and Denmark, to prepare a Final Concept Note, Administrative Agreement, Grant Agreement and Operational Guidelines by June 30th, 2009.
Tome & Principe (USD 0.2m).
As a result of unsuccessful negotiations concerning lines of accountability and designated responsibilities with regards to the ETF (see Annexe H ) Unicef withdrew as a possible Trustee for the ETF in July 2009.
EPDF Committee Meeting, Copenhagen, 2009: the committee approved the general principles of the New EPDF concept note presented by the EPDF Task Team. Design of the programme commenced, a draft of which was to be available by September 2009. In addition, the EPDF discussed and approved a UNESCO proposal that the FTI Secretariat be asked to formulate a request for proposals to help countries measurably improve learning outcomes.
14
This brings total CF disbursements since the fund‘s inception to USD 491m or 35% of allocations. With cumulative cash receipts from donors reaching USD 1,159m to date (71.5% of pledges), it reflects a current liquidity situation of USD 668m that is expected to remain substantial until the end of 2010. As of March 31st, EPDF pledges had risen to USD 114 m. New pledges so far that year had come from Russia (USD 2m), Canada (USD 8.1m) and Sweden (USD 7.2m). Since March, USD 6.6m of EPDF funds had been disbursed through FTI, bringing total disbursements to USD 35.4m (47 % of the allocated USD 75.75m).
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Annexe B A.
The Governance and Management of the FTI
Introduction
B1. This annex examines the governance of the FTI. Specifically it documents the initial thinking around the governance structure, how the structure developed over time, what key changes occurred and why, and what the current situation is. B2. Governance relates to how an organisation guides its own activity. It concerns both formal and informal arrangements for functioning and decision-making. FTI governance covers both the country level and the global level. This annex addresses governance both in terms of how the partnership has been governed and the practical management issues of the FTI which hold the partnership together and influence its direction and ways of working. B3. The annex provides the background information and analysis necessary for the evaluation to answer the High Level Questions on governance: Has FTI's own governance and management made a difference in how efficiently the Initiative works in furthering EFA goals? Namely, can the FTI governance bodies be considered legitimate? Are FTI decision-making processes open, transparent, inclusive and well founded? Does the Initiative have an adequate monitoring and evaluation framework, and is it creating regular, useful inputs to decision making? Are FTI processes (endorsement, processing of catalytic funds requests, triggering the flow of funds) consistent across countries, timely and efficient (for example, how much time does it take between FTI endorsement and the flow of FTI-triggered funding at the country level)?" (ToR, Preliminary Report, p82).
B4. The Issues Paper which was developed as a background to this external evaluation – and which is part of the terms of reference for the evaluation – is relevant to this analysis (FTI EOC 2008b). It put forward a number of issues around governance and these are reproduced in Box B1 below. B5. Several changes have been made to the FTI's governance structure and functions over time. Recently (Oslo, December 2008) a number of far reaching governance decisions were made, informed by work that had been done over the previous two years on key governance bottlenecks within the Partnership. The changes that have taken place in the governance arrangements and the process by which decisions on governance were taken are discussed chronologically in this annex. For an overview see the time-line of key governance events and decisions which is included in Table B1 (on page 22;a more complete overview is in Annexe A ). A summary of the overall findings for the evaluation period can be found in Section J, at the end of this annex. The evaluation's judgements about the likely adequacy of the recent reforms and its recommendations going forward are presented in the main body of this report. B6. This annex is divided into a number of sections. This introduction is followed by a brief overview of FTI governance in Section B, and a discussion of the evolution of these arrangements and structures in Sections C and D. Section E examines the FTI Secretariat, while Section F focuses specifically on the FTI Trust Funds. Governance at country level is discussed in Section G, followed in Section H by an analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the World Bank in the governance and management of the FTI. Section I briefly considers how the FTI compares to other Global Partnerships. Section J presents the evaluation's assessment of the questions raised in the Issues Paper (see Box B1), and the final section (Section K) contains a number of brief reflections on the issues arising from this annex.
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Box B1
Governance issues highlighted in the Issues Paper for this evaluation
Decision making: How are decisions made in FTI? Does decision making follow established rules and order, and is it fully transparent? Are the governance and management arrangements effective and appropriate given the program's evolving scope and mandate? Trust funds: Concerning the CF, to what extent do its management mechanisms work against a sector-wide, multi-donor approach; harmonisation and alignment? Is the way in which the CF and EPDF are institutionalised (as trust funds within the World Bank) consistent with FTI principles (stressing government ownership, etc.)? Legitimacy: To what extent can the governing bodies of FTI be considered legitimate? How and how effectively have civil society organisations and partner government representatives been brought into FTI governance? Functioning: Is the Secretariat effective and productive: putting out information and reports and organizing discussions as required and in a timely manner? Communication: Concerning the substance of FTI communications: how transparent are these and how is information used to promote accountability within countries (not just at the local donor group level but between the implementers and parliament and civil society organisations)? To what extent is there open, broad-based discussion of FTI – its objectives, possible contributions, potential valueadded – within countries, or is it still a donor agenda? Monitoring and evaluation: Does FTI have its own outcomes-oriented global monitoring and evaluation framework and if so, is it effectively used to support and justify changes in the Initiative's agenda and core processes? How effective has FTI been in articulating lessons learned about accelerating EFA progress? Processes and procedures: How efficient are FTI processes and procedures, e.g., those for country selection, program review and endorsement, the disbursement of funds and services, the collection of performance data and reports, and the conduct of annual reviews? How have these processes evolved over time and how consistently have FTI standards been applied across countries? Source: FTI EOC 2008b.
B. Overview of FTI Governance The FTI's approach to governance and management B7. The FTI's light touch governance structure was intentional as explained in its 2004 Progress Report because "the FTI has moved away from a global program administered by a central secretariat applying a standardised "model", to a flexible approach with greater responsibility placed with governments and country based donors in education." (FTI 2004k p22). The governance arrangements for the FTI were thus designed to be non-bureaucratic and streamlined in how they managed the FTI and made decisions (Buse 2005). This was clearly outlined in the FTI Framework document (FTI 2004a). B8. The governance of the FTI has been under continual review. In fact, as is highlighted in Chapter 2 of Volume 1 (Cambridge Education, OPM & Mokoro 2010) of the Synthesis Report, the FTI was launched and rolled out before the arrangements for its functioning were properly in place. The governance arrangements, both at global and at country level, have continued to evolve over time. This reflects several factors: the complexity of the FTI's intentions as a global partnership, the fact that it was started before its architecture was fully
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worked out, and the contested perceptions of partners as to how it should work. Moreover, decisions about governance have been difficult to make given the evolving nature of the structures themselves. B9. Until late 2008 the main guiding document for FTI governance was the FTI Framework document (FTI 2004a). This document continues to guide the functioning of the FTI but has now been supplemented by the recent amendments and changes set out in the governance document of 2009 (FTI 2004k).
Governance structures B10. The main governance structures of the FTI are briefly explained in this section. Figure B1 below shows the global governance structures embodied in the FTI Framework document. Figure B2 below is the evaluation team's interpretation of the governance arrangements that operated at global and country level from 2004–2008. At country level the structure as represented in the 2004 Framework document originally included two elements 4 of governance, namely the "national government" and the "local donor representatives" (FTI 2004a p12). This was later expanded (from the end of 2008) to explicitly include the Local Education Group (LEG), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and a "Coordinating Agency"5 for the FTI (FTI 2004k pp3–6). The global governance includes the Partnership Meeting (PM), the FTI Steering Committee (SC), which has recently been transformed into the FTI Board, and the FTI Secretariat. There are separate global governance arrangements for the main FTI Trust Funds, and these are discussed in detail in Section F. Figure B1 FTI Governance Structure at Global Level as established by the 2004 Framework Document
4
The key FTI governance documents (2004 and 2009) refer to governance "levels" in contexts where there is no sense of hierarchy. The evaluation team opted to use the word "elements" in cases where "levels" may mislead. 5 Often referred to as the "lead donor". Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid-Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Figure B2 FTI Governance Chart 2004–2008 This chart is the evaluation team's interpretation of the governance structure over this period. As explained in the text, there were continual adjustments during the period, and significant reforms are being implemented during 2009. FTI Partnership Meetings – bi-annual high level forum for mutual accountability, lesson sharing, advocacy, consultation and review of progress.
FTI Governance 2004–2008
Steering Committee – policy, strategy and decisions for FTI. Consists of representatives from FTI‘s main constituencies (donors, partner countries, multilaterals and CSOs).
Two Co-Chairs – oversight of the Secretariat, chairs SC meetings. One G8 and one non-G8 chair in post for 1 year. World Bank - provides a legal home for the FTI‘s management both financially and administratively.
Catalytic Fund Committee – members are contributing donors. Sets policy, guidelines and decides on allocations. Chaired by the World Bank.
Technical Meetings –held for technical discussion.
Partner Country Government -(generally Ministry of Education)- initially by invitation now open to all IDA category I and II countries. FTI aims to be country led and driven so the government must take initiative in writing and submitting its ESP.
Task Teams and Working Groups – established to work on specific technical issues, integrates members of the partnership who volunteer to participate.
EPDF Committee – members are contributing donors. Sets policy, fund guidelines and approves allocations. Chaired by the World Bank.
Local Donor Group – is made up of donors operating in education sector of the country. The group is chaired by the Lead donor.
Local Education Group – this broader group is should be representative of main education stakeholders. It is headed by the Ministry of Education and includes donors, members of Civil Society, teacher unions, other ministries (where appropriate) etc.
FTI Secretariat – hosted at and managed by the World Bank under the direction of the SC and co- Chairs. Staffed by WB staff and secondments by donor partners.
Indicates supporting role Indicates provision of direction, (in the direction of the arrow). 18
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National Government B11. The central idea of the FTI is that the leadership of the FTI is at country level. National governments (Ministries of Education in collaboration with other government agencies) are responsible for developing Education Sector Plans (ESPs), for implementing them, and for monitoring and evaluation. It is expected that these processes and products are the result of close consultation with civil society and development partners. 6 The ESP is expected to be in line with the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and with the FTI Indicative Framework (IF)7 (FTI 2009p). Local Donor Group B12. As outlined in the revised FTI Governance of the Partnership (FTI 2009g p5) the local donor group consists of representatives from bilateral and multilateral development partners and other donors, (i.e. international NGOs and private foundations) involved in the education sector;8 it is led by a coordinating agency ("lead donor"). The LDG is responsible for: supporting the government's development, implementation, and monitoring of the ESP; for its appraisal and endorsement; for mobilising financing to implement the Plan; for monitoring and promoting progress towards harmonisation and alignment; for taking an active role in Joint Annual Reviews (JARs) of the ESP; for reporting on funding commitments and disbursements; and for supporting the national government in applying for use of FTI funding instruments (FTI 2009g, p5). B13. Later documents on governance emphasise the role of donors on the one hand, and the lead (coordinating) donor, on the other (FTI 2009g; FTI 2009p). In the current structure, the lead agency is responsible for: (a) "acting as the communications link between government of the partner country, the LDG and the FTI secretariat"; (b) "playing a leadership role ... in the monitoring, development, endorsement and implementation of the ESP"; and (c) "playing a monitoring and facilitating role ... (ensuring) timely and efficient disbursement of funds ...through (i) support to the Supervising Entity (ii) reporting on progress to the partnership through the FTI Secretariat" (FTI 2009g, p6). This is a more extensive role than was foreseen in the 2004 FTI Framework document, which specified that the coordinating agency "acts as the communications link between the Government of the partner country, the LDG and the FTI Secretariat, and may be given other agreed roles such as managing the appraisal process or facilitating discussions" (FTI 2004a, p5). Other country level elements (LEG, CSOs and the Coordinating Agency) B14. In the original design of the FTI which is outlined in the Framework document (FTI 2004a), only two elements of governance were mentioned at country level. The revised governance structure, approved in December 2008, gives more details on the country level governance structures and responsibilities. The description of country level governance now explicitly includes – in addition to the government of the partner country and the Local Donor Groups – a specific outline of the responsibilities of the Local Education Group (LEG), of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and of the Coordinating Agency. 9 The roles of these entities and the manner in which they relate to each other in the FTI process are now explained in the FTI Process Guide (FTI 2009p). 6
"Development partners" is a term used for aid agencies/donors in the FTI's governance-related documents. 7 FTI Framework 2004: "the primary education component of the sector plan is assessed in full consideration of the benchmarks of the FTI Indicative Framework … as adapted locally". 8 However, the LDG may in some counties exclude significant donors e.g. China or donors providing exclusively general budget support. 9 There is, however, nothing in the new arrangements regarding necessary in-country capacities for coordinating agencies to play their full FTI related role. Volume2_Feb2010x
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B15. At country level, the FTI does not have an official operational presence. Officially this role is taken on by the coordinating agency on a rotating basis. In practice, the country case studies and the interviews conducted for this evaluation have shown that the FTI is often seen as synonymous with the World Bank, partly because of the Bank's role as the "supervising entity" for the FTI Catalytic Fund.
The FTI Partnership Meeting B16. At global level, the Partnership Meeting (PM) was set up as a global platform for consultation among all the FTI partners: which includes donors, United Nations (UN) agencies, recipient countries, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), civil society representatives, participating FTI countries, and the FTI Secretariat. The PM took place annually until 2006, and since then takes place every two years. As the FTI was conceived to support EFA, the PM was timed to take place yearly after the annual meeting of the UNESCO High Level Group on EFA. This is no longer a requirement, but can be done if convenient. B17. The original 2004 FTI Framework highlights that the purpose of the PM is to set strategic policy direction for the FTI and to systematically review and address issues which affect progress towards Universal Primary Completion (UPC). The document also mentions a strong advocacy role of the PM aimed at ensuring (growing) commitment of resources to the FTI. Most donors agreed that the partnership "should retain decision making for the FTI, on issues that affect the focus and key principles of the Partnership" (FTI 2007w, p5). The revised governance arrangements have changed the role of the PM substantially. The PM is no longer assigned the main decision-making role; rather it is described as a "high level forum for mutual accountability, review of progress, challenges and bottlenecks, lesson sharing, consultation and advocacy" (FTI 2009g, p7). This evolution of the role of the Partnership Meeting occurred as the partnership grew and it was increasingly recognised that a tighter group was needed to make decisions about the focus and key principles of the FTI. This change happened simultaneously with the growth of the Steering Committee and the growing representation of partners on that Committee; "large numbers can make for an unwieldy forum for open and in depth dialogue" (FTI 2009g, p1). The transfer of "decision making power" was approved in December 2008 (FTI 2008y p1).
The FTI Steering Committee (SC) B18. In its original conception the SC had five standing members, as follows: two co-chairs who sat for one year – one from a G8 country and the other from a non-G8 donor country – UNESCO, the WB, and as a fifth member the most recent out-going co-chair for a six-month period following its tenure. The membership of the SC has been expanded on three occasions since then to ensure better representation of stakeholder groups (although the latest round of changes in December 2008 have – as will be noted below – shifted the balance back in favour of donors). The original design of the FTI, which put G8 chairs in rotation, was the result of the strong early involvement of the G8 in the gestation of the FTI and aimed at gaining both financial and political buy-in to the objectives of the FTI. The purpose was to encourage the G8 members to deliver on their commitment to ratchet up aid for basic education. This policy of inclusion was a strategic decision by the like-minded donors to try to draw in other donors who were perhaps less committed to the principles upon which the FTI was based. B19. Successive chairs have used their tenure to seek progress on specific issues (this has included Denmark's focus on governance during its recent tenure, and in earlier chairing arrangements, Germany's focus on capacity development, Russia's on quality education, the EC and then Germany on strengthening country level processes, etc.). A full list of chairs and co-chairs of the FTI can be found in Table B8, on page 64 at the end of this annex. In some respects therefore co-chairs have been drivers of the Initiative, and this agenda-setting
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by co-chairs has helped move forward some key aspects of the FTI (such as the recent governance reform). However, this approach also has a major weakness: it has meant that the FTI has tended to move in different directions at different times, and that important pieces of ongoing work have not necessarily been carried through beyond the tenure of the specific co-chair. For example the work on quality initiated under the Russian co-chair has not been completed in spite of the importance of the issue. In addition, giving the responsibility for these issues to the co-chairs has contributed to keeping the Secretariat from acquiring true authority and capacity in areas which should be part of its mandate (see section E below). B20. Currently the Board10 has 17 members: six donor representatives (three bilateral donors selected among the five largest contributors to the FTI trust funds, and three donors to include one G8 member and two non-G8 members), four partner country representatives with at least two from Africa, four multilateral agency representatives (with standing positions for the WB, UNESCO, Unicef, and the European Commission (EC)); and three CSO representatives (two from the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) with one representing civil society coalitions from partner countries, and one representing civil society coalitions from donor countries; the third place is allocated at the discretion of the Board to another key stakeholder group11). B21. In the original design the SC was described as being responsible for providing overall policy guidance to the FTI. The SC also gave "operational direction" to the Secretariat in between the Partnership Meetings, and helped ensure coordination (FTI 2007w p5). In practice this led to difficulty in separating the policy role of the SC from that of the PM, in part due to lack of clarity on where and how particular decisions are taken. Under the revised arrangements the Board is very clearly the governing body of the FTI – a role which the SC had de facto been taking on gradually. It is now the Board which decides on policies and strategies for the FTI, reviews and approves the objectives of the FTI partnership, plays a major advocacy role, gives direction to the Secretariat, monitors the utilisation of the FTI Trust Funds to ensure their use is in line with the objectives and policies of the FTI, commissions the FTI working groups and task teams, approves the annual objectives and report of the FTI, and enhances the links among FTI partners by strengthening communication and collaboration (FTI 2009g). B22. Representation of different actors at Board meetings was something that was raised by a number of interviewees. Not only has the seniority of staff members attending the meetings declined over the lifetime of the FTI, but the proportion of CSOs and partner country representatives as compared to donor members has declined following recent governance changes (see Table B1 below). The re-naming of the Steering Committee as the Board of Directors and the decision to bring in a high-level independent Chair represents an important effort by the FTI to raise representation to a more senior level. There have also been efforts to curtail the size of delegations sitting at the table in meetings as the Steering Committee has more than trebled in size from five to seventeen . B23. The formal records of Steering Committee meetings reveal very little about the practical extent of the participation by partner countries, offering little evidence of their initiatives or interventions. From the records, CSO representatives appear conspicuously more vocal and a number of interviewees also commented on this. It is not clear how, if at all, partner country representatives "represent" the views of other partner countries. There is no formal mechanism for this, and a number of interviewees also commented that it was especially difficult for partner country representatives to digest all the papers associated with FTI meetings, since they have full time jobs and only limited staff assistance. 10 11
As of July 2009 the Steering Committee has become the Board of Directors. The World Economic Forum Global Education Initiative was chosen.
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Table B1 Chronology of selected key moments in FTI governance Date 2002
Event
Comments/Implications
Establishment of the FTI, targeting a select group of invited partner countries. FTI Action Plan drafted by the World Bank, provided the outline concerning how to move forward FTI Secretariat established in the World Bank's Education Division. Invitations sent the first batch of 18 countries to join the FTI (plus an additional five large countries for the "analytical fast track").
2004
FTI covers 16 countries Decision to open the FTI to all low income/ IDA countries, which could meet the criteria for endorsement. The CF and the EPDF are both established and managed by the World Bank on behalf of the FTI Adoption of the FTI Framework (FTI 2004a)
The Framework document crystallised the design of the FTI and is the reference point for all the changes since
Approval of the first FTI Secretariat Work Plan and Business Plan outlining resource needs 2005
2006
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed First Review of governance and management structures conducted (Buse 2005) Beijing meeting results in a first set of governance reforms FTI Assessment Guidelines produced which make country level processes more flexible Cairo PM meeting discusses governance extensively and results in a second set of governance reforms
SC expanded from 5 to 8 members, including for the first time Unicef, one partner country, and a civil society representative
The Head of the Secretariat submits a proposal to double the size of the Secretariat
2007/2008
Increase of the SC to 14 members with increased representation from partner countries (4, with at least two from Africa) and civil society (from 1 member to 3) Decision to have PM every two years rather than every year
Problems arising from governance at country level become more evident, with issues around FTI processes in a number of countries such as Mozambique and (later) Haiti The Catalytic Fund becomes the Expanded Catalytic Fund A drafting committee for governance is established including the EC, Canada and the FTI Secretariat to develop a proposal for addressing governance issues A task team is established for country processes A country level process guide is developed to provide guidance to country FTI processes.
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Date 2008
Event
Comments/Implications
Netherlands "Visioning" Paper produced to provoke discussion around the key governance issues facing the FTI Establishment of a Strategic and Governance Task Team to develop proposals to address the outstanding governance concerns
Key decisions include:
Oslo SC approves a further set of governance reforms
2009
SC to have the status of a board and become the decision-making body SC expanded to 17 members (maintained 3 seats for CSOs and 4 for partner countries) with more representation of the biggest donors to the FTI Technical meetings abolished The FTI to have a full time independent chair on three year contract who will also chair both Trust Fund committees. PM no longer necessarily held in conjunction with the UNESCO EFA High Level Meeting.
April Copenhagen Partnership Meeting endorses the decisions made by the SC in Oslo. September sees the first meeting of the new board (10 September in Paris).
th
The FTI Secretariat B24. At global level, the FTI is hosted at, and managed by, the World Bank (WB). The FTI does not have a separate legal status/personality and relies on the WB for providing a legal home for its management (both from an administrative and financial perspective). As highlighted in the Global Campaign Review of the FTI, the placement of the FTI within the WB arose out of a dual concern of donors with the high costs involved in establishing an independent entity and a lack of confidence in UNESCO's capacity to lead and mobilise funds for the initiative – which would have been the natural alternative emerging from UNESCO's mandate and role vis-à-vis EFA (Rose 2003a).12 B25. The FTI Secretariat is managed by the WB under the direction of the Board (formerly the SC) and is housed at the WB offices in Washington.13 The Secretariat is composed of both WB and partner agency staff. The Secretariat is responsible for providing technical and administrative support to the FTI and supporting knowledge sharing. The Secretariat is discussed in detail in section E below.
Technical Meetings B26. Although these were not specifically mentioned as a discrete aspect of governance, the FTI Framework made provision for FTI donor partners and recipient country partners (or 12
As noted in Rose‘s report "UNESCO‘s weaknesses need to be understood in the light of changes to its financial support occurring since the 1980s, which have only improved in recent years. In addition, its ability to mobilise countries to produce EFA plans is constrained by a lack of incentive structure whereas, as will be seen, the linking of FTI proposals with the potential for countries to receive external funding gives the World Bank considerable leverage to ensure that countries do produce plans" (Rose 2003a, p8). 13 However, in late 2009 the Secretariat moved out of the World Bank‘s offices into another building. Volume2_Feb2010x
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subgroups within these with common sets of interest) to organise technical or consultative meetings as appropriate (FTI 2004a p13). In practice, over the years this resulted in the organisation of meetings – composed of donors and UN agencies – once or twice a year to "provide a platform for information sharing and coordinated decision making on specific implementation issues" (Buse 2007). Without formal terms of reference, the Technical Meetings tracked progress (particularly of the Task Teams and Working Groups) and addressed some of the broader systemic issues and constraints facing the FTI at country level. They also provided a forum for technical discussions and presentations. These meetings were attended mainly by education experts. B27. Until 2004 the Technical Meetings formally "endorsed" countries for FTI support by non-objection (this was later dropped). The meetings also provided an opportunity for reaching consensus on technical approaches which partners wished to promote. Finally, the TMs served to highlight donor achievements on harmonisation and alignment, providing an incentive for further progress. The Technical Meetings have been abolished as part of the recent governance reforms.
Working Groups and Task Teams B28. The FTI has also established both working groups and task teams to carry out or supervise studies and to reflect on technical issues. According to the FTI Secretariat's overview in 2006, Working Groups (WGs) are established on a permanent basis, whereas Task Teams (TTs) are ad hoc to carry out a specific task and therefore of limited duration (FTI 2006m). Participation in the Working Groups and the Task Teams is voluntary. A compilation of the history of the main Working Groups and Task Teams can be found at the end of this annex in Table B9 (page 67). The revised governance arrangements give the Board the authority to establish and abolish Working Groups and Task Teams. B29. From an organisational and governance perspective the Working Groups and Task Teams provide inputs both to the FTI Secretariat and to the SC, and through these (where relevant) to the PM. In addition, the FTI has what it calls "other areas of work" (FTI 2006m, p4) to address issues related to gender and HIV/AIDS, (both of which have a wider expert membership and are sometimes referred to as working groups). B30. In practice, the effectiveness of the Working Groups and Task Teams has been variable (Buse 2005, supported by interviews conducted by this evaluation). Points that emerge from the documentation and analysis include: (a) Working Groups and Task Teams have been a valuable means for members of the FTI14 to engage in specific areas of interest and to feel involved in the workings of the FTI. (b) Working Groups and Task Teams have been created by different bodies. It has not always been clear which of the FTI governance structures they report to. (c) Working Groups and Task Teams consist of FTI members. Those members have generally been education experts or persons with a general development background, but have not always had expertise related to the topic (e.g. fragile states, financing, communications etc.). The Working Groups and Task Teams have at times taken on external technical expertise to support or inform their work. 14
Particularly the Steering Committee; involvement of developing countries and CSOs has been ad hoc. Developing countries and CSOs have been represented in: the evaluation TT and the EOC (includes Ghana and GCE); the Governance TT (Ghana and GCE); the Strengthening Country Level Processes (SCLP) TT (includes three developing countries and GCE); Visioning Group (Guyana and GCE). Both the Fragile States TT and the HIV/AIDS TT are linked to external working groups and therefore informally have broader external representation.
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(d) The performance and longevity of Working Groups and Task Teams is variable, depending on the commitment of the participants. Their financing is also dependent upon their membership. (e) Working Groups and Task Teams have not always had clear terms of reference. They have often "floated" within the partnership. The Secretariat has not consistently monitored the Task Teams and Working Groups and was unable to supply a comprehensive overview of their history or their current status to the evaluation team. This is highlighted by Table B7: it contains the most complete available information but nevertheless has a number of gaps which extensive examination of available documentation and interview records was not able to resolve. (f) An analysis of the minutes of various FTI meetings shows that there is often no clear termination of Task Teams or Working Groups – they are created, allowed to lapse and are then revitalised as and when needed. (g) Documentation on the Task Teams and Working Groups is patchy depending largely upon the lead organisation and the extent to which they insist on documenting the groups' membership, discussions and outputs. (h) The Task Teams/Working Groups approach has in some cases been slow to produce results and therefore to advance the FTI agenda. For example, the Country Processes Guide was not issued until six years after this country-led partnership began; the fragile states Task Team was formed in 2005 yet the issues it was addressing remain largely unresolved (see Annexe H ). B31. The Working Groups and Task Teams have played a significant role within the FTI and have enabled progress on a number of key issues. They have also been important in enabling the FTI Secretariat to remain lean whilst taking forward issues and ideas that are important to the partnership. Governance structures around them have been loose which has allowed flexibility but has also led to the pace of production being entirely dependent upon the make-up and commitment of individual members of the group. With no overall strategic plan, Working Groups and Task Teams very much set their own agenda within the often broad scope of work assigned by the Steering Committee. The recruitment of external technical expertise to the work of the group has frequently also been a function of group membership (i.e. willingness and ability to make additional support available). B32. Over time, Working Groups have been used less (see Table B9) being instead replaced by Task Teams, which tend to be set up to accomplish a more tightly defined piece of work. Often however, this work evolves and develops (e.g. the EPDF II Task Team), highlighting perhaps the need for oversight and follow-up with the Task Teams. It is interesting that Working Groups defined by the FTI as being "created to analyze specific themes of concern to FTI partners" (FTI 2006g p11) have been used far less, perhaps indicating a more task-orientated focus of the FTI management bodies. As the FTI continues to grow and develop, there is likely to be pressure for more formality of structure around the work of Task Teams and Working Groups, with closer follow-up and accountability.
C. Evolution of Governance Arrangements and Structures B33. FTI decision-making structures have figured prominently in the debate and reflection among FTI partners over time. At the request of the partnership the governance arrangements have been formally reviewed in a number of studies. The principal ones include the two reviews by Buse – 2005 and 2007 – and independent work by the 2008 governance Task Team. The prominence of governance as an issue in the Terms of Reference for the present evaluation continues this trend. To understand the changes which have occurred in governance structures and arrangements, the next sections summarise some of the issues that the FTI faced initially and how these have evolved.
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2002–2004: from the launch to the FTI Framework B34. The first three years of the FTI testify to its rapidly growing scope and the endorsement of 16 countries (Buse 2005). The FTI partnership also provided a framework for donor harmonisation and coordination and for discussion around good practices in the education sector. However, constraints and limitations also emerged, which Buse highlighted: (a) The FTI was being rolled out (and therefore perceived) as a vertical programme – with decisions made at global level and too little understanding and interaction with the country level. (b) There was substantial lack of clarity on which decisions were to be made by which decision-making bodies; the resulting duplication of tasks and mandates complicated progress within the partnership. (c) Countries were unclear on the process by which they could become part of the FTI (as illustrated in a number of the country case studies conducted in the context of the present evaluation). They were similarly unclear about the relationship between the ongoing efforts at education improvement (through the development of Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) for example) and the FTI process. (d) Access to the FTI was by invitation only to countries which met a series of strict criteria. This limited the sense of ownership and participation in the initiative. (e) The focus of the FTI was mainly on increased financing (as opposed to other important factors such as capacity building). (f) The FTI was perceived as "slow moving" and insufficiently responsive to country needs and concerns (Buse 2005). B35. The implementation of the FTI at country and global level faced considerable challenges at the time. This came out clearly in several of the evaluation's country case studies and also in the global level interviews. In most cases the planning process for the FTI endorsement was taking place in parallel with the education sector planning process, rather than as part of it, and the first countries were being asked to develop separate FTI plans (even in situations where comprehensive country education plans existed, e.g. in Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Uganda (initial attempt at endorsement in 2002), Mali, Malawi and Rwanda). There was a lack of clarity as to who the partners for dialogue were at country level, and whether this needed to include, for example, the Ministry of Finance. The endorsement process was marred by confusion around who should endorse, when it should take place, and what the nature of the process should be 15 – and whether this was a country-level process or a global one. Revisions of the country proposals were driven by the FTI Secretariat rather than by the country or the local donors. Finally the modalities for resource mobilisation were not understood. Ministries of Education were convinced that FTI endorsement would bring substantial additional money (in part because the correspondence with the countries by the FTI Secretariat – in that early period – implied that this was the case – e.g. country case studies of Nicaragua and Burkina Faso), and many of the partners assumed that endorsement would mean the establishment of a direct funding line from the FTI to the country level.16 Because the details of the FTI were still being worked out and
15
In Nicaragua, for example, the MOE interpreted the endorsement to mean that partners (donors and CSO) should develop individual formal assessments of the FTI plan. These were then attached to the proposal which was submitted to the FTI Secretariat. Upon clarification by the Secretariat, a formal endorsement meeting was held following which the donors drafted a document of appreciation of the plan which highlighted the strengths of the proposal, their commitment to seeing it implemented, and the areas that would require follow up. 16 The 2004 Status Report (FTI 2004e) acknowledged:
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criteria were unclear, a number of countries (e.g. Mozambique and Ethiopia) were asked to join the FTI, only to be later told that they did not qualify for direct financial support because they did not meet the "donor orphan" criterion.17 B36. These concerns led to a recognition that the FTI needed to shift from its global-level focus to a stronger emphasis on country-led processes. They also resulted in substantial efforts to clarify the objectives of the FTI and strengthen the endorsement process – in particular to explain and reinforce the important role of the Local Donor Group. In this context the FTI Secretariat developed a number of strategies and tools for improving communication around the FTI. At the Oslo meeting in November 2003 it was decided that the FTI would be open in principle to all low income IDA countries. This required designing a strategy which would let countries become involved at different points, essentially allowing good performers to move fast, and others to get help to meet the criteria for endorsement. An operating framework – based on these developments and the agreements reached among donors – was drafted following this meeting, and the main outline of the FTI was then laid down in the FTI Framework document (FTI 2004a) (summarised in Exhibit 6 of the main report).
2005: Governance stocktaking – the first Buse review B37. In 2005 a Review of the Governance and Management Structures of FTI (Buse 2005) was commissioned. Its purpose was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of FTI to date and to identify options for strengthening governance structures. B38. Overall the study highlighted that loose governance structures had been successful in keeping a wide and not always compatible group of stakeholders together. In a sense, therefore, the "light touch" approach had been an advantage. However, it also underscored that shortcomings in the governance arrangements had created confusion over where authority lay and stood in the way of decision-making among this "unruly mélange" (Buse 2005, p.iii) whenever consensus was not immediately forthcoming. B39. As a result, and as the review noted, the FTI had been slow in acting and was seen by key stakeholders as a "feeble compact" (Buse 2005, p.iii) with an imbalance in expectations on different partners – i.e. countries were expected to go through numerous steps and make many changes while the donor side of the partnership equation was not perceived to be making equal progress in changing their investment patterns and in moving towards greater predictability of funding. Because of initial lack of clarity, the initiative had been communicated in different ways by different partners to different constituencies, enhancing the sense of disappointment about lack of progress. As documented in Appendix II, in Chapter 3C of the Synthesis Report, and in this evaluation's country studies, it was also proving much more difficult than anticipated to mobilise the additional funding which was supposed to come with the FTI endorsement. Finally, the FTI itself was changing, moving into more countries18 – including countries with more challenging contexts (fragile states) – implying a greater burden on governance structures.
The FTI was widely perceived as a parallel source of financing through a global fund. The perception was reinforced by FTI communications, which invited partners to submit FTI plans for endorsement for FTI financing. In most cases, this also created confusion at the country level as to which plan was the FTI plan – the country‘s existing plan(s) or a different plan. In many cases, the FTI had the unintended effect of creating a parallel planning process. 17
Initially defined by the Catalytic Fund Committee as countries having fewer than five donors, disbursing more than USD 1m annually (see Appendix III for further details, in the context of a comprehensive analysis of the CF). 18 A year after the Governance Review the number of partner countries had grown from 19 to 29 (Netherlands MOFA 2008b). Volume2_Feb2010x
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B40. The report of the first governance review (Buse 2005) presented a number of options to improve FTI governance. These options were based on extensive consultation with stakeholders (although – as the report itself notes – this did not include consultations at the level of partner countries), and on an analysis of international experience of other Global Partnerships. The key recommendations from this report were: (a) Ensure that only one of the governing bodies has governing status. The report recommended that this should be the SC and that the TM have a strictly technical focus. It also recommended more work on clearly defining the roles of the different governing bodies of the FTI. (b) Ensure the FTI focus moves to country level. This would involve a combination of including country-level representation on the governing body (which had not been the case until then), and of improving channels of communication between the FTI and the country levels. (c) Ensure greater agreement on what different components of the partnership aim to achieve and in this manner address the credibility issues which had arisen as a result of differing donor views and the lack of real progress in donor education spending patterns. (d) Ensure that the FTI is led by "heavy hitting champions" (Buse 2005, p31), rather than technical education experts. This could be achieved by changing the membership of the SC to higher level officials who could delegate tasks to technical representatives and/or increasing the profile of the manager of the secretariat to director level. (e) Review the functions of the FTI Secretariat – developing a more comprehensive assignment of roles and responsibilities and consider increasing staff and resources to better accommodate the growing workload. (f) Carry out country-level consultations on the findings of the report to elicit the views of stakeholders at this level (Buse 2005).19 B41. Discussion of the findings of this study took place at the PM in Beijing in 2005. This led to a number of governance related decisions (FTI 2006g): (a) Expansion of the SC from five to eight members, to include Unicef – with the purpose of strengthening linkages between the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI) and the FTI, one civil society representative, and one representative of partner countries. Criteria for selection of the last two representatives were to be developed by the SC. (b) Co-chairs of the SC to be members of the SC six months before and six months after their mandate to ensure continuity. (c) The PM to become bi-annual after 2006 and to be held before the High Level EFA meeting rather than after it, so as to ensure better linkages between issues identified at FTI level and deliberations by the EFA meeting. B42. A discussion paper produced by the Netherlands MOFA in 2008 reflected on these developments and highlighted that while these were important decisions, "they left many of the core observations untouched". The "core observations" regarding which very little progress was made in Beijing included that governance was essentially very loose, that the FTI meant different things to different people, that there was no strategic plan, and that it was difficult to reach decisions because they had to be made by consensus. Furthermore the roles of the various entities (Steering Committee, Partnership Meeting, Task Teams, etc) continued to lack sufficient definition, and the report noted that the much praised compact of 19
The evaluation was unable to find evidence that such consultations were held; if they were held, they were not reported on in the Minutes of the FTI Meetings.
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the FTI was as a result making it difficult for words to be translated into actions. (Netherlands MOFA 2008b)
2006–2007: Continuing review of governance, including country level B43. A drafting committee/team on governance was established at the FTI Technical Meeting in October 2006. The team included members from the EC, Belgium (later replaced by Canada) and the FTI Secretariat and its task was to describe in one document the de facto governance structures which had resulted from the decisions by the Beijing and Cairo Partnership Meetings as well incorporating some of the established practices in connection to these meetings. This work became an important input to the work which was subsequently done by the Governance Task Team (in the second half of 2008), which was able to draw on the material and texts already prepared and consulted on in the Steering Committee. B44. Further discussion around governance took place at the Cairo PM. Overall the 2006 Cairo meeting put a strong focus on improving country level processes, among other actions donors agreed to explore and develop ideas for joint training of development agency staff to enhance donor harmonisation in policy dialogue (FTI 2006s). No evidence was found by the evaluation that this training ever happened. The March 2008 Strengthening Country Level Processes (SCLP) summary and recommendations contains a mention of the training in its discussion of outstanding issues "the implications of FTI process and quality assurance recommendations for donor staffing and capacity development need to be considered" (FTI 2008ag, p4). Other pertinent areas which emerged from the focus on country level processes include the priority given to the Secretariat's work on quality assurance in the FTI, the SCLP team's work, and the quality assurance work in the context of the CF (which included putting in place the external quality review). B45. An input into the Cairo meeting was the Governance Issues Paper (FTI 2006g) drafted by the Governance Working Group. This outlined key partner concerns about issues related to representation and observer status in the SC, the responsibility of lead donors, the need to define which organisations qualify as civil society, extending membership to other stakeholders (E9 members,20 private sector representatives of parents and communities), quality assurances for country level processes, and the need to ensure country dialogue in between proposed biannual partnership meetings. A number of these concerns are reflected in the following governance-related decisions from that meeting: (a) After a further review of the representation of constituencies in the SC (which had already been reviewed at the previous PM meeting in Beijing) the SC was increased to 14 members, as follows:
Donors (4 members): 2 current co-chairs, incoming co-chair, outgoing co-chair.
Multilaterals (3 members): WB, UNESCO, Unicef. Developing countries (4 members), with at least 2 from Africa. Civil Society (3 members) including a civil society organisation from a donor country, another from a partner country and a representative of the Global Campaign for Education (GCE). (b) Extending the partnership to include E9 countries and foundations contributing to FTI goals. (c) Approving the organisation of regional FTI meetings (organised back-to-back with other regional events) to provide a forum for partner country exchange of experience in between the PM meetings every two years. In addition, it was decided that the FTI 20
The E9 countries are Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan, and account for more than 50% of the world's population. Volume2_Feb2010x
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would continue to provide input into the UNESCO EFA High Level Group meeting each year. B46. However, a number of decisions remained pending at this meeting. This included many of the changes that were suggested in an annex (FTI 2006s) circulated in Cairo and which had been drafted with the intention that it would form part of a revised version of the FTI Framework document. This annex sought to address some of the concerns around the mandates of different governing bodies (and the overlap between them) which had been identified by the governance review (Buse 2005). For each of the levels and structures of FTI governance, the annex provided details on the members, powers, duties and organisation. It was even suggested by some that the annex should replace the FTI Framework. However, the Cairo meeting decided that the FTI Framework document would continue to be the guiding document of the partnership but that elements of it would to be integrated into the governance document so as to achieve a "stand alone constitutive document on the FTI governance for the partnership" (FTI 2007w p6). B47. The finalisation of the document for circulation to the SC was held back by internal World Bank discussions on the portion of the text which outlined this organisation's roles and responsibilities (FTI 2006s). The paper was circulated ahead of the March 2007 SC meeting and certain proposals in that paper were immediately adopted (in particular the selection of four members of the SC from developing countries, and one member from civil society). The finalised text "on the role of the World Bank" was promised by the Bank for March 23 rd 2007 (FTI 2007x, p3). By May the governance drafting committee was able to circulate the governance annex to the full partnership in order to receive their comments (FTI 2007x, p2). Further discussions took place later that month about the role of the SC (May 22 nd) as outlined in the governance annex. Comments on the annex were received until July 2007 and by September comments (with the exception of the World Bank's comments which were received too late) had been incorporated. The annex was presented to the September SC meeting and a detailed discussion ensued, including whether the management of the FTI Trust Funds should sit within the FTI Secretariat or the Bank.
2008: further formulation and adoption of governance reforms B48. As outlined above, 2007 saw limited progress around governance, and the difficulties in taking sufficiently extensive governance decisions reached a peak at the Tokyo PM in early 2008. In response to this situation the Netherlands volunteered at the Tokyo meeting to write a visioning paper which was to be entitled An FTI Fit for Purpose and Fit for the Future (Netherlands MOFA 2008b). In parallel, the FTI co-chairmanship rotated and Denmark came in and announced its decision to focus on the governance issues and provide support to address them. This support included a substantial investment of the co-chair's time and additional in-house and consultancy support, highlighting the very different ability of different agencies to give dedicated human resources to FTI issues. B49. A process followed by which the Netherlands' visioning paper – a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis of the FTI – was circulated among partners for comments, revised in various rounds, and then presented at the FTI meeting in Paris, in September 2008. Reactions to the paper were mostly positive. However in order to move forward on the various decision points a Governance Task Team (GTT) was established with representatives of the main constituencies (Ghana, the GCE, Unicef, the World Bank, the European Commission (EC), Canada and Denmark). B50. This task team worked iteratively with the various constituencies (producing drafts and circulating them back to the main groups within the FTI) producing a Governance Document which put forward a concrete proposal – vetted by the constituencies – for each of the issues highlighted in the Netherlands' visioning document. This governance document
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(FTI 2009g)21 – approved by the SC Meeting in Oslo in December 2008 – included a large number of proposed changes, the most important of which were: (a) Decision-making power transferred from the Partnership Meeting to the Steering Committee. (b) The Steering Committee to become a Board of Directors with the requirement of senior level representation from the various constituencies (rather than the hitherto more technical representation on the SC). (c) Size of the SC increased from 14 members to 1722 (six bilateral donors instead of four, four partner countries with at least two seats for African countries, three CSOs, and four standing representatives of multilateral agencies). (d) Representation for the biggest donors to the FTI enhanced by assigning three of the SC seats to the five biggest contributors to the FTI Trust Funds. (e) A single independent full time non-voting Chair to preside over the Board (instead of two co-chairs) who will be chosen through an open recruitment process and who will hold the position full-time for a three-year period.23 The Chair to be contracted by UNESCO in an effort to establish distance from the WB. (f) Two thirds majority to be applied for decision-making, although consensus will still be preferred. (g) The independent Chair of the Board also to chair the FTI Trust Fund Committees (EPDF and CF). (h) Strengthened linkages between the Board and the FTI Trust Funds by making the Trust Funds report annually to the Board, which in turn will monitor that trust funds are used according to FTI objectives and policies. B51. A number of factors appear to have facilitated these governance decisions, some of which had been proposed in a different form before. This includes the process by which the various drafts were discussed (in smaller sub-groups with representation of the constituencies in the Governance Task Team rather than in the full cumbersome environment of the PM). The decision by a small number of bilateral donors (Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to make a substantial technical input into the process either through external consultants or by making more staff time available played an important role. In addition, some of the governance problems that the FTI was facing were having implications for endorsement processes, for CF disbursements, and for the arrangements which were being put in place at country level, and this generated additional pressure for change. An important example was the controversy which arose in Mozambique over the arrangements for putting money into the education pooled fund (see this evaluation's Mozambique case study). B52. The governance reform at the time of writing was nearing completion. The first Board meeting was held in September 2009, with more senior level representation than for previous SC meetings. The last PM which was held in Copenhagen in April 2009 was of a consultative nature in line with the changed mandates of the different governing bodies of 21
The document is titled Education for All Ŕ Fast Track Initiative: Governance of the Partnership. The final version is dated March 2009. 22 However, out of the various constituencies represented in the governance structures, partner countries continue to have rather limited representation and the latest round of changes to the SC composition has shifted the balance back in favour of donors. As is noted in Section F partner countries (and civil society) are not represented on key financial bodies i.e. the EPDF and CF committees. 23 Recruitment of this Chair was ongoing when the evaluation team drafted the present report. Volume2_Feb2010x
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the FTI. A process was also put in place to recruit an independent Chair. However, dissatisfaction with the profile of the candidates led to the 2009 September Board meeting decision to re-start the recruitment process. An appointment was made by the Board meeting in Rome on 4 November 2009, with the new Chair to take office from 1 December 2009. The previous co-chairs continued to act beyond their originally envisioned term whilst the recruitment was finalised.
D. Summary of Changes in Governance Arrangements over Time B53.
The main changes in governance that have taken place include:
(a) Greater streamlining of governing bodies, improved clarity on the functions of the different structures, and better accountability (with greater emphasis on country-level governance). (b) Greater clarity on where and how decisions are to be taken, moving away from a large and often politically dominated PM to the more manageable structure of the Board. (c) Improved representation, in particular of partner countries and civil society stakeholders and with a special role for the biggest FTI donors who have in the past expressed disagreement with the manner in which the FTI was evolving (or failing to evolve). (d) Changes in the frequency of meetings, with a full PM every two years (not annually). (e) Greater clarity on country level governance and FTI endorsement processes. This has included the development of the country level process guide (FTI 2009p), and more clarity on the country level governance processes and structures in the new governance paper (FTI 2009g). (f) Greater independence of the chair (of the new Board) through open/external independent recruitment. (g) Improved linkages between Board (formerly the SC) and the Trust Funds by having the independent chair preside over all three. (h) Efforts to improve communication around the purpose and strategies of the FTI, including providing greater clarity on the various financing instruments for the FTI. B54. The recent round of decision-making foresees that a new Framework Document for the FTI (to replace the now largely outdated 2004 document) will be produced following this evaluation. As this section has highlighted, numerous changes have been made to the governance of the FTI. However, these have required substantial time and energy from partners and this has affected the overall performance of the FTI (a point which was repeatedly made in this evaluation's interviews). The process of change from Buse's recommendations in 2005 until the present has been slow.
E. The FTI Secretariat Initial design B55. As noted earlier, the FTI was set in motion before a design was fully worked out. The origins of the Secretariat reflect this. When the decision was made to launch the FTI, based on the Action Plan, a small Secretariat was created in the education department of the World Bank. At first the Secretariat was made up of just a Head and an analyst. B56. As the Initiative went forward other donors offered financial support and staff secondments. However, other parts of the Bank, and also some of the other bilateral donors, were reluctant to support the development of a strong Secretariat. As a result the Secretariat 32
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remained small. The location of the Secretariat thus reflected the origins of the FTI, and represented a pragmatic way for the Bank to get things moving quickly.
Staffing B57. In the Framework document (FTI 2004a) the Secretariat is described as being staffed by World Bank employees and secondments from partner agencies. Until June 2004 the Secretariat consisted of just two World Bank staff "the head of the Secretariat and a team assistant" (FTI 2004e p29). In March 2004, the FTI approved a work plan for the Secretariat which included a budget and staff plan. The staff plan included an additional "two economist profiles and a communications specialist" (ibid). All of these staff (including the head of the Secretariat and team assistant who were already in place) were to be provided by the World Bank, whilst the communications specialist was provided by a donor partner. By early October 2004 the three new staff members had started work in the Secretariat. B58. A draft Business Plan prepared by the Secretariat for 2004 laid out clearly its five principles of operation (FTI 2003c). The Plan highlighted that "the Secretariat should support the FTI with a minimum of staff, resources and transaction costs; it should not assume functions that others can perform" (ibid p15). The "lean and mean" secretariat" referred to by Buse in his evaluation of the governance of the FTI in 2005 was thus intentional from the start (Buse 2005 p27), as was the means of sourcing staff "the Secretariat will work with rotating staff, drawn from partner agencies" (FTI 2003c p15). B59. An organisational diagram for the Secretariat was produced by Buse as an annex to the governance review. It showed a very flat structure, with seven FTI Secretariat staff (Buse 2005 p31) and highlighted the dual subordination of the Head of the Secretariat to the "the FTI Partnership" and to the Human Development Network Education Department (HDNED) Director within the World Bank. This flat structure continued even though the size of the Secretariat subsequently more than doubled. B60. In 2006 the then Head of the Secretariat put a proposal to the partnership to double the size of the Secretariat. His argument was that the size of the FTI trust funds and the reach of the FTI (i.e. the number of countries who had been endorsed or were somewhere in the process of seeking endorsement) had increased significantly. It was acknowledged by the Steering Committee in late 2005 that "the Secretariat is overstretched and its resources need to be increased in a way commensurate with its responsibilities, particularly under an expanded FTI" (FTI 2005n p4). This was a theme that was also picked up in the governance analysis by Buse. However, this tension remains between the desire amongst some donors for something "informal, light and flexible" and the capacity necessary to fulfil the ever growing requirements of the partnership (ibid, p.iii). B61. The Secretariat submitted a further staffing plan to the Steering Committee in January 2006 and this resulted in the approval of two more posts. In the minutes of the Steering Committee in January 2007 further staffing needs were presented by the Secretariat as part of which three new staff members were to be selected (communications, education position and a financial management position) (FTI 2007q p3). The Secretariat has grown further since then and by mid-2009 had 16 staff, including long term consultants. The management structure remains flat with all staff reporting to the Head and Deputy Head of the Secretariat (as explained in communications with the Secretariat September 2009). 24 The Head of the Secretariat now reports higher up in the World Bank structure to the Vice-President for Human Development and to the newly established FTI Board of Directors. This change reflected pressure from the FTI partnership, and in particular the donors, for the FTI Secretariat to be less directly accountable to the Education Department. 24
The evaluation notes that some changes to this structure were under way in late 2009.
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B62. There has been a high rate of attrition in the leadership of the Secretariat. Interviews conducted by the evaluation point to the pressures of the work and the complex politics and tensions between the Secretariat and the Bank as factors which have influenced this high turnover.
Status B63. The location of the Secretariat within the World Bank, with its staff largely being Bank employees, made some sense when related to the origins of the FTI, but increasing discomfort about it emerged within the partnership. As early as November 2003 it was acknowledged that there had been "a lack of clarity regarding the role that the World Bank plays in the FTI. It has frequently been difficult for partners and internal players to distinguish between the Bank's role as host agency to the Secretariat and its role as one of the financing partners." "Bank management will have views on its role and prerogatives as host agency for the secretariat" (FTI 2003c p13). B64. The governance review (Buse 2005) highlighted these issues. Quotes included in Annex 3 of that report illustrated that the FTI was perceived by some education stakeholders as a "Bank initiative" due to it being housed within the World Bank. Whilst Buse felt that it was only a "minority of respondents" who raised the "costs of such close association with the Bank" (Buse 2005 p26), interviews carried out at both at global and country level for this evaluation suggest that the unease amongst stakeholders about the Secretariat's location within the Bank has grown. This lack of comfort has been recognised in the recent review of governance by the FTI, and the appointment of an independent Chair is an attempt to address it, implying that the Secretariat will then report to an external FTI manager. This is also reflected by a recent decision to relocate the Secretariat in another building in Washington DC, outside the World Bank. The rationale behind this decision is that it will reduce confusion and criticism about the Secretariat's independence.
The Secretariat's roles and responsibilities B65. The FTI Framework document describes the responsibility of the FTI Secretariat as the provision of "technical and administrative support", as follows:
Overall development of the Fast Track Initiative, including: o Communicating information about the FTI o Organising FTI meetings o Facilitating collaboration at all levels o Monitoring FTI implementation Administration of the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund, including: o Setting up the Fund o Overseeing implementation o Preparing meetings and background documentation for the CF Strategy Committee o Annual reporting of Fund activities Supporting the development of cross-country performance measures. Knowledge sharing, communications and outreach (FTI 2004a p13).
B66. The Stocktaking paper highlighted the need for further clarity on the roles and responsibilities within the partnership and a Working Group was established for this purpose (FTI 2003c p.vii). It also added to and expanded upon the responsibilities of the Secretariat as described in the Framework document. The key tasks laid out were "the production of regular reports for the FTI partners; management of the FTI Catalytic Fund; and reporting on the progress of both FTI countries and FTI donors against their respective commitments" (ibid, p15). The latter activity – although clearly part of the vision of the FTI compact and an important part of FTI's aid effectiveness agenda – appears to have been lost in later FTI reports (no evidence of it being mentioned) and it was also not included in Buse's definition 34
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of the role of the Secretariat (Buse 2005 p25). This was perhaps more to do with a change of focus amongst the decision-making partners than a deliberate dropping of reporting on donor commitments. The revised governance arrangements however, recognise the need for such a function and explicitly include a provision that the Secretariat will provide "technical and administrative support to the FTI partnership, collecting, monitoring and sharing, among FTI partners, global and at country level information on all funding amounts and sources associated with delivery of the endorsed Education Sector Plans" (FTI 2009g p12). B67. Early on the FTI Partnership recognised that "good data quality and measurement integrity are critical to its success" (FTI 2003c, p14) and responsibility for this role was given to the Secretariat (see above). It was however, recognised that for "the FTI Secretariat to function effectively, complementarity with UNESCO is important" (ibid). In other words, inputs from the monitoring work by UNESCO through the Global Monitoring Reports (GMR) and the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) would complement and support the FTI Secretariat in this role. Whilst the Partnership recognised how essential data collection would be, they also sought to build upon global initiatives that were already operating in this field. See Annex F for further details on the monitoring and evaluation of the FTI. B68. The Secretariat Business Plan for 2004 lays out how success would be defined for the FTI Secretariat. Three out of four of these criteria are related to the Secretariat's need to carefully monitor what is happening at country level. The fourth aspect relates back to the Secretariat's role in holding donors to account: FTI countries adopt and maintain sounder country policies. FTI countries show improved results on the ground," (examples of this include "more countries report actual PCR"). FTI countries demonstrate "x factor" – genuine commitment to EFA progress; donors increase quantity and quality of aid for primary education. (FTI 2003c pp40–41).
B69. The Buse review highlighted that the Secretariat needed "to do more of some things and less of others" (Buse 2005 p25). Insufficient technical and analytical work needed for "adequate informed decisions" was considered one of the weaknesses of the Secretariat (ibid). Other interviewees during this exercise by Buse referred to inadequate "monitoring of country level performance" (ibid). Similar concerns were raised by interviewees for this evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation was highlighted as an area in which there is much opportunity for the FTI but in which the Secretariat had so far lacked adequate capacity and for which an adequate framework had yet to emerge (again, see Annex F). There has never been a comprehensive institutional review of the Secretariat's operations – although this was recommended by Buse in the 2005 report – and the observations of one of the donors interviewed underscores how in reality the "Secretariat's role and operations have evolved by trial and error i.e. it has not been carefully planned. In fact it is always in crisis mode", an observation which this evaluation endorses. B70. The responsibilities of the FTI Secretariat have included communication, management reporting, and advocacy about the FTI to the Partnership and to a wider audience. This has included written and oral communications directly to various partners at global and country level, as well as the production of internal reports and communications, external documents for the general public, and an FTI website. Attention to communications has increased over time and Secretariat publications have become more professional. Nonetheless, references to poor communication and misunderstanding came up frequently in the country case study interviews (e.g. Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique and Pakistan). This seemed to be a continuing problem not just something that occurred at the outset during the understandably confused period of the FTI's launch. The evaluation case studies also underscored how a lack of clarity as to the Secretariat's role and priorities has caused
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confusion at country level (e.g. Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Rwanda) as countries strive to reach endorsement and gain funding with variable levels of input from the Secretariat. The Country Process Guidelines (see ¶B93) clarified many of the issues that have arisen in the past but it took until February 2009 for the approved version to be published. B71. Countries have sometimes appealed to the FTI Secretariat for support when facing issues related to the endorsement process, the calculation of financing gaps, or the choice of aid modalities (see Uganda, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Mozambique country study reports). In general, the Secretariat has chosen in these cases to take a neutral stance on the issue of aid modalities. Nevertheless, in Rwanda for example, it is upon a request by the FTI Secretariat that a 10-year plan had to be drafted (in addition to the existing 5-year plan). In Uganda, the Secretariat has provided an assessment of the credibility of the financing framework underlying the country plan. Box B2
Changes in functions of the FTI Secretariat
Secretariat responsibilities in 2004 Framework Document (FTI 2004a)
Selected responsibilities added over time
Responsibilities as highlighted in the 2009 Governance of the Partnership Document (FTI 2009g)
Overall development of the FTI, including: Communicating information about the FTI Organising FTI meetings Facilitating collaboration at all levels Monitoring FTI implementation
Supervision of the work of the FTI working groups and task teams
Administration of the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund/ Support to CFC committee
Administration of the EPDF/support to EPDF committee
Support the FTI Partnership, Chair, Board of Directors, the TF committees, and Working Groups and Task Teams Provide support and coordination to FTI meetings Collecting, monitoring and sharing of global and cross country information on funding amounts and sources Coordinate efforts of the FTI partnership to fulfil the four gaps (policy, data, capacity and finance) Facilitate sharing of lessons Provide support to TF Committees in their oversight of effective disbursement, and in the FTI TF proposal process
Supporting the development of cross-country performance measures
Provide support, where required to LDG and CA to strengthen in country processes
Knowledge sharing, communications and outreach
Work with FTI partners to promote effective communications, in particular at country level
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Observations
Resource mobilisation is not specifically included as part of the Secretariat's functions Advocacy is not clearly separated from the specific information needs of the FTI
From 2006 clarified that trustee role for CF is with the WB directly – see ¶B86–B87; ¶B117.
Maintain a record of all Partnership members, including the LEG and LDG members and the CA in each partner country
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B72. Box B2 above compares how the Secretariat's functions are described in the FTI Framework document and in the recent revised governance arrangements. This shows how the FTI Secretariat's functions have expanded over time. In particular, the recent Governance reform has sought to expand the Secretariat's functions in line with areas which have been identified as being weaknesses of the FTI. This includes stronger support to the country-level processes and structures, a more explicit consideration of the need to provide support to the four "gaps", more structured data on country-level activity, among other areas. One aspect that emerges is that the Secretariat's role vis-à-vis the functioning of the FTI will require solid capacity in financial management and control within the FTI Secretariat to support the Board in this area, and to work closely with the World Bank. Currently this capacity does not exist within the Secretariat, and this is an area which will need to be addressed. The GFATM for example, has a specific unit for financial issues.25 B73. Also under the new governance arrangements for the FTI a key advocacy role is assigned to the Board (which has no permanent full time staff other than the Secretariat), and specific responsibility in advocacy (among many other responsibilities) is given to the new position of Chair of the FTI. However, the Secretariat has no specific responsibilities in this respect. By contrast the GFATM has a whole section devoted just to its external relations, the team includes specialists in communications and fund-raising as part of the permanent staff. It will be critical to ensure that the Secretariat has the resources (human and financial) to implement this expanded mandate effectively. Some areas which are given just one line in the description of responsibilities in the new Governance arrangements – such as the support to the four "gaps" in fact entail considerable additional expertise – at senior level – within the Secretariat to ensure that consistent high quality support can be available to countries. This is particularly critical given the rather poor record which the FTI has had to date on providing support to addressing these gaps (see the main volume of this synthesis report).
Funding B74. Initially the costs of the Secretariat were borne almost entirely by the World Bank. Other donors were expected to contribute through the secondment of staff to key positions within the Secretariat as and when needed. In the 2003 Stocktaking Report it was agreed that the Bank would continue to house the Secretariat and "contribute to its staff and financial costs, in line with the corporate priority attached to the achievement of the MDGs" (FTI 2003c p40). It was however suggested that other FTI partners contribute "through an agreed cost-sharing formula, through secondments and/or contributions to financial costs" (p3). Further discussion of such a formula however is not reflected in later minutes of the Steering Committee. Instead in 2004, a trust fund was established to finance Secretariat operations (FTI 2004e, p30). The same report estimated the cost of the Secretariat ("staff, travel and overheads") was at USD 1.17 million per year at that time and that the World Bank financed 67% of these costs. Additional staff costs of USD 523,000 were absorbed by two partner agencies (DFID and France) covering staff secondments to the Secretariat. Pledges to the Secretariat Trust Fund in 2005 came from DFID (UK) (GBP 300,000), Germany (USD 50,000) and France (USD 50,000). B75. Operations of the FTI Secretariat Trust Fund are summarised in Table B2 and Table B3 below. These figures give only a partial view of the costs of the Secretariat and of the overall management cost of the FTI, because they do not include the in-kind contributions of the World Bank, nor the costs to other partners of their participation in working groups and task teams – activities which might otherwise be undertaken and/or paid for by the Secretariat, and thus be more visible as costs entailed by the FTI.
25
See section B1 of this annex for more comparisons between the FTI and other global partnerships.
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B76. The tables do show that the Secretariat trust fund has until recently been very dependent on UK contributions. The UK is the only donor to have contributed every year since the trust fund was established in 2004, and accounts for more than half of all contributions up to June 2009. No other donor exceeds a 10% share over the period. In the first three years, there were never more than three contributors in all. The number of contributors rose to six in FY08 and nine in FY09 (when the UK share fell to about one quarter); Over the last year, five of the contributing agencies were funding for the first time. Disbursements from the trust fund grew very rapidly after its first year – by more than 80% in each of FY06, FY07 and FY08, and by more than 45% in FY09. B77. Funds have not been allocated to the Secretariat as an automatic percentage from money pledged to the trust funds (as often happens in other global partnerships), instead the Secretariat is dependent upon specific allocations. This has meant that the Secretariat has been required to fundraise by appealing to the SC. This has limited the ability of the Secretariat's management to plan or resource itself in a timely fashion. Since its inception, the two FTI Trust Funds have disbursed USD 483m, however the equivalent of just two percent of these funds26 has been used for the running of the FTI Secretariat and administration/supervision of the CF27. B78. This is a low percentage compared to other global partnerships. The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) spends 5% of its overall fund expenditure on management (see section I of this annex, in particular Table B6). Buse identified the need for a reform of the Secretariat which would include "contributions both financial and in kind" (Buse 2005 p.vi). The majority of those interviewed by Buse felt that the Secretariat "was not adequately resourced",28 but it was also broadly felt that partners would be unwilling to commit "sufficient resources for the operational work of the Secretariat for the present arrangements (let alone scaling up)" (ibid, p25). And Buse also underscored that "the literature (on Global Partnerships) notes the tendency towards underestimation of the true operational costs of partnership and the consequent lack of resources dedicated to secretariat functions. Lean and mean arrangements run the risk of becoming a false economy" (ibid. p iv). The FTI partnership has since its origin shied away from a "global fund" model, instead seeking to keep the Secretariat "lean and mean" (Buse 2005, p27).The concern of not creating "another bureaucracy" at global level seems to have abated somewhat since then and many donors and indeed the task team working on the new EPDF have now recognised the need for a stronger Secretariat.
26
This is an estimate based on the reported budget of the Secretariat compared to CF and EPDF disbursements. It does not include the cost to partner agencies of secondees. 27 It has not been possible to obtain any figures for the cost of EPDF administration. Unlike the CF, this is not regularly reported in annual EPDF reports. 28 This was also a common opinion among the present evaluation's interviewees.
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Table B2 Donor contributions to the FTI Secretariat Trust Fund (USD)
Australia Germany UK France Canada Netherlands Norway Belgium Spain Ireland Germany EU
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
541,440 54,026
544,884
1,803,537 173,085
1,596,336 78,994 197,996
508,230
389,760
FY09 321,908 112,387 660,792 70,242 177,428
470,950 315,976 50,000
50,000
280,968 70,242 351,210
144,000 702,420
Total 2004–2009 321,908 112,387 5,146,989 203,262 548,509 470,950 897,990 280,968 386,218 351,210 244,000 702,420
approximate shares (%) 3.3% 1.2% 53.2% 2.1% 5.7% 4.9% 9.3% 2.9% 4.0% 3.6% 2.5% 7.3%
total 9,666,811 645,466 1,065,834 2,484,852 2,723,062 2,747,597 100.0% USD total from WB accounts 688,699 1,041,008 2,466,840 2,794,218 2,647,916 9,638,681 Source: World Bank. Notes: FY05 = 1 July 2004 – 30 June 2005, etc. Inception date for the trust fund was 8 September 2004. Shows actual contributions for the FY (in some cases donors also made pledges for subsequent years). Currency conversions for non-USD contributions are estimated, using Oanda interbank rates for end-June of each FY. This explains discrepancy with WB USD records (which include investment income).
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Table B3 Disbursements from the FTI Secretariat Trust Fund 2004–2009 (USD) FY05 Direct Costs Disbursed by WBG staff costs consultant fees associated overhead costs travel expenses (net of rebate) equipment costs media workshop contractual services total administrative fees Total disbursements
FY07
Total 2004–2009
FY08
FY09
1,196,739.61 1,246,641.59 15,202.47 514,633.56 350.00 90,221.49 40,618.17 3,104,406.89 44,419.51 3,148,826.40 46.5%
2,748,756.50 2,593,875.94 128,008.61 1,497,696.20 1,624.16 206,526.31 64,011.95 7,240,499.67 179,793.95 7,420,293.62
7,812.25 196,182.04 31,395.51 77,428.73
415,870.53 13,523.59 154,665.52
525,112.56 335,636.68 36,493.56 219,857.84
4,830.85
14,368.39 55.00 598,493.03 20,193.80 618,676.83 86.7%
7,260.65 1,124,361.29 47,994.58 1,172,355.87 89.5%
1,019,092.08 399,545.10 31,393.48 531,110.55 1,274.16 89,844.93 23,338.78 2,095,599.08 53,545.95 2,149,145.03 83.3%
1,041,008.39
2,466,839.61
2,794,218.35
2,647,915.52
9,638,680.84
357,409.48
422,331.56
1,294,483.74
645,073.32
500,910.88
2,218,387.22
357,409.48
357,409.48 779,741.04
779,741.04 2,074,224.78
2,074,224.78 2,719,298.11
2,719,298.13 2,218,387.22
2,218,387.22
317,649.38 13,640.11 331,289.41
annual increase (%) Total receipts (includes investment income) excess of receipts over disbursements Fund balance beginning of period end of period
FY06
688,698.97
expenditure shares 2004–2009
37.0% 35.0% 1.7% 20.2% 0.0% 2.8% 0.9% 97.6% 2.4% 100.0%
Source: World Bank. Note: 8 September 2004 is the date of inception for the Secretariat Trust Fund. FY05 = 1 July 2004 – 30 June 2005, etc.
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F. The FTI Trust Funds B79. In addition to the global and country levels structures described in section C above, the FTI also includes two trust funds – the Catalytic Fund (CF) and the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF). The CF, established in March 2003, provided relatively short term grants to FTI endorsed countries to implement their plans. In 2007 the CF was modified to become the "Expanded" Catalytic Fund which can take on the original short term grants as well as larger medium and long term grants and is no longer restricted to "donor orphan" countries. The EPDF, established in 2004, finances technical assistance to help countries to develop capacity for improved sector analysis and planning. It also seeks to promote expertise exchange, as well as the dissemination of good practice and progress in results assessment and follow-up.
Legal and fiduciary responsibility B80. Both the CF and EPDF are managed by the World Bank as trustee for the contributing donors. This means that the World Bank has both legal and fiduciary responsibility over these funds (see Box B3 below for an overview of trust fund management by the World Bank). World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs) supervise CF projects and manage EPDF projects in return for which management fees are provided.
Organisation and decision-making B81. Each Trust Fund is governed by a Strategy Committee. These committees bring together representatives of those donors contributing to the Trust Fund. Not all FTI partners participate in the financing and governance of the Trust Funds and therefore not all partners are represented on the Strategy Committee. There is no representation from CSOs or partner countries on either of the Strategy Committees. B82. The Strategy Committees of the TF represented until recently the most formalised component of FTI governance. The procedures for managing and disbursing the FTI trust funds are strict and common across all TFs managed by the World Bank (see Box B3 below).
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Box B3
The World Bank and Trust Funds
The Bank participates in some 170 global and regional partnerships, for which it committed more than USD 170 million from its own resources in fiscal year 2007. The Bank plays different roles in these initiatives, including trustee of donor funds, financial contributor, and implementing agency. The Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships vice-presidency assists with the mobilisation of trust fund resources and is responsible for the overall trust fund oversight, including the clearance of all new trust funds. 29 Trust Funds managed by the World Bank – key figures The number of TFs under World Bank management increased from 929 at the end of FY2006 to 1020 at the end of FY08. Between FY04 and FY08, the total stock of trust fund assets held by the World Bank (including promissory notes30) tripled from USD 8.59 billion to USD 26.31 billion. Annual disbursements of trust funds managed by the World Bank Group have grown steadily and rapidly in recent years – from 10% of total IDA, IBRD and TF disbursements in FY02 (USD 1.9 billion) to 17% in FY06 (USD 4.4 billion) and to 25% in FY08. IDA-eligible countries remained the primary beneficiaries of trust funds, receiving more than half of total disbursements in FY08. On a regional basis, the largest share of disbursements continued to go to Africa (32%), followed by East Asia and Pacific (14%) and South Asia (13%). The health and social services sector received the largest share of disbursements (41%), followed by public administration and law (14%) and agriculture (7%) and education (5%). Size of main trust funds As of June 30, 2008, assets held in trust by the World Bank belonging to the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm), Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria – GFATM; the Global Environment Facility – GEF and Carbon Finance accounted for 66% of total assets held. The EFA-FTI trust funds account for less than 3% of total assets held. In terms of cash contributions received in FY08, GFATM continued to receive the largest amount, accounting for USD 3.07 billion or 35% of all FY08 cash contributions. The next-highest recipient programs were: the GEF, receiving USD 788 million, or 9%; the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) receiving USD 745 million, or 8.5%; and the FTI receiving USD 420 million or 5%. Together, these top four programs received about USD 5 billion, or 57% of all FY08 cash contributions. Reform of WB Trust Fund management, and Trust Fund typology With the launch of a set of Trust Fund reforms in late 2001, the WB developed a set of standard policies and controls, a more robust decentralised organisational framework, a mandatory accreditation program, and an integrated information system to support their management. To address risks associated with administering a rapidly growing, increasingly complex trust fund portfolio and to mainstream trust funds into Bank strategies and operations, Bank Management introduced a Trust Fund Management Framework (TFMF) that was endorsed by the Board in late 2007. A new typology for WB-managed Trust Funds The Trust Fund Management Framework defines a typology for the IBRD/IDA-administered trust fund portfolio consisting of three broad categories of funds, based on the type of services provided and the execution role assumed by the Bank: (i) Bank-executed trust funds (BETFs) are those for which the Bank has spending authority in support of its own program, including for analytical and advisory activities, project-related 29
A fund established to be administered by the World Bank with contributions from one or more donors to support development-related activities or programs. A trust fund can be country-specific, regional, or global in scope. It can finance recipient activities, Bank activities, partnership activities, or a combination of these. It can be set up as a programmatic fund to cover a series of activities, or on a free-standing, single-purpose basis. A trust fund may be executed either by a recipient agency external to the Bank, or by the Bank itself. 30 Irrevocable and legally binding contributions pledged by donors through signed administration agreements and settled through deposit of a demand note.
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activities, partnership secretariats and TF administration activities. (ii) Recipient-executed trust funds (RETFs) are those the Bank passes on to a third party recipient for development activities, typically financing the investment and recurrent needs of service delivery, capacity building and technical assistance. The Bank normally plays an operational role for these funds, including appraisal and supervision of funded activities. (iii) Financial intermediary funds (FIFs) comprise a heterogeneous mix of trust funds not covered by either BETFs or RETFs, e.g. funds involving financial engineering and complex financial schemes or arrangements under which the Bank provides specific administrative or financial services with a limited fiduciary or operational role. FIFs typically encompass multi-donor initiatives designed to implement international agreements in support of global partnerships and programs. By value of disbursements, FIFs represent the largest category of trust funds, with 52% of total disbursements in FY08. RETFs are the second-largest category, with 38% of total disbursements, while BETFs account for the smallest portion of disbursements, with 6%. Major FIFs include the HIPC, GEF, GFATM, Carbon Funds, and IFFIm. The Catalytic Fund is a Recipient-executed trust fund (RETF), and the EPDF is a Bank-executed trust fund (BETF). Reform of WB Trust Fund Management in July 2008 st
The revised Operational Policy and Bank Procedure (OP/BP) 14.40 on trust funds was issued on 1 July, 2008, with major implications on fiduciary standards applied to World Bank-managed trust funds: ₋ ₋ ₋
BETFs will be integrated with existing Bank administrative budgets and processes. RETFs will be aligned with processes, systems, and oversight arrangements applicable to IBRD/IDA lending operations, including fiduciary and safeguard policies and application of the results framework. FIFs will undergo more systematic technical review of financial instruments and a Senior Management review and approval process. In particular, TFs with financial engineering components will be considered FIFs and will be subject to an upstream review and downstream monitoring of financial and implementation risks.
Starting in end FY08, RETF projects over USD 5 million are subject to the same Bank processes as for regular loans and are reported as part of the Bank's portfolio. An updated Trust Fund Handbook, which elucidates on how the policies are reflected in the business processes, was issued in December 2008. At the country level, systematic integration of trust funds into the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process is under way. Sources: World Bank 2007j, World Bank 2008ab, World Bank 2008c.
B83. The CF Strategy Committee, sets the policies and guidelines of the CF, decides upon the country allocations, and provides guidance to the FTI Secretariat during implementation. Decisions within the Strategy Committee are made by consensus. The CF Strategy Committee is chaired by a World Bank representative (although this is set to change under the new governance arrangements). In general, meetings of the Strategy Committee are held back-to-back with Steering Committee meetings as there is much overlap in their membership. B84. The EPDF functions much in the same way as the CF. It is chaired by the WB (this will similarly change under the revised governance arrangements), and the members of its Strategy Committee are the contributing donors as well as the World Bank. The EPDF Strategy Committee sets the criteria for the use of the Fund resources and decides on regional allocations. The Strategy Committee meets annually to review progress of the previous year and decide on allocations and approve (on a non-objection basis) regional plans for the coming year.
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B85. In contrast to the CF, the EPDF is World Bank executed (see Box B3 above). The management of EPDF funding is delegated to the Bank's Regional Education/HD management teams. The Regional Managers are responsible for preparing an annual plan for the use of the funds in collaboration with their staff working at the country level and with the other country-level donors, monitoring those activities, and reporting annually on implementation progress, outcomes and Fund accounts. Annual plans are circulated to the Strategy Committee. In practice the EPDF has largely functioned on the basis of proposals being submitted by Task Team Leaders (TTL) of the WB to their regional managers. The EPDF also has a specific role of supporting education sector plans but the reality has often been that it has funded TTL priorities. A Task Team was created in 2007 to make some suggestions about re-calibrating and it was suggested that the proposals at country level should be signed off by the Local Education Group. However the evaluation did not find any evidence that this or other recommendations made by the Task Team have been implemented. The EPDF is reviewed in detail in Appendix IV.
Links and relationship between the Trust Funds and the Secretariat B86. Whilst the World Bank has the overall legal and fiduciary responsibility to manage the CF, the FTI Secretariat exercises day to day responsibility. The FTI Secretariat serves as the Secretariat to the Strategy Committees of the EPDF and the CF and as the liaison with Bank operational managers. In this capacity, it organises the meetings of the Strategy Committees. B87. The FTI Secretariat reports periodically on the Fund's activities to the FTI Partners through the Steering Committee. The Secretariat has been understood to have an oversight role with respect to the Trust Funds but in practice the EPDF and CF have been chaired, implemented and monitored mainly by the WB.
Strategic decision-making about how the funds can and should be used B88. The decisions about strategy, policy and the allocation of the CF funds in response to particular country requests are all taken by the Strategy Committee, often during the same meeting. Donors reportedly struggle with the volume of paper work pertaining to country requests and to work around this have taken to dividing up the detailed review of documentation amongst themselves. B89. Two key issues for the Committee have been the role of the Bank at country level and a lack of clarity on steps (for example for financial allocations and disbursements) at country level. These issues have been discussed at recent FTI meetings and some steps have been taken as part of the latest governance reform, both in terms of approaches and processes. The development of a Process Chart and an FTI Process Guide for country level processes has helped clarify the steps that are supposed to take place at country level and how these fit together. The purpose of these guiding documents is to clearly outline the steps that are followed at country level in the FTI preparation, appraisal and endorsement process. This represents an important effort in clarifying procedures at a country level. However, the global level process in terms of how the trust fund is managed is less clear – the Process Chart's explanation on this issue lacks detail "the CFC calls upon an independent, desk review of the proposal to aid decision-making…The CFC agrees CF modality and Supervising Entity (SE) and decides on CF allocation" (FTI 2009p).
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B90. Strong views were expressed during the evaluation (especially by interviewees from non-World Bank donors) on the use of the EPDF. The EPDF was described as being very World Bank driven with other stakeholders at country and global level having very little understanding of the purpose of the EPDF and the process by which it could be accessed.
G. Governance at Country Level B91. The FTI Framework has had implications for country level governance. Indeed the main outcome of the governance and design discussions in 2002 and 2003 was to shift the locus of the FTI to country level. However, the country-level processes were not spelt out in detail, and much of the energy of the partners continued to be devoted to making the partnership mechanisms work more effectively at the international level. As more countries joined the FTI the need to further detail and clarify governance at country level became apparent. In much the same way that the FTI Framework codified the overall FTI design, the more recent country level processes guide seeks to clarify procedures and responsibilities at country level. This process of change has however happened very slowly and the resultant lack of clarity has been problematic for many countries.
Country focus B92. Table B10 (at the end of this annex) shows in detail the current responsibilities allocated to the different layers of governance within the FTI structure and highlights in particular the significant responsibilities placed at country level. The FTI Framework document highlights the country level responsibility for ensuring that a costed, quality education sector plan exists, which is clearly monitorable and which addresses country capacity constraints. This was one of the central tenets of the FTI. It is a compact in which "governments demonstrate their commitment to education through efforts to transform their education systems" (World Bank 2002 p4) and in response donors would provide financial and technical support. Therefore "the need to foster local ownership and engage local communities cannot be overstated, in the context of increasingly decentralised environments" (ibid: p20). Country ownership is thus one of the guiding principles of the FTI Framework (FTI 2004a). The FTI process as a whole is thus expected to be country-driven and the primary decision-making and activity is intended to focus at country level.
Strengthening country level processes B93. In March 2007 the Secretariat presented to the SC a report on quality assurance in the FTI. The report had assessed the quality of 28 Education Sector Plans using a 12-point scale. The report highlighted that the Indicative Framework was only referenced by just over half of the ESPs. (FTI 2008ah) At the Bonn Technical Meeting (FTI 2007s) group discussions were held on how country level processes could be improved. Some donor representatives working at country level were present at this meeting as well as CSO representatives. The discussion – whilst recognising how important it was "that the local led process remain at the heart of FTI" – acknowledged some of the inherent difficulties in the current ways of working (FTI 2007s p12), including: (a) The complexity of the role of the lead donor – who could easily be torn between "multiple roles…particularly regarding their involvement in policy development and implementation as well as in evaluating progress, conflicts of interest could occur, and could become apparent in the endorsement process" (ibid p12). (b) A recognition that the technical capacity to do what was being required by the Partnership was not always available in agencies at country level. (c) Donor staff did always have incentives to work towards the global aims of the FTI by forming partnerships at the local level.
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(d) Communications between donor agency HQ and the field needed to be improved "to increase synergies" as did communications "between the FTI Secretariat and agencies at the different levels" (ibid). B94. A Task Team (TT) was set up (chaired by the EC, including UNESCO, Unicef, UK, France, Netherlands, Global Campaign for Education, World Bank, and Germany). Initially the defined objectives of the TT were to look at improving quality assurance at the planning and implementation stages. A year later, in April 2008, the TT was expanded to include country representatives from Ghana, Guyana, Mozambique. Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. B95. The Country Level Process Guide was drafted and an overall process chart was approved by the SC in September 2008 (FTI 2009p p3). The supporting guidelines were presented to the SC in December 2008 and approved in January 2009. The guide defined clearly who the various actors at country level were and what roles and responsibilities they had in the FTI process. (However, certain aspects of the process guide remain incomplete: in particular it refers to an interim strategy process for fragile states that has yet to be worked out – see Annex H) B96. The section on the CF process drew attention to some elements which could potentially increase country ownership and to others that may undermine it. It acknowledged formally the problems that had been occurring in some countries due to the constraints of having the Bank as Supervising Entity. "If the World Bank, due to its rules and regulations, cannot "deliver" the desired modality, the Local Education Group can select an alternative Supervising Entity" (FTI 2009p p16). B97. Although concerns had been raised in SC meetings about how introducing additional layers of quality assurance risked resulting in delays and affecting the level of country ownership (FTI 2008y p2), the new CF process added an additional stage. It stated that an "independent desk review of the final CF programme proposal is required" following submission. This review will provide a statement advising the CF Committee whether the funding request should be approved. Interestingly, a marker was also left in the guidelines document for the Transition Fund process which was aimed at countries in fragile contexts and which could not meet the requirements for endorsement in place for the FTI (see Annex H for further discussion of the Transition Fund). B98. Whilst the drafting of the Country Level Process Guide provided an important forum for discussion and resulted in much needed clarification of the processes and resultant roles, it also served to highlight the capacity gaps between what was expected of LDGs and LEGs and the government and what realistically could be achieved. Such a gap was even more significant in fragile states, further emphasising the need for an alternative process for such countries. The process of defining and finalising the Country Level Process Guide – which was central to the aims of the FTI – was started with the formation of the TT in May 2007. However the final guide was not published until February 2009. So whilst the issues were eventually addressed31 this underscores the lack of efficiency in the governance processes and the need to manage the work of the TTs so that the FTI responds in a more timely manner to issues that arise. B99. It was not possible for the evaluation to make an assessment of the impact of the Country Process Guidelines on implementation since it they have only been drafted recently. However, they represent a considerable improvement in terms of spelling out sequences and roles more clearly. But they still leave various important issues moot. For example: 31
See the main text of the evaluation report for the evaluation‘s assessment of the relevance and likely effectiveness of the country processes that have been defined.
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(a) The Guidelines need to acknowledge more explicitly the challenges that have arisen at country level if when an alternative Supervising Entity (other than the Bank) is sought. It would be useful if the guidelines could specifically address what this role involves and highlight that taking on the role of supervising entity lies within the capacity and possibilities of other agencies. In other words the Guidelines should actively seek to remove some of the barriers which agencies may still feel exist. The inclusion of a brief case study on the experience in Zambia would be useful in this respect, as it would provide a reflection of the lessons which the World Bank has learned from being the supervising entity in so many FTI countries. The Guidelines could be more specific about capacity issues that may need to be addressed in order for other agencies to take on this role. They could also refer specifically to possible support that the supervising entity could expect to receive, e.g. from the FTI Secretariat. (b) There is a need for the guidelines to be more explicit about the mechanisms and the importance of continued engagement in the post-endorsement process. As it is, the Guidelines focus strongly on the initial phase up to endorsement (this is illustrated very clearly in the diagram on page 6 of the guidelines) – to which the majority of the text is dedicated. They devote far less attention to what happens after endorsement. This immediately makes the guidelines less obviously relevant to countries that have already been endorsed. The country studies conducted in the context of the evaluation have highlighted that this is a serious weakness of the FTI process thus far. (c) Ensuring that the guidelines make it clear that for monitoring to work, the Joint Sector Review (JSR) which is mentioned in the Guidelines needs to be a meaningful exercise, involving genuine engagement of all partners, not token participation as is the case in some countries. The guidelines should recognise that countries have very different political economies, and therefore they don't all have the same inclusive and democratic value system. In this context it would be very helpful if the guidelines could include some specific strategies for making the JSR exercises more meaningful. (d) Similarly it would be helpful if the guidelines acknowledged the capacity constraints that may exist within LEGs and LDGs to take on the roles that are required of them (see also section on LDGs and LEGs – ¶B101ff below). In response to this the Guidelines should provide some explicit suggestions as to how such situations can be addressed and what kind of support can be provided by the FTI to strengthen these important mechanisms. (e) Finally the Guidelines should reflect more specifically on the challenges to effective participation by some of the stakeholder groups and what can be done to address this. CSOs for example are often disadvantaged in the preparation processes, they frequently face capacity constraints and do not get specific time or budgets allocated for participating in time-consuming FTI processes. B100. More fundamentally, the Guidelines do not very directly address the question as to why countries (and/or active in-country donors), should want to engage with the FTI, although this is mentioned as an initial decision on which the FTI Secretariat can provide guidance. This lack of coherence is partly the result of separating the process guidelines from the FTI Framework's explanation of what the FTI is and how it is supposed to work, and from more detailed guidelines about applications for support from the CF. The evaluation makes an overall recommendation (in Chapter 5 of the main volume of this report) that the FTI's main guiding documents should be comprehensively redrafted and brought together in a new "FTI Framework" document that would also take account of the other findings of the evaluation that are set out in the main report.
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Local Education Groups and Local Donor Groups B101. The LEGs and the LDGs are seen as cornerstones of FTI functioning, and are pivotal to the FTI's core principle of being country-driven. In practice however, the evaluation found a mixed picture with respect to both the LEGs and the LDGs across the various FTI countries. B102. The legitimacy of the Local Education Group and the extent of its genuine participation in the planning process were noted as concerns across country contexts (see Table B10 at the end of this paper for its responsibilities). In a number of the case study countries the LEG and LDG seemed to be indistinct, non-existent, or functioning only sporadically (e.g. Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen), while in Ghana it was unrelated to the FTI. In other countries, although a LEG existed, it was not involved in the FTI-related key decisions such as endorsement or CF funding (e.g. Rwanda, Burkina Faso). B103. As is acknowledged in the Country Process Guidelines, there is significant variety in representation from country to country and change over time. The evaluation also noted that the level of stakeholder participation in education processes at country levels has differed. Whereas national planning processes were often quite participatory, the actual process of preparation for FTI endorsement and appraisal – in particular in the early endorsed countries – has often not been as inclusive. Civil society in particular, although participating in national planning processes, is often excluded at this stage. The Nicaragua case study, for example, noted that "the process, while of good technical quality, had not been very consultative, and that most of the other departments of the MOE, including at senior level, were either not or only marginally involved. Thus although stakeholders had been widely involved in the drafting of the [national education plan] itself in 2001, the involvement of civil society and other stakeholders – including those internal to the MOE – was far more marginal when the FTI proposal was prepared" (Visser-Valfrey et al 2010). B104. In a number of countries, the FTI did result in increased engagement by a wider group of stakeholders, and in enhanced country ownership, but in others the arrangements were established before the FTI became influential in those particular countries. Burkina Faso in this context offers an interesting example of where the endorsement process has improved. For Burkina Faso, "during the first request (2002), participation was minimal due to time constraints and also the FTI request was parallel (additional) to the existing main planning framework (PDDEB) so most of the participation and consultation took place beforehand around the PDDEB and less around the FTI request" (Chiche et al 2010). During the second request, participation was much wider within government (including the finance ministry), all donors were involved, and there was much better alignment with national plans (drafted in a participative manner, at national and local level, including civil society and teacher unions etc). "Participants in …thematic…groups and in the joint missions include Government representatives (MEBA, MEF), donors, and civil society representatives (teacher unions, APE, AME, NGOs) … FTI's inputs did contribute to enhanced planning and policy analysis in basic education, more inclusive policy dialogue (between the four education ministries, with civil society, with the Ministry of Finance)" (ibid). B105. It was also clear from the case studies that over the first years the LEGs had very little knowledge of what was being requested from them specifically in the context of the FTI and that the level of "ownership" of the FTI has been limited. Exceptions to this were also noted, for example in the case of the Yemen case study which found "very strong national ownership of the proposal ... building on a very strong participatory process. The proposal itself has been elaborated by a small technical team, but since the underlying NBEDS builds on 18 months of intense participation across regions and stakeholder groups, the participation requirement has been fully respected" (Duret et al 2010). It was also clear that in almost all contexts, LEGs have had relatively little influence on how aid is spent.
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B106. Important concerns were also noted with respect to the LDGs which also have – in theory – a pivotal role in the context of the FTI – "the FTI relies on the local donor group to assess the scope, volume and timing of development assistance needs, and make funding decisions according to the policies and regulations of each donor, within a framework of commitment to maximise coordination, complementarity and harmonisation. The Coordinating Agency in particular has an important leadership and advocacy role to play as regards FTI information to the country, other local donors and in the mobilisation of incremental donor funding in support of endorsed country plans" (FTI 2004a p12). B107. The capacity of LDGs to fulfil their extensive roles in the context of the FTI (see Table B10) has been an ongoing issue. This concern was voiced at the Bonn Technical Meeting in May 2007 and by many interviews carried out for this evaluation. The LDG's designated role includes developing and appraising the ESP, assessing the financing gap and advising on funding modalities. Most of the LDGs faced difficulties in providing sufficient capacity across the breadth of inputs required. Concern was raised in Kenya that whilst some members of the group had detailed knowledge others did not "and as a result at any one time a donor group may lack the capacity to provide the required inputs and in such circumstances could require substantial technical assistance" (Kenya Country Study). There are also concerns about rotation within LDGs affecting understanding, follow-up and commitment to processes. The specific role and capacity of the lead donor was shown to affect the dynamics of country level processes and hence the outcomes. Several country studies also highlight the lack of capacity of the LDG in terms of aid effectiveness, and the lack of awareness on FTI processes and the FTI's aid effectiveness objectives.
Country level governance in practice B108. Right from the start of the FTI the country level governance has been designed at global level and there has been little monitoring of its practice in the countries concerned. The present evaluation provided a unique opportunity to look at what was happening at country level in terms of governance and this highlighted the following issues: (a) Changing rules and unclear processes, combined with limited or incoherent communication from the FTI Secretariat have led to confusion and high transaction costs. This has been a problem in both endorsed and non-endorsed countries. Prior to the adoption of the Country Process Guidelines in 2009 the operation of the FTI at country level has varied and has been significantly influenced by individuals in country. Expectations have been raised at country level and have subsequently not always been met. This was also underscored in Buse's review (2005) see ¶B39 above. (b) There is little knowledge or ownership of the EPDF in country.32 The EPDF was conceived to be FTI's key mechanism for developing planning and analytical capacity in country, yet, among this evaluation's case studies, countries more often than not had no knowledge of the Fund or only knew of it as a World Bank "internal" fund. In Moldova, for example, the EPDF is perceived to be an instrument that is largely driven by the World Bank with the terms FTI, EFA and Catalytic Fund being used fairly interchangeably. (c) The country lead donors have played a less prominent role than was expected in passing on the message about the FTI, and in particular about its objectives in terms of aid effectiveness, to their local representatives. This was evident, for example, in Cambodia and Ghana where the country donors had a surprising lack of awareness of the aid effectiveness goals of the FTI.
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(d) Information sharing on the FTI with partner governments has been less than optimal, partly due to the fact that LDGs are used as a conduit for the FTI Secretariat to pass on information, a role they have sometimes failed to fulfil (Burkina Faso, Cameroon) – as a result Burkina Faso has felt the need to apply for membership of the board to ensure they would have adequate information (Burkina Faso country case study).
H. World Bank Roles and Responsibilities Introduction B109. The World Bank (WB) has played a key role at all stages and in almost all activities of the FTI. Although, as outlined in Chapter 2 of the main volume of this report, donors had varying views of what the FTI was and what it was to become, the WB played a key formative role in the design of the FTI, by providing its intellectual underpinnings, identifying the first invitees, developing the appraisal guidelines, conducting the simulations, etc. As a result the WB left a continuing imprint on the FTI. It is therefore important to clarify what the different roles of the WB are, and how they have come about, in order to ensure appropriate understanding of the existing dynamics both within and outside the WB, and to avoid the danger of simplistic conclusions. This section tries to identify the various roles the WB has played in the FTI, with an emphasis on a factual explanation of the different strands.
Origins B110. The WB played a key formative role in the Fast Track Initiative. Although it was not the prime mover behind the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 (though an important one), and although the G8 was a key forum for preliminary thinking about a global initiative on education,33 the World Bank President at the time – James Wolfensohn – was a key early champion of the need for a Fast Track Education Fund. B111. World Bank research (Bruns et al 200334) provided the intellectual foundation for the FTI, and aimed to understand what the more successful EFA countries had in common. The idea was that the FTI could marry the willingness of governments selected for "fast tracking" to implement the policy prescriptions derived from this analysis (Bruns et al 2003) with additional finance and other support from external partners. This would set a pattern (a demonstration effect) that would propagate improved performance. Several key building blocks of the FTI originate in the WB, such as the Indicative Framework, the country status reports and associated simulation models often used in country to calculate the financing gap and prepare the ESP. B112. On that basis, the World Bank drafted the 2002 Action Plan, the founding document which initiated the FTI process (World Bank 2002). All the key design features of the FTI are visible in that document:35 it advocated UPC as the litmus test of progress; put forward what later became known as the Indicative Framework; identified the four "gaps" – data, policy, capacity, resources; and called for the scaling-up of aid where countries could demonstrate that they had a credible plan to make use of it. B113. A very small Secretariat was set up in the World Bank – at first informally, using Bank staff. This Secretariat started the process of inviting a small number of countries to apply for 33
A series of agreements reached at successive G8 meetings (and at the Monterrey Financing for Development Conference in 2001 in particular) aimed at operationalising the commitments made in 2000 when the Millennium Development Goals were adopted. 34 Bruns and her colleagues acknowledged that they themselves were building on previous work by others. 35 Education for Dynamic Economies: Action Plan to Accelerate Progress Towards Education for All, World Bank, 9 April 2002. This was a revised version of a paper first circulated in September 2001.
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FTI endorsement. WB task team leaders played a key role in selecting countries to be invited in this initial round. B114. Finally, the WB anticipated a key role for itself in the FTI, by scaling up its own support to EFA as outlined in the 2002 Action Plan (World Bank 2002: p21): ₋
Use the Bank's multi-sectoral comparative advantage to help countries anchor education in the broader development context, recognising that important factors outside the sector influence education outcomes.
₋
Help countries improve data and information base.
₋
Support countries in designing and implementing sound policies.
₋
Support capacity building: Improving capacity for public expenditure management, at both the national and local levels, will be crucial for effective service delivery and proper use of existing and new resources.
₋
Help reduce the financing gap. The Bank will scale up its resource transfer in several ways: reverse the decline in lending observed during the last three years; use its convening authority on financial aspects to establish a more effective and coordinated program for mobilising additional concessional funding for education; and ensure that resources are allocated to countries in a predictable, flexible and transparent manner.
₋
Improve internal capacity to deliver. The Bank has embarked on a large staff recruitment program to strengthen the skill mix of its education sector staff. Increased management and budgetary support for the education sector has been key in generating this new momentum.
Current WB roles (as accumulated over time) B115. The World Bank has several responsibilities in the management and implementation of the FTI initiative, both at global and at country level. B116. The World Bank hosts the Secretariat of the FTI. The Secretariat is placed under the responsibility of the Vice Presidency for Human Development (VPHD). As a result, the Head of the Secretariat is answerable to both the FTI Steering Committee and to WB line management (initially the Head of Education within the VPHD, currently to the VP for Human Development). B117. In terms of staff management, according to current arrangements Secretariat staff (WB employees or seconded by the WB) are subject to WB staff regulations and management procedures, in particular in terms of "loyalty" (see below), of rotation rules, and of performance assessment. In addition, the WB provides in-kind support to the Secretariat (estimated for FY09 at approximately 23% of total Secretariat expenditure). This involves physically housing the Secretariat in World Bank offices in Washington (see Section E above). The World Bank also acts as a trustee for the three FTI trust funds (the CF, the EPDF and the Trust Fund for the Secretariat). The WB provides both financial intermediary services (including treasury and accounting services, management of donor contributions and fund transfers) and operational support – i.e. implementation in the field. Responsibility for trust fund management was transferred from the Secretariat to the World Bank VicePresidency for Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships in 2006. B118. Box B3 above (in Section F) of this annex presents a general overview of the World Bank's trust fund management operations. As a trustee for the Catalytic Fund, the World Bank is responsible for overall accountability and financial services for the fund. It also acts as the default supervising entity for catalytic fund projects, which involves project preparation and implementation by World Bank country offices, and project approval through internal WB Volume2_Feb2010x
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processes. Changes in trust fund management processes in 2008 (see Box B3) implied that as a supervising entity, the WB had to apply regular WB standards and processes, as well as aid modalities, to CF operations. B119. As is explained more fully in Appendix IV, the EPDF was adapted from the previous Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF) which had been set up by Norway and the World Bank, specifically for the Africa region. It was originally called the Program Preparation Fund so it was seen, as NETF had been, as providing an alternative source of funding for WB project preparation and related assessments. The overall accountability for the fund is held by the WB Regional Task Managers. WB task team leaders (TTLs) for different countries make proposals for use of EPDF funds to the relevant Regional Task Manager. B120. At the global level, the WB input to the FTI has also been in terms of policy work, drawing on WB education expertise – though its education staff has not grown as envisaged. The FTI may also benefit from the "convening power" of the WB to bring partners around the table. B121. At country level, the expectation is that the WB provides inputs through its country presence, knowledge and capacity and that country staff are supported by education expertise in Washington. The Bank is, at least theoretically, able to bring a broad range of sectoral and cross-sectoral expertise (economists, aid effectiveness and public finance specialists) into the education sector dialogue and FTI process. The WB also has a certain advantage in being able to capitalise on its general role vis-à-vis PRSPs and PRSP monitoring, its Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) and other general budget support which it provides in some countries. The WB is often a key player in local donor groups and country aid coordination mechanisms, both at country and at sector level, although the degree of its participation in such groups varies. The WB's status usually ensures it has easy direct access to the partner government. The availability of this range of expertise at both country and HQ level is what the 2002 Action Plan refers to as the Bank's "multi-sectoral comparative advantage" (cf. ¶B114 above).
Concerns that have arisen B122. The multiple roles of the WB within the FTI initiative have raised both opportunities and concerns. Opportunities have developed in terms of synergies between WB programmes and the FTI, taking advantage of the WB technical capacity, potential FTI influence on the WB, and cost saving. Concerns, on the other hand, have been raised in relation to the lack of a clear division of responsibility between the two entities, leading to ambiguity and potential conflicts of interest. B123. A major concern among FTI stakeholders is the image of the FTI as a WB initiative. This concern was voiced in interviews carried out for this evaluation both at global and at country level, and even in interviews within the WB – and was outlined as early as 2005 in Buse's governance report as a "perception risk" (Buse 2005). This is illustrated by examples of confusion between the FTI and the WB: donors' concern and evidence from country case studies (e.g. Rwanda, Burkina Faso) that EPDF work is not identified with the FTI, and that partner governments and donors are not aware of this Fund's existence or of its purpose; and there are many cases where the FTI is conflated with WB and seen as a "World Bank thing" (see for example the Nicaragua country case study). This concern about the branding and visibility of the FTI has at times given way to the belief that the FTI is used to serve WB interests – as expressed by a number of interviewees – i.e. that it may have displaced WB funding for basic education (CF)36 and been used excessively to fund WB activities (EPDF). 36
The business risk to the Bank posed by global programme funds is acknowledged by the Bank itself, see Box B4.
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B124. On the issue of reporting, two main concerns were raised: (a) the lack of clear division of responsibility between the FTI Secretariat and the WB for reporting; and (b) the risk of conflict of interest if the FTI Secretariat reports are meant to be critical of the WB, in particular given the dual accountability of several of the FTIS staff both to the WB education department and to the FTI. The Secretariat should be able to report independently and objectively on the World Bank's role in the FTI, calling attention to operational issues at the policy and country levels. Although the position of the Secretariat within the WB makes it easier for the Secretariat to access information and interact with WB staff informally, and for the FTI to potentially influence the WB, it may create an issue in terms of lack of distance and objectivity, and at an extreme may lead to a conflict of interest with the WB staff regulations requiring loyalty to the WB. B125. Regarding aid modalities and fiduciary responsibility, various donors and partner governments expressed frustration that WB rules have not allowed the WB to be more flexible and innovative with respect to aid modalities; heightened by consequent delays in disbursement (cf. disbursement analysis in Appendix III). Expectations had been raised by the commitments contained in the 2002 Action Plan that the WB would "ensure that resources are allocated to countries in a predictable, flexible and transparent manner". This implied an effort to ensure both that WB rules would evolve to allow a more predictable, flexible and transparent support, and that the CF would be at the forefront of the new aid effectiveness model. In practice, examples from country studies show the difficulty for the WB to use/join the "most aligned modality". Several country studies and interviews highlight that the trust fund management reform (see Box B3 above) and subsequent strict application of WB standards, procedures and aid modalities to CF funding have been seen as a step backwards in terms of alignment, transaction costs and aid effectiveness. In addition, the Mozambique country study and various interviews carried out for this evaluation outline the initial reluctance of the WB to accept alternative supervising entities – highlighting the reputational risk involved for the WB itself. B126. As regards the WB and the aid modalities that it uses, it should be noted that: (a) The same bilateral donors who complain at country level are represented in the WB governance that sets the rules on fiduciary standards that WB applies. (b) There is room for a distinct debate that a different set of WB fiduciary rules would be better. (c) It is also possible to argue, that the WB's sharp distinction between general budget support on the one hand and project modalities on the other is not optimal and that the Bank ought to have an instrument that would allow it to join with other donors in providing sector budget support.37 (d) Meanwhile Bank staff are, of course, obliged to follow Bank rules. Efforts have nevertheless been made within the WB to enhance disbursement rates – for instance, through changes in WB procedures to carry out due diligence and quality assurance work upstream, before approval by the CF, and putting in place service standards which stipulate that grant agreements have to be signed within 45 days.
37
There has been some positive evolution within these rules, with efforts to ensure WB aid modalities are more suited to Paris Declaration objectives (reform of investment lending and review of development policy lending which are both ongoing; pilot to increase the use of country procurement systems). Some of this positive evolution has been strongly pushed for by the FTI, such as the use of the Development Policy Operation for provision of sector budget support by the WB. Volume2_Feb2010x
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Box B4
World Bank-administered Trust Funds and related risks
Extract from A management framework for World Bank-administered Trust Funds. World Bank. September 2007 p35, ¶4.13–4.14 The potential impact of large vertical funds on the overall aid architecture can be particularly pronounced. ... Funds such as the GFATM represent an alternative aid modality to IDA's country-based model – one that can significantly alter the allocation of ODA across countries and sectors. A critical and recurring issue involves the Bank's role as trustee and implementing agent, wherein partners may seek an "a la carte" approach for specific services without adequate consideration of the Bank's fiduciary interests. In some cases, proposals for such funds can also run in parallel with other Bank resource mobilisation efforts (for example, IDA replenishments). Over the long term, the potential for substitution can pose a business risk for the Bank in key sectors. ...Other challenges associated with FIFs [Financial Intermediary Funds] relate to high start-up costs, partnership management, conflicts of interest, and the design of financial instruments. ... Complex governance and funding arrangements on FIFs contribute to heightened reputational risks for the Bank.
B127. A major concern voiced by interviewees both within and outside the WB is the risk that CF funding substitutes (or crowds out) IDA education funding, in particular since the creation of the Expanded Catalytic Fund in 2007. This contrasts with the objectives set out in the 2002 Action Plan whereby the Bank would "scale up its resource transfer" (World Bank 2002 p22). In addition, while there is a clear rationale for partner governments to favour CF grants over IDA loans, the shift of WB financial resources away from the education sector might be accompanied – at country and global level – by a scaling down of WB education specialist staff, which again would not allow the Bank to fulfil its 2002 ambition of improving internal capacity to deliver. B128. Related to this issue is the need for a better understanding of WB budgeting, staffing and staff incentives to work on FTI-related issues. As outlined in the report of the Task Team on Replenishment (FTI 2008c), "the nature of incentives in the World Bank is that where there are IDA projects, there is greater staff priority in terms of staff time, staff quality, and country dialogue". Where sector budget support is provided, it does not come under the direct responsibility of the WB education directorate. This issue has been recognised by the WB and the FTI and some progress is being made in terms of (a) improving reporting on CF-funded projects by the WB, which are now much more visible in WB education reports; and (b) making FTI CF funding activities part of the deliverables of WB task team leaders. B129. Finally, regarding the EPDF, the extent to which the WB manages and selects the activities to be funded by the EPDF leads to considerable criticism both from other donors (EPDF referred to as the "slush fund"38) and from partner governments, who complain of a lack of transparency in the selection of EPDF activities. It should be noted that interest conflict issues were raised in the first EPDF concept note, but then brushed aside. Weak management of the EPDF has also been raised in relation to the variable quality of reporting on allocation and use of funds, and on outcomes of activities funded (see Appendix IV).
Modifications under the recent governance reforms B130. The 2009 governance reforms of the FTI have addressed some of the concerns raised with regard to the WB, in particular through the appointment of an independent Chair of the Board (formerly Steering Committee), and go some way towards reducing the ambiguities highlighted above. Efforts have been made to ensure a better division of responsibility and enhanced independence of the FTI vis-à-vis the WB. The independent Chair of the Board will also take over chairing of the Catalytic Fund and EPDF committees. 38
The term "slush fund" was frequently used in interviews – not with any implication of corruption, but to highlight its convenience as a support to Bank work.
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She will be contracted through UNESCO, partly in order to avoid dual accountability (to the FTI and to the WB), and should have a more continuous relationship with the Head of the FTI Secretariat than the two rotating co-chairs could have had. In addition, the FTI Secretariat has moved to offices outside of the World Bank.
I. The FTI as a Global Partnership B131. The FTI is conceived as a "compact" – between donor countries and low-income countries to accelerate progress towards the UPC. The initiative integrates commitments made in the Monterrey Consensus on Development and in the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Although the FTI has always been keen to distinguish itself from global funds, this section examines – by looking at other global partnerships – what has been shown to be essential for effective partnerships and proposes how the FTI may learn from this. The evaluation's judgements about how the FTI ought to evolve in the future are explained in the main Synthesis Report.
What makes for effective partnerships? B132. A comprehensive analysis of business/political science and global health partnership (GHP) literature commissioned by DFID 39 found that successful global partnerships have these seven characteristics in common: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Clarity of leadership. Common understanding across all involved. Clear purpose. Clear role. Commitment by all partners. Transparent and well-understood management arrangements. On-going measurement of results and impact.
B133. The study underscored that the most common reasons for the failure of partnerships are: a) poor/unclear leadership; and b) cultural differences (the impact of which may be minimised by clarity of understanding, purpose and role). B134. Table B4 below provides a summary from the same study of some of the key determinants of success of global health partnerships (GHPs) at the level of: (a) inputs; (b) outputs; and (c) outcomes/impact.
39
Druce & Harmer 2004. Other key documents consulted for this section include Burris & Beletsky 2006, Utting & Zammit 2006 Volume2_Feb2010x
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Table B4 Determinants of success for global partnerships Level Inputs
Areas of influence Goals and scope Structure and organisation
Determinants of success
Simple and focused goals with clear delineation in terms of geography, population, activities Clear agreement and procedures on governance, including:
Ways of working
Outputs
Progress measurement
Linkages at international and country levels
Outcomes/ impact
(Table adapted from Druce & Harmer 2004)
Small number of primary governance structures (1–2) Strategic board deciding on 10–20 most important decisions Constituency management and mechanisms which involve stakeholders Strong involvement of senior champions Strong and shared vision of the partnership Partners perceive they are equal in terms of commitment Clarity about roles and accountability Functional mechanisms for managing debate and achieving consensus Approaches and mechanisms which are responsive to changes in the environment Clarity on performance metrics and milestones among partners Effective use of agreed upon monitoring framework and targets to measure, identify and track success Agreed procedures and resources strategies exist for advocacy, financing, and delivery of technical assistance. Advocacy is raised at international and national levels Partners mobilisation strategies in place and functional National level mechanisms for delivery of program objectives exist Mechanisms in place for: a) performance measurement; b) dissemination of information among key stakeholders; c) generating participation at national and international levels Implementation of capacity building strategies/ technical assistance/ resources Methods for demonstrating added value, efficiency etc.
B135. In view of the results summarised in Table B4 what are the areas where the FTI appears to have fared well against these characteristics? (a) The FTI has a clear stated goal and objective. (b) The FTI foresaw the need for benchmarking and follow up by introducing the Indicative Framework as an instrument for developing country baselines and for monitoring progress.40 (c) The FTI has begun to open up to better and more representative stakeholder participation (however, representation still remains disproportionately in favour of the donors who clearly continue to dominate decision-making). (d) Links with international advocacy – such as the EFA High Level Group (HLG) – have been part of the thinking behind the FTI. (e) Efforts have been made by the partners to pool and allocate resources (e.g. for the functioning of the Secretariat, and for country-level endorsement processes).
40
However, the Indicative Framework has not lived up to its billing – see the main report of this evaluation, and also Annexe C .
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B136. However, there are also areas where the FTI does not measure up to the determinants of success: (a) The FTI has been characterised by differences among members in terms of interpretations of goals and objectives and constantly changing aims. (b) There has been lack of clarity during a substantial part of the evaluation period concerning where decision-making powers lie (this applies both amongst global partners, as well as between national and global levels). (c) There are serious concerns about the quality of the FTI's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework in practice (see Annexe F for a full review). (d) Strategies for capacity development, or for mobilising capacity from partners, have been piecemeal (see 0 on capacity development). (e) Both globally and at country level the coordination mechanisms of the FTI have been dominated by donors although there have been moves towards having better representation of other stakeholder groups. LEGs – which are central to country level coordination and action – are generally weak structures, having imbalances in stakeholder representation, and insufficient capacity to carry out what is being asked of them. (f) Support by senior champions of the FTI has been variable (although prominent persons such as Eveline Herfkens (Minister of Development Cooperation, the Netherlands), James Wolfensohn (President, World Bank) and Gordon Brown (as Finance Minister, UK) have all, at times, been advocates for the FTI) and there appears to have been insufficient continuity and leverage generated from this support. (g) The dominance of the World Bank has prevented the partnership being seen as an equal one, and has distorted its actions in important ways. B137. Table B5 takes this analysis a stage further and compares the FTI to the GFATM. Whilst there are accepted and significant differences between the health and education sectors and between the two partnerships41 it is interesting to see how another global partnership manages its governance. B138. The GFATM Secretariat is led by an Executive Management Team which consists of a Director, Deputy Director and five Component Clusters. In broad terms these component clusters reflect the key functions of the secretariat by focusing on: (a) country programs; (b) finance; (c) external relations; (d) strategy performance and evaluation; and e) corporate services. The GAVI alliance – anther major health initiative which aims at promoting access to immunisation in developing countries – follows a similar structure and includes sub-structures which focus on mobilising resources to fund programmes; coordinating programme approvals and disbursements; legal and financial management; and administration.
41
GFATM is a Fund with specific objectives to fight certain diseases. The FTI was set up as a global partnership to work with countries on improving their policies whilst also working with donors to improve support to education. Volume2_Feb2010x
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Table B5 Governance arrangements for GFATM and FTI compared Level
Global
Local
GFATM
FTI
Governance structures
Supported by
Board (includes representatives from donor and recipient governments, NGOs, the private sector, and affected communities) Secretariat Technical Review Panel
Partnership forum (not explicitly part of the governance structure) for understanding and debate among partners every two years – includes online e-discussions Global Implementation Support Team (GIST) and Independent Appeals Board on Grant decisions Technical Review Team for Grant Proposals Detailed guidelines for CCM requirements and operation Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reporting to the Board
Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) Principal Recipient Sub-Recipients Local Fund Agents
Supported by
Governance structures
FTI Board (formerly the Steering Committee) which includes representatives of partner governments, CSOs and donors/ development agencies) FTI Secretariat Local Education Group (comprised of representatives of the Government, civil society and local donors/ development agencies) Local Donor Group Supervising Entity of the CF
Partnership meeting (until the recent governance reform the PM was part of the governance structures with responsibility for decision-making Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee EPDF Strategy Committee Various working groups and task teams brought together by the partnership FTI Framework Document Guidelines for governance arrangements (developed in 2008) Country Process Chart (developed in 2008).
B139. By comparison the Secretariat of the FTI is much more functional, directed at operational issues, and has limited responsibility for financial implementation. For example, the new governance arrangements for the FTI (FTI 2009g) allocate the key advocacy role to the Steering Committee and give a specific responsibility in advocacy (among other responsibilities) to the new position of Chair of the FTI but do not allocate a specific advocacy role to the Secretariat. By contrast the GFATM and GAVI each have a whole section devoted just to external relations. B140. The GFATM has been shown to be (or is widely recognised to be) a successful operation (Macro International 2009), although there are concerns at country level about the parallel nature of its operation. In order for the comparison of governance for the two partnerships to be relevant, it is important to also compare the objectives of the two Secretariats. Interestingly the main functions of the Secretariats of the GFATM and the FTI are not very dissimilar (although the size of the funds managed is far larger for GFATM). Whilst the FTI Secretariat does not provide legal support, it has a greater role in terms of knowledge management and is expected to operate both at global level and at country level, but has far fewer staff to carry out its functions.
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Table B6 The GFATM and FTI Secretariats compared GFATM Secretariat
FTI Secretariat
Day to day operations Mobilisation of resources Managing grants Financial support Legal support Administrative support
Supporting day to day operations of the PM, Chair and steering Committee Promoting effective communication and data reporting Supporting country level LDG and the country Coordinating Agency ("lead donor") Sharing information on funding Supporting the FTI Trust Fund Committees Coordinating support of the partnership to filling the four gaps (policy, data, capacity and finance) Sharing lessons learnt Head and Deputy Head
Main functions
Internal organisation
Director, Executive Director, Five Component Clusters (together comprise Management Team) 5 in total (country programs; finance; external relations; strategy; performance and evaluation; and corporate services)
Internal divisions
Number of staff Location Staff accountable to Operational budget Contributions received from donors in FY 08 Disbursements FY08
No formal internal divisions
370 Geneva (at WHO until Dec 08, now independent) GFATM (independent)
16 (including long term consultants) World Bank, Washington DC
USD 3,065m (GFATM as a whole)
USD 420m (FTI as a whole)
USD 2,134m (GFATM as a whole)
USD 146m (FTI as a whole)
World Bank
Source: EFA-FTI Secretariat operating budget for the period July 2010–June 2011; World Bank 2008c.
B141. Just as the FTI can learn from the GFATM, the reverse is also true. The FTI has in the course of its implementation had certain characteristics and approaches which make it stand apart from the GFATM and which constitute worthwhile experiences for other global partnerships to reflect upon. These lessons apply to some countries, and not necessarily to the FTI as a whole. This includes: (a) Staying much closer to national plans and policies by endorsing a national policy rather than specific project/grant proposals (although in some cases the CF has done just that where proposals have been "projectised"). (b) Influencing policy and planning in certain contexts and countries, by strengthening the analysis behind key decisions and choices. (c) Working through existing sector coordination structures, rather than establishing new ones. (d) Strengthening SWAp processes and harmonisation and alignment through the use of national systems.
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J. Summary of Findings B142. This annex has sought to outline key governance changes and issues over time. It has also contrasted the FTI with other global partnerships. This analysis illustrates that the FTI has since its inception grappled energetically with governance and management issues. Addressing these has taken up substantial time and energy. B143. Ultimately this mid-term evaluation has to make judgements as to whether and to what extent the changes which have been made will resolve the underlying issues that were raised in Section Annexe B of this annex. This is addressed in the main volume of this Synthesis Report. However, Table B7 below captures the evaluation's main findings related to the key governance issues which were presented in the introductory section of this report (see Box B1). This is a summary which should be read in conjunction with the analysis done in the main synthesis report. Table B7 Main findings to key governance questions Key questions Decision making: How are decisions made in FTI? Does decision making follow established rules and order, and is it fully transparent? Are the governance and management arrangements effective and appropriate given the program's evolving scope and mandate? How effective has FTI been in articulating lessons learned about accelerating EFA progress?
Trust funds: Concerning the CF, to what extent do its management mechanisms work against a sector-wide, multidonor approach; harmonisation and alignment? Is the way in which the CF and EPDF are institutionalised (as trust funds within the World Bank) consistent with FTI principles (stressing government ownership, etc.)?
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Main findings Greater clarity has been achieved on where decisions are taken and what the procedures are. Mechanisms have been established for decision-making in absence of consensus. Decision-making has been streamlined under the 2008 governance reforms within the FTI, and moved from the Partnership Meetings to an FTI Board, creating an environment for greater clarity and transparency. However, decision-making around the endorsement and funding for countries still lacks sufficient transparency. In spite of changes, the governance arrangements continue in a number of respects to be inadequate for an organisation of the size and complexity of the FTI. Key issues that will need to be addressed in this respect are the mandate, internal organisation and the size and staffing of the FTI Secretariat, the lack of involvement of partner countries in financial decisions, and the voluntary nature of the work done through working groups and task teams, which has lacked efficiency and has contributed at times to key issues taking inordinately long to resolve. The FTI has not been consistently effective in articulating lessons learned about EFA progress. (This is further discussed in Annexe F under Monitoring and Evaluation.) CF management mechanisms have not been conducive to promoting SWAps and have in some country cases worked against harmonisation and alignment. IDA rules applied to the CF have exacerbated this problem Mechanisms for Trust Fund management and decision-making are in several respects inconsistent with FTI principles. Conflict of interest is an issue due to multiple roles of the WB vis-à-vis the FTI and the TFs. The fact that partner governments are not represented on the CF or the EPDF committee effectively means that there is no partner government involvement. (These points are taken up in the main report.)
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Key questions Legitimacy: To what extent can the governing bodies of FTI be considered legitimate? How and how effectively have civil society organisations and partner government representatives been brought into FTI governance?
Functioning: Is the Secretariat effective and productive: putting out information and reports and organising discussions as required and in a timely manner?
Communication: Concerning the substance of FTI communications: how transparent are these and how is information used to promote accountability within countries (not just at the local donor group level but between the implementers and parliament and civil society organisations)? To what extent is there open, broad-based discussion of FTI – its objectives, possible contributions, potential valueadded – within countries, or is it still a donor agenda? Monitoring and evaluation: Does FTI have its own outcomes-oriented global monitoring and evaluation framework and if so, is it effectively used to support and justify changes in the Initiative's agenda and core processes?
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Main findings The FTI has made significant progress in improving CSO participation in the FTI. Progress has also been made towards better partner government representation. However, there are still areas of decision-making where CSO and partner organisations are not at all represented, in particular as far as the financial decisions are concerned. And there are also issues with respect to the level of active involvement of CSOs and partner countries even where they are represented. In spite of progress, the FTI continues to be heavily weighted in favour of donor influence on decision-making. The FTI Secretariat has grown in size over the life time of the FTI but continues to be seriously understaffed in relation to the roles it is expected to play. The flat structure of the Secretariat and the lack of a formal internal organisation influence its capacity, as does the fact that certain key functions (such as resource mobilisation) are not represented within its internal functions. Reporting by the Secretariat has improved, but has focused mostly on the advocacy side of information provision, with insufficient attention to the need for critical internal analysis to feed into decision-making by the FTI (Annexe F ). The broadening of the FTI membership to a wider range of partner countries has opened up the discussion on issues affecting the FTI. The FTI has over time become better owned by its various constituencies although donors still have a relatively strong position and voice. While efforts have been made to address this area, FTI communications have been and continue to be problematic at various levels. Communications regarding CF processes have lacked transparency with countries not being clear on the process or on the reasoning behind decisions by the CF. (This point is reinforced by the analysis in Annexe K ).f In a number of cases there is insufficient understanding by country level donor staff of FTI processes and procedures. The absence of partner country representation in the financial realm of governance limits the scope of engagement of partner countries and tilts the balance of power in favour of donors. The FTI does not have a credible evaluation framework; even the monitoring of inputs is weak (see Annexe F on Monitoring and Evaluation, and Appendix VI for recommendations on a future M&E framework).
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Key questions Processes and procedures: How efficient are FTI processes and procedures, e.g., those for country selection, program review and endorsement, the disbursement of funds and services, the collection of performance data and reports, and the conduct of annual reviews? How have these processes evolved over time and how consistently have FTI standards been applied across countries?
Main findings Processes and procedures with respect to review and disbursement are generally taking longer now than in the earlier phase of the FTI. Delays are related in part to the adoption of IDA rules for the CF disbursements (see chapter 3C of the main report, and the detailed analysis in Appendix III). Processes have become more demanding over time. Country case studies highlight inconsistent standards in terms of processes at country levels. The new Governance document (FTI 2009g) and the Country Process Guidelines and accompanying chart are important attempts to clarify processes and procedures at global and country level.
K. What are the issues that need resolution? B144. Governance has been on the FTI agenda almost since the beginning. There have been various iterations of governance reform, leading up to the latest series of changes which have been laid down in the 2009 FTI Governance document. The analysis above shows that progress has been made on a number of fronts, including: (a) Better representation of different constituencies within the membership (although the latest round shifts balance back slightly to a greater donor representation than was the case under the earlier round of changes). (b) Clarification of roles and responsibilities of different governance structures (globally and at country level) which should lead to more streamlined processes and decision-making. (c) An important development has been the establishment of the Board (to replace the Steering Committee) with higher level representation from the partners involved. This should ensure better linking between operational and policy level decisions within key agencies and ensure higher level support for the FTI, provided higher level representation is maintained in practice. (d) Adoption of a voting procedure for the Board which can be used to overcome the difficulties associated with making decisions by consensus. (e) The contracting of an independent chair for the FTI Board who will also chair the two Trust Fund committees. This should go some way towards ensuring that the different elements of the FTI work together more coherently. (f) Putting country level processes more at the centre of the governance structures and the processes of the FTI. This is likely to clarify and facilitate processes at country level and to help LEGs, LDGs and other local partners (government, CSO) in their understanding of FTI processes at this level. These reforms have also served to clarify how country governance links in with global governance. B145. A substantial effort has been made to address issues that have affected the governance of the FTI with selected key partners investing technical expertise and time into addressing these complex issues. However, a number of key issues have not been tackled by the governance reforms and still remain to be addressed. These include the following (in several cases the evaluation's documentation and analysis of these issues is set out in other supplementary annexes which are referenced below): (a) A number of proposals of the recent Governance Document (FTI 2008d) have either been postponed or have not been adopted. This includes the proposal to institute a 62
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Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI
two-thirds majority decision-making rule for the TF and the suggestion to merge the two Trust Funds into one to ensure greater coherence between these and the needs at country level. (b) The constraints on the Trust Funds that derive from the application of current WB roles and requirements. (c) The role of the LEG and the LDG at country level has been underscored again in the latest governance reform. However, the country case studies that are part of this evaluation – and the analysis in this paper – have highlighted the weaknesses of many of the LEGs and LDGs. (d) Resolving the conflicts of interest which arise out of the multiple roles of the World Bank (trustee, supervising entity, partner in the LDG/LEG, provider of technical services, host of the secretariat, EPDF-related roles). These issues have been only partially addressed through the reforms so far and are likely to continue to affect the functioning and the outcomes of the FTI. The multiple roles of the WB have affected the balance in the partnership by giving one partner a much more prominent role. It has led to the FTI being identified at country level (and to a lesser extent at global level) as a WB program. Conflicts of interest have been a serious constraint on the Secretariat's ability to secure the interests of the partnership as a whole. (e) In spite of improved representation, the FTI still has less inclusive mechanisms than some other global partnerships and broader representation issues do not extend to some of the key decision-making bodies of the FTI – in particular the Trust Fund committee. Thus the FTI continues to be donor dominated, in spite of the changes. Some key procedures – such as the presentation of country proposals by the lead donor rather than the country government – reinforce this. (f) Criteria and transparency of decision-making by the Trust Funds continues to be an issue with different standards being applied to different countries/proposals. (This is documented in Annexe K ). (g) A number of key functions of the FTI float within the partnership, e.g. financial mobilisation, and depend to a significant extent on the goodwill and voluntary work of members. (h) The preference for a small Secretariat has persisted, and most donors continue to argue for the benefits of a "lean" secretariat, even though this is no longer realistic. The small size of the FTI secretariat contrasts with the generally much larger secretariats of other global initiatives, and there is a mismatch between the roles that the secretariat is expected to perform and the resources it is given. A number of issues related to the secretariat need addressing including subordination/placement within the World Bank; the lack of internal structure/organisation of the Secretariat; and inadequate staffing. (i)
The FTI does not have monitoring and evaluation mechanisms which give it sufficient insight into the reality of processes at country levels and into the progress which the partnership is making globally to achieve its goals. This limits its capacity to react in an appropriate and timely manner to issues which arise (see Annexe F ).
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FTI Mid-Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Table B8
Co-Chairs of FTI Meetings
Country
Co-Chairs
Job Title
Denmark and Italy
John Nielsen
Head of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark
Renzo Rosso
Coordinator Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy
Denmark and Japan
John Nielsen
Head of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark
Shinichi Asazuma
Senior Coordinator Global Issues Cooperation Division International Cooperation Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
Denmark and Japan
John Nielsen
Head of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark
Shinichi Asazuma
Senior Coordinator Global Issues Cooperation Division International Cooperation Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
Japan and The Netherlands Germany and The Netherlands Germany and The Netherlands Germany and EC
Takehiro Kano
Russia and EC
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Period of Chair (to) November 2009
Location of Meeting
December 2008
Oslo
September 2008
Paris
Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator, Policy Coordination Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs –Japan Deputy Head Education Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
April 2008
Tokyo (Donor's Meeting)
Head Division of Education, Health and Population Policy, Germany
December 2007
Dakar
Deputy Head Education Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands Head Division of Education, Health and Population Policy, Germany Deputy Head Education Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
September 2007
Washington
Ronald Siebes Bernhard Kühn
Head Division of Education, Health and Population Policy, Germany
May 2007
Bonn (Donors' Meeting)
Marja Karjalainen
Principal Administrator
Andrei Volkov
Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Head G8 expert group on education Principal Administrator
November 2006
Cairo (Fourth Partnership Meeting)
Ronald Siebes Bernhard Kühn Ronald Siebes Bernhard Kühn
Marja Karjalainen
Copenhagen (Fifth Partnership Meeting)
February 2010
Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Country
Co-Chairs
Job Title
Period of Chair (to)
Location of Meeting
Russia and EC Russia and Belgium Belgium and UK
Andrei Volkov
Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Head G8 expert group on education
October 2006
Brussels (Donors' Meeting)
Marja Karjalainen Andrei Volkov
Principal Administrator Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Head G8 expert group on education
March 2006
Moscow (Donors' Meeting)
Kris Panneels Martine Van Dooren
Director, Multilateral Cooperation, Belgium Director General, Belgium
Nov-Dec 2005
Beijing, China (Third Partnership Meeting)
Desmond Bermingham Martine Van Dooren
Head of Profession, Education, DFID September 2005
Washington (Donors' Meeting)
Desmond Bermingham Desmond Bermingham
Head of Profession, Education, DFID March 2005
London (Donors' Meeting)
and Sweden
Ewa Werner-Dahlin
Sweden and US
Carin Jämtin
November 2004
For Sweden could also contact: Ewa Werner-Dahlin (Sida)
Brasilia (Second Partnership Meeting)
Emmy Simmons
Head of Education Division, Department for Democracy and Social Development – Sida Minister for International Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, U.S. Agency for International Development
March 2004
Washington (Donors' Meeting)
Belgium and UK UK
Norway and US
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Director General, Belgium
Head of Profession, Education, DFID
Nils Haugstveit
Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Emmy Simmons
Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, U.S. Agency for International Development
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FTI Mid-Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Country
Co-Chairs
Job Title
Period of Chair (to)
Location of Meeting
France and Norway
Mireille Guigaz
Director for Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
November 2003
Oslo (First Partnership Meeting)
Åge B. Grutle
France and The Netherlands France and The Netherlands Canada
Bruno Delaye
Director General, Multilateral Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
March 2003
France (Second Donors' Meeting)
Joan Boer Bruno Delaye
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
February 2003
Joan Boer Len Good
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands President, CIDA, Canada
France (Donors' Preparatory/Technical Meeting)
November 2002
Canada
Tom Wallace
Director General, Policy Analysis and Development, CIDA, Canada
October 2002
Brussels (First Donors' Meeting) Washington (Donors' Preparatory Meeting)
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Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Table B9 Summary of FTI Task Teams (TTs) and Working Groups (WGs) This table was put together using minutes from FTI meetings, Progress Reports and Annual Reports. Input was also sought from the Secretariat. The remaining gaps and the difficulty with which the table was put together highlight the lack of centralised data upon either the make-up of WGs and TTs or their actions and outputs. Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Finance Working Group Members: Chaired by UK, Chair handed over to Netherlands – Nov 2005. France, USA, FTI Secretariat, Netherlands, UNESCO USA, Germany, EC, UIS, Japan, Norway, Belgium, UK
To monitor and keep up with the ever growing selection of lending instruments tailored to country-specific needs – particularly how to include general budget support in FTI accounting.
November 2003 – recommende d in the Progress Report – endorsed at FTI partnership meeting in Oslo
Work reported on in 2004 (FTI November Partnership Meeting, Brasilia): (i) a review of the methodologies for assessing the education financing needs at the global level; (ii) several case studies on alternative delivery models; (iii) a study on tracking aid flows to education; and (iv) a study on the relationship between budget support/SWAps and education outcomes. 2006 – "Review of Absorptive Capacity in the Education Sector" was commissioned by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Global Campaign for Education for the Finance Working Group. March 2006 – Request for clarification: "the Technical Meeting endorsed the Working Group's proposal that the Terms of Reference for this working group should be clarified. The Steering Committee is to develop the Working Group Terms of Reference and specific topics with input from the lead of the Working Group"42. October 2006 – update provided to Technical Meeting on: "Public Finance Management and Education; and a draft report on absorptive capacity issues.
By November 2006 not functioning as talk at SC meeting about reviving it.
Not indicated in records.
42
Revived active in Cairo Meeting, November 2006. Disbanded 2007
FTI Steering Committee Minutes, March 2006.
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Harmonisation Working France (WG Lead)_, EC, FTI Secretariat, Norway, Netherlands, Nadine Belgium, UNESCO, Spain, JICA, Sweden, World Bank, Canada, Germany. Numbers of members grew from 10 to 18 between April 2004June 04
To develop the donor indicative framework and to look at ways in which donors could better harmonise their aid.
March 2004
According to its update (June 2004) the WG functions entirely via email. Donor Indicative Framework was produced – finalised July 2004. Production of guide on Donor Indicative Framework for use by countries – Guide on the use of the Donors Indicative Framework (DIF) on donor commitments and harmonisation in education (for lead donors) (2004) Joint pilot study with EC on effectiveness of DIF indicators – use of DIF. Four pilot countries selected for a trial phase to test the relevance, reliability and validity of the DIF indicators: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Niger. Fact Sheet on Aid Effectiveness in FTI – October 2005.
Disbanded.
Unknown
Communications Working Group Members: FTI Secretariat (WG Lead), Unicef, USA, Canada, UNESCO, Netherlands
Set up to define a communications strategy, including key messages customized to various agencies.
November 2003 – Oslo
Work with the Secretariat on communications plan.
Disbanded – date not included in records.
Work taken over by the Secretariat when they employed a communication expert.
EPDF Working Group Members: CIDA and....
The main objective of the EPDF working group was to develop a new funding facility, to be administered by the World Bank, to support country level program preparation and cross-country knowledge generation and sharing.
2003
2004 – Developed a concept note describing the fund. By Nov 2004 this had been agreed with the Bank and was expected to be set up by early 2005.
November 2004
The EPDF was set up.
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Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Fragile States TT Members: UK (Chair), World Bank, Netherlands, UNESCO, Unicef, Save the Children, Canada, Belgium, USA, Germany, Italy, FTI Secretariat
In response to growing desire within the FTI to look at how it could best help fragile states (FSs). At the technical meeting point was made that some of the FTI requirements were too onerous for FSs – interest expressed for further work on the issue.
March 2005, FTI Technical Meeting held in the UK
2005 – Background paper for partnership meeting (Nov, Beijing) – included options for FTI on FSs. 2006 – Further work by FSTT to produce a note on benchmarks, guidelines and principles – idea of work to find out what needed to change in FTI to work with FSs. 2006 (Cairo meetings) Progressive Framework (PF) was presented and tabled – FSTT asked for PF endorsement. March 2007 – FSTT technical working group in London finalise PF and work out FTI vision for FSs. May 2007, (Bonn) PF endorsed at FTI Technical Meeting. FSTT asked to develop proposals for "longterm transition countries" to work with Unicef and Netherlands. Drafting team established in Bonn (Unicef, DFID, CIDA, Netherlands and the Secretariat), to look at a mechanism of interim support to FSs ESP "Transition Fund" model. 2007 – Work on PF guidelines at the same time loosely connected process of developing financing strategies for FSs. 2007-8 – work on financing options – working group convened including INEE working group on education and fragility and other contributors including CSOs – worked on a paper submitted at Tokyo Technical Meeting, April 2008 – paper was endorsed. 2008 – FSTT developed a paper entitled "A Global Process for Education: FTI financing Mechanisms" (Sept 08) outlined proposals for the Paris Meetings (Sept 08). Sept 2008 – SC decided to use the Transition Fund as a financing tool within the FTI for FSs. Oct 2008 – INEE Round Table in Brussels was used by donors on the FSTT to discuss a draft concept note produced by Unicef.
Unofficially December 2008
Sept 08- Dec 08 (Oslo) progress was slow decided by the SC in Oslo that Unicef would reach agreement with the SC on a process for integrating the Education Transition Fund. Idea had always been that once a "solution" for financing of FS had been found TT would disband. When agreement with Unicef to host the ETF collapsed in July 2009 – the issue was taken up by the Secretariat with support from the co-chairs.
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Governance Working Group Members: CIDA, EC
Recommended by the cochairs to the SC: "in the longer term, the FTI Partnership should review the composition and terms of reference of the Steering Committee (including the appointment and tenure of the Co-Chairs). We recommend that a small task team should be established to lead this 43 review."
Nov 2005
Study done by Ken Buse (ODI) on governance within the FTI – this was presented to the partnership meeting in November 2005 by the co-chairs.
Not mentioned as officially disbanded.
"Recommended by the cochairs to the SC: Partnership should commission an external evaluation of the FTI to be conducted towards the end of 2006 and the early part of 2007. We would recommend that a small task team should be established to prepare and support this evaluation" (see above, p7).
Nov 2005
Evaluation TT Members: Unicef, USAID and GCE
43
Reason disbanded
Governance Annex – approved by SC in May 2007, then circulated to the partnership. Work continued by Governance TT (see below).
May 2007 – Presentation to the SC, Bonn – ToR drafted by Greg Loos (USAID) on request of SC.
By April 2008 Joe De Stefano was in post and presented to the Technical Meeting.
Role handed over to the Evaluation Oversight Committee led by USAID in Sept 2007 (SC Minutes).
Co-Chairs' Recommendations Paper, Beijing, November 2005, p.6
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Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Expanded Financing Mechanisms Task Team Members: Netherlands (Chair), Sweden, UK, Norway, EC, World Bank, France, FTI Secretariat, Italy
"At its meeting in Beijing in late 2005, the FTI Partnership endorsed a proposal put forward by the Netherlands to explore the possibility of creating a financing mechanism that could provide long term predictable financing to countries with FTI-endorsed education sector plans but insufficient domestic or external aid resources to implement them. The FTI Partnership created a Task Team for this purpose. The Task Team's mandate was to explore options and ways of designing such a mechanism, preserving the basic principles of the FTI and building upon the experience of the Catalytic Fund." 44
November 2005
Concept note for SC on the Expanded Catalytic Fund. March 2006 – Draft Report FTI Task Force on an Expanded Financing Mechanism, The Hague, 28 February – 1 March 2006 & power point presentation.
Disbanded
Not clear from records
44
Expanded Catalytic Fund Concept Note – November 2006: p1
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Steering Committee Task Team It seems this work was taken forward by a drafting team comprised of (EC, Canada and FTI Secretariat).
A task team to review the composition and terms of reference of the Steering Committee (Nov, 2005, Partnership Meeting). Key issues need to be addressed such as who will be involved; would the composition change every year, and would there be regional rotation? There is a difficulty if the group chosen is to determine which civil society should be included.
November 2005.
A Governance Annex was produced which contained recommendations for the SC as well as broader governance recommendations (FTI 2007w, p3).
Disbanded
Work merged into work of the Governance TT and that of the governance drafting committee.
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Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Quality and Learning Outcomes Task Team Members: Russia (Chair), UNESCO (5 other members)
Proposed by Russia with the aim of evaluating "the efficiency of basic education development and to accelerate the access of FTI countries efforts on improving quality within national 45 strategic plans" .
October 2006.
Presentation to the SC of proposal on Quality Development (by Russia) – Oct 2006.Proposal included work plan: create a system of indicators for quality; develop an instrument of education quality assessment (National Assessment and Monitoring System) that is low-cost and does not put excessive strain on national capacity. Develop national monitoring capacity and use it to inform policy change (Proposal on Quality Development TT). March 2006 – asked by SC to do a desk review of existing assessment initiatives on quality. Review of 35 ESPs to look at how quality was defined. 46 Presentation at UNESCO "Learning Counts" Seminar, Paris, Oct 2008. A "Meeting Statement" was issued which specified further action by a Working Group aimed at providing recommendations for improving the EFA-FTI Indicative Framework and Appraisal Guidelines47. There is no report of this at subsequent FTI meetings. FTI Secretariat September 2009 newsletter announced that two additional (quality) indicators are to be added to the IF, and become reporting requirements, reading 48 ability i) at the end of grade 2, ii) at the end of primary (whenever that is-no recognition that the length of primary schooling ranges from 5 to 8 years). Not clear if these result from work of QTT, or from another source, such as the UNESCO activity.
Disbanded 2008 – without producing a final report. Leadership and function of TT passed to UNESCO.
Meant from start to be temporary (Minutes, SC Meeting, November 2006)
Goal defined as: "The task team would aim to facilitate country dialogue and activities related to quality of learning. From an inventory of practices and a review of lessons learned, the task team would make recommendations to strengthen the Appraisal Guidelines and the Indicative Framework in the area of learning outcomes." (Technical Meeting, May 2007)
45
Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, October 26th 2006. 46 "The UNESCO draft desk review "Overview of Approaches to Understanding, Assessing and Improving the Quality of Learning for All" served as a background paper for the discussions and will, in its final form, provide a working document with recommendations for action by EFA partners." (UNESCO Meeting Note, Learning Counts International Seminar on Assessing and Improving Quality Learning for All, October 2008). 47 "Specifically, the central task of the WG would be to reach consensus on an operational definition of common core indicators of quality, with specific recommendations for improving the EFA-FTI Indicative Framework and Appraisal Guidelines" (ibid). 48 "The FTI Secretariat will work closely with LEGs to facilitate a gradual and smooth implementation" FTI Secretariat Newsletter, September 2009. Volume2_Feb2010x
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
HIV/ AIDS Working Group Members: Ireland, Sida, and the Netherlands
UN Inter agency group on HIV/AIDS offered support to the FTI. Link established after report by Clarke and Bundy (2004) showed that HIV/AIDS was not being considered in sector plans.
First features in Status Reports – November 2006
Review of 12 endorsed sector plans in 2004 (led by UNAIDS group) Out of which recommendations were made to strengthen the Appraisal Guidelines.
Ongoing external group in which some bilateral are already involved.
N/A
74
Revision of FTI appraisal and endorsement guidelines. Working group commissioned the review of 8 newly endorsed plans in 2006. 2007 – "Development Agency Toolkit on mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in Education" May 2007 – Technical Meeting WG asked "working group asked for guidance on how best to coordinate their work with that of other task teams and working groups (i.e., Capacity Development, Fragile States, and UNGEI)." No answer given in that meeting.
February 2010
Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Capacity Development Task Team Members: Russia (Chair then Germany) "The Task Team currently involves a large number of bilateral headquarter and country level staff as well as multilaterals" (FTI 2006s)
"to ensure that the implementation of EFA plans is not hampered by insufficient or uncoordinated capacity development in FTI 49 countries"
March 2006 (endorsed at Nov 2006 Partnership Meeting)
2006 – Initial questionnaire on the role of capacity in the FTI context for both FTI endorsed and eligible countries. Incorporation of the CD guidelines into the appraisal guidelines (TT asked to do this Nov 2006). March 2006 – request from SC to look at inclusion of E9 activities into CD framework. May 2007 – CD Guidelines translated into French and Spanish. 2007 – CD Guidelines piloted in 13 countries. October 2007 – Workshop held in Bonn to go over lessons learnt. 2007 – Endorsement of Capacity Development Guidelines. 2007-08 – South-South study led by Japan to identify good practices in CD and to update the UNESCO/E9 database.
April 2008, Steering Committee.
Mandate had been completed – "The mandate of the CD task team will be concluded and an exit strategy agreed at the next Technical Meeting" (SC Minutes, Sept 2007, p11). All tasks set had been completed – closure approved by SC April 2008 (Minutes, p9).
49
The focus of the TT was to be on developing a countrybased, demand-driven approach, looking at where the FTI can make a difference.
FTI Status Report, November 2006.
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
EPDF Task Force Members: Lead – Norway (10 members)
To review the priorities and ways of working of the EPDF
November 2006, in Cairo
May 2007
Work completed – new task teams created to continue work where necessary (see below).
Central Thematic Window Task Team World Bank (Chair), Sweden, UNESCO, FTI Secretariat
Set up to work on the creation of a central thematic window (Technical Meeting Minutes, May 2007). The Steering Committee had advised opening a new window in the Education Program Development Fund to support technical and analytical work on post-basic education.
May 2007, Technical Meeting
Report prepared by a consultant for Task Force – a summary of the developments in aid architecture. Also looked at how to support local authorities in making effective use of local and donor resources. The Task Force looked into recipient- executed vs. Bank-executed approaches at the country level, as well as how to develop synergies with other existing task forces. Key recommendation was to reaffirm that the main priority for EPDF was to provide technical and analytical support to countries as they prepared their national education sector plans. The EPDF should not be an implementation mechanism. EPDF should be expanded into post-primary education (SC May 07). Discussions reported (at May 2007 EPDF Meeting): "on the opportunities and challenges in broadening technical and analytical support for national teams, knowledge generation, and knowledge-sharing and policy dialogue. Four main issues were discussed: (i) recipient-executed approach vs. Bank executed approach at the country level; (ii) better collaboration with other partners; (iii) responsive support for "Thematic Work"; and (iv) synergies with other existing Task Forces." Recommendations presented September to the EPDF Committee 2007. Sept 2007 – Update to the EPDF committee and presentation of options. Decision made that "a separate thematic window will not be created but that regional teams will be encouraged to work together and identify cross cutting or global issues to be funded" (EPDF Committee Minutes, Sept 07: p5).
September 2007
Decision made TT role fulfilled – closure not confirmed in minutes. Work now being carried on by the EPDF II TT.
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Monitoring and Evaluation of EPDF Task Team
Set up to review the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the EPDF (Technical Meeting Minutes, May 2007). "To help shift EPDF monitoring from an activitiesdriven exercise to a more systematic monitoring and evaluation against an established results framework for the EPDF" (EPDF Minutes, May 2007). How does the FTI and its Trust Funds prioritise where funding goes?
May 2007, Technical Meeting
An external desk review of the EPDF-funded activities expected to be conducted next year. The task team produced a draft report of this in 2008 to the EPDF Committee in June 2008.
Disbanded
Follow-up of feedback on the paper taken over by the Secretariat (June 2008). Work now being carried on by the EPDF II TT.
Recommendations presented to SC (April 2009).
Disbanded – but their final report will be discussed in November 2009.
Set task completed
Irish Aid (Chair), Canada, World Bank, FTI Secretariat.
Prioritization Task Team Chair Sweden
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Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Reason disbanded
Strengthening Country-Level Process Task Team (SCLP TT) Members: UNESCO, Unicef, UK, EC (Chair), France, Netherlands, GCE, WB, and Germany.
To look at quality assurance in the FTI process – not just in the planning stage, but in the implementation of the plans. Consideration should also be given for a separation in the role of lead donor, between advice provider and evaluator of progress. These two roles were important for the local donor group; however, it was complicated for a lead donor to have an external point of view being put forward at a critical stage of the process. This issue could form part of the work of the Task Team. Partners agreed that the Task Team would develop options with concrete proposals to be put forward to the Partnership. To move forward on decision points raised by the Netherlands Visioning paper "a SWOT analysis of FTI"
May 2007, Technical Meeting
Recommendations presented to SC meeting Nov 2007 and request to continue work approved.
December 14, 2008
Decision made by the SC meeting in Oslo, December 2008 (minutes, p4). Process guidelines have been approved and circulated.
Disbanded 2009 after finalising the governance document.
Proposals were approved and governance changes put into action.
Growing pressure for change within the EPDF Committee
December 2008, Oslo
Still active – preparing to present a proposal to the Board of Directors – November 2009.
N/A
In April 2008 the following new members joined: Ghana, Guyana and Mozambique, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden (April 2008 SC Minutes).
Governance Task Team Members: Ghana, GCE, Unicef, World Bank, EC, Canada, Denmark (Chair). EPDF II Task Team Members: Australia(Chair), FTI Secretariat, World Bank, Ireland, Canada.
78
Update provided Technical Meeting 2008 – included Process Chart and suggestion of External Review for endorsement process. Process chart approved by SC in September 2008.
September 2008, Paris Meetings
Worked with different constituencies to get feedback and comment on a Governance Document which put forward a concrete proposal for each of the issues highlighted in the Netherlands SWOP analysis and the previous governance Annex. Dec 2008 – Governance Document was approved in Oslo meetings. April 2009 – Approval of draft concept note for future of EPDF. Currently preparing final recommendations for the new look EPDF for November's board meeting.
February 2010
Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
Replenishment Task Team Members: UK (Chair), Australia, Denmark, EC, FTI Secretariat, Spain, UNESCO, World Bank. The FTI Secretariat kindly agreed to provide logistical support.
Initially responsibility was given to the co-chairs and Secretariat.
December 2008, at Oslo SC meeting
Building on work done by the Secretariat in 2008.
Still active
A consultant Andrew Rogerson was employed by the FTI Secretariat to undertake preliminary work on FTI having a more organised funding mechanism.
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The visioning group will look at the role of the FTI within the broader EFA movement.
Inputs from consultant Paul Isenmann – document presented to the SC at the April 2009 Copenhagen meeting which laid out set of point by point recommendations and a complete description of the replenishment process proposed. Consultation with stakeholders report presented to SC in April 2009.
Based on this work, the FTI Secretariat presented a Summary Replenishment Strategy at the Steering Committee in Oslo in December 2008. It was decided that a Task Team should be constituted to design an FTI replenishment mechanism and make recommendations to the Steering Committee in time for the April 2009 Copenhagen meetings of the FTI. Visioning Group on role of FTI in EFA Members: Netherlands (Chair), Guyana, GCE, UNESCO, World Bank.
Reason disbanded
May 2009 – Final Proposal on the Replenishment of the EFA-FTI Trust Funds. Presented to Board of Directors September 2009.
April 2008, Steering Committee Meeting
The "Visioning" paper (Netherlands MOFA 2008b)
Probably disbanded but no record.
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FTI Mid-Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Name of TT or WG
Reason established
Date established
Actions/ Outputs
Date disbanded
FTI Focus Task Team Members: Chair Sweden
To explore the implications for the FTI indicative framework and the analytical tools necessary to broaden the scope of the FTI, including financial needs and mechanisms.
April 2009 (Copenhagen SC Meeting)
Proposal of what planned to be given to the Board at September 2009 meeting.
Still active
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Reason disbanded
February 2010
Annex B: Governance and Management of the FTI Table B10 Key actors and responsibilities in FTI processes Key actor Government
Local Donor Group (LDG)
Local Education Group, Civil Society Organisations Lead Donor (or coordinating agency) Donor HQ
FTI Secretariat
Endorsement Develops ESP and financing framework, ensures wide consultation with stakeholders Expresses interest through letter to the LDG or the FTI Secretariat Supports the country in developing ESP Responsible for the appraisal of the ESP
Participate in planning processes at the country level through their representation in the LEG. In theory should be consulted on appraisal report Acts as the communications link between the Government of the partner country, the LDG and the FTI Secretariat Consulted on appraisal report Donor organisations, at the appropriate level, should in theory confirm commitments, and plans to scale up and align support around the ESP In contact with LDG regarding the FTI partnership and appraisal process
CF SC
World Bank (WB)
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CF allocation Develops financing framework, financing gap calculation, and CF request
Supports the country in developing financing framework Responsible for appraisal of financing gap
CF commitment and disbursement Signs grant agreement with Supervising Entity Prepares disbursement requests
Annual monitoring and reporting Prepares annual reports with support from lead donor and/or supervising entity
EPDF Sometimes discusses possible uses of EPDF
Often consulted on nature of grant agreement and aid modality Often part of Joint Sector Review
Presents the request to the CFSC
Sometimes fills the Country Information Fiche even if not Supervising Entity
Prepares documentation for CFSC
Provides support and demand for annual report
Decides on the allocation From 2009, requests independent review (External Quality Review) of proposal Often participates to the presentation of the request to
(if WB Supervising entity, standard formats
Sometimes discusses possible uses of EPDF
Prepares and manages fund request and
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FTI Mid-Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Key actor
Endorsement
CF allocation
CF commitment and disbursement
the CFSC (If WB is SE, prepares project appraisal document and fiduciary risk assessments) Supervising entity (SE)
SE and aid modality defined either before or after CFSC (in theory before)
Annual monitoring and reporting for WB annual reports)
Prepares grant agreement Signs grant agreement with government (MoF) Assesses performance and disburses funds accordingly
EPDF implementation
Fills the Country Information Fiche and prepares annual report
Source: FTI 2009p and country case studies.
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Annexe C A.
The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target
Introduction
C1. The Indicative Framework (IF) has been a centrepiece of the FTI's approach, while achieving Universal Primary Completion (UPC) has been its headline target. This Annex:
B.
comments on the derivation and validity of the IF; reviews the global availability of data on the IF indicators; summarises the use of the IF in the evaluation's case study countries; and comments on the concept and measurement of UPC.
The Indicative Framework: Origins and Purpose
C2. The FTI Framework document (FTI 2004a) gave prominence to what it calls the FTI Indicative Framework,50 described as: "a limited set of education policy, service, delivery and financial benchmarks" [emphasis added]. The full Indicative Framework is reproduced in Table C1 below, which also includes a column to show which of the indicators are reported by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report. C3. The Indicative Framework derives directly from the analytical work by Bruns and her colleagues (Bruns et al 2003). From their analysis of primary completion rates across a sample of 55 low-income countries, argued that a relatively small set of key parameters "are important determinants "[emphasis added] of primary education outcomes: overall spending on primary education; average class size; average teacher salaries; spending on inputs other than teacher salaries; and the rate of repetition. They concluded that: "the overall level of resources is adequate and the distribution is balanced, education systems have the basic ingredients they need to perform well….Many chronic problems of low quality, inefficiency, and inequity…can be traced to imbalances in these key elements." C4. Prior to its incorporation in the FTI Framework, the same analysis underpinned the Action Plan for EFA (World Bank 2002) which set the FTI in motion. In that document, however, the language was more forceful, referring to "norms". C5. Nevertheless, Bruns et al also stressed the importance of a flexible approach, indicating that this framework is not sufficient for a credible EFA plan, 51 and "must not be applied rigidly" [emphasis added], as:
System-wide averages do not guarantee an efficient underlying distribution. Target parameters may not be optimal in different country contexts. The overall level and mix of resources do not guarantee the transformation of those resources into quality schools and higher student learning.
C6. The authors insisted that: "there will be many cases where they are culturally, institutionally, or financially inappropriate and rigid adherence to any particular target values must be avoided. The ultimate value of this framework is as a guide to the direction of reform, not as a dictate regarding where it should end".
50 51
The term Framework was used for both the FTI instructions and for the set of indicators. Which would need to extend beyond primary education and UPC.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Table C1 FTI Indicative Framework Benchmarking Tool for EFA/ESPs Indicator
Average for some successful countries
Reported in the GMR52
Resource mobilisation Public domestically-generated revenues as % of GDP External grants as % of GDP
14–18
No
—
GMR reports total ODA and ODA per capita
Education share of budget (%)
Yes GMR reports on share of education in total public expenditure
Defined as public recurrent spending on education as % 1 of total public recurrent discretionary spending Estimate including grants
20
No
Estimate excluding grants
20
No
Primary education share of education budget (%)
42–64
Yes GMR reports on distribution of public current expenditure on education by level
Defined as public recurrent spending on primary education as % of total public recurrent spending on education, including grants2 Student flows Intake into first grade, total
3
Girls' intake rate Boys' intake rate
100
Yes
100
Yes
100
Yes
100
No regular reporting on PCR. GMR reports Survival rate instead which is not equivalent.
Girls' completion rate
100
No
Boys' completion rate
100
No
10 or less
Yes
Pupil–teacher ratio in publicly-financed primary schools5
40:1
Not reported for publically financed primary schools alone. Combined with private schools in GMR reporting.
Average annual salary of primary school teachers 6 divided by GDP per capita: (for countries with both civil service and contract teachers, use the weighted average salary)
3.5
No
Primary completion rate, total
4
% repeaters among primary school pupils Service delivery
Contract teachers Number of new contract teachers recruited this year
No
Total stock of contract teachers
No
Average salary civil service teachers
No
Number of new civil service teachers recruited this year
No
Total stock of civil service teachers
No
Average salary
No
Recurrent spending on items other than teacher remuneration as % of total recurrent spending on primary education7
33
Yes GMR reports on share of primary recurrent budget on teachers' salaries
Annual instructional hours 52
The absence of reporting of particular indicators is primarily due to the absence of international data, or the absence of specially commissioned data sets.
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Annex C: The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target
Indicator
Average for some successful countries
Reported in the GMR52
Estimated effective hours of schooling (not official hours) in publicly-financed primary schools
850–1000
No
Private share of enrolments % of pupils enrolled in exclusively privately-financed primary schools
10 or less
Reports on % enrolment in private schools but the denominator includes government aided or 8
financing private schools .
Source: FTI 2004a. Notes: (1) Public recurrent spending on education includes all spending through ministries or other government units providing primary and secondary schooling, vocational/technical education and higher education. It also includes public expenditures for education transferred to private and non-government providers and educational grants and subsidies to students or their families. Public recurrent discretionary spending is defined as public spending from all sources—including external grants—less debt service (interest payments only). The education share of total public recurrent spending should be presented both including and excluding external grants. (2) This benchmark is pro-rated to the nationally defined length of the primary cycle, i.e. 42% if it is 5 years, 50%, if 6 years, 58% if 7 years, and 64% if 8 years. Countries whose basic education cycle is longer than 8 years are encouraged to report data for a primary-equivalent sub-cycle of 5 or 6 years. (3) Defined as students enrolled in grade 1, net of repeaters, as a percentage of the population cohort at the official age of entry to first grade. (4) GMR 2009, reports two survival rates (to Grade 5 and to last Grade) and a Primary Cohort Completion Rate which is defined "as the number of pupils who complete the final year of primary school, expressed as a percentage of the number who entered" (UNESCO 2008a p411). (5) Includes all teachers on payroll, GMR says that their data is based upon "headcounts of pupils and teachers" (UNESCO 2008a p354). "Publicly-financed schools" refers to schools supported by government whether publicly or privately managed and all teachers fully paid by the government, either directly or indirectly. (6)The average annual salary of primary school teachers – this includes salary and budgeted cost of benefits (i.e. pension, health services, transport, housing and other items paid for by the state) – divided by GDP per capita. For countries with a two-tier teacher contracting system, disaggregated information on teacher stocks, flows and average monthly salaries (in local currency units, with exchange rate, or in USD) should also be presented. (7) Recurrent spending on items other than teacher remuneration includes all non-salary spending (e.g. teaching/learning materials, student assessment, school feeding, student stipends, etc) plus salaries of administrative and other personnel who are not classroom teachers. (8) The GMR reports on private share which it defines as the number of pupils/students enrolled in private institutions that are not operated by the public authorities but are controlled and managed, whether for profit or not by private bodies such as NGOs, religious bodies, special interest groups, foundations or business enterprises (UNESCO 2008a p411).
C7. Exhibit 14 in Volume 1 of this report (Cambridge Education, OPM & Mokoro 2010) presents the Indicative Framework as it appeared in the Framework document (2004), highlighting the things that it hoped to achieve. The Indicative Framework has fulfilled a number of functions as laid out in FTI reference documents. The Indicative Framework was intended to be used as a tool to foster debate, to allow consistent monitoring and evaluation, and to assess the credibility of education sector plans. The intentions of the framework and the way in which it was used were however in some contexts quite different. This is illustrated at country level by Table C3 and Table C4, section E below. The origin of some of the confusion can perhaps be understood through the diverse understanding of how the Indicative Framework should be used to assess country plans. These range from: "technical benchmarks or "norms" against which countries' EFA plans may be evaluated and costed" (World Bank 2002 p15), to "the sector plan is assessed in full consideration of the benchmarks of the FTI Indicative Framework as adapted locally" (FTI 2004a p6), to "Governments of partner countries [elaborate] an ESP that is generally compliant with the FTI Indicative Framework" (FTI 2009g p4). Despite the many references to the Indicative Framework providing only guidance, and therefore needing to be adapted to the country context, it has often been understood in a more prescriptive sense.
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C. Global Reporting of IF Indicators C8. The FTI has stressed the importance of monitoring the benchmarks in the Indicative Framework; even if they are not treated as rigid norms, they should be monitored. In view of the emphasis on these selected indicators, it is curious that the GMR does not make more use in its reporting of the "norms" put forward by the FTI IF. This illustrates the unavailability of the necessary data. C9. The ways in which the FTI has defined some of the indicators within the Indicative Framework (see Table C1 above) are distinct from the indicators that are internationally available; therefore such data are not collected by the UIS. Examples include the private share of enrolments, defined by the percentage of pupils enrolled in exclusively privately-financed primary schools. Whilst the GMR reports on percentage enrolment in private schools, these figures include government aided or funded private schools. The data that the indicator requires on exclusively privately financed private schools are not easily available across countries.
D.
Technical Note: Derivation of the FTI Indicative Framework
C10. The Indicative Framework was derived from a statistical analysis in Chapter 3 of A Chance for Every Child (Bruns et al 2003). The 55 IDA-eligible (low income) countries were grouped into four categories on the basis of their EFA "success", where success was defined as having a GER of 85% or above and a PCR of 70% or above: • • • •
Group 1 included the 10 "high performing" countries that met those criteria; Group 2, the 8 "high inefficiency" countries with GER of 80% or above but PCR of 60% or lower; Group 3, the 7 "low coverage" countries with both GER and PCR 60% or lower; Group 4, the 24 countries that fell in between the cracks.53
C11. Using non-parametric tests, they tried to find whether there were statistically significant differences between these groups of countries in terms of four variables: average teacher salary as a multiple of per capita GDP, pupil-teacher ratio and average repetition rate and unit costs. They showed that there were statistical differences between Groups 1 and 2 in respect of the repetition rate, between Groups 1 and 3 in respect of the teacher salary and the repetition rate; and between Groups 2 and 3 in respect of the teacher salary and unit costs. C12. Given that the four other variables have been chosen on a non-statistical basis, these are quite weak results to support the conclusion that: this analysis confirmed that the three stylized groupings did in fact reflect statistically significant differences in primary completion rates and in four key underlying variables.
Why are those four variables key? When for none of the four variables are there differences between all three groups. Moreover it is disingenuous to conclude from an analysis of differences between the characteristics of different groupings that the members of each of the groups are similar to each other.54 C13. In addition, regression analysis was used to evaluate the explanatory power of these variables in relation to the sample as a whole (i.e. across all four groups, omitting a further five countries with no data on PCR). This is based, on a regression equation between the primary 53
Making 49 in total; it is unclear what happened to the other 6 countries – presumably missing data. Classify cars into four groups by their wheel trims: in a parallel analysis compare their engine cc, maximum speed, model type and you will obtain a similar result. The parallel conclusion – that the type of wheel trims is dependent on engine cc, maximum speed and model type – would be nonsense. In fact, where the argument that differences between groups is prima facie evidence that the constituent members of the groups are very similar has been used in courts of law, it has been dismissed (Carr-Hill 1973). 54
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Annex C: The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target completion rates around 2000, on primary completion rate around 1990, on the percentage of recurrent spending on education, the teachers' salaries and the repetition rates (see Bruns et al 2003, Table 3.2, p65). Their results, which are reproduced in columns 2 and 3 of Table C2 (a) below, were interpreted to mean that "high average teacher salaries: has been a constraint to school system expansion…that high repetition constrains primary completion progress" (ibid, p65). The comment that: "The regression variables explained about 80% of the variance" (ibid, p66) appears to be interpreted as showing that the variables included as explanatory factors are powerful determinants of the dependent variable (in this case the PCR around 2000). But, in fact the bulk of the variance in the PCR around 2000 is provided by the PCR in 1990. This is illustrated in Table C2 (b) where Model 1 including PCR 1990 as the only variable accounts for 84.3% of the variance in PCR 2000; and the addition of the other variables accounts for only an additional 0.8% (less than one hundredth of the amount accounted for by PCR 1990). Although we were unable to reproduce the values in their Table 3.2 (Bruns et al 2003, p65), the pattern of results would almost certainly have been similar. Table C2 Regression Analyses of Primary Completion Rate (a) Coefficients
Intercept 1990 PCR Recurrent spending on primary education as % of GDP Average Teacher Salary (as multiple of per capita GDP) Pupil teacher ratio Average repetition rate (%) R squared Observations
Bruns et al 2005 CoeffiT Stat cients 47.86 5.08 0.40 4.14 12.28 3.90 (4.49) (4.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.72) (3.46) 0.81 44
Our Result CoeffiT Stat cients 9.88 1.99 0.81 9.19 3.87 1.42
0.71 42
(b) Analysis of R squared Model 1 2 A B
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 0.843 0.710 0.703 11.921 0.851 0.724 0.710 11.777 Predictors: (Constant), PCR 1990 Predictors: (Constant), PCR 1990, Recurrent spending on primary
C14. Overall, therefore, the derivation of the Indicative Framework is statistically shaky: Bruns et al used a regression model on a small dataset to establish causality between educational outcomes and system characteristics. Given the complexity of the relationships involved, this use of statistics was not a good way to base the derivation of the IF. C15. There are, nevertheless, obvious reasons why assessments of the effectiveness of government spending on education and on primary education should be concerned with the primary completion rate; and also why non-teacher salary spending should be relatively high as a proportion of all recurrent spending, and the average repetition rate should be low. But the reasons for a specific target for teacher salary, pupil-teacher ratio, instructional hours and construction costs are less clear and highly dependent on country context (see Fuller & Clarke 1994). The evidence for these indicators is very briefly reviewed below. At the same time there are also counting problems with some of the indicators and these are also briefly reviewed.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) C16. Teacher salary Ŕ about 3.5 times GDP per capita: the argument here is about the affordability of primary teachers relative to the national budget; but, if that "rule" were followed, teachers would see their salaries as low and this would likely to lead to difficulties of recruitment and retention. Salary level is not necessarily a constraint if it is combined with accountability in teacher management. C17. Pupil-teacher ratio Ŕ about 40:1: the best international evidence on the importance of the pupil teacher ratio is from the international assessment studies. But those are not concerned with primary completion rates but with assessment at particular levels in particular contexts. Moreover, the evidence from such studies is inconclusive even about the effect of the pupil-teacher ratio on grade specific achievement. C18. Repetition rates: the calculation of repetition rates relies on the data on individual students being collected accurately and systematically; so that, for example, the student who drops out mid-year, only to re-enrol in the same grade (either in the same school or another school), is not recorded as a new entrant; and such students may be more common than repeaters. The lack of analytical categories with which to deal with this problem is one of the causes of a tendency to under-report repetition, over-estimate intakes from the population into the first grade, and over-estimate rates of dropping out (see Crouch 1991; Marshall 2003). Moreover, in countries where automatic progression is followed, low repetition is by no means related to quality. C19. Annual hours of instruction Ŕ 850 or more. This is one of the more doubtful indicators as the evidence is not strong that increasing the number of instructional hours per se – without attention to quality – is beneficial (see Baker et al 2004). In the evaluation of the Chilean experiment of moving to full day schooling, Valenzuela (Valenzuela 2005) showed that there was a robust positive effect of the programme based on tests carried out before and after the reform; but the magnitude of the effect is small, raising doubts about cost effectiveness. C20. In sum, in addition to the statistical flaws of their analysis, Bruns et al (Bruns et al 2003) focused on a number of easily quantifiable indicators leaving out several substantive aspects of quality that the IF in its current form has not encouraged countries to consider. 55 They stressed that, although the IF can ensure that an education system has adequate resources and a good mix of core inputs, the management of these factors to produce learning at classroom level is what will produce student learning outcomes. The IF is a tool that must be used with caution and common sense. At country level, indicators need to be tested according to their relevance in that context and at the global level of the partnership decisions on funding should not be influenced by a dogmatic application of the IF. In short as recognised by Bruns et al 2003, the IF alone will not provide quality education at national level, school level and classroom level. Basing policy reform programmes on a set of indicators for which the justification is flawed (see C14 above), and for which the source data are often unreliable, can be a hindrance rather than a help. It would be better for the FTI to recognise more consistently the specificity of each country's context and to focus on improving the quality of the data sets already being used and collected globally.
E.
Use of the Indicative Framework in FTI Countries
C21. This section reports on the ways in which the Indicative Framework has been interpreted and used in practice in the countries which were case studies for this evaluation. Table C3 provides a summary across the case study countries as to where the IF was used
55
Although a recent issue of the FTI Newsletter (September, 2009) highlighted that two indicators on reading skills would be added to the Indicative Framework. One indicator will be on reading in early grades (at end of grade 2) and a second on reading skills at the end of the primary cycle (as defined by the country).
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Annex C: The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target and in what context i.e. at what stage during the FTI story was the country endorsed, and whether they already had an ESP. Table C3 Use of Indicative Framework and UPC in Countries Did the ESP that was endorsed by the FTI use/refer to the Indicative Framework?
Did the ESP include indicators on UPC? Before FTI
As a result of FTI?
Yes – but has not begun FTI endorsement process
N/A
N/A
N/A
Not endorsed ("analytical fast track" )
Yes – 2006 National Framework for Education and FME 10 year plan. By 2009, 13 states have 10 year ESPs
N/A
No
No
July 2005
Yes, KESSP stated in July 2005 (2005–2010)
The IF contains some overlap with the KESSP Results Framework with some of the same indicators used, however the link is not made explicit.
Yes
No
March 2004
Yes – May 2003 first ESP
Yes – Ghana's ESP was commended by the LDG for its use of the IF as a benchmarking tool.
Yes
No
February 2003
No – but there was NBEDs (a sub-sector education strategy focusing on primary education) 2003–2015
The IF was not really relevant in Yemeni context – see ¶C22 below.
Yes
Unclear
Invited 2002, endorsed March 2003
Yes – ESSP implemented 1998– 2005 focused on basic education
Used indicators but not the benchmarks.
Yes some
No
October 2006
Yes – latest ESP covers 2006–10
No57
No
No – but is included on the FTI project
November 2002, but not endorsed for CF funding until 2007.
Yes – PDDEB 2008– 2010
For initial endorsement the IF was not used (had not been propagated). For CF endorsement used indicators but not benchmarks
For initial 2002 endorsement – No. But for CF endorsement in 2007 – Yes
Yes
Country Case Study
Date endorsed
Pakistan
Not endorsed ("analytical fast track"
Nigeria
Was there an ESP before the country began FTI endorsement?
Kenya
Ghana
Yemen
Mozambique
Cambodia
Burkina Faso
56
56
"The New Education Reform emphasises targets Universal Basic Completion (UBC of 11 years' duration) by 2015, not UPC" (Allsop et al 2010). 57 As reason why the IF benchmarks were not used "a difference between the FTI IF suggested benchmarks and those quoted in ESSP and the CF project is that in most cases the latter are more micro level and responsibility can be efficiently assigned to departments and included in Departmental [Annual Work Plans]" (Purcell et al 2010). Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Did the ESP that was endorsed by the FTI use/refer to the Indicative Framework?
Did the ESP include indicators on UPC? Before FTI
As a result of FTI? No
Date endorsed
Was there an ESP before the country began FTI endorsement?
November 2002
Yes – PNE – National Education Plan
No but was used for the version presented to the FTI. IF not compatible with what was happening in the sector so once proposal was endorsed not really used.
Yes
Invited in June 2002, endorsed end 2003
Yes – EFA Strategic Development Plan 2001–2010.
No
Yes
Invited in 2002, endorsed November 2004 but not eligible for CF funding
Yes – Education and Training Policy in 1994 and a series of medium term Education Sector Development programmes since 1997/98.
No
No
No59
Yes – latest prepared in 2003
No
No
N/A
Uganda (D)
Not endorsed yet despite early invitation, 2002
Yes – Education Strategic Plan (2003– 07) and Education National Implementation Framework (2008–10)
Not always appropriate so not main drivers of the plan.
No
No
Zambia (D)
Invited to join in 2002 but did not apply. Endorsed September 2008 May 2007
Yes – PRODEC, 1998–2010 plus operational plans (PISE 1 and II)
Yes in part – the understanding at the time was that the plan presented for endorsement should be in line with the IF benchmarks.
Yes
No
Invited in 2004, not endorsed yet preparations started in 2006.
Yes – the PIF (1995– 2005), re-published in 2001 for 2000–2015.
No
Yes
No
Country Case Study
Nicaragua
Vietnam (D)
Ethiopia (D)
Mali (D)
Malawi (D)
58
No
2002 –secondary education master plan National EFA Plan – 2003–2015.
58
"Vietnam had nearly achieved UPC at the time of FTI endorsement" (Bartholomew 2010a). The plan now includes a UPC indicator – but its inclusion was due to budget support (DBS/PBS) frameworks stressing the importance of this (Dom 2010). 59
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Annex C: The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target
Country Case Study
Rwanda (D)
Moldova (D)
Date endorsed
Was there an ESP before the country began FTI endorsement?
Did the ESP that was endorsed by the FTI use/refer to the Indicative Framework?
Did the ESP include indicators on UPC? Before FTI
As a result of FTI?
November 2006
Yes – ESSP, rolling 5 year plan started in 2003. Education Sector Policy 2003
Most indicators were included
Yes60
No
Invited November 2004. Endorsed May 2005.
Yes – Consolidated Strategy for the ESP.
IF is not used and bench marks seem irrelevant to Moldovan context. Government has its own IF.
No
No
C22. Table C3 aims to show the degree to which the FTI's emphasis upon the IF and UPC has had an impact at country level. The IF was aiming to influence education policy and planning and one indicator of the degree of influence is whether or not the IF and in particular the UPC indicator are referred to or used in the country's ESP. In most country case studies, the IF indicators have not been used to strengthen the monitoring of education sector plans (ESPs) (see Table C3). One of the main reasons for this was that in most countries their ESPs were already in place (see Table C3) when the country sought FTI endorsement. In countries in which IF benchmarks were used in their ESPs (Mali, Burkina Faso, Rwanda) this seemed to occur due to a misunderstanding concerning the requirements for endorsement (that plans had to be in line with the IF benchmarks). This confusion unfortunately led to the ESP targets being considered to be unrealistic by local donor groups and partner governments. C23. As highlighted also in the review of 28 Education Sector Plans carried out by the FTI Secretariat in 2007 (FTI 2008ah) countries were not reliably using the Indicative Framework (only 64% of the 28 ESPs referenced the Indicative Framework). This evaluation's country case studies showed that it was also not being understood consistently. Despite insistence at global level that it was to act as guidance, some countries (e.g. Burkina Faso and Nicaragua) saw the IF as a necessary part of the Catalytic Fund application process. In some of the case study contexts the IF appeared less relevant: examples were Moldova, where the primary-aged population is decreasing, and Yemen where: ... whilst Yemen was lagging behind and struggling with each of the EFA goals, paradoxically, the FTI Indicative Framework parameters were actually close to the benchmarks in Yemen. Therefore the FTI Indicative Framework did not help to highlight key policy gaps, notably low efficiency in the use of resources; higher unit costs in the delivery of education services and demand-side constraints for access and retention in school. (Duret et al 2010)
C24. It was also interesting to see in the country studies in more detail exactly how the IF was used, and if it was not used why not. Table C4 below provides more detailed excerpts from the country studies about the use of the IF and illustrates the variety of interpretations and implementation of the IF across FTI countries.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Table C4 How was the Indicative Framework used in the case study countries? Country Use of the Indicative Framework Pakistan
Pakistan's early contacts with the FTI Secretariat petered out. The federal Ministry of Education did prepare a set of targets against the IF, but this was never incorporated into national planning.
Nigeria
None of the FTI IF indicators are being monitored explicitly.
Kenya
The KESSP (endorsed in July 2005) framework for analysis and subsequent M&E included a number of the indicators included in the FTI Indicative Framework (IF), but did not link them to the IF.
Mozambique
Invited in 2002, and endorsed in March 2003. Some IF indicators were incorporated into the existing processes, but there was not a visible FTI influence in streamlining the demand for data or monitoring indicators. The present data system is not yet compatible with the IF indicators, as data is still collected with EP1 and EP2 split, and not integrated primary education.
Ghana
In terms of the IF indicators, most of the data that related to student flow indicators was collected. Ghana was endorsed in March 2004.
Cambodia
Endorsed in October 2006, the reliability of EMIS data was questioned by some, whilst other stakeholders felt strongly that the FTI indicator framework was being used too rigidly and prescriptively.
Yemen
Endorsed in February 2003, the FTI IF indicators have never been considered at the national level in the monitoring of poverty reduction. It is difficult to know if the FTI IF could have influenced the high level M&E framework if the indicators had been routinely followed at the sub-sector level. The completion rate is not given as much as emphasis as traditional GER and NER and seems documented for MDG reporting only. The other FTI IF indicators have been clearly phased out over time. The retention rate to grade 6 disaggregated by gender is the only indicator reflecting the FTI IF which remains. The IF was relevant in Yemen in that it encouraged a consolidation of available information from different sources to set up a baseline year. Also the definition of a framework to monitor progress for the whole lower basic education sub-sector including indicators from the FTI IF helped align Yemen to internationally recognised indicators and practice.
Burkina Faso
During discussions around endorsement in 2002, the World Bank argued that the credibility of Burkina Faso's FTI request would rely upon the objective criteria of the IF. Letters from the FTI Secretariat to Government also implied that the request was to be "consistent with" the IF benchmarks. The systematic reference to the IF to guide policy reforms aimed at addressing the key efficiency constraints in Burkina Faso was difficult for the Government to accept. It perceived the discussion as pressure to cut expenditure (recurrent expenditure through teachers' salaries, and capital expenditure through unit costs in school construction) and identified the IF as a new set of conditionalities in the same vein as those established during the structural adjustment period. However, in 2002, the Ministry of Education was just starting the implementation of its ESP and did not want to lose any opportunity to acquire additional resources that might enable the scaling up of the Plan. So finally, it submitted a request to the FTI in line with the IF 2015 benchmark and the objective of achieving UPC in 2015. This confusion from the Government about the purpose of the Indicative Framework may have been fed by a lack of clarity on the part of the external partners. The evolution towards more flexibility in 2007 has enhanced alignment with country needs and existing procedures and its relevance. The IF benchmarks on resource mobilisation have not contributed to the increased resources to education and basic education, since Burkina Faso was already allocating more than the benchmarks, and the main constraint was elsewhere, in increasing the resources available in the budget.
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Use of the Indicative Framework
Nicaragua
Since being endorsed in November 2003, there has not been systematic and regular analysis of the IF indicators, although some of them are presented in partial form in almost all MOE analytical reports. This lack of production and analysis of the IF indicators represents a lost opportunity to progress against a common framework. The IF indicators have supported the monitoring of educational progress in the country, as they measure the main areas of progress such as enrolments, repetition and drop-outs. In order to have a complete overview, however, these indicators should be supplemented by indicators to measure quality.
Vietnam (D)
Invited in June 2002 and endorsed at the end of 2003. The Desk Study found no evidence that the IF was significantly used in dialogue between Vietnam and education donors. The 2005 PAD for Targeted Budget Support includes a reference to the fact that teachers' salaries in Vietnam, relative to GDP, were below the FTI IF benchmark. Invited to join the FTI in June 2002, and endorsed in November 2004, but not eligible for CF funding. In relation to policy focus, the ESDP III includes new indicators and targets related to NER, and primary education (Grade 5 and Grade 8) completion (whereas ESDP I and still ESDP II targets were in terms of GER). However, this was not influenced by the FTI (directly at least).
Ethiopia (D)
Uganda (D)
A number of the FTI Indicative Framework (IF) indicators have been monitored as part of the ESDP core set of indicators since the outset – albeit this is because they were identified locally as being relevant rather than because of their belonging to the set of FTI IF indicators. The coverage of the ESDP core set with regard to the FTI IF has improved over time (e.g. ESDP I and II monitored GER, whereas ESDP III monitors NER as the IF suggests), but this again was not linked to direct inputs from the FTI partnership and arose from country processes. The FTI IF indicators that are not regularly monitored to date are all those related to teachers (PTR is monitored), to instructional hours, and to the share of private enrolment. The FTI Quality Support Review in early 2008 made a number of suggestions on performance reporting in Uganda, including that the Ministry develop an ESSP Results Framework for the Plan period, with performance targets and key outcome indicators. As with the earlier FTI inputs in this area, these suggestions appear to have not yet been acted on, and the FTI has had no discernible impact in this area. Although there was an awareness of the FTI Indicative Framework (IF) indicators, these were not the main drivers of the plan. There is also no mention of the FTI in the Joint Appraisal of the plan in 2002, nor does the plan itself refer to the FTI.
Zambia (D)
The resource envelope was calculated by projecting domestic resources available from the GRZ budget and commitments by donors. In this instance the plan included specific targets for educational indicators for 2007 rather than EFA goals. The action plan for accelerating process towards UPE is the plan presented for endorsement by the FTI. Although it is based on existing documents and strategies (PRODEC, PISE, PRSP, Country Status Report), it required extensive revision of existing objectives and financing framework, in order to bring them in line with IF benchmarks, as it was understood was required by the FTI. Mali was then endorsed in May 2007.
Mali (D)
Efforts to ensure alignment with the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks led to extensive discussions on issues related to teacher remuneration, teacher training, contact hours, etc Nevertheless it should be noted that these discussions were held often before Mali sought endorsement by the FTI and not specifically in relation with the endorsement process, mainly under the leadership of the World Bank. Regarding the mobilisation of domestic resources, the FTI had a marginal influence through the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks, in particular in highlighting the need to increase the share of resources going to primary education. Regarding the other benchmark of allocation of 20% of recurrent expenditure to education, Mali had already reached the benchmark IF value. Indicators of the IF have been included to the overall monitoring framework "in order to monitor the action plan for accelerating progress toward UPE.
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Use of the Indicative Framework Invited in 2004, and not yet endorsed although preparations started in 2006.
Malawi (D)
Two reviews of the draft NESP and its financial framework were carried out partly using the FTI appraisal guidelines to provide recommendations to strengthen the NESP. The ESIP contains elements that are required for FTI endorsement. The FTI IF indicators were calculated for Malawi and compared with benchmark values in the government's 2006 Public Expenditure Review PER. Most of the IF indicators are not routinely monitored, but many (not the primary completion rate) are calculated periodically as part of analytical exercises e.g. the government's 2000 (PER). The FTI – through the appraisal process, which used the IF benchmarks as a point of reference – has contributed to an enhanced focus on the issues of completion and teacher management and motivation. This focus nevertheless initially mainly came from the 2003 Country Status Report, financed by the NETF and the WB, and carried out by the WB.
Rwanda (D)
The issue of teachers' salaries per se was not a major focus of the discussion during the appraisal in 2006 (the date of Rwanda's endorsement), since current salary expenditure per staff is around 3.3 times GDP per capita at primary level and 6 times GDP per capita at secondary level therefore in line with the IF benchmark. The IF benchmarks were used as a reference to promote a higher share of primary education in the education budget. Although local donors had long been insisting on the need to reduce the share of the education going to higher education, and key measures had already been taken by Government, the inclusion of this concern in the FTI appraisal contributed to giving it further weight. Indicators focus mainly on the output level (number of students enrolled, number of schools, number of teachers) more than on quality outcomes. Indicative Framework indicators might have been more relevant for satisfying international databases but have not been used in Moldova.
Moldova (D)
In Moldova there is no mention of the Indicative Framework in documentation relating to FTI implementation. The Country Information Form, which is submitted annually to the FTI, contains a table with a summary of indicators that is similar to that of the Indicative Framework. It is apparent that the indicators listed are neither used as targets nor collected for monitoring purposes.
C25. It is clear from the examples provided in Table C4 that the Indicative Framework has had a useful impact by focusing policy discussions (Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Ghana). The nature of this debate on specific indicators has been influenced by the situation in country when FTI was first introduced. Such discussions have also been influenced by the way in which the Indicative Framework was perceived in country and its relevance to the country context. The country examples also serve to highlight how the Indicative Framework was not used consistently to monitor performance within or across countries that had been endorsed.
F.
Universal Primary Completion (UPC) as the FTI indicator
C26. The concepts of UPC and Universal Primary Education (UPE) are often used interchangeably. However, right from the start of the FTI in the Action Plan, the importance of using UPC as opposed to UPE was stressed as key to reaching EFA. It was considered vital that children not only attended primary school but completed primary school in order to receive the quality of education envisaged by the EFA goals. Box C1 below clarifies the concepts.
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Annex C: The Indicative Frameworks and the UPC Target Box C1
UPE vs. UPC – clarifying the concepts
The terms Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Primary Completion (UPC) are often used interchangeably in casual conversation. (This was apparent in many of the interviews conducted for this evaluation.) Yet the Action Plan stressed the importance of using UPC rather than UPE as a measure of progress towards Education for All. Since children who did not complete primary school would not receive the quality of education envisaged by the EFA targets the Action Plan argued that "EFA must mean Universal Primary Completion". Whilst the concept of UPC is undoubtedly consistent with the EFA goals, it may imply a much more demanding target to achieve MDG2, since the phrase "have access to and complete" does not necessarily mean UPC by 2015 in the sense measured. It might, for example, be interpreted to mean universal access to grade 1 in 2015 by children who all subsequently complete. This would be UPC by 2021 (for a six-year primary cycle). See the GMR for 2002 (UNESCO 2002) which spells out and discusses the many possible meanings of this phrase. Formally, the Primary Completion Rate (PCR) is defined as: the ratio of the total number of students successfully completing (or graduating from) the last year of primary school in a given year to the total number of children of official graduation age in the population (this is the UN definition and matches the one used in the FTI Framework (FTI 2004a). The concept is intuitively straightforward; in practice however, the PCR is tricky to calculate because (a) of possible ambiguities in recording the number of completers (the numerator), and (b) uncertainty about the relevant population cohort (the denominator). There are also many practical difficulties in measuring UPC. These are discussed in Box C2 of this annex. C27. Under the heading "Why EFA must mean Universal Primary Completion", the Action Plan argued that this was the first time EFA progress has been measured in terms of primary completion rather than enrolment. "This new indicator61 recognizes that true and sustainable learning begins to occur only after the completion of at least 5 to 6 years of primary education of reasonable quality." It acknowledged that UPC was a tougher target than, say, achieving a 100% Gross Enrolment Rate. This might "seem like moving back the goal post in a game that already appears almost lost. And yet, this is the goal stated in Dakar and reiterated as the education target in the MDGs".62 C28. However, others involved in the collection of data and education indicators argue that UPE implies a full cycle of primary education and therefore it is synonymous with UPC. International compacts made at Jomtien (1990) and Dakar (2000) were clear about the importance of completing primary school. The framework for action at Jomtien included targets on "universal access to and completion of primary education by the year 2000" (Osttveit 2000 p3). However, the re-branding that was pushed under FTI with the new term "UPC" could be deemed necessary as many countries had since Dakar begun to focus solely on enrolments as a measure of progress (and this is still an issue today).
61
Calculated as the total number of pupils successfully completing the last year of primary school, in a given year, divided by the total number of children of official graduation age in the population. The length of the primary cycle varies from country to country. In practice, 5 years has usually been used as the basis for calculating "survival rates" etc. and making cross-country comparisons on UPC. 62 It can be argued that this is not strictly true (see Box C1 on the different interpretations of UPE and UPC). Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) C29. Table C3 above illustrates the patchy improvement on the use of UPC in Education Sector Plans in the case study countries. Even some countries that have been endorsed neglect to use UPC as an indicator within their ESP e.g. Moldova. Very few countries (Cambodia) that did not use UPC in their ESP prior to being involved in the FTI started using it as an indicator as a result of the FTI. Many more obviously looked to the Indicative Framework and its associated indicators as a necessary part of the endorsement process in order to access Catalytic Funds and so applied to varying degrees the UPC indicator prior to going for FTI endorsement e.g. Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mali and Vietnam. C30. As illustrated in Box C2 below, UPC as an indicator has developed and been used differently by different institutions. It has not always therefore accurately served to measure progress in the way that was originally intended.
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Primary Completion Rate – Issues of Definition and Data
PCR Definition The Primary Completion Rate (PCR) is defined as: the ratio of the total number of students successfully completing (or graduating from) the last year of primary school in a given year to the total number of children of official graduation age in the population (this is the UN definition and matches the one used in the FTI Framework). The concept is intuitively straightforward but in practice the PCR is tricky to calculate because of possible ambiguities in recording the number of completers (the numerator) and uncertainty about the relevant population cohort (the denominator). The UIS until recently published a proxy for the PCR under the name Gross Intake Rate to the last grade of primary. The EFA Global Monitoring Reports have been publishing a similar "Survival Rate" defined as: total number of new entrants in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the theoretical entrance age to the last grade. The number of new entrants is the total number of new children in the last grade of primary minus the number of repeaters. The latter definition is the one used by the World Bank and the FTI. Note that conceptually, the Primary Completion Rate should mean the percentage of a starting population cohort which, after allowing for deaths and migration into and out of the country, complete the primary cycle in the given country. This means that the correct denominator for the indicator should be the numbers of children of initial schoolgoing age in the year that they should have entered school. Apparent Variations in Reported Figures All education indicators published in international reports are based on figures provided by UIS. Any difference may be due to :
The use of different version of the UIS database, which is updated three times a year to provide data as timely as possible;
The inclusion of national data where no US data is available (EdStats, Unicef).
Note also that EPDC (the Education Policy and Data Center) use a different approach basing what they call PCR on retrospectively reported educational attainment among different 5 year age groups from household surveys. Measurement Problems There are some obvious technical problems with any of these definitions:
They rely on an estimate of the numbers of children in a single age year (see Note on Data Quality in Appendix I of Volume 3 (Cambridge Education, OPM & Mokoro 2010)). This does not apply to the survey-based EPDC figures, but they face a different set of issues concerning possible survey bias. (see Carr-Hill 2005a) The criteria for completing the final year may change from year to year. Children may be held back from the final grade of the primary cycle until parents or schools assess that they have a good chance of succeeding (evidence from several African countries). The age range of the cohort of students in the final year may change substantially from year to year when there has been a previous expansion (or contraction) on the intake rates; so that the extent to which it can be used to provide useful policy information is variable.
There are other practical and interpretative problems:
Tracking children who shift between schools and jurisdictions within a country to know what happens to them. The criteria for what counts as a final pass and the policy towards repetition in earlier grades may change over time so that changes in the PCR become difficult to interpret.
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Annexe D
Summaries of Country Case Studies
The summaries included in this annex do not correspond exactly to the Country Study Report Executive Summaries but have been produced as a point of referral for those who wish to understand in brief the results of the country studies and desk studies. D1
Country studies presented in this annex are: Country Burkina Faso Cambodia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nicaragua Nigeria Pakistan Yemen Ethiopia Malawi Mali Moldova Rwanda Uganda Viet Nam Zambia
Full / desk study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Full case study Desk study Desk study Desk study Desk study Desk study Desk study Desk study Desk study
Endorsed in 2002 2006 2004 2005 2003 2002 Not endorsed Not endorsed 2003 2004 Not endorsed 2007 2005 2006 Not endorsed 2003 2008
Page 101 107 111 117 123 131 137 41 149 157 161 165 169 173 179 185 189
Note: complementary information on country studies is provided in Annex K (interviewee analysis) and Annex J (financing gap). Full country case studies are available online at: http://www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/ .
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FULL COUNTRY STUDIES D2 The full country studies were carried out in order to develop greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, in the context of each country. Findings from the case studies have fed into all aspects of the evaluation but particularly to the lessons-learned. D3 Full country studies are based on the methodology outlined in the Evaluation Framework (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM 2009a). They take account of the perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and M&E, aid effectiveness) reflected in the extended logical framework for the evaluation. The country study reports document how the FTI has interacted with and contributed to country education processes. They document what key changes have taken place in the education sector over time, including trends in public expenditure and aid flows to the sector. They then identify where and in what ways FTI has made a specific contribution, and subsequently assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of these contributions. D4
D5
Country studies involved four overlapping phases: ₋
Phase 1: Preparation for the country study (including the drafting of an initial issues paper). Country teams were provided with a base of research by the core team, including documentation from the FTI Secretariat archives, a draft country timeline and relevant global level interview quotes. These inputs along with a literature review were used by the country team to produce an issues paper which was circulated to the wider team for review and comment.
₋
Phase 2: The country visit (usually two weeks in country). Country visits usually included two days outside of the capital to meet with local level representatives, teachers, parents associations and pupils. Country teams held meetings with a wide range of stakeholders, including government officials (Ministries of Finance, Ministries of Education, local government representatives), civil society representatives (parent teacher associations, teacher unions), international NGOs, and donor representatives. See Annex J for an analysis of interviews carried out.
₋
Phase 3: The country aide memoire (presented to stakeholders in country for comments) was circulated to those interviewed and their organisations to gain feedback which would help shape the country report.
₋
Phase 4: The country report.
Country study teams were usually composed of three team members.
D6 Two pilot country studies (Kenya and Cambodia) were carried out before the others, in order to provide feedback on the clarity, relevance and completeness of the logical framework. They were also used to assess the most efficient methods of proceeding for the remaining case studies, and to yield a template for the structure of the Country Study reports.
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Annex D: Burkina Faso Summary
BURKINA FASO SUMMARY Sector Context D1 The Government of Burkina Faso is striving to improve conditions of life in a nation with a rapidly rising population that currently stands at about 14 million people, of whom almost half are under the age of 15. The education system, as defined by the 2007 Education Policy Law consists of pre-primary education, primary education, post-primary education (the first cycle of secondary school, technical and vocational education and training), non-formal basic education and adult literacy, and promotes compulsory free education for children between 6 and 16. D2 The Ten Year Basic Education Development Plan (PDDEB, 2000–2009) was adopted in 1999, following a decade of growing interest in education in Burkina Faso. It aimed to achieve a Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 70% and a literacy rate of 40% by 2009. The second phase of PDDEB (2008–2010) was adopted in 2007. It aims to achieve universal primary completion (UPC) by 2020. D3 The quality of budget preparation and execution has improved significantly since 2000, both at national level and within the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA). A coordinated approach to support improved Public Finance Management (PFM) for basic education has been defined. The share of the budget going to education and primary education increased significantly in the 90s, stabilising in the last decade. Nevertheless, given the strong increase in the national budget in the 2000s this represents a significant scaling up in absolute value. Domestic education expenditure has increased from 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 to 3.7% in 2007. Analysis of expenditure per pupil illustrates the relatively high cost of primary and higher secondary, as opposed to the relative under-funding of lower secondary. Between 2000 and 2009, external resources in support to MEBA have nearly doubled, which is a sharp increase compared to the previous ten years. Table D1 Year 2002 2002
Month June October
2002 2003
November April
2006 2007
May
2008
March
2008
December
Summary Timeline of Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Events in Burkina Faso Event Burkina Faso was among the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI Partnership An evaluation of the Burkina Faso proposal was carried out by local donor representatives, under the leadership of Canada, in time for the Brussels partnership meetings in November Burkina Faso was endorsed at the Brussels Partnership meetings Following a letter from the FTI dated April there was no interaction between FTI Secretariat and Burkina Faso until 2006. Due to the "donor orphan" clause, Burkina Faso had no access to Catalytic Fund (CF) resources. During the Cairo Partnership meetings, the Government of Burkina Faso pleaded for a revision of the criteria for access to the CF The Expanded CF concept was approved, enabling the CF to support all endorsed Education Sector Plans (ESP) with insufficient funding, making the "donor orphan" clause redundant Government of Burkina Faso prepares a funding request for the CF on the basis of its newly endorsed PDDEB II (2008–2010) An amount of United States Dollars (USD) 102m endorsed by the Steering Committee, covering 2009–2011
Progress towards Education for All (EFA) D4 The primary completion rate rose from 19% to roughly 40% between 1991 and 2006/07. Despite some progress between 1994 (18.9%) and 2007 (28.7%), adult illiteracy remains a huge problem for the country, and the PDDEB 2015 target of having 40% adult literacy looks as though it will be missed. Regarding learning outcomes, preliminary results from the 2007 PASEC (Programme d‘Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN) survey seem to show a strong deterioration of Burkinabé pupils‘ performances in literacy and numeracy. The likely downturn in PASEC results between 1996 and 2007 could be related to the shift from an Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) elitist to a more universal system in Burkina Faso. Most of the 2015 EFA targets look set to be missed (except gender parity in GER) and the country is definitely off track for the achievement of UPC by 2015.
The FTI in Burkina Faso D5 The Burkina Faso request was endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meetings, on November 27th 2002. However, due to the "donor orphan" clause, Burkina Faso was not able to access Catalytic Fund resources following its endorsement. Nevertheless, two donors (European Commission and France) set up programmes "in the name of the FTI" in the years following endorsement. D6 Subsequent to the revision of the criteria for access to Catalytic Fund financing in 2007, the Government was persuaded to prepare a new request on the basis of its newly endorsed PDDEB II (phase 2 covering 2008–2010). This second request is based on the objective set out in the PDDEB II to achieve Universal Primary Completion in 2020, and requested financial support from the Catalytic Fund in order to fill the financing gap identified for the basic education sub-sector (USD 144.9 million) for the period 2009–2011. D7 Following the positive evaluation of the request made by local donors, an amount of USD 102 million was endorsed by the Steering Committee, covering 2009–2011 through a DPO (Development Policy Operation) under the supervision of the World Bank (WB). The choice of Sector Budget Support (SBS) as an aid modality was mainly due to the combination of the fact that the WB could not participate in the pooled fund since its withdrawal in 2007 and the refusal (by Government and other local donors) that FTI funding be provided through a traditional WB project modality. The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) support will be the first full-fledged (SBS) programme for basic education, and in Burkina Faso as a whole. Table D2
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Burkina Faso
Date of endorsement: June 2002 First allocation: USD 102m endorsed in December 2008, but none yet disbursed. First disbursement planned for the second half of 2009.
Funds will be provided through Sector Budget support and will not be earmarked within the basic education budget.
FTI and the Education Sector D8 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Burkina Faso. D9 Education Policy and Planning: The FTI Indicative Framework (IF), the promotion of an education country status report (RESEN) and the use of an education financial simulation model constitute the "core FTI inputs" to help define credible education policies and strategic planning. FTI‘s focus on the primary cycle was particularly relevant in a country where enrolment and completion rates were among the lowest in Africa. The expansion to include adult literacy was also relevant to Government priorities and needs in 2002. In 2008 the extension of the areas to be covered by CF funding to the whole of basic education was consistent with current progress and a growing body of supporting evidence. Also, even though controversial, the FTI IF and related processes have been used for policy reforms in Burkina Faso. D10 Education Financing: Although no actual financing has yet been received by Burkina Faso from the CF, it is worth emphasising that throughout the evaluation team‘s meetings with 102
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Annex D: Burkina Faso Summary government and local donors, it was evident that the FTI‘s value to Government and the education sector was seen primarily as a source of finance. Between 2002 and 2006, the catalytic effect on donor aid promoted by the initiative was only marginally additional, and there have been significant delays in CF funding – with disbursements starting up to five years after the endorsement. During this period, the FTI however contributed, albeit modestly, to the improved mobilisation and use of domestic resources for basic education through enhancing the capacity of MEBA to request additional funding, and stimulating debate and reflection on the efficiency of the education budget. The choice of SBS for CF funding is also relevant in the context of existing aid modalities, the dynamics at the local level, and Burkina Faso‗s financing needs. D11 Data and monitoring and evaluation (M&E): Burkina Faso has long been familiar with collecting and using data on education for monitoring. With regard to FTI inputs, the FTI appraisal was not used to highlight the country's "data gap" and therefore, it does not set out any areas for improvement in M&E. It is said that the FTI does not create any additional reporting requirements by Government or the donors since, according to interviewees, no regular reports are exchanged between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat in Washington, However, the lack of such informational exchange between Burkina Faso and the FTI Secretariat may be symptomatic of a wider problem with communication. D12 Capacity: The FTI inputs in terms of capacity development were of three types: i) discussions on Capacity Development (CD) issues during the preparation, negotiation and appraisal of fast track strategies to achieve UPC; ii) the activities supported by the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) (and its predecessor the Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF)); and iii) the dissemination of FTI guidelines on capacity development. The contribution of FTI to building capacity in the sector, beyond the initial identification of critical CD issues, appears to have been negligible. The activities targeted under NETF and EPDF were relevant for Capacity Development as they principally related to the management of education service delivery, but they have mainly supported upstream activities and few downstream activities, in the absence of a Government plan for CD in the education sector. The FTI CD guidelines were shared, but have not been used by the local donor group (LDG) to engage with education ministries for sustainable capacity development. FTI‘s most effective contribution has been the part-funding of the 2007–09 RESEN which was intended as a capacity-building exercise in data analysis and not simply a fast exercise to produce the required data. D13 Aid Effectiveness: The FTI inputs in terms of aid effectiveness were of three types: (i) negotiation of the requests and evaluation by the LDG; (ii) discussion on aid modalities in 2008 and preparation of the DPO; and (iii) pilot on the Donor Indicative Framework and study on aid effectiveness in the education sector in Burkina Faso. Aid predictability in the sub-sector remains very limited, both in the short and the medium to long term. Between 2002 and 2009, the catalytic effect on donor support was minimal. FTI CF support is a positive example providing funding for three years (in reality, closer to two and a half years). It is currently the only information MEBA has on aid committed for 2011. Nevertheless, it also contributes quite negatively to short term predictability. The experience of Burkina Faso demonstrates the influence of having the World Bank as supervising entity on the choice of aid modalities. First, the WB seems unable for internal fiduciary reasons to contribute to pooled funds. No other donor is willing to take on the role of supervising entity due to lack of capacity in the field. As a consequence FTI funding in such a mechanism is ruled out. While second, the WB‗s Sector Budget Support modality (Development Policy Operation) requires substantial preparatory work. D14 Cross-Cutting Issues: FTI inputs on cross-cutting issues consist of the IF indicators; the guidelines for appraisal of the Education Sector Plans (ESP) by the LDG; the funding of the RESEN in 2007–2009 and the financial support indirectly through FTI‘s catalytic effect or directly through future CF funding. The RESEN was particularly relevant in providing hard evidence and in-depth analysis of gender, income, geographical inequalities, and in particular, Volume2_Feb2010x
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Overall Conclusions D15 Relevance: The focus on UPC, on primary then basic education, and on the efficiency of education expenditure are all relevant. Added to these key factors is the choice of SBS for CF support. However, the rigid approach to the IF and the 2002 definition of the financing gap led to a missed opportunity to strengthen education plans and their costings; the more flexible approach taken in 2008 was more appropriate. FTI inputs for capacity development and data/M&E were relevant but insufficient compared with the objectives set by the Initiative. The Capacity Development guidelines may have been relevant but have not been used as a basis to develop a common understanding of CD issues, enhance donor coordination or foster a joint approach between MEBA and education donors. D16 Accelerating progress on EFA: FTI has contributed to enhanced planning and policy reforms, catalysing an "intellectual revolution" on the way to analyse, conceive and implement a sound credible plan for primary education. It has enhanced the focus on universal primary education. Nevertheless, this contribution takes place in the context of an existing dynamic at local level (PDDEB and the reform of the education sector, the poverty reduction strategy plan (PRSP), aid coordination in support of PDDEB, PFM reforms, etc) which has constituted the main driver of accelerated progress on EFA over the past decade. Overall, it was mainly in the requirement for requests to be presented to the Partnership and the CF in 2002 and in 2008 that the FTI contributed to an acceleration of existing dynamics. D17 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: FTI has contributed to increased domestic and international resources in support of basic education, along with other major pre-existing drivers such as the Government focus on primary education from international conferences, the General Budget Support (GBS) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) focus on the social sectors. FTI has also strengthened the existing dynamic towards better aid effectiveness and donor coordination through its process of appraisal of the requests and discussions on aid modalities for CF funding. It is now leading the way in the move towards SBS and fully aligned aid modalities. The main risk is the lack of predictability of donor aid to basic education, and the risk of donors moving out of the sub-sector.
Reflections D18 In terms of recommendations to feed into the wider set of recommendations from the evaluation, the Burkina Faso case study highlights the need for: ₋
Direct communication from the FTI Secretariat to the partner country and a stronger FTI Secretariat both to fulfil this task and to provide adequate feedback and support to country level processes.
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Ensuring a broader ownership of FTI capacity development support (outside the WB); a more pro-active support to further donor coordination in addition to the FTI CD guidelines; support focused on implementation as well on preparation of plans; and long term support focused on building capacity, as opposed to shorter support focused on a specific output. Ensuring the possibility for alternative supervising entities for the Catalytic Fund, other than the World Bank, is actually considered seriously at country level. This would involve both adequate and timely support from donor HQs and further clarification and simplification of the role of supervising entities, as well as a stronger involvement of the FTI Secretariat in supporting the local donor group and providing adequate information.
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Finally, further reflection is needed on the action of the FTI to ensure better long term predictability of aid, both for the CF and for education ODA as a whole, and on the requirement for additionality of CF support. Regarding the CF in particular, better long term predictability involves a reflection on aid modalities and conditionality, on the process for renewal of CF support, and on the criteria for allocating CF funding. Regarding additionality, this would involve a closer monitoring of existing donor and government commitments to support education and basic education.
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Annex D: Cambodia Summary
CAMBODIA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Cambodia‘s population is 13.4 million, with the share of children and youth now at 61%. The public education system is organised into six years of primary schooling (grades 1 to 6), followed by three years of lower secondary (grades 7 to 9) and three of upper secondary (grades 10 to 12). D2 Donor assistance provided to the education sector between 2003 and 2007 was USD 385.6 million. Though disbursements fluctuated, they were on a slightly rising trend, increasing from USD 75.0 million in 2003 to USD 88.2 million in 2007. However, the share of aid to education in total Official Development Assistance (ODA) has declined from 13.9% to 11.2% over the same period. D3 Domestically financed education expenditure, which is used primarily for recurrent expenditures, has increased in recent years. Recurrent expenditure on education, youth and sport increased by 42% in real terms between 2003 and 2007. The Government has committed, in the National Strategic Development Plan 2006–10, to providing 60% of total government and donor resources for basic education. It has also committed and is achieving a share of the government recurrent budget for education at around 18.5% of total recurrent. Actual recurrent expenditures on education have been running at 17.1%–18.8% of total government recurrent expenditures between 2003 and 2008. D4 Policy, strategy and aid planning in the education sector is organised through a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp). In 2000–01 the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS) embarked on a policy-led reform process based on the first ESP and Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP), which continues to be the basis for education sector planning. Table D3 Year 2005
Month November November
2006 2007
November March/April May Nov/Dec
2008
December March April June October
Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Cambodia
Event Letter sent from MOEYS to Unicef expressing the desire to join the list of FTI countries The Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) agree to investigate the financial implications of endorsing the proposal for Cambodia to join FTI ESWG endorsed the Cambodian ESP 2006–2010 As part of pre-FTI activity, international partners submitted a request for shorter term CF funding through the lead donor, based on Cambodia‘s absorptive capacity Cambodia applies for USD 57.4m grant to FTI Steering Group. The grant was in principle approved by FTI. MOEYS departments with technical assistance (TA) support prepare detailed proposals for CF activities Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) drawn on for various needs World Bank appraises final CF Programme Document, completing its own appraisal component for delivery to FTI Secretariat FTI Secretariat approves Cambodian proposal for USD 57.4m Country FTI CF Grant becomes effective First disbursement of FTI Grant
Progress towards EFA D5 Progress towards EFA in some areas has been substantial. Net admission even in remote areas has increased from below 50% to over 70% between 2000–2006, but key areas of concern remain the high dropout and repetition rates especially in the early primary grades and in the more remote provinces. However, pupil-teacher and pupil-class ratios fell in the period 2000–2006.
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The FTI in Cambodia D6 At the end of 2005, MOEYS sent a letter to Unicef, the lead donor, expressing the desire to join the list of FTI endorsed countries. This was followed by the commissioning by the donor ESWG of an appraisal of basic education during 2006, which was to form the base document for the initial application. On a parallel track, the WB Task Team Leader submitted a proposal through the WB sector manager for the use of EPDF funds during 2006 to provide TA support for a range of planning activities. D7 Early in 2007, the ESWG prepared a request for FTI CF support based on the assessment of the financing gap identified in the 2006 study, and of the sector‘s absorptive capacity. In May 2007, Cambodia formally applied for an FTI CF grant of USD 57.4 million, which was approved in principle by the FTI Steering Committee. D8 In September 2007, the WB and other Development Partners (DPs) in the education sector launched a joint mission to support the MOEYS in the final preparation of the proposal for the utilisation of the grant. In December 2007, the findings of the financial management and procurement assessments were disseminated by the WB, with the fiduciary reviews giving Cambodia a high risk rating. Discussions on the sensitive issue of the financing modality reached decision point in the early part of 2008. There were two diametrically opposed views. One promoted by the European Commission (EC), was for the use of budget support and government systems for the financing modality. The EC had been providing sector budget support to education for a number of years without fiduciary problems. The other view articulated by the WB was that the financial and procurement assessments had identified critical risk levels. After a period of intense and sometimes traumatic discussion, a parallel aid modality was adopted. D9 The proposal for the utilisation of the USD 57.4 million for the three year CF programme was approved by the FTI Secretariat in April 2008. In June 2008, the Country CF Grant became effective and the first disbursement was released in October 2008. D10 Early perceptions prevailing on both the Government and DP side were that FTI was essentially a source of funding for the purpose of fast tracking the implementation of UPC. There was little awareness of the aid effectiveness goals of FTI. Even today, there is a surprising lack of awareness, especially on the donor side, which reflects badly on interactions between FTI, some donor headquarters and donor country offices. Table D4
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Cambodia
Date of endorsement: 2006 First allocation: October 2008 – First disbursement of FTI grant (USD 57.4m)
63% of CF project funds were allocated for building new schools or replacing incomplete schools, construction funds for district education offices. Remaining funds used for scholarships, classroom quality improvements, training and classroom materials.
FTI and the Education Sector D11 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Cambodia. D12 Education Policy and Planning: The preparation of the FTI project was carried out through existing education sector processes and institutions which pre-date FTI engagement in Cambodia by several years. The process of planning the CF project did not lead to any noticeable improvements in the existing policies and processes. Where improvements are 108
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Annex D: Cambodia Summary taking place post-FTI, they are attributable to the processes that were already in place, and not to FTI. FTI inputs were consistent with country and policy needs as reflected in the ESP/ESSP and EFA priorities. However, FTI design should have taken a broader view of the results framework which would have prioritised systematic capacity building and government ownership issues. FTI has contributed to the participation of key education stakeholders in policy setting and planning processes, and to access to and quality of primary education among vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Micro and macro level planning and policy dialogue would have benefited from additional guidance from FTI on education policy and strategy formulation. D13 Education Financing: FTI finance inputs were provided exclusively through EPDF and CF grants. FTI CF funds will help close the financing gap for UPC, and stakeholders (government and donors) considered the CF finance package to be reasonably balanced in terms of dealing with access and quality issues. EPDF funds were used for a range of supportive planning and policy including the preparation of the FTI CF project planning document, and the strengthening of policy dialogue on the education of children with disability. It is too early to judge whether the FTI funding will lead to funding additionality. However, there are signs of a reverse trend with one major donor (the US) curtailing one of its projects because of availability of FTI funding. The FTI CF grant has contributed to the short term predictability of funding to the sector. However, the long term is not predictable since there is no indication for Cambodia as to what will happen to FTI funding after 2010. This is particularly serious where operational activities are being funded by FTI. D14 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: Data collection and monitoring mechanisms pre-date FTI intervention (e.g. the Education Management Information System (EMIS) and the Aid Management Information System (AMIS)). Therefore, Cambodia did not require major FTI inputs for the development of an EMIS. CF inputs are focused on scaling up existing programmes requiring further support. They will facilitate decentralised education management as well as the inspectorate of education to function more effectively, both from a pedagogical and a financial perspective. The long-term influence of FTI will depend on whether data that are being collected with FTI resources are utilised, and whether the data and M&E systems of the FTI CF project are fully integrated with government systems and harmonised with DPs. D15 Capacity: Institutional development and capacity building is one of the three components of FTI support. The focus of CD in the FTI CF project is on the weaker parts of the programme, i.e. financial management, and programme planning and management processes where improvements had already begun. Implementation activities supported by the FTI CF are being carried out through the regular departments of MOEYS, with the exception of the financial management function. The fact that CD planning has been seen as a separate process from operational planning reduces the efficiency of CD processes, as does the failure to adopt an holistic approach to CD. FTI could be a catalyst for the integration of DPs contributions to broader CD, but currently the FTI project seems relatively divorced from these higher goals. D16 Aid Effectiveness: Cambodia had a reservoir of good aid management practices on the ground before the advent of FTI. The ESP and ESSP are well established, and widely understood and accepted by DPs and other stakeholders, as providing a sound, country-led, sector-wide framework for aid alignment. There was no review of these long standing frameworks as a result of FTI, nor was it necessary. While FTI activities have been in line with principles of better aid management, FTI has had little influence on developing the aid effectiveness agenda, or on sector dialogue, harmonisation, accountability, and key aspects of alignment. FTI aligned its assistance with the ESP and ESSP and worked through the institutions which facilitated joint planning, monitoring and mutual accountability of the sector. By doing so, FTI helped maintain the progress towards UPC. However, by-and-large the aid effectiveness systems were in place prior to FTI, and have not evolved in response to it.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) D17 Cross-Cutting Issues: FTI support to cross-cutting issues was through support to the ESP/ESSP framework, which was therefore supportive of and relevant to the policy adopted by the government. Gender, inclusion and disability have been a relevant FTI focus. EPDF monies have also been used to support policies and strategies for dealing with vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
Overall Conclusions D18 Relevance: FTI supports a set of priorities that were identified by the Government and supported by other donors prior to FTI. These priorities are set out in a coherent five year planning framework, the ESP, and are complemented by the longer term EFA strategy and the annual ESSPs. These planning frameworks, which provided FTI priorities, are consonant with the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). The FTI CF project will make a significant contribution to closing the financial gap for UPC/EFA. The process of deriving the FTI CF project design and aid modality, had limited relevance to the broader aid effectiveness agenda. Thus, while FTI supported the needs and priorities of Cambodia from a policy perspective, it did not contribute to enhancing or strengthening progress towards a full SWAp. The relevance of FTI was also potentially reduced because it was understood by many to be essentially a funding source. D19 Accelerating progress on EFA: Under the FTI process neither the ESP nor the ESSP improved micro-level planning nor developed the broader macro agenda issues. Despite the lack of a coordinated approach to capacity development in the Ministry, FTI did not step in. This was a lost opportunity, especially in view of the recently produced FTI CD Guidelines that could have facilitated this process. FTI is expected to make an important contribution by providing resources to priority areas. However, there is strong concern about issues of continuity and sustainability as the current funding line will expire in 2010, and there are no clear indications of what will happen after this. D20 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: When FTI became part of the education landscape, significant resources had already been mobilised by Cambodia‗s DPs. The RGC has been firmly committed to providing resources for education. FTI is relatively young in Cambodia, and so far, there is no evidence of a catalytic effect of the FTI endorsement process whereby other donors expect to increase their financial support. There is no strong evidence that FTI has helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies in line with the Paris Declaration ideals. Whilst the FTI endorsement process has supported existing policy, priorities and processes in general, there is evidence that FTI may be working against some of the key principles in the Declaration which it seeks to promote.
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Annex D: Ghana Summary
GHANA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Free, compulsory, Universal Basic Education has been a constitutional right in Ghana since 1992, however the first comprehensive education sector plan was not implemented until 2003, when the development of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) informed the ESP 2003–2015. The four main areas of focus of the ESP include equitable access to education, quality of education, educational management and science, technology and TVET. A key policy decision resulting from this was the 2005 Grant capitalisation scheme, which saw the replacement of fees from basic education with the provision of per capita grants for all basic education schools as part of a wider decentralisation strategy. D2 In 2004 the Education White Paper was published, which proposed the extension of universal and compulsory basic education to include two years of kindergarten, whilst creating a more inclusive second cycle. In an effort to address these recommendations, the 2007 New Education Reform set a target of Universal Basic Completion by 2015 and by 2020 for all Junior Secondary School graduates to have four years of senior high school. D3 Recent developments include the passing of the 2008 Education Act, which calls for the establishment of independent inspectorate, curriculum and assessment bodies. Furthermore a revised Education Sector Plan is currently being developed, for the period 2010–2020. The focus of the plan is set to shift the emphasis from basic education to senior high schooling and TVET. Table D5 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Ghana Year 2002
October November November
Event Ghana is invited to join FTI. Ghana accepts letter of invitation from the FTI Secretariat. Ghana puts together a first draft of the proposal for inclusion into FTI. Ghana submits application for FTI endorsement to the FTI Secretariat. Development Partners‘ appraisal of FTI proposal submitted by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Ghana redrafts proposal for inclusion into FTI based on recommendations from development partners and the Secretariat. Final version of Ghana‘s proposal submitted. Development partners endorse Ghana‘s Education Sector Plan. Catalytic fund strategy committee allocate USD 8m to Ghana to support basic school text books, teacher initiative scheme and monitoring and supervision. Grant capitalisation scheme: the replacement of fees from basic education with the provision of per capita grants for all basic education schools as part of a wider decentralisation strategy. Ghana receives official notice from the FTI Secretariat to notify the government of a grant allocation of USD 8m. Ghana signs grant agreement for CF First tranche of year one allocation is disbursed. Entire USD 4m used for the procurement of textbooks. The strategy committee confirmed the second year allocation of USD 11m for Ghana. Ghana requests the release of the second tranche of year one allocation for the procurement of motorbikes, bicycle for teachers, teachers‘ accommodation and motorbikes for circuit supervisors. Ten Year Work Plan for Education of 2006: highlights the need for obligatory education for all children for 11 years, for quality and efficiency in the delivery of education services, and to bridge the gender gap in access to education. Ghana receives official notification that USD 11m has been approved for 2006. Second tranche of year 1 allocations made. USD 4m disbursed. Ghana draws up a proposal for the use of year two allocation focusing on equitable access to education and quality of education. Ghana receives an official letter from the World Bank on behalf of FTI, notifying that the grant allocation of 11m will be paid in two tranches. Minister Owusu Ankomah is invited to the 4th FTI partnership meeting in Cairo. First tranche of year 2 allocation disbursed (USD 6m). CF Committee decide to top up Ghana‘s Year 3 allocation as requested to reach USD 14m.
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2003
2004
Month June July August September November January February March November
2005 February February May July December 2006 January February April July
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2008 2009
Month
May September February
Event The New Education Reform addresses White Paper recommendations, setting target of Universal Basic Completion by 2015, and by 2020 for all Junior Secondary School graduates to have four years of senior high school. Ghana is selected as a member of the steering committee. Second tranche of year 2 allocation is made (USD 5m) Ghana informed that USD 7.1m of year three grant is available and that a remaining amount of USD 6.9m is expected to come in one last tranche. The development of ESP 2010–2020 is under way. The focus of the plan is set to shift the emphasis from basic education to senior high schooling and TVET.
Progress towards EFA D4 Overall progress towards the EFA goals is mixed in Ghana. On the positive side, regarding the EFA goal of expanded early childhood education, there is a good chance that the target of providing kindergarten for all children by 2015 may be achieved, with the Gross Kindergarten Enrolment Rate standing at 89.9% in 2007/08. Furthermore, with 88% of students completing Primary 6 (P6) in 2007/2008, there has been significant progress towards UPC by 2015. Despite these encouraging trends, other EFA targets look set to be missed. A literacy rate of 61.7% of adults in 2006/07 presents a serious handicap as Ghana attempts to develop a skills-based economy. Also although gender parity is within sight in basic education, it remains true that girls are less likely to complete both primary and junior high schools than boys. Quality problems are severe in Ghana‘s education sector; in 2007 a mere 1 in 4 of children who reached P6 were achieving a proficiency in English, and 1 in 10 in Mathematics.
The FTI in Ghana D5 Ghana was among the first 18 countries to receive an invitation to join the FTI partnership in June 2002, which it accepted in July that year. The ESP 2003–2015 was finalised by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports in May 2003, focusing on equitable access to education, quality of education, educational management and science, technology and TVET. By November 2003 Ghana had submitted its application for endorsement to the FTI Secretariat. D6 FTI‘s impact on Ghana has been primarily through the provision of CF financing. To date, Ghana has received three allocations from the Catalytic Fund Committee totalling USD 33.2m. Of this, USD 19m has been disbursed, the complete amount of the first two allocations. The modality chosen for the disbursement of the first two allocations from the CF, although notionally quick in disbursing, was strictly project-based and earmarked for specific procurements through the Funds and Procurement Management Unit of the MOE. It was decided at the November 2006 FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Meeting, that Ghana‘s Year Three allocation would be topped up by USD 3.2m, to reach USD 14.2m. D7 In December Ghana received the official confirmation from FTI that the Year Three allocation had been increased to USD 14.2m, but at the same time the CF SC requested more information on education indicators and the coverage for the financing framework. There appears to be no record of a response on either of these issues, and as of June 2009 the Year Three Allocation has not been disbursed. D8 There is no systematic information on EPDF support to Ghana or a definitive list of expenditures however estimates of EPDF spending on behalf of Ghana have been in the region of USD 405,000 to date. Currently EPDF is supporting the development of a new ESP to cover the period 2010 to 2020.
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Annex D: Ghana Summary Table D6
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Ghana
Date of endorsement: March 2004 First allocation: December 2004, USD 8m Disbursed USD 4m in May 2005, Disbursed USD 4m in February 2006
The first disbursement was spent on textbooks for deprived regions. The second disbursement was used for the procurement of motorbikes (USD 2,314,260), bicycles for teachers (USD 331,200), teachers‘ accommodation (USD 1,052,500), and motorcycles for circuit supervisors (USD 481,350).
Second allocation: January 2006, USD 11m Disbursed USD 6m in November 2006 Disbursed USD 5m IN September 2007
Financed equitable access to education (60%) and quality of education (40%).
Third allocation: December 2006, USD 14.2m. Disbursement pending.
Procurement of textbooks and other learning materials to reflect revised curriculum, training of teachers, provision of teacher incentives for deprived areas, rehabilitation of classrooms, furniture
FTI and the Education Sector D9 This evaluation examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Ghana. D10 Education Policy and Planning: There is no evidence that FTI processes and activities supported the strengthening of policy and planning for EFA and UPC at country level. The ESP was already being developed in early 2003 and so could easily be used as the basis for the FTI proposal. The process of scrutiny by development partners (DPs) and their subsequent feedback, led to an early allocation from the CF, but very much on the back of the ESP. FTI made very little tangible contribution to policy and planning at that time. The possible exception to this is the emphasis on benchmarking that FTI promotes, as the practice has gradually become very visible standard practice for MOE in relation to reporting on targets. D11 Education Financing: Aid commitments to basic and primary education in Ghana have increased since endorsement but only sporadically; donor support increased slightly in importance in 2004 and 2005, but in 2007 it represented 6.8% of the total, consistent with shares seen in the period prior to FTI. As a result there is no clear FTI effect. Furthermore, it cannot be concluded that FTI supported financial management in the country because the modality selected for fund disbursement was essentially project-based and financial management systems were supported by other, non-FTI programmes. It was reported that the FTI financial simulation model was used in the development of the ESP 2003–2015; however it is not now in regular use. Overall the only major finance inputs of FTI have been the contributions of the Catalytic Fund (USD 19m disbursed) and EPDF (approximately USD 400,000). It is worth noting that the effectiveness of CF contributions has been compromised as disbursements have become increasingly late and stalled completely in 2007/08, undermining the predictability of FTI funding. D12 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: the evaluation country study team found that since 2003, there has been substantial improvement in many aspects of the M&E processes, including the decentralisation of responsibility for M&E and a more institutionalised culture of monitoring with the introduction of several monitoring and review mechanisms. However, it must be noted that these processes have occurred against the background of the ESP and other activities and are not specifically attributable to FTI. Indeed FTI has tended to "piggy-back" on existing reporting systems that already exist. Where FTI has made contributions in this area has primarily been through the Indicative Framework which has become an influential monitoring tool in the MOE. The Indicative Framework was particularly Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) important in advocating the need to align teachers‘ salaries to the recommended 3.5 times GDP. D13 Capacity Development: The FTI submission strongly identified the risks of Ghana‘s low capacity, especially in regional and district offices. It was envisaged that FTI CF resources could be used to enhance capacity at all levels. In practice the FTI CF funded activities tended to be at the margins of the system. CF funds were allocated to an incentive scheme of housing and motorcycles to encourage teachers to teach in underserved areas, and vehicles were purchased for 53 deprived districts to support the strengthening of monitoring and supervision. There have been some efforts to promote CD with EPDF funds, however these are only recent and also remain piecemeal. EPDF funds have been spent supporting work on the 2009 budget, to harmonise the ESP and the government‘s White Paper, and for preparatory studies for the next ESP (2010–2020). Ghana also participated in EPDF–funded regional activities in 2007 and 2008. Although all these contributions were relevant to Ghana‘s capacity needs, they remained rather piecemeal, and little or no contribution was made by FTI to establishing a coherent policy and approach to CD generally. Furthermore very few people were familiar with the Capacity Development Guidelines, and they certainly were not used. D14 Aid Effectiveness: Although there have been recent efforts to promote aid effectiveness in the education sector in Ghana with the introduction of regular joint reviews and Donor Partner meetings, a development partner coordinator in the MOE and a costed SWAp, none of these can be specifically attributed to FTI. The primary impetus appears to have been the wider Paris agenda. An example of this is the Sector Group in Ghana, which functions as a Local Donor Group but do not see themselves as having any particular relationship to, or origin within, FTI. Furthermore the modality for the disbursement of the Catalytic Fund is strictly project-based although flexible, and the unpredictability of funds has raised transaction costs. D15 Cross-Cutting Issues: The FTI endorsement process requires that the country plans address issues of gender equity and HIV/AIDS, and donors felt that Ghana‘s proposal dealt adequately with these issues. As has been argued, the production of the 2003 ESP and FTI submission were closely linked. Therefore identifying any influence of FTI beyond that of the effect of overall EFA profile on the creation of the ESP, is difficult. However, CF projects did promote equity of access through their focus on supporting teachers in deprived areas.
Overall Conclusions D16 Relevance: There is consistency between what FTI has sought to accomplish and Ghana‘s needs in relation to the achievement of the EFA/Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The 2003 ESP was written when the priority for the Ghana government was basic education, and this is reflected in the plan. CF resources were used in a relevant way to support components of this plan. It is possible, however that FTI will not continue to be as relevant in Ghana, as the focus of the ESP 2010–2020 is set to shift to senior high schooling and TVET. D17 Accelerating progress on EFA: In relation to progress against key EFA indicators, it is not possible to make attribution to an "FTI effect". FTI may have had an indirect influence on the development partners and Government and through them on EFA, but rarely has this influence been through direct output and so measuring it is problematic. It is true that the CF has made tangible contributions to EFA, initially by addressing a funding gap for EFA-related activities, and more recently by allowing the MOE flexibility with how they spend resources. However, this contribution has been hampered by the slow disbursement of funds and arduous programming procedures of the chosen project approach. D18 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: There is no evidence of FTI influence being effective in harnessing additional resource flows. The allocation of funds from domestic and international sources to EFA priorities has oscillated during the period of FTI engagement 114
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Annex D: Ghana Summary in Ghana, and no causality or correlation can be determined. JICA and USAID did indicate that their head offices had shown great interest in the FTI process, and that in the case of USAID this may have resulted in additional funds, but this was not representative of the general experience. Concerning aid effectiveness, the aid environment in the education sector in Ghana remains highly individualistic and uncoordinated with variety of aid instruments in use. It is likely that this will continue as the Government and development partners maintain current processes. Set against this, the role of FTI in bringing coherence seems likely to remain marginal at best.
Reflections D19 The nature of the partnership between the Government of Ghana and FTI needs to be revisited, if it is to remain relevant, effective and efficient. The study highlights a number of key issues including: The need to revise the nature and channels of communication between the Government and FTI, if FTI wishes to contribute to the dialogue about policy and planning priorities in the future. The need to review modalities employed for disbursement of funds thus far. The need for FTI to address and react to the government‘s legitimate shift from a focus on the basic education cycle towards a more rounded all sector approach, reflected in ESP 2010–2020. The need to address delays in fund disbursement, in part through a departure from what has in effect become a WB project modality, and also through a compact between FTI and the recipient government that the "rules of engagement" should not be altered during the lifespan of that country‘s funding. This could be facilitated through a change to the Supervising Entity, perhaps to one of the development partners outside the "big three" (Netherlands, UK and World Bank). The need to address capacity development in a sector-wide, coherent and comprehensive manner. Finally the need for the FTI partnership to reflect on the reasons why FTI activities in Ghana (and elsewhere) have tended to neglect the broader ambitions of the FTI and come to be narrowly focused on FTI as a discrete source of finance through the CF.
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Annex D: Kenya Summary
KENYA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Kenya is a country of 35.5 million people, of whom an estimated 16.7 million are below the poverty line, and 84% live in rural areas. The Kenya education system is organised on the basis of: eight years of primary, followed by four years of secondary and then by a minimum of four more years of higher education. For early childhood education, two additional pre-school years are specified, and English is the medium of instruction from upper primary onwards. D2 The political context in Kenya changed significantly following the victory of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the elections of 2002. The period between 2002 and 2007 saw recovery and rapid economic growth. There was a marked improvement in relations between government and donors, with an accompanying increase in bilateral ODA, from USD 276 million in 2001 to USD 777 million in 2006. D3 The new government developed an Economic Recovery Strategy, covering the period 2003–2007. In 2008, a long-term plan, Vision 2030, was launched, and a Medium Term Plan 2008–2012 was developed for implementation of the Vision. Vision 2030 highlights the need for Kenya to provide a globally competitive education system which also covers training and research. D4 In 2003, the incoming government immediately declared Free Primary Education (FPE), which had been central to its manifesto. Its policy initiatives focused strongly on the attainment of Education for All (EFA), and in particular universal primary education. An eighteen month participatory process resulted in Sessional Paper No.1 of 2005, which became the policy reference point for all subsequent planning in the sector. The Ministry of Education (MOE), supported by development partners, prepared a sector wide programme and plan, the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP), which was launched in July 2005. This became the basis for FTI endorsement in Kenya. Table D7 Year 2004
Month November
2005
March
2005 2005
July July
2005
September
2005
November
2005 2006
December November
2007 2007 2007 2008 2008
March May November June December
Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Kenya
Event Letter of information sent to Kenya from the FTI chairs – Kenya becomes aware of FTI for the first time Department for International Development (DFID) education advisor in Kenya writes to the Education Secretary updating him on the FTI process, and alerting him to a new simplified process of country endorsement Following an evaluation of KESSP, Kenya was endorsed by the FTI The Catalytic Fund (CF) Strategy Committee approved an allocation of USD 22.5m. Following a revised assessment of the country‘s financing gap, this was increased to USD 24.2m A Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) was agreed between the International Development Association (IDA), DFID, and the Government of the Republic of Kenya (GOK) A formal letter of agreement was issued by the World Bank for a single tranche of USD 24.2m th The single tranche of USD 24.2m was disbursed, 30 of December At the FTI Partnership meeting in Cairo, it was agreed to top up the year three allocation to USD 48.4m, payable in two tranches The Grant Agreement for Kenya‘s year two allocation was signed, a year behind schedule The first tranche of USD 23.7m disbursed The second tranche of USD 24.2m disbursed The first tranche of USD 24.2m disbursed The final disbursement of funds (USD 24.0m) under the three-year agreement was disbursed by 31st December
Progress towards EFA D5 The primary school completion rate (PCR) was about 80% by 2006, with a reduced drop-out rate, partly due to the improved learning environment in schools where the availability Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) of textbooks has increased substantially. The gross enrolment rate (GER) for early childhood education in 1999 was 44%; by 2006 it had risen to 49%. Relevant KESSP indicators show that from the 2005 baseline for primary net enrolment rate (NER) of 83%, the 2006 figure was 86.5%, while the PCR had fallen from 77.6% in 2005 to 76.5%. At the same time the pupil:teacher ratio had worsened from 43:1 in 2005 to 50:1 in 2007. In terms of progress towards EFA objectives for primary education, the 2009 Global Monitoring Report ranks Kenya in 100th place out of 129 countries on its EFA Development Index. Kenya is highlighted as one of a small number of countries (along with Ethiopia, Mozambique and Senegal) which have sharply increased the share of gross national product (GNP) invested in education and also seen significant declines in the numbers of out-of-school children.
The FTI in Kenya D6 Kenya was not amongst the first countries to apply for endorsement by the FTI, and there is no mention of the country in any of the FTI documentation prior to 2005. Senior civil servants first became aware of the FTI at the High Level Group meeting on EFA in Brazil in late 2004. However it seems clear that Kenya‗s application to the FTI in 2005 was closely linked to the completion of the KESSP in the first half of that year, and the understanding and knowledge of the FTI mechanisms which had been acquired by the lead donor in the sector (DFID at that time) and the World Bank lead economist for the education sector. D7 Following an evaluation of the KESSP, Kenya was endorsed by the FTI in July 2005 as is required by FTI protocol. A financing gap of USD 22.5 million was identified. A Joint Financing Agreement was then agreed in September 2005 between the IDA, DFID and GOK. This initially covered funding through DFID, World Bank and the FTI CF. All FTI CF support has been disbursed through the Joint Financing Agreement. D8 In July 2005 the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee approved an allocation of USD 22.5 million for Kenya. This was later increased following a revised estimate of the country‗s financing gap by the local donor group. This was followed by a formal Letter of Agreement from the World Bank in November 2005, for a single tranche of USD 24.2 million, which was duly disbursed on December 30, 2005. The support was extended to three years in 2006. In that year Kenya requested a further USD 85.4 million from the CF to fill its estimated financing gap for that year. Following long discussions, Kenya‗s year two allocation was doubled to USD 48.4 million, payable in two tranches. At the FTI Partnership meeting in Cairo in November 2006, it was agreed to top up the year three allocation to USD 48.4 million, also payable in two tranches. The final disbursement of funds under the three-year agreement took place in December 2008. The total amount disbursed to Kenya over the 2005/06–2008/09 period is currently USD 121 million. No further allocations appear to be planned for Kenya to date.
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Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Kenya63
Date of endorsement: July 2005 th
First allocation: 30 December 2005 A single tranche of USD 24.2m disbursed
SIMBA (School Instructional Materials and Book Account) (part of the KES 2.578 billion of capitation grants)
Second allocation: 2007 The first tranche of USD 23.7m disbursed in May The second tranche of USD 24.2m disbursed in November
SIMBA (part of the KES 3.311 billion tranche of capitation grants) SIMBA, ECDE Community Support Grant, Primary School Infrastructure, Special Needs Education, HIV/AIDS SIMBA, ECDE Community Support Grant, Primary School Infrastructure, Special Needs Education, HIV/AIDS School-level bank accounts
Third allocation: 2008 The first tranche of USD 24.2m disbursed in May The second tranche of USD 24.0m disbursed in November
FTI and the Education Sector D9 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Kenya. D10 Education Policy and Planning: In the period before the introduction of FTI support, there had been intense activity in education policy formulation and planning. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2005 and the KESSP were in preparation at the same time, and the possibility of FTI financial support came just as the KESSP was ready to be appraised, so that a dual process took place of KESSP appraisal for GOK and donor support and a "light touch" appraisal for the purposes of FTI endorsement. It is therefore not possible to state that FTI made a material contribution to the improvement of policy formulation and the generation of an education sector plan. Rather, the FTI CF was used as a valuable funding mechanism to supplement other resources in order to implement the existing KESSP. Considering the very strong alignment between KESSP and FTI objectives, the contribution of the CF may be judged as highly relevant to the requirements and aspirations of Kenya. D11 Education Financing: The FTI has supported the existing modes of funding by contributing CF resources to the pooled fund without putting in place new systems specific to the CF resources. The FTI has also supported the existing financial monitoring and reporting processes. Disbursements from the CF have enabled the total pool of resources in the KESSP to increase. GOK has been able to disburse FTI CF resources swiftly because of its existing system of school bank accounts, into which resources are transferred directly from the centre, reducing/minimising leakage (however this system was not set up specifically for FTI). FTI CF resources have made a substantial contribution to external financing of the sector, but they have not noticeably catalysed additional resources from development partners. The long-term availability of CF resources and of other aid remains uncertain. D12 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: Both the FTI endorsement process and subsequent monitoring and review arrangements for the FTI CF resources were integrated with the design of KESSP. The KESSP framework for analysis and subsequent M&E included a number of the indicators included in the FTI Indicative Framework, but the Indicative Framework as such did not feature. The only report specific to the FTI CF is one short report per tranche which shows what FTI CF resources have notionally been spent on, this was deemed adequate due to the 63
CF disbursements are recorded against the expenditure items shown. However, this is part of a Joint Financing Agreement within which funding is fungible, and the Catalytic Funds may equally be seen as part-financing of the entire KESSP. Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) KESSP reporting. The FTI CF did not directly contribute to the KESSP investment programmes (IPs) relating to M&E, though the additional resources in the pooled fund may be considered to have increased the total amount of funding available to all IPs, including those of M&E and the EMIS. D13 Capacity: It is not clear that FTI has added much to capacity building in general, although the way that KESSP works mainly through existing Kenyan structures is commendable. There have been difficulties in developing and implementing a coherent plan for capacity building. Capacity building and technical assistance (TA) plans are drawn up annually but appear to be delivered in a somewhat ad-hoc manner. The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) is not well known or understood. However, an unspecified number of senior MOE staff and others appear to have participated in regional activities. D14 Aid Effectiveness: The aid effectiveness agenda in Kenya pre-dates the FTI, and is structured around the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), eventually agreed in 2007. Education is seen as a model sector for harmonisation and alignment, and is the only ministry implementing a SWAp in Kenya. A number of donors entered a Joint Financing Agreement with Kenya in 2005 (as mentioned above), and the funds allocated by the CF were also included. The CF has contributed around 50% of the total pooled funding to date. FTI CF funds have been disbursed in support of KESSP and FTI is seen as following (and encouraging) good aid effectiveness practices in disbursement and implementation. There is scope for significant further progress in implementing the commitments of the Paris Declaration (PD), but at the same time, the gains in aid effectiveness that are being made could be threatened by any deterioration in standards of public financial management, or by political instability. D15 Cross-Cutting Issues: FTI support to salient cross-cutting issues (equity and inclusion, gender, HIV/AIDS) has mainly been through its overall support to KESSP, which addresses them all, and has a number of investment programmes focused on them. Kenya has an exceptionally well developed education sector strategy for HIV/AIDS, and the attribution of some FTI funds to this investment programme may have helped to prioritise it. There remains a general concern that the cross-cutting issues reflected in KESSP have not been as well-funded as other investment programmes.
Overall Conclusions D16 Relevance: The evaluation concludes that FTI support has been highly relevant both to Kenya's needs and strategies and to the objectives of the FTI partnership. Because KESSP is sector-wide in scope there has been no question of FTI's focus on universal primary completion distorting Kenya's overall broader strategy for EFA and education generally. D17 Accelerating progress on EFA: The FTI CF has provided a major share of external support to KESSP during the years it has been operational, and has thereby helped to boost Kenya's efforts towards EFA. D18 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: The volume of CF resources deployed was substantial, both as a proportion of all CF resources and as a share of external financing for KESSP. However, there is little evidence of a catalytic effect whereby FTI endorsement led other donors to increase their financial support to basic education in Kenya. Rather, the efforts of the two existing major donors in the sector (DFID and the World Bank) in supporting the development of KESSP while drawing on their engagement with FTI at a global level made the endorsement process much smoother. The momentum which FTI gave KESSP, along with the JFA, may have encouraged some donors to pool resources to the education sector, but there is no evidence that the total amount of ODA increased.
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Reflections D19 In many respects, the way in which the FTI CF funding has been integrated into the KESSP is a good example of how Paris Declaration principles can be promoted through appropriate aid mechanisms. At the same time, there is a challenge to clarify FTI rules and procedures to make its operation less dependent on the energy of specific individuals. It would also seem desirable that when CF funding is given in support of a specific plan, that FTI CF Steering Committee should either commit to supporting that plan throughout its intended period, or should develop an exit strategy, which is articulated in conjunction with the recipient country government and the local donors.
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Annex D: Mozambique Summary
MOZAMBIQUE SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Mozambique‘s constitution states that education is a right, as well as a duty, for every citizen. As such, the National Education Policy (1995), set the goal of providing universal basic education. D2 The main planning document in Mozambique is the Five-Year Plan, which is operationalised by the country‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Mozambique has so far developed two such papers, PARPA I (2000–2005) and PARPA II (2006–2009). PARPA II is divided into five pillars which cover the macro-economy and poverty, governance, economic development, human capital and cross-cutting issues. The fourth pillar includes education and informs the development of Mozambique‘s education sector plans. D3 Mozambique has had two education sector plans, Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 1999–2005, and the Strategic Plan for Education and Culture (PEEC) 2006–2010/11. Whilst ESSP focused on access, quality and capacity building, PEEC is more comprehensive covering the whole education sector, reflecting the government's commitment to EFA and the MDGs. D4 On account of progress made by ESSP in access, the PEEC provides more attention to quality and equity, by improving the curriculum, the facilities and the capacity of teachers. Notably the PEEC aims to mainstream special education, through teacher training. Another area of focus of the PEEC is post-primary education, for which demand is growing as primary education improves. It is envisaged that this demand will be met by expanding access to secondary education, reformed secondary school curriculum, improved TVET responding to labour market demands, and development of computer skills for secondary school students. The PEEC also includes strategies to address gender disparities and HIV/AIDS, both of which adversely affect education in Mozambique. Table D9 Year 1998
Month
2000 2001 2002
June November August
2003 2004 2006
September March March April
May 2007
April May
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Event ESSP developed, to cover the period 1999–2005. This was central to Government efforts to boost economic and social development. Government signs a new Five Year Programme (2000–2004) and a Country Assistance Strategy with the World Bank. Mozambique‘s first PRSP developed and implemented, Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) to cover 2001–2005. The FTI Secretariat sent a letter to the government of Mozambique, inviting them to join FTI. Government of Mozambique expressed interest and agreed to submit a country proposal by November 2002. In-country review of FTI proposal where donors and the FTI Secretariat made initial recommendations. Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with several financing agencies to establish an Education Sector Support Fund, FASE, which became operational during 2003. The Government began a formal revision of the ESSP to plan for the period 2004–2008. The Ministry revised the proposal (following donor recommendations) and resubmitted to FTI. Mozambique is endorsed. FTI Progress Report of Mozambique‘s proposal. A second PARPA was approved, covering 2006–2009. Strategic Plan for Education and Culture (PEEC) approved to cover 2006–2010/11, replacing the ESSP. Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Mozambique and donors, not including WB, regarding a joint financing agreement for the Education Sector Support Fund. Head of in-country donors in Mozambique sends letter to FTI asking for funding for country‘s financing gap. The Mozambique CF allocation was approved on the basis of filling the financing gap
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Month
July December 2008
August September
Event estimated at USD 79m. Disagreement on modality with WB refusal to use FASE under its current guise. Procurement and FM assessment for the education sector carried out. Lead donors in Mozambique wrote to the Chair of the Strategic Committee FTI Catalytic Fund to request support in clarifying FTI guidelines and assistance in resolving the modality matter. Issue of channelling mechanism resolved after intensive negotiations between WB, Government and Donors, WB will sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with an agreed Annex and channel the CF to FASE in 3 annual releases in 2008, 2009, and 2010. FASE bilateral donors write to the CF Strategic Committee regarding the Channelling of FTI funds, pointing out the implications of the World Bank funding through FASE for aid effectiveness and the confusion over rules and procedures from the Catalytic Fund Committee.
Progress towards EFA D5 In terms of progress towards EFA, Mozambique has demonstrated significant achievements, although the challenges are still huge. From independence in 1975 onwards, Mozambique made notable progress towards universal primary education, but many of these gains were threatened during the period of war from 1982–1992. Despite this set back, progress since 1992 indicates that the positive trend has been re-established, and commitments to universal primary education reinstated. The implementation of the first EESP resulted in significant achievements given the social and economic conditions and the efforts of post-war reconstruction. The abolition of school fees in 2005 and the introduction of a new curriculum with free school supplies meant that by 2006, the GER increased from 70% to 105%. Furthermore the primary completion rate has risen from 16% in 2000 to 46% in 2007. Gender disparities have also fallen with girls‘ access to the first grade of primary school increasing in relation to boys; the gender parity index has increased from 0.75 in 1997 to 0.94 in 2008 in EP1. Remaining challenges include that growing pupil-teacher ratio in lower primary education, which grew from 62 in 1999 to 76 in 2006.
The FTI in Mozambique D6 Mozambique‘s engagement with the FTI partnership has been in two phases. The first relates to the period 2002–2003 when the FTI proposal was prepared and gained endorsement, and the second from 2007 when Mozambique applied for additional CFs, after which there were lengthy negotiations in-country concerning the funding channel. D7 Mozambique was one of the first of the group of 18 countries to be invited to join FTI in 2002. The FTI preparation process coincided with the preparation of PEEC that included major reforms to the education sector. The primary education component of the plan was guided by FTI and the IF, although the FTI proposal was then integrated into the sector plan that was being developed. The FTI proposal was endorsed by the local education group (LEG) in March 2003, but the whole PEEC wasn‘t approved until June 2006, a delay that was caused by the institutional reorganisation of the Ministry after national elections. D8 The endorsement praised the proposal for the elaboration of a draft teacher education strategy, the action plans for addressing regional gender disparities and HIV/AIDS, as well as the plan for addressing school construction and capacity building, which were all elements that were previously missing in the education sector. D9 FTI endorsement led to the expectation in-country that there would be additional funds as a result however on this issue communications from FTI were vague, and there was uncertainty regarding whether FTI would be an additional donor. As it turned out, Mozambique was not allocated any CF resources at that time because it failed to meet the donor-orphan criterion of having fewer than four donors disbursing more than USD 1m annually. As this was
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Annex D: Mozambique Summary not the expectation in-country, when funds did not materialise until four years later, there was disappointment and the perception that expectations had been raised and not met. D10 The second phase of Mozambique‘s engagement with FTI began in 2007, when changes in CF eligibility criteria allowed all countries with FTI endorsement to apply to the FTI CF. In May 2007, Mozambique was allocated USD 79 million of CF resources. The Netherlands was then the lead donor of the education sector donor group. D11 The Ministry of Education and donors requested that the CF funds be channelled through FASE, the education sector support fund, in order to use the most aligned form of support. However the World Bank, as Supervising Agency felt that the FASE procurement procedures prevented them from using it under the World Bank regulations. Although the World Bank was a major GBS donor, GBS was classified as a development policy loan. However lending through FASE was a Specific Investment Loan, necessitating the application of World Bank International Competitive Bidding procurement procedures. D12 The donor group and the Ministry of Education were unwilling to adjust the FASE Memorandum of understanding to accommodate World Bank procurement rules, and were reluctant to channel resources through a project modality incongruent with the Paris Declaration principles. It was suggested that the Netherlands take over as Supervising Entity and manage the funds, disbursing through FASE on behalf of the FTI, but this was rejected by Ministry of Planning and Development and the World Bank. The CF Strategy Committee and the FTI Secretariat were called upon for guidance as to how to resolve the matter but they declined to intervene, viewing the situation as an in-country matter. D13 Finally the issue was resolved through negotiations with the World Bank and the Ministry of Planning and Development. An agreement was reached in August 2008 that led to World Bank procurement procedures being used for all FASE funds above a certain threshold, as well as certain derogations from the government systems, including a technical annex on procurement added to FASE Memorandum of Understanding, the development of annual procurement plans, annual reporting on FTI disbursements, and virtual earmarking of FTI funds. Although opinions were mixed, there was a lot of dissatisfaction among education sector stakeholders regarding the outcome, with many donors feeling that the addition of the technical annex compromised alignment. The Ministry of Education were also unhappy about the additional procurement procedures. They also felt that they had been caught in the middle of the disagreement. The case of Mozambique and the dispute about the CF funds made Mozambique a cause celebre within FTI and a special session of the September 2008 FTI meeting was devoted to establishing what went wrong and what needed to be done to ensure that a similar situation did not arise again. Table D10
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Mozambique
Date of endorsement: March 2003 First allocation: May 2007, USD 79m Disbursed USD 28m in November 2008, USD 30m 2009- disbursement pending USD 21m 2010- disbursement pending
CFs have supported the sector plan and its policies to achieve UPC. As the government‘s share of the education budget mainly covers salaries, the contribution from FTI and other Donors forms a large share of overall non-salary expenditure providing infrastructure, textbooks, equipment and teacher training.
D14 The first tranche of the CF funds were disbursed in November 2008 and despite the long time spent resolving the disbursement issue, they were still received as scheduled with a payment of USD 28m. The second and third tranches are due for disbursement in 2009 and 2010.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) D15 EPDF funds of around USD 150,000 have been used for Mozambique. These have been used to provide technical assistance to undertake the assessments that required by the World Bank to allow them to channel FTI funds through FASE, and by the Ministry of Education to prepare the secondary education strategy, a study on school management and training of Ministry personnel in World Bank procurement procedures.
FTI and the Education Sector D16 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Mozambique. D17 Education Policy and Planning: Overall, the study found that FTI has had some positive influences on policy and planning in Mozambique. FTI contributed to the analysis of the financial implications of different policy options for teacher education and school construction, through the use of a simulation model which then fed into the PEEC. Through this FTI has influenced changes in teacher training which have made progress towards UPC more affordable, but the low cost school construction it influenced proved quite inefficient. Cross cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, equity and exclusion were highlighted in the FTI process in 2002–2003 and subsequently are being addressed in the PEEC. This considered, the FTI process could have given more attention to the need for safeguarding quality as education expanded. D18 Education Financing: The evaluation notes that FTI has not affected the education budget process in terms of making it more comprehensive, transparent or efficient. In terms of financing, external funding to basic education in Mozambique has increased since 2005. However, this was as a result of the donors‘ desires to support the new education sector plan through an aligned modality. It is likely that most donors would have supported the education sector plan anyway regardless of whether FTI endorsement occurred and so it is not possible to attribute any of the increased funding to FTI. The Government of Mozambique has been increasing its share of funding to the education sector over the same period, but this is because education has been a priority sector. CFs appear to have been additional to government expenditure, but not catalytic of further resources. It is noted that CFs have matched the funding gap estimated in the PEEC, which means that they have been relevant in supporting the sector plan and in turn UPC. Mozambique also received EPDF funding, which although relevant, has not always been used in line with the government‘s priorities. Finally, although CF funding through FASE has reinforced the efficiency of the pooled funding mechanism, it has also detracted from it through the derogation from government systems required by the World Bank, and the transaction costs for the Ministry of Education of additional reporting and procurement procedures. D19 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: In this area, non-FTI inputs have been more significant than FTI inputs. The main innovation related to data collection recently is a plan for improving data processing at provincial and district level, but this did not result from FTI influence. Where influence can be ascertained is in that of the Indicative Framework on the PEEC results framework; FTI negotiations coincided with the development of the PEEC and the IF influenced the establishment of some of the PEEC targets and approaches, particularly those regarding pupil-teacher ratio, gender and UPC. Although FTI has led to these improvements in reporting, there is no such evidence in terms of the data use or influence. As data are produced and used as they were prior to FTI, there is not an identifiable FTI effect on M&E. Furthermore data collected doesn‘t seem to be used for policy decision making except for establishment of goals and targets, and seems to have little influence on the planning and budget exercise. It is true that as a result of the CFs going through FASE and the World Bank being the FTI Supervising Entity, there has been more monitoring of FASE required.
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Annex D: Mozambique Summary D20 Capacity: FTI inputs to capacity development (CD) in Mozambique have been small in volume and miscellaneous in nature, and as a result have not constituted a comprehensive CD strategy. For example, although the FTI plan for Mozambique noted capacity needed for implementing the low-cost, community-based model of school construction to progress towards UPC, this issue was then neglected and no comprehensive CD strategy was developed. The use of EPDF funds for TA in the preparation of the secondary education strategy filled an obvious need and was effective. However, overall EPDF has made only a minor contribution in Mozambique, and many people were unaware of its existence as a separate source of funding. Furthermore the considerable transactions costs caused by the negotiations over the management of CFs has diverted scarce professional resources from the government and donors away from valuable discussion of policy and planning, negatively impacting CD. D21 Aid Effectiveness: FTI has not had a positive impact on the effectiveness of aid and has resulted in a reversal in aid effectiveness in the education sector. Although CF funds were channelled through the FASE pooled funds, which is the most aligned mechanism, it resulted in all FASE funds becoming less aligned with government systems. This was a consequence of using the World Bank as Supervising Entity, whose procedural regulations necessitated the derogations from government systems. Had a bilateral donor been selected as Supervising Entity, this would not have been necessary. Donor harmonisation also suffered as the disagreement over CFs created a loss of goodwill between the donor group and the World Bank and there remains a perception that the donor group no longer speaks with one voice. Furthermore, as this process captured all donor dialogue for 18 months, it was a very inefficient use of time. D22 Cross-Cutting Issues: As part of the FTI endorsement process, plans have to be assessed for their attention to gender and HIV/AIDS, in the case of Mozambique this triggered dialogue around these issues. Mozambique‘s plan included action plans for the prevention and mitigation of HIV/AIDS and how gender disparities would be addressed, which proved to be "trigger" conditions for endorsement. The CF funds used to support FASE did include activities in the area of HIV/AIDS but there was no evidence that extra funding was provided through FASE as a result of FTI influence. CF funding has also supported gender equity policies, such as improving the accessibility and safety of schools, curbing the problem of sexual abuse, promoting complete primary schools and identifying and implementing strategies to address the direct and indirect costs of sending girls to schools. It is worth noting however, that although there has been considerable improvement in gender equality indicators, the same progress hasn‘t been made in HIV/AIDS.
Overall Conclusions D23 Relevance: FTI support in Mozambique can be considered relevant in that it supports progress towards the EFA goals, which were already established as a national priority. It has had a catalytic effect on policy discussions and strengthened policies in teacher training, classroom construction and in the introduction of the concept of UPC. Similarly, the overall objectives of FTI which were aimed at increasing aid effectiveness were relevant to Mozambique, as they were in line with the objectives of the education group at country level which had been undertaking a number of initiatives in that area. However, when Mozambique was endorsed in 2003, it required extra funding to meet these goals and it was the expectation of the Ministry of Education and the donors in-country that this would follow. In this respect, FTI‘s donor-orphan funding criterion rendered the initiative somewhat irrelevant in at that time, however, by the time the clause was dropped in 2007 there was better alignment between the funding needs of the sector and what FTI was able to provide. D24 Accelerating progress on EFA: Mozambique has been making progress on EFA goals, demonstrated by the increase in the primary completion rate from 16% in 2000 to 42% in 2006. Although FTI has been assisting Mozambique in progressing towards EFA, there is little evidence to indicate that it is accelerating the process. The commitment and policies to achieve Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) EFA were already under discussion before FTI endorsement, with FTI‘s role being to support the process. It is true that in specific areas including HIV/AIDS and gender, FTI has encouraged planning for endorsement but it did not influence policy. The contribution of CFs has helped increase the scope of educational activities in conjunction with other FASE donors, but there isn‘t any evidence that it assisted in accelerating progress on EFA goals, as this additional funding didn‘t actually permit the education of more children or result in any quality improvements. Furthermore the additional procurement procedures due to CFs being channelled through FASE have slowed down the implementation of some activities in the past six months, particularly procurement of textbooks and classroom construction. D25 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: International resources from donors for basic education had been rising prior to and since FTI endorsement. This reflects donor support for Mozambique‘s new sector-wide education plan to and a willingness to channel funds through FASE. It cannot, however, be attributed to FTI, as the trend would likely have existed without endorsement. Government funds have also increased as education is identified as a priority sector, and CF resources have further contributed support to the ESP. FTI has, however, resulted in a negative impact on alignment in the sector, as although CFs are channelled through FASE which is the most aligned funding system in the education sector, FASE in 2009 is now less aligned with government systems than it was in 2006 as discussed above.
Reflections D26 A reflection of FTI in Mozambique offers many useful recommendations to ensure that some of the experiences are not repeated, particularly concerning the dispute over the funding channel for CFs.
Mozambique‘s experience of the initiative has been problematic on account of the general lack of clarity about the aims and objectives of the process. There was a strong feeling in-country that the FTI Partnership should have been clearer in their communications with the education sector in Mozambique, particularly concerning funding and disbursement procedures.
Better communication and a willingness by the FTI Secretariat to become part of the decision making process on how CF funds should be channelled would have significantly reduced the time spent by the education sector attempting to resolve the issue.
Bilaterals who had funded FTI at the global level felt they had little influence on FTI processes at the country level. This may well undermine the willingness of bilaterals to contribute to FTI and led to the perception from quite a few CPs that CFs were not relevant given that this was a vertical form of funding. They felt that the aid effectiveness agenda would be better served if those funds were channelled through bilaterals in-country either through sector support or GBS, rather than adding an additional level of complication by having global funds.
The Mozambique case identified how the World Bank, despite being a major GBS donor, could not provide support to a sector fund without using their own procurement procedures. There is a contradiction that procurement is not an issue with GBS funded through WB development policy loans, but it is an issue for specific investment loans for sector support, and this needs to be addressed.
The questioning of PFM systems by the World Bank undermined the position of donors who were trying to generate funds for FASE, by eroding their support at HQ level.
In the current aid architecture, it does not make sense to focus solely on education sector processes when these are intrinsically tied up with macro processes at the country level. Similarly attempts to leverage additional funds for primary education will not be successful when other initiatives are being undertaken in an uncoordinated way,
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Annex D: Mozambique Summary such as the European Code of Conduct. In Mozambique this is likely to result in donors exiting the education sector at the same time as CFs are ending.
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Annex D: Nicaragua Summary
NICARAGUA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 The recent history of the education sector in Nicaragua has covered two governments and distinct policies: between 2002 and 2006 and under the previous government, the 2001 National Education Plan (PNE) and the 2005–2008 Common Work Plan (PCT) were the main policy documents. From 2007 onwards (with the entry of the new government) a new plan and strategies are being developed. D2 The 2001 PNE emphasised increasing access, improving quality, promoting technological innovation, strengthening the teaching workforce, and decentralising educational management. A key priority in the PNE was the expansion of school autonomy – initiated as a pilot experience in the 1990s – which promoted decentralised decision making and management through school councils and direct grants to schools. By 2006 almost all schools in the country had become autonomous. In 2004 the PNE was replaced by the PCT and for the first time brought together the basic and secondary education plans and budgets of all key stakeholders in one planning framework. D3 In 2007, with the change of Government, the school autonomy process was abolished and free basic education declared. The Government of Nicaragua (GON) is currently developing an Education Sector Plan (ESP) and an Institutional Development Plan (IDP). The main focus at present is on eliminating illiteracy, improving the quality of education, strengthening participatory and decentralised educational management, and promoting an integrated and systems approach to education. Table D11 Year 2000 2001 2002
Month August March June October November November
2003
January February September November
2004
October November 2005 2006
December December
2007 2008
January December
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Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Nicaragua
Event First version of Nicaragua‘s PRSP published National Education Plan (NPE) 2001– 2015 published Education Participation Law approved extending school autonomy to all public schools Nicaragua invited to join the FTI partnership Nicaragua submits its EFA/FTI Country Proposal to FTI for endorsement Local donor assess the EFA-FTI Country Proposal and commit to establishing an Education Roundtable Endorsement at the FTI Brussels‘ Meeting of Nicaragua‘s strategy, donors "reaffirmed their commitment" to assist Nicaragua in achieving their goals. First official meeting of the Education Sector Roundtable Presidential Decree 71 – orders the establishment of sector roundtables in all sectors Education sector SWAP initiated Nicaragua is allocated USD 7m from CF for 2004 (disbursed in two equal tranches in October 2004 and May 2005) Common Work Plan (PCT) for 2005–8 drafted as part of the SWAp process Common Fund (PROASE) to finance PCT established by Canada and Denmark (USD 29m) World Bank PASEN project (2004–8) established (USD 15.7m) Support Programme to Education Sector Budget (PAPSE) initiated by the EC providing non-earmarked budget support linked to progress against sector goals Second FTI CF allocation of USD 7m made by CF Strategy Committee (SC) meeting in Brasilia (disbursed in two equal tranches in December 2006 and November 2007) Four year USAID project the Excelencia project begins (USD 15m) Third FTI CF allocation of USD 7m by FTI CF SC th Third FTI CF allocation of USD 7m increased to USD 10m by 4 CF strategy meeting in Cairo (disbursement pending) New Government elected, school autonomy process abolished by Ministerial Decree PAPSE disbursements frozen by EC amid concerns about lack of transparency in municipal elections
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Progress towards EFA D4 Overall the period has seen as strong focus on primary education but achievements have not been uniform. Pre-primary education has seen impressive gains, with net enrolment increasing between 2001 and 2008 from 28.8% to 55.2%. In adult literacy, important progress has also been made, mainly attributable to the literacy drive of the Government which came to power in 2007. In the last two years adult illiteracy is claimed to have decreased from 22.2% in 2007 to 4% in 2009. In primary education, enrolment progress has been more modest, a mere 4.2% increase in net enrolments since 2001, reaching 87.2% in 2008. Regarding learning outcomes the available evidence comparing 2002 and 2006 shows that performance has not improved significantly, and underscores some of the important challenges of the system. A number of key Education for All (EFA) 2015 targets look set to be missed, in particular those relating to primary completion, equitable access and quality education.
The FTI in Nicaragua D5 Nicaragua was among the first 18 countries invited to join the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) partnership, in mid 2002. To qualify for endorsement the country was asked to prepare a separate FTI Plan. This plan focussed on two sub-programmes of the PNE: the "Schooling Improvement Programme" and the "Student Scholarship Programme", both of which aimed at ensuring good quality primary education and completion. The FTI proposal itself was prepared by the Ministry of Education (MOE) over a relatively short period in the second half of 2002, with substantial technical assistance from the World Bank (WB). It was presented to local stakeholders in mid November 2002 and identified a financing gap of USD 106m for four years. D6 The endorsement itself congratulated the GON on a well-structured proposal based on a solid analytic foundation and the incorporation of the objective of education quality improvement. It also highlighted areas which would need further attention, including: teacher preparation and motivation; institutional capacity; targeting of school scholarships; and the limited budgetary capacity of the GON to respond to the expected increased demand. D7 An immediate outcome of the endorsement was the agreement by country stakeholders to form "a permanent roundtable of education donors". A few months later the GON instituted sector tables across government by Presidential Decree, officially starting Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp) in key sectors. D8 Nicaragua was formally endorsed just two weeks after the country consultation process at the FTI meeting in Brussels on the 27 th of November 2002. The expectation that endorsement would lead to an immediate increase in funding was not met. In subsequent correspondence between the MOE and the FTI Secretariat the latter committed to allocating initial funding from the FTI donor trust fund (the precursor to the Catalytic Fund (CF)) as soon as this became available, to working with existing donors to scale up support, and to identifying new donors for the sector.
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Annex D: Nicaragua Summary Table D12
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Nicaragua
Date of endorsement: November 2002 First allocation: 22 November 2003, USD 7m Disbursed USD 3.5m on 1 October 2004, Disbursed USD 3.5m on 9 May 2005
Spent on the "school food" programme (68%) transfers to autonomous centres in the Educational participation Regime (24%), IT hosting of national educational portal, incentives to pre-school volunteers.
Second allocation: 12 November 2004, USD 7m Disbursed USD 3.5m on 20 December 2006 Disbursed USD 3.5m on 30 November 2007
Financed the "Enrolment Recovery Programme" including textbooks, didactic and other fungible materials and teacher training
Third allocation: i) 2 December 2005, USD 7m – disbursement pending
Government plans to use this tranche for printing and purchase of text books as part of the curriculum reform process.
ii) 12 December 2006, USD 3m top-up – disbursement pending
D9 A first allocation to Nicaragua for USD 7m for 2004 was decided upon at the inaugural meeting of the FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee in Oslo on 22 November 2003, one year after the endorsement. A further indicative allocation of USD 7m was made for 2004, but with the understanding that these resources would be contingent upon performance. A third USD 7m commitment was made to Nicaragua in 2005, later increased to USD 10m in 2006. The Government of Nicaragua was officially notified of the availability of these USD 10m in February 2009. The WB has been the management agency for Nicaragua over the full evaluation period and the funds were disbursed through a traditional project modality.
FTI and the Education Sector D10 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Nicaragua. D11 Education Policy and Planning: Overall the study found that FTI has not influenced policy. Key policies were in place when the FTI proposal was developed, and subsequent policy changes have mainly been decided at the political level. FTI has, however, made a contribution to improving planning within the sector. This influence has mainly taken place through the establishment of the Education Sector Roundtable – which was a direct outcome of the endorsement process and assisted in the SWAp start-up and subsequent preparation of the PCT and of Annual Work Plans (POA). The process of annual planning and reviews with the donors has become well institutionalised and survived the changes in leadership in the sector and in the country. D12 Education Financing: The available data show that during the endorsement period and immediately afterwards (2002–2004) there was no increase in the allocation of public resources to either the MOE or to primary education. Rather, MOE spending, as a proportion of public revenue and GDP, increased only very marginally and primary education spending decreased in relation to public revenue. Financing of primary education, however, increased from 2005 onwards and accelerated in 2007 and 2008. However, this took place after the catalytic effect of FTI had waned and is mainly due to the political priorities of the new government. The evaluation concludes that the FTI-CF has been no more than an additional modest source of funding for the MOE and has not influenced other education financing. It was also noted that while CF allocations have been used for priority programmes of the MOE, they were not employed on the activities for which they were first designated. In addition, the procedures for disbursement and management have not been modified now that more aligned mechanisms of financing – including a donor pooled fund established in 2005 – are in place. Finally, this study found no evidence that the financial inputs through the CF have improved the predictability of
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) external financing or contributed to increasing it. Rather, the predictability of FTI funding has become increasingly elusive with disbursement delays becoming successively longer. D13 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: Overall, the case study finds that the areas where progress has taken place, in improving both data and monitoring and evaluation since 2002, in the sector are principally linked to the SWAp process and are not specifically attributable to FTI. There has been no systematic and regular analysis of the indicators of the IF after these were collected for the initial FTI proposal. This represents a lost opportunity to measure progress against a common framework, weakens MOE accountability and capacity to make global analyses of the education situation, and also points to structural weaknesses of the SWAp. Education Programme Development Funding (EPDF), which could have been used to strengthen capacity in data, monitoring and evaluation was not accessed by Nicaragua for this purpose. However, given that the majority of those interviewed consider FTI to have had a catalytic effect on the start-up of the SWAp, it can be deduced that – albeit indirectly – FTI has played a part in the improvement of data management, monitoring and evaluation which has come out of the Joint Annual Review (JAR) processes. D14 Capacity: The FTI briefly provided an opportunity for a debate on Capacity Development (CD) during the endorsement process but these issues did not receive adequate follow up. In addition, the FTI has contributed through the CD guidelines which are currently being used in the development of an overall sector CD strategy. However, capacity development initiatives continue to be fragmented over numerous projects and there is no clear shared vision on how to move forward. In addition, the selection of the WB grant modality as the aid delivery instrument for FTI CF allocations has also meant that possible indirect effects on capacity building – through the use of the national financial systems and procedures – have not been achieved. The study finds that with the exception of the two FTI inputs listed above, the most effective advances in CD have been delivered through the SWAp process. The joint working arrangements and reviews that the SWAp process entails have permitted the officials of the MOE to improve their capacities for leadership and management of the sector. The FTI contributed to these advances in that it was one of the factors that led to the establishment of the Sector Table and to the launching of the SWAp. D15 Aid Effectiveness: The FTI has contributed directly, although not exclusively, to improvements in aid effectiveness in education in Nicaragua. The coordination, dialogue, evaluation and Official Development Assistance (ODA) delivery instruments that have been developed as part of the SWAp process – although not perfect – have shown progress. Available evidence indicates that the joint working arrangements that were established under the SWAp have increased the effectiveness of aid by: a) consolidating sector ownership on the part of MOE officials; b) aligning ODA to government designed sector plans; and c) harmonising donor efforts – including common funding instruments; and d) reducing transaction costs and increasing mutual accountability through Joint Annual Reviews (JARs). FTI‘s main role in this context has been in kicking off the process of harmonisation of national level sector dialogue through the establishment of the Education Sector Roundtable, and through its contribution to increasing alignment with country policies and priorities. The FTI did not subsequently adapt itself to the changing context or grasp emerging opportunities to further contribute to aid effectiveness. D16 Cross-Cutting Issues: Equity has been a prominent cross cutting issue for Nicaragua and this is reflected in the Education Plans for the period covered by this evaluation. As a result of the FTI endorsement process, stakeholders identified the need for better coordination and established working groups to deal with specific cross-cutting issues. In this manner, FTI has had an influence on planning processes. However, there is no clear evidence that this included monitoring processes and CD on cross-cutting issues. The current changes in policy and strategies – with a much stronger focus on equity and which impact on cross-cutting issues – are the product of political commitments and cannot be attributed to FTI.
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Annex D: Nicaragua Summary
Overall Conclusions D17 Relevance: FTI was clearly relevant to the needs and priorities of Nicaragua in the early 2000s. The focus on Universal Primary Completion (UPC), on basic education, on enhancing sector capacity and on galvanising more and better harmonised and aligned support to basic education, were all highly relevant to the needs of the sector and to the importance which Nicaragua attached to SWAp processes and improved harmonisation and alignment. FTI was also particularly relevant because it provided further legitimacy and a "sense of purpose" to the EFA agenda which Nicaragua had committed to. However, the fact that FTI required a separate proposal represented a missed opportunity for the sector to examine the priority programmes identified for FTI support in the context of the sector as a whole, and to address some of the overarching issues that were critical to making progress on the important equity and capacity gaps in the sector. The initial catalytic effect with the establishment of the Sector Table as a result of the endorsement process waned quickly and key areas where FTI sought to have an influence – such as the critical area of CD – were left untouched. D18 Accelerating progress on EFA: Evidence of progress towards EFA is mixed. In the area of primary education, where the vast majority of education resources were expended (including those of the CF), there has been disappointingly little improvement over the period that FTI is active in Nicaragua. Although FTI contributed to improving planning and to a limited extent data and monitoring and evaluation processes, these mechanisms have not functioned effectively in addressing issues which arose as a result of the school autonomy process, and many of the key challenges which the sector faced in 2002 still exist today. Overall therefore, FTI has had little impact on accelerating progress on EFA. D19 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: Over the evaluation period there has been a noticeable growth in funding in primary education, although overall the budget for the education sector has not increased. This reflects funding provided by other donors through budget support mechanisms and in the more recent period, is the result of a strong government focus on expanding coverage and quality at all levels of education and a growing government budget. There is little direct evidence that this growth in funding is attributable to FTI. However, it is likely that FTI played a modest indirect role through its contribution to the establishment of the Sector Roundtable, which allowed stakeholders to come together and resulted in strengthened planning and improved aid effectiveness, including the establishment of pooled funding mechanisms through which an important part of the money targeted at basic education was channelled.
Reflections D20 The findings in this study suggest that the main catalytic effect of the FTI endorsement in Nicaragua has been on planning processes and on aid effectiveness. Through the SWAp process FTI has contributed indirectly to the modest gains in data, monitoring and evaluation. D21
This case study highlights a number of key issues, including:
The need for further reflection around what the catalytic effect of FTI can realistically be beyond the endorsement process. The need for careful reflection around the "gap filling" principle of FTI as the main motivation for joining the FTI was in fact the possibility of securing funding through the FTI-CF.
The absence of any real incentive or requirement for FTI donor partners to take responsibility for FTI at country level.
The importance of ensuring that FTI aligns with modalities and procedures as these evolve in the sector. And the critical importance of addressing the issues which have led to the delays in disbursement of FTI-CF.
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The implications of the choice of FTI CF management agent for the visibility and ownership of FTI.
The centrality of CD issues for the possible FTI effect beyond the endorsement process – i.e. the plan may be credible but, in the absence of capacity to implement it, progress will be constrained. The need for careful monitoring of policy and strategies which address equity issues needs much more serious consideration and attention, as these are one of the key factors in Nicaragua failing to meet UPCFTI partners at country level need to place monitoring and accountability at the centre of decision making processes. The need for improved mechanisms of communication between the country and HQ and between the country and the FTI Secretariat.
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Annex D: Nigeria Summary
NIGERIA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Nigeria is a Federal Republic divided into 36 states, with the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja. It has three tiers of government – federal, state and local. The Nigerian education system is decentralised under this Federal structure, and the 1999 Constitution assigns concurrent responsibility to all three tiers of government. The administration of the education system is shared between the Federal and state Ministries of Education as well as 21 statutory bodies referred to as Commissions and Boards. At state level State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs), supported by 774 local government education authorities (LGEAs), are responsible for basic education. Unclear roles and responsibilities among the three tiers of government have caused confusion, duplication, and sometimes rivalry in the discharge of responsibilities. D2 The National Education Strategy is defined by the 2004 National Policy on Education, and the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act which provides for unitary basic education sub-sector of 9 years of free and compulsory basic education for all children. A 2006–7 presidential commission on education reported that the sector was in crisis and that nothing less than major renewal of all systems and institutions was required. D3 The EFA GMR 2009 cites Nigeria as one of the countries struggling with the impact of poor governance on the education sector. Poor governance is significantly slowing progress towards EFA and undermining the quality of basic education services. Despite recognition on the part of government of the need to promote good governance, increase accountability and enhance the role of civil society, institutional arrangements remain complex and lack transparency. Table D13 Summary Timeline of FTI and Other Relevant Events in Nigeria Year 1960 1979
Month
1993 1999 2000 2002 May June 2003
April June
2004
May
2007 2008
May
2009
April
Event Independence from Britain was followed by a series of coups and a military government Start of the Second Republic as Alhaji Shehu Shagari is elected President returning Nigeria to civilian rule. The Education Trust Fund (ETF) was established, companies with more than 100 employees contribute 2% of their pre-tax earnings to the fund – funds are used to finance capital expenditures for education, 40% goes to primary education. Launch of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Programme which aims to achieve EFA by 2015. States are encouraged to develop their own programmes of UBE implementation Education Sector Analysis project launched with support from UNESCO. Nigeria is the subject of discussions on FTI given its population size it is considered important in terms of achieving EFA and the MDG targets. Nigeria writes a letter asking to be included in FTI. Nigeria is included in a special category (a so-called second tier) under the EFA-FTI. Nigeria is invited to receive technical and analytical assistance to create policy capacity to scale up on EFA. First civilian run Presidential elections since the end of military rule, Olusegun Obasanjo elected for a second term Joint paper produced by development partners in Nigeria setting out the requirements for EFA and for FTI, aim was to develop a government-donor partnership. The Universal Basic Education Law makes provision for the UBE programme that provides free, compulsory education for nine years for all school aged children. The FGN makes a provision of 2% of its share of the consolidated revenue Fund to finance the implementation of UBE. Sida and USAID write an official letter to the MOE about FTI and its potential benefits, they encourage Nigeria to join following the completion of an education sector plan (ESP). EPDF support provided to 13 countries including Nigeria to finish their ESP. Three states prepare costed state education strategies aiming for FTI endorsement. WB staff member, funded by EPDF, presented a review of the Kano, Kaduna and Kwara ESPs and gave guidance as to what was required for FTI endorsement. WB sponsored meeting as part of the preparation for a new 2010 Country Education Sector Status Report the WB sponsored a meeting of Commissioners for Education and State UBE Board Chairmen from all of the states. FTI criteria were outlined and hope was expressed that some states would become "models" and access EFA-FTI grants.
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Progress towards EFA D4 It is difficult to provide a picture of Nigeria‘s current status with respect to the EFA goals or to comment on the prospects for reaching the goals by 2015 due to the dearth of reliable education data. The 2005 school census suggests a national primary GER of 95% with rates of 103% for boys and 86% for girls and a NER of 63% (68% for boys and 59% for girls). Two household surveys undertaken in 2003 and 2005 recorded overall net enrolment rates of 60% and 46%. A comparison of survey results for 1999 with those for 2006 suggests that the primary GER increased from 87% to 92% and the NER from 59% to 62%. However, all of these estimates mask significant variations across the country. The 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR) reports that Nigeria has more primary age children out-of-school than any other country in the world and trend projections to 2015 suggest a gross primary enrolment rate of around 105% and a net enrolment rate of just over 70%.
The FTI in Nigeria D5 Although Nigeria‘s formal engagement began when the FTI was launched in 2002. Progress since has been slow. In 2002 a so-called "analytical fast track" was launched to support large countries that did not yet have a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or a costed ESP64. Although the FTI Progress Report of 2005 set 2008 as a target date for when Nigeria would join the FTI, it has proved challenging to identify practically how the FTI can support Nigeria. Despite discussions between the FTI Secretariat and successive World Bank education task team leaders, no further tangible progress has been made towards endorsement. D6 Nigeria has however benefited from a small amount of EPDF funds, and received significant support from its predecessor the Norwegian Education Trust Fund which over the period 1999–2005 gave USD 1,247,000 as part of the World Bank UBE project. This was the largest amount given to any country during this period. The EPDF funds were used to finance workshops and a visit to Nigeria by a World Bank staff member to informally review three states‘ education sector plans. D7 However since April 2009 two meetings have been held in Abuja under the auspices of the World Bank, involving Federal and state education officials and education donors and civil society. It is understood that in principle the World Bank envisages that a small number of states could join the FTI from 2010, initially accessing EPDF funds to finance the development of costed, sector plans. Nevertheless, outstanding issues around the modality of FTI engagement in Nigeria remain unresolved.
The Education Sector D8 The Nigeria study differs from the other country case studies as Nigeria has not been endorsed by the FTI. Therefore the study focuses mainly upon progress towards EFA and particularly UPC over the 10 years since the restoration of democracy in 1999. This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below. This section summarises the main findings for Nigeria. D9 Education Policy and Planning: Most of the initiatives that have taken place in the area of policy and planning since 1999 have been country led as there has been limited financial and technical support from external partners. The National Framework for Education in Nigeria specifies a set of policies, strategies and targets that encompass the 6 EFA Goals and are consistent with the FTI objectives. However, government reports and interviews with key education stakeholders in Nigeria describe weak systems of planning and budgeting, with little involvement of civil society. Constitutional restrictions on the role that the FME may play in the delivery of basic education limit effective sector wide monitoring of the sector. Poor governance 64
The other "analytical fast track" countries were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and DRC.
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Annex D: Nigeria Summary and corruption further undermine the effective implementation of policy at state and local levels. There is currently no costed, national education sector plan linking policy, planning and budgeting for the education sector, and there is currently no obligation upon states to produce costed sector plans, nor to report on progress towards UPC. With donor assistance, a small number of states have recently been able to produce costed education sector plans. D10 Education Financing: there is a lack of accurate information on aggregate education expenditures. This means that no plausible estimates exist of the financial requirements needed to achieve universal primary or basic education across the country. Best estimates are that total public expenditure on education in Nigeria is equal to around 5% of GDP, and that state governments fund around 43% of the total, the Federal government 31% and local governments 26%. In addition to state and local government revenues, the primary education sub sector can benefit from two funds financed by the FGN, the UBE-Intervention Fund (UBE-IF) introduced in 2005 and the Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF), introduced following the debt relief negotiations in 2006. Financing is also available from the Education Trust Fund (ETF) which is financed by a levy on large firms. The former two require matching funds from the state governments. Currently, around USD 150 million of funds allocated by the ETF have not been disbursed and of the NGN 95 billion (USD 630 million) allocated to the UBE IF between 2005 and the end of March 2008, only NGN 43 billion had been released. External aid is, and is always likely to be, only a very marginal source of finance for public expenditures on primary education. Even very substantial multiples of current aid would have little impact on the gap between the current level of funding and the amount required to provide all children with a quality education. D11 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: the lack of accurate data on basic education, nationally and at state levels, is universally acknowledged in Nigeria. All indicators of education outcomes and efficiency are estimates. There is no usable time series data and no results from the 2006 and 2007 school censuses have yet been published. The quality of basic reporting, and collating of education data are low with few incentives for its improvement. Although there was some evidence that attitudes concerning the need for accurate data on the education system and for some sort of monitoring system are changing it is difficult to see how the FGN can persuade all state governments to improve the quality of data which they collect. Since 2003 there has been considerable donor support to strengthen EMIS systems and assistance to improve data on expenditures at Federal level and in selected states. However, it is not clear that improvements have been sustained and regular detailed monitoring of basic education is, in general, not occurring at either Federal or state level. D12 Capacity: the Nigerian education sector suffers from weak capacity at the institutional, organisational and individual levels. A weak institutional framework with multiple agencies with overlapping roles and responsibilities remains unreformed despite efforts to do this in the period prior to the last elections in early 2007. There is no overarching capacity development strategy and no set of plans for this is in place across the education sector. However the FME is accessing the Virtual Poverty Fund to finance a number of strategies to strengthen teacher deployment and teacher quality and to provide for the training of school-based management committees across the country. The states visited do not have overarching capacity development plans in place and are making very limited use of the UBE Intervention Fund resources earmarked for this purpose. Since 1999, external assistance for capacity development has been provided by a number of donors however, there is currently no harmonised donor approach to capacity development and limited demonstrated political will by state governments to invest the resources required. D13 Aid Effectiveness: it is important to note that unlike many countries in sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria has not enjoyed long relations with its donors, nor is it an aid dependent country. Therefore assumptions that hold true for other countries in the region concerning aid modalities and the alignment of country practices and policies with international norms cannot be assumed to be the case in Nigeria. Apart from debt relief, total external aid to Nigeria since 1999 has Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) been comparatively small (less than 2% of total government expenditure). Between 1999 and 2005, the average annual commitment to the education sector was USD 69 million and in 2006 it was USD 80 million – around just 7% of all sector allocable aid, and (very) roughly equal to just 1% of total public expenditure on education. There is no established forum for government and donors to conduct a dialogue around support for the sector, in spite of several donor efforts over time. Donor assistance over the last 10 years has been project focused, albeit with large-scale sector programmes. D14 Cross-Cutting Issues: the key cross-cutting challenges discussed in the country study report are equitable access, religious and private education and HIV/AIDS. Governance is an important cross-cutting issue which has been threaded throughout the report. In 2005 Nigeria missed achieving the EFA gender parity goal in primary education as agreed to at Dakar in 2000. The FME has developed a national policy on gender in basic education. Whilst the gap is reducing, it remains widest amongst the poorest and amongst children in rural areas, particularly in the North and in the Niger Delta. Nigeria is estimated to have the third highest HIV case load in the world after India and South Africa: 3.7 million adults are living with the virus. However the integration of HIV/AIDS policy within the education sector is limited despite the development of a national policy on HIV/AIDS and the production of a set of implementation guidelines.
Overall Conclusions D15 Relevance: The Federal Government considers the EFA and MDG education goals to be one of the country‘s main priorities. In principle, given the high number of out-of-school children in Nigeria, and the relatively low levels of per capita income, aid per capita and planning and implementation capacity, the need for effective policies and additional external support is as valid for Nigeria as it is for other already endorsed countries. The main issues include whether the Federal Government is willing to be associated with the FTI; if so, what would be (and would not be) the most relevant form of external support; the modalities through which support could be offered; and the implications for the FTI Secretariat and the local (education) donor group if endorsement were to be sought. D16 Accelerating progress on EFA: as ¶D4 outlines Nigeria has a long way to go before it will attain the EFA goals. Whilst the Government has prioritised EFA, there is no doubt that if Nigeria has more primary age children out-of-school than any other country in the world (Error! Reference source not found.), support and assistance will be needed. Currently despite acknowledging the vast numbers of out-of-school children in Nigeria FTI has not made an impact on accelerating progress on EFA. D17 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: Nigeria already has its own "catalytic funds", most notably the UBE Intervention Fund, which is not being accessed to the extent possible by the state governments through their SUBEBs. A reduction of the administrative and policy obstacles are limiting the usefulness of the funds, which need to be given priority prior to adding a further layer of available funding such as the FTI Catalytic Fund. Equally, there is an argument that the deployment of the Intervention Fund should be more clearly linked to state education sector plans.
Reflections D18 The FTI has limited experience working in Federal states and so far there has been limited communication between the FTI and the Federal Government. Despite more recent, tentative plans for engagement and some limited discussions it remains unclear how Nigeria might join the FTI and seek endorsement if the Federal Government seeks to pursue this. D19 Nigeria lacks a credible, costed national education sector plan. Indeed, given the strong federal nature of the country it is unclear whether such a plan covering activities across 36 states would be required or could be relevant. More manageable would be state sector plans 140
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Annex D: Nigeria Summary embedded within overall state development policies and strategies. These would then be accompanied by Federal Government statements of national education policies and a detailed set of the steps that Government would be taking to support education, particularly basic education, across the states. If the focus is on state sector plans, the values of some aspects of the Indicative Framework (including the government expenditure norms) would need to be adapted. D20 In principle FTI could play a role in helping to build capacity at both Federal and state levels utilising EPDF funds. However, given the likely overall size of the financing gap across all states and the finite resources available and given the challenges of capacity, data and weak governance, any assistance to states would need to be well targeted to those with a real and demonstrated commitment to use their own resources effectively. D21 If Nigeria is to join the FTI and seek the endorsement of education plans, there will be implications for both the FTI Secretariat, particularly if the process is not to be driven by only one or more of the donors, and for the local (education) donor group. Initially the FTI Secretariat may need to be directly involved in discussing/negotiating the requirements and processes. At the same time, the in-country capacity of the education donors would need to be assessed to determine whether it is sufficient to support the endorsement process, and subsequently the monitoring of FTI‘s inputs across a potentially large number of states.
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Annex D: Pakistan Summary
PAKISTAN SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Pakistan is a Federal state, comprised of four main Provinces (Punjab, Sindh, the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan) together with a number of other territorial units (the capital territory, federally administered areas on Pakistan's borders, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir). The four provinces account for the vast majority of Pakistan's land area and population, but are very different from each other in population size, ethnic composition, political economy and other dimensions. Since independence more than sixty years ago, Pakistan has experienced alternating periods of military and civilian rule. Since 2001, efforts at political and administrative devolution down to the district level have changed the landscape for the delivery of basic services. D2 The Pakistan economy grew rapidly during most of the 2000s, but has more recently been affected by the global economic downturn in 2008. Pakistan is not highly aid dependent, but the aftermath of September 11, 2001 highlighted Pakistan's strategic importance in the "war against terror". International ties that had been affected by a nuclear test and by the return to military rule in 1999 were renewed, and there was a resurgence in aid. Measured by aid commitments as a proportion of GNI, aid levels rose from about 1% to 2% over the period to 2007, but with fluctuations linked to debt relief. D3 On many economic, social and governance indicators, Pakistan has underperformed its Asian neighbours. Income and wealth distribution is highly unequal, and analysts identify deepseated reasons of political economy for the apparent lack of "political will" to make mass education a priority. There are long-standing governance concerns related to endemic corruption at all levels and to systemic weakness in public financial management. D4 Attitudes towards the use of aid to support large-scale improvements in basic services, including education, are coloured by the experiences of the Social Action Programme (SAP) during the 1990s. Coordinating multi-donor support across provinces and sectors proved immensely complicated, and there was inadequate ownership at provincial level. Weaknesses in governance and financial management were exposed, and the government failed to fulfil its commitment to increase its own funding of social services.
Progress Towards EFA D5 Pakistan has signed up to EFA and the MDGs, but consistent low levels of public expenditure on education and on social services in general suggest that the level of political commitment is, in practice, rather weak. Successive EFA Global Monitoring Reports have highlighted that Pakistan is off track for achieving universal primary education by 2015, and accounts for a substantial share of the global number of children out-of-school. Pakistan underperforms its South Asian neighbours and other countries of comparable average income. Education performance is marked by deep disparities based on gender and wealth, as well as across regions of the country. Moreover, there are deep concerns about the quality of the education that is provided. There are large deficits in basic infrastructure and teaching materials, and fundamental weaknesses in the systems for training, engaging and managing teachers. The available assessments indicate very poor levels of learning attainment, while primary cohort completion rates are estimated at well under 50%.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) Table D1 Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2008 2008Ŕ 2009
Summary Timeline of FTI and Other Relevant Events in Pakistan
Event National Education Policy (1998–2010) developed – one of a number of documents outlining how GoP intends to meet EFA targets. Civilian Government Overthrown. Military Rule Under General Pervez Musharaf. Millennium Summit adopts MDGs. World Education Forum. Pakistan among signatories of Dakar Declaration. Education Sector Reform (ESR) Programme (2001–2004) includes core objective to improve the literacy rate and universalise primary education. Beginning of decentralisation to district level. 9-11 attacks highlight Pakistan's strategic importance and presage re-opening of aid ties and a resurgence in aid flows. FTI launched. Pakistan receives letter of invitation as one of five large countries to receive "analytical and technical support", and confirms interest in participating. MOE complains to FTI Secretariat at lack of progress in seeking endorsement and additional funding. MOE has prepared a Pakistani version of the Indicative Framework. FTI Secretariat informs Pakistan of approach adopted under the FTI Framework document. Pakistan will not qualify for Catalytic Fund. Secretariat notes that Pakistan's federal system would require adaptation of the FTI model. [but no evidence of subsequent work to follow this up]. Commencement of support through EPDF – between 2005 and 2008 Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of EPDF support. Return of civilian rule. Contacts with FTI Secretariat suggest continued FTI interest in engaging with Pakistan.
The FTI in Pakistan D6 When the FTI was launched in 2002, Pakistan was included as one of five large countries (along with Bangladesh, DRC, India and Nigeria) that were invited "to receive analytical and technical support as a first step towards possible eligibility for financing" 65. The Federal Ministry of Education expressed interest and saw this particularly as an opportunity to attract additional external finance for the sector. It prepared a document which, inter alia, sought to show where Pakistan stood against the benchmarks of the Indicative Framework, and to set targets related to those benchmarks. However, these targets were never made operational. D7 Pakistan's efforts to seek endorsement and additional external finance through the FTI foundered for several reasons. When the original design was crystallised in the 2004 FTI Framework, the FTI Catalytic Fund was made available only to "donor orphans", and Pakistan did not qualify. Pursuing the endorsement process, as a way of stimulating coordinated and strengthened donor support for a credible national plan to achieve the core FTI goal of UPC (universal primary completion), would have required active support from a lead donor, and a willingness of donors as a group to collaborate in supporting the exercise. Neither of these conditions was met. In turn this was linked to a deeper issue: as acknowledged by the FTI Secretariat in 2004, the design of the FTI as set out in the Framework did not fit federal cases like Pakistan, where responsibilities for basic education were devolved to sub-federal levels. The work that would have been required to adapt the basic model to such cases was never undertaken. D8 However, as an "analytical fast track" country, Pakistan was eligible for support through the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), and has been one of the biggest EPDF recipients, with a total allocation of more than USD 1.4 million between 2005 and 2009.
FTI and the Education Sector D9 The country study examines education progress in six interrelated areas, highlighted in bold below. 65
Letter from WB Country Director to Pakistan MOE on 25 June 2002.
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Annex D: Pakistan Summary D10 Education Sector Policy and Planning: Responsibilities for basic education are divided between federal and provincial level, and decentralisation during the 2000s saw a further transfer of the responsibilities for basic education service delivery to the district level. At Federal level, the Ministry of Education has been weakened by the transfer of responsibilities to other Federal bodies, such as the Higher Education Commission (HEC), which effectively has Ministerial responsibility for tertiary education, and the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), which has a direct role in relation to basic education. The bulk of federal expenditure on education now falls under other bodies than the MOE, and this has had a debilitating effect on the MOE itself. D11 Since 2001, the government has been actively encouraging the private sector to increase its role in education provision (including through public-private partnerships), but the state remains the largest provider of education, covering 67% of total primary enrolment. The IMF and World Bank have acknowledged that Pakistan‘s recent experience suggests that the public sector has to be the main provider in rural areas and for poor households, where the enrolment gaps are the largest. D12 The federal government has adopted a consultative approach in the development of national strategy documents (engaging in particular with donors and with the growing number of civil society organisations in the sector) but it has taken an inordinately long time for such documents to be finalised. Moreover, national education policies and plans (as in other sectors) remain very weakly articulated with the annual plans and budgets – mostly at sub-federal levels – that more directly affect service delivery in practice. D13 Education Financing: Despite repeated commitments (and even obligations in federal legislation) to increase allocations to education, public expenditure on education remains restricted to less than 2% of GDP per annum. Public budgets are dominated by recurrent costs, for teacher salaries in particular. There are systemic problems in the utilisation of development budgets at all levels, which are regularly under spent by as much as 50%. A major reason for this underutilisation of funds is the complex financial allocation and release system where authority to allocate and release funds rests at the federal and provincial levels while actual utilisation of funds is highest at the district level. D14 Various estimates have been made of the "financing gap" that needs to be filled if EFA targets are to be achieved. These differ greatly in their scope and methodology, but it is clear from all of them that the existing levels of public expenditure are far short of requirements. At the same time, there is no mechanism for such "gap" calculations directly to influence public policies or expenditures. D15 The share of donors in education finance has steadily grown since 2001, with current estimates resting at 11% of the education budget. Traditionally, external funds have been utilised for development budget, and most external funds have been disbursed through project modalities. D16 In addition to government spending, there is substantial private spending on education. Education appears to be a highly valued good at the household level, including among poor households. D17 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: The FTI design gives central importance to improved data and analysis as a basis for better policies, without which additional expenditure may be fruitless. FTI's data gap perspective is particularly relevant for countries which, like Pakistan, were invited to join an "analytical fast track", and this is the area where the FTI (through the EPDF) has made its most obvious input. D18 There are major concerns about the quality of basic data on education. Administrative data are heavily reliant on self-reporting, and annual education statistics do not cover nonVolume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) government institutions (the five-year census in 2005 was the first to do so). Donors have supported efforts to strengthen data collection (including EMIS in several provinces), but there are few signs that the government itself systematically uses the data available to monitor performance and to inform policy (though there are efforts to improve this situation through the Punjab and Sindh education sector programmes). The National Education Assessment System (NEAS), funded by World Bank and DFID, has carried out sample-based standard assessment exercises at Grade 4 in 2005-06-07-08 (the latter including private schools on a pilot basis) and at Grade 8 in 2008. D19 There is a particular concern about data collection and use at district level, since monitoring, if it is to be effective, needs to take place at the levels responsible for service delivery. Data on adult literacy are especially weak, and governance issues in the management of teachers render the related data unreliable. D20 The EPDF financed about 16 activities in Pakistan, most of them analytical studies. Poor record-keeping made it difficult to identify and assess them. Generally, the studies conducted seem to have been relevant and potentially useful, although in some cases the link to basic education was, at best, tenuous. However, the EPDF seems to have been used primarily as a tactical adjunct to other World Bank activities. There was hardly any awareness of the EPDF as such, either in government or among donors, and it has therefore not been used in the strategic and capacity-building manner that its bilateral donor funders hoped for. D21 Capacity: There are serious issues in terms of personal, organisational, and institutional capacities at all levels in Pakistan. They are linked to Pakistan's governance weaknesses which, in the education sector, are strongly manifested in teacher management, with systemic problems of political patronage, ghost and absent teachers and a very weak role for head teachers. D22 Weak capacity hampers policy and planning at federal and provincial levels and is also a central challenge to education management at the district level. Since decentralisation, the district government is responsible for the day to day planning and delivery of education. It is the district government, which gets to assess the needs in the schools, identify the sites to build new ones, and make decision on where to do reconstruction work, and also is responsible for undertaking monitoring of education delivery in schools. However, this tier of government continues to suffer from serious capacity gaps in planning, delivery and monitoring of education inputs. D23 Weak capacity often reflects systemic weaknesses. For example, teacher training institutions are chronically under-resourced, and therefore often depend on external financing to run courses. "Development budget" activities, including capacity development, tend to be left to the donors, but, in the absence of effective national capacity development strategies, donor inputs are likely to be projectised, excessively focused on individual training and gap-filling, and of doubtful sustainability. D24 Aid Effectiveness: Aid to Pakistan is dominated by a small number of large donors – the World Bank, AsDB, USAID, Japan and the UK. Part of the legacy of the SAP, also linked to subsequent decentralisation, is a greater tendency to operate through provincial-level partnerships. At Federal level, aid is coordinated by the Economic Affairs Division (EAD). The strategic reasons for supporting Pakistan since 2001 have ambivalent influences on aid effectiveness: the profile of education has been raised, as have levels of aid for basic education, but the urge to disburse for strategic reasons may be at odds with the requirements of delivering aid more effectively. Moreover, donors' in-country capacity is limited not only by the scale of the country (Pakistan's population exceeds the combined population of the 28 smallest FTI-endorsed countries) but also by security-related constraints.
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Annex D: Pakistan Summary D25 In terms of the Paris Declaration agenda: alignment with government policies tends to be un-demanding, because national policies and plans are stated in very general terms, yet reporting to government of aid commitments and disbursements is very unsatisfactory; alignment with government systems on the other hand is more difficult for donors, because of the complexity of federal structures, and the weaknesses in governance and public financial management that have already been described. The 2008 economic crisis was a setback in making Pakistan ineligible for further direct budget support from the World Bank, and its large education operations in Punjab and Sindh have been configured as sector support programmes. Coordination and harmonisation among donors is limited because there is not a strong and effective demand (as opposed to exhortation) from government; there are significant multi-donor collaborations clustered around the WB education programmes in Punjab and Sindh, while, interestingly, the government of NWFP and its donors are working towards a sector wide approach at provincial level, with Germany playing a pivotal role. Progress towards more results-oriented approaches is very limited, as is any realisation of mutual accountability in practice. As noted, the EPDF has not been used systematically to enhance country ownership or donor coordination. D26 Cross-Cutting Issues: The most salient cross-cutting issues relate to inequalities. Gender inequalities have received the most international attention, and, despite some progress, the gender gaps in Pakistan remain large. However, they are part of a pattern of inequality that is strongly correlated with wealth, and much greater in rural than in urban areas, and linked to regional inequalities across and within provinces and territories. There is very limited attention to the educational needs of children with disabilities, and policy statements are often not matched by effective action. Although AIDS is seen by UNAIDS as a disaster in the making in Pakistan, preventive efforts are feeble for a variety of capacity and cultural reasons.
Overall Conclusions D27 Relevance: The FTI objectives are certainly relevant to Pakistan. FTI‘s primary objective of facilitating universal primary education by 2015 is clearly consistent with Pakistan‘s needs, and with stated public policy. At the current rate the country is expected to have 3.7 million out-of-school children by 2015 (and this is probably a substantial underestimate). The expressed commitment to meeting EFA targets is however not matched in action by the Pakistani government, as reflected in low budgetary allocations and political appointments in the education sector. This apparent lack of political commitment is a challenge to any donors seeking to engage with Pakistan. D28 While the objectives of the FTI are clearly relevant to Pakistan, its current design is more problematic, since Pakistan does not fit the model where a single group of donors (and other non-government stakeholders) can usefully engage with an empowered national ministry of education. The final chapter of the report reflects further on how the FTI model might need to be adapted to become more relevant to Pakistan's situation. D29 Accelerating progress on EFA: As already noted, progress in Pakistan continues to fall far short of what would be required to meet the EFA objectives. Thus far, the FTI has had no significant impact. Nor can it be said (as is argued in regard to some other large countries operating without FTI endorsement) that government and donors have found effective and adequate means of collaboration outside of the FTI mechanisms. D30 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: Again, the FTI has so far made no significant contribution to the mobilisation of resources for basic education in Pakistan, nor to assisting government and donors in using aid more effectively.
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Reflections D31 The Pakistan case offers both retrospective lessons and future challenges for the FTI. On the former, it shows that the FTI was ill-prepared for the challenges of dealing with the large "analytical fast track" countries. It was slow to realise the special problems posed by the combination of size and federalism, in the absence of a donor willing to take an active lead, the FTI Secretariat lacked the capacity (and also the mandate) to move things forward. The lack of intellectual effort addressed to this group of countries, contrasts with the amount of attention the FTI paid to the challenges of fragile states. It is hard not to conclude that the concern to increase the number of (small) endorsed countries outweighed concerns about the number of potential beneficiaries in larger countries. D32 If the FTI is to be relevant to Pakistan in the future, it will certainly need to adapt its design. Moreover, although this has not been a comparative study, even casual observation shows that the characteristics and possibilities in different federal states are very different, and therefore the FTI will need to come up with country-specific designs for them. In Pakistan's case, each of its main provinces constitutes a different theatre of activity, with a different subset of donors involved. It would therefore be worth examining whether the FTI could operate in one or more provinces, endorsing and supporting a provincial-level sector plan. If, on the other hand, it is decided to keep the FTI engagement at an "analytical" level, the FTI will need to seek a more strategic instrument than the EPDF has, so far, proved to be.
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Annex D: Yemen Summary
YEMEN SUMMARY Sector Context D1 The Republic of Yemen was only twelve years old in 2002 following the reunification of traditionalist North Yemen and Marxist South Yemen: and it was only eight years since the civil war. The process of merging the two public administrations led to the creation of a massive civil service. The civil service had a complex and centralised organisational structure, representing a significant strain on public finances while producing little value added in terms of delivering needed services to the population. The public administration laws were often superseded by traditional and non-formal rules deeply embedded in a powerful tribal culture. In 2002, the country relied heavily on oil resources to sustain its economy. It was severely under-aided relative to need but also faced significant institutional constraints on its ability to use aid effectively. Little progress had been made in implementing an aid effectiveness agenda. Yemen was the poorest country in the Middle East with one of the highest population growth rates in the world which stressed the country‘s resources and added extra burden on the government to meet its poverty-reduction goals. The majority of Yemenis lived in rural areas, scattered across small villages in different terrains proving challenging for service delivery. D2 The public formal education system was unified, based on an educational ladder of nine years of compulsory basic education followed by three years of general secondary. Parallel religious education was integrated into the mainstream. Three different ministries were given responsibilities to manage education services for basic, technical and higher education. Formal basic education was identified as one of the key pillars of the country‘s long term vision and benefited from favourable budget allocation as well as external support from a small pool of bilateral and multilateral partners. However Yemen was off track for achieving EFA goals. The country had some of the worst school enrolment and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls and women. Acknowledging that previous efforts to reform and improve basic education in Yemen had not been as successful as anticipated, the Government of Yemen (GOY) prepared, the National Basic Education Strategy (NBEDS). This was done in a participatory manner and was the first strategy to be completed which addressed education related MDGs directly. Table D2 Year 2002 2002 2002 2002
Month June August September November
2002
December
2003 2003 2003
February March November
2004 2005 2006
November December November
Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Yemen
Event Yemen among the first 18 countries to be invited to join the FTI Partnership GOY accept the invitation The World Bank and the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands conduct a joint FTI mission Donors informally endorse a draft of the EFA-FTI Country Proposal and send a letter to the FTI Secretariat seeking approval from the donor community during the Brussels Partnership meetings Seven countries endorsed during the Brussels Partnership meeting, but Yemen not one of them Yemen jointly appraised by the local donor community and the FTI Secretariat The donor community at the Paris donor meeting further endorse the Yemen proposal Yemen is granted the first of three successive allocations – United States Dollar (USD) 10m during official launch of FTI Catalytic Fund Yemen is granted the second allocation of USD 10m from CF Yemen is granted the third allocation of USD 10m from CF Decision is made during the Partnership meetings in Cairo to top up Yemen third allocation of USD 10m
Progress towards EFA (2002–2009) D3 Progress has been slow over 2002–2009 and Yemen is unlikely to meet any of the EFA goals by 2015. Although enrolments in lower basic education have increased from 2.2 million in 1997 to 3.3 million in 2007, and the GER in basic education shifted from 62% to 74% over the same period, the PCR is low at 60% in 2007, 70% for boys and 49% for girls. There were still 1.8 million children of basic school age out-of-school in 2005. Yemen is still ranked at the
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The FTI in Yemen (2002–2009) D4 Yemen was among the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI Partnership in June 2002 following the endorsement of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and development of a comprehensive National Basic Education Strategy (NBEDS) in the same year. The GOY with the technical support of the World Bank prepared an EFA-FTI draft proposal which was jointly endorsed by the local donor community and the FTI Secretariat in March 2003. The GOY sent to the FTI Secretariat its final proposal corresponding to a three year implementation plan for NBEDS (EFA-FTI Credible Plan 2003Ŕ2005) in October 2003 just in time to benefit from the largest allocation of the newly established FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) in November 2003. D5 Yemen was granted three successive allocations from the FTI Catalytic Fund for a cumulative amount of USD 40 million. The FTI CF Grant phases 1, 2 and 3 were managed like a traditional World Bank project at each stage of the design, implementation, and supervision, through the support of a programme administration unit. The implementation of phases 1 and 2 has targeted four (out of 21) governorates, each completed in a one-year period, by August 2005 and November 2007, respectively. The FTI CF resources were invested as planned on "priority" programmes in the areas of access (school construction) and quality (teacher/school, manager/supervisor training) with capacity building activities at governorate and district levels to support implementation of the project. Phase 3 is due to start in the second half of 2009 until 2011 increasing coverage to seven governorates and scaling up of key policy areas. D6 Yemen is the second largest recipient of the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) after India with an estimated amount of USD 1.885 million allocated since 2005/06. Following Ministry of Education (MOE) discussion and agreement on World Bank proposed set of activities, the EPDF provided support: i) to education sector plans; ii) to capacity building in a variety of areas; iii) to monitoring and evaluation and knowledge-sharing; and iv) to sustain partnership agreements. Table D3
Catalytic Fund Summary Table for Yemen
Date of endorsement: February 2003 First allocation: November 2003 – First allocation of USD 10m
Second allocation: November 2004 – Second allocation of USD 10m Third allocation: December 2005 – Third allocation of USD 10m November 2006 – Top-up allocation of USD 10m
st
nd
For 1 and 2 allocations: Grant focused on access and supply-side activities – 70% of grant allocated for this (school construction and provision of school kits). 20% of grant allocated to quality-related activities (support to decentralised training schemes, provision of equipment etc). Remaining 10% devoted to capacity building activities at central, governorate and district levels on planning, statistics and computer literacy. rd
The 3 allocation (to be disbursed in 30 month period over 2009–2011) will support a "female teacher contract scheme" on selected governorates
FTI and the Education Sector D7 This country study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role FTI played in each of these. This section summarises the main findings for Yemen.
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Annex D: Yemen Summary D8 Education Policy and Planning: FTI has made a contribution to improving policies within the basic education sub-sector. This influence has mainly taken place through i) the gender focus of the endorsement process; ii) the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the FTI CF projects which tailored supply-side policies for underserved governorates; and iii) the FTI EPDF which supported a wide range of upstream and downstream analytical work with direct linkages on demand–side policies. The influence of FTI was also discernible in the approach to planning within different levels of the education sector. In basic education the FTI proposal initiated the development of the first medium term implementation plan for NBEDS with costed strategies. In addition, the FTI Catalytic Fund project helped identify priority programmes in the area of access. However, the projectised nature of FTI CF support, which introduced parallel planning processes at governorate and district levels, superseded FTI‘s earlier strategic inputs into national planning. Support has also been provided by EPDF to finalise a general secondary education strategy and served as a basis for the design and implementation of the second largest multi-donor funded project (SEDGAP). The EPDF also funded the education country status report, completed in July 2009. D9 Education Financing: The available data show that there has been no increase in the relative priority accorded to basic education in public expenditure decisions over the period of the FTI‘s involvement. Public expenditure has risen in real terms but this has been at well below the rate necessary to achieve EFA targets. Education spending has fallen as a share of GDP and as a share of public spending (but in a context of a large shock in oil revenues that is not likely to be permanent). There has also been a relative shift in the allocation of education spending away from basic education towards technical education and vocational training. On the donor side, the study found that external resources increased in the period following FTI endorsement, directly through the catalytic fund allocation (USD 40 million over 2004–2011) and indirectly though a catalytic effect on existing donors (World Bank, GTZ, the Netherlands, KfW) and on attracting new donors (Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID)). However, after peaking in 2006, donor financing has been falling subsequently. D10 FTI CF resources were invested on priority programmes, used as planned and therefore reached beneficiaries in the most underserved rural areas of four populous governorates which account for the majority of out-of-school children. Due to high fiduciary risks, the procedures for disbursement and management of the FTI CF were not aligned on government systems. Finally, the evaluation found that delays in finalising agreement and disbursement of FTI CF grant phase 3 (USD 20 million over 2009–2011) have impacted negatively on aid predictability for basic education. D11 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: The study found that FTI did not have a clear strategy for its engagement in data and monitoring and evaluation. As a result its influence was low over the evaluation period. Delays in designing an Education Management Information System (EMIS), inconsistency of annual school surveys, persistence of fragmented information management and low internal demand for timely data from policy makers, has highly constrained the effectiveness of donor support in the area of data collection. By contrast the FTI EPDF supported studies usefully promoted data analysis and provided a set of evidence on the performance of the Yemeni education system on key outcomes. However, there is no evidence yet of an effective feedback loop into planning and decision making processes at central and local levels. Whilst the FTI IF indicators were collected and discussed among stakeholders in 2002/03 – establishing a baseline which was presented in the FTI credible Plan 2003–2005 – these indicators were only reviewed during the supervision of the "FTI CF project" they were not used as a benchmark against which to report progress during joint annual reviews. D12 Capacity: Firstly, the evaluation found that many of the factors that constrain CD lie well beyond the education sector and that FTI missed the opportunity to engage and sustain inter-ministerial discussion on CD issues. Secondly, FTI processes did not explicitly discuss the trade-off between supporting the speedy delivery of education services and supporting long Volume2_Feb2010x
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2) term capacity development. However, the choice of a programme administrative unit (PAU) to manage the FTI CF projects implicitly marked the preference for the former. One can argue the negative effect of PAU on strengthening national systems in the short-term (capacity building activities supported by PAU focusing on unfamiliar and complex World Bank procedures) but conversely, there were significant efficiency gains given implementation capacity and the fiduciary management environment. It is worth noting that the FTI CD guidelines have not contributed to address the above mentioned trade-off and – without being a result of the latter – they have not been used in Yemen. It was difficult to assess the durable impact of the limited FTI inputs in the area of CD. It is too early to identify the effective contribution of the FTI EPDF to institutional capacities in Yemen. D13 Aid Effectiveness: The FTI provided an important initial boost to the aid effectiveness agenda in education in Yemen. Available evidence indicates that the FTI endorsement period a) encouraged a unified process of policy dialogue leading to the signature of a Partnership Declaration and organisation of Joint Annual Reviews; b) consolidated sub-sector ownership on the part of MOE officials; c) reinforced alignment with government sub-sector plan and priorities; and d) promoted coordination and harmonisation. The FTI proposal has contributed, although not exclusively, to the design of the multi-donor funded basic education development project (BEDP) where the World Bank, KfW, DFID and the Netherlands used the same procurement, financial management and supervision procedures. However the initial boost provided to aid effectiveness has not been consolidated over the evaluation period. No evidence has been found of efforts made by FTI to integrate Gulf donors into education sector roundtable. The FTI CF has adopted the same implementation arrangements established for BEDP but was not merged with it. Moreover the CF projects are using a mechanism of reporting disconnected from the annual review. D14 Cross-cutting issues: Gender has been a prominent cross-cutting issue for Yemen reinforced by FTI processes and activities in the areas of policy, planning and data for the period covered by the evaluation. Gender issues were at the heart of the policy dialogue during the FTI proposal and endorsement processes. As a result, the FTI CF grant successive projects have addressed girls‘ access and retention in basic education schools in seven governorates through provision of classrooms and female teachers in remote rural areas and/or improvement of the school environment to be supportive of girls and acceptable to their families. Moreover, the FTI EPDF-funded studies helped provide evidence of the persistence of a gender gap, the relevance of demand-side policies and the social benefits of female literacy. The FTI EPDF also contributed to the design of the conditional cash transfer scheme to benefit a sample of rural girls enrolled in grades 4–9. On the contrary, the study found that Yemen‘s particular aspects of fragility do not appear to have influenced the design of FTI engagement. While constraining the effectiveness of government programmes and donor support, FTI activities have not directly addressed fragility issues. Security concerns have contributed to a relatively limited donor in-country presence which has constrained donor engagement.
Overall Conclusions D15 Relevance. Overall FTI‘s aims were highly consistent with the needs and priorities of Yemen in early 2000s but the means of doing so were much less clear in the complex Yemeni context. Firstly whilst Yemen was lagging behind and struggling with each of the EFA goals, paradoxically, the Indicative Framework parameters were actually close to the benchmarks in Yemen. Therefore the Indicative Framework did not help highlight key policy gaps notably low efficiency in the use of resources; higher unit costs in the delivery of education services and demand-side constraints for access and retention in schools. The FTI- IF focuses more on resource mobilisation and service delivery parameters than on the efficient use of resources and demand constraints. Secondly, the focus on filling the data gap and on the institutionalisation of M&E systems was highly relevant. Nevertheless the FTI‘s emphasis on an EMIS was undermined by the absence of incentives to promote internal demand for data from policy makers. Thirdly, Yemen was an obvious candidate for FTI in the area of capacity 152
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Annex D: Yemen Summary development but it was ambitious to expect it to make a significant difference, given the considerable capacity constraints beyond the education sector. Critically, FTI was short of proposals to address the trade-off between the speedy delivery of education services and the long term capacity development of the education sector. Finally, the aim to increase financial support and enhance progressive aid modalities was relevant in an under-funded and under-aided country where partners operated individually. However the FTI‘s proposals to operate in a risky fiduciary environment and to include non traditional donors (e.g. Gulf donors in Yemen) on aid discussions were not developed when Yemen was endorsed. D16 Accelerating progress on EFA. Progress towards EFA is slow. In the area of lower basic education where external education resources were expended (including those of the catalytic fund) the improvement on equitable access and retention did not match the expectations over the period FTI is active in Yemen. Although FTI contributed to improving policy and planning, many of the key challenges the sub-sector faced in 2002 (especially interaction between gender, poverty and residential area) remain acute while the long-term financing prospects for the sector have not improved. Overall it is difficult to argue that FTI contributed significantly to fast track progress on the six EFA goals. D17 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness. The FTI in Yemen provided an initial impetus for donor support to EFA but this appears not to have been sustained. Public spending on basic education has fallen as a share of total public expenditure and the financing gap to achieve EFA targets is increasing, while the sustainability of current public spending levels is uncertain as Yemen faces the exhaustion of its oil reserves that have supplied up to 75% of government revenue. While FTI played an important initial role in taking forward the aid effectiveness agenda for the sector there is no plan in place to move towards the use of government systems through sector budget support or a full sector wide approach.
Recommendations and Reflections for the Overall Evaluation D18 The findings in this study suggest that the main catalytic effects of the FTI inputs in Yemen have been on policy and planning for primary education and on aid effectiveness. The evidence on education financing is mixed as the initial positive contribution has not been sustained. Through EPDF studies FTI has contributed indirectly to data and monitoring and evaluation activities. FTI activities did not impact institutional or organisational capacities. D19
This case study highlights a number of key issues, including: The need for further reflection around the core objective FTI wishes to pursue in states facing major capacity constraints and potential trade-offs between short-term service delivery and long-term capacity development.
The centrality of capacity development issues for the effective implementation of education reforms and the potential use of FTI as a platform to extend the dialogue of in-country donors beyond education sector (e.g. civil service reform, public financial management).
The value added of the FTI CF for both a demonstration effect for the whole system of reform while at the same time being adequately concentrated and focussed (e.g. promotion of school grant mechanisms) .
The importance of ensuring that elements of the FTI compact continue to be understood and considered beyond the endorsement period, especially considering high turnover of Ministry officials and donors staff.
The implications of the limited presence of donors for in-country ownership of FTI, i.e. the FTI in Yemen, is essentially a relationship with the World Bank who lead much of the technical work.
The centrality of EPDF for the financing of analytical work which would not otherwise
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The possible future capacity of FTI to mobilise "non-traditional donors" (e.g. Gulf donors in Yemen), especially when sufficient funds cannot be mobilised through regular ODA channels.
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Annex D: Desk Country Studies
DESK COUNTRY STUDIES D1 The desk studies were carried out in order to provide the evaluation team with a wider pool of examples for their final report. Although the desk study authors were provided with a base of research by the core research team in the same way as the full country case study teams, time allocated was significantly less. Each desk study was assigned to a single main author with a more limited time budget and no country visit. The fact that some of the desk studies are so comprehensive and detailed reflects the availability of relevant source material and the authors' previous familiarity with the countries concerned. The supporting research drew on the full electronic archive of the FTI Secretariat for each country and included preparation of the country timeline that appears in each of the studies. D2 Whilst the format and approach of the desk studies is very similar to that of the full country case studies: all of the studies address the same evaluation questions and have captured findings across the spectrum of countries reviewed. The desk studies could not be researched to the same depth. Due to limited time, interviews carried out were few. In all cases, however, the authors were familiar with the country they were studying, and able to make selective enquiries with stakeholders. D3 There is considerable variation in the depth achieved in this selection of desk studies as will become apparent to the reader. At one extreme, in Ethiopia and Rwanda – both countries with a complex FTI experience to review – the researchers and the evaluation team had very detailed country knowledge and were able to draw on substantial literature covering many years as well as recent country-based experience. This enabled these two studies to draw evidence-based conclusions on most of the issues covered by the full country case studies. At the other end of the spectrum, several of the countries reviewed (Uganda, Malawi, Zambia) have only recently begun to engage seriously with FTI and there is therefore much less FTI experience to review.
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February 2010
Annex D: Ethiopia Summary
ETHIOPIA SUMMARY Sector Context D1 Ethiopia‗s population of 74 million (census 2007) continues to grow fast (at 2.6% p.a. between 1994 and 2007, only 0.2% lower than in the 1984–1994 period). Under-15 year olds represented 45% of the population in 2007, down from 49.8% in 1984, but this meant more than 33 million children compared to 20 million in 1984 and 25 million in 1994. Such growth represents a massive challenge for the education system, which has had to "run to stand still" let alone expand access from a very low base. Since 1994 there are four levels of general education in Ethiopia. These are pre-primary (largely confined to urban areas and left to private providers), primary (eight years in two four-year cycles, from age seven), lower secondary (two years) and upper secondary (two years), the latter being a preparation for university. The provision of education is mainly through state schools although non-government education is slowly but steadily rising, especially in urban areas. D2 Emerging victorious from a protracted civil war in 1991, the ruling party since then (the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) embarked on a transition toward democracy (which has proven complex) and decentralisation, economic reforms, and the universal provision of basic services – starting from a dire socio-economic situation left by the previous regime. Striking progress has been made with regard to the provision of basic services, financed by "the most pro-poor budget of Africa" in line with the country‘s poverty reduction strategic plans. The growing economy had started to show signs of structural shifts, before being hit by the current global crisis. Poverty, widespread and deep, had significantly decreased between 1994/95 and 2004/05 but the recent deterioration of economic trends is likely to have severely affected previous progress. D3 Generally the aid partnership is an uneasy one. Progress has been made such as the rapid development of the Protecting Basic Services (PBS) programme to replace GBS (abruptly frozen on account of the post-2005 election political developments). However, to date donors have failed to design a clear and transparent system of "graduated response" which would guarantee that aid structurally co-financing basic services and other key developmental activities would not be hostage to political difficulties. On the Government of Ethiopia‘s (GOE) side, its strong policy assertiveness goes together with weak aid management capacity. The GOE-donor overarching policy and aid dialogue is weak and more strongly instrument-led than focused on the country‗s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Table D4 Year 2002 2002
Month June October
2004
November
2007 2007
May December
2008 2008 2009
March November March
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Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Ethiopia
Event Ethiopia among the first countries to be invited to join the FTI Partnership An Education for All (EFA)-FTI proposal, sent by the GOE, was not considered (although local donors had endorsed it) as the Partnership explained the first step was to get the sector plan "endorsed" by local donors The Ministry of Education‘s (MOE) Vice-Minister was invited to the FTI Partnership meeting in Brasilia. The country‘s endorsement followed rapidly, along with an explanation that Ethiopia did not qualify for CF funding as it was not a donor orphan Ethiopia‘s candidacy to the FTI Steering Committee and its acceptance by the Partnership Ethiopia received an allocation of USD 70m at the CF committee meeting (Ethiopia can request a second grant of USD 98m any time within three years, provided it can demonstrate progress in implementing the first grant) Official Notification of the allocation of the grant of USD 70m Grant agreement signed General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) launched although covenants were not satisfied until June 2009.
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FTI Mid Term Evaluation Ŕ Final Report (Volume 2)
Progress towards EFA D4 The continued high priority given to primary/basic education in terms of policy and financing has permitted a massive expansion of the system (primary NER) from