Idea Transcript
Kumho Tire Applied (Adapted from Sarah M. Buel, Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University)
1.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1999) (explaining that Daubert's “gatekeeping requirement” applies not only where experts rely on scientific principles but also where experts give experience-based testimony).
2.
Following the Court's decisions in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho, Congress amended FRE 702 in 2000: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. According to the Advisory Committee's note, the Court adopted these changes in response to Daubert and cases applying Daubert, including Kumho and Joiner. FRE 702's broad language sought to account for the Daubert factors, while not requiring any single factor and permitting trial judges to consider other relevant factors articulated both before and after Daubert. This approach provided the trial judge with significant discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.
3.
From a 2010 law review article: Kumho Tire Co.v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999), significantly expanded upon and clarified the Court's previous holding in Daubert, finding that: (a) the Daubert factors apply to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists; (b) Rule 702 and 703 grant all expert witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses only when that testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the witness' discipline; (c) the Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test, but should be applied in a flexible manner and only when they constitute a reasonable measure of reliability; (d) among the factors a court should consider in determining whether to apply the Daubert factors are the nature of the case, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his/her testimony; (e) whether the Daubert factors are reasonable measures of reliability in a given case is a matter of law for the trial judge to resolve; and (f) trial judges have broad discretion in making Daubert rulings.