PS4060/PS5060/PHIL4465: Theory of Decisions and Games Fall 2013 TR 12:30-1:45pm Clark 309 Dr. Brian Fogarty 800 Tower
[email protected] (314) 516-5520 Office Hours: Mondays and Wednesdays 11-2pm, Tuesdays and Thursdays 2-4pm, and by appointment in 800 Tower or 348a SSB (in PS main office)
OBJECTIVES This course is an introduction to social choice theory and game theory with specific applications to politics. In particular, we will focus on non-cooperative game theory which allows us to analyze abstract strategic situations between rational actors. While there are no prerequisites for the course, basic knowledge of set theory, logic, and calculus will be beneficial. There are two main sections to the course. The first part will take a brief look at social choice theory. The second part, and a majority of the course, will be devoted to understanding the basics of game theory, including Nash equilibrium, perfect and imperfect information games, and repeated games.
READING
MATERIAL
Class readings will be drawn from one main source: Osborne, Martin J. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press.
Additional supplemental sources include: Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. 2000. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. University of Michigan Press. Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press. Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. McCarty, Nolan, and Adam Meirowtiz. 2007. Political Game Theory. Cambridge University Press. Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press.
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For mathematics background: Gill, Jeff. 2006. Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research. Cambridge University Press. Simon, Carl P. and Lawrence Blume. 1994. Mathematics for Economists. W.W. Norton.
REQUIREMENTS It is important to keep up with class readings and you should generally aim to complete the weekly readings before we start a new topic. In addition to the readings, you will also be responsible for the following: 1. Problem Sets: (4 combine for 50% of your final grade) 2. Final: (worth 50% of your final grade) You will generally have a week to complete the problems sets. Students can work in groups, but should not turn in identical assignments. The take-home final is given out on Thursday, December 12, 2013, and due back 24 hours later.
CLASS
SCHEDULE
Topic 1:
Introduction to Rational Choice & Social Choice Theory
Topic 2:
Nash Equilibrium & Strategic Games with Perfect Information Osborne: Chapters 2-4
Topic 3:
Extensive Games with Perfect Information Osborne: Chapters 5-7
Topic 4:
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information Osborne: Chapter 10
Topic 5:
Signaling Games Osborne: Chapter 10
Topic 6:
Repeated Games Osborne: Chapters 14-15
Topic 7:
Bargaining Games Osborne: Chapter 16
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