Idea Transcript
articles JANUARY 23, 2007 · 10:00 PM
HELSINKI RECONCILIATION: AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POLICY FOR ATJEHNESE PEOPLE AND REFORMATION OF DEMOCRATIZATION HELSINKI RECONCILIATION: AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POLICY FOR ATJEHNESE PEOPLE AND REFORMATION OF DEMOCRATIZATION Presented at Legal Pluralisme International Congress and Workshop, Human Rights and Conflict Panel, in University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java-Indonesia, 27 June-2 July 2006
Traumatic Experiences in the Past Helsinki Reconciliation which was signed by two parties conflicted for more than three decades (RI-GAM) on August, 15, 2005 was the most important policy in the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono[1], moreover in the history record of this 59 years old republic. The memorandum of understanding has startled the international world. Whereas in fact, the six points are the concrete manifestation of brilliant diplomacy, which probably will end frictions, and contradictions which has teased Aceh for a long time ago. It is very attractive to be observed. The enthusiasm to realize this reconciliation has turned up for long time ago. For The Atjehnese, it is not a new concern; it is a sequel episode of previous efforts that always ended with abortive attempt. Those two parties, which can control themselves at the beginning, in fact it is still so hard to manage the situation in the sphere. Some neutral outsiders have facilitated several negotiaitions (in some historical documentations) show that since the intention to stop the bloody dispute in Serambi Mekkah has begun even more. It still cannot realize the longed reconciliation. The experience in CoHa and Jeda Kemanusiaan (Humanity Cease) are very important admonition, that they do not have good intention to realize the reconciliation. The Atjehnese worry that those parties, who can not implement the core point of agreement are creating contra-productive actions like the previous reconciliations. Moreover, they only would be “the puppet” and “experiment” of the immature policy of the government. They also worry that it is only a political maneuver of contradictive elites. No more than an effort to increase the “absurd bargaining position” and only gives profit to one party (both for RI or GAM) in front of international world. Perhaps, it is not a public policy for the society, but elite policy for some fixed groups and political interest (Fadhillah Putra, 2005: 69). In addition, in my personal opinion, this agreement was clearly not a well-prepared or a well-planned policy. It was only because of the sense of humanity after all the the greatest catastrophe ever happened in this world. After a series of failure talks and agreement based on “Peace through Dialog” which were last only for few months, both sides suddenly felt that this is the right moment to halt the frictions and bloody disputes. Then, serious talks organized, but still in fact, the process of dialogue continued giving spaces for political contents from ellites. Several questions can be drawn. Why did not the president himself intensively involved, why should the vice president with all his political manuevers or why the government and the free aceh separatist movement merely send their indirect representatives to Helsinki namely: Hamid Awaluddin (Minister of Human Rights and Law of The indonesian Government) and Bakhtiar Abdullah as the spokes man, but why not Hasan di Tiro himself?. Maybe I will noticeably accuse to stand against the agreement. To be honest, I just want to remind everyone about the ellite dilemma in the past which lead to the failure of agreement because of political compensation in the future. In reality, one of the intentions of the government to resolve conflict in Aceh is to implement the Islamic Law which was claimed as the answer for the separatist movement with respect to the Acehnese identity (LIPI Reserachers, 2004: 204) . On the contrary, although the overall identity of acehnese society is Islam, the agreement or cease fire or whatever will never obtain the ultimate goal, because the ideology of GAM are liberalism and nationalism, not Islamism anymore. That is why this Helsinki Reconciliation is rather fragile instead of strong and tough agreement while the rate of betrayals from the two ellites are still undeniable. To support this conclusive proof, a recent research by Indonesian Survey Agency or Lembaga Riset Indonesia on March, 2006 revealed what’s inside the Acehnese mind (Media Indonesia newspaper, Monday, 24 July, 2006). The research has obviously stated that more than half of the Atjehnese society still hesitate that GAM will not really continue their fight for Aceh independence from The Unitary State Republic of Indonesia, Only 48% respondents from Acehnese society convincely believe that GAM will immediately discontinue the freedom aspiration. Furthermore in the basis region of GAM, solely 43% declared that GAM struggle will end soon. Only time will proove if both of the ex ellites of GAM and so does the Indonesian government will remain faithfull to the agreement. Both ellites should be the role models for the society and for the international world. The abuse of power from ellites also arouse another setback. The willingness to change the balances of power at that very moment will cause uncontrollable political situation, primarily since the lower level society has no access to reevaluate or criticize the wrongdoing of the ellites. Kerstin Steiner moreover added, ”it is a very complicated situation in a real bad political stipulation, particularly when the outsiders tell you what to do or not to do this or that”.
Ellites Dilemma According to those historical facts, by realizing the recent conclusive fact in The Atjehnese society aftermath Helsinki Reconciliation who always hope the real peace will be comprehended soon (LIPI Reserachers, 2006:47), and honestly expect many things on this occasion, in order to realize the orderliness, truth, and justness, they need some regulation to maintain the reconciliation[2], yet implicitly the Atjehnese people suffered a traumatic experience as the consequence of the former tragedies Related with the custom and tradition of “betrayal” to the agreement which repeatedly happen in the similar situation and condition, some politicians, sociologist predict that in almost time, if the two opposite sides do not have strong commitment and attention to maintain this moment, it will be a loosing momentum for everyone. Moreover, the next Atjehnese generation will not rely anymore on the word “reconciliation”. Even though reconciliation is not a new thing for them, but all attitudes and behavior of those parties would be a special track record in their memory. So it is urgent that the solution are immediately should be analyzed again, the reconciliation agreement with all the consequences in order to give good effects for the society. Why?, Because the decision is in the “man on power’ position, and of course, not on the “grass root” people. There must be a comprehensive effort from all elements to fix the policies, which related to the future of a nation. It is not only a political euphoria which has running today. Especially in Indonesia, when democracy reformation acceleration in general and in Aceh in particular considerably has long been a slogan for this republic, whereas in new socio-political order since 1965, the freedom to express their opinion, creativity, especially in closed socio-political policy[3], and furthermore, the social order of society need a decision and policy which are not only qualified and valuable, but also acceptable. The abuse of power from ellites also arouse another setback. The willingness to change the balances of power at that very moment will cause uncontrollable political situation, primarily since the lower level society has no access to reevaluate or criticize the wrongdoing of the ellites. Kerstin Steiner moreover added, ”it is a very complicated situation in a real bad political stipulation, particularly when the outsiders tell you what to do or not to do this or that”. In this case, the continuation of AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) also needed to be supervised in order to prevent the over lapping of agreement limit which produce in togetherness and endorsement with the civilians, which basically are the ultimate target of the policy. Eventually the policy necessarily needs deep analysis and research because there are always be positive and negative impacts for everything. Then the problem are, is the policy can be an actual political policy for the people who long for the peace? Or it is only an elite policy that longing for authority, popularity, and endorsement with reconciliation pretext? Finally it would be a new dilemma for the society. Is it an effective thing for a sample of democracy reformation acceleration for this country? (With assume an open-minded public policy[4]) which was filled with the interests of conflicted elites. While in the level of implementation, based on experience and field data, it is susceptible to betrayals. One of the agreements items which are very crucial is the point of 1.2 concerning with political participation by local political party as a political compensation for the former elites of GAM in one year, at least 18 months by consulting with the legislatives in House of Representatives (DPR RI). This point became important because associated with openness and courage of The Indonesian Republic to take the option. It can be a trigger of democratization and reformation, with endorsement no political vile in it pioneering and implementation. Furthermore, in point 4.1 mentioned that all the violence between fortifications will be ended at last when the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has signed. This point became one of core points of all reconciliation agreement. It is because the most important essence of this reconciliation is to stop the violations. Actually, there are still infractions in the field. Reconciliation formulation is not a terrifying obsession for The Atjehnese. But it is less concern about the situation and condition of The Atjehnese who has felt crisis of trust (public distrust) to the elite and law enforcement to the peace agreement. In the conceptional level, the reconciliation implementation should be realized operationally by both sides for the benefit of Atjehnese people with all its demand, sanctions, and another logic consequences (intentionally or not). Concerning to the problem above, the signing of reconciliation agreement in a true meaning for Atjehnese people still can not be comprehensively manifested yet. The complexity of internal and external problems caused a number of obstacle for the field implementation. Nowadays, at this very moment, the efforts to create tranquility in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam are not an easy mission. Even though the formulation of this reconciliation agreement is not very difficult to be implemented for the Atjehnese people atmosphere, but in this condition, it still faces barriers in the implementation. It is also caused by the distrust of The Atjehnese people to the reconciliation agreement itself that has become a syndrome, they seems to be no longer trust and believe in all of the policy of double standards and insincerity, which were more often only being agreed, but not to be applicated, including (perhaps) this MoU of Helsinki. They were become accustomed to the betrayals by those two parties, which have made the society in a deep pain, agony, starvation, and suffered. As a result, thousands of people died, millions fled and become refugees, widows, and orphans (which has increased at that very moment) in a enormous number[5]. Because of it, the reconciliation agreement can not be applied well in Aceh. At this point, as far as I am concerned, this process still needs and will take time, started from socialization up to the application. Besides, the decision making under the conflict situation, whereas the decision makers always get involve in the competition among them. It is much more apprehensive that in the condition they bring another party as an object of game theory (Philips, Louis : 1995). they made. It is very hazardous because instead of accommodating the public interests, the decision will be fully filled by intrigues and interests of the two decision makers. “Resolution in political system within distractions will probably make the system conquested by the environment or distractions” says David Easton (1984, 153) in his book: A Framework for Politycal Analisis
More Conducicive Situation To be honest, this reconciliation has brought the Atjehnese in a better condition. This hilarious improvement can create a new chance to realize a sustainable peace road map and even let the Atjehnese to decide what they want in the frame indonesian unitary state and we do hope that it s not only for political compensation for GAM (because GAM represent who? The Atjehnese? Or if they do are as the Atjehnese represntative in this agreement, are there any aspirative process for the Atjehnese or the society had a chance to criticize and add any appropriate ideas in The Local Governance of Atjehneses Bill?. According to Aceh Monitoring Conflict and World Bank on December 2005, the rate of violations by the end of 2005 has steeply decrease after the Helsinki Agreement. In notification, there were exclusively two incidents took place and this was a significant improvement in this very reconciliation process. More important than that is, the item of local political party, public sectors authorization and the halt of every forms of violation will be an analysis tools to measure the succesfullness of the government public policy and whether this policy will generate the reformation and democratization in the positive ways. To manifestate the real peace in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam is not an easy task, in spite of all the scrutiny, eventhough the legal drafting of this peace agreement is no too extrime to be socialized in the life of Ajehnese society. More crucial than this is, how to deal with the differences and appreaciate it, since everybody knows that each decision has its own weaknesses and strenghts for the sake of society. Alternative Solutions In conclusion, i finally arrive on my basic arguments in order to maintain this conducive situation untill the overall peace process reach the ultimate target. At least, there are several suggestions to be offered. First, i agree that a public concultacy (Amrizal J.Prang, Serambi Indonesia newspaper, 27 June, 2006) by means of public hearings, open talks must be done soon. Next, community based programs must be based on a comprehensive an integrated need assesments in order to ignore any rejections from the society and to establish a local development based on the real needs and wants of the society itself and to solve the core problem as well. It will also be worth by thinking and designing a long-term incremental and gradual conflict resolution strategies, not a sudden ones, to put out the arguments which claim that this peace iniciative was only the innate gift from God and not a mature plan from both conflicted parties. Based on the considerations, I suggest that the mechanism of peace agreement should be equipped with tightness, exactness, and clarity for the lawbreaker of the reconciliation agreement, especially in the substances matter, that is, no more violations which always has sacrificed the civilians as the victims whose not guilty at all. If the decision-making do not find an effective direction, as described in the policy point above, it will raise another disasater even though it has become an agreement, but those opposite and contradicts sides have used to betray and have disobeyed the sanctions. By seeing this context and of course in line with this, there are some chances to revise the agreement, then add more concrete sanctions to the offender of reconciliation agreement. Diversity of content and radical control change still need to be supervised carefully in order to stabilize the socio-political circumstance, especially before the local election and to avoid the voter distortion. 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