Interaction between State and Non-state Actors in Ethnic Policy in the [PDF]

Interaction between State and Non-state Actors in Ethnic Policy in the Russian Federation: cross-regional comparison1 Karina Mikirova

Department of Political Science 1 Heinrich-Heine University of Düsseldorf Universitätstr. 1 40225 Düsseldorf Germany E-Mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Phone: +492118113960

Paper prepared for presentation at the Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Workshop “The Governance of Partnerships”, Munster, Germany, 22-27 March 2010. Draft. Please, do not cite. Comments highly welcome.

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The paper on Russian regional governance structures in ethnic policy is made within the PhD program “Political steering through law and social norms in Eastern Europe” at Heinrich-Heine University of Dusseldorf (Germany), financed by METRO Foundation.

Abstract The growth of nationalism and extremism can be observed in Russia2. This growth threatens the multi-ethnical Russian nation and puts interethnic stability at risk. Maintaining interethnic peace is a problem which can be solved through teamwork of state actors and civil society3. Many Russian regions have special platforms (institutional settings) for interactions between state and non-state actors4 for solving problems of interethnic tension. There are two main ways for creating such platforms; platforms are either formed with hierarchical or non-hierarchical characteristics. Scientists and public activists have underlined the different characters of relations between actors among the regions, although the causal mechanism is still unclear. We have to examine which approach, hierarchical or non-hierarchical, a region decides to follow and why, and what factors affect their decision. Thus, this paper helps to answer to these questions by taking into consideration the role of informal rules in Russia and concentrating on a variable such as resource interdependence. The methodological approach chosen is controlled comparison of cases with a most similar case design combined with process tracing. The results show differences in institutional settings of platforms for interaction between actors in the chosen regions, supporting the hypothesis that resource interdependence makes actors partners, motivating state actors to non-hierarchical interactions.

Introduction Theoretical Framework Policy making is very centralized and hierarchical in the Russian Federation5. However, there is some evidence of non-hierarchical forms of governance6. Thus, a lot of platforms for interactions between state actors and non-governmental organizations on various issues have been recently established at the federal level. Moreover, regional authorities caught up on this federal trend and 2

Кавказский Узел. 03.01.2009. Год 2008 - свои и чужие в России. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/xenophobia_reality. 3 Civil Society is an arena, situated mostly outside family, state and market; in which people voluntarily interact for promotion of own and public interests and the common good. CIVICUS. 4 Non-state actors are considered private business actors and non-governmental organisations. 5 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009 - Russia, 30 June 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a55bb4237.html. 6 The state’s first official step towards interactions with civil society was made in 2001. The state authorities held the Civic Forum. After having set up the Civic Forum, the Public Chamber was formed. The main step towards the development of dialog between state and non-state actors was made during the second phase of the administrative reform in the Russian Federation. One of the main aims of the administrative reform 2005-2010 is to increase the work effectiveness of state bodies. There are several ways for achieving the aim. One of them is dialog and interaction between state actors and civil society.

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established numerous public and advisory councils to their regional administrations. In spite of being mentioned as non-hierarchical institutional settings, they have hierarchical characteristics in many cases. Scientists and public activists7 have underlined the different characters of relations between actors among the regions, although the causal mechanism is still unclear. Thus, the questions of the paper are Why do regions decide to follow hierarchical or non-hierarchical approach? How does resource interdependence influence their decision? Hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of governance are the heart of the concept of governance. As the main object of the work is an institutional setting of platforms for interactions between actors, the institutional (structure) and actor (process) definitions of governance will be seen as leading. Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf unite these two approaches. According to them, governance is “the institutionalized mode of social coordinated actions which are taken and implemented through collective connected policies” (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995a; Scharpf, 2000). Platforms for interactions between state and non-state actors can be created based on nonhierarchical modes of governance, namely, network governance. The broad definition of networks which refers to negotiation systems will be used in this paper. The formal regulations of these negotiation platforms are fairly similar among Russian regions and suppose nonhierarchical institutional settings which refer to voluntary interaction in which conflict of interests can be solved only through negotiations. However, platforms function in different ways: coordination between actors inside platforms can be hierarchical as well as non-hierarchical. This leads us towards the conclusion concerning the presence of informal rules. “One way of identifying informal institutions is to look for instances in which the similar formal rules produce different outcomes and then attribute that difference to informal institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Formal rules regulating platforms for interaction in Russia are quite new and weak. The numerous “holes” in platforms’ legislation in combination with the tendency of state actors to hierarchical institutional settings8 make the shift towards hierarchical structures possible. In conditions of weak formal institutions, informal rules can play a positive role, as well as a negative role. On the one hand, they can reduce transaction costs, uncertainty, and help to force formal institutions; on the other hand, they can hinder formal institutions to reach their goals

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Gornyj, M.; Sungurov A., Ayropetân, A.. According to the theory of path dependence, there are several conclusions regarding Russia that may be summed up. Firstly, authoritarian and hierarchical traditions are typical for Russia; this means that state actors would prefer to establish hierarchical platforms for interactions. Secondly, institutions were changed in Russia quite often and significantly, thus, most institutions are quite new and weak and can be changed significantly easy by will of powerful actors. Thirdly, informal rules dominate the formal rules, meaning that formal rules regulating interaction platforms are merely “tip of the iceberg” (Denton 2006). 8

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(Lauth 2000). Preference for hierarchical characteristics of platforms’ work demonstrates a conflict between formal and informal rules, while non-hierarchical characteristics represent a positive role of informal rules in the developing of interaction between state and non-state actors. The question to be answered is under which conditions actors will prefer informal rules supporting formal rules or informal rules contradicting formal rules. According to principal agent theory, in frame of the Russian case, the state is a principal, and civil society is an agent. Upon forming the platform for interactions, state actors delegate rights to participate and influence policy making to an agent, namely, non-state actors. Their formal contract consists of formal rules regulating interactions, which in their turn have many “holes”. “Holes” allow different interpretations or/and implementation of the same norms. Therefore, there are many opportunities for opportunistic behavior9. There is the high tendency of opportunistic behavior among state actors due to their wish to get power rights back and having all necessary institutional resources for this. Getting delegated rights back means that platforms will simulate interaction between actors and civil society policy influence. In reality they will be controlled and steered by state actors. Therefore, platforms will have hierarchical institutional settings. Opportunistic behavior is high if asymmetrical dependence is high (Provan 1993). Asymmetrical dependence can be overcome by positive interdependence10. Under the presence of mutual dependence according to the theory of transaction costs, a principle will not use control instruments because of their high costs, and thus, non-hierarchical instruments such as motivation will dominate (Schulze 1997, Kondrašin11 2007).

Hypothesis 1: The higher the positive interdependence between state and non-state actors, the lower the level of opportunistic behavior of state actors and the more non-hierarchical institutional setting of platforms. Interdependence ↑ → opportunism ↓ → non-hierarchical institutional setting↑

Hypothesis 2: The lower the interdependence between actors, the higher the level of opportunistic behavior of state actors the more hierarchical institutional setting of platforms. 9

Opportunism is a “way agents operate, according to their own interests, which is not limited to reasons of morals and contradicted interests of other agents” (Popov 2006). 10 Interdependence exists when the outcomes of individuals are affected by each other’s action (Johnson and Johnson 1989). Positive interdependence exists when there is a positive correlation among individuals’ goal attainments; individuals perceive that they can attain their goals if, and only if, the other individuals with whom they are cooperatively linked attain their goals (Deutsch 1949 a). 11 The transcript system is ISO 9 (International Organization for Standardization, http://www.aurint.de/Transliterationssysteme_Russisch_Deutsch.htm).

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Interdependence↓ → opportunism ↑ → hierarchical institutional setting↑ According to the concept of governance, “…interactions are based on the recognition of interdependence. No single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified social challenges…” (Kooiman 2003:11). Therefore, a lack of resources12 forces interactions between state and non-state actors. The state lacks resources. The question is whether non-state actors possess necessary resources. Civil society also needs resources. The question is whether the state is ready to share its resources with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 13. Hypothesis 1.1.: The more significant the resources14 of civil society and the higher the state readiness to share its resources15, the higher the level of resource interdependence between state and non-state actors. Civil society resources↑ + accessibility of state resources↑ → resource interdependence↑ NGOs’ resources on average are not big in Russia16, and the state, based on path dependence (authoritarian and hierarchical traditions, preference of hierarchical modes of steering by state actors), is usually not ready to support independent NGOs. Therefore, there is a necessity in a strong antecedent condition which strengthens resource interdependence between actors. Since the year 2000, the theme of investment attraction17 in Russian regions has been of high importance. The strategy needs maintenance of a favorable investment climate. A favorable investment climate means favorable tax legislation and necessary infrastructure, and socialpolitical stability (i.e. a good image) of a region18. The last criteria forces regional authorities to maintain sound relations with civil society in a long term, increasing state willingness to share resources. At the same time, civil society benefits from a favorable investment climate, namely

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Resources are regarded as any mean that helps to accomplish an objective now or in the future (Themudo 2000:

6). 13

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) constitute one of the core forms of civil society and distinguish themselves from the state and market. They are autonomous from the state and not oriented on making a profit. NGOs are founded on private initiative and have a concrete organizational structure (Nohlen 2002: 324). 14 Resources of civil society consist of possessing institutional, information and knowledge, manpower, material and organizational and idiosyncratic resources. 15 Accessibility of state resources consists of material, non-material types of state support to NGOs. 16 ГУ-ВШЭ. 15.02. 2007. В обществе нельзя быть "свободным одиночкой" http://www.hse.ru/temp/2007/02_15_kuzminov.shtml; An Assessment of Russian Civil Society (2005) CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Russia_Country_Report.pdf. 17 Investment attraction is the strategy by which an economy brings new money into its communities to expand their economic base. 18 The strategy of investment attraction in the Rostov region, 2004. http://www.donland.ru/content/info.asp?partId=7&infoId=5412&topicInfoId=5412.

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through favorable civil society legislature and access to foreign and regional funding, which can increase the resource potential of civil society. Due to the increasing resource advantage of civil society, state actors are becoming more interested in teamwork with civil society on various issues. Thus, resource interdependence between state and non-state actors grows under the condition of maintaining a favorable investment climate in a region. Hypothesis 1.1.1.: Maintaining a favorable investment climate19 in a region increases resource interdependence between state and non-state actors. Favorable investment climate↑ → resource interdependence ↑

Analytical Framework The framework of this paper is actor centered institutionalism. It is characterized by “its giving equal weight to the strategic actions and interactions of purposeful and resourceful individual and corporate actors and to the enabling, constraining, and shaping effects of given institutional structures and institutionalized norms” (Scharpf 1997: 34). Actor constellation will be described through analyses of types of actors involved in the issue, their interests and resources which they can invest in solving the problem. Institutional settings will be analyzed from two perspectives; they must be seen as both formal and informal institutional settings. A formal institutional setting is based on formal rules (laws), an informal institutional setting consists of working rules. The observation of informal institutional settings can only be made indirectly by describing interactions between actors inside of these settings. The more detailed distinctions between hierarchical and non-hierarchical characteristics of platforms can be defined by using van Waarden’s dimensions for the classification of types of policy network: actors, structures, functions, rules of the game, actor strategies, and power relations Hierarchical20 and Non-Hierarchical Platforms21 of Interaction between State and NonState Actors (Scharpf, 1997; van Waarden, 1992)

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Maintenance of a favorable investment climate within a region is measured by using the investment attractiveness rating of Russian regions, using the rating agency EXPERT; http://www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions. 20 Hierarchical platforms are hierarchical institutional settings for interactions between state and non-state actors. 21 Non-hierarchical platforms are network institutional settings (network, regime, joint-decision system21) for interactions between state and non-state actors. Joint decision systems are formal or informal institutional arrangements, which oblige actors to engage in negotiations with each other. Regimes are formal institutional arrangements, which facilitate negotiations, but do not oblige actors to engage in negotiations. Networks are

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Dimensions

Non-hierarchical

Hierarchical platforms

platforms Formal and Informal Institutional Networks (network, regime, Hierarchy joint-decision system). Settings Actors Type Public\private Loyal\critical NGOs Resource distribution Power relations Strategies Public Actors Private Actors

Level of conflict (about the ways) Functions access to decision making processes for CS consultation or exchange of information negotiation or exchange of recourses coordination of actions cooperation in policy formation implementation legitimacy Structures Boundaries Intensity of relations Type of membership Type of coordination Centrality Degree of delegation Rules of the game No opposition/consensus

Predominantly private Predominantly public actors actors Loyal and critical NGOs Predominantly loyal NGOs Shared between public and Owned by public actors private actors Balance State dominance Access to civil society’s State domination and control resources Access to decision making Access to state finance and process and state resources support Medium

Low

Via formal procedure

Via invitation from state actors

Yes

Possible

Possible Possible Possible Via soft instruments and mutual agreement As a result of team work

No No No Via order and control or no implementation at all As a result of joint meetings

Opened Regularly

Closed In case of an “emergency”

Voluntary, based on an Voluntary, based on application from NGOs invitation from state actors Horizontal Vertical Yes, non-state Yes, state Medium Low Consensus – search

an

No opposition

informal institutional arrangements, which facilitate negotiations, but do not oblige actors to engage in negotiations (Scharpf 1997).

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Methods and Case Selection The methodological approach chosen is a controlled comparison of cases with a most similar case design combined with process tracing. The data is collected via semi-structured interviews with experts and relevant actors, namely, state officials and leaders of NGOs, and questionnaires; content analysis of appropriate laws and documents. Ethnic policy22 and the question of prevention ethnic conflicts23 and tension among youths were chosen based on the criteria of state interest in these issues, the low level of conflict among actors about the aims and the state’s inability to solve the problem by itself due to lack of material, informational and idiosyncratic resources. These criteria help us to concentrate on the interaction between actors rather than concentrating on the battle of NGOs for their rights under the presence of a semi-authoritarian state (Kropp 2009). The chosen Krasnodar and Stavropol regions are very similar in many aspects such as •

geographically, they are located in the North Caucasus; this means that they have got similar historical and cultural features;

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ethnically, the two regions are multiethnic regions and have similar ethnic structures (the biggest ethnic group24 is Russians (more then 80%), the second biggest one is Armenians (5%) and the third one is Ukrainians (2%)); the whole number of ethnic groups in the Stavropol as well as in the Krasnodar regions is approximately 120 ethnic groups25;

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demographically, the regions experienced mass migration in the 90s, and they share similar consequences of this process today: competition in the labor market, in the property market, the pressure on the social sphere, change of the ethnic structures, phobia of migrants, etc26;

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economically, among the Russian regions, the two regions belong to the middle regions concerning economic and social characteristics27;

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Ethnic policy is a system of normative, organizational and ideological measures of a state, which has the aims of solving contradictions in the ethnic sphere and taking into account, combining and realizing ethnic interests” (Tavadov 2007: 252). 23 Interethnic conflict is any form of the civil, political or armed antagonism in which the parties or one of the parties will be mobilized, operate or suffer because of ethnic distinctions (Tiškov 1997: 476). 24 Ethnic group is a self-perceived group of people who hold a common set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contact, including religion, language, history, and common ancestry, giving them a sense of “peplehood”, (Lemay 2000: 24). 25 Russian population census of 2002. 26 Krasnodar and Sravropol regions were one of the most attractive regions for migrants in the 90s (Râzancev 2003). 27 www.socpol.ru/atlas/maps/2_3_1map.gif; inside the type the Krasnodar region heads the list, and the Stavropol region finishes the list.

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•

the Krasnodar region as well as the Stavropol region have ethnic problems today and the regional authorities pay attention to ethnic policy. The regions are also close to old and current ‘hot spots’.

The differences between regions are in the independent and condition variables. While the Krasnodar region in 2008 was characterized as a region with high investment potential and a region with minimal risk for investments, the Stavropol region did not have such achievements28. The Krasnodar civil society is described as relatively strong in comparison to the neighboring regions’ civil societies29. Legislatively the Krasnodar civil society is guaranteed different material and non-material types of state support30, while the Stavropol region does not have analog laws. According to the hypothesis mentioned above, these variables, presence of resource interdependence which is additionally stimulated by a strategy of investment attractiveness of a region, should lead to different institutional settings of platforms for interactions between state and non-state actors in the regions, namely, more hierarchical in the Stavropol region and more non-hierarchical in the Krasnodar region. Two platforms for interactions between actors on the issue will be analyzed and compared in each region. The paper is structured into the 5 parts: the first two chapters provide the analysis of the state of the issue, thus, Chapter 2 describes the state of ethnic sphere in both regions and Chapter 3 presents the discussed issue between actors; the next three chapters are caused by the analytical framework, thus, Chapter 4 presents actor constellation in frame of the issue; Chapter 5 analyzes the formal regulations of the compared institutional settings; Chapter 6 presents negotiations within the platforms and at the end of the work a summary of results will be presented.

State of Regional Ethnic Sphere The analysis of the interethnic sphere of the Krasnodar region shows that the situation was very dangerous in the 90s and till 2005. After 2005 the situation has stabilized and has significantly improved. The problems of the 90s were caused by the political, economical and social crises in Russia and intensified by the uncontrolled migration in the region. The tension in the social and 28

http://www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions. Every year Krasnodar NGOs show their competitive strength in winning presidential grants: http://nbfond.ru/konkurs-grantov/granty-2009/spisok-pobeditelej/, http://nbfond.ru/konkurs-grantov/granty-2008/spisok-pobeditelej/, http://nbfond.ru/konkurs-grantov/granty-2007/spisok-pobeditelej/. 30 There are the laws “On charity activities in the Krasnodar region”, 2002; “On interaction between state actors and public organizations”, 2003; “On grants”, 2003; “On public hearing”, 2005; the regional target program “On assistance to development of civil society 2007-2009; 2006 in the Krasnodar region. 29

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economic spheres made it fruitful for politicians to use an ‘ethnic card’ in order to mobilize population. The ex-governor of the region used Cossacks as an electoral base. The ex-governor not only underlined the leading role of Cossacks among other ethnic groups in the region, but also made discrimination pronouncements towards some ethnic groups31. The position of the regional administration did not change after the current governor came to power in 2000. The new governor also supported Cossacks. He accused migration and several ethnic groups to cause the problems of the region. Moreover, some so-called Cossacks’ organizations used power methods against undesirable ethnic minorities. This policy was supported by the regional administration32. As a result, the Krasnodar region was linked very often with ethnic tension and conflicts in the media. The Turks’ problem and complaints of other ethnic groups suppressed by the regional authorities were made public by NGOs33. The discriminations in the region became internationally known. The representatives of international organizations such as the Soviet of Europe visited the region34. International attention and ethnic tension in the region forced the regional administration to change its ethnic policy. The change of the situation was very important under the influence of investment attraction strategy of the region. The strategy needed not only the development of technical basis, but also a presentation to investors that the region is safe and secure for investments. This strategy became a priority for the region due to federal interests. The ex-president Vladimir Putin did his best to take the Winter Olympic Games 201435 to Sochi (the Krasnodar region). Moreover, since 2002 the federal centre has organized the international economic forum in Sochi36. Further, in spite of the regions geographically belonging to the North Caucasus, it was not included in the new North Caucasus federal district37, which unites the problem regions of the North Caucasus. This underlines the special attitude of the federal authorities to the Krasnodar region as a secure and stable region for investments. It was clear for the authorities that pressure is useless because -

NGOs showed they are strong enough to fight against discrimination;

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Осипов, Александр, 2004: Краснодарский край как витрина российской национальной политики Диаспоры, 2004, №4, с. 6-37. 32 Осипов, А. 2004. 33 Кавказский узел. 02.02.2007. Правозащитники Краснодарского края просят СЕ обратить внимание на дискриминацию нацменьшинств. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1175012.html. 34 Кавказский узел. 15.03.2006. Делегация Совета Европы прибыла в Краснодар. http://www.kavkazuzel.ru/newstext/news/id/958840.html. 35 РУССКИЙ NEWSWEEK. 05.07.2007. ЗИМНЯЯ ОЛИМПИАДА 2014 ГОДА ПРОЙДЕТ В СОЧИ. http://www.runewsweek.ru/news/sport/18893. 36 The international investment forum in Sochi (Krasnodar region) has taken place every year to attract investments for southern Russian regions. 37 Moscow Times. 19.01. 2010. Khloponin Tapped to Head New Caucasus District. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/khloponin-tapped-to-head-new-caucasus-district/397772.html. Russia Profile. 20.01.2010. A Human Shield. http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Politics&articleid=a1264013211.

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Pressure could bring good results but only in short term conditions; investment attraction strategy needs long-term ethnic stability.

The state actors chose partnership and paternalistic strategies towards NGOs. Interest of state authorities in long-term stability in combination with relatively strong civil society created possibilities for interaction. For the first time in December 2005 the governor met with 40 representatives of ethnic NGOs (EthNGOs). This, however, does not mean that the ethnic sphere in this region became stable. Nevertheless, almost all interviewed leaders of EthNGOs mentioned that since 2005 the situation in the ethnic sphere is getting better due to the teamwork of state and non-state actors38. The achievements of the Krasnodar administration in the regional ethnic policy were marked by the State Duma’s committee for ethnic affairs. Moreover, in 2007 the experience of the Krasnodar region in realizing ethnic policy was proclaimed as exemplary for other regions by the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Especially, the following positive experiences were mentioned: organization of interaction with EthNGOs, prevention of ethnic conflicts, good cooperation with the media and the political parties39. While during 2000-2005 the Krasnodar region was characterized as a very problematic region among “Russian” 40 regions in the North Caucasus; in 2007-2009 the leading position belonged to the Stavropol region41. The regional authorities tried very hard not to accept the fact that ethnic tension was high. Conflicts with ethnic components were called conflicts of everyday life42. Such practice had negative consequences. In May-June 2007 mass youth unrests in the capital of the region took place. The mass fight between Russian and Caucasian youth in May led to mass protests at the beginning of June43. The conflict had characteristics of an ethnic conflict because the fighting parts were united by their ethnic identity. The survey44 shows that every second person in Stavropol estimated the situation as potentially dangerous. The regional and local authorities were not able to deal with the situation for several days. Without official 38

Interviews with leaders of Krasnodar EthNGOs in October 2008 and May 2009. 08. 02. 2007. Евгений Трофимов: В Краснодарском крае отлажена система мер по реализации государственной национальной политики. http://www.duma.gov.ru/index.jsp?t=news/indexa.jsp&file=3951.html. 40 North Caucasian regions in which Russians are an ethnic majority call “Russian” regions. 41 Кавказский узел. 25.06. 2009. ГУВД: массовые драки в Ставропольском крае возникают из-за экономических причин. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/155841. 42 Новая газета. 31.05.2007. Массовое побоище в Ставрополе пытаются представить как «бытовое» и правоохранительные органы, и власти города, и руководители этнических диаспор. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/40/22.html. 43 Аствацатурова М. А., 2007: СТАВРОПОЛЬСКИЙ КРАЙ: МЕЖЭТНИЧЕСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ В ЭТНОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОМ ЛАНДШАФТЕ. Журнал «Казанский федералист», 2007 , №3-4 (23-24). http://www.kazanfed.ru/publications/kazanfederalist/n23-24/10/. 44 The survey of the scientific-educational centre "Innovation and Research in the Social Sphere" of the Stavropol State University, October 2007. 39

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information the population was informed by rumours45. The high readiness of the population to believe rumours and the speed of their spread underlined the existence of high interethnic tension among the regional population46. The negative influence on the state of the regional ethnic sphere also showed the political competition between the governor and the mayor who represented different political parties. The competition grew into opposition between the executive and legislative branches of power47. In spite of that none of the parts used an ‘ethnic card’, the lack of communication between the regional and local authorities did not allowed them to work and react to the conflict together and energetically. Both sides used the conflict in order to underline the inability of the other side to deal with the issue48. While the authorities did not act, leaders of EthNGOs played an important role in calming down people of corresponding ethnic groups49. Arriving at the region, the deputy head of the federal envoy in the Southern Federal Districts worked with EthNGOs regularly and often during the conflict situation and several months after50. The authorities have not recognized officially that the conflicts had ethnic features. However, after the conflict authorities’ work increasingly on ethnic problems. The authorities together with education centres conducted several surveys for getting more information about the state of the ethnic question in the region. Moreover, the regional authorities established the Youth advisory body for ethnic affairs to the committee of youth affairs. The conflict puts into question the ability of the authorities to react co-ordinately and immediately; competences of the law enforcement bodies; effectiveness of the regional ethnic policy; presence of work with the media; effectiveness of work with NGOs; authorities’ ability to inform the population51. Therefore, while the Krasnodar authorities were able to stabilize the ethnic sphere, the Stavropol authorities mainly lost control over the issue.

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Новая газета. 07.06.2007. Как ставропольские власти проиграли информационную войну. Есть жертвы. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/42/08.html. Вечерний Ставрополь. 09.06.2007. Мы – за открытый диалог с людьми http://www.vechorka.ru/gazeta/?b=view&articleID=7969. 46 Национальный синдром. Интервью с Авксентьевым. http://www.tribuna.ru/articles/2007/06/22/article6976/. 47 Report about the Stavropol region within the “Stabilizing Northern Caucasus: Development of Institutional Conflict-Prevention Mechanisms” New Eurasian’s project which is supported by the Secretary for State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (British Embassy, Moscow). 48 Русский Репортер. 14.06.2007. Взорвется ли Ставрополье? http://www.rusrep.ru/2007/04/nacionalniy_konflikt/. 49 Вечерний Ставрополь. 06.06. 2007. Призыв к миру и объединению. http://www.vechorka.ru/gazeta/?b=view&articleID=7915.Обращение консультативного Совета по вопросам национальноэтнических отношений при администрации города Ставрополя к жителям города. http://stavropol.stavkray.ru/bezop/pksovet/work/national.htm. 50 Ставропольская правда. 06.06. 2007. Точка кипения. http://www.stapravda.ru/20070606/TOChKA_KIPENIYa_5557.html 51 Report about the Stavropol region within the “Stabilizing Northern Caucasus: Development of Institutional Conflict-Prevention Mechanisms” New Eurasian’s project which is supported by the Secretary for State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (British Embassy, Moscow).

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Issue Interethnic conflicts and tension put political, economic and social stability at risk. Therefore, ethnic policy, which strives for interethnic peace, is seen as an essential part of maintaining political, economic, social stability52. Both regions have problems in the ethnic sphere. One of the biggest problems for both regions is the growth of nationalism and ethnic extremism among the youths53. In 2008 there were four local youth conflicts between different ethnic groups in the Krasnodar region. Seven of eight ethnic motivated crimes in the region committed in 2007-2008 were committed by young people at the age from 16 to 35. Most of them were members of informal youth extremist unions54. In the Stavropol region ethnic tension among the youths grew into a mass fight between Slavic and Caucasian youths in May 2007. One Chechen was killed. In June 2007 two Russians were killed. These murders were seen as revenge of Chechens. This leaded to a mass unauthorized demonstration of Slavic youth with the slogan “Russia is for Russians”. The survey about the attitude of students toward the state of interethnic relations among youths shows that 13% of the youths in this region are ready to join extremist organizations. The report of the Stavropol administration for 2008 reports that 62% of young people are ready to participate in conflict situations in order to protect the interests of their ethnic groups. The growth of interethnic tension among youths is dangerous not only for public security, but also for political stability as it has a tendency to erupt into mass unrest and terrorism. The issue discussed between state actors and NGOs in this context is how to maintain interethnic stability among youths in both regions.

Actors Constellation Types of Actors The realization of ethnic policy is the obligation of the regional executive structures. Thus, state actors are represented by the regional administrations and by the law enforcement bodies in both regions. Governors carry the main responsibility for the realization of ethnic policy and the maintenance of interethnic peace and stability. The regional administrations also have special departments which are responsible not only for forming regional ethnic policy, but also for 52

Concept of the State Ethnic Policy of the Russian Federation, 1996. According to the law of the Russian Federation, youths are citizens of Russia between the age of 14 and 30. 54 Report “On measures for prevention of extremist activities among the youths”. Department of youth policy to the administration of the Krasnodar region, 08. 04. 2009. 53

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interaction with public organizations. In the Krasnodar region there is the office for interaction with public organizations, religious organizations and monitoring of migration process with the department for interethnic relations and interaction with EthNGOs. According to the normative act regulating the work of the office, its main aims are preservation of interethnic and interdenominational peace and harmony; and consolidation of social and political forces for supporting social-political stability of the region. The office is submitted to the deputy head for internal affairs of the administration. The main obligation of the department derives from its name, namely, interaction with EthNGOs55. In the Stavropol region the committee for interethnic and Cossacks’ affairs was established in 2006 as a successor of the department for ethnic questions and interaction with religious organizations to the Council for public and economic security of the regional administration. The legal status of the committee was enhanced. Nowadays the committee is directly submitted to the governor. The main tasks of the committee are the formation of regional ethnic policy; state support to Cossacks; participation in state policy concerning Russians living abroad; interaction with religious organizations; ethnic monitoring; maintaining interethnic peace; assistance to ethnic cultural autonomies (ECAs)56. The key difference between the named offices is that the Stavropol committee is not obliged to interact with EthNGOs, the committee is obliged to help only ECAs, other types of EthNGOs are not mentioned in the resolution. As long as the problems connect two policies, namely, ethnic and youth policy, youth departments are also involved in the process. Among the main directions of activities of youth departments are the prevention of spread of extremism and social, ethnic and religious intolerance. The youth department of the Krasnodar administration in comparison to the Stavropol department includes the special section which is responsible for the prevention of extremism among the youths. Other involved state actors are the Council of security to the Krasnodar and to the Stavropol regional administrations, the law enforcement bodies such as the department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, the Federal Security Service, as well as the regional prosecutions. There are some differences between the regions in organizing the authorities’ work on the issue. While the Krasnodar authorities were succeeded in forming a vertical structure in realization of ethnic policy between local and regional levels, the Stavropol regional authorities were not able to establish such coordination, i.e., because of the conflict between the governor and the mayor of Stavropol. The Krasnodar authorities also concentrate on the work with the media and the 55

Resolution of the Governor “On the office for interaction with public organizations, religious organizations and monitoring of migration process”, 2004. 56 Resolution of the Governor “On the committee for interethnic and Cossacks’ affairs”, 2006.

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political parties on the issue. In the Stavropol region work with the press and political parties were more complicated because of the strong competition between two regional political elites. Another part of interaction is NGOs which are represented mostly by NGOs along ethnic lines (EthNGOs). Regional ethnologists who also actively work on that issue do it within educational centers, EthNGOs or NGOs. Private actors such as ethnic businessmen are also key actors, however within ethnic policy they are usually members of EthNGOs and act within and on behalf of these NGOs. There are over 120 EthNGOs in the Krasnodar region. 31 EthNGOs are members of the NGO “The Centre of Ethnic Cultures” (CEC). This NGO has no analog in Russia. All other ‘Houses of Friendship’ are municipal organizations. The Centre of Ethnic Cultures was established in 1992 as a regional NGO. The main aims are development of ethnic cultures and teamwork between EthNGOs and state actors57. Nowadays the NGO is a recognized platform for interactions between state actors and EthNGOs on the issue. Among numerous EthNGOs the biggest and the most active EthNGOs are established by Armenians58, Adyghe, Russians, Cossacks, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Polish, Greeks, Georgians, Germans, Jews, Abkhazians, Ossetic, Dagestani, Gypsies, and other ethnic groups. EthNGOs usually have the aim of realization of interests of respective ethnic groups. There are also NGOs working on the issues on behalf of the regional population such as “Southern Regional Resource Centre” (further SRRC), the Youth Group for Tolerance “ETnIKA”, the regional NGO of graduates of Russian Universities and others. There are around 85 registered EthNGOs in the Stavropol region. Analog to the CEC the Stavropol Congress of ethnic groups of Russia can be seen, which includes around 16 EthNGOs. This NGO was established in 2003 and declared the following aims: forming directions of ethnic policy, participation in formation and realization state public programs, and prevention of ethnic conflicts59. In the interview with the author the leader of the NGO said that in spite of putting these aims the NGO does not pursue any political purposes60. Among other EthNGOs Armenian EthNGOs, Slavic EthNGOs and Cossacks’ organizations should be mentioned. Concluding, there are the similar actors’ types with similar tasks within in the sphere of regional ethnic policy in both regions.

http://kubanetnos.ru/. There are over 40 Armenian NGOs in the region. The most powerful Armenian NGO is a regional office of The Unity of Armenians of Russia. 59 Кавказский узел. 12.07.2003. Зарегистрирована новая общественная организация - "Ставропольский конгресс народов России". http://old.kavkaz-uzel.ru/printnews/news/id/576569.html. 60 Interview with the leader of the Congress of ethnic groups of Russia, September 2008. 57 58

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Actors’ Interests Maintaining interethnic stability is one of the direct obligations of regional authorities. The regional authorities are interested in solving the problem because this is not only a question of their competence but also of the stability of their power. After the construction of a "power vertical" in the Russian Federation61, governors are responsible directly to the federal authorities for their failures. In ethnic policy, for example, the regional authorities of the Stavropol region have to write a report to the deputy special representative of the president in the Southern Federal District on the situation in the ethnic sphere every three months. EthNGOs are not interested in the growth of the problem, as a conflict with ethnic components has a negative impact on the image (status) of ethnic groups and, thus, on their social status in society. Many EthNGOs have officially declared the aim of maintaining interethnic peace in their main regulations. Thus, most actors are interested in maintaining interethnic stability on the whole and among youths in particular. Moreover, the actors agree that the interethnic problem demands the teamwork of state actors and NGOs. State actors underline this in their target programs62, non-state actors reflect the aim to interact with state actors in their regulations. However, formal readiness to interact and its factual realization depend significantly on personal characteristics of people who are responsible for that interaction. Thus, in the Stavropol region till the end of 2008 the staff of the committee for interethnic and Cossacks’ affairs was represented by people of so-called “old generation”, who saw the danger for the region in ethnic diversity63. According to the opinion of interviewed regional EthNGOs, the main work of the committee was connected with Cossacks64, while ethnic minorities were forgotten65. In the Krasnodar region the corresponding department was formed relatively recently in 2004 with “new young people”, who did not have “luggage from the past”. As soon as the regional administration changed its attitude towards ethnic policy, the work of the department was positively estimated by EthNGOs. Interviewed EthNGOs underlined their positive experience of work with the department66. 61

The complex of measures conducted from 2000-2008 under V.V. Putin in order to strengthen the federal power and weaken the regional power. 62 The regional target programs “Harmonization of interethnic relationships and the development of ethnic cultures in the Krasnodar region” (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008), “Development of interethnic and interdenominational relationships in the Stavropol region 2007-2009” recognize that NGOs (in particular EthNGOs) play a very important role in maintaining of interethnic tolerance, interethnic stability and underline the necessity of developing an interaction between state actors and NGOs in ethnic policy. 63 The representative of the committee mentioned in the interview that the authorities are not interested in providing conditions for education of ethnic languages, because it leads to “brain drain”. 64 http://www.stavregion.ru/organi_vlasti/komitet_nac/events/. 65 Interviews with leaders of Stavropol EthNGOs in September 2008 and May 2009. 66 Interview with leaders of EthNGOs: “Active regional ethnic policy, active dialog between the authorities and EthNGOs, real dialog” (Abkhazian NGO); “Thanks to the teamwork of the authorities and EthNGOs the reasons for

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Being interested in interethnic peace the Stavropol regional authorities nevertheless do not have such strong motivation in long-term methods for its achievement as their colleagues in the Krasnodar region. While the Krasnodar authorities understand that for investment attraction it is not enough to have no open ethnic conflicts, however, the roots of conflicts must be solved. In comparison, the Stavropol authorities are satisfied with the situation of absence of obvious conflicts67. It is enough to show the federal authorities that the regional authorities can deal with the situation. Despite officially accepting that teamwork between state and non-state actors is important, the Stavropol state actors are convinced that the regional civil society is weak, and thus, the real teamwork is hardly possible68. There are also some differences in interests of NGOs in the regions. In the Stavropol region the status of a head of an EthNGO is regarded as very prestigious among local communities. Thus, it is common within the region that people are more motivated by their own selfish aims rather than by interest of their corresponding ethnic group. As a result, some EthNGOs rather represent the interest of a small circle of people and not of their ethnic group69. Thus, the authorities’ question “Whose interests do leaders of EthNGOs represent?” is understandable. During the confrontation between the governor and the mayor many parallel NGOs representing the same ethnic groups were established in the Stavropol region. Many of them see each other as opponents and do not interact with each other. These EthNGOs were established by the state actors in cooperation with ambitious representatives of ethnic groups. This division made it more difficult for regional EthNGOs to consolidate. Thus, it was not possible for leaders of state and public Cossacks’ organization, two regional Azerbaijani and Chechen NGOs and numerous Armenian NGOs to forget their political interests during 2006-2008 and combine their force or at least become negotiation partners in their interactions with state actors. Most EthNGOs are interested in peace; however, their activities in this direction are limited due to their limitation on the interest of a small circle of people and/or ethnic elites. The last tendency is quite obvious in the Stavropol region. State actors are also highly motivated in achieving interethnic peace but also have different kinds of motivation to achieve the aim. While in the Krasnodar region the authorities are motivated by financial investments to achieve long

conflict situations were solved” (Belarusian NGOs); “The process of the dialog is continuing, the level of interaction is close” (Gypsy NGOs). Representatives of EthNGOs have contact details of the authorities including cell phone numbers. 67 Investment attraction as priority was proclaimed by the Stavropol governor at the end of 2008. 68 Interview with the head of the committee for informational policy and mass communications to the administration of the Stavropol region, May 2009. 69 Interview with the well-known Stavropol ethnologist: “Very often EthNGOs are headed by not the best representatives of corresponding ethnic groups. We can not see these EthNGOs as representatives of respective ethnic groups”.

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term interethnic stability, the Stavropol authorities are satisfied with short term methods of achievement of ethnic peace.

Actors’ Resources EthNGOs can possess the following resources: institutional70, informational and knowledge71, material and organizational72, manpower73 and idiosyncratic resources74. The strongest resource base among the Krasnodar NGOs has the Southern Regional Resource Centre (SRRC). The SRRC owns the following resources Institutional resources: The members of the NGOs are members of different public councils and advisory bodies to state bodies, i.e.: the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Public Council to the president of the Russian Federation; the Public Council to the Governor of the Krasnodar region, the Advisory Body to the Krasnodar department of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation, etc. Informational resources: The NGO has constant access to the internet, has its web-site and prints monthly the newspaper “New reality”, periodically prints the magazine for NGOs “Idealist”, has a data base about more than 1000 NGOs. Knowledge resources: The NGOs owns technologies of realization of public campaigns and actions; training programs on all aspects of NGOs’ activities; methods of leading grant programs; methods of regulation of interethnic conflicts and so on. Manpower: The members of the NGOs are experts in the following fields: finance management, accounting, employment management, public relations, interethnic relations, conflictology. Financial resources: the NGO is financed by the Agency of the USA for international development, the institute “Open Society”, Mott’s Fond, Fond of Macarthur, TACIS and other foreign and international organizations. For 12 years of work the SCCR realized projects for more than 55 million dollars. The main projects were on development of civil society; development of tolerance of interethnic relations. Organizational resources: the NGO rents property 88 square meters; has equipments; a car; an internet line.

70

Institutional resources are actors’ rights deriving from formal regulations. Informational and knowledge resources are awareness about the problem and knowledge of possible solutions. 72 Material and organizational resources are financial funding and organizational basis, namely, offices and equipment. 73 Manpower resources are quantity and qualification of members. A regional EthNGO unites formally from a dozen to a hundred people and much more informally, including families of members. 74 Idiosyncratic resources are personal characteristics and abilities, reputation and access to politicians. The main idiosyncratic resource for EthNGOs is popularity and authority of a leader of the EthNGO among the ethnic group and the regional population. 71

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Idiosyncratic resource: the leader of the NGOs is an ex-highly ranked state and regional official, a well-known ethnologist and public activist; a head and a deputy head of two advisory bodies75. The strong resource potential has the Krasnodar CEC, which owns the following resources Institutional resources: The authorities have recognized an important role of the NGO in the process of interactions between state and non-state actors on the issue. Information and Knowledge resources: more than 30 EthNGOs are members of the NGO who meet and exchange information regularly. Manpower resources: each of 31 members has up to several hundreds members. Financial and organizational resources: The NGO has a three-store building in the centre of Krasnodar. The building is used free of charge by EthNGOs. The municipal authorities also pay for public utilities. Within the building around 20 EthNGOs have offices. There are also 2 rooms, which are used as conference rooms or for performances. The NGO has its web-site and constant connection with the Internet. The web-site is financed by the municipal budget. The web-site plays an important role in informing the population about history of ethnic groups of the region, about activities of EthNGOs, about corresponding laws. The NGO won a federal grant in 2008. Idiosyncratic resources: leaders of 31 EthNGOs are authoritative people in the region76. Among existing EthNGOs it is worth mentioning the resource potential of the Union of Armenians of Russia. The NGO has its regional departments in both regions. Moreover, in the Krasnodar region there are more than 30 local departments of the NGO. The NGO receives money from membership fees, donation of natural and juridical persons including foreign persons, profits from exhibitions, lotteries; entrepreneur, publishing, intellectual activities and so on. The NGO has the aim to unite Armenians in Russia. Armenians are the second biggest ethnic group in the regions. Thus, the potential for manpower is really significant. Many Krasnodar EthNGOs have an office, Internet resources and other basic resources which are necessary in order to concentrate on direct activities. In comparison to Krasnodar EthNGOs, most of the interviewed leaders of EthNGOs in the Stavropol region mentioned financial problems. As a result, most time they have to concentrate on searching for money rather than on their original tasks. Many EthNGOs do not have offices, and members meet them at private flats. These EthNGOs which have offices claim that they do not have enough money to pay for public utilities. The situation became worse when the exmayor of Stavropol limited financial privileges and benefits for NGOs. Financial and 75

http://www.srrccs.ru/. Savva M. is a head of the SRRC, professor of the Kuban state university, doctor of political science and PhD of social science; 1994-1995 was the head of the department for ethnic affairs to the Ministry for ethnic affairs and regional policy of the RF, 1995-1996 was a deputy head of the Krasnodar city administration. 76 Most of them are businessmen, scientists, sportsmen.

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organizational problems are also problems of the Stavropol Congress of ethnic groups of Russia. EthNGOs also add that the process of financing from the regional budget is not transparent. Lack of money, leads in many cases, to the existence of an EthNGO only on a paper. Further the lack of authority of a NGO’s leader leads to lack of manpower and idiosyncratic resources. The weakness of Stavropol EthNGOs can also be explained by the absence of any significant support from the state actors. Thus, while the Krasnodar authorities use a wide range of supporting measures, combining material (regional grants77, financial support: for one arrangement to each EthNGO per year78), non-material (regional programs), organisational support (population informing about EthNGOs79), and institutional mechanisms (NGOs have access to public councils) 80. The authorities of the Stavropol region for the last years did not financially or organisationally support EthNGOs, however, some EthNGOs got the access to public councils81. Resource distribution among actors shows that in the Krasnodar region NGOs have significant resources which can be invested in solution of the issue. Moreover, state actors use different methods for supporting and strengthening resource bases of EthNGOs82. While in the Stavropol region EthNGOs are busy with the problem of getting offices and other necessary resources for existence. In addition, Stavropol authorities do not use any obvious methods of material or nonmaterial support of EthNGOs. Formal Institutional Settings of the Platforms In this paper two platforms for interactions between state and non-state actors in each region will be analyzed, namely the advisory body for interethnic affairs to the governor (case 1) and the youth advisory body for interethnic affairs to the committee for youth affairs (case 2) in the Stavropol region and the CEC (case 1) and the advisory body to the department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar region (case 2) in the Krasnodar region. 77

Resolution of the governor of the Krasnodar region “On grants of Krasnodar administration for supporting useful public programs of public associations”, 2003. 78 As a part of the regional target program “Harmonization of interethnic relationships and the development of ethnic cultures in the Krasnodar region” (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 79 The administration finances publication of books, pamphlets, insets in local newspapers about EthNGOs, about life of ethnic groups. 80 For example, the deputy head of the Gypsy NGO stated that the authorities help them with information, to get contacts with necessary people (state officials, experts), to get rooms for conferences, simplified permissions for carrying out arrangements, to invite people to their conferences and so on. 81 In the Stavropol region there is no law about regional grants. The regional target program does not provide financial support for EthNGOs. No one from 15 interviewed leaders of EthNGOs mentioned any type of support from the regional authorities for the last 5 years. 82 Financial support from the state, on the one hand, can be seen making dependent on the state, on the other hand, as a result of interaction. Having enough material resources a NGO can concentrate on its direct aims.

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Stavropol Region: Case 1 the Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor In order to address the interethnic tensions in the Stavropol region, the regional administration organized two advisory bodies for ethnic affairs, one reporting to the governor and one reporting to the regional department. The main tasks of the body reporting to the governor are to develop offers for the harmonization of interethnic relations, prevention of ethnic conflicts, preservation and development of ethnic cultures. The platform’s functions are to hold consultations with EthNGOs and religious organizations for solving the above mentioned issues; to discuss relative bills; to take part in respective scientific researches; to inform the population about state activities in the ethnic sphere; to help the media to explain the aims of ethnic policy. The staff is formed from representatives of state bodies and public organizations, predominantly, ethnic and religious public organizations. The body is headed by the governor. Meetings are held as often as necessary. Meetings are finalized by decisions which can have the form of recommendations. Decisions are made by majority vote83.

Stavropol Region: Case 2 the Youth Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Committee for Youth Affairs According to the regulation of the youth advisory body, it is a consultative body and was established in order to organize interaction between the regional authorities and public organizations as well as with EthNGOs to discuss the most important social, ethnic, cultural and education aspects of ethnic youths. The main tasks are forming proposals on the realization of state youth ethnic policy in the Stavropol region, harmonization of interethnic relations, prevention of interethnic conflicts among youths and pass them in the right order to the government of the region; working out proposals on realization ethnic, cultural, education programs and initiatives for development of interethnic relations, education of respect to other ethnic groups and their cultures. The functions are the same that the advisory body to the governor has. The staff of the body is formed by representatives of state actors, public organizations and EthNGOs of the Stavropol region. The head of the body is the head of the committee for youth affairs. Meetings are hold as often as necessary, but at least once within three months. At the end

83

Resolution of the governor of the Stavropol region “Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor”, 2005.

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of meetings decisions are made in form of recommendations and resolutions. Decisions are made by majority vote84. The legal regulations of both bodies are very similar in the parts of tasks, functions and formation process. In both laws there is lack of information about criteria of membership, about who sets the agenda. The process of decision making is not mentioned, and the recommendation status of the bodies’ decisions is underlined. The main difference is the regularity of meetings, in the last case members are obliged to hold a meeting at least once in three months, in the first case there is no prescription. Krasnodar Region: Case 1 Centre of Ethnic Cultures This case is different from other cases due to its more informal structure. Members of the NGO as well as state actors view this platform for interactions as important. However, there is no legal provision regulating interaction between state and non-state actors within the platform. The main formal rules which can be found are: there is no limitation for the access of EthNGOs to the umbrella organization and thus, to platform’s work; there are several criteria for membership: a candidate must be registered as a regional EthNGO, has to have a statue and aims; offices within the NGO’s building are given based on results of the contest between NGOs. However, the priority has “old” members85. Krasnodar Region: Case 2 the Advisory Body to the Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar Region (further DMI) According to the law, the advisory body is a voluntary unity of NGOs’ representatives, representatives of education, medical and sport institutions. The body is a consulting body to the DMI whose decisions have recommendation status. Meetings are arranged at least 2 times a year. The head of the DMI confirms the staff of the body and a change of the staff. Candidates to membership to the body are considered during meetings based on the proposals of the members, the DMI and confirmed by the head of the DMI. A new candidate has to have at least three recommendation letters from current members of the body. A head and a deputy head of the body are confirmed by the head of the DMI only under conditions that their candidates were supported by most members of the body. State actors can not be members of the body. However,

84

Decree of the administration of the Stavropol region “Youth Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Committee for Youth Affairs ”, 2007. 85 Interview with the leader of the CEC, May 2009.

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they can participate at meetings as experts. Experts have the same rights as members excluding the right to vote. An annual agenda of the body is formed by the members during the first meeting in a current year and is coordinated with the head of the department. Every member has the right to add and correct an agenda. Every member also has the right to say his or her opinion about any question of body’s activities; to submit proposals, remarks, and corrections in discussing questions; to participate in preparation of materials to meetings; to take part in realization of decisions; to give interviews about the body’s work to the media. If there is a disagreement among members concerning a certain question, a special commission for finding a compromise can be established. Decisions are made by majority vote. If a member does not agree with a decision, he or she can write his or her individual opinion. This opinion will be a part of materials of the meeting. Meeting’s protocols can be distributed through the media or/ and the Internet. The body makes decisions which are formed as determinations, addresses. Decisions can be sent for implementation to corresponding bodies. Decisions have a recommendation status86. In comparison to the legal regulations of other platforms this platform has more detailed formal prescription, namely, there is some information about access to the platform, about agenda setting, about decision making. The important difference is also that only NGOs can be members of the body. The following similar “holes” of the formal rules that regulate interactions of state and non-state actors within the platforms can be seen 1) lack of information about procedure of access to the platforms, 2) lack of information about agenda setting, 3) lack of information about process of decision making, 4) decisions of platforms have recommendation character, state actors are not obliged to respond to these recommendations in any form. 5) lack of information about implementation of decisions. In other words, this arises several questions: Who has access to policy making? Who sets the agenda? How are decisions made and whether decisions will be implemented?

86

Resolution of the DMI “On the advisory body to the department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar region”, 2008. The “Advisory body to the department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Stavropol region” was organized in the Stavropol region. Till February 2010 there was only one meeting in February 2009, so it is not possible to analyze the negotiations between state and non-state actors in framework of this institutional setting.

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The first gap gives state actors the potential to include loyal NGOs, while the second and the third may allow state actors to rule policy formation and decision making. The last “holes” may lead to a lack of results on the work of such platforms. These gaps are regulated by informal rules which differ from region to region.

Interactions within the Platforms Stavropol Region: Case 1 the Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor The advisory body to the governor was reestablished in 200587. Meetings are held approximately once a year. After coming to power of a new governor in 2008, the staff of the body was slightly changed. There are 24 members: 10 state actors, 8 public organizations, 4 scientists, 2 religious leaders) 88. The staff changes are made by state actors without any consultation with non-state members89. The protocol of the meeting on the 10th of May in 2007 helps to make some conclusions about the process of decision-making within the body. In the meeting the role of Slavic NGOs was discussed. The topic was brought up by state actors. The state actors’ attitude was: -

many EthNGOs have different resources (material, organizational, manpower), the main problem for the state is that they should be used in the right way;

-

Slavic EthNGOs play an important role in maintaining interethnic peace;

-

many Slavic EthNGOs have extremist features;

-

most Slavic EthNGOs do not interact with each other;

-

Slavic EthNGOs do not want to interact with the authorities;

-

there are 9 Slavic EthNGOs in the region. In reality only 3 EthNGOs work;

-

the committee wanted to support them; however, positive results were not achieved.

Suggestions were made: -

to establish Slavic EthNGOs with special aims in order to prevent conflict situations;

-

to recognize Russian nationalism as a serious public appearance and work on it.

The recommendations were made in form of common tasks for state bodies to improve the state of Slavic ethnic groups90. Interestingly, the recommendations were spoken out by state actors and did not suit the logic of the discussion during the meeting. This leads to the conclusion that they were made before the meeting by state actors. This gives ground to the idea that, actually

87

“Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor” was established in 1993 and in existence until 1998. In 2005 state officials decided to reestablish the body. 88 Enclosure “On the staff of the Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor” to the resolution, in reduction on 30.09.2008. 89 Interview with ex and current members of the body, September 2008, May 2009. 90 Minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Governor on 10 May 2007.

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NGOs play an insignificant role in decision making process as well as in implementation of decisions; their participation was not mentioned in the recommendations. It is worth mentioning that NGOs do not resist these conditions openly. One reason is that the EthNGOs members of the body are loyal to the state actors. State actors decide by themselves who can be a member. The right of NGOs is to accept or reject the offer. Almost all interviewed state and non-state actors, members as well as non-members of the body pointed at the decorative character of the platform. According to official documents the regional administration created the advisory body reporting to the governor in order to provide consultation about the most important social, cultural and educational aspects of life for Stavropol ethnic groups and in order to collect NGOs proposals on how to maintain interethnic stability in the region. In reality, however, the only role of EthNGOs in these meetings is to increase the legitimacy of state actions in the ethnic sphere. As a result, this advisory body showed its ineffectiveness during the conflict between different ethnic youth groups in May and June 2007 in Stavropol. It could not prevent the conflict and did not emerge as an institutional arrangement for negotiations in the aftermath of the conflict, when intensive negotiations between state actors and EthNGOs took place, because many key EthNGOs were not members of this advisory body. Therefore, the platform is ruled by state officials. This means that state actors not only head the advisory body, invite the members, hold meetings, but also set the agenda, propose decisions and implement them.

Stavropol Region: Case 2 the Youth Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Committee for Youth Affairs After the conflict the regional administration established a new advisory body on the departmental level in order to provide consultations between state actors and EthNGOs on the harmonization of interethnic relations and the prevention of interethnic conflicts among youths. The head of the body is the head of the committee for youth affairs. State actors appointed members after calling to leaders of loyal NGOs with a request to delegate one youth representative. This body consists mostly of EthNGOs, namely, youth representatives of EthNGOs and its meetings take place every 3 months. The agenda is formed by officials of the committees of interethnic and youth affairs. The aims of the meetings are to get information from EthNGOs and to inform them about the state’s attitude towards the issue. At the meeting in autumn 2008, i.e., the advisory body addressed the “Russian march” that was planned by Slavic NGOs during the Unity Day of the Russian Federation. The initiative of the meeting belonged to the state actors, moreover, the members saw the agenda only at the meeting. The state actors 25

sought to receive information about which EthNGOs were going to participate. In order to prevent unrest, state actors asked EthNGOs to persuade ethnic youths, especially the nonRussian youths, not to undertake any opposing action. The suggestion from non-state members to use the media to inform the population was not taken into consideration by the state actors91. The work of the advisory body demonstrates that it concentrates on the consequences of the problem rather than on the reasons. According to a questionnaire issued by the author, the members of the advisory body maintain that the main advantages of the participating EthNGOs consist in getting information from state actors about their priorities in ethnic policy and the possibility of influencing decision making by informing state actors about their interests and views. They, however, remarked that it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the body. On the one hand decisions made had still not been realized at the time the questionnaire was issued92. On the other hand they highlighted the importance of the advisory body as a platform for negotiations not only for state actors and EthNGOs but also for the youths of different ethnic groups93. Thus, the regional administration once again heads the advisory body, appoints the members, organizes the meetings and sets the agenda. The state actors want to use the platform as an arrangement for providing their interests in ethnic policy as well as getting necessary information from EthNGOs. Thus, both platforms were established and are ruled by state actors. The role of EthNGOs concludes physical presence at meetings for increasing legitimacy of state actors’ decision in the ethnic sphere and providing information to state officials. Krasnodar Region: Case 1 Centre of Ethnic Culture There are also two negotiation platforms on the issue in the Krasnodar region. There is no special platform for interactions on ethnic problems. The interviewed non-state actors explained that the regional authorities do not want to establish any in order not to attract too much attention to problems of the ethnic sphere. Another explanation is that there are not enough conscious NGOs which can provide proper work of this body. The role of the main platform for negotiations between state actors and EthNGOs was taken by the regional NGO “Centre of Ethnic Cultures”, which unites more than 30 EthNGOs. This NGO regularly organizes meetings of EthNGOs and 91

Agenda of the meeting of Youth Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Committee for Youth Affairs on September 30, 2008 and personal participation of the author at the meeting. 92 The question about which decision was made and realized was not answered by 6 of 7 interviewed members. 93 Questionnaire for the members of the ”Youth Advisory Body for Interethnic Affairs to the Committee for Youth Affairs in the Stavropol Region”, September 2008.

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representatives of state bodies. Meetings are arranged 1-2 times a month. The CEC regularly organizes, with the support of state actors, discussions about different topics concerning interethnic relations and invites leaders of EthNGOs and state officials from different branches and levels of power. Within this platform EthNGOs define the problem, set agenda and propose policies. The status of decisions made is relatively high as state actors attend the meetings. State actors appreciate attending the meetings because the CEC unites almost all influential EthNGOs. Thus, state actors get extensive information about all relevant problems in the ethnic sphere and can discuss solutions94. In 2008 the problem of interethnic relations among youths was raised several times. For example the role of the family in promoting interethnic tolerance among youths was discussed. Being an informal body it is difficult to follow the results of such meetings. In interviews, conducted with the author, EthNGOs stated, however, that state actors take their information and suggestions into consideration95. Teamwork of state actors and the NGO also occurs in organization and realization of different arrangements such as ethnic festivals, concerts and so on. Thus, in 2008 more than 400 ethnic cultural and sport events were realized. The members of the CEC took participation in many of them. The biggest annual ethnic cultural arrangement is the regional festival “Wreath of friendship of Kuban ethnic groups”. The festival is organized by the NGO and supported by the regional administration within the target program96. Krasnodar Region: Case 2 the Advisory Body to the Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar Region Another platform is an advisory body on the departmental level. The department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia in the Krasnodar region founded the advisory body in order to increase the legitimacy of its actions and normative acts and to increase its ability to address problems, particularly ethnic conflicts and extremism among youths. The body work has the aim to increase and intensify the interaction between the department and public organizations, to assist to the work of the department, to increase the legal culture among staff of the department, to form among the population an objective assessment about DMI activities, and to create a positive image of police servants. The staff of the body is formed by NGOs after co-ordination with the head of the department. All members including the head and the deputy head are members of various NGOs, religious 94

Interview with the head and deputy head of regional and local departments responsible for interactions with EthNGOs, Krasnodar, October 2008. 95 Interviews with the members of the EthNGOs “Centre of Ethnic Cultures”, May 2009. 96 Маштоц. 29. 11. 2008. B Краснодаре прошел VI краевой фестиваль национальных культур. http://www.mashtots.ru/publikacii/v-krasnodare-proshel-vi-kraevoj-festival-nacionalnyx-kultur.

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organizations, business structures, representatives of the cultural, sport, and education spheres. 5 members out of 39 are directly connected with the ethnic sphere. Namely, the head of the body is a well-known ethnologist and the head of the NGO “Southern Regional Resource Centre” (SRRC); one member is the head of the CEC; another member is the leader of a Jewish EthNGO, and the 2 last members are heads of NGOs working on ethnic issues. State actors are not allowed to be members. However, they participate in meetings as experts without the right to vote. Thus, 19 state actors have the status of experts. They represent such state bodies as the DMI, the office for interaction with public organizations, religious organizations and monitoring of migration process, the department for youth policy, the department which is responsible for providing mass events, the department for Cossacks’ affairs and so on. The presence of the authorities raises the status of the decisions because consultations between state actors and NGOs increase the feasibility of the decisions. The agenda is coordinated by NGOs and the head of the department, and the implementation of decisions is checked during the next meeting97. Meetings are held at least twice a year, but the members work permanently according to a plan that is established by the member-NGOs. The problems of interethnic relations in general and efforts against extremist activities among youths in particular are among the main efforts of the advisory body work. According to the 2009 working-plan of the advisory body, which is the result of negotiations on the issue in 2008, several actions are planned to address interethnic tensions among youths such as the study of youth subcultures in the Krasnodar Region, a round table with members of the advisory body and leaders of regional EthNGOs on the formation of interethnic tolerance among youths, meetings with the media on questions of preventing crimes by persons under the age of 18 and the prevention of extremist activities among youths; publishing materials about ethnic groups living in the region, for example, Tajiks, Gypsies; several meetings and round tables on the prevention of extremism and terrorism98. Besides, one member-organization of the advisory body developed and realizes the program “How to live in a multiethnic city?” in 2008, a project financed by the Netherlands. The aim is to educate people in tolerance and respect for the cultures of different ethnic groups. The suggestions at the end of the program were presented to the state actors99. The members of the platform work with the state actors close and regularly. Thus, in August 2008 the city department for youth policy and the NGO of graduates of Russian Universities organized the discussion about tolerance within the training seminar for youths from different countries100. In November 2008 the regional department for youth policy organized the 97

Interviews with the head and two members of the body, May 2009. http://www.guvd-kuban.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3295&Itemid=36. 99 Общественная дискуссия: Как жить в мультикультурном городе? 31.03.2008. http://www.guvdkuban.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2030&Itemid=36. 100 28.08.2008. Дискуссия о толерантности. http://www.kkoovrv.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=345&Itemid=45. 98

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seminar “Prevention of extremist activities among youth” for coordinators of work with the youths. The trainers were representatives of regional NGOs101. In 2008 the SRRC worked closely with the department for youth policy. As a result the following surveys were made and materials were published: Kuban youths and religious; Questions of prevention of extremism; Methods of mental and patriotic education of youths; Conflict potential of the Krasnodar youths; Methods of decreasing and prevention of extremism among the youths102. Therefore, within the Krasnodar platforms NGOs can get access to the platforms through formal procedure, influence agenda setting; actively participate in decision making and in implementation of these decisions. While the Stavropol platforms mainly simulate teamwork in order to increase legitimacy of state actors’ decisions in ethnic policy.

Conclusion In both regions, the regional authorities created or supported institutional arrangements for interactions with NGOs on the issue of maintenance of interethnic peace. However, the structure and context of platforms’ work considerably differ. In the Krasnodar region NGOs participate in platforms’ work actively and negotiate with state actors at all steps of the policy cycle from problem definition to implementation of decisions. Moreover, NGOs and state actors were able to establish permanent working bodies regarding the issue. In the Stavropol region, in contrast, the role of EthNGOs was limited by the state actors reducing its main task to providing information to state officials without having the power to influence decisions. These differences can be explained by a low level of interdependence, namely, resource interdependence between state and non-state actors in the Stavropol region and a higher level of resource interdependence in the Krasnodar region. The lack of offices and financial resources impede Stavropol EthNGOs from focusing on their professional activities. The regional EthNGOs are weak and are not able to consolidate their forces. State actors do not see them as a constant partner. At the same time, the regional authorities use short-term strategies towards civil society, which consist of working together only in case of ‘emergencies’. In other words, they merely join forces when there is a threat for political security. During periods between ‘emergencies’, state actors mainly ignore civil society. 101

Plan of the regional seminar for coordinators of work with the youths of municipalities of the Krasnodar region from 21.11.2008 to 27.11.2008 “On prevention of extremist activities among the youths” . 102 http://www.srrccs.ru/browsePublications.do?magazineId=9.

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Ignoring also appears in lack of state support to the regional civil society. The lack of positive interdependence leads to the establishment of hierarchical platforms for interactions between state and non-state actors (Hypothesis 2). In the Krasnodar region, the regional authorities do their best to attract investments. The use of hierarchical mechanisms for the dealing with civil society in 2000-2005 proved to be harmful for investment attraction103. The authorities changed their strategy in 2005 by choosing the partnership and paternalistic strategies towards NGOs104. These strategies made NGOs stronger and more significant as a partner. Solving financial and organizational problems give EthNGOs the ability to focus on the issue and engage state actors in interactions through the created informal platform and participation in the platform created by the regional authorities. Thus, in the Krasnodar region, NGOs have resources which state actors need for solving the issue, and state actors share their resources motivated by the necessity of good long-term relations with non-state actors for maintaining a favourable investment climate. Mutual dependence overcomes opportunistic behaviour of state actors and leads to non-hierarchical structures of platforms for interactions between state and non-state actors (Hypothesis 1). The results show differences in institutional settings of platforms for interaction between actors in the regions, supporting the hypothesis that resource interdependence makes actors partners, motivating state actors to non-hierarchical interactions.

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