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A Doctoral Thesis.

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Louise Strode

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LANGUAGE,

CULTURAL POLICY AND NATIONAL IN FRANCE, 1989-97

by Louise Strode

A Doctoral Thesis

Submittedin partial fulfilment of the requirements for the awardof Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

September1999

© by Louise Strode 1999

IDENTITY

ABSTRACT

The French State, and political elites operating within it, have a long tradition of involvement in the has been language This the production, managementand even control of and culture. - and remains identity. important in definition State-led French terms the model of of construction and of a Against this background, the present thesis examines conceptions of French identity held by political elites, the agents of the State, in relation to language and cultural issues prominent on the policy-making agenda in the 1990s. The thesis specifically considers the possibility that elite visions of identity may be changing under the influence both of new approachesto French cultural introduced by from 1980s the the Socialists, and specifically the Ministry of Culture policy-making led by Jack Lang, and of a seriesof potentially destabilising challenges to French models of cultural identity debated in have been the 1990s. policy and which

In order to examinetheseissues,the thesistakesthree casestudies,focusing on political debatesin the public arena surrounding a number of language and cultural policy issueswhich have been perceived as symbols of French identity.

The regulation and promotion of the French

language, audiovisual broadcasting policy and the Internet are selected as case study areas,which reveal these perceptions, and point to anxieties about identity in the debateswhich surround them. Thus these debates are used as a means of reexamining contemporary elite perceptions of French identity. This examination is carried out through the close reading of contributions to the debates, made by political figures of significance in each case study area. The term `political elites' is used in the sense of Pareto's definition (1935, in Parry, 1969, pp.34,46) of the elite as a `governing elite', composed of all political `influentials', whether or not they act for the State, as part of a government, or indirectly as part of the wider polity, in opposition.

The casestudiesdemonstratethat elite conceptionsof identity in Franceof the 1990s,whilst disturbedby contemporarychallengesto French cultural policy-making, did not changein any fundamentalway. Instead,they illustrateda reversionto traditional, rigid conceptionsof identity, ratherthan the welcomingof more dynamicandhybrid ones.

Table of contents List of Abbreviations

iv

Acknowledgements

v

CHAPTER 1 Language, cultural policy and national identity in France: introducing the links 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Introducing identity and culture in France 1.3 The development of a national identity in France, pre-1945 1.3.1 Building Republican identity 1.3.2 Spreading Republican identity 1.4 National identity and modernisation in France, post-1945 1.4.1 The search for stability

1 3 5 7 10 15 15

1.4.2Thebirth of consumerculture

17

Malraux's Ministry of Culture

22

1.4.3 French identity, `High Culture' and the establishment of

1.5 Identity debates and global change: towards destabilisation identity? French State culture and national of views of 1.5.1 The challenge of immigration 1.5.2 The end of Empire and decentring of identity 1.5.3 Nations, culture and global change 1.5.4 Global change, cultural imperialism and identity 1.5.5 Multiple identities?

1.6 `Popular' culture asnational culture and new identity? 1.6.1French cultural policy in the 1980s 1.7 Conclusion:language,cultural policy andFrenchidentity in the 1990s

26 27 29 30 34 38

41 43 50

CHAPTER 2 Methodology: the challenges of exploring language, cultural policy and identity in contemporary France

2.1 Introduction 2.2 The role of political elites andtheir discoursein this study 2.2.1Examiningpolitical communicationin the French context 2.3 Constructingthe corpus 2.3.1 Gathering the data 2.3.2Developingthe corpus and researchaims 2.3.3 Selectingthefinal corpus 2.4 Writing and analysis 2.5 Summary

i

53 56 60 66 66 71 74 75 79

CHAPTER 3 Language policy and French national identity: from the ancien regime to the loi Toubon 3.1 Introduction: overview of language policy and identity formation in France 3.2 Language policy in the twentieth century

3.3 Languagepolicy in the 1990s

3.3.1 The `loi Toubon'and French identity 3.3.2 Thepassing of the loi Toubon: its effects and aftermath 3.4 Conclusions

80 84

90 93 99 105

CHAPTER 4 Meeting international challenges for French in beyond Europe language identity French and policy national 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 France in the world: the extent of the challengesfor the

107

French languageandfrancophonie in the 1990s 4.1.2 TheEuropeanchallengefor the French languageand French identity

109 113

4.2 The French language and national identity in Europe and

beyondin the 1990s

115

4.2.1 Contextualisation of the texts chosenfor detailed analysis 4.2.2 European integration as a threat to the French language fear identity: of uniformity and the imposition of English and 4.2.3 Interpreting thefear of uniformity

115

4.2.4 Multilingualism and French universalismas alternativesto uniformity

4.2.5 French elite resistanceto languageswithin Europe, other than English 4.2.6 Opportunitiesfor the French languageand identity: linking the EUand francophonie

117 122 124

126 129

4.2.7 Francophonie, `Europe' and a universal mission 4.2.8 Beyond Europe -francophonie as universal alternative to global uniformity

132

4.2.9 Francophonieand identity after the cold war 4.3 Conclusions

141 145

136

CHAPTER 5 French national identity, audiovisual policy and European integration in the 1990s- the GATT debate and beyond 5.1 Introduction 5.1.1Audiovisual industriesand the French tradition of regulation 5.1.2France, audiovisual regulation and the EuropeanCommunity/ Union 5.2 France,the GATT debateand Europeanaudiovisualpolicymaking in the 1990s

151 153

5.2.1 Cultural exception and the GATT debate

160

5.2.2 TheFrench battlefor audiovisual regulation since the

Uruguay Round 5.2.3 Contextualisation of the texts chosenfor detailed analysis

ii

156 160

164 166

5.2.4French and Europeanidentity: opennessthreatenedbyfree trade 5.2.5 A French and European battle for identity 5.2.6 French identity and the rejection of consumerism 5.2.7 The special nature of French identity, in opposition to its

169 172 174

Others

177

5.2.8 France, Europe and the challenges of a new world order

180

5.2.9 Opportunities for protecting and promoting French identity

through European audiovisual policy 5.2.10 Francois Mitterrand 's vision of a `cultural Europe': further opportunities for promoting French identity?

5.3 Conclusions

181 185

189

CHAPTER 6 French identity in the `information society': the Challenge of the Internet 6.1 Introduction 6.1.1 The Internet in France: a threat to French identity?

193 194

6.1.2 TheFrench Stateand communicationstechnologies

196

6.2 The Internet's challenge to French identity 6.2.1 Contextualisation of the texts chosenfor detailed analysis 6.2.2 The scale of the Internet's challenge: the uncertain 'Digital Revolution' 6.2.3 The French language and identity in a global communications diversity, difficulties threats to the and market: of regulation 6.2.4 Policy ambiguities: regulation versus opportunity 6.2.5 Promoting French identity on the Internet

201 201

6.2.6 Thefrancophone 'mission' against uniformity 6.3 Conclusions

226 232

204 208 214 220

CHAPTER 7 General conclusions 7.1 Overview 7.2 Contribution to wider fields of research 7.3 Project limitations and directions for future research

235 241 243

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 Primary sources

1.1 Statementsby individual Ministers and other policy-makers 1.2 Institutional publications/documentation 2 Secondary sources 2.1 Presssources 2.2 Books andjournals

iii

247 260 269 280

List of Abbreviations ACCT

Agence de la Cooperation culturelle et technique

ALF AMI AN ARP

Avenir de la languefrancaise Accord multilateral sur l'investissement AssembleeNationale Associationauteurs,realisateurs,producteurs

CAEF CDS CEC CIA

Conseil de l'audiovisuel exterieur de la France Centre des democrates sociaux Commission of the European Communities Central Intelligence Agency

CILF CNC CSA CSLF

Conseil internationalde la languefrancaise Centrenational de la cinematographic Conseil Superieurde 1'Audiovisuel Conseil superieurde la languefrancaise

D2 MAC DGLF

Name of a digital standard Delegation generale ä la langue francaise

DGT DOM-TOM EC

Direction generaledesTelecommunications Departementset territoires d'outre-mer EuropeanCommunity

EU

European Union

FD

ForceDemocrate

FN

Front National

GATS

GeneralAgreementon Tradein Services

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

G7 HCF HDTV IHEDN IT JO MEDIA MILIA NGO OECD PAL PC PCF PS PTO RPR SECAM UC UDF UN UNESCO VOD WTO

Group of sevenleadingindustrialisednations Haut Conseilde la Francophonie High Definition Television Institut desHautesetudesde Defensenationale Information Technology JournalOfficiel Mesurespour encouragerle developpementde l'industrie audiovisuelle Marche internationaldu livre illustre Non-GovernmentalOrganisation Organisationfor EconomicCooperationand Development Phaseon Alternate Lines PersonalComputer Parti Communistefrancais Parti Socialiste Public TelephoneOperator Rassemblement pour la Republique Sequentielcouleur ä mesure Union desCentristes Union pour la Democratiefrancaise United Nations United Nations Education,Scientific and Cultural Organisation Video-on-Demand World Trade Organisation

iv

Acknowledgements It would not have been possible to conduct this research and write this thesis without the help and support of many people. Firstly, I especially wish to thank my supervisor, Dr Phil Dine, who devoted so much time to discussing my thesis with me. His comments and guidance, as well as constant encouragement to `keep going', Professor invaluable. director difficulty, My times of research, particularly at of were Alec Hargreaves, was also always willing to provide useful advice on many points. Other staff (present and former) of the Department of European Studies have contributed to the preparation of this thesis, through commenting on draft chapters, offering practical advice and the loan of books and articles, and suggesting further Allen, Linda Hantrais, Smith, Dave Mike John Marks, to avenues explore, especially and Steve McGuire. I would also like to acknowledge the support of several former tutors at Aston University, where I was an undergraduate, who were very supportive as I began my graduate studies, especially Lorna Milne and John Gaffney, also Lynne Wilcox, who shared valuable insights gained from her research into French language policy. My research in Paris was greatly facilitated by the kindness and advice of many staff working within government departments and other organisations, as well as political parties. Several of these people continued to offer help whilst I was in I should especially mention Estelle Baiche at the CNC, the UK. working Frederique Mauduit, Sylvie Comut-Gentille and Evelyne Pierre at the Ministere de la Culture, Jacqui Richard at the Service d'information du Gouvernement, Nelly Damonneville at the HCF, Josseline Bruchet at the DGLF, Colette Martin at the Maison des Francais a i'etranger (Ministere des Affaires etrangeres), and staff at the library of the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Back in the UK, Laurie McGarry at Loughborough University Library was always willing to help me search for particular documents, and I would also like to thank others who corresponded with me and sent useful information, such as staff at the French Embassy in London, plus Jean-Pierre Jeancolas and Patrick Vittet-Philippe. Thanks are also due to many fellow postgraduates and friends who discussed the practical side of my research with me, and especially Sue Hopkinson and Rachel Jones, who were always ready to listen when I needed to moan to somebody! Finally, for their unwavering support and encouragement, I owe a very special thank-you to my family, especially my parents and my husband Graeme Clarke, to whom I am forever indebted.

V

CHAPTER ONE: LANGUAGE, CULTURAL POLICY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN FRANCE: INTRODUCING THE LINKS 1.1 Introduction The aim of this thesis is to explore the perceptions of French identity that were held by political elites in France in relation to the language and cultural issues prominent on the policy-making agendain the 1990s. The term `political elites' signifies in the first instance the most important actors of the State who take part in policy-making, including both politicians and administrative elites. The peculiar overlap between administrative and political posts in France has been highlighted by various authors, and is discussed further in Chapter Two.

These groups are

likely to be products of the French State's clearly established mechanisms for the creation of elites through highly centralised education and training, as described by Suleiman (1974,1978, 1984). The French State has a long tradition of involvement in the production, managementand even the control of language and culture, predating the Revolution (Cook, 1993, pp.8,10; Looseley, 1994, p. 18; Ruby et al., 1993, p. 15). This has been important in terms of the construction and definition of a State-led conception of French identity, and the attitudes surrounding it. Political elites are more specifically taken in this thesis to signify politicians involved in either policy formulation, or debates on culture and its relationship with national identity, whether or not they act for the State, as members of the party in government at a given time. This definition follows Pareto's conception of the elite as `governing elite', composed of all political `influentials', whether they exercise this influence directly as part of a government, or indirectly as part of the wider polity, in opposition for example (1935, in Parry, 1969, pp.34, 46)'.

Policy-making in France on languageand culture has developedand become more institutionalisedsincethe establishmentof the Fifth Republicin 1958by Generalde Gaulle,and the creation of the first Ministry of Culture in 1959 headedby Andre Malraux. From this period,termslike Culture andla politique culturelle (cultural policy) have found significancein France,and have been the subjectsof much debatefor various sectionsof the French polity (amongstother groups). Studyingthe attitudesof political elites towardsidentity in connection with policy-making on languageand culture can enhanceour understandingof the factors 1 Vilfredo Pareto (1935) The Mind and Society (Treatise of General Sociology), New York, Harcourt Brace.

1

influencing such policy-making in contemporary France, and in particular of the continuing importance and meaning of the role of identity in this process. The broad intention is that debates communicated by political elites in the public arena - that is, the statements of be legislation, linguistic focusing used as a can on particular areas of cultural and politicians lens through which to reexamine contemporary elite perceptions of French identity. More specifically, the thesis aims to consider if, and if so, to what extent, contemporary elite visions by French in both influence light the identity be the the of approaches of new changing of may State to cultural policy-making introduced from the 1980s, and recent challenges to this policy from beyond the State which may impact on French identity. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the theoretical groundwork for this investigation of identity, literature identity, by the cultural a of review of surrounding means perceptions of debatesand cultural legislation in France. It is argued that elite perceptions of French identity in relation to language and culture represent a key topic of research and debate because of the long-standing role of the French State, and political elites more generally, in the development of French identity through policy in linguistic and cultural areas. The role of the State is itself subject to continuing debate. It is argued that debate surrounding the State's role in language has intensified in the post-1945 period, as France has modernised, decolonised and and culture developed into a consumer society. This is because such a transformation has in turn entailed the questioning of (amongst other issues),received conceptions of culture, national and cultural identity, and of the influence of the State on these. This has particularly been the case for the found institutions, having eventually once criticised established post-1968 generation who, themselves in policy-making positions and the unprecedentedelection of a Socialist President and government after 1981.

These debates,and their effects on post-war cultural policy-making are reviewed, togetherwith ways in which identity hasbeenconceptualised.Despitethe influenceof possible in in identity brought debates by shifts perceptionsof and policy about social change,cultural it is France, post-war not the casethat elite visions of Frenchidentity havechanged.Rather,the developmentof a seriesof issuesanddebatesin the 1990saroundpossiblechallengesto French policy-making on languageand culture, and to the elite views of identity which inform these, has revealed the tendency of policy-making elites to frequently revert to traditional, rigid conceptionsof identity, as opposedto an embracingof more dynamic and hybrid ones. This is the key argumentwhich I wish to presentin this thesis,and it is outlined through analysisbased

2

demonstration in to the this of three the chapter, related concluding section of on aims outlined the elite preference for traditional conceptions of identity. I will illustrate the complexity of the language French to and cultural policy a series of contemporary responsesof political elites issues, demonstrating these responses to be fundamentally undynamic, and revealing many tensions and ambiguities. The rest of the thesis is structured around three case studies. Following a methodology issues from discussing design the attempt to analyse the arising of my research, and chapter for in identity, Chapter debates Two, I the then to context provide go on political about identity in France through an exploration of the and culture understanding elite conceptions of identity The in State-led (Chapter Three). language French the next construction of centrality of three chapters (Four, Five and Six) consist of case studies of political debatessurrounding some have implications development for issues in 1990s the the which safeguard and cultural policy from films in language, be French to culture various sectors, which may regarded as symbols of of French national identity, given their role in the construction of a State-led vision of French identity and the range of State resources and policies which have traditionally been devoted to them. The regulation and promotion of language, audiovisual broadcasting policy and the Internet are selected as case study areas,which reveal these aims and anxieties about identity in the debateswhich surround them. The case study chapters illustrate the central argument that identity in France, disturbed by French to conceptions of whilst elite contemporary challenges cultural policy-making, are not changing. Finally, the seventh chapter concludes the thesis with findings the summariesof main of the case studies, and suggestionsfor further research.

1.2 Introducing identity and culture in France `Culture' and `identity', are terms which are surroundedby seemingly endlesstheories and in fields the controversies of social, political and cultural studies. `Culture' is a term that has beengiven a variety of meaningsin severaldifferent contexts,discussed,for example,by Jenks (1993) and Featherstone(1995). In the contextof contemporaryFrance,the word `culture' has a long-standingstatusas an important term, much usedand debated(Cook, 1993,p.4; Rigby, 1991,pp.4-5). Rigby for example(1991, p. 197) notes how cultural debateor discoursehas been, and remains, `such a vital componentof French intellectual life'. And as Cook notes (1993, p.2) `Thereare as many definitions of culture as there are writers on the subject'. For example,culturemay be consideredin a narrow senseasrelating to artistic creativity, or it may

3

be given a more broad, anthropological interpretation in the sensethat all cultural practices and representationswithin a society may be taken into account. These would include, for example, arts, beliefs, institutions and forms of communication, encompassing specific cultural forms such as `popular culture'. `Culture' may refer to the values of a group, the norms they follow, the material goods they create, indeed their whole way of life. In addition, `cultural studies' often examines the relations between ideology and culture, such as how power and domination are produced through culture (Grossberg et al., 1992, p.4). As McGuigan describes (1997, p.5), recent work in cultural studies has been increasingly concerned with `race', sexuality or gender issues. Examples are the work of Gilroy (1987,1992,1993) and Mercer (1990). What is of interest in the context of this study is the selection made by French elites of certain aspects of culture for debate and promotion, and how these choices have been and continue to be, so bound up with the construction and maintenanceof a French national identity. As has already been noted above, the French State has, since the ancien regime, played a key in role the development of national identity in France, through the production, organisation and even the control of culture. As Flynn notes: `The myth of the state and the myth of the nation have been intimately interwoven in France' (1995a, p.3). This in turn impacts on issues of culture, as Ritaine suggests: `Dans le savoir politique francais, la triade Peuple-Nation-Culture est centrale: la culture y est le fondement de la nation, l'instruction du peuple est l'instrument majeur de la democratie.'(In French political thought, the relationship between People, Nation and Culture is central: thus culture is the foundation of the nation, and educating the people is the key to democracy) (1983, p. 13).' Moreover, as Hall argues (1992a, p.293), identities can be constructed through the production of `meanings about "the nation" with which we can identify [Hall's emphasis]'. These meanings, Hall maintains, are contained in the `stories' which are told about a nation, as well as memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed by it'.

The significance of views such as these will be demonstrated

below, when I review the literature treating the origins of this relationship between `People, Nation and Culture' in France. However, by way of introduction to this central point, it is first necessaryto consider what `identity' signifies, and its position in the investigation charted by this thesis.

2 This and all subsequenttranslations are my own, unless otherwise stated. The use of square brackets denotes where I have quoted part of a sentence or section from a text.

4

`Identity', writes Billig (1995, pp.7-8), is a strange notion, which cannot be found `within the body or mind of an individual'!

In simple terms, the term indicates the senseof

being, that is, who and what you are, and where you belong. Billig goes on to describe identity as not a `thing', but `a short-hand description for ways of talking about the self and community' (1995, p. 603). Staab too offers a similar view of identity, and argues: `Through such an identity the individual locates and defines him or herself in the world, acquiring a collective personality basedon sharedvalues, experiencesand orientations' (1998, p.34). Identity may be linked with a place such as a city or country, or a people, such as an ethnic group, a religion, a gender, identity besides level, for So, being sexuality, a profession, example. conceived of on a personal in be discussed may relation to a group or collective (Preston, 1997, p. 54). Hence we may speak of the significance of `national identity', `cultural identity', for example. Furthermore, it is often more appropriate to consider `identities', as a person or group may adopt more than one identity at any given time. Identity may not remain the same, as it may be subject to change, disturbance or disruption from various forces. As Hall maintains (1995, p. 65), identities are `points of suture, points of temporary attachment, [ ]a way of understanding the constant ... transformations of who one is or as Foucault put it, "who one is to become"'. So identity can be constructed in multilayered and contradictory ways.

What is of particularinterestin the contextof this study is clearly the conceptof `French identity'; what it is to be French. Especiallyimportantthen to review first of all are notionsof `French identity', including `French national identity', and, closely linked to that, `French identity' cultural andhow thesehavedevelopedin line with the Frenchnation-state.Following on from this introduction, I considerhow ideas about identity in Francehave been subjectto changeandredefinition over time, andhow theseideashavebeenlinked to the developmentof culturalpolicy. Throughexaminationof thesedebates,I will identify the possiblechallengesto the State'sviews of identity which have emerged,before the rest of the thesis considersthe impact of thesechallengesas they are illustratedin contemporarypolitical debateson cultural andlinguistic policy.

' Billig refers to K. Bhavnani identities, A. Phoenix (1994) introduction', `Shifting and an shifting racisms: -K. Feminism and Psychology, no.4, pp. 5-18, and to J.Shotter and K. Gergen (eds) (1989) Texts of Identity, London, Sage.

5

1.3The developmentof a national identity in France, pre-1945 Identity can be conceptualised as a historical and social construction. It has been argued that the developed than invented time identity is rather over and artificial one, concept of national an imagine. Thus immemorial, has time as we might something that simply existed naturally since `a time histories', through believe `national tell passing people, which us about we cannot "our" people, with "our" ways of life, and "our" culture' (Billig, 1995, p.71). Instead, Anderson (1983), proposes a definition of the nation as an `imagined political community' (p.7). Anderson explains how factors like the development of `print capitalism' (newspapers, the language, literacy, for the the religion, of of standardisation encouragement novel, example), in defining State the the the and enlargement a role of all played education, colonial exploration imagined, (1990b, imagined Bhabha 1) the nation as community. p. also views nation as an requiring construction and narration: Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully in horizons image Such the their realize mind's eye. an of the nation - or narration, might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the West. An idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force. Similarly, Hobsbawm (1983, p. 1) argues that the formation of national identities works partly through the creation of nationwide symbols and `invented traditions', stressing that the `traditions' of a nation which may be taken for granted as long-established, may in fact have been `invented' relatively recently. Hobsbawm goes on to discuss the development of particular `mass-produced' examples of such traditions in late nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, such as education, official public holidays, commemorative ceremonies, heroes and sporting events. So the rise of the nation-state, besides transforming the ways that people thought about themselves and their communities, transformed identity, even introducing the notion of `identity' itself into everyday vocabulary (Billig, 1995, pp.61-2, with reference to Giddens, 1990).4

`SeeAnthony Giddens(1990) The Consequences Modernity, Cambridge,Polity. of

6

1.3.1Building Republicanidentity Billig explains that throughout Europe in the Middle Ages, there was little conception of to little identity, territorial `English', being `French' nation a of conception and or national as S how have the France, (1995, In 19-21) the to noted authors various case of owe allegiance pp. its language in its in far from being Republican `united traditions and culture' and country, (Rigby, 1991, p. 8), and moreover, becoming `the most State-centred of all European nations' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 132), required its national identity and cultural unity to be `constructed' by be France's `shift This to the modern world', viewed as of could part artificial means. process in how, for `the (1997, 108), France, described by Preston shift was made the who explains p. as form of a revolutionary upheaval, the construction of a self-conscious republic and thereafter a 1) in (1992, ideals life'. Brubaker the these p. routines of everyday slow process of embedding argues that modern-day France was created on the basis of a political ideal of Republican institutional in `the to and territorial frame of the state', thus reinforcing the nationhood, relation in the ancien regime. of established nationhood political understanding

The building of

citizenship meant that cultural differences had to be subordinated. Indeed, Brubaker maintains that `while French nationhood is constituted by political unity, it is centrally expressed in the for cultural unity'. Thus the French nation-state which was gradually formed advocated striving assimilation, in deference to a single political and cultural centre (pp. 1,3,5).

So cultural and

linguistic homogeneity was formed by what Llobera calls `state generated nationalism' (1994, p.200). Johnson describes (1993, p.49) how at the time of the Revolution, symbols of nationhood now taken for granted did not exist in France, such as a national flag, a national language. So, as Billig argues, `the `nation' was not a concrete entity, whose existence all for take citizens could granted. It was a project to be attained' (1995, p.25). The Revolution then created a new community, which Johnson describes as believing in a `mythical past which linked it to Greece and Rome, and with its own symbols and rituals'. He also maintains that the key theme of the Revolution which emerged was that of being in danger, particularly from enemies who worked in league with foreigners. It was this fear, which allowed rival political in groups the Assemblee nationale (National Assembly) to work towards this new community,

5Although Billig noteshowthedatingof thenation-state's by some in Europehasbeencontested appearance

historians(1995,pp.19-21).

7

flags, like linked to army rituals to and symbols rhetoric, and nationalist aggressive and exploit 6 became Revolution French loyalty. the Thus, synonymous, the nation and colours and oaths of develop to 49). Political (Johnson, 1993, not only elites attempted p. as nationalism spread (Weber, `unity idea but the of spirit' of nationhood, a political and administrative structures 1977, p.97). The French Republic, Nouvel and Ruby argue (1992, pp.3-6), became a `grand liberty, its by (1979), in Lyotard terms the message of unrivalled and used narrative', institutions, be legitimacy transmitted public services, social security via could universality and and the military.

Indeed, Weber explains, it was the Revolution that had had the effect of

transporting national politics and the national language into regions it had previously scarcely touched (1977, pp.98,277).

So the Revolution removed the power of royalty, the aristocracy

down Citizen Rights Man the Declaration the the the the set of of and of church, and and in French The (Johnson, 48). 1993, the that enshrined nation p. sovereignty was all principle Revolution, Soboul claims, `completed the nation which became one and indivisible' (cited in Weber, 1977, p.95; see also J.Hayward, 1973). This idea was enshrined in the first article of the French Constitution of 1958: `La France est une Republique indivisible, laique, democratique et ' The official translation of this, reproduced in the copy of the Constitution available sociale. from the Assembleenationale is: `France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic'.

I feel that this translation however does not adequately convey the meaning of

`sociale' in the context of the constitutional statement; here I would argue that it really suggests the idea of mutuality, commonality of interests and aims and solidarity.

Moreover, the

Revolution offered the chanceto be proud of being French (Johnson, 1993, p.48).

Hobsbawm'sconceptof `inventedtraditions' in EuropeanStatesalso has a particular resonancehere(1983). He describeshow, in Francefor example,`traditions' establishedduring the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuriesincludedthe declarationof `Bastille Day' as a holiday, building the public of revolutionary and Republicanmonuments,together with war ' de Eiffel Tower Tour France (1983, 271-3). memorials,the and the creationof the race pp.

6I will returnto this themein the casestudychapters,asI demonstrate that the Frenchelite feeling of beingunder threatcontinuesto be significantin morerecenttimes. The threatof invasionfrom oncehostileneighbourssuchas EnglandandGermanymay havedisappeared, but Frenchelitesfeel at risk from othersourcesasFrenchculturecan still be threatened. 'Foreigners'have changedtoo: in the post-coldwar environmentthey are less likely to be military rivals, following the break-upof the Easternbloc, but cultural ones,with the Japanese,Americansand 'Anglo-Saxons'treatedasthe mostobviouslymenacingforces. 'Interestingly,Robertson(1992,p.179),describesthe `the from 1870 take-off to the as around mid-1920s period

B

However, Hobsbawm arguesthat such efforts required a `genuine popular resonance' in order to be successful: the development of a `conscious tradition' relied on `broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in' (pp.263-4). Smith too (1993, p.9) points to the importance of imagery like the Republican icon of `Marianne' in creating French national first The attempts at taking education and culture to the people and creating a consciousness. by Revolution back French `authentic to the culture of the people' are also traced new Charpentreauand Kaes (1962, discussedby Rigby, 1991, p.39)8. In this way, the State intended to replace the various forms of popular culture found in all of the localities of France and irrationality, ignorance, folk `a being based `archaic', on culture of superstition, perceived as `a local factionalism' a national popular with culture, modern culture of the people, violence and a secular, rational and national culture, which was seen as the only possible culture that could lead France into the twentieth century' (Rigby, 1991, p.9).

Hobsbawm(1990,p.21), explainsthe significanceof the Frenchinsistenceon linguistic language He Revolution. French the that the to the since argues uniformity willingness acquire important in more making a person a French citizen than the native use of French, was really given that the Revolution itself spent so much of its time proving how few people in France ' it. According to Ford (1993, p.34), language acted as `an essential litmus test to actually used define the unitary body that was to comprise the Republic'. Thus linguistic plurality was made unacceptable, since the use of numerous languages was deemed to reinforce the superstitions and historical memory that the Revolution wished to efface'. As Billig notes (1995, p.27), it was the language of Paris which was imposed on the whole of France, and the `Rights of Man period of modemglobalization',in which 'the generalissueof the coordinationof the particularand the universal receivedwidespreadpracticalandpolitical attention'. He seesthe generalfocusingon the needto invent tradition and nationalidentity, as discussedby Hobsbawm(1983), in this period as developingwithin the context of `an increasinglycompressed,globalizedworld', and influencedby the contingenciesof this global compression.He points to the establishmentof `basicgeohumancontingencies'aroundthis time such as the time-zoningof the world, the creationof the internationaldateline,theuseof the Gregoriancalendarandthe seven-dayweek. Besides these,he notes the importanceof movementsconnectingthe local and the pan-local, such as the ecumenical movement,the internationalsocialistmovement,the InternationalYouth Hostel movement,the Olympic Games andNobelprizes. All of thesemay be consideredas `particular-universal'developments, andhappenedat a time of increasingconsciousness of the global world, itself facilitatedby more rapid travel and communication,discussed in the caseof Franceby Weber,for example(1977). SeealsoFeatherstone's discussion(1995,p.95) of Robertson (1990) `After nostalgia? Wilful nostalgia and the phase of globalization', in B. S.Turner (ed.) Theories of ModernityandPostmodernityLondon,Sage. , 8See JacquesCharpentreau

and Rene Kaes (1962) La Culture populaire en France, Paris, Editions ouvrieres.

9Hobsbawmrefers to studies like de Certeau in Chapter Three. in detail 1975.1 to this more point et al., return

9

Occitans Bretons did in Revolution to Citizen' declared could who the and the extend not and of French help So language in to national languages a construct was used school. not use their identity on a linguistic, rather than ethnic, basis. The centrality of language in the construction Three. in Chapter further identity be French explored will of national

1.3.2 Spreading Republican identity Lebovics (1992, p.7), sees the last decades of the nineteenth century as `an intellectual and `sentiments, for Lebovics in France'. It that then, the claims was quest political watershed ideologies, even words came into intellectual use in ways that continue to operate powerfully today'. Hazereesingh (1994, pp. 125-6) would seem to support this view, noting the emergence This during half `popular the the the second of nineteenth century. of sense of nationhood' feeling, he argues, was `as much an ideological construct of the Republican State as a recognition (and affirmation) of shared cultural values by diverse sections of the community'. Weber (1977, p.493), goes even further, providing much evidence to support the view that a form of cultural homogenisation came about after economic integration. He explains how, between fundamental in 1880 1910, took and place French society, which particularly changes face forever. France For example, the development of roads and railways the of rural altered made remote regions more accessible, and increased mechanisation improved productivity and for life diet, many people. The development of the school system represented aspectsof such as for Weber `an instrument of unity', an `answer to dangerous centrifugal tendencies', the `keystone of national defense' (p.333). Geography and History lessons became particularly good `instruments of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning'.

Girardet (1989, pp. 156-7) has

de la franraise, l'idee d'une `une de France nation written of. sorte predestination gegraphique a la la kind l'image d'une a (a France, of preexistant patrie virtuelle anterieure patrie reelle' geographic predestination of the French nation, the idea of a pre-existing France, the image of a virtual country existing before the historical or real France). This vision was the one dominant in nineteenth-century school textbooks such as Le Tour de la France par deux enfants (Bruno, 1877), which offered the apparently vital knowledge of la patrie (country, implying senseof its heritage, see preface). The episodes in this book, presented through narrative and drawings, emphasisemoral lessons as well as knowledge of France, highlighting the national unity of an `amazing France'. The conclusion to the preface of the book is particularly telling `En groupant ainsi toutes les connaissancesmorales et pratiques autour de l'idee de la France, nous avons

10

leur la les la grande par traits montrer et nobles, plus ses sous patrie aux enfants voulu presenter l'honneur, par le travail, par le respect religieux du devoir et de la justice. ' (So in grouping France idea I France, to knowledge with all of the wanted present of around moral and practical its most noble traits to children, and to show them it in all its glory through honour, work, and the religious respect of duty andjustice. ) Lebovics claims that loyalty both to one's region and to France was `ideologically Until the (1992, 4). the beginning twentieth end of the the p. of century' universalized' at State identity little felt the inhabitants French the with common regions of nineteenth century, (Weber, 1977 For from 241,486). this to change, people would pp. other regions or with people have to feel like a community by sharing experiences:these were provided by the development of roads, railways, schooling, military service, markets, money, goods and printed material, thus in late in `national things the to the nineteenth view of regional minds' creation of a contributing is, disintegration described `the has been `acculturation', This that as one of century'. process into Paris dominant local by their the and absorption of cultures and civilization modernity of the schools' (Weber, 1977, pp.485-6). This included the suppression of `popular' culture, which representednot only a danger to national unity, but also a menace to the social and moral order (Rigby, 1991, p. 13). Thus, `the unassimilated masses had to be integrated into the dominant culture as they had been integrated into an administrative entity' (Weber, 1977, p.486). The peasantsof the nineteenth century were seen as unenlightened, since they were so different from people in Paris and other towns, living according to different economies, speaking different languagesand being unaware of the `culture' of the city, and especially of the 1° Paris (Weber, 1977, 5). city of p.

Economist Adolphe Blanqui, as Weber notes, noticed in 1851 how France seemed life living land different foreign `Two to the that they composedof peoples same a so seem on eachother,thoughunited by the bondsof the most imperiouscentralizationthat ever existed'. Blanqui also noticed how towns were becoming increasingly alike whereascountry people showedgreat diversity from one region to anotherand even from one province to another. Weber describeshow such diversity had not previously seemedof any consequence,yet the influenceof the Revolutionhadmadethe ideaof nationalunity `an integral andintegratingideal 1°SeealsoDouglasJohnson'spoint abouthow in the Middle Ages,peoplein onepart of Francewould havehad difficulty understandingthosein anotherregion,andthis continuedinto the nineteenthcentury(1993,p.41; seealso Braudel,1988citedby Billig, 1995,p.30).

11

(1994, 185), describes As Llobera levels' (Weber, 9). 1977, one of the earliest p. at all p. decisions of the Assembleenationale was the decree of 4 August 1789 which abolished feudal `it boundaries This that as were suppressed, rights and privileges. meant provincial rights and had longer identity; keep longer double "national" the to no regions was obviously no a possible the right to see themselves as nations; France was the only possible nation. ' Thus diversity became synonymous with `imperfection, injustice, failure, something to be noted and remedied' (Weber, 1977, pp.9,97). provincialisms

and

This attitude is part of the Jacobin tradition, in which `all

particularisms

were

equated with

feudal

backwardness and

antirepublicanism' (Safran, 1995, p.39). The rapid development of schooling in the nineteenth century introduced mass teaching of `the language of the dominant culture, and its values as well, among them patriotism', values which were later reinforced by military service. Thus rural lifestyles were to undergo dramatic changes as a result of urbanisation and the spread of urban values (Weber, 1977, pp.493-4)).

Indeed, it has been argued that patriotism was emphasisedwith the attempt at developing a unified national consciousness,as urban ways of thinking were imposed on the in kind world rural a of `colonial exploitation' (Weber, 1977, p.98), where local and regional cultures were badly treated at the expense of the development of centralised, State institutions (Hazareesingh, 1994, p. 128). Weber argues that this process was one which was `akin to colonization', since it followed the idea that `conquered peoples are not really peoples; lacking their own culture, they can only benefit from civilizers' enrichment and enlightenment'. Thus France became governed by officials in a colonial-style administration, which barely understood the ways of rural France and its `natives', and chose to pursue a systematic destruction of local or regional culture. This kind of `cultural imperialism' then is highlighted by Weber, who notes that `order imposed by men of different code and speech, somebody else's order, is not easily distinguished from foreign conquest' (1977, pp.486-7).

Flynn (1995a,p.6) notestoo how Frenchelites adopteda similar missioncivilisatrice or civilising mission,in the approachto France'soverseascolonies,since`Frenchpolicy foresawa transformationof local populationsthrough educationand an extensionof French culture'. Similarly, Hazereesingh(1994, pp.131-2) explains how universalism, as one of the major intellectuallegaciesof the Enlightenment,became`blendedafter 1789 into a messianicvision which portrayedFrenchpolitical andcultural valuesasparadigmsof excellence.' But, he likens `this elevateduniversalism'to othertypesof internationalism,which he describesas `essentially

12

(1994a, 27), for Hayward Jack too the arguesthat p. a cloak pursuit of an expansionist strategy'. French elites believed the idea, pioneered during the Revolution, of nationality as the foundation of the political community, and the context for legitimate political decisions, to be universally valid, and a model for other nations. However, as Marshall (1973, pp.47-8) notes, the `colonial myth', the idea of colonialism as liberation, or `saving' peoples by applying republican principles abroad, did not entail the extension of full political rights to the native populations, who were believed by colonial elites to be mentally unable to handle true democracy. Moreover, as Brennan explains (1990, p. 59), this overseas expansion by France and other European countries served to bolster the development of nationalism and national identity within the colonist states: `The markets made possible by European imperial penetration motivated the construction of the nation-state at home.

European nationalism itself was

motivated by what Europe was doing in its farflung dominions'.

Indeed, the International

Colonial Exposition of 1931 held in Paris aimed `to intensify the loyalty of the metropolitan population to the colonial empire so that the French visitors, and eventually the nation, would arrive at a deep realization that they lived in a new greater France with hometowns (petites patries) all over the globe' (Lebovics, 1992, p. 53). Thus the idea of la Grande France (greater France) was promoted.

Lebovics describes(1992, p.100) how figures such as anthropologistand politician Louis Mann (1871-1960),who helpedto organisesome of the `ethnographicdisplays' at the 1931exposition,becameinvolved in the early twentiethcenturywith the discipline of sciences humaines. Lebovics explains scienceshumaines as one of the new disciplines studying `humanswhom nature had brought together' and their social organisation. These flourished becauseof `the need socially to stabilizethe new republic after its political consolidationand the task of governing a new colonial empire', and were set up as sciencesaround the social visions of intellectualsof both the Right and Left, who often had no formal training in social sciences(p.6). The societies,publicationsandmeetingsof scienceshumainesgroupsLebovics describes,were concernedwith `keepingalive a conservativevision of French identity', with powerful figureslike Mann speakingfor `theauthenticand eternalFrance', againsturbanisation and the developmentof a more modern, democraticFrance (pp.13-4); for nationalism and protectionism(p.37) and ultimately for a scientifically-basedracism for determiningwho was French(p.41). Suchideasarepart of what Lebovicscalls `True France',which is `half cultural style, half political project' (p.9). His fascinatingstudy tracesthis project or discoursethrough

13

its 1900-1945, essentialist, the thought explaining period of cultural and socio-political determinist vision of a monolithic national identity": `The idea of France it ['True France'] for despite indeed is all vicissitudes antihistorical, consecrates profoundly static and ahistorical, infuse history to everyone and everything core persists vital empire of monarchy, republic, -a (p. 9). if threatened the national character' with undying seriously In the 1930s for example, Lebovics maintains that the Front populaire or `Popular Front', a Communist-Socialist coalition government, followed a largely conservative vision of identity, as it concentratedon breaking down barriers to `high culture', or the democratisation of traditional culture: `No one, or no one in office, contemplated fostering new modes of creation' (1992, p. 15712). Looseley however (1995, pp. 14-5) offers a more positive view of this period, `sociocultural' did Front Popular that the approach to cultural a perhaps attempt more arguing in leisure the for He that time. on, earlier sport and more explains youth, with policies policy, 1920s and early 1930s, the PCF had pledged to move away from a `high cultural' approach, but `authentic bourgeois to this were cultural proletarian practices', and counter as viewing in hope developing back from fascism loomed, to turn this the a new of strategy as encouraged based from how France's heritage. (1991, 4) Rigby the on great artistic p. notes patriotism 1930s, Marxists and Marxist sympathisers had begun to argue that the universalist, humanist `Culture' bourgeois of a was strategy for concealing the economic exploitation of the notion (1940-44), felt Vichy Later, traditional as under class. an even more approach was working Petain and his followers `set out to uncover and to renew the True France of their imaginations' (Lebovics, 1992, p. 171), with the promotion of popular art glorifying Petain, the regime and the family, the celebration of regions, countryside, local crafts, religion and local languages (see Looseley, 1995, 19). p. also

In Francethen,nationalandcultural identity was establishedbetweenthe late eighteenth legal twentieth the systems. centuries,via centralisation, school, and military and and early This happenedas elite groups behaved as `guardians' of `French culture', resisting and "In the post-war period, Lebovics writes, French anthropology had to disengage itself from the legacy of figures like Marin, with Claude Levi-Strauss for example attempting to steer French social theory away from questions of identity, towards an acceptance of cultural democracy and pluralism within France, even if he too presented this aim `in the oeculiarly French way of nositinQ one humanity indivisible' (1992. n.49). 12Lebovics

refers to Pascal Ory (1990) `La Politique culturelle du Front populaire francaise, 1935-1938', doctoral thesis, University of Paris X, Nanterre, esp. p. 1654; and to Julian Jackson (no reference given).

14

is, `Others', belonging the be described that influences, to as which may opposingothercultural (1995, 78), Billig because, This p. the explains as occurred culturesoutsideof promotedcanon. Lavabre descriptions formulate `us' `them', to of social groups. sharedcultural an requiresa identity, Other highlights (1996, 52), to too the centrality of the of national any assessment p. which, she argues,is constructed around `difference': Quant ä l'identite nationale, eile se definit par la permanence(la duree) et par la difference (nous et les autres): eile releve ä la fois d'un ensemble de caracteres des lors de qu'elle est subjectives, objectifs et representations partagees, et, specifiee comme collective ou nationale, suppose une conscience d'appartenance. (As for identity, it is defined by its permanence (its existence) and by difference ('us and them'): it encompassesa collection of both objective charactersand subjective, sharedviews, and, when it is specified as collective or national, presupposesa consciousnessof belonging.) The imposition, by elites, of what can be described as cultural norms, in this case a particular construction of national identity, reveals a suspicion of cultural hybridity and difference. This process can be seen to have acted in France on members of the same society, and not only on far in that and countries societies are away geographical terms. I will argue in this thesis that this process is still at work during the contemporary period, being revealed in the construction of national identity by French political elites in relation to cultural policy.

Furthermore, the

State-led `construction' of France as a nation and of French identity may be said to have contributed to a publicly and politically acceptedfeeling that identity in France is such a subject for debate, and a legitimate area for State intervention. Indeed, Zeldin comments that national identity has long been problematic in France, claiming that `no nation has tried harder to find and expressits identity' (1983, p.5).

However, moving on from the period 1789-1945,which saw the establishmentof the FrenchState'sconceptionof national identity, the presentstudy must now considerthe socioeconomic,political and cultural debatesand developmentsarising in more recenttimes. Their impact on, and links with elite thinking on identity and action on culture, will be specifically addressed. 1.4 National identity and modernisation in France, post-1945 1.4.1 The searchfor stability

Following the Liberation of France in 1944, France began a period of reconstructionand

15

identity have and national to of conceptions effects on significant was modernisation, which France Vichy, to Occupation disastrous restore After the needed and the experiencesof culture. its position in the world, to rebuild a senseof nationhood and to reunite the country. Kelly, Fallaize and Ridehalgh (1995, p. 103) argue that following the Liberation, Others within the French nation were identified: the cowards and collaborators picked out in the epuration (purges); or the external Others such as Britain and the United States, who threatened French reassertion on the world stage. But French elites also needed to establish political stability. This necessity led to a search for national unity via the post-war debatesconcerning the type of from free it break bind helping the together, to the ghosts of nation could system which political the Vichy era and avoid damaging political divisions (ibid. ). The establishment of a new stability however was hampered by the question of decolonisation, which appearedinevitable as the country's economy and armies could no longer independence becoming time the more as at same movements were an empire, support vociferous. The issue became extremely divisive, and mainland France experienced civil unrest because of it. Marshall (1973) explains how, prior to World War Two, most French citizens had shown little interest in supporting the colonial regime, yet, following the Liberation of 1944 and the `Free French' action partly organised from Algiers, political elites worked to develop a kind of `colonial consensus'. They argued that the colonies were a key economic, political and strategic force in both the reconstruction of France's domestic economy and the rehabilitation of its international role as a powerful nation. Thus this sought-after consensus,promoting ever became between France the territories, colonial significant at a time when a and closer union for had be drawn by Constituent for French Empire France to the the up and new constitution Assemblies in 1945-46." The collapse of this consensusultimately contributed to the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958 (Marshall, 1973, p.2).

Still, the French State had one final use for the colonies in order to moderniseand `competein the post-war industrial contest', when it called on the labour of its ex-colonial immigrants(Ross, 1995,p.9). Moreover, as Ross emphasises(1995, p.7), decolonisationwas "Yacono effectivelysummarises Frenchfeelingsbehinddecolonisationat the end of the SecondWorld War and Brazzaville conferenceon the future of the colonies: `En realite au debut de 1944, pour un esprit francais,la decolonisationetait encoreune choseimpensableet l'ideal demeuraittoujours qu'un Africain francaisdevint un jour un Francaisafricain'. (In reality, at the start of 1944, decolonisationwas still inconceivablefor the French first ideal become French day African the that and an and remained person would a mindset one a colonised ) (1991,p.56) African second.

16

inseparablefrom modernisation,so that: The peculiar contradictions of France in that period can be seized only if they are seen as those of an exploiter/exploited country, dominator/dominated, exploiting colonial populations at the same time that it is dominated by, or more precisely, entering more and more into collaboration or fusion with, American capitalism. This complex position for France has been instrumental in the formulation of national identity and attitudes towards culture in the post-war period. As I will discuss below, the situation of France as caught between the desire for its own power and prestige on one hand, and on the other, its own fears of domination, has proved a particular challenge to State conceptions of identity and policy on language and culture.

1.4.2 The birth of consumer culture Modernisation of industry and the economy began quickly after the war, and became, along with the social changes which accompanied it, a central preoccupation of France in the 1950s (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, p. 140). Ross (1995, p.4) describes the State-led drive for modernisation as particularly strong in France, and accompanied by a widespread desire for a new way of living. With the help of American `Marshall Aid' from 1947, improved industrial production began to lead to sustained economic growth, and the beginning of the period known in France as `les trente glorieuses'.14 Moreover, the French experience of modernisation was in contrast to the experience of the United States. The US, which provided financial rapid, assistance and a model of consumerism for France, was a country whose own route to modernity had been slower and more steadily undertaken throughout the twentieth century (Ross, 1995, p.415). Suddenly the old, rural, Catholic France was transforming itself into an urban, industrialised consumer society, where new prosperity brought accessto consumer goods designed to make everyday life easier and more efficient, such as washing machines, cars, refrigerators, detergents. Work too was changing, as the jeune cadre dynamique, the bright young executive, became both the new model worker, epitomising business, success, and modem American managementtechniques; and the new agent of consumption (see Kelly, Jones 14The`thirty goldenyears' of prosperity;the thirty-year post-wareconomicboom. isRoss

refers to Lefebvre's writings, but gives no precise reference.

17

Parrot Story As the 165-76). 1995, 143; Ross, Forbes, 1995, enthusiasm remark, and pp. p. and for US management techniques in the early 1960s was even more surprising as up until then, French employers had ranked amongst the most conservative and hierarchical in Europe (1977, to the Further thanks in 1981, 120)16. Marceau, expansion provided were opportunities p. cited Economic European birth by the the the the of new markets offered of education system and Community in 1957. Yet, as Gaffney has commented (1988, p. 5), the paradox of France's rapid demonstrated been has for in fact France's lies the that change amazing capacity modernisation "`the it de Gaulle, After to tradition old and convention. all, was within a complex relationship hero dreams honour the were really of glory, codes of and cult of man", whose values, attitudes, Political, into brought "modem" the twentieth the century politics'. of nineteenth century, who institutional and cultural change has involved incorporation of the modem and the old, so that the post-war embracing of American/Northern European lifestyles has taken place against a background of a `continuing "Frenchness"' (Gaffney, ibid. ). "

This tension may be revealedin the fact that the new prosperity and new religion of consumption brought both delight and guilt, as expressed in the 1950s obsessions with happiness and hygiene, evident in the media and in advertising, which stressed the duty of women to provide a clean and pleasant environment for their families, and in moral political discourse, as politicians pledged to literally `clean up' crime, terrorism, prostitution and industrial unrest, `just as they had earlier purged France of traitors' (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, pp. 143-4).

A further reaction to the new French identity of consumerismwas humanist thought, 18 fitted into became how it. So, `modern the world' especially concerned with and people which whilst the need for scientific progressand industrial reconstructionwas recognised,debates

16Marceaudoes not provide a referencefor Story and Parrot. "The concept of `modernity' has been subject to considerable debate, as summarised by Featherstone (1995, pp. 145-54). Basically, we might call it, as does Giddens, a `post-traditional order', with its major features including: machine-basedindustrialism; capitalism founded on commodity production and the commodification of labour; a great increase in organisational power in terms of surveillance of populations; the control of violence and the industrialisation of war; the development of the nation-state as the basic referent for `society' (see Anthony Giddens (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity, Cambridge, Polity, cited by Featherstone, 1995, p. 145). "Kelly, Fallaize and Ridehalgh (1995, 109), p. write that humanism after the Second World War was quite a vague notion, not proposing specific policies, but more an `ideological framework' suggesting that what humans had in common should guide human endeavours,and especially those of the State.

18

for development and spirituality this society, the capitalism of of consequences centred on the For mass media effectively the and consumer society new prosperity, example, culture. by discussed high culture, through the strengthening of popular culture, as served to destabilise Kelly, Jonesand Forbes (1995, pp. 144-7). For example in publishing, traditional categoriesand in de `Livre first the poche', boundaries were undermined with the cheap paperback collection, The Similarly, the 1953. mass production of posters and prints. art publishing offered development of the audiovisual media (the transistor radio, the television) brought a more diverse range of music to listeners, as new singers, especially influenced by rock `n' roll from America and then the UK, found a wide audience. New music transformed young people's leisure into a major consumer industry, as records, concert tickets, fashions and pop magazines developed around it.

Mass circulation magazines aimed at various specialist audiences

flourished, such as the women's magazines like Marie-Claire and Elle, or the celebrity, photojournalism Paris-Match. The weekly L'Express changed its format and layout to copy that of the American newsmagazine Time: `it was a form of import-substitution: a conscious attempt to (Kelly, American by dominance US methods' appropriating cultural meet the challenge of Jonesand Forbes, 1995, p. 147).19

form of

Indeed, the debates around the validity of mass culture found a particular focus in the hostility to the USA, whose mass production methods and culture were models to be

both emulated and attacked (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, p. 140). Although Kuisel (1993, Hazareesingh imperative', be kind `a Americanisation 4) to that of global seemed p. writes (1994, pp. 130-1) describeshow following the Second World War, `there was a distinct streak of intellectual French the through community, and was entire cultural nationalism which ran founded on a common apprehensionof the consequencesfor French culture of the rising tide of American cultural barbarity'. Such debate regarding mass culture mirrors the rather ambiguous has States. America United traditionally has long France the that with enjoyed rapport 115), hell) 1993, heaven (Forest, for la fois (both France `a a p. and paradis et enfer' represented been Americanization' be `modernization has long to with equated revered, since place (Morley, 1996, p.328), yet held in suspicion. So the American conception of modernity became 191nterestingly,the editor of L'Express, Jean-JacquesServan-Schreiber wrote a book called Le Defi Americain (The American Challenge) (1967) which had an extraordinary impact in France and other European countries. It from Europe industry. instead dominated by Yet American of a complacent, outdated of protection warned American influence, the book advocated renewal for Europe through the adoption of Americanisation's dynamism and innovation, where it could be beneficial.

19

for defend French target traditional to a opponents of various political persuasionswho wanted French identities.

However, as Kelly, Jones and Forbes argue (1995, p. 142), this `anti-

modernism' of nationalists and protectionists was ambivalent: `most of its own supporterswere simultaneously proud of the home-grown modernity of their own industry and culture, certainly as compared to that which they regarded as backward and pre-modern: that is the people of the African, Asian and Oceanic territories of the Empire'. French elites, they argue, did not want their vision of modernity as part of `la mission civilisatrice' (the civilising mission) to be threatened, especially after the humiliations of the war had weakened the State-led sense of national identity. Anti-modernism was evident in some advocacy of cultural protectionism, for example in the hostility to the 1946 Blum-Byrnes agreement, in which US economic aid to France was agreed, but at the price of increased accessof American films to French cinemas (see Looseley, 1995, p.27). The French government began to legislate for protection against foreign competition, and to subsidise the domestic film industry, particularly `art' films. Further anti-American measures included attempts to reduce imports of American children's comics and to protect the Franco-Belgian cartoon or bande dessinee, despite the popularity of such American cultural forms (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, pp. 140-2,171).

All of this

relates to the feeling that American culture could infiltrate France by numerous underhand means, with American cinema often depicted as a `Trojan horse' in the 1950s (Forbes, 1995b, p.294). This fear is still alive in the 1990s, as my casestudies will illustrate.

Kuisel (1993) and Gaillard (1994),link the attitudesof intellectualswho havea showna long tradition of aggression towards the USA (Rigby, 1991, p. 167), to those of politicians and wider society, explaining how `depuis cinquante ans, la France hesite entre la fascination pour la civilisation americaine, et une hostilite marquee vis-a-vis de 1'« imperialisme » d'outreAtlantique'

(for fifty

years, France has oscillated between fascination with American

civilisation, and a marked hostility regarding its `imperialism' (Gaillard, 1994, p. 8). Rigby (1991, pp. 163-4) also notes how all of this debate surrounding the traditional idea of a `painful, self-questioning' acceptanceof mass culture is of course foreign to the younger generation, who have been `for decades [

] perfectly at easewith it, considering Anglo-Saxon rock and pop ...

music and American cinema to be their own living culture'. Others have regarded mass culture as synonymous with conformism. Barthes for example in Mythologies (1957) criticised mass culture for its `conformist, consensualist nature', whilst using it to fight against the process of embourgeoisement(Rigby, 1991, p. 177). Lefebvre too denounced mass culture for repressing

20

fantasy in a spectators and alienating all members of society, making citizens merely passive by Edgar however (1968, in Such 1991, 36). Rigby, criticised cited an attitude was world p. Morin, who, unusually amongst French intellectuals in the post-war period, tried, like pioneers he in `Cultural Studies' UK20, to to the of understand youth culture and attempted expose what saw as the `puritanism' of French intellectual culture which rejected the new post-war youth culture of America (see Rigby, 1991, pp. 168-74).

Yonnet (1985), explains how the

unwillingness of French intellectuals and academic institutions to accept modern popular culture has often been synonymous with a distaste for `culture ouvriere' (working class culture), and, as Rigby maintains (1991, p.22), a politically conscious culture. Yonnet (1985, pp. 196-7) describeshow, after the Second World War, the French elite notion of `high culture', la Grande Culture, became even more dominant, as the followers of the `popular culture' ideal held by the Popular Front, the education and theatre movements tried to promote literary high culture to French people as a whole, whereas previously it had been restricted to a relatively small audience. In particular, the championing of high culture as a means of moral and self improvement was encouragedby intellectuals and early sociologists of leisure time like Joffre Dumazedier, who in Vers une civilisation du loisir (1962), worried about the possibly `inferior' quality of pursuits which were filling up newly available leisure time, and the consequencesfor society. Dumazedier's anxieties still included a hostility to culture from the USA, as he criticised the spread of `une 06-civilisation'

(a televisual society/culture) which was being

spread by improved communications, since `la planete est devenue plus petite' (the planet has shrunk) (1962, p.241). He argued that the central question for contemporary society was as follows:

Commentune civilisation oü le loisir est devenuun droit pour tous et tend a devenir peu ä peu un fait de masse,peut-elle favoriser en chaque homme, quellesque soientsanaissance,sa fortune ou son instruction,la realisationd'un equilibre optimum librement choisi entre le besoin de repos,de divertissement et de participationa la vie socialeet culturelle.(How a societywhere leisurehas becomea right for all and is graduallybecominga masscommodity, can enable eachman, of whateverbackground,meansor education,to achievethe perfect, freely chosen balance between the need for rest, for entertainment and participationin socialandcultural life) (1962,p.243).

20See,for example, Hebdige (1979).

21

This argumentindicatesa still prescriptiveattitude: for Dumazedier,an apparentlyprogressive pioneer of social enquiry, `culture' still required `official' management,in the supposed interestsof the `masses'. Yonnet also suggests(1985, pp.197-8) that the dominanceof the French ideology of high culture perpetuated by schools, universities and the tradition of French popular song explains the rejection of American rock and pop music by some. Yet it is also possible that all of the hostility to mass (synonymous with American) culture was particularly felt in France becausemass culture developed there comparatively late. This is because modernisation and the move away from a rural, localised society to an industrial, urbanised one did not take off until after the Second World War and the beginning of the trente glorieuses, unlike the situation in countries like Germany, the USA and the UK which had seen more modernisation at an earlier date (Rigby, 1991, p.9; Ross, 1995, p.4).

As modernisationmadeprosperityrise and leisuretime increase,culture becamemore important to the State, as it developed as a commodity. Writers and artists began to make more money and to gain increased recognition. Consumer demands in turn encouraged `repetition over risk, sensitivity to market segment, and an awarenessof culture as an industry in which each participant has a particular specialised role' (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, p. 150). Moreover, as the economic importance of culture grew, the French State became more and more involved with its development and organisation.

1.4.3 French identity, `High Culture' and the establishment of Malraux's Ministry of Culture Initial post-war State intervention carried on the types of action undertaken by the Popular Front and Vichy, mostly in Paris, but increasingly in the provinces with library and theatre work (Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, pp. 150-1). Following on from this, culture became an overt policy area, as the first Ministry of Cultural Affairs was set up in 1959 by General de Gaulle, headed by critic and novelist Andre Malraux.

The establishment of the Ministry arguably

resulted from de Gaulle's wish to restore France's international prestige and national identity, and his belief that culture was important in the achievement of this aim (Looseley, 1995, p.33; Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 1995, p. 151). Malraux himself saw culture as a humanist alternative to religion, which could develop a sense of national cohesion. Looseley (1995, pp.36-7) describes how Malraux regarded culture as `the highest and most lasting forms of artistic achievement of the past'. Elsewhere (1994, pp. 120-1), he likens this particular conception of

22

hovered "culture high in ideal `a the cultivee" which every sense,a culture as culture that was immaterially like a skylark above material, sociological and economic realities'. Malraux also how involvement his distinct from leisure, people with of and saw role as not one saw culture as far but `the free that, their time, the greater one of consumer society would address since spent task of helping them create significance' (Looseley, 1995, p.37). With such a philosophy, the Ministry's mission statementwas described in a decree on 24 July 1959 as: `Rendre accessibles les oeuvres capitales de l'humanite, et d'abord de la France, au plus grand nombre possible de Francais, assurer la vaste audience ä notre patrimoine culturel, et favoriser la creation des (The 37). in 1995, (reproduced Looseley, 1'enrichissent' de l'esprit de fart p. qui oeuvres et Ministry Responsible for Cultural Affairs has as its objective to make available the major works French to humanity, France, to the people, of number greatest possible of of and particularly for heritage, the our cultural and to promote the creation of ensure widest possible audience from Jones it. Kelly, taken translation the and can enrich works of art and of mind which Forbes, 1995, p. 151). So the ethos of Malraux's Ministry became concerned with not only the traditional promotion of the national heritage, but also the new ideas of the creation and `democratisation' it 37). However, 1995, i. it (Looseley, to p. of culture, e. making easily available ordinary people identity French definition the `high' which of culture and a universalist conception of was still a State followed and aimed to `democratise', as it set about refurbishing major monuments and facilities de la France Maisons the with centres as multi-disciplinary establishing culture around for theatre, music, exhibitions, cinema, lectures, television and science, designed to decentralise high culture as a whole (Looseley, 1995, p.41). This ideal of what culture is and/or should be, and how this can be `democratised' has continued to inform many debates on cultural policy identity beginning the since and of the Fifth Republic.

Suchideasabout`high' culture,and its possiblechallengeby `mass'culture,introduced in earlier connectionwith modernity and Americanisation,can be consideredin the contextof longstandingFrenchintellectual and political debatesabout the nature of `culture'. Rigby, in his comprehensivesurvey of French cultural policy and debatesduring the twentieth century (1991,pp.5-7), emphasisesthat a `universalist,humanistnotion of "Culture" with a capital C still survivesstrongly in French society,despitemany vigorous attacksupon it'. He refers to variouscollocationsof `culture', besides`la Culture', all indicative of the idea of Culturebeing a unified, universalculture `of the mind and spirit, madeup from the greatworks of writers and

23

artists: "la haute culture", "la culture superieure"; "la culture universelle"'.

Meanwhile, other

terms indicate that Culture comes from the State and its institutions, and is closely related to the `la `la `la `la culture officielle', education system, such as culture cultivee' culture savante', dominant belongs Culture Similarly, to terms that there culture universitaire'. are suggesting `les `les like dominante'. The `le `la cultives', culture owners are groups, pouvoir culturel', intellectuels'.

Various conservative and right-wing authors and journalists have sought to

defend this dominant form of `true' culture, which remains a powerful force in contemporary French life, given the volume of debatesurrounding it. Linked to notions of `high culture' is the idea that it is French culture rather than any other which incarnates the values of high culture, of a `superior' culture (Kuisel, 1993, pp.xii; 236; Rigby, 1991, p.7).

Indeed, as Jenks maintains (1993, p.9), `the dominant European

linguistic convention equates"culture" largely with the idea of "civilization": they are regarded as synonymous'.

Rigby (1991, p. 8) describes how the term `la culture francaise' has

traditionally implied for many writers `a culture characterised not only by its unity and homogeneity, but also by its aesthetic superiority'.

This may indicate `civilisation', `taste',

`haute cuisine', and a philosphical stance (Kuisel, 1993, pp.xi, 23), together with the works of great French writers and artists for example who demonstrate the natural `greatness', `la grandeur' of French cultural identity (see also Looseley, 1995, p.4). As Featherstone argues (1995, p.31), and as we saw earlier in considering Weber's `internal colonisation' of France by the State in the nineteenth century, this `view that French culture represented universal civilization and the meta-culture of humankind' was promoted by the formation of the highly centralised, integrating French State.

However,the perpetuationof traditional, elitist ideasaboutculture,by, for example,the Frencheducationsystem,and notions of high culture, has come under attack. In particular, celebratedFrenchsociologistPierreBourdieu,who developedthe term `cultural reproduction', hashighlightedhow a culturewhich is establishedby elite socialgroupsas `legitimate' setsup a norm which cannotbe rivalled by any other `inferior' social group (1979, discussedby Rigby, 1991,p.6). Jenks(1993, p. 131) explainshow Bourdieu's definition of culture includes `all semiotic systems,ranging from languageas a communicativenetwork, through scienceto art and literature; all instancesof a symbolic universe'. According to Bourdieu, culture has real power, sinceit `remainsone of the most importantways in which classesdemarcatethemselves from one anotherand in which certain classesexert power over other classes'. He maintains

24

from in the impact has importance to society, that the social on everyone an accorded culture to the displays bourgeois towards culture, a certain reverence who already cultured petit His 6). 1991, is (Rigby, it have `high-flown p. all about notions' of what working classeswho famous research published as La Distinction (Distinction) (1979) analyses how cultural and `aesthetic' have the as a space of privilege and cultural capital, constructed social mechanisms based on no other rationale than the limited possibility of individuals having `taste' (Shiach, 1993, pp.214,216). Bourdieu defines cultural capital as `a form of knowledge, an internalized towards, the empathy agent with equips social which code or a cognitive acquisition in deciphering for cultural relations and cultural artefacts' competence or appreciation (R.Johnson, 1993, p.7).

Randal Johnson (1993, p.24) explains how for Bourdieu, cultural

`naturally' by legitimising leads domination superior to as somehow particular practices capital do to those by these not to others and who practices appear superior, especially making inferior led their to and to exclude themselves as own practices regard participate, and who are from the legitimate practices. Bourdieu's key argument is that possessing cultural capital, or a `code' for being able to understand and be interested in works of art, arises from a long process involving education through the family or group, educated members of society and social institutions (R.Johnson, 1993, pp.7,23).

Although Bourdieu's ideas have been criticised by

21, have do they commentators nevertheless a resonance when we consider elements of some French elite thinking on culture and identity such as Malraux's ideal of French identity based on high culture as `cultural capital' to be `democratised', and the frequent relegation of mass culture and `non-French' identity to the non-legitimated cultural sphere.

Yet there are factors in the post-war era, which have arguably had effects on State identity'. Some `cultural `French `culture', the of these and policy' meaningof conceptionsof issueswill now be reviewed,andthe possibility of a re-evaluationof theseconceptsraised.

2'For example, Bourdieu has been accused of being too deterministic in his analyses, as he does not really envisage a possibility of an alternative to the cultural hierarchies found within educational institutions for example (Shiach, 1993, p.215, with reference to John Frow (1987) `Accounting for tastes: some problems in Bourdieu's sociology of culture', Cultural Studies, no. 1, pp.59-73). Similarly Archer (1993) argues that Bourdieu's theories of cultural reproduction, whilst advanced as being universal, are in fact over-dependent on the structure of French education.

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1.5 Identity debates and global change: towards destabilisation of State views of French culture and national identity? So far we have reviewed factors related to the socio-economic and cultural development of France in the post-1945 period which have influenced elite ideas about French identity and development, identity debates We which and global about consider cultural policy. must now have provided challenges to State visions of French culture and identity. Mercer has noted how identity becomes an issue only when it is seen to be in crisis (1990, p.43). Billig too (1995, pp.5-6) arguesthat in times of crisis, signs of nationalism which by be for `banal taken groups such as adopted as a resource were granted; nationalism', may in but like American flag, the case Billig the the to anthem, national politicians. refers examples Republican `invented' French include France the the they constituent of elements of might also national identity, such as the French language, the centralised education system, the evocation Safran, (see 1968 Events Resistance, May history Revolution, the the the also of a common of 1995, p.60).

Kelly (1995, p.2) draws attention to the paradox that `national identity is most

strongly assertedwhen it is most sharply challenged, and the internal and external challenges to the French have been substantial in the [last] century and a quarter'. Lipiansky too, although focusing on the representation of identity in political essays of the first half of the twentieth does draw identity debates, to attention some suggesting that they seem to century, more recent transcend traditional `ideological cleavages' (1991, p.255). He highlights twentieth century French identity, felt by `Others' to threaten the some various about mentioning concerns identity. These include immigrants, present within France; American hegemony, from outside; as well as growing internationalisation, or `globalisation', of the economy, politics and 3, in integration (1991, Germany European the especially pp. solidarities, seen and re-unified 255,259).

Similarly Max Silverman, writing on immigration and citizenship in France,

effectively summariseshow debateson national identity appear to transcend traditional party or class divides:

The ambivalenceof the discourseof nation traversessocial relations and runs, like a fault line, acrossright- andleft-wing politics, and acrossthe stateand civil society. It cuts acrossclassaffiliations and createsnumerouscontradictionsin the ideologies of parties. [...] These contradictions can only be understood within the context of the more profound ideologies of the French republican nation, which do not necessarilyrespectclass, party or any other affiliations (1992,p.7).

26

Lipiansky (1991, pp.253-4) also comments on the use of `the nation' as a symbol of unity and be invoked by politicians during periods of doubt, difficulty and social dislocation. to power Writing about the 1980s, he argues that the `identity crisis' for France is less about the affirmation of a French national character,than the feeling of a threatened identity, which must be defended against numerous dangers, both internal and external. This recalls Revolutionary ideas about France, discussedearlier in section 1.3. Indeed, Safran writes of the `defensive posture' of French cultural superiority surfacing periodically ever since the end of the Second World War, amongst not just the extreme Right but intellectuals and others, `educated Parisians, even those with leftist leanings'. The rise of American power, the weakening of France's economic and international position, the popularity of the English language and the development of an international technocracy were denouncedas the perceived threats.

Safran continues to point out that for several generations, most

intellectuals and politicians, particularly those on the Left, remained committed to the Jacobin tradition. Thus anything which could be regarded as contrary to the ideals of the Republic was condemned and suppressed. This included the development of class consciousness,and ethnic minorities, who were felt to threaten `national ideology' (Safran, 1995, pp.38-922).

1.5.1Thechallengeof immigration The increasedpresenceof ethnic minorities due to immigration in the post-war period began to changethe ethnic composition of France, suggesting that it was becoming a more plural society. However Schnapper (1994, p. 134), argues that the French experience of immigration has been based on a model of integration `through an individual citizenship which is universal and "colour-blind"', whilst Weil and Crowley (1994, p. 111), write of France being `proud of its immigrants into its "republican" society', which has included the aim of to assimilate ability erasing ethnic or national origins by the second generation. This notion has caused particular problems for the French State, which has had difficulties in adjusting to a new era of ethnic diversity. In the 1990s, the traditional idea that `multiculturalism' cannot work; that there is only one French culture, to which assimilation may be impeded by the beliefs of `alien' or 22Safran la Nation,Paris,Editionssociales, refersto RogerMartelli(1979)Comprendre p.71;Jacques

Chevallier (1980) `L'Etat-nation', Revue du droit public, no. 96, September-October, pp. 1271-1302; Safran (1984) 'The French Left and Ethnic Pluralism', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 447-61.

27

`separate'subcultures, has been especially challenged by Islam. Yet for some people, Islam has confirmed their views on the unworkability of multiculturalism.

For such people, the idea of

the creuset or `melting pot' of different identities coexisting is terrible, and challenges in the 1990s brought particularly by Islam have reinforced this opinion, even if some people have changed their ideas about Frenchness. Certain aspects of Islam, as a code including both the private and public domains, have been felt by some to threaten the French Republican tradition, which advocatesassimilation and homogenisation of individuals, not communities (Hofmann, 1993, pp.64-7). This was clearly seen in the debates over the foulard islamique (a headscarf worn by Muslim females), which emerged at several points from 1989 onwards when groups of girls in French state schools wished to wear the headscarves,and were in dispute with their schools who argued that they were contrary to the Republican principle of larcite (secularism) which discouraged signs of religious practice in public education.

Yet Gaspard and

Khosrokhavar have argued (1995, p.204, cited in Leruth, 1998a, p.58)23that blind Republican hostility to the wearing of the headscarf `denies the young women their right to choose "integration without assimilation" and to create for themselves a new hybrid identity as French women and Muslims'.

The public and political debates over this issue split many groups in

France, not necessarily along party political lines. Indeed, Scullion (1995, p. 37) argues that, as in the 1930s, `a cohabitation of Left and

Right on mattersconcerningthe statusof foreigners'has existedsincethe mid-1970s,and this has drawn apparently `progressive' thinkers into essentialist and conservative views on immigration and identity, concurrentwith Lebovics' idea of an exclusive,reactionaryFrench identity (1992, p.xiii). 24 Kastoryano (1996, p.62) reminds us that from the mid-1980s, diversity, multiculturalism or the `right to be different' havebeenregardedby somefigures in the Frenchmedia,politics and academiccircles as a questioningof the Frenchnation's identity anda threatto nationalunity25 Thus for some,the ideal of integrationas le creusetfrancaisor

23Francoise Gaspardand FarhadKhosrokhavar(1995) Le Foulardet la Republique,Paris,La Decouverte. 24Anti-immigrantpolicies and discourse were displayedby Socialistgovernmentsfor example,such as Prime

Minister Edith Cresson's comments about chartering planes to repatriate illegal immigrants (Shields, 1994, 242). p. As Bernard notes (1993, cited by Scullion, 1995, p.37), such ideas have sometimes pandered to the xenophobic elements within the French electorate, encouragedby the influence of the far-right Front National party and fears about religious fundamentalism, urban violence and unemployment.

25See Braudel'scommentson the desirabilityof the assimilationof North Africans for examplein L'identite de

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`melting pot' which assimilates different identities, described by Noiriel (1988) reigns supreme. And, as Hargreaves explains (1995, p.31), doubts over the willingness of young immigrants to conform to the dominant values of French society were symbolically expressed in the 1993 reform of French nationality laws, which made gaining French nationality harder, requiring most immigrant-born children to specifically request French nationality, rather than to receive it as a matter of course.

1.5.2 The end of Empire and decentring of identity More generally, we should also consider the implications of France's position in a new world order, and in particular the effects of decolonisation, which might be said to have encourageda `decentring of the subject' in the case of the State view of French national identity. Forbes (1995, pp.292-3) explains how over time, decolonisation began to erode `a system of values which placed the culture of metropolitan France at the pinnacle of a hierarchy', and encouraged the recognition of the diversity of the French language and French-speaking cultures which in existed many countries. Political, linguistic and cultural unity could no longer be maintained. Symbolically, the French of metropolitan France lost its claim to be a `universal' language and became `just another dialect'.

This has not been easy to accept, as Apter suggests, noting

French intellectuals' resistanceto post-colonial theories of culture and identity (1995).

Salontoo (1984,discussedby Rigby, 1991,p.8) notesthe importanceof the State'saim `rayonnement' the of or diffusion of Frenchculture,a conceptlinked to the policy of bolstering the French language,which was really begun in earnestafter the SecondWorld War by the Frenchgovernment,which I considerin more detail in ChaptersThree andFour (Gordon, 1978, p.56; Forbes,1987,p. 141). This conceptremainssignficanttoday,asRigby notes: No doubt many Frenchpeoplewould scoff at the idea that Francehad a special civilising mission, but the fact remainsthat the Stateand its agenciesstill take extremely seriously the question of the promotion of French language and culture from foreign corruption, and take equally seriously the protection of French languageand culture abroad, a policy and attitude expressedin the phrase `le rayonnementde la culture francaise' ['the influence of French culture'] (1991,p.8, with referenceto Salon,1984;and Gordon, 1978).

la France(1986,vol.2, part 1,pp.193-9,Paris,ArthaudFlammarion,citedby Lebovics,1992, 2). p.

29

The significance of this statement in relation to the continuing seriousness of contemporary languagepolicy in France will be examined in Chapter Three, which explores State mechanisms for language policy in relation to the continued centrality of the French language to elite conceptions of French identity. Chapter Four follows this, providing a case study of language policy and political elites' thinking on French identity in the 1990s. Yet even if the idea of rayonnement remains, French elites have still had to confront a series of international factors, which have affected France's standing in the world. Following the end of empire and the `decentring' of a colonial model for French identity, French elites neededto look, in the post-1945 period, towards a `recentring' of the country's position under a hexagonal, Europe-facing vision of metropolitan France within a more integrated Europe. Since de Gaulle's time, successiveFrench political actors have turned towards Europe to rediscover and express French identity through seeking a dominant economic and decision-making role, France being a founder member of the original European Community in 1957. However, as Jack Hayward notes (1994b, p.296; see also 1994a, pp.27-8), these `Gaullist dreams of selfindependent assertive, national grandeur' have been thwarted at various times over the years through disagreementswith other nations who would not defer to France. The reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the reconfiguration of alliances at the end of the 1980s also contributed to this. My case studies (particularly Chapters Four and Five) will discusshow, despite some opposition, French political elites have neverthelessturned more and more often during the 1990s to `Europe' as a site for their own linguistic and cultural policy agenda,concerned chiefly with the expression and promotion of a `French' identity.

1.5.3Nations,culture and global change Flynn (1995a,pp.5-6) arguesthat the increasinginterdependence of nations, which might be describedas globalisation,hashad uncomfortableconsequences for Frenchelite conceptionsof identity. He writes that the need for France(like many countries),to look towards national other states to achieve national goals, is especially problematic for French policy-makers `becauseof the way Francehaschosento representitself to itself, given the State'stradition of 6 power andprestige. Moreover,Frenchidentity, Hoffmannremindsus (1993,p.77), `hasnever 26SeeLipiansky, 1991, p.251, for example, who comments on French politicians' liking for using the Gaullist style of attempting to personify the French nation, and for making reference to the `quelques considerations graves sur fame nationale' (weighty reflections on the national consciousness).

30

beendetachablefrom Frenchpolitical institutionsandprograms- it has alwaysbeentied to the the Europeanisation by State Thus economy the of the or globalisation of acceptance state'. " identity. its for French have implications visions of must

At the global level, Friedmanarguesthat economicfragmentation,decentralisationof led identities has increased to the a crisis of of and weakening national capital, competition, identity, in that we are witnessing the breakdown of the idea of `citizenship' in the senseof a identity by is being Instead this an territorially-defined and state-governed society. replaced based on `primordial loyalties', such as ethnicity, `race', local community and language; forms fragmentation, Friedman This he describes `culturally maintains, of concrete'. process as which has also taken the form of nationalist movements, movements for cultural autonomy, ethnic (1994, local towards trend autonomy and self-control of communities movements, and a general Lyotard We 35). 86; Kellner, 1998, of what might regard such change as part see also p. p. (1979) describes as the `postmodern condition', characterised by the collapse of `grand from in decision-making in State's loss the the this the away shift of power and case narratives', leaders (see business towards citations and civil servants politicians and elected representatives in Forbes, 1995a, p.258). `Grand' or `meta-' narratives, Lyotard suggests, aim to establish definite boundaries between truth and falsity, and these belong to the modernist past, just like 131). by 1995, discussed Billig, in inevitability (1979, the p. of progress confidence science and By contrast, postmodernist thought, taking ideas from post-colonialism, post-Fordism and postin dominant `totalising' theory, science and once structuralism, rejects such universalist, (Harvey, `the indeterminacy fragmentation, difference, other' and philosophy, and privileges 1989, p.9; Kellner, 1998, p.3628;Kellner, 1992, p. 143). I should note at this point however that the theories surrounding modernity versus postmodernity, like the existence of globalisation, are currently subject to considerable debate in social and political theory, with some authors

27`Globalisation' is however a term subject to much debate, as writers such as Hirst and Thompson (1996, pp.2, 7) suggest that the concept of globalisation as a recent phenomenon is flawed, arguing that the current highly internationalised economy is not unprecedented, as the importance of foreign trade and significant international flows of capital were features of the international economy between 1870-1914. We saw earlier (note 6) too how Robertson (1990, cited by Featherstone, 1995, p.95), suggests that the period 1880-1920 was a period of drawing more nations into a global figuration of interdependencies and power balances. See also globalisation, discussionsin Waters (1995, pp.38-64). 28Kellner

refers to Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991) Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, London and New York, Macmillan and Guilford.

31

29 into `postmodern' beyond `modem' have one the that a the era gone we notion questioning Others suggest that we might be in an `interregnum' period between the two, since `historical 1998, (Kellner, in fall do moments' neat patterns or at precise chronological epochs not rise and between in `borderland fact the be it Indeed, that 39). modem and the a are we may p. insecurities, together a with tensions, that panic, and perhaps confusion creates postmodem' in live `a cultural and social environment of shifting we senseof excitement and possibility as is it 39). Whatever (Kellner, 1998, the future' but troubling explanation, p. moods and an open true that in the contemporary period we are witnessing such feelings of uncertainty and in identity debates in These surrounding cultural policy and political are evident confusion. France of the 1990s, and my case studies will discuss how these anxieties are developed in is However Internet there language, debates not scope policy. audiovisual and on political in debates to the this thesis to postmodernity, opposed as surrounding modernity engage within fascinating though they are.

Conceptssuchaspostmodernityareneverthelessuseful in understandingpossibleways in which identities might be subject to change in the contemporary period.

What we can

the is `grand the those of that the power concerning as narratives', such collapse of suggest, French State and economy, have implications for the traditional elite view of French culture as does French in `Gallic Kuisel the not culture superiority of confidence summarises: superior, as fit easily the dictates of political and economic reality, which remind the French they should in international in their the whatever affairs, and world economy a secondary position accept is difficult' (1993, 235). humility Such p. pretensions. cultural

Douglas Johnsonmeanwhile (1993, pp.59-60), suggeststhat the French problem of identity, manifestedin concernsover Europe, regionalism and immigrants for example, is intrinsically because invariably felt `the have French themselves special, seen as strongly frequentlyoccupyinga position of leadership,whetherpolitical or cultural'. He also points to 29Seealso criticisms of the concept of `modernity', e.g. that some argue that we are really speaking of Western modernity, since in some places such as East Asia, modernity may not have yet peaked (although the term `West' may also be criticised, on account of it always signifying the positional superiority of Europe and the USA, not a (1992) New Formations, David Morley Kevin `Techno Orientalism', Robins category, as geographical and suggest no. 16, pp. 136-57, discussedin Morley, 1994, p. 134)). Thus it may be more appropriate to talk about modernities, not modernity (Featherstone, 1995, p. 84). Massey too has criticised much of the literature on postmodernity for failing to acknowledge that the apparently new sense of dislocation, displacement and hybridity is really a First World perspective, since many people around the colonised world may have a long history of destabilising contact in (Doreen 3-15, Massey (1992), 17, Home', New Formations, `A Place Called alien other cultures cited pp. with no. Morley and Robins, 1995, p. 217; Morley, 1994, p. 139).

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the difficulties of adaptingwithin a short time to defeatand occupation,traumaand guilt over anti-Jewishcollaborationand colonial wars, the loss of power and prestige,the needto adapt State apparatusesto regional and Europeaninstitutions, and a complex range of political loyalties. Indeed, Philippe Ricalens, a prominent army official30, argues (1994) that French cultural exceptionalism - or the idea that French culture is something special and different, worthy of protection - must be defended when France is faced with changes in the political, economic and military spheres". By means of my case study analysis of debates on cultural policy, I will be arguing in Chapters Four, Five and Six that contemporary political elites in France have certainly tried to re-discover a kind of `Gaullian grandeur', through defending and bolstering their conception of French culture against external threat.

Furthermore,to return to Flynn's point aboutFranceand globalisationdiscussedat the beginning of this sub-section, we can usefully consider here Featherstone's argument (1995, p.84) that we should not disregard the role of the nation-state, in the more global climate, particularly `[ ... ] the continuing political struggles between nations, blocs and civilizations, as well as the cultural aspects of this process, [which] has often been neglected'. Kellner too writes that culture and nationalism remain important in an apparently globalised world, as clashescontinue between global, national and local cultures (1998, p.35). This is relevant even though we may frequently speak of globalisation, in terms of a `compressed world', where consciousnessof the world as a whole has intensified (Robertson, 1992, p. 8); or `time-space compression', where space seems to shrink to a `global village' of telecommunications and rapid transport, and a `space-ship earth' of economic and ecological interdependence (Harvey, 1989, p.240). Related to Featherstone's argument about struggles between nations and cultures is Kelly's summary (1995, p.3), of how several countries such as Germany and the United States, which represent `external others [ ] against who the French assert their distinct ... existence', have been used by French elites for the `projectioning' of France's `selfquestioning', and anxieties about French identity. This, as we saw earlier, is in spite of the fact that French elites have simultaneously rejected and welcomed the social and cultural models 3ocontröleurgeneral des armies "See also how the idea of `cultural exception' was used in debateson audiovisual policy, as discussedin Chapter Five.

33

by the USA and Germany (Kelly, ibid.; Bishop, 1995). Further examples of the Other offered for French elites have been Japan, as a model of economic success,yet potentially a threat; and the economic and political union of Europe, which has encouraged debate over both increased and decreased prestige for France as it has evolved.

Relations with both Japan and the

developing European Union have been significant in the formulation of elite conceptions of French national identity in relation to contemporary language and cultural policy, and I will demonstratethis in my casestudy chapterson language, audiovisual policy and the Internet. Featherstone(1995, p. 111) also highlights the `continuing importance of cultural factors in the development of nation-states and in their relations with other nation-states'. Interactions between nation-states, `especially those which involve increasing competition and conflict, can have the effect of unifying the self-image of the nation: the image or national face which is presented to the other'.

Furthermore, Featherstone explains how `in effect the process of

cultural formation of a national identity always entails a part being represented as a whole: a particular representation of the nation is presented as unanimous and consensual'. Such a portrayal of the nation has been significant in the caseof France's cultural relations with certain other nation-states during the post-war period, most notably the United States. As I explained earlier, the US has been the subject of elite attacks on account of mass (American-led) culture's supposed harmful effects on French culture and the universalist values of French elite conceptions of national identity.

The presentation by French elites of a `unanimous and

consensual' French identity or representation in opposition to American and other threats has been important in language and cultural debatesof the 1990s, as my case studies will illustrate. It was particularly prominent in the debates on audiovisual policy, which are discussed in Chapter Five.

1.5.4 Global change, cultural imperialism and identity

Yet if we considerthe implicationsfor identity of aspectsof global geo-politicalchangesuchas thosementionedabove,we would expecttraditional representationsof Frenchnational identity as `unanimousand consensual',to use Featherstone'sterminology (ibid.), to be subjectto reevaluation.Many theoristsarguethat in the late twentiethcentury,identity is multi-faceted,and everopento new influences. Consequently,many authorswould suggestthat the identification of a `Frenchnational identity' or `nationalculture' is problematic,indeed impossible,since in reality, both culture and identity are constantly changing (see Jameson,1983 and 1984 for

34

just identity, like in by implication, Kellner, 1992, 143)32. French example, cited p. culture, and any other, may be said to have a `hybrid and permeable' character (Kuisel, 1993, p.233; Said, 1993, pp.xvii, svix, ssii, 15; Tomlinson, 1991, pp.92-3; Morley, 1994, p. 15233;Andrews, 1995, is 78). This because,as Hall explains (1992a, p.302), `as cultures become more exposed to p. outside influences it is difficult to preserve cultural identities intact, or to prevent them from becoming weakened through cultural bombardment and infiltration'.

Such exposure to other

influences or `infiltration' is often said to result from the `time-space' effect of globalisation on communications, which have become more rapid, so that the world feels smaller and distances shorter, enabling easier, quicker access (with the correct equipment) to information from different locations (Hall, 1992a,pp.299,304; Harvey, 1989, p.240). The development of global computer networks is of particular significance, since ideas, information and images can be instantaneously circulated around the world, overcoming boundaries of time and space (Gates, 1995, referred to by Kellner, 1998, p.28). 4 Friedman (1994, p. 195) notes how early discussion of globalisation often concentrated on describing such changes in communication as a form of cultural imperialism, since they were feared to privilege the growing hegemony of particular cultures, especially American consumerist values. The result has been suggested,by some, to be cultural homogenisation, which could undermine national identities and the supposed `unity' which national cultures may enjoy. It is this interpretation of globalisation, which is frequently by contemporary French political elites in their discussions of cultural policy and employed identity. However, such a view of cultural imperialism has been criticised by many national theorists, as I outline below.

Morley for example(1994, p. 144) explainshow the traditional `crude version' of the cultural imperialism thesis describes the global dominance of the American media as evidence `the threat posed by American popular culture to all authentic indigenous national cultures of identities'. Such an interpretation is also invoked by Tunstall in The Media are American and (1977, p. 57, in Tomlinson, 1991, p. 8; Morley, 1994, pp. 138,150).

Similarly, other authors

32See FredricJameson (1983)`Postmodernism Society',in N.Foster(ed.) Postmodern andtheConsumer Culture, Seattle,Bay View, and (1984) `Postmodernism,or the cultural logic of late capitalism', New Left Review, no.146,pp.53-92. 33SeeMorley's references to Hall (1990); Arjun Apppadurai (1990) `Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy', Public Culture, vol. 2, no. 2; Homi Bhabha (1983) `The Other Question', Screen, vol. 24, no. 6. 34SeeBill Gates (1995) The Road Ahead, New York, Viking.

35

the Americanisation, influence with combines which of refer to the powerful and continued 1964), (McLuhan, keep `global as an the the to village' and media act on of globalisation effects been having hegemony American despite the traditional American-dominated village, 135, 1994, (Morley, Japan by pp. weakened and threatened the action of other countries such as important Such 8-9). 1992, 331; Robertson, 138-42; Morley, 1996, p. a model was especially pp. is hegemony, that American be the peak of cultural at the time of what was considered to immediately after the Second World War (Morley, 1994, p. 142).

The non-Americanforms of cultural imperialism did not in fact figure in the traditional Moreover, (1971). the for by Schiller imperialism example espoused concept of cultural it because is imperialism to presents the media open traditional cultural criticism argument audience as somehow consisting of puppets, or passive viewers who absorb everything and `colonising' Thus 21-3). hear (Tomlinson, 1991, the they pp. view or criticise none of what described identity to the as easy predict. are on media of effects

Several researchershave

therefore indicated capable of that are and role a active actually play more viewers nevertheless interpreting American broadcasts in different ways, according to their own circumstances and international, is that the to this suggest view not cultural experiences, although accepting American-dominated media, are powerless (Katz and Liebes, 1985, in Tomlinson, 1991, pp.4735 Yet 150). in 1994, Morley, 50, and Morley, 1994, pp. 142-3; also Miller, 1992, cited p. (Morley, 1994, p. 143). In fact, at a time when the world is said to be shrinking, when we speak imperialism `global to the assumes the the possibility of resistance cultural notion of village', of is describes: ] identity, `[ for Kellner complex and an especially culture as a new significance ... local terrain today ones and new configurations emerge permeate as global cultures contested that synthesizeboth poles, providing contradictory forces of colonization and resistance, global homogenization and new local hybrid forms and identities' (1998, p.28)."

So whilst French political elites may regard the globalisation of culture as bringing Americanimperialism,other groupsmay view it as a movementtowardsthe developmentof a

35SeeDaniel Miller (1992) `The Young and the Restlessin Trinidad', in Roger Silverstoneand Eric Hersch (eds) Consuming Technologies, London, Routledge; E.Katz and T. Liebes (1985) `Mutual Aid in the Decoding in (eds) Television Preliminary Notes, from Cross-Cultural Drummond Dallas: in P. R. Paterson Study', a and of Transition: Papers from the First International Television Studies Conference, London, British Film Institute, p. 11.

36See alsoKuisel, 1993,p.232; Tomlinson,1991, p.26.

36

describe for (1997, 4-5) Hargreaves McKinney more cosmopolitan culture. example pp. and how aspects of globalisation such as less constrained air travel and international in individuals both to communications allow physically and mentally, participate more easily, in have been Developments than time. television more one society at a particularly significant, as the French State can no longer act as such a strong `gatekeeper' of television and marginalise or exclude cultural diversity associated with

international migration

from television

programming. This is becauseviewers in France may now accesschannels originating in other countries, especially in the Arabic world, thanks to the increaseduse of satellite broadcasting. Together with imported video cassettesand cable stations, this method allows migrants and their descendantsan alternative to the neo-colonial images of migrants as aliens or victims which have traditionally characterised terrestrial television representation (Hargreaves, 1997, pp.93-6). It has also been suggestedthat instead of seeing a complete `renaissance'of cultural imperialism, especially of the unsophisticated and deterministic model proposed by traditional theorists, we are in fact experiencing a postmodern situation, which according to Morley, may represent the `highest stage of cultural imperialism' (1994,1996), on account of the more hybrid identities which may be produced as a result of changesin global communications. For example, Hargreaves and McKinney (1997, p.4) discuss how in `post-colonial' France, French-speaking minorities originating in ex-colonies but now settled in France are using creative forms including film, literature, art and music to effectively cut across the old binary logic which opposed `insiders' to `outsiders', thus creating what Bhabha describesas a hybrid `third spacepermitting the development of new cultural forms, new political initiatives " (Bhabha, 1990a, 211; 19-39). Bhabha, 1994, and new structures of authority also p. pp. Furthermore,the tendency of the traditional thesis of cultural imperialism, particularly the overdeterministic, `hypodermic' model of the effects of the media, to regard `foreign' culture as allpowerful and manipulative is too simplistic since it takes no account of the way in which such influences can act as progressive forces, changing the establishedcultural hierarchies set up by social or political elites (Morley, 1994, p. 143,145; Fejes, 1981, on Schiller'$, in Tomlinson, 1991, p.40). It is quite possible to argue that `the French' do not always perceive the products, "For a discussionof the debatesaround the difficulties of speakingof a `post-colonial condition', seeHargreaves and McKinney, 1997,pp. 14-7. 38F.Fejes (1981) 'Media Imperialism: an Assessment', Media, Culture and Society, vol. 3, no.3, pp.281-9.

37

1995, (Kuisel, language `foreign' from and other as completely attitudes coming countries in Chapter discussed 39), French television, the given p. consumption of non-French cinema and Five. On the contrary, some groups of people may feel less threatened by `Americanisation' identity by for `high French the traditional than cultural' version of and mass culture, example, which political elites may seek to defend so vigorously. So, if we equate Americanisation with globalisation, we must take account of the view that people are active, not passive, in the just institutions Aspects the on global scale. reproduction of social of global culture cannot `happen' on their own; they have to be reproduced around the world by people: `Globalization can be mistaken as an external influence. In fact global influences can only exist as social influences if people take them into their lives' (Spybey, 1996, p. 5). Globalisation may also be more than imperialist domination in the style of Americanisation, since Axtmann suggeststhat globalisation and `global citizenship' (being responsible for and participating in global challenges and problems) might lead to more acceptance of diversity, heterogeneity and otherness,not uniformity (1997, in Kellner, 1998, pp.37-8; also Featherstone, 1995, pp. 13-4).

1.5.5Multiple identities? This idea is significant if we return to contemporary theories about the nature of identity and its relationship with culture.

Hall for example (1990, p.225), describes cultural identity as

something which is in motion, subject to change with time: `a matter of "becoming" as well as it is "being"', `not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history since of and culture'. Although Hall situates cultural identities in terms of their histories, he explains that this does not mean they are not subject to transformation: `Far from being grounded in a "recovery" mere of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our senseof ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within the narratives of the past'. Identities may be said to be changing due to the fragmentation of `cultural landscapes' in modem societies, such as class, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, nationality, and Hall explains that these once provided us with `firm locations as social individuals' (1992a, p.275). This may be considered as part of the postmodern condition, where identities are sometimes described as being transformed by such fragmentation through the loss of a stable `senseof self called the `dislocation' or `de-centring' of the subject (Hall, ibid. ). This process can be linked for example to the collapse of the `Eurocentric imperative', meaning the loss of the colonial model of European culture as

38

universal; the unquestioned Centre noted earlier.

Slater describes this as symptomatic of

Slater (1994, 88, Young 1990, 1939). Indeed, to p. elsewhere, postmodernity p. with reference highlights Vattimo's argument that the West may be said to be `living through an explosive issues it developing but `cultural the world, also situation', as confronts other universes' such as within itself, `as an apparently irreversible pluralization renders any unilinear view of the world and history impossible' (1992, p.6, cited in Slater, 1994, p.98)40.

It is also arguedthat individuals have multiple identities or objectsof loyalty, `eachof in issue (Flynn, depending the the can claim on question' which priority circumstances or 1995b, p.236). Such multiple identities, Flynn maintains, may be described as `concentric circles', centring on the individual and moving outward, through local, regional or national levels, then on to the European level and further beyond (1995, ibid. ). So identities cannot be fixed and unitary. Hall also explains (1995, p.66) that because identities are not static, this `undermines any notion of a politics constructed around fixed identities or `real' interests'. He arguesthat becausepolitical collectivities always result partly from `imaginary identifications', they are `imaginary communities' which `can act as a mobilising political force'.

I will

demonstrate later in my case study chapters that this is an important resource available to and used by contemporary French political elites as they attempt to use cultural policy debates to identity French a conception present of national which is a static, traditional vision rather than a forward-looking, dynamic one. We can argue that such political elites may deny the reality of in the postmodern age, as they refuse the culture of others, preferring to cling to a culture mythical certainty of `traditional' culture (see de Sola Pool, 1979, in Tomlinson, 1991, pp.92, 94).41 Billig (1995, pp. 136-7) describes the postmodern world's fluid conditions, with the loss of certainty, the blurring senseof place, the collapse of old boundaries. Consequently, citizens of this world who feel insecure may be `driven to seek secure identities, often regressing to an earlier stage of development. Myths of nation, tribe and religion seem to hold out the hope of 39See RobertYoung (1990)White Mythologies:Writing History andthe West,London, Routledge,also Slater's argumentsfor recognitionof the `non-Westernother': `The life of the mind does not begin and end inside the Occident;therecanbe no Westerncheckpointto keepout non-Westernthought' (1994,p. 116). 40SeeGianni Vattimo (1992) The Transparent Society, Cambridge, Polity. 41Ithiel de Sola Pool (1979) `Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures', in K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (eds) National Sovereignty and International Communication, New Jersey, Ablex.

39

psychological wholeness, offering the fragmented, disorientated person the promise of psychic security'. My analysis of 1990s cultural debateswill show this comment to be extremely pertinent in the case of French political elites and their attitudes towards national identity. Moreover, I will suggestthat French actors who behave, through their discourse on culture, as if so sure of their cultural identity, reveal a tendency towards a kind of racism by ignoring the increasing foreign influences in French contemporary life. This `us and them' and significance presence of it syndrome, has been argued, has re-appearedin several European countries (including France) and has been termed `the new racism' or `cultural racism' by sociologists examining issues of identity (for example Wieviorka, 1994, pp. 173-88). Thus we see the tendency of some cultural groups to consider themselves somehow superior to other groups displaying different cultural characteristics or traditions (Morley, 1994, p. 144).

Gilroy has commented on this idea,

highlighting links between `cultural racism' and `the idea of "race" and the ideas of nation, nationality and national belonging': We increasingly face a racism which avoids being recognized as such becauseit is able to link `race' with nationhood, patriotism and nationalism, a racism which has taken a necessarydistance from crude ideas of biological inferiority and superiority now seeks to present an imaginary definition of the nation as a unified cultural community. It constructs and defends an image of national culture - homogeneous in its whiteness yet precarious and perpetually ] This is a racism vulnerable to attack from enemies within and without. [ ... which answers the social and political turbulence of crisis management by the recovery of national greatnessin the imagination. Its dream-like construction of our sceptred isle as an ethnically purified one provides special comfort against the ravages of decline. (1992, p.53)

Although Gilroy writes about the UK here, such commentsare also relevant to the French context, since ethnic divisions in France,resulting from the diverse experiencesof different immigration and regions serve to challengeFrench identity: `With striking frequency, the expressionof Frenchnessis inflected by the specific experienceof groupswho perceivetheir own placewithin the nation asdistinctly problematic'(Kelly, 1995,pp.2-3). We saw earlierthe difference, of significance sinceidentitiesareconstructedaccordingto eachother and exclusion is asmuch a factor of identity asis inclusion (Morley andRobins, 1989,p. 14,1995, p.45) 42 42See alsoMcRobbie,1994,p.40

40

However, the notion that the `Other' constructed in political discourse on national identity is always perceived as a threat is misleading.

The Other can, in some cases, be

portrayed as an opportunity, for example when another cultural identity or country can provide a location for the increase of French influence. This will be demonstrated in the thesis, which will seek to examine both constructions of the Other. My case studies will illustrate how the Other is revealed as both a threat and an opportunity at different times. It has been suggestedthat easieracceptanceof multiple and unstable identities under postmodernity could be a progressive feature, as individuals have more freedom to change their identities (Kellner, 1992, p. 174; also Melucci, 1997). My case study chapters will demonstrate how this strategy has been adopted by some French political elites, who refer, for example, to their multiple identities as French, European andfrancophone (French-speaking) at different times.

Finally, we must considerhow ideas about changing identities might influence elite attitudestowardsculturein France,andultimately, their effectson policy. 1.6 `Popular' culture as national culture and new identity? Postmodem theories often privilege popular culture, regarding it as `the site of the implosion of identity and fragmentation of the subject' (Kellner, 1992, p. 144). There is also an emphasis on the blurring of boundaries between art and everyday life, the collapse of the distinction between high art and mass or popular culture, together with `a general stylistic promiscuity and playful mixing of codes' (Featherstone, 1992, p.267). Such ideas emphasise the breaking down or levelling out of symbolic hierarchies, and a movement towards `cultural declassification' or `decentring' of culture, related to the classic ideas of postmodernity (Featherstone,ibid). This is also linked to the growth of the consumer society and the development of communications. Baudrillard for example has described how under postmodernity, everyday life becomes `aestheticised', as the distinctions between reality and image become blurred, thanks to media like television. Thus we are in a `depthlessculture of floating signs and images' (Featherstone, 1995, p.44) 43 Baudrillard seeshigh culture as being destabilised, as symbolic hierarchies based on canonical judgements of taste and value are being eroded. So his conception of `mass' is not the same as traditional theories of mass culture, in which the massesare taken to be manipulated 43Featherstone refersto JeanBaudrillard(1983)Simulations, NewYork, Semiotext(e), and(1993)Symbolic Exchange andDeath,London,Sage.

41

has led development to of era Instead, a postmodern the through commodity media. popular down broken have levels between distinctions `cultural disorder', where of culture in 44 the (1983) Lipovetsky 19). postmodern 1995, too (Featherstone, culture consumer sees p. leading longer to dominant greater development, repress, no culture can since a as positive era in is freedom. Lipovetsky, a more For individual the consumer now an active agent, is idea This to for (see 156-9 similar `self-service' example). pp. culture personalisedmarket of Jameson'spoint about the cultural logic of late capitalism, whereby the commercial consumer's importance means that any product offered in the cultural market-place is as good as any other level, the (1995, 131) that Billig Moreover, in 86). 1997, one on (1991, Preston, p. explains p. be homogenised the leading a is to logic of capitalism perhaps world cannot culture, since a `network of bounded, national cultures which claim to be uniquely different'. Yet, as we saw boundaries identities increasingly in state, of crossing are era, postmodern a globalised, earlier, identities through their their changing patterns of consumption own create can consumers since in declining State, French in Furthermore, international the by the such a climate, media. aided its powers as we have seen, can no longer impose a uniform sense of identity; supra-national identity State So State's identities the version of claims. may challenge the and sub-national And identities. free individual in loyalties for the the market of new of an must now compete identities territory, can emerge more easily, and the multiple narratives and new national within local, ethnic and gender identities become the site of postmodern politics (Billig, 1995, pp. 1323, with reference to Roosens, 1989).

identity have for its implications The consequences of conceptions of global changeand in developments in identity impact had an prevalent recentcultural policy on the elite views of France. Both intellectualsandpolitical elites appearmore readyto acceptinto the cultural field belong `high forms to to culture', such as pop music, science would seem which not cultural fiction, cartoonsand television. Rigby for example(1991,p. 161) noteshow arts like jazz and legitimation, being described by Bourdieu arenow granted cultural as not quite recently cinema, `part long-accepted heritage'. the as of cultural perceived

"Featherstone refers here to Baudrillard (1983) In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York, Semiotext(e). However Baudrillard did sometimes come to negative conclusions, when he argued that people consume the media in Featherstone, judgements (see discussed Simulations Death, Symbolic Exchange making and cit., and op. without 1995, p.44).

42

1.6.1 French cultural policy in the 1980s The easier acceptanceof `popular' culture is associatedwith the 1980s and the arrival of Jack Lang as Minister of Culture, who brought a modernised, decentralised attitude to French State as (1987) Wachtel (1994,1995) by Looseley and cultural policy, well-documented Significantly, after twenty-five years of political opposition, the Socialists - including in both Presidency in the 1968 in the power, now anti-authority protests of participants - were its 68, that May Government. The was established,rigid all the of criticisms with ethos of and `grand in Lang the brought to the new policy approach, as principle refused and elite, was favour in idea ('cultivated' la traditional of elitist and culture) cultivee of culture narrative' -a 119-30, 1994, (Looseley, definition democratic pp. of cultural activity a more open, pluralist and 1995, p.44). Wachtel explains how for many people, Malraux's idea of democratisation and the Maisons de la Culture had turned into a kind of hegemony representing a repressive and ideal but democratisation Socialists idea the Gaullist the took of society, whereas narrow, 6 Lang's (1987, 14). it into definition that p. was more pluralist of cultural action a absorbed it State, be the its the `to Looseley, or society, culture with context, was reconcile aim, notes 121; (1994, it integral the p. to part plays within everyday experience' economy and emphasize its broader, in his Ministry Thus 1987, 5). to Wachtel, encompass culture attempted p. also in it heritage `subsumes the arts, and popular cultures anthropological or ethnological sense,as the customs, models and rituals and general way of life by which a given community expresses to he 4). In itself 1995, (Looseley, the on early opportunity seized particular, p. and represents France `the to of a economic as well as spiritual regeneration present cultural activity as a means (Looseley, from inertia, US-dominated by multinationals' and competition weakened recession, 1994, p. 121).

According to Wachtel (1987, p.54), the linking of economyand culture was crucial to Lang's attemptto lift the statusof Frenchculture in public opinion, by presentingit as a source funds increased, jobs. budget The the were and new culture was significantly of vital new 43Langwas Minister of Cultureunder SocialistgovernmentsbetweenMarch 1981-March1986,and May 1988March 1993. 46Aprominent example of the Socialists' attempt at more 'democratised' events was seen in the 'postmodem' parade for the Bicentennial of the French Revolution on 14 July 1989, in which Jean-Paul Goude created a mixture of African and French drums, jazz percussion, solemn marching and bright costumes (Lebovics, 1992, pp. 192-3). Yet the parade was also in itself a possible celebration of French universalism (Leruth, 1998b). The significance of this event is examined in more detail by Kaplan (1993) and Leruth (1998b).

43

between `pet President Mitterrand's three out projects' of the Brands travaux shared areas: (major building projects and renovations such as the Louvre and the Bastille Opera); the incorporation of new cultural forms such as songs, cartoons and circus into an eclectic version (cultural development), le developpement of an officially-sponsored culture; and culturel 7 financial in help for the workplace, trade unions and regions. meaning new cultural activities A particular beneficiary of the new policies was decentralisation, from 1982, which helped many provincial towns and regions to pay for renovations to architecture and archaeological develop develop better to to to more museums, subsidise arts, and sites, new and performing 259; between (Forbes, 1995a, Ministry the the p. of artists, public, cooperation partnerships and Wachtel, 1987, p.95). Wachtel however (1987, p.75) points out that ultimately, the huge Paris decentralisation budget became that the the casualty. required so much money projects

The official recognitionandfunding of creativeforms previously ignoredby the Stateas help, fashion, theatre, activities undeserving of such pop music commercial as cartoons, puppet and videos, circus

and cooking

were part

of

the

idea of

decloisonnement or

`decompartmentalisation'. This signified the breaking down of barriers between art and the disciplines, the amateur and the professional, but especially elite, high art and artistic people, mass culture (Looseley, 1994, p. 124,1995, p. 123; Wachtel, 1987, p. 5). Thus it seemedthat at last the State was acknowledging the importance of consumer or mass culture in an arguably 48 postmodern, globalised society. Furthermore, Jean-Pierre Colin (1986), who worked within Lang's Ministry of Culture, explains that the concept of `difference' became a major focus of Socialist cultural policy during the early 1980s under Jack Lang, as new initiatives focused on groups previously excluded from `Culture', such as women, regional groups, the young, homosexuals. 9

However these aspectsof Socialist policy did generatedebate and a good deal of `aristocratic' intellectuals'(Emanuel,1994,p. 147) suchasAlain Finkielkraut and opposition,as Marc Fumaroli, advocateda return to the policy of `cultivatedculture'. Suchauthorscriticised "For a discussionof thegrandstravaux,seeNorindr, 1996. aaThis is not say that the Ministry however abandoned its support for more traditional, `classical' arts. As Wachtel explains (1987, p.93), democratisation signified widening the definition of culture, not completely rewriting it. 49Seealso Giordan, 1982.

44

projects they described negatively as `cultural supermarkets' and lacking `cultural value' such as the construction of the Bibliotheque nationale de France and the Eurodisney theme park (Looseley, 1994, p. 128; Ruby et al., 1993, p.5). Fumaroli (1991) particularly attacked the general interventionist strategy that has characterised post-war cultural policy.

Finkielkraut

(1987) criticised the movement towards `le tout culturel', that is, the kind of ideas advocatedby Lang's ministry, which pledged to encouragethe recognition and the practice of non-traditional forms of culture (Looseley, 1994, p. 128; Forest, 1993, p.9). Finkielkraut suggestedthat such policy and thinking leads to a confused relativism of culture in which there is `no difference between Shakespeareand a pair of boots' (1987, pp. 149-51), thus regretting that the universalist ideal of high culture had now become one amongst many ideas about culture (see also Looseley, 1994, p. 128; Forest, 1993, p. 10; Peters, 1993, p. 101). He also attacked multiculturalism and argued for the reinforcement of `French identity' through culture, significantly at a time when France was experiencing considerable debate about the integration of immigrants into French society (Forbes, 1995a, p.260). Furthermore, Looseley (1995, p. 118) and Colin (1986, p.55) describe how some government figures and party members were opposed to policies for regional and `community' or ethnic cultures and languages, as they considered the `Langian model of a national multiculture' (Looseley, ibid. ), to be a potential threat to national unity. Both Lang and Colin's ideas about regional and multicultural policies are criticised by Looseley for remaining fundamentally Jacobin, i. e. based on traditional Revolutionary ideas: `[..] just as Lang thought of central-government policy as harmonising regional identities, so too does Colin view multiculturalism as an opportunity for the national culture to be redefined and survive; again, unity in diversity' (Looseley, 1995, p. 114).

Furthermore,in consideringthe extent of changing views about culture and identity during the Lang era, we must consider more carefully the Socialists' perceptionsof mass culture. It is interestingto recall the 1990 report from the Ministry of Culture entitled Les Pratiquesculturelles des Francais 1973-1989,which published findings of a survey of the cultural activities of French people, following on from previous surveys of a similar nature in carriedout 1973and 1981. In this report,the Ministry finally acknowledgedthe move away from traditional ideas of culture basedon books, galleries and theatre towards an increased involvementwith modem forms of audiovisualculture, and appearedmore ready to `consider cultural practice as falling firmly within the context of general patterns of leisure and sociability' (Rigby, 1992, p.7). However, whilst the Ministry may have acknowledgedthe

45

importance of television for example, it continued to denounce it in this report. Rigby seesthe analysis in this document, whilst claiming objectivity and a scientific approach, as `underpinned and directed by the idea that a regular pattern of going out several times a week in the evening to engage in a wide variety of leisure and cultural practices is the superior way of living a modern, open, mobile, flexible and fulfilled existence', whereas television is `the contemporary form of the degree zero of leisure and cultural practice' (pp. 10,12).

This view of Rigby's is

indeed borne out by the report's negative descriptions of home-centred leisure such as `le vieillissement culturel' (cultural aging) and `le repli progressif sur le chez-soi' (increasing stayat-home tendency) (Donnat and Cogneau, 1990, p.265). Furthermore, although the authors of the report acknowledged that nearly all social groups in France watch television, they still described it in negative terms as a barrier to participation in more worthy cultural pursuits outside the home: `Le fait de souligner la propension plus faible des cadres superieurs ou des Parisiens a regarder la television chaque jour ne doit pas faire oublier que les uns comme les autres sont neanmoins ä plus de 50 % chaque soir devant leur petit ecran'. (Highlighting the reduced likelihood of senior managers or Parisians to watch television each day should not make us forget that more than 50% of these groups, like others, are neverthelessin front of their small screeneach evening) (Donnat and Cogneau, 1990, p. 55).

So, although the authorsof the 1990 report recognisedthe way in which nearly all categoriesof Frenchpeoplewatch television(Donnatand Cogneau,1990,p.55), they `yet again ] pursuedinto a newly-definedfield of leisure and culture the samepreoccupationswith ... patternsof distinction and difference, and, in so doing, once more helped to consign the [

working class to the sameold position of cultural barbarism,and continued to perpetuatea idea of the cultural role of television in modernFrenchsociety' (Rigby, 1992,p. 13). negative My casestudiesof cultural policy in the 1990swill demonstratehow suchundynamicattitudes in continue elite conceptionsof identity in contemporaryFrance. These conceptionsare particularly striking in connectionwith new cultural forms found in `new media' such as the Internet,which is consideredin ChapterSix. It hasbeennoted that the Left had long had difficulties with facing up to the economic realities of the market-placein relation to culture, as they had tendedto regard capitalismand the businessworld, in which cultural industries such as publishing and recording usually operate,as harmful to innovation and creation,and Lang himself voiced such an opinion early on in his ministerialrole (1982,seeWachtel, 1987,pp.52-3). Yet on other occasionshe seemed

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to accept more mass-cultural, industrially produced forms of culture, operating in a market economy with no apparent public service mission (1981, in Looseley, 1995, p. 123). Looseley comes to the conclusion that Lang's chief innovation, besides the raising of the cultural budget, was to face up to a development which the French State could no longer control or ignore, namely `the rise of a civilisation of mass leisure in which culture was fast becoming a commodity, a prospect still shocking to the 1981 Left' (1995, p.240). So the State had to understand the economic importance of `lower' cultural forms connected with the boom in audiovisual entertainment and information technology, together with growing spending on culture and leisure generally (Looseley, 1995, p. 128). We must also take account of both the relationship between cultural policy and broader social activity in trends in the post-1968 era. For example, the groups targeted in the decloisonnement and developpement culturel policies were, not by coincidence, the ones having made demands for social change following May 68 (Looseley, 1994, p. 114). Thus political elites had to react to these groups' needs and different views of culture and identity.

Wachtel suggests (1987, p.92) that as France became more

modernised, educated and urbanised, with more money available for leisure, it was inevitable that people would place more value on culture. So we can suggest that French society had already changed, and argue, as Wachtel does (ibid. ), that the policy effectiveness of the Socialist experiment was really a measureof prior public acceptanceof the ideas behind it. The startling official recognition of cartoons and rock music then was arguably the acceptance of existing trends (Looseley, 1995, p. 125). Yet perhaps this assessmentis too simplistic. Whilst it is true that policy changes are expectedto partly result from changesin society, `society' does not act or make decisions on its Groups interact, may own. making advancesand retreats at different times in contested spaces such as culture and identity, with the result that power may shift between different, linked actors. An interesting example we might recall here concerns the defacing of copies of sculptures - `high cultural' art - at the Louvre Metro station in 1992. Paradoxically, in the same year the Ministry of Culture sponsoreda graffiti art exhibition containing a Metro carriage with the same type of graffiti which the rail authority was then spending 90M F per year removing (Looseley 1995, p. 178). Such a situation suggests that different, competing attitudes towards the definition of `culture' can coexist at any one time. We will see later on how this possibility continues to causedifficulties for French elite views of national identity, as Chapters Four, Five and Six examine how elite debate on the value of different types of cultural activities continues

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in contemporary France. Another problematic issue concerning attitudes to mass, consumer culture for the Socialists was the growth of foreign (mainly American) multi-national companies and their influence on French and international culture and identity. If French cultural policy under Jack Lang stands out due to his `populist' style of honouring contemporary film-stars like Sylvester Stallone and Warren Beatty (ibid. ), it should not be forgotten that this policy also included the defence of French national identity against the `domination' of foreign imports (notably those from the USA) of a supposedly inferior quality, such as the Eurodisney park and the `Dallas' Hayward, J. 228; in 45; 1993, 1991, Kuisel, (Ang, Tomlinson, 1985, see also p. p. soap opera 1994b,p.296)50.Lang, despite his stanceon the acceptanceof `low' cultural forms synonymous American-led mass culture, was no stranger to anti-American outbursts, attacking with American culture on several occasions on the international stage and claiming that France led the `culturally non-aligned countries' (see, for example, Looseley, 1994, p. 122,1995, p.77; Wachtel, 1987, pp.3,9,52-3; Forbes and Kelly, 1995, p. 189; Forbes, 1995a, p.259). Yet Lang did inaugurate the Eurodisney park in 1992, which is indicative of the bizarre Franco-American both Left indicate his did discussed What hostile that was earlier. moments cultural relationship `invasions' Right and cultural of strong were still capable reactions against possible as well as threats to traditional elite views of French identity as superior. I will demonstrate that such a be in in in debates has France, 1990s the the examined which will gained support cultural view in my case study chapters. Furthermore, I will show how Lang's successorshave attempted to develop the notion of France's leadership of `non-aligned' countries in global cultural issues, francophone happened has This the movement. at the same time as, since particularly within the Lang years, the political presentation of opposition to `Americanisation' has been more frequently subsumed within fears about globalisation, as the term `mondialisation' has become important in the French economic and political vocabulary. more

Returning to the assessmentof Jack Lang, Looseley (1995, pp.240-1) suggestsother signs of the Lang years following traditional elite ideas about culture and identity which informed earlier policies, pointing to the cultural budget and the economic importance of culture had been highlighted in Giscard President the 1970s, Lang's renewed under which `democratisation' of high culture seen in the grands projets, and a Gaullist obsession with SoSeeIen Ang (1985) Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination, London, Methuen.

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national grandeur (rather than cultural inequalities) which these suggested. Moreover, Looseley argues: Indeed, a further continuity with the de Gaulle era is this perennial preoccupation, despite all the talk of diversity and eclecticism, with fostering a national culture, visible in a host of other ways: the insistence on maintaining the state's role as harmoniser when the decentralisation laws were being implemented, the promotion of French mass culture in opposition to American, the stresson collective fun, and the idea of a national multiculture enshrined in the Goude procession (1995, p.241). So we might conclude, as Looseley does (ibid), that in many respects, the Lang administration did not really challenge the central tenets of cultural policy developed since the time of Malraux; rather, its rhetoric gave way to reasserting them and sometimes redrafting them. Furthermore, the Socialist years did not solve the dilemma of the State's role as cultural prescriber and regulator (Looseley, 1995, p.243). The potential importance of this in the postLang years is raised by Looseley in the conclusion to his study of Socialist cultural policy (1995, p.244), as he wondered how Lang's successorsmight resolve the contradiction between a State policy promoting the `grand narrative' of a shared national culture and one trying to accommodate a new communications era `which is steadily isolating individuals within their domestic space,unpicking the very fabric of community life'. This uncharted area is the private Chapter in Six investigates French political elites' reactions to the this thesis, of subject which challengesto traditional State views of identity brought by the development of the Internet.

The lasting effects of a possible shifting of views of identity, which may have influenced policies such as decloisonnement, also warrant closer consideration. Looseley's study offers a preliminary assessmentof the transition from Jack Lang, to Jacques Toubon's Ministry of Culture in 1993. Looseley suggests that `a dramatic new approach' to cultural policy did not look likely under Toubon, indeed, that the merging of the ministerial responsibilities for Culture and Francophone Affairs (relating to French-speaking countries and the French language) might indicate `not a redefinition of the cultural so much as a return to a more classical, Gaullist conception concerned with the "defence" of the French language and France's international rayonnement' (1995, pp.228-9) S' It is the contention of this thesis that

s'JacquesToubon took over from Lang in March 1993, when a Centre-Right, RPR-UDF government came to power. The significance of the merger of culture andfrancophonie is explored further in Chapter Three.

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dramatic `a does new Toubon not constitute the assessmentof and afterwards certainly towards in the elites of policy-making attitudes many ways, as approach', rather, a retreat identity, as demonstrate frequently to traditional, of conceptions rigid a reversion cultural policy

hybrid dynamic to ones. and opposed an embracingof more 1.7 Conclusion: language, cultural policy and French identity in the 1990s in 1990s developments investigate the I in I It is to this argument which turn my case studies, as The impact identity, study case their policy. on cultural and of such conceptions revealing issues debates Six) around several cultural policy examine political chapters (Four, Five and having implications for the safeguard and development of French culture in various sectors. These are the regulation and promotion of language, audiovisual broadcasting policy and the in identity, French be life national Internet. These areasof cultural may regarded as symbols of identity, French State-led the in and volume the their of a vision of construction role of view

international devoted been have their State them, to visibility at an and resourceswhich rangeof level. Certainly,theseareasof policy have seenan intensificationof debateduring the 1990s, into been have leadership based State French called on cultural policy-making as models of digitalisation52 deregulation by of the recently, more and and privatisation, effects of question the media. Furthermore,political debatehasfocusedstrongly on respondingto these,andother, for implications have traditional the for cultural policy-making, which new challenges in identity held by These French a climate arising challengesare political elites. conceptionsof `postmodern'; describe theorists where old certainties regarding as would which some `grand identity in the the narratives'on which are question,aswe see collapseof perceptionsof identity as viewed from the Centrewas previously based. Indeed,it can be suggestedthat the for has been in described this the a seriesof watersheds chapter, post-warperiod, as whole of the Frenchpolitical elite constructionof nationalidentity. We can point here to the breakdown late its faced France tensions traditional comparatively associatedwith rural society, as of American technology to and culture, modernity, as mass such anxieties over conversion hegemony. Similarly, we might cite the end of Empire and the difficulties of decolonisation 52Atechniqueof transmittingsignalsusing digital form, which computersunderstand,making communications morerapid.

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68 May immigration. legacy The the the the trente glorieuses and post-colonial end of and of by followed be described the economic watershed of the oil could as a social watershed, events crises of the 1970s, the political upheaval of the post-1981 arrival of the Mitterrand/Socialist All 1980s. fragmentation the the the of these end of of world structures at generation, plus issues are examples of developments, which have encouraged, and continue to encourage, reflection on the meaning and future of French identity amongst the French polity and wider in brief, demonstrate, have As the already reviewed case study chapters will and as we society. contemporary challenges with particular implications for national identity and its relationship with cultural policy include, for example, fears over the increasing Americanisation of culture; the presence in metropolitan France of immigrant groups who may have different cultural identities; digitalised based the on mass market globalised, communications and/or national culture, and a changing post-cold war international order encompassingthe continually evolving project of the European Union.

However this is not to suggestthat the factors of uncertainty cited above are all interpreted by French political elites simply as threats to French national identity: there are instances where potential challenges for cultural policy-making are interpreted by French it is identity. for Yet development French the elites as offering new political opportunities of still the case that the view of identity which is presented through these opportunities remains a strongly traditional and rigid one, indicating the French State's belief in the continuation of long-established, inflexible myths about what it is to be French. So we see in the late twentieth imposition French the elite century, of a particular construction of national identity, revealing a hybridity of cultural suspicion and difference. This acts today on members of the same society just as it did under the period of the State-led drive for modernity from the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries.

In examiningthe policy themesanddebateswhich provide the casestudiesin this thesis, the aims of my analysisare threefold. Firstly, I intend to unravel the unvoiced assumptions be presentwithin the conceptionof identity found in the responsesof French which may political elites to the contemporarycultural issuesdiscussed.In doing this, the secondaim of be fulfilled, will analysis my which is to demonstratehow the political responseto the policy challenges,despitethesebeing qualitatively new issuesin somecases,are in fact rooted in the identity constructionsof the past, thus offering further understandingof the relationship betweenFrench identity and cultural policy in the longer term. Finally, the analysis will

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illustratethe tensions,ambiguitiesand contradictionsinherentwithin the responseof political elites to the contemporarychallengesfor French identity, and offer conclusionsregardingthe possibleimplicationsof suchdiscrepancies, andthe complexity of elite perceptionsof identity. Before presenting this analysis however it is necessary to explain the methods of enquiry used in my research,which I discuss now in Chapter Two; and to explore the centrality of languageto elite conceptions of French identity in Chapter Three.

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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY: THE CHALLENGES OF EXPLORING LANGUAGE, CULTURAL POLICY AND IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 2.1 Introduction Having introduced the aims of the research in Chapter One, I now turn in this chapter to my choice of methodology, with the intention of explaining how and why I used particular research strategies. Through this, I also hope to draw out some of the challenges which arose from the attempt to carry out and write up a doctoral researchproject using qualitative methodology. Whilst writing this thesis I have tried to keep in mind the notion that undertaking researchinvolves a complex process of learning and discovery, different stages of which may different at advance rates according to the nature of the work. The contemporary organisation of postgraduatetraining and funding has also been an important influence, given the nature of a PhD as a training or apprenticeship in both research and communication skills to be completed four years. Regarding the PhD process as a learning experience, together with ideas within from my own practical experiences and a formal research training programme during gleaned the period of study, has led me to reflect on different methodological approaches,influences and difficulties. The nature of these factors, and the ways in which they impacted on my research, below, together with a discussion of how the researchwas designed and carried out explored are how findings the research and were achieved.

As explainedin ChapterOne,the aim of this thesisis to exploreperceptionsof French identity held by political elites in relation to cultural policy-making in the 1990s.

In

undertaking the research, my intention was, in broad terms, to examine political debatesin the public arena about particular areas of cultural and linguistic legislation, where French elite concerns about cultural and national identity are revealed. I specifically wanted to investigate the question of whether - and if so, to what extent - visions of identity held by political elites in France might be changing in the light of recent challenges to French identity in connection with cultural policy-making.

Observing the development of numerous initiatives and debates

involving French policy-makers during the 1990s, which appeared to be concerned with safeguarding and developing the importance of French culture in various spheres, from the French language to film production, led me to the view that French identity was indeed challenged. With this in mind, I set out to investigate some of the areas of policy under

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development in the 1990s,which may be regarded as symbols of French national identity, given their role in the construction of a State-led vision of identity and the range of policies and State resourceswhich have long been devoted to them. I selected several of these areas of policy as casestudy themes for the thesis. These themes were: policy for the regulation and promotion of language,audiovisual broadcasting policy, and the development of the Internet. The starting point for my research was 1989. This was a significant point for French identity, being the year of the bicentennial celebrations of the French Revolution of 1789. It was a time of national reflection on the meaning of Frenchnessas established over the course of 200 years of Republicanism. 1989 also signified a time of international change associatedwith the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. Both these events were significant for French identity as French political elites faced the break up of old divisions and alliances in the international order and the emergence of Germany, their long-time partner in European in larger a affairs, new, and more powerful form. The case studies selected examine political debate and legislation occurring during the 1990s. Throughout this period there were various examples of an intensified political debate in France concerning national identity and cultural issues. I originally intended to examine the years 1989-96 as a discrete period, with 1996, as my `cut-off point, with my frame being governed by the Bicentennial of 1989, discussed above, and the death of the former President, Francois Mitterrand in January 1996. This event was of symbolic significance not only for French cultural policy - the Mitterrand era being perceived as a time of change and innovation in cultural policy, symbolised by the grands travaux (great projects) indicative of the status of cultural policy as one of Mitterrand's domaines reserves (special areas of responsibility) - but also for the French Republic as a whole, in terms of the death of the first Socialist President, had for two consecutive seven-yearpresidential terms. The focus of the study is on served who the period from 1989 up to the start of 1997, although, with some spillover into the period beyond this, of Lionel Jospin's premiership, which commenced in May 1997, after President JacquesChirac, Mitterrand's successor,had called a sudden general election. For completion, it was necessaryto look beyond 1996, so I make reference to key developments since then where relevant to the analysis, particularly with regard to the Internet case study, which is the most contemporary issue covered in the study. However, I am not engagedin a comparative study of the different periods of presidencies and governments.

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Finally, my chosen case studies ultimately focus in most depth on the period from 1993 issues is debate from This because this and national on cultural point, political onwards. identity intensified in the areas studied. In language policy, the loi Toubon of 1994 which for life in foreign the limit `loan' French the to the way paved public words use of attempted for to Union European targeting the responding as an opportunity sphere of policy-making elite language. In identity French the French the to the threats to case of related use national possible during imperialism the debates American-led resurfaced on cultural audiovisual policy, of EU development (GATT), Tariffs General Agreement Trade the the of of on and negotiation in digital Internet, digitalisation. The the the generated of particular and arrival age, and quotas debatesabout new threats and opportunities for French identity.

In examiningthe policy themeswhich would provide the casestudies,the aims of my intended analysis were threefold. Firstly, I intended to unravel the unvoiced assumptionswhich identity in be found French the the of political present within conceptions of responses may be issues doing discussed. In to the the the cultural would so, second aim of analysis elites despite how demonstrate to the to the political response policy challenges, realised, which was thesebeing qualitatively new issuesin some cases,are in fact rooted in constructions of the past, thus offering further understanding of the relationship between French identity and cultural in the context of France's history. policy

Finally, the analysis was intended to reveal the

tensions, ambiguities and contradictions inherent within the elite response to the contemporary for identity, French and draw conclusions regarding the possible implications for the challenges French State of such discrepancies,and the complexity of elite perceptions of identity.

The choice of qualitative research(basedon an interpretativeapproachto data in nonform) largely it determined by because This the the topic. was natureof research was numerical be difficult to use quantitative methods (using numerical statistical data and more would traditionally `scientific' approachesto produceobjective knowledge),to attemptto investigate identity perceptions of and culture. As the casestudieswill demonstrate,theseare political issueswhich often reveal contradictoryand ambiguousresponses,which quantitativemethods such as numerical analysisor questionnaireswould be unlikely to draw out effectively, and interest to the aimsof the researchproject. With thesethoughtsin mind, are of enormous which the questionsof importancewhen designingthe study were as follows: What could qualitative How show? could the subject be investigated,using such methods? How could methods

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appropriatedata be gatheredand then analysed,and what might be the limitations of the kind how do below I I to these tasks? these of used methods give an account of addressed methodological uncertainties and moved towards the final design of my research. I decided that fulfillment of the aims of the research as stated above could only be discourse, debates, through the to the on close reading of contributions or achieved political French identity and the cultural policy areas in question. The case studies would themselves give an overview of legislation on the issues, reflecting the connection between language and cultural policy measures and elite concerns in the State management of French identity. However, it would be necessary to go beyond these measures, in order to uncover the true complexity of perceptions held by French political elites, as illustrated in debates around cultural policy. Detailed analysis of the discourse of political elites would reveal the deeper truths about this identity, demonstrating it to be more complex than may be apparent. For example, sometimes what we might expect politicians to say, but cannot be said, due to both practical and symbolic constraints of, perhaps, economic and trade policy, or the influence of history and institutions, or conventions about these, discussedin Chapter One, may have at least as, if not more, significance as what can be said. Political actors may in fact be quite limited in the production of their discourse, and I return to this point in section 2.2.1. For these reasons, following contextualisation of the cultural policy issues in France, I decided that each case study of my thesis would focus on the analysis of texts, which are part of the larger body of elite discourse on identity and cultural policy. At this point, I should explain what use my research made of the concept of `political discourse', before charting the methodological issues associatedwith the construction of my corpus and its analysis.

2.2 The role of political elites and their discoursein this study For the purposesof my study, I took `discourse'in generalterms to mean the whole body of discussion,which may be written or expressedorally, about a particular topic, to which an individual or group of individuals may contribute(which may be found on identity issuesfor in form the example, of opinion expressedby journalists, businesspeople,ordinary citizens). Within this wider body of discourse,specificinstancesof political discourseexist, that is, a subgroup of the wider discourse. This meaningclosely follows the approachof Gaffney (1989, p.26), who seespolitical discourseas `the verbal equivalentof political action: the set of all

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forms by verbalisations, adopted political organisations and political political and expressible individuals'. So, political discourse is distinguished from discourse in general in that it is the discourse of politicians and policy-making groups. Given that the focus of my study was to legislation, identity, it to consider examine political perceptions of cultural was appropriate statements and contributions to the debates made by political actors. By studying publicly informing identity by the thesis the arguments on exposed statements political actors, analyses the debate over a number of key issues in the field of language and cultural policy in it is is discourse France. Thus to these not contemporary used as a means of access arguments; in itself the object or topic of study, in the style of some `discourse analysis' approachesin the social sciences(Tonkiss, 1998).

Analysis of political texts was, however,potentially one of a number of possibleways of getting to the heart of the research subject. For example, one possible method would have been to concentrate on analysing the policy provisions contained within legislative documents. I have included reference to these in my researchas a means of providing a solid background to the context of policy-making during the period examined. However, it is necessary to go beyond such policy texts, in order to give proper consideration to the perceptions of identity and inform cultural policy which may policy-making as they are communicated by those in the public eye closely associated with cultural policy.

To do this, we can firstly consider the

resource consisting of examples of political discourse produced by individual politicians and groupings. Secondly, as outlined earlier, detailed analysis of political discourse in the context of debateson cultural policy is necessaryto uncover the true complexity of political attitudes to the relationship between cultural policy and French identity. We might suggest that debateson cultural matters are almost a particularly French `art form', given that they are a part of French life and social life, and involve intellectuals, in a way that they are not in the UK for cultural example (Kuisel, 1993, p.234; Rigby, 1991, p. 1).

Furthermore,I did not undertaketo interview individual politicians, since this method be unlikely to yield communication of attitudes other than those already officially would in presented existing examplesof discoursesuchaslegislativedocuments,pressreleases,media interviewsand so on. In addition, interviewswould self-evidentlynot involve the presentation of policy issues to a wider public at different times, and as such would not constitute contributionsto a publicly aired debateon identity and cultural policy. Analysing what a

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in interview the would establish a situation where communicates of a research politician setting the interviewee could choose what to say according to the questions asked and his/her interview factor This the to method would make expand upon particular points. willingness identity ideas intention the culture and about of examining entirely unsatisfactory, given my freely are and ordinarily communicated to the public, whether through officially edited which forms such as press statements,published extracts from parliamentary debatesand conferences, or sometimes unedited forms such as live radio or television interviews.

A secondary

it interview be difficult to that also extremely such a wide range of would consideration was in factors due the texts to collected of accessto and and analysed, politicians as are covered figures the of all within the time constraints surrounding the researching and availability writing-up of the project.

Another possibility would havebeento interview particular advisorsand civil servants had be likely to wish to remain anonymous. worked with specific politicians, who would who These are, after all, part of the wider definition of `political elites', as I described in Chapter One, which may signify the most important State actors who take part in policy-making, including politicians and administrative elites. Indeed, it has long been recognised that there is in degree between France. the of overlap work civil servants and politicians a peculiar of Firstly, this is due to the nature of the French system of training such persons. As Suleiman notes, `France has one of the most clearly establishedmechanisms for the creation of its elites of an Western society' (1978, pp. 17-8). This is because the State forms its political elites itself, through a highly centralised higher education system and the administrative organs which it Ecole (ibid., Suleiman, important is 1984, 118). Particularly ENA, the also monopolises p. or d'administration, a prestigious Paris academy established in 1945 to select and train nationale candidates who would move into the most senior State administrative posts (Stevens, 1981, p. 135-7; Wright, 1994, p. 118). Yet being admitted to the highly competitive ENA has also meant the possibility of moving into not only prestigious civil service posts, but also private sector businesses, ministerial cabinets and open political engagement (Cole, 1998, p. 105-6; Suleiman, 1978, p.25). Although the ENA and other top schools operate an open system of entry based on public entrance examinations, they have been criticised by many for perpetuating ' inequalities `State and creating a new social nobility'. Many leading politicians began as civil 'SeeBourdieu,1989,for example.

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deputes increase in has 1958 the of numbers seen an servants: every general election since (MPs) who are former ENA students (Stevens, 1981, p. 137).

Many leading politicians also

Giscard Chirac, Valery Jacques ENA. Prominent through are contemporary examples passed d'Estaing and Philippe Seguin on the Right, and Lionel Jospin, Michel Rocard and Jean-Pierre Chevenementon the Left (Suleiman, 1995, p. 173; Thody, 1998, p. 157). Cole describes (1998, it is in how for broad 106) ENA the training attracts the sense, as political a a ground elites p. best and most ambitious students who form powerful networks which can help them to move between State administration, business and politics according to their ambitions. Also civil servants in France have tenure and the opportunity to take secondments to undertake political in activity, safe the knowledge that they can come back to their administrative posts, and are in to to think tanks (Ager, 1996b, permitted act as advisors political parties and movements, or Suleiman, 1984, 105; pp. 120-6). p.

Further features of this system of interpenetration of

political and administrative personnel are the nomination of top civil servants according to political criteria, the practice of substituting civil servants for party politicians in positions of blurred lines between breed business, the authority, and a new more government and as political in `technocrats' the State planning and regulatory organisations, or nationalised grew up of industries (Cole, 1998, pp. 105-6; Miliband, 1969, p. 113).

Yet although there is a degree of overlap between the roles of politicians and administrativepersonnel,the latter are not the political actorsor `figureheads'who are seenby the public communicatingpolicy concernsto the generalpublic or to other politicians, and contributingto a debateto which the public canbe exposed.Although civil servantsmay have in a role policy-making,and indeedin writing the actualspeechesand declarationsof a minister leader, in what a politician says a speechor interview, releasesin a pressconferenceor writes or in a newspaperarticle is generallyperceivedby various audiences,whether other politicians or the generalpublic, both inside and outsideof France,as consistentwith the publicly-presented beliefs andpolicies of that particularpolitician, and thoseof the generaldirection of their party or political grouping, or even, in some cases,of the nation itself. As Drake (1995, p.140) argues,`A leader'sdiscourseis one of the tools of a political leader,sinceit is the dimensionto his or her role most immediately apparent, and so most immediately susceptible to interpretation,commentandreaction'. Therefore,politicians, throughtheir public discourse,are involved with policy-making, but also have a symbolic role as communicatorsof only not

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policy on a national and international level. Besides this, we should not forget the importance of what a politician says about policy and how he or she says it, in terms of safeguarding his or her own political future. As Northcutt (1996, pp.58-9) explains, `language and voters' ability to identify with language is one of the principal factors that mobilise support for candidates'. In view of these factors, I must qualify my earlier statement at the beginning of this section that `political discourse is the discourse of politicians and policy-making groups', in stating that the contributions to political discourse discussed in my study are produced by policy-makers who are politicians, rather than civil servants. As I outlined at the beginning of Chapter One, the term `political elites', therefore, is taken in this thesis to signify politicians involved in either formulation policy or debateson culture and its relationship with national identity. These may include both those within the ruling party in government, or those in opposition. This definition follows Pareto's conception of the elite as `governing elite', composed of all political `influentials' (1935).

2.2.1 Examining political communication in the French context

Having explainedmy reasonsfor using political discourseto examinethe relationshipbetween identity and cultural policy, I now outline some of the issuesrelated to the study of political language. I particularly consider the context of the production of political discoursein contemporaryFrance. Following this, I explain my corpus and the methodologicalquestions its from constructionandanalysis. arising In the generalstudy of political language,Schäffner,Musolff and Townson (1996,p.9) argue that political discourseis a broad concept, covering `internal discourse', which they describeas meaning politicians talking to other politicians, and the production of legislative texts during policy-making, and `externaldiscourse',which signifies politicians addressingthe wider public, usually with texts which are argumentativeor persuasivein nature. They also arguethat the secondaspectmentionedfits into a more generalcategoryof `public discourse' includes the language of media, together with advertising and any linguistic which communicationaimedat a non-specifiedgroupof addressees. However, such a distinction is problematic for my approach looking at political languagein the context of France. I examine texts which may be initially described as `internal', which, whilst not necessarilyaimed at the generalpublic, for examplethosewhich

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form the basis for discussions on policy-making at events which target a more limited audience, may ultimately be communicated to the wider public via citation in the media. Examples, in the context of my study looking at cultural policy in France, might include speechesat a workshop or conference organised by the Ministry of Culture, or other communications which are aimed in the first instance at government and civil service officials or specialists from a particular industry, but which may also subsequently be reported by the press, be made available on included information government web-sites, within packages at press conferences, or be distributed to interested parties as examples of policy initiatives and concerns of the Ministry. Such texts, therefore, cannot be exclusively `internal'. Where sources such as circulars were unlikely to attract attention in the public sphere, I did draw on them to obtain background information about particular policies, and considered them relevant to my analysis of discourse if they were subsequentlycommunicated to a public audiencethrough the media.

Examplesof `external' discourserelevantin the caseof my research,where politicians include directly, the wider public address several formats covering different kinds of discourse and attract varying levels of attention and audience. Press conferences for example, although they are reported on by journalists, may only allow speakersa short time to develop ideas. They are aimed primarily at media representativesand the wider international community (Gaffney, 1994, p. 11). Speechesmay be aimed at various audiences,and as noted above, may be reported in sections or as whole texts to a larger group of people by the media. In France it is common for the President or Prime Minister to addressthe nation (and the world) at particular points in the calendar, like New Year, or at times of special political or diplomatic importance, e.g. the national celebration of the French Revolution on 14 July. This is usually done by means of a televised broadcast, and involves a `ritualised' setting such as speaking from the Elysee Palace2, an event which in itself may involve the use of certain `discursive conventions'.

Other examples of `external' discourse can be found in French newspapersand magazines,which frequently featurepersuasivearticles written by Ministers and Deputies,or indeed the entire reproduction of a speech,which again permits the distribution of their discourseto a wider public. Similarly, television and radio interviews are aimed at a wide audience(perhapswider), andthe intervieweehasthe freedomto expandin a more spontaneous fashion than would be possible within a formalised press conferenceor declaration(Drake, 'The official residenceof the FrenchPresident,in Paris.

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1995, p. 147; Gaffney, 1994, p. 11). Furthermore, speeches and interviews given in a more international setting such as at an event within France where many countries are represented,or further Francophone Summit European Union to at a or attract possibly event, are positioned attention on an international level, as the occasion is likely to be reported by the media in many if Even countries. statements or texts produced at these events are not widely reported, they be instruments still may effective of use to French political elites.

This is because such

interviews identity, ideas France French and speeches communicate policy and concerning and to international leaders and policy-makers in the first instance. Moreover, it should be recognised that whilst certain instances of discourse may apparently be addressedto audienceswithin France, they may at the same time serve to create an identity for France which will be displayed internationally or externally as well as inside of France. This point is of importance in relation to my research since, whilst I am not engagedin far audience responseper se, as as my corpus of texts is concerned, the nature of the measuring audienceis nonethelessproblematic as it is one of the conditions of production of a political text influence its orientation (Gaffney, 1989, pp.34-5). Gaffney argues that in reality, a which may political text which is studied may have `an actual audience and a set of other audiences: journalists, political adversaries, the politically uncommitted' (and also political actors having various degrees of allegiance to the speaker). He discusses how the one-way nature, and lead it text the to undergo a shift settings, of a political can ritualised audience signified within in status, nature or attitude.

Indeed, according to Gaffney, the attempt to influence or

is this shifting nature manipulate or status `one of the primary rhetorical devices of political discourse' (ibid. ). This is because,as described above, a text may be communicated to different beyond that of its original intention. audiences

This possibility may be recognised and

by the producer of the text, who can adapt his/her choice of words and forms of acknowledged address accordingly. This could be seen to happen for example when a French politician addressesa national audience, but recognises that this address is then communicated at an international level by the media. Where relevant to my investigation of political perceptions of French identity, I will demonstrate how the audience within some of the texts I discuss may in shifts nature and status, and how this may occur in a variety of settings. undergo The ritual aspect of political discourse assumes a particular significance in French is This due to the importance of presidentialism, and the personalisation of culture. political

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politics, which has developed because of it during the Fifth Republic, which requires good form in features I they these part closely, as performance ritualised settings. now examine more inform institutions, lie behind to to texts that of a set of references and continue and events French politics. Moreover, presidentialism, and its resulting personalisation of French politics, in which the institutions of the current French political system under the Fifth are ways Republic have affected the role of discourse in French political culture. Elgie (1993, p. 1) explains how the development of the semi-presidential system in France has led to important political changes: `Since 1958 and the triumphal return of de Gaulle to the centre of the political stage, the presidency has become the focus of attention for the public, the media and the political elite alike. It is a much coveted institution. ' These changes made the president a figure of great symbolic importance, being particularly strengthenedby General de Gaulle thanks to his 1962 amendment to the Constitution introducing the election from 1965 of the president by direct universal suffrage. However, Elgie notes that some of the claims about the `presidentialisation' of the Fifth Republic are exaggerated, as France is still classified as a semi-presidential political regime, since a directly elected President coexists with a Prime Minister, and both have certain constitutional powers (1993, pp.7,22-37). Yet the Fifth Republic's encouragement of presidentialism, through its enhancement of the presidency, has resulted in the development of presidential leadership, and a presidential style of discourse as a leadership. it is led This by has that to the of situation, resource argued various authors, in of politics personalisation general under the Fifth Republic, encouraging a greater focus on the individual rather than the party. This feature has influenced various aspects of the French party political system, including the prime ministerial position, contenders for leadership and deputy positions for ministerial office and party positions (Drake and Gaffney, 1996, p. 17). Now, all political leaders in France, at various times and to different degrees, face expectations to speak and behave in accordance with codes and conventions of a possible presidential candidate (ibid. ). This in turn has had consequencesfor the organisation of political parties, as they have had to adapt to the demands of presidential politics. As Cole (1998, p. 141) explains, `the most successful parties in the Fifth Republic have been presidential parties, able legitimately to envisage the conquest of the regime's greatestinstitutional prize, the presidency'. At the same time, the backing of a political party has become essential for any politician to have a significant career; there is no room for the political loner (Suleiman, 1995, p. 172).

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Besides the development of the presidency, further enhancement of the importance of individual political personalities in France (and indeed other representative democracies), has been encouragedby the mediatisation of political life (Gaffney, 1991, pp.20,25; S.Hayward, first `was it the France (1990, 25), Susan Hayward Moreover, 1989). which was p. notes as West European country to capitalise on the ability of television to mediatise the political first the de Gaulle, It under president as who, was messageeffectively on a massive scale'. for television harness first the he Republic particular use of political actor to created, was the 58, 1989, image (S. Hayward, p. communication of the presidential message, and ultimately, 1990, p.25; Guichard, 1985).' Such a phenomenon, coupled with the demands of the the has to successful on concentrate actors political encouraged cited above, system presidential interviews, debates, for `media walkabouts, example press conferences, events', exploitation of inauguration ceremonies and meetings. Their ability to perform well in public is frequently in front the facilitate the `media and camera, of scrutiny tested at close events', all of which frequent use of television by French politicians to transmit long speeches at key moments (which are themselves frequently reproduced at length in national daily newspapers such as Le Monde). This is in contrast to the situation in the UK, where it may be argued that the culture of is `soundbite' to the stronger. pressure use

So the effectsof the mediatisationof Frenchpolitical culture under the Fifth Republic have,togetherwith presidentialism,madethe effectiveuseof languageever more importantfor `right' failure in France. The the to of a politician successfullyadopt politicians contemporary discoursein the public arenais thus self-evident,and may be demonstratedin the caseof a figure such as former Socialist Prime Minister Edith Cressonfor example. Cresson'sabrupt do declarations in to language served severalunfortunate mannerand choice of over-familiar during 1991her her image harm to those to of party and government personal aswell as great 92, andcontributedto her removalfrom office (Wilcox, 1992,1996).° In additionto the increasedimportanceof languagefor politicians underthe influenceof in French Fifth Republic the the culture, electoral system mediatised political presidentialism ; Ironically though, de Gaulle's use of television may have contributed to his downfall, as, in the final years of his in 1965 French the to presidential citizens action, and election see other politicians campaign allowed presidency, how Gaullists (Thody, 1989, State them the television the radio now controlled all and monopoly of showed pp. 144-5).

°I pickup this point againin ChapterSix.

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A

arguably informs the role of political discourse in the French context, given that parties and politicians are continually involved in campaigning for elections, particularly the presidency. Gaffney (1997, p.277) explains how the five-year parliamentary cycle and the seven-yearcycle of the presidency, at both times involving parties in the different roles of governmental and figures), individuals have further (candidates the and other presidential party, enhanced role of increased the dependency of parties upon them. The system has also created a situation of and levels for different elections. Furthermore, the peculiar campaigning permanent at various be is, President Prime Minister time that the and may at a given situation of cohabitation, where from opposing parties, may reduce the President's real power, whilst curiously increasing his/her symbolic power, as his/her discourse is modified to portray an image of someonewho is is is in the trials tribulations the above and of everyday politics and concerned only with what interests of France. This is in line with Max Weber's notion of a `charismatic leader', who is set from his/her least through ordinary people endowment with apparently superhuman, or at apart exceptional, powers or qualities (cited in Gaffney, 1989, p. 19).

Thus article 5 of the

Constitution may become ever more important, which concerns the President's role as arbitre (arbitor or guarantor) of the nation's interests.' Drake and Gaffney for example (1996, p. 18), argue that this situation was effectively demonstrated during the cohabitation period of 19861988. So the presidential role as arbiter, at times enhancedby cohabitation, may act as a further condition of the production of discourse in the case of a president, or perhaps any presidentiable (politician considered or aiming to be considered a credible presidential candidate). In the follows I will draw upon any possible implications of these factors, where they which analysis help to illuminate our understanding of the construction of political perceptions of French identity.

More recently,however,the institutions of France'spolitical systemhave been subject to new influences,as political leadershipnow takes place at several levels, not necessarily As France. Drake and Gaffney argue (1996, pp.26-7), French governmentis already within complexgiven the existenceof the various layersof Stateauthority such as the presidency,the Prime Ministerial and governmentallevel and the numerous tiers of local government,in addition to the various influential lobbies and interest groups such as trade unions. Melucci (1997, p.68) notes the loss of authority at the top levels of decision-makingof contemporary SSeeMilne, 1997,pp.24-5, for a discussion this of aspect.

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nation-states, not just France, as interdependence and transnational economic and political forces take over. Now, European integration, in the form of the developing European Union, is, according to some viewpoints, perhaps the most significant force which affects French discourse in a national leadership context as a new resource to be drawn upon, and also as a constraint (Drake and Gaffney, 1996, p.26). Jack Hayward (1994a, p.27) too points to the example of Francois Mitterrand, who, as President, provided a good example of a politician who utilised European integration as a `mobilising myth' to support his own domestic policy and leadership in times of difficulty.

Even if Mitterrand's policies were not always successful

(whether at the domestic or European level), he still hoped to be remembered as a statesman who tried to help France secure a leading role in the `New Europe'. This issue is of interest in in for discussion framework `Europe' to that the study my sense of can constitute a relation French political elites to discuss issues of French identity and influence on the world stage (see also Schmidt, 1997a, 1997c). In conclusion to this section, I maintain that as factors relating to the institutions and traditions of French political culture such as those discussed have shaped it is discourse Fifth Republic, the then the under appropriate to role of political and enhanced in body to their texts the the of or sensitive effects when considering examined corpus, remain data, of this study. This corpus and its composition are the subject of the following section.

2.3 Constructing the corpus 2.3.1 Gathering the data Following the initial stagesof the research,consisting largely of a literature review (worked on in conjunction with a programme of research methods training), I established a working framework for the corpus of my study. I began to collect a variety of examples of contributions to the political discourse related to my selected case studies, on language, audiovisual and Internet policy, which I had selected for their importance to the political debates on French identity in the 1990s. These were taken from a range of sources, for example government or declarations official party-political and policy documents, transcripts of television and radio debates, transcripts

of

parliamentary

debates, press

articles

and

interviews

and

documents. I also made use of secondary sources such as general press publicity/campaign articles, European Union and European Commission documentation, academic articles and monographs, and sources on the Internet. These were particularly useful in identifying specific

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be help legislation debates the of primary sources of researchedwith events, and which could official documentation and individual examples of political discourse related to the relevant issues. In this way, I obtained a wide range of documents for my proposed corpus. In the UK I in in London, and French Embassy France, the also contacted relevant organisations and journalistic based Internet official and on resources such as web-sites, conducted research held at various university centres. sources Approximately nine months into the first year of the research (June 1996), 1 undertook a in `pilot' fieldwork Paris, to order to assessthe availability and appropriatenessof week's visit initial information in light intentions to the the of of my research, gather additional sources of information in addition to that which I had already obtained, and to highlight possibilities for future targeting. During this fieldwork, I visited various centres, including some of the archives departments like the Ministry of Culture, specialist libraries on political science government of and European Union information, a government documentation centre (La Documentation francaise) specialising in electronic databasesearching, and other general libraries. My work facilitated by knowledge from some was existing of certain centres gained an earlier period of residence and study in France during my undergraduate degree. The visit also permitted introductions and recommendations to various other organisations and contacts useful to the researchsuch as relevant Ministry of Culture officials. From this initial visit, I establishedsome information for case study materials and continued collecting these. good sourcesof

I also virtually completedthe collection of materialsfor a possibleintroductory chapter which I had in mind on the Bicentenaire celebrations of 1989 (Bicentennial of 1789 Revolution),which could be usedto introduceissuesof identity relatedto Frenchhistory andits Republicanpolitical culture. Eventually I felt, following further considerationof this proposal, that the use of the Bicentenairewas not in fact essential,in view of the issuesI proposedto it being discussed to relate elsewherein the study, and the guidelinesfor the appropriatelength felt I thesis. the that I could refer to the Bicentenaire in the Introduction of the thesis, of its significance in relation to national identity, but that sufficient quantities of regarding interestingmaterial for examinationwere availablewhich would standup on their own in the form of the main casestudiesof the thesis.

Following this fieldwork visit, I continued

in France,by letter, fax, telephone,e-mail etc., building on work contacts with correspondence during the first year and the findings of the June 1996 fieldwork visit, with the aim out carried

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This 1996. by data the far period the of end of required collection as possible, as completing, of in Paris the further fieldwork in three data at spent weeks of period a collection culminated of 6 from information derived My the personal visits were archives main sources of year. end of

documentation centresat: and/or de 1'information et de la communication or DIC; de la Culture (Departement Ministere -the Departement des etudeset de la prospective or DEP; Delegation generale a la languefrancaise DAI) des Departement internationales DGLF; or affaires or Agence de la Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) -the Nationale des sciencespolitiques (FNSP) Fondation -the d'Europe (a European Documentation Centre) -Sources Conseil de la Francophonie (HCF) Haut -the d'information du gouvernement (SIG) Service -the National de la cinematographie (CNC) Centre -the des Affaires etrangeres - Cellule de documentation de la Maison des Francais a Ministere -the 1'etranger francaise (government publishing house, library and researchcentre) Documentation -La Georges Pompidou Centre d'information Bibliotheque the at publique -the Assemblee nationale -the parties? political -various

Searchingby thememeantthat I collecteddocumentswhich containedsubstantialtreatmentof the subjectsto be analysed,rather than every individual interview which may contain a sole in fight GATT like fairly banal `France the the agreements', must saying something sentence in detail have Yet to topic. covered no researchproject can claim contextof anotherunrelated in field. Issues suchastiming, resourcesavailable available a resources particular all absolutely for travel and fieldwork, accessto archives,variationsin the quality, range and cataloguingof in by the areas of staff working and of organisations, cooperation materials conserved kind. influence factors this a researchproject of which may governmentandpolitical parties,are Human error too may lead a researcherto miss certain items whilst spending long hours in working archives. In my case,I am confidentthat my organisationof my researchschedule, 6Thecostsof fieldwork visits to Francewere generouslysupportedby travel grantsawardedby the Department Faculty Studies Loughborough University. Social Sciences European Humanities the and at of and of 'Documentation was also supplied to me during the course of my research, without personal visit, by sources such as the European Commission, the Mission de la Recherche et de la technologie of the Ministere de la Culture, like RTL, Presidential the stations press offices, the Direction generale des relations culturelles, scientifiques radio et techniques of the Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, the Ministere delegue aux affaires europeennes,the Conseil de 1'audiovisuel, Societe both des in individual the civile plus other superieur auteurs-realisateurs, researchers France and the UK.

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identification best the careful of resourcesavailable enabled me to cover a very wide range and in of material my subject area. A further issue I should comment on concerned my discussions of the precise nature of the research topic with the information staff I met and corresponded with in France. I was reluctant, at some points when meeting with or writing to officials, to expand upon the exact debates in about connection with aims of my research and proposed analysis, especially identity. This was because I did not wish to give the impression that my main aim was to criticise government or party policies and opinions in some way, even if I would ultimately from findings. felt I that giving too much some negative my opinions resulting research offer away might prejudice my treatment as a researcher,if some people felt I was likely to analyse in hostile from French `Anglo-Saxon' or proand elite opinion a way, perhaps an policy American standpoint, being from the UK.

I thought this could be a factor governing my

its interaction issues identity French the given sensitive of some nature about and reception, with other cultural identities (for example in the context of debate about Americanisation of the French film industry). Hence I did not expand a great deal on my precise lines of enquiry, at times glossing over my exact interest in identity and simply asking for documents on particular policy themes. I also aimed to be careful not to offer any criticisms of French policies or held by in French in actors conversation opinions political or my correspondence,either openly by `the (not, for terms choice of with of or possibly negative connotations example, speaking industries'). This strategy then enabled me for the most part to read of cultural protectionism documents in in determine for a variety of sift my own and way and myself, which, my opinion, interesting in terms of their discussion of identity (although, with regards to the the most were by post, I did not have this freedom, as it was pre-selected). It is possible that material received my methods could be accusedof being a little dishonest, in my attempts to disguise any of my own viewpoints on French policies or political opinions in my meetings with officials. However, I used the methods that I did in the hope of maximising access to a good range of useful material. Furthermore, I felt that it was important to investigate texts where `identity' did not necessarily appear as a central theme or as a keyword according to archive classifications, it interesting be to see how it was developed by political figures on a perhaps more since would in level, connection with policy issues. With the benefit of hindsight though, it is subtle possible that my strategies did perhaps cause me to miss some material, which may have been

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filed under a different heading not identified by the people I approached, on account of me not always being entirely precise in my requests. Yet a degree of aleatoire (chance) can always in the collection of data, perhaps more so in the case of qualitative data on subjects occur inviting such ambiguities and complexities as do identity and cultural issues. The researcher must recognise such factors and aim to make effective use of all sources where possible, charting problems which may arise and seeking alternative areas of information wherever possible. In general, most officials I met with in the libraries and archives in Paris were very helpful in helping me to find the documents I was seeking. Where I did not find much in certain places, this was of significance for the research, since it frequently confirmed my previous suspicions regarding the usefulness of sources, for example some of the political parties whose resources were not always well-suited to assisting researchers. I had expected that in some cases,the majority of examples of discourse concerning certain issues would emanate from the governing party, and the opposition, at a given time. Some parties may not, for various reasons, historical, financial whether or ideological etc. or their lack of media coverage, devote time and resources to debate on cultural issues. My experiences of active research, particularly the fieldwork in France, confirmed that these suspicions were indeed the case. The smaller parties such as the Parti Radical and the Force democrate were not, in my experience, geared up for receiving researcherswho wish to plough through their archives, if indeed they had any true `archives' available! Also several of the parties claimed that their paucity of information at the time was due to reorganisation of their headquarters. Another factor in my researchusing party resourceswas the need to deflect the parties' attempts to bombard me with propaganda, whether through packs of recent publicity posters or discussion. This was particularly the case with the Front National documentation centre, where the official I met with (although quite wellhelpful) was somewhat suspicious as to the nature of my research topic and organised and enquired as to whether someone else or some other `organisation' had chosen it for me, before lecture a on the merits of the FN as a political force. These issues meant that often I offering found that other sources such as the press, radio and television interview transcripts and correspondencewere more satisfactory means for finding opinions and reactions of some of the political parties. However, despite some problems with the political parties, usually the specialists I saw could refer me to other centres who could help me, and I think that the long-

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I had establishedwith someof thesepeoplehad a positive effecton the standingcorrespondence way I was treated once we met in person. During the autumn stay in Paris, I had sufficient time available for what I wanted to do and was pleased that I managed eventually to exploit more sources than I had anticipated. Moreover, I was glad that I had delayed this period of work until the end of 1996, since having in had UK, I the texts the trip the a autumn preparing and gathering whilst spent additional idea I best I than to the texts the would and people approach and needed clearer much of places have had, had I attempted to continue the fieldwork in Paris earlier in the year. By the end of 1996, the position was, briefly, that I had collected a workable corpus, factors from to to the certain existence various related and availability of materials subject investigation I Following this, as additional of some outlined above. continued sources, back in journalistic UK, the sources, Journal officiel publications, electronic avenues using databasessuch as Politique et societe (La Documentation francaise, 1996), sources on the Internet, and further correspondence with contacts in France in organisations such as the government ministries.

2.3.2 Developing the corpus and research aims

I should explain at this point that at the time of undertakingmy fieldwork the focus of my had finer happen later. the tuning undergone not which would research My PhD researchtopic had grown out of an interest in identity issues in France developed throughout my undergraduate studies, particularly by my experiences of studying in France during 1993-4, when I became interested in issues related to the Americanisation of imperialism, and cultural culture, which I later began to investigate in a final-year dissertation. On beginning my postgraduate studies I wanted to develop these interests further and to investigate those questions of identity in France which seemed increasingly problematic, debates (both political and in other spheres,e.g. the media), and policies concerning concerning the possible protection of French culture in an increasingly global market-place, besides hostile reactions by some politicians and other sections of the community to the sometimes different ethnic groups within France. In particular I was interested in questions presence of relating to the possible consequences of globalisation and European integration for French identity and culture, whether positive or negative, and the reactions to these consequencesby

71

political elites. In order to find a manageable way of approaching this complex subject area and to structure my research,I initially chose to investigate the possibility of there being a consensus keen identity. French I French across existing political parties about culture and was especially to consider what politicians communicate about identity, believing their opinions to be constructed according to certain recurring themes, ideas and images, which could transcend party boundaries. I wondered if certain myths concerning identity and the idea of French nationhood stemming from France's revolutionary and colonial past, and ongoing Republican political culture, might be reactivated by political elites in response to possible cultural challengesto their perceptions of identity of importance in the 1990s.

With this in mind, I beganmy collection of texts with the aim of collecting materialto form a representative sample of the five main political

formations in France - the Rassemblementpour la Republique (RPR), the Union pour la Democratie francaise (UDF), the Parti Socialiste (PS), the Parti Communiste francais (PCF) and the Front National (FN) besides trying to include some of the smaller groups. As noted above though, I had expected that in some instances the majority of examples of discourse concerning certain cultural issues from the parties of which had been in government and opposition, with rather would originate less coming from the smaller parties, and I did in fact find this to be the case as a result of my research.

However, after gatheringmy data, and carrying out some sifting and analysisof the began I issues to that the realise materials, of culture and identity which I was interestedin be on would more profitably analysedwithin a somewhatwider framework than the working question of cross-partyconsensus. I felt that this early focus was now constraining my investigation,in that it did not allow me to `dig' deeply enoughinto the relationshipbetween identity cultural policy and culture, as used by contemporary French political elites. Furthermore,I had begunto questionwhether finding a cross-partyconsensuson identity and culture would necessarilybe so interesting or surprising, given France's post-revolutionary history, the social transformationin the post-1945period and the consensusof policy political aroundthe Ministry of Culture which I believedto inform all parties. On the other hand, this be be to the case,as a counterargumentto this assertionmight point to the argued not could idea of a guerrefranco francaise (war amongstthe French)arising at various points in history

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when French society has been split along regular fault lines concerning some cultural and identity issues in the post-Revolutionary period. We might suggest here the Dreyfus affair, the between Church and State and tensions around laicite (secularity), the Vichy period, the split Algerian war for example. However, with these considerations in mind, I redirected my focus towards the construction of political discourse on identity, and how this was related to cultural policy. I now aimed to analyse how issues which had come to the fore during the 1990s and in examined my case studies, had shaped discourse on cultural policy by French political elites expressingidentity. Cross-party comparisons would no longer be the main focus, but could still be drawn on where appropriate. Far from being a waste of time or energy, I believe that this development of the research

focus was an important part of the learning curve which I followed in working on my PhD research.Looking at cross-partyconsensusprovided a useful route into the investigationof my subject,and helped me to systematicallyexploit many sourcesof primary materials,which I thenusedto constructmy final corpusfor analysisandto refine my researchaims. Otherimplicationsfor my researchhad arisenfrom my searchfor data in France. After the fieldwork, I began to rethink the structure of my proposed analysis, as I had found more material about some cultural policy issues, but less about others, than I had at first expected. Similarly, I began to see a number of ambiguities within the texts, which led me to reconsider my ideas about how to view different cultural issues, for example, whether as potential threats or opportunities for French cultural policy. I now recognised that the opinions expressedby in the texts could not necessarily be split up into clear-cut categories, so I would elites political have to rethink my structure of case studies. I will return to this point later when I discuss issuesconcerning writing-up the case studies.

Finally, the results of my fieldwork reinforced my opinion that there was a division betweenthe issuesof importancefor Frenchcultural policy during the period 1989-93and the 1993 onwards,which I had thoughtwould be of relevanceto the theoreticalfindings of period the final researchproject. As I explainedin ChapterOne, the post-1993period coincidedwith JacquesToubon of the RPR succeedingSocialist Jack Lang as Minister of Culture, and also FrancophoneAffairs, and I outlined how it had beensuggestedthat the arrival of Toubonmight herald a return to a more classical,Gaullist conceptionof culture basedon the defenceof the Frenchlanguageand its rayonnement(Looseley, 1995,pp.228-9). My data indicatedthat the

73

in French issues interesting terms included the of and controversial most post-1993 period identity within a short space of time. The chapters which follow will discuss these issues, as I test the hypothesis that this period of cultural policy-making in France is coterminous with an identity fundamentally on the part of political elites. undynamic conceptions of embracing of

2.3.3 Selecting thefinal corpus My case studies aimed to addressthe particular concerns of French political elites about culture identity, behind they the these the provoke, which may or reactions concerns and reasons and be discourse to in legislation. As the used can of earlier, study political outlined may not result help assessthe nature of and responses to the various challenges to identity as they are in by perceived such elites and presented the public arena.

Given that my study aimedto consider- as far as possible-a representativesampleof it indicated that for discourse that preliminary analysis each topic considered, and examples of during in detail the be texts to course collected all study appropriate nor possible neither would length!, I the to the thesis construct the needed of a of standard within constraints research, of thesis according to the following model: each case study would include the detailed analysis and (in basis `core texts' the all cases) wider consultation of a of chosen on comparison of several illustrating be Such `core' those larger body texts chosen would of material considered. much debate in the the terms case typical themes within of presented responses, or and significant in importance the their to the those political of producers positions of with regard or study; `moments' having the those to as particular or prominence case study; spectrum where relevant be deeper issue. for Besides debate these texts would the analysis, reference or main chosen of from `minor' discourse in to the emanating case studies examples of made where appropriate figures or from `satellite' texts considered to be of lesser importance in thematic terms, but from less dense invite to nature. analysis of a major producers, which would seem

The specific texts chosenfor close analysistherefore illustrate important and typical in dominant they the themes terms which present. analysed and are and compared of responses, As I arguedat the beginning of this chapter,such analysisis essentialto understandingthe it identity how French the and of assumptions elites about of policy-making complex nature 'Concerningthe preparationof this thesisaccordingto the recommendedlengths,I disregarded5000 words for had I for I translations translations, all considered a reasonable allowance systematic since provided which from French sources. quotations

74

Through issues and comparing the studied. to the policy cultural of challenges relates illustration their hope I to in of texts an the offer examined, unravelling the themes presented by French held identity French political illustrate the that of conception overall and complexity face in the cultural is largely backward-looking contemporary of unchanging and elites a draw of such I In consequences to possible concerning conclusions addition, aim challenges. conception. The choice of `core texts' for examination was made according to the following criteria. These included the setting and timing of the event, which influenced its possible exposure important However, the text. the most and/or reporting, and the status of the producer of development themes in its inclusion lay interest in central text of the and of each element identity. French concerning

A further factor considered was the possibility of including

interest for different the figures to throughout as appropriate example cases, particular political in including discourse from a President, or perhaps a Minister for Telecommunications in the factors to in issues further develop to the Internet. I relating these particular the relation caseof for individual in the texts analysis. chosen exploration of the casestudy areas each chapter's

The backgroundto the main texts discussedis presentedat the beginning of eachcase forms interest in the discussion the terms main their which together of analysis of with a study, they areall importanttexts in their own right, focusof the casestudy As will be demonstrated, .9 becauseof their developmentof key themeswhich enablethe tracing of elite perceptionsof One in Chapter hypothesis illustration identity, French as stated of points supportingmy andthe I however, Before this should material, that such perceptionsare undynamic. analysing into had data I for the my research assembled actually analysing commenton my methods issues from the this analysis. of arising some corpus,and 2.4 Writing and analysis As Drake and Gaffney have noted (1996, p. 14), the study of language and discourseis limited, leads `scientific' to their mechanicalresults, such as since study often problematic, for by Moreau Cotteret Rene Jean-Marie the those obtained quantitative analysis of and 9My case studies include extracts from the texts to support various points of discussion. Originally my intention however issues include texts the to to this thesis, entire as an appendix a number of were raised regarding was long length format. The by in formats, and copies a were supplied a variety of some of and archives access differing standardsof printing and presentation, sometimes containing annotations and mistakes on the copies. A further issue concerned copyright, as most of my sourcesrequestedthat I did not reproduce the texts in full.

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however (1991, that Griffiths not should Richard (1969,1976). words p. xiii) suggests example `on they that linguistic are from `a be examined only point of view', preferring philological or Gaffney Drake also in and the whole merely situated their stylistic, social and political context'. `interpretative' in instead be manner language ) (ibid. an analysed that should political argue is that to its this a in assert italics] not [my to although and significance, effects order elucidate in is line the This is research, my of aims with approach non-scientific. analysis qualitative in issues terms of is themes presented the to and cultural policy particular consider which interpretation linguistic the less focus than in I Thus on identity. characteristics on my analysis, have I fact to from derives This that in the study chosen texts. the themes the presented of illuminate debates to our its broadest in which discourse sense,as a collection of contributions texts identity, than of set a as rather understanding of political attitudes about culture and deconstructedfor their interest in terms of understanding an actor's particular discursive style or leadership. to approach

Early on in my research,I madesomeattemptto utilise information technologyin order both but time-consuming facilitate these and texts, proved themes, of my to sift so analysis and frustrating in terms of results. This was due on one hand to the difficulty of scanning and layouts, the foreign other on texts column newspaper or characters containing either processing found (as I documents fact when the that the necessity of physically reading still remained to the 1° Whilst data Nudlst I considered using the such computer-based methods analysis package). in find helpful this did for I them have out types their carrying not of project, certain merits may involving fashion, in Therefore reading, the a manual out carried analysis was research. laborious, this be the dissecting Whilst this of texts. nature may sometimes categorising and discourse deconstruction that the based actual reading such was of close analysis and on project frequency, for data the was unavoidable and enabled a greater meaning, simply not of became Furthermore, the the easier and of analysis gradually content. process understanding of familiarity as with the construction of the texts, party and personal positions, rapid more filing diagrams ideas images developed. found I the various and of charts, and use recurring be different key hypotheses based themes to of assistancewhilst working on my on and systems 10Iattended an introductory training course on the use of this complex qualitative data analysis package. As a framework Nudist data index first I that the of using required and establishing an system realised reading result for identify key it headings Furthermore, terms; tool could not provide a analysis. only could using such a subject discourse. different the themes to of elaboration reading of contexts and styles of nuanced according more

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interpretationsof the texts, as well as searchtechniquesfor data that are computerisedsuchas like Politique et societe (La Documentationfrancaise,1996),andInternetsources. databases In analysing my texts however, I became aware of certain limitations of my approach. In particular I became aware that meanings of texts can be `made' as they are interpreted and reinterpreted by a researcher. The researcheris not innocent, passively absorbing and explaining data. Rather, I recognised that a researchercan select and use material for his/her own purposes, data inadvertently) the by ignore (either which in doing of aspects certain choice or so may and in I of be this examples than my since gathering say others. significance of greater may discourse,and then in collating quotations on individual topics, I went through my own process interesting felt I the texts and those most were which sections of of sifting and selecting in in Therefore, this I best to the writing. my was explaining point significant, or which related decided it data, I which the who the themes was research came out of my of way, although form be through how to they narrative, my own used could and quotations were most relevant, how describe 60) (1997, Coffey Atkinson no p. and my own process of editing and selection. is `reading the After it be how determine not activity, an all, will read. text can constrain or

her his `brings how text information'. to the Thus they or a reader explain passivereceipt of her his ignorance) (or knowledge knowledge, texts, unique or and of similar a stock of cultural biography'."

Similarly Hewison (1995, p.223), arguesthat when undertaking analysis, `in

is into text texts whose meaning a new saying somethingwe are only reconstitutingprevious immediatelyremadeby thosewho hearor readit'. Another limitation was possibly my backgroundas a British, not French, researcher. Despitehaving worked with the Frenchlanguagefor many years,it is still possiblethat I may have misinterpretedor passedover certain meanings,particularly cultural references,which a Frenchpersonmay havenoticedor indeedhaveinterpreteddifferently. Also, my position as an `outsider', yet closely analysingthe texts, may have had a bearing in perhapsleading me to Another in due immersion texts. the the to too analysis of my much of somepoints, make in This different bring the texts. to of some such analysis, reading might a not absorbed person, discourse is Gaffney in Left's by his French the under presidentialism, analysisof point noted "See also Watson, 1997, pp. 88-9, on this point. We might also think of Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' here. Bourdieu arguesthat day-to-day social life, as well as larger social institutions, are structured according to a set of `structuring dispositions' or `habitus'. The habitus, according to Bourdieu, is the product of past experiences, him into by incline `unconscious', individual daily life dispositions brought the to the and a set which of absorbed (Giddens her to actions particular and reactions et al., 1994, p. 59; Krais, 1993, p. 169). or

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The French Left and the Fifth Republic (1989), in which he argues that the conversion of a `discursive event' (e.g. a speech,interview) into a text for analysis constitutes a distortion. He in refers the same vein to problems of interpretation in literary analysis, where he argues that `any effective thematic elucidation will distort the narrative quality of the text' (p.35). Gaffney himself attempts to mitigate this problem however by analysing a handful of whole texts, whilst form `in order that the ideas contained within it and signified by it - its their respecting connotations, allusions, the issues it raises and does not raise, the metaphors and other figures it uses and does not use - may be properly expounded and given weight' (p.36). Whilst I can appreciate the merits of this approach, I did not feel such a method was appropriate for my purposessince my study does not concentrate (as Gaffney's does) on the analysis of one text at is time, and not as concernedwith form and style. Rather, my analysis compares and contrasts a different examples of contributions to discourse because it considers the themes raised within them, not necessarily the discourseper se, and the rhetorical/stylistic devices contained within it, to the same extent. A thematic approach, whilst flawed in some respects,was, I felt, essential to my attempt to illuminate and successfully reexamine the different opinions on identity and cultural policy held by political elites and used in relation to my chosen case study topics.

It is neverthelessimportant to note how the subjective influences related to the positionality of the researcherdiscussedabove,can have an impact on the type of researchin which I havebeenengaged.In spite of the uncomfortablerecognition of thesemethodological difficulties, I believe that the alternative of merely presentingvast amounts of raw data in form and non-selected unanalysed would be unsatisfactory,since it would not offer an overall interpretation or argument and so could not really constitute a valid contribution to understandingof the subjectof the research.It is importanthowever to remain awareof these difficulties of researchand writing, and so recognisethe limitations of the researchand the interpretations of possibility other of it which may be encounteredthrough subsequentprocesses of academicexchange. Similarly, I end with a comment on a few aspectsconnectedwith writing-up my implications had for the shapeof my thesisas it ultimately emerged. In writing which analysis the casestudiesI becameawareof the needto be wary of pre-conceptionsin sifting the major themespresentedin the texts studied,and of the needto be opento the importanceof the points from the analysis. For example,I had, early on, believedthe Internetcaseto may emerge which

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be particularly concerned with France's policy actions within the European Union, but it becameclear later on that other angles of importance, besides this aspect, were also emerging. Another issue related to the structuring of analysis and writing was an early over-willingness to structure analysis around quite rigid chapter headings. After a while I felt I had been in the trap of letting myself over-organise the approach to writing the study, when it really was preferable to step back slightly and instead let the material lead what I would write about. In this way, I had to set aside some earlier ideas about what issueswould be of most significance in relation to the different cases. As Michael Green argues (1997, p.201), research requires a process of writing, and many connections and insights can only happen through the process of writing. Such hurdles though, point to the importance of being aware of pre-conceptions in the research and writing process,and are, I feel, all part of the training connected to writing a PhD thesis.

2.5 Summary In this chapter I have discussedthe researchmethods which were used to undertake the research for this thesis, giving reasons for my choices. The methods I have used, based on the thematic discourse of political study via a corpus of texts concerning French identity as expressed in cultural policy, have hopefully allowed me to effectively investigate my research topic and discussthe findings from it. However, I am also aware of the limitations of this study, related to the difficulties of analysing and writing about political texts treating the debates surrounding identity. I have tried to indicate the nature of these problems in the course of this chapter as I have discussedthe factors involved in the researchprocess and the production of my thesis.

Regarding the outcomes of the research,I suggestthat my approach leads to an interesting contribution to the greater understanding of contemporary French political identity of as expressedin cultural policy. I turn to the examinationof thesein my perceptions casestudies,after the following chapter,where I contextualisethe casestudiesin the form of a discussionof the French languageand the role it has played in policy relating to identity formationanddefinition in Francethroughthe ages.

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CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE POLICY AND FRENCH NATIONAL FROM THE ANCIEN REGIME TO THE LOI TOUBON

IDENTITY:

3.1 Introduction: overview of language policy' and identity formation in France The French language can be considered as one of the very foundations of French national identity. This is demonstrated in the well-documented history of the French State's is `much language French (1988, 202), As the French. Rupnik more p. explains manipulation of is language `the Indeed, the culture the than a means of communication at service of a culture'. France, the it honour is the of personality affecting a matter of perceived as and any attack on 192) (1996a, identity'. Ager in too State, the p. the the national civilising mission, short unity of form decadence, is in `linguistic traditionally of this a as that seen as symbol change comments illness and disease...'.

Such a connection is so important that in contemporary France,

in be discussed debates, in idea this to this will as abound political statementswhich refer language is in Four. language Chapter It in this the as of status policy case study on chapter and it kept identity has the French policyon continually and cultural which of national a symbol depending than times on particular socioothers, at more prominence enjoying making agenda, in background, fore Whether the the to the presence or and political circumstances. economic State in be demonstrated language the terms activity scale of of as a cultural symbol can of below. be it, in it the outlined and attracts, as will expenditure surrounding

As I indicated in Chapter One, languagewas a powerful tool in the building of the French nation-state. Modem Francewas formed as a mixture of various ethnic groups, for identity French Catalans, Basques, Alsatians. A could common, centrally-generated example 'The term `language planning' is sometimes used in discussions of State involvement with language, and involves official instruction to define the status of a language and to define the nature of the language it involves (Ager, 1990, p.9). Language planning though has been more specifically linked with using the skills of linguists how language language, Phillipson to explains planning solve problems status corpus and of and of a and others theory has recently tried to include wider social, economic and political concerns, and to acknowledge the myth of it (1992, language involved in (1983) for 86, `Towards J. V. Neustupny to p. with a paradigm reference objectivity in light Planning (1990) Language Newsletter, 9/4, `Language 1-4; H. Haarmann the of planning pp. and planning', language: Language, framework', Journal Sociology International theory the of of a methodological of a general described Also Phillipson describes has been `language 103-26). how 86, `language policy' as pp. planning' no. (with reference to B. B. Kachru (1981) `An overview of policy and planning', Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, II, pp.2-7), due to dissatisfaction with previous technocratic approaches (p. 86). Elsewhere though, `languagepolicy' is used to mean `language planning done by Governments' (Tollefson, 1991, p. 16, also Ozolins, 1993, quoted in Ager, 1996a, p.2). It is in this sense which I use 'language policy', to describe the action of language, in but (see ), I acknowledge Ager, ibid. the regarding sense of a social policy also governments or public that this is linked to `language planning' in the sense of action by linguistic specialists who may work with further debates For on this point, seeAger, 1996a,pp.2-3). government.

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for bases This different that being identity, be other meant groups. composedof not an ethnic identity neededto be established,basedon Republicanism,and its factors of linguistic and in hope identity, the of creatinga new community. political As de Certeau et al. explain (1975, p.9), the role of the monarchical State in the destruction of regional and `perhipheral' cultures by the systematic imposition of French language in public life is well recognised. Grillo (1989, p.29) notes that under the ancien dominant `the French for linguistic was there unification, was no actual policy regime, although language,the language of the powerful, and gradually infiltrated many areas of public life'. In 1539, article 111 of the Edict of Villers-Cotterets by Francois I prescribed the use of French instead of Latin in laws and court judgements, thus enshrining French as the official legal and language. administrative

After this, edicts following the annexing of newly-conquered

French the from the demanded, of the use exclusive mid-seventeenth century, provinces language(seede Certeau et al., ibid. ). By the sixteenth century, Lyon was an important printing and publishing centre, with for in being books French first the there, crossroads city serving as a cultural and the produced Europe. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Paris and Versailles too were important Enlightenment Writers literature. had the France such of a great produced cultural centres, and des (Dictionnaire French Voltaire the Montesquieu Rousseau, status of strengthened and as lettres francaises, 1964, p.937; Gordon, 1978, pp.34-5; Phillipson, 1992, p. 104). French was French The in important by Europe world politics. role ruling elites, playing an used within language then enjoyed a prestigious position on a global level as a language of culture and international relations (Gordon, 1978, p. 35; J.Hayward, 1983, p.245, in Wilcox, 1998, p.27; Pomeau, 1991, quoted in Miguet, 1996, p. 68).

So French became the language of elites,

for the for whilst affairs example, church service and civil employment, military necessary instead French, the whose usage official of massescould not generally write, and spoke patois by Cardinal in formed 1635, by Academie francaise. body, This the was charged was regulated Richelieu with giving French proper rules? 'Today, the Academie is informally under the `protection' of the French President, rather than being a direct government agency. It gives money for awarding literary and language prizes and provides recommendations and language issues Although it initiates the to on although policy. government and policy rarely proposals, opinions Academiefrancaise has powerful symbolism as a guardian of the French language, given its offical duty to `purge it has dictionary. been language, job, fix' is the the of a constituted with only one specific which construction and Its forty members, known as `Immortals', meet to discuss this every Thursday afternoon for eight months of the (Ager, last full in 1996a, in 1986 1935 first the the the appearing version and of current, part ninth, edition, year,

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This situation of French being an elite language was changed by the revolutionary government,which in 1790 appointed Abbe Gregoire to prepare a report on language use within the French territory. Ford (1993, p.34) argues that the new Republic found linguistic plurality unacceptablebecause `a multiplicity of languages reinforced the superstitions and historical memory that the Revolution wished to efface'. Furthermore, `the language policies of the First Republic came to express the Revolution's obsession with unity as well as its negation of its monarchical past' (ibid. ). Similarly, Grillo (1989, p.35) notes how, `for the Revolutionaries, diversity of language was associatedwith the old regime, with feudalism', and how `linguistic heterogeneity was associated with a policy of divide and rule'.

Ager too (1988, p. 181),

describeshow at the time of the Revolution, French was regarded as the language of freedom, hence it. the to whole country access and needed

Meanwhile, the Left thought regional

languages had to be eliminated, as they were `the language of the serf or the aristocrat, or bigotry or of the past'. French on the other hand, symbolised equality, reason and democracy (Sanders, 1993, p. 1). Because linguistic diversity was considered by the revolutionaries to be an obstacle to spreading revolutionary ideals and equality, linguistic uniformity had to be encouraged,through the teaching of French in primary schools (Judge, 1993, pp. 12-3). This view was clearly demonstrated in 1794 when Abbe Gregoire's report was presented to the Convention, advising on `la necessite et les moyens d'aneantir les patois et revolutionary d'universaliser l'usage de la langue francaise' (the necessity and the means of obliterating patois and of making the use of French universal) (de Certeau et al., 1975, p. 11). The report also claimed that six million French people did not speak French, whilst around thirty patois 3 figures (Grillo, 1989, 24-5) As a result the these are questionable were spoken - although pp. famous issued decrees, the government made several most revolutionary on 20 July 1794 (2 Thermidor an 2), stating that all public texts must be written in French. A linguistic terreur (revolutionary period of terror and repression) followed in France's regions, particularly in Alsace, where the use of German was repressed(as described by Brunot, 1967, quoted in Grillo, 1989, p.38). French was no longer an elite language, as it was now imposed on the masses. pp.54-5;Marnham,1994,p.29). 'See de Certeau et al. (1975) for analysis this of report; also Grillo (1989, pp.31-6) for details on language and other revolutionary figures; also Balibar (1991). 4SeeF.Brunot (1967) Histoire de la langue francaise des origines ä nos jours - vol. IX La Revolution et l'Empire, Paris, Armand Colin.

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So, as Ford argues (1993, p.31) `the post-revolutionary nation came to mean a (pre-revolutionary past), a common culture, and a a common community of people sharing language'. common

However, as Weber has maintained (1977, p.67), France remained

linguistically diversified well into the nineteenth century, when as late as 1863, more than a A did French. the standardised, written any not understand country's population quarter of French had to be imposed by means of institutional mechanisms such as the education system began in 1881. French to free became use only approved education compulsory and which dictionaries and grammars and to train teachersto punish children using regional languagesand dialects (Ager, 1990, pp.220-1). In addition, since parish priests preferred to preach in the local language (considering it a way of preserving the Catholic faith), and defended local culture, had `become Republic languages they to the threat a political as as a were seen regional instrument through which the Church undermined national consensus'. Eventually, the State issued a decree in 1903 which banned Breton, Basque, Flemish and Provencal in religious instruction (Ford, 1993, pp.36-7).

Weber (1977) sees such efforts to establish linguistic

State(civilising the and mission) general republican mission civilisatrice uniformity as part of led drive for modernisation carried out within metropolitan France, which involved the domestic centre `colonising' the domestic periphery. As Phillipson notes (1992, p. 101), a 'key inherently language belief in French has been the the this superior. as mission component' of

Therewere also further issueswhich had an indirect influence on spreadingthe use of French. Conscription, for example, had been established during the Revolution, and had a impact forcing language during 1870 1914-18, to the men young on wars of and particular in from French. their to villages and communicate move away

Likewise Napoleon's

instead Latin included had French the of use of centralising administrative and military reforms for national ceremonies and military academies,and required a knowledge of French for many jobs, even postmen, enforced through a system of nationwide written exams. public service Populations too began to mix across France through the influence of better roads and new like business between different brought transport also new areas, at of railways, which means the same time as newspapers and electoral systems were developing (Ager, 1990, p.220; Ager, 1996a, p.45; Armstrong, 1973, p. 133; Szulmajster-Celnikier, 1996, p.44). The Third Republic into the of great also a period colonial expansion, which saw was mission civilisatrice put further both ideas French development thus the the abroad, aiding and spread of and of practice symbols of nationhood.

The universality of French was nevertheless threatened by Great

83

Britain's expansion overseas,and French defeat at the hands of Germany in the Franco-Prussian beginning twentieth 45). By the 1996, (Szulmajster-Celnikier, the 1870 century, of p. of war Ford argues (1993, pp.31-2), `the Republican nation came to be defined in both political and in definition the is domain than `in this that clearer terms', of process no continuing cultural identity'. feature French became language in French the of national an essential way which However, according to Judge (1993 p. 14) and Szulmajster-Celnikier (1996, p.47), more direct have French to in using the twentieth returned political elites century, recently, legislation, such as decreeson spelling and grammar, faced with the new concern of the survival describes (1978, Gordon 7) language. French such policies as a continuing p. as a world of French `linguistic expansionism', in the form of national and official action. Thus the defence key in have been its diffusion English French the terms, policy world continued and against of from dates Franco-Prussian the The to war, after arguably wish address such problems aims. French, develop the defend the to e. g. of position and organisations were created which several Alliance francaise, founded in 1883, to provide teaching in French for adults outside formal Gordon, 1978), these (1993, that Judge 14, to suggests referring structures. p. educational has fact French in keeping `were French the that the colonialism and also with spirit of groups in foreign (see 1997b, 193). Brulard, p. also policy' always played a part

3.2 Languagepolicy in the twentieth century During the twentieth century, the position of French as a world language has deteriorated United for its language losing French at a example, almost status as an official rapidly, with, Nations meeting in San Francisco in 1945 (see Judge, 1993, pp. 14-5,1996, p.30). Prior to this, French had begun to lose ground to English in most international institutions, after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 had signalled the transition from the use of French to English as the main language of international diplomatic relations (Thody, 1995, p.90; Wilcox, 1998, p.27). Szulmajster-Celnikier (1996, p.48), points to the defence of French immediately after the Second World War, attributing this to a loss of the French language's status linked to the Vichy increasing by American-English the the military and and also use of words encouraged regime, in influx USA. The Chapter One, the of actions as we saw saw an post-war period, economic into France of consumer products and culture, whose development brought many imported ideas and terminology from the USA. This coincided with the increased political, military and USA (Brulard, 1997b, p. 199). Consequently English terminology the of power economic

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became more widespread and English became increasingly important in terms of economic exchange and socio-economic mobility.

As Wilcox notes (1998, p. 28) `The ready and

French influences by foreign the the population of mass cultural widespread acceptance of implied a dilution of the specifically French identity which previous language planning foster'! had to sought measures Partly in responseperhaps, although also for reasonsrelated to France's desire to regain begun language identity French for boosting French influence, the through were policies world in earnestafter the war, significantly in the aftermath of France's wartime humiliation and loss formerly When (Gordon, 56). 1978, Empire colonial states gained newly-independent, p. of francophonie brought the to like UN, the they the world to of concept organisations access 1996, (Judge, international language French the thus as an status of enhancing political stage, in had idea francophonie the The the 30). nineteenth century end of appeared at of p. (Szulmajsterlanguage to the typology use according of populations geographical writings on Celnikier, 1996, p.45).

With the help of prominent figures such as Presidents Senghor

(Senegal),Bourguiba (Tunisia) and Hamani (Niger), the movement set up various organisations for Cultural Agency (Agence de Cooperation ACCT technique and the or culturelle et such as Technical Cooperation)' and CILF

(Conseil international

de la langue francaise

or

International Council for the French Language), to back the aim of establishing a francophone (1996, 46). As Judge Szulmajster-Celniker, 1996, (Judge, 1993, 15; explains p. p. community Egypt, For ideal for francophone leaders 26), the various reasons. rallied around such p. Cambodia and Vietnam for example, French was regarded as the international language of nonQuebec for the In Tunisia, French saw modernity, and was seen as a vehicle alignment. francophone community as an arena for international influence!

Other countries simply saw

5Wilcox refersto Kuisel (1993) and Jeffra Flaitz (1988) The Ideology of English, New York, Mouton de Gruyere. 61n1880,FrenchgeographerOnesimeReclus(1837-1916)inventedthe term `francophone', in his book France,Algerie et Colonies,to indicatepeopleandcountriesusingthe Frenchlanguage(Judge,1996,p.25; Miguet, 1996,p.69). 'The ACCT's namewas changedto the Agencede la francophonie at the 1997 francophonesummit meeting held in Hanoi (ACCT, 1997c). °Brulardsuggests(1997b,pp.201-2) that apartfrom the UN, the francophonecommunityis the only world-wide from including different inclinations different states all continents, economic of political and organisation but we might alsoconsiderthe positionof the British Commonwealth. development,

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joining the movement as a route to operating at an international level in an official language, or to using French as a common language in what were often multilingual countries (Judge, 1993, 9 15) p. Alongside the development of francophonie, Ager (1990, p.221) argues that French language policy this century has concentrated on the defence of `correct usage' and limiting infiltrations. influence foreign the of variations and regional

This has included the use of

led has to a situation where to which and spelling, regulate grammar, vocabulary policies French spelling is distinguished from that of other romance languages by its considerable debate irregularities the and certain national pride are subject of a which complexity and (Szulmajster-Celnikier, 1996, p.47), and the Academie francaise continues to exert some influence on this matter through its collaboration with governmental bodies dealing with linguistic issues(Judge, 1993, p. 12; Brulard, 1997b, p. 193).

Numerousandquite vociferouspressuregroupshaveworked to promoteand defendthe French language, such as Defense de la langue francaise (Defence of the French Language), founded in 1959, and the Association generale des usagers de la langue francaise (General Association of Users of French), set up in 1977.1° Numerous well-known books have expressed is French language by that the threatened poor spelling and external pressuressuch as concerns the excessiveuse of words of English or American origin in French. Examples are De SaintRobert's Lettre ouverte ä ceux qui en perdent leur francais (1986)", which makes the casemore '2 (1964). humorous franglais? but lines Parlez-vous to Etiemble's more on similar seriously, The level of concern about the subject has been revealed in the number of letters in the press language bodies (Ager, 1990, p.223), as well as French the to and protests governmental about the numerous language books which exist and the popularity of Bernard Pivot's televised has (Brulard, 1997b, 194). Indeed, the twentieth competition seen several p. century spelling "Forfurtherdetailsonthefoundingof francophone institutions, seeJudge,1996,pp.27-9). "See Offord, 1993,for a detailedconsiderationof the role of `privateorganisations'or NGOs in protectingthe Frenchlanguage;alsoAger, 1996a,pp.126-31;Wilcox, 1998. Under a law of 1901,associationsare requiredto registerandto be formally recognisedby the State- althoughin return, Statesubsidiesare given. This recognition allowsthe creationof quite stablepolicy communities,Ager notes(1996a,p. 126). 'Paris, Albin Michel. De Saint-Robert was a Gaullist langue headed de la Commissariat the and politician, francaise. His experiencesas Commissaire are detailed in this book (see also Ager, 1996a, p. 58). "Such books are in addition to a further body of work developed since 1900 on the general theme of the French language being in crisis, looking at education and research,knowledge of grammar etc. (Ager, 1990, p.236).

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debates have French Many the taken place within the reforms spelling system. proposed of of the media and education sectors, and amongst intellectuals, an example of which was the debate over possible spelling reforms under the Rocard government during 1989-92, initiated by a intellectuals group of and supported by primary school teachers (Ager, 1996, pp. 119-25; Wilcox, 1998, pp.91-2). State concern about the future of French has led to the creation of various institutions devoted to the protection and promotion of the French language. In 1966, for example, De Gaulle created the Haut Comite pour la defense et 1'expansion de la langue francaise (High Committee for the Defence and Spread of French), `expansion' being later changed to `promotion' (Ager, 1996a, p.56). This was under the control of the Prime Minister, which focused mainly on monitoring terminological developments affecting the purity of the French language (Judge, 1993, p. 16). This was later modified in 1973, to form the Haut Comite de la langue francaise (High Committee for French), with the name change designed to reflect less neo-colonial aspirations, according to Ager (ibid. ).

The Haut Comite included three

focusing `quality' influence language, French the the on of commissions abroad and cultural francophone with cooperation countries (Judge, 1993, p. 16). This body was then replaced in 1984 by the Comite consultatif de la langue francaise (Consultative Committee for the French Language) and the Commissariat general de la langue francaise (General Commission for the French Language). The role of the Comite consultatif was to examine general language usage problems at home and abroad, francophone matters and French policy for foreign language teaching, and to advise the Prime Minister on these issues. Meanwhile the Commissariat intended follow to was on from the work of the Haut Comite but also to encourage general public and private organisations to defend the French language and to coordinate work of bodies other and terminological various

commissions (Judge, 1993, pp. 16-7).

The

Commissariat also now included the Permanent Secretary of the Academie francaise, a change latter's the saw position strengthened (Judge, 1993, p. 12). Also in 1984, President which Mitterrand, who had pledged, on his election in 1981, to afford a higher priority to francophonie, created the Haut Conseil de la francophonie or HCF (High Council of francophonie), which aims to define the role of the French language and promote cooperation between French-speaking countries, and produces an annual report on the status of francophonie in the world (Brulard, 1997b, p. 192; Judge, 1996, p.31). This, combined with the Secretary a of State for Francophone Affairs, and the first of the biannual creation of

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`francophonesummits' (of heads of francophone states/governments)", both in 1986, suggested from language this dimension French international importance for period. the policy of a new Further changes followed in 1989, after the Socialist party's return to power the into francaise the la langue de Commissariat changed was the general previous year, when Delegation generale de la langue francaise or DGLF (General Delegation for the French body 14 by francaise de langue la the Comite advisory Language) and the replaced consultatif Conseil superieur de la languefrancaise or CSLF (Supreme Council for the French Language). in importance, terms bodies (1993, 17) of more Judge that the given more were new argues p. Ager, (see defence French for brief broader also the of promotion and specific aims and a 1996a, p.60). The DGLF's role was redefined, being responsible for publishing the findings the Terms), Official (Dictionary the des of Dictionnaire containing termes officiels of in for law by use and consequently prescribed terminological commissions which are approved 1997b, Brulard, in 58; Ager, 1996a, 1989, June (see decree 89-403,2 documents p. official decree's 1984 in decree 1989 the June the Also was removal of of of significance the p. 192). France), languages (the langues de France' `les suggesting a more prescriptive of mention of language French than in to various the the rather to a single reference senseof approach policy, 15 17). (Judge, 1993, languages France p. within regional

Indeed, the French State's desire for regulation in the area of languagepolicy had French 1975 December the 31 demonstrated by the been Law 75-1349 of on use of already Language - the loi Bas-Lauriol - which referred to three areas where using French was to become compulsory. These were commerical and advertising contexts, to protect the consumer; in employment contracts, to protect the employee, and information given to consumers by law leaflets. The firms bodies, the compulsory use of new also required public e. g. or private institutions. State in documentation, terminology contracts, education, and all governmental The rule was that where a French term existed, it had to be used, with those breaking this introduce be fined. liable Attempts time to to this a unified made at were also requirement "The summitsare held in different parts of the world in a patternlike that of the Commonwealth(Ager, 1996a,p.59). The DGLF was placed under the control of the Minister of Culture in 1996, which had controlled its budget de la (Ministere Culture, 1996d, 6). 1994 p. since

"A decret(decree),andan arrete (decision)areboth ministerialorders,having force of law and appearingin the Journal Officiel (Ager, 1996a,p.177).

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Community limited by European law but the the terminology, scope was scope of grammatical 16, its 156) (Ager, 1996a, in 1982 1977 laws, and despite two government circulars p. and " 12). 1994d, 49; JO, legislation was not really applied (Szulmajster-Celnikier, 1996, p. p. However, the law did highlight the perceived problem of encroaching domination from other languages, and was really aimed at defending French against these, most notably English (Judge, 1993, pp.21-2; Szulmajster-Celnikier, 1996, p.49). As Machill notes (1997, p.487), the fact that the loi Bas-Lauriol was passedunanimously by parliament, suggeststhe existence of a its language, French desirability the the and protection of of cross-partyconsensusregarding the identity. French status as a symbol of continuing It can be seenthen from this overview of issuesthat although various debateshave come been far from this has that language French the the and arena, policy-making never and gone, desire linked has involvement been to to the protect and elites of political closely policy identity. factor language If the to French turn the consider now we a of national as promote 1990s,the period of the present study, we can seethat the wish to protect, promote and regulate language is still very strong. During this period, the French language, as an area symbolising French national identity, has faced new challenges in areas related to State models of policythe have French, These the the recently, and more media use audiovisual concerned of making. Internet. As a result, the French language has developed renewed importance in terms of the debates around the French policy-making agenda, taking place in these spheres. Both policy keystone language French have debates the the that of as revealed political elites regard and their conception of French national identity, and resist any threats which may undermine this. The case studies which follow this chapter will

demonstrate how this feeling informs

identity its thinking on national and relationship with several areasof policy contemporary elite following looking language Before the these the explain culture. sections and at areas, on background to languagepolicy-making in the early 1990swhich influenced these debates.

16Acircularis a noticeof ministerialwishesand advice. Somecircularsappearin the JO, but they are addressed to the relevantindividuals and organisations.Civil servantsthough are expectedto follow them (Ager, 1996a, p.177). "The law was not properly applied by courts due to its lack of clarity on its provisions and sanctions (Ager, 1996a, pp.44,156,184). Also it appearedto clash with Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, which banned measures have the effect of restricting, imports amongst European member countries (Brulard, or restrict, would which 1997b, p. 195).

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3.3 French language policy in the 1990s French the interest 1990s, the During the protection and promotion of regarding renewed (1998), has As Wilcox by demonstrated languagewas shown politicians and pressure groups. Language) French (The Future francaise ALF the de la langue like Avenir of or groups It 1990s. the during language in French the intense was the early support of activity undertook ALF for example, who mobilised a group of intellectuals of various political persuasions to French the in 1992, Constitution French as to the recognising successfully propose a change Constitution 2 Article 1992 the On June language. 23 to was of an amendment national is Republic language (the francais' le the de la Republique langue `la of that est stating adopted, French). This served to make French the official language, but without reference to other languagesused within the country. " As Wilcox argues (1994, p.277), the implementation of this legislation within the context of the Maastricht Treaty ensured that the article represented but language, its importance by France also the national of of reaffirmation a symbolic only not because level. identity This the European French amendment was made was at a of an assertion in the light of fears that further European integration promised by the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty (see integrated Europe in increased English lead Union) to the European a more use of would on Wilcox, 1994, pp.269-70). Given the need to revise the French Constitution to enable the French government to transfer competencies to the institutions of the European Union, the the incorporate into Constitution the to the of role setting out a provision opportunity was seized French language, so that it could not be qualified by any European-level decision (Machill, 19 488). 1997, p.

During the debatesin the Assembleenationale, UDF (a Centre-Right party) deputy Alain Lamassourehighlighted how sovereigntywas a key factor behind the languagearticle: `au moment ou' nous allons ratifier un traite qui va decider de la disparition de la monnaie a la langue d'une nationale monnaieeuropeenne,marquernotre attachement nationaleau profit fort (at treaty to time which will a are going ratify et necessaire' a when we symbole un est "However, aswe saw earlier,and asDebbaschnotes(1992,p.459), the absenceof a constitutionalspecification Fifth Republic had definitely French defence French the to the under not prevented and promotion of relating throughthework of variousinstitutions. "As Machill (1997, p.488), and Wilcox (1998, pp. 307-8) explain, the 1992 Constitutional amendment in in law, Constitutional 1994 Toubon the terms the the of against since significant constitutional complaint proved Council had to take account of the new article when assessingthe complaint.

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determine the disappearanceof the national currency in favour of a European currency, marking our attachment to the national language is a strong and necessary symbol) (quoted in Wilcox, 1994, pp.272-3; Brulard, 1997b, p. 199). However, supporters of regional languages and culture such as researcher Henri Giordan denounced the constitutional amendment as a nationalistic reaction by French policy-makers to European integration

Liberation, 4 August 1992).

Furthermore, the French State indicated a continuing lack of respect for the diversity of regional languageswhen a proposal that the Constitution should declare that French was the language of the Republic, `dans le respect des langues et des cultures regionales de France' (whilst respecting the regional languages and cultures of France) was rejected by the Senat (Wilcox, 1994, pp.274-5)20 This was a disappointment to the regionalists, since Mitterrand, on election to the presidency in 1981, had declared his support for regionalism (see Ager, 1996a,p.46), and the Ministry of Culture had commissioned a report (Giordan, 1982) which commented on the need to address the marginalisation of minority languages and cultures. Similarly, another issue was that originally it was proposed that the Constitution would state that `le contentious francais est la langue de la Republique' (French is the language of the Republic). This was not it possible as met with opposition from other francophone countries which had come to believe in their co-ownership of French, and that it was no longer the exclusive property of the (Judge, 1996, pp.26-7). As Wilcox argues (1998, p. 308), whilst this republic metropolitan incorporation into the French Constitution of a reference to the national language might seem just a symbolic recognition of French, like references to the Tricolore flag and the Marseillaise fact the that French had long been recognised as synonymous with the idea of anthem, national the French nation served to add weight to `this previously unwritten, but key ideological principle'.

Efforts by languagepressuregroupsled to further policy developmentssuchas the Law on the use of the French language,4 August 1994, or loi Toubon (formally proposedby Minister for Culture and Francophone Affairs Jacques Toubon), which caused much ` in 1994? The law soughtto addressthe useof foreign words in areasof public life controversy 20Theproposalwasmadeby Henri Goetschy.During theAssemblee nationaleandSenatdebateson the Toubon law in 1994,Goetschyalsoarguedthat the law might jeopardiseattemptsto preserveregionallanguages(Brulard, 1997b,p.193). 21Abill discussedin Parliament normally takes the name of the Minister who has been most closely it with or presentedit, henceloi Toubon,loi Bas-Lauriol. connected

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in France, through reasserting `the right of the Frenchthe such as advertising and media speaking consumer, employee, researcherand the public at large, to be informed and to express themselvesin French' (Brulard, 1997b, p. 195)22 Therefore the law was designed to addressthe same problem that the previous loi Bas-Lauriol had failed to solve, as language campaigners had continued to note (Ager, 1996a,pp. 183-4). Ager explains (1996a, p. 156) that the Toubon law was a redraft and strengthening of the 1975 law, which it also repealed. Contraventions of the 1994 law would be punishable by fines imprisonment, determined through employment legislation or the application of the Penal and Code. The 1975 law had provoked a number of court actions which led to some fines being imposed on organisations which did not obey its provisions for using French rather than English terms, but pressure for its replacement resulted from the recognition that the borrowing from English had not been stopped (p. 183). It seemed that the consumerist approach to policy had been sufficient, as Ager argues: `The net result of the feedback seemed to be that language not become language it than should something more policy policy: should approach a general social identity to reinforce policy at home and image abroad' (p. 185). It was this approach which informed the thinking behind the Toubon proposal, as I will discuss below.

The passingof the loi Toubonandthe debatessurroundingit, amongstthe Frenchpolity, French various aspects of economicand social life, have been examinedelsewhere concerning (Ager, 1996a,pp.156-8;Brulard, 1997a,b; Machill, 1997; Wilcox, 1998). The issuewarrants considerationwithin the presentchapter,given its impact as a debatewhich brought linguistic andculturalquestionsstronglyto the forefront of the political agenda.Moreover,the provisions law in the the context of this thesis, as the legislation is integral to the significance are of of language debate in France, having served as a point of reference for other policy whole language,and broader cultural, policy questions. As Machill notes (1997, p.480), the law increased legitimation for protectionistmeasuresin mediapolicy, someaspectsof which offered in Chapter discussed Five, which considerselite views of Frenchnationalidentity in relation are to audiovisualmediapolicy. Similarly, it had implications for languagepolicy in relation to the challengesand opportunities for French identity presentedby new technologies,as will be demonstratedin Chapter Six. The loi Toubon debatesraised questions too about French 22The`RapportRenouvin' of 1989had already consideredthe economicand commercialusesand statusof the Frenchlanguage:the Conseileconomiqueet social had askedBertrandRenouvin,from March 1987,to look at this area(JO, 1989).

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language policy in relation to the idea of `Europe' and European identity.

These became

especially interesting in the light of France's EU presidency period in early 1995, particularly as international focus of subsequentlanguage policies, and also informed some aspects the regards of audiovisual and Internet policy. These are discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Before examining these case study areas, a summary of the context, main events and debates surrounding the Toubon legislation follows.

3.3.1 The Toi Toubon' and French identity Wilcox notes, in her study of the role of pressure groups in language policy-making in the early 1990s(1998, p.29) that the decision to formalise the position of French through the loi Toubon, and through the constitutional amendment of 1992, are indicative of the failure of previous language planning measures, and that their defensive intentions suggest a problem of `the French national self-image' or identity, which became increasingly evident in the early 1990s. She points to the political context of the Maastricht Treaty referendum held in 1992 and the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay the of renegotiation Round talks ending in December 1993 (pp.297-8), as significant factors. The Maastricht issue, as noted above, raised fears amongst both politicians and the electorate, of the potential loss of identity for France through further European integration. sovereignty and

GATT became a

contentious cultural policy issue when the USA demanded that films, television programmes and other audiovisual products should be treated like any other goods, and therefore subject to the agreement. This, French policy-makers and creative artists feared, would jeopardise French protection measures for cultural industries and lead to an increase in the existing importation of English-language productions. Consequently, the French negotiators demanded (cultural exception culturelle an exception) clause. This debate will be examined in Chapter Five, which focuses on the presentation of political elites' perceptions of French identity in industries, but, in summary, much of the debate centred on the notion of to audiovisual relation further flood Anglo-American of a productions threatening the French language and culture, and identity. ultimately,

Wilcox suggeststhat `the coincidenceof the eventscited abovecanbe seento havehad a cumulative and mutually reinforcing effect on French perceptions of the threat which they both issues `were that and posed', perceived less as specific issues than as a generalised threat to French prestige, economic prosperity, national independence and cultural specificity'.

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As a

language ideal for for like ALF the to groups press reform of result, political climate was defensive (1998, Balladur 297-8). Indeed, the of on a mood nostalgia pp. capitalising national law, from Toubon Far Right time the the the around of government was under constant pressure introduction (1996a, National. Ager 157) Front Therefore, that the the maintains p. especially intended law have been to appeal to the could of an apparently pro-French, anti-American xenophobic vote, whilst the daily newspaper Liberation suggested the law was connected to hostility to foreign products (24 February 1994, quoted in Ager, ibid. ).

Thesetheoriesgo someway to explaining the influence of the languagelobby on the influence by being However ALF the to also able very active at the were policy government. intitiation stage of the policy process, through preparing documentation, meetings and debates for example.

Also the group's elite members were politically

acceptable to the policy

be they to and although very generally were critical of existing policy, were seen community, in i. language believing the terms that the preservation of status quo of and society, e. supportive language identity integrity. had French Activists the to was essential national and valuable of technocratic links with policy-makers, accessto government institutions and knowledge of the had been in by debates the the and opportunity given process, successful seizing political policy in Constitution 1994 (Wilcox, 1998, pp.295-8). Furthermore, other francophone states the on looked towards France for leadership on the defence of French. The Toubon law was partly a heads to the opinion of some of of state that France had not been doing enough to response language, French the a similar situation to that of the 1992 constitutional amendment promote by francophones also supported was outside France (Brulard, 1997b, p. 196; Szulmajsterwhich Celnikier, 1996, p.49). French political elites therefore needed to seize the opportunity to France leader in the field of language policy. as a strong present

This factor has also been

in terms of policy-making debates in other areas of language and cultural policy, significant be discussed in my case studies. which will

The ALF action which culminatedin the passingof the lo! Toubonbeganon 11 July 1992 with the publication of an appel or public appeal in a national newspaper (Le Monde, 11 July 1992). It expressed concerns about a possible link between the decline of the French language and French national sovereignty, and disappointment with the lack of defensive legislation for the use of French in audiovisual broadcasting and education. Following this, Pierre Beregovoy's Socialist government began to develop a proposal for updating the 1975 Bas-Lauriol law. Prior to 1992 and the influence of the pro-reform language movement, there

94

was no indication that the Socialist government intended to reform national language law, instead initiatives related to francophonie (Wilcox, 1998, p.295). concentrating on

Now

Catherine Tasca, Secretary of State for Francophone Affairs and Overseas Cultural Relations from April 199223proposed a law to include regulation of the use of the French language, focusing on areas such as science24,business, audiovisual broadcasting and international organisations,but the government's term of office was nearly over and the draft was not taken any further, although Tasca had hoped that the proposal could be discussed during an extraordinary session of Parliament Le Monde, 15 July 1992,10 December 1992; Wilcox, 1994, p.275; HCF, 1994d, p.200). She organised an informal seminar on 4 December 1992 in Paris, at which around 50 invited, eminent public figures such as linguist Claude Hagege her filed to their give opinions on proposal, gathered which was at the Senat office on 17 March 1993, although never debated (Secretariat d'Etat a la francophonie et aux relations culturelles exterieures, 1992; Le Monde, 10 December 1992).

Tasca'sbill was shorterand lesscomprehensivethan the version suggestedby ALF, for in its focus individuals for legislation State, terms the than of on or regulatory example rather (for details, companies seeWilcox, 1998,pp.166-70). Interestingly,the bill contained private no real statementon language as a means of maintaining cultural specificity, or as a fundamentalelementof French identity. Wilcox suggests(1998, p. 170) that insteadlanguage had be described in to terms of human rights, since `by 1992, the terms "identite' choice [identity] and "patrimoine" [heritage]had becometoo closely associatedwith the doctrine of the Front National for the Socialists to risk actively promoting these concepts'. Yet in debates language, on culture andnationalidentity, Socialistand otherpolitical elites subsequent were not so reluctantto use such concepts,as my casestudieswill demonstrate,a fact which factors questions regarding raises what might make various political elites adopt particular discoursesat different times. With the new Gaullist-Centristgovernmentin power following the 1993 legislative incoming Minister of Culture and Francophone Affairs, JacquesToubon, the elections, Council to the announced of Ministers on 2 June 1993his intention to proposea law similar to 23TascasucceededAlain Decaux.

24TheHCF devotedits 1992conference(1-2 April 1992,Paris,to the role of francophonie within the scientific community(HCF, 1992).

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immediately been had issues language bill. The enhanced deferred Tasca already the profile of by the change of governmental responsibilities: whereas Catherine Tasca had been Ministre delegue a la francophonie aupres du ministre d'Etat, ministre des affaires etrangeres (Junior Affairs), for Francophone Responsibility Affairs Foreign Ministry Minister at the with of Culture (Minister la francophonie de de la job Ministre of Toubon was given the culture et of full direct issues language the a Affairs), of Francophone responsibility which made and ministry.

This, together with the combination of the responsibilities for culture and

francophonie, suggested a potential return to a classical, Gaullist approach to language and One, in Chapter (1995, 228-9), by Looseley and noted pp. cultural policy-making, as suggested " himself. by Toubon and Just prior to the Francophone Summit held in Mauritius in October 1993, Toubon also

issueda pressstatementin which he describedhis hopesfor the new law, and the government's intention to develop the CSLF and DGLF as more effective policy-making bodies (Toubon, 1993r).The Toubon proposalwas supportedby various intellectuals and the pressuregroup ALF (Le Monde, 10 December1992;Wilcox, 1994,p.275), and aimed to give Frenchpeople de de dans la faire leur langue de d'utiliser droit `le un certainnombre circonstances utiliser et in it be for language (the to leur vie couranteet professionnelle' used and right to use their key lives), to of their areas extending and of everyday professional circumstances various information, education,audiovisual broadcasts,public conferences,employment and public law 1994d, 200). The the 1994a 1; HCF, (DGLF/CSLF, were of main provisions p. p. services that notices in public places should be in French, as should health and safety regulations, language foreign (apart from teaching). teaching and examinations contracts, employment Furthermore,all radio and television advertising should not use foreign expressionswhere State-subsidised in documents French terms conferences at were existence,and equivalent becoming into in be left French, English, translated more common which was not should in law The that the amendment constitutional scientific research. also reiterated especially `Frenchis the languageof the Republic' (seeThody, 1995,p.61; alsoBrulard, 1997a,p.42). Related language policy initiatives led by Toubon included the launch on 4 November 1994 of several discussion/focus groups on the future of the French language, which brought "SeeToubon'sdescription of thedecisionas'surtoutle signed'unerelancedenotrepolitiquefrancophone, dannla tradition du gaullisme' (notably indicativeof a revival of our francophonepolicy, in the Gaullist tradition) (JO,AN, 11June1993,p.959, cited in Wilcox, 1998,p. 172).

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information journalists, business together people, authors, advertising and

technology

la de CSLF (Ministere discussions to the their to present results of specialists, who were Culture, 1995d, p. 15; announcement in JO, Senat, 26 May 1994, p. 1893, and JO, AN, 3 May 1994,2nd sitting, p. 1361). From November 1993, the Minister had also asked a group under the leadership of Jean-Louis Boursin26 to present proposals to develop the publishing of by discussed findings 22; de la Culture, 1995d, in (Ministere French p. scientific research Toubon at 2nd reading of bill's proposal, JO, AN, 13 June 1994, p.2887). A television publicity language) (about) ' (Let's langue, `Notre was run our speak parlons-en! campaign called between 16 June-5 July 1994, including extracts from Bernard Pivot's programme Bouillon de Culture (Culture Stock) shown on 25 March 1994 which had been dedicated to the language theme (DGLF/CSLF 1994a, p.4,1994b, p.4). Action aimed at children and young people followed with a language competition organised by the Ministry of Culture and the DGLF in la de Culture, (Ministere 1994 between 15 October-2 December Bayard Presse conjunction with 1995d,p. 14).

Wilcox notes (1998, pp.174-5) that by the end of 1993, when Toubon's bill was EU immigration, in debates France Parliament, to and reform citizenship on submitted integration and enlargementhad developedto a point where public opinion seemedmore had law, defensive language Toubon than the to acceptmore proposed policy such as willing been the case in 1992. Languageprotection representeda potential way of stopping the So, influence. from foreign destabilisation French although of society,particularly perceived the Toubonproposalrespondedto ALF's concernand campaignssince 1992 aboutthe neglect language domestic policy, the socio-economicand political climate at the time, and the of Right's interest in a francophonerelance (relaunch)" might have encouragedthe French forward influence if had for to the not put group pressure proposals reform even government beenthere(Wilcox, 1998,p. 176). Indeed,as Thody (1995, p.62) and Brulard (1997b, p. 195) discuss,althoughthe main law debates be the to of seemed and employee rights, political about consumer provisions identity issues. bill Wilcox (1998, 265) Toubon too that the upon explains was not seized p. by the French government as being about identity, but that this became the promoted overtly "Professorof theParisInstitutd'etudes politiques,agregein mathematics andmemberof theCSLF. 27See RPR, 1993aand 1993b,for example.

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how the to debate for Parliament, protect topic about were made as various suggestions main of French language. Political elites of various persuasions were involved in this, indicating a identity. The Right factor is French language important French how the of as a consensusabout for example supported a proposal by the Senat's CAC (Cultural Affairs Committee) to add French. the of role and status regarding of principle statements

Communist politicians

fight Anglo-American idea to to their this too, against wish and openly referred supported `Trojan language, into French the hegemony through the they saw creeping which cultural horse' of the audiovisual media.28 One of the key issues discussed concerned the freedom of the individual in relation to the French State, as discussions asked whether or not the use of official terms developed by This in imposed, be the was media. especially advertising and government organisations could for harmful interest for Socialists, the consequences whose protests about possible of particular the concept of freedom of speech effectively weakened the arguments of the pro-reform (Wilcox, 1998, 309). p. movement

Another contentious issue was the status of regional

languagesin France, particularly raised by figures such as senator Henry Goetschy (Centrist), (referring `linguistic Jacobinism' to the further Toubon feared that the proposal represented who Jacobin motto `one nation, one language') (Brulard, 1997b, p. 195). Eventually a statementwas incorporated into the law (Article 21) stating that regional languages must not be prejudiced by 29 law. implementation This point echoed debates around the 1992 constitutional the of the is language `the French'. Republic the stating of amendment

Machill (1997,p.488) noteshow, althoughthe draft law found `broadagreement'in the Senat and Assemblee nationale, some perhaps unpredictable alliances formed during the debates. He explains how, following the first Senat reading, the Centre-Right RPR and UDF, (see 16 April 1994). for law Liberation, Communists April 14 the the all voted on also and Meanwhile the Socialists abstained, as they and the Communists also did on 1 July in the Assemblee nationale vote, although both parties argued for further regulations to be incorporated in the form of amendments(Machill, 1997, p.488; Liberation, 5 May 1994). It has 28See IvanRenar(PCF),in JO,Senat,12April 1994,p.970. ""Les dispositions de la presente loi s'appliquent sansprejudice de la legislation et de la reglementation relatives de langues law France leur ('The ä the regionales et apply ne s'opposent usage'. present provisions of pas aux laws to and orders concerning the regional languages of France and do not prevent their use' prejudice without translation from Ager, 1996a,p. 167).

98

been suggestedthat the somewhat restrained political opposition to the law resulted from the 31 July-1 imperialism (Le Monde, branded American fear being supporters of of opponents'

August 1994a). Despite some differencesin the various views expressed,the parliamentarydebates linguistic Toubon the the the consensus about political strength of proposal revealed around issues, notably `the principle of language planning as a means of maintaining the unity of the French nation-state, enhancing French collective consciousness,inclucating a senseof national 303; (Wilcox, 1998, francophone the the see p. community' continuation of pride, and assuring issues had debates 265). Furthermore, translation the terminological and about also p. 1998, (Wilcox, important language State the the the as guardian of national role of established debates this Indeed, 266). these of or a reassertion, one more example, arguably represent p. role.

3.3.2 Thepassing of the loi Toubon: its effects and aftermath Following the parliamentary debates, the Senat eventally passed the Toubon law on 1 July 1994, and, following an appeal made by some senatorsand deputies for the law to be amended (mostly Socialists - see Liberation, 6 July 1994), the Conseil constitutionnel approved the law its during two the exception of articles sitting of 29 July 1994. Referring to the provisions with for freedom of speech, thought and opinion of the 1789 Declaration des droits de 1'Homme (Article 11) and the Constitution (Article 2), the Council disagreed with several articles and by law's but demanded 12, text, the the of censured use particularly article which phrases individuals in social, commercial and intellectual contexts (including the media) of terms by created the State commissions de terminologie (terminology commissions) instead of foreign terms, and also the requirement for researchersreceiving State bursaries to publish their work in French. Therefore the law could not demand that the use of French be imposed on private individuals, non-State organisations and private companies (Thody, 1995, p. 72). However, the French in to requirement use remained, and was enforceable the case of public services general (see Le Monde, 31 July-1 August 1994b; Brulard, 1997a, pp.40-1). By this time, a Prime Minister's circular had also appeared,reminding public employees of their duties with regard to the French language (the first such circular on this theme since 1977) (see Le Monde, 3-4 July 1994; Premier Ministre, 1994c). Finally, the loi du 4 aoüt 1994 relative a 1'emploi de la langue francaise appearedin the Journal Officiel, becoming law, without the two excluded articles (JO,

99

1994g). This was followed by a further decree, published on 5 March 1995, applying the law and defining sanctions which could be taken. (JO, 1995, pp.2-6).

However as Ager notes

(1996a, p. 174), many commentators believed the Toubon law to be weakened by the Constitutional Council to the point of inefficacy, since the private sector and ordinary citizens be law did define to terminology, the what was not compelled use official not clearly could and meant by `French', especially if regional languages are considered `French', as Toubon stated. This problem left it to the courts to decide whether or not an offence was committed. Toubon himself was dismayed by this uncertainty, which he had wanted to avoid (Toubon, 1994n). Nevertheless, the Toubon law, and its referral to the Constitutional Council, paved the future for debate become language in have and action concerning use way other areas which important (Wilcox, 1998, p.292). Machill (1997, p.499) explains how analysis of language illuminates in France, with protection still seeming to our understanding of media policy policy override other concerns. With regard to the audiovisual media, the Toubon legislation did law 30 September 1986 on audiovisual communication (no. 86-1067), by adding the of modify Article 20 (1) enforcing the obligations of radio and televison stations to prioritise the French language and francophonie, with the exception of specially broadcast programmes entirely in a foreign language and pieces of music. The law of 1994 now prescribed the compulsory use of French or translations into French in all programmes or broadcast advertisements. Legislation introduced it also making was compulsory for audiovisual media to broadcast a minimum of 40% French songs and music (Wilcox, 1998, p.289)."' As Machill argues (1997, p.503), `The preparation and the passing of the loi Toubon reveal close similarities to the corresponding steps in laws imposition the connection with undertaken on of quotas for film and television productions. In spite of the change of government, this area of politics is characterized by identical discourse'. and almost continuity

Such claims are considered in more detail in

Chapter Five which examines audiovisual policy.

The debateson the useof Frenchin specific circumstancesof the media also mentioned the problems for the French language and identity presentedby digital media. It was feared that new technologieslike the Internet would be controlled by the Japanese particularly

"Article

12-1 of loi no.94-88 du 1er fevrier 1994, modif: ant la loi no.86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 6 la liberte de la communication (JO, 1994a). relative

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3' Americans and

Jacques Toubon's concern led to the appointment of Andre Danzin to

investigate this area. New information technologies like the Internet have provided a relatively debates identity, the French on and since to national of representations official challenge recent This for French increasing the become have loi Toubon, topic government. concern the of a issue is consideredin Chapter Six of the thesis. loi debates the during the Regulatory policy themes touched on surrounding political Toubon were picked up again by Jacques Toubon's successor Philippe Douste-Blazy, who becameMinister of Culture in 1995, following JacquesChirac's election to the Presidency and law 32 Toubon further the For circular regarding example a the resulting ministerial reshuffle the field defining the 1996, 19 March of application of and effectively extending appearedon in French in the law, particularly the areas of marketing of goods and services, use of be French to 1996b). (DGLF/CSLF, businesses as used now was and education conferences, in France, for in businesses, language conferences where possible the of written communication information to the language language the public. teaching open at places the of of and as

Institutional changesoccurredwhen the DGLF was placed under the control of the Ministry of Culture in 1996 and the creation of an Observatoirede la languefrancaise was Culture to by Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, carry out research was which of announced " body, first inform future the Ministry The this presidency under report of policy. which would in Atlanta French focused the CSLF, Berger, the Yves the of on use writer and memberof of 34 decree Meanwhile, 16). 1-3,1996d, 1996 (DGLF/CSLF, 1996c, on Olympic Gamesof a p. pp. 3 July 1996establishedspecialistcommissionsand a Commissiongenerale de terminologieet de neologie,which was to work with the Academicfrancaise in establishingnew terms and foreign instead bodies be by (which of used and servicesand should adopted public expressions

"See JacquesBrunhes(PCF),in JO,AN, 3 May 1994,secondsitting,p. 1370;JacquesToubon,in JO,Senat 12April 1994,p.950. "Under thereorganisation, Francophoniewasnow linked with theMinistere desAffaires etrangeres,andFrench languagecameunderculture,throughthe DGLF, which hadbeenthe PrimeMinister's responsibility. "Douste-Blazy,1996h;Ministerede la Culture, 1996c. Also reportedin Le Figaro,21 March 1996. ''Yves Berger went to the Olympics as his first `mission', to examine the status of French and to draw up for future help Government financial to events. was also given with translation and aid recommendations interpreting (see Ministere de la Culture, 1996c). President JacquesChirac also spoke of his concern about the use language French Olympics (Chirac, 1996b). the the at of

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words) (DGLF, 1996d, annexe 5, p.24; Ministere de la Culture, 1996g). Pressure groups saw their role strengthenedand legitimated as further decrees resulting from the passing of the loi Toubon, gave State approval to five associations seeking to defend the French language through de liaison, francaise, francophone d amitie de la langue Defense Association et prosecutions: Avenir de la languefrancaise, Conseil de la langue francaise, Association des informaticiens de langue francaise (DGLF, 1996a, annexe 4, p.23; Szulmajster-Celnikier, 1996, p. 50; Wilcox, 1998, p.293). Other ministerial changesmade reflected contemporary concerns, for example as Alain Juppe's government from May 1995 included a Secretary of State for Francophone issues for in Ministry Affairs, May Foreign 1997 the the of and return of responsibility at Communication to the Minister of Culture following the election of Lionel Jospin's Socialist government.

At the sametime as the announcementof thesemeasures,Douste-Blazyalso explained the three major directions of his language policy, in a statement on 20 March 1996 to the Council of Ministers, and an accompanying press conference (Douste-Blazy, 1996h; Ministere de la Culture, 1996c). This declaration took place during a week of publicity and events concerning French, called `Le francais comme on 1'aime' (The French we love), organised by the Ministry

of Culture between 18-24 March 1996, around the annual international

francophonie day. Douste-Blazy announced that the main aims of government policy for languagewere now as follows:

language French, the the the guaranteeing presence and spread of of as Republic (including through the development of a multilingual `information society', and through international organisations);

French language for international the maintaining role of as a communication; linguistic diversity in the world through the safeguarding cultural and promotionof multilingualism. The communicationpledgedto publicise terms which the Commissionsde terminologiewere working on, through the internet server of the Ministry of Culture, and to set up an interministerial group to examine global and interministerial aspects of language policy (DGLF/CSLF, 1996b;DGLF, 1996a,annexe2). As Ager notes, the announcementof these familiar a concern suggested with aims motivesof defendingandmaintainingthe Frenchcorpus language the identity (1996a, the 4,140, as structure to of understood and pp. with reference -

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Bengtsson, 1968 and van Deth, 1995)35 What was new however was the emphasis on `multilingualism'.

The theme of `multilingualism' had been discussed before (e.g. Rocard,

1989b),but becameincreasingly important in the mid-1990s, as Chapter Four will discuss. This was because policies on language were being formulated against a background of increased government concern and activity surrounding the international standing of the French language and francophone ideals, mentioned during the Toubon proposal debates by various political actors. The debatessurrounding thesepolicies are the subject of the following chapter.

The generaltrendtowardsthe growing internationalisationof communications,business international has led French political elites to look for means of bolstering the affairs and international and status of French. In addition to concerns regarding the availability or national French-language of otherwise audiovisual broadcasts and the effects of new technologies (discussedin Chapters Five and Six), increasing anxiety has been felt about the maintenance of the status of French in trade, finance, professional organisations, education and research, and international institutions such as the United Nations (Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, p.28; see 36 1994d; Charette, JO, De 1995d) also

Judgeargues(1993,p. 15), that in the 1980s,Frenchpolicy beganto turn away from the traditionalpromotion of francophonie alone,and to favour pluralism, in line with the idea that French and other languagescan and should exist alongside one another, serving different, Such needs. a notion was also well suited to France's greater involvement with changing Europeanintegration,since as Judgemaintains,`the new philosophy in Francetoday is that to fulfill the Europeanideal everybody should be given the possibility of being trilingual'. Moreover,concernsvoiced during the 1990sover the declining importanceof Frenchas a world language,andthe limited impact of measureslike the Toubon law and radio quotasfor Frenchlanguagesongs(seeChapterFive) in combatingthe domination of English in the media and various aspectsof public and professional life, encouragedFrench political elites to turn increasinglyto the advocacyof the ideaof multilingualism within the EuropeanUnion. 35SeeS.Bengtsson(1968) La Defense organiseedc la languefrancaise,Uppsala,Almqvist and Wiksells; J.P.van Deth (1995) `La Politique linguistique de la France', Lecture at Institut franfais, London, 10 March 1995. 361n1993,the Frenchgovernmentbegan`une politique volontariste'regardingthe respectingof Frenchas language in internationalinstitutionssuchas the United Nations,the training of civil servants official working an andimprovedterminologicalhelp for translationpurposes.In the caseof the UN, Francehasbeenableto enlistthe its francophone of and G7 partnersat variousconferencesand summits,but within Europethe rallying of support Frenchspeakers working within the EU institutionshasbeennecessary(Ministerede la Culture, 1997d,p.9).

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So French policy began to encouragethe learning and use of several languages,that is, `plurilingualism' or `multilingualism' to counteract the domination of English which may be confusing in certain contexts, as it is argued that its use becomes muddled (described as 1'esperanglais - see Judge, ibid. )"

Such an idea is strengthened by the association of

multilingualism with values of democracy, diversity and cultural enrichment (SzulmajsterCelnikier, 1996, p.53).

Yet, as Ager comments (1996a, p. 140), multilingualism proposed

be did for immigrant foreign languages this time to to not extend support around or regional, by in dealing with the State, or any notion of rights for languages other than citizens used French. So the arguments used by French politicians in favour of the multilingualism and diversity they claim to defend sit awkwardly alongside France's position as `the only EU member state to grant exclusive official status to one language without making any reference to the other languages spoken within the country', such as Breton, Catalan or Alsatian (Wilcox, 1994, pp.269,276-77;

see also Giordan, 1992).

As Phillipson notes (1992, p. 106), an

for those defending the purity of French is that legal measureschosen to uncomfortable parallel support French are similar to fascist action in countries like Italy, Germany and Spain, being based on `intolerance of dialects and minority languages within national borders, xenophobic national linguistic purity, and an expansionist urge externally' (also Calvet, 1987, p.261, cited by Ager, 1996b, p.71)38.

However, Minister of Culture JacquesToubon had justified the 1994 loi Toubonby following its that, than rather arguing own interests, France aimed to defend linguistic variety for Europe as well, against the invasion of foreign words: `Nous ne sommes pas chauvins, noun le qui preconisons plurilinguisme europeen' (We are not prejudiced, we who are arguing for European multilingualism) (Toubon, 1994n)39 Other politicians also highlighted how domination of English in the free European market could threaten the French language 40 Official literature too had presented the Toubon legislation as a means of encouraging linguistic ;'SeealsoToubon,1994e. 38SeeLouis-JeanCalvet (1987) La Guerredeslangues les et politiques linguistiques,Paris,Payot. 39TheToubon law also stated in Article 11 that the command of the French language and of two foreign languageswas a key educational objective (JO, 1994g; also Brulard, 1997b, p.204).

40See JacquesLegendre(RPR), JO, Senat, 12 April, p.951; Ivan Renar (PCF), JO, Senat, 12 April 1994, p.969.

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in interests France diversity, the than and other of protectionism and rather pluralism francophonecountries (see, for example, DGLF/CSLF, 1994a, p. 1; Balladur, 1994a; Ministere de la Culture, 1994b, 1994c). Toubon also argued that French language policy was needed as free harmful the to the of market and globalisation of the economy, as a effects an antidote justification for this proposed legislation in 1994. He claimed that there was a need for a revival `new francophonie, describing language French world a war world; a post-cold policy and of (a by `un domination to single cultural model) of the seul culturel' modele order', susceptible free market (JO, 3 May 2nd sitting, p. 1360; JO, Senat 12 April 1994, p.950). Encouraged by the success of the GATT negotiations of 1993, and the resulting increased politicisation

of

the

francophone movement,

language policy

by been French has policy-makers, particularly pushed multilingualism

based on

since France's

first in half 1995, to EU Council Ministers the the the right of with of presidency of being described beyond European Union the as another aspect often and multilingualism within GATT by French/European `cultural the the campaign policy of exception' achieved of (considered in Chapter Five). This policy theme has also played a significant role in France's issues, French in (examined Chapter Six). These for language the Internet the and use on policy State's development of its leadership of francophonie, will be discussed in the case studies follow. which

3.4 Conclusions In conclusion,we can note Ager's commenton how recentpolicies for the French language, its by law `have Toubon 1994, the of reinforced official and public character, exemplified its (have to) towards tried territories move social groups, and unifying role across and stressed in domain in forcing him her to tongue the the every citizen use national or greaterregulationof A, (1996a, 205). These, 9-10), `status `tie Ager (1990, the p. suggests pp. are policies and use' of political community to the speechcommunity, aim at social monolingualism, and regard (French)languageas a right to be extendedto all, denying any such languageright to others within the political community'. This is evident in the French State'sreluctanceto regardthe diversity of languages`asa resourceto be madewidely available',hencethe traditional hostility 41`Statusplanning' refers to official instructiondefining the `status'of a language,in terms of its official function, in and contrastto `corpusplanning', carriedout to definethe natureof the languageinvolved recognition andto guaranteeits quality (Ager, 1990.pp.9-10).

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to regional and immigrant languages (Ager, 1996a, p.205).

This tendency is still seen in

debatesamongst French politicial elites ongoing at the time of writing, regarding the possibility indicates issue Languages. This Regional Minority Charter European the on and of signing identity for its French language political elites, and relationship with continuing problems of is discussed it, least, to to traditional them the about and at cling views wish of some of and further in Chapter Four. Returning to the specific issue of the Toubon legislation, we can consider the following by law dilution behind by Wilcox the the the of proposed eventual on reasons comment offered the judgements of the Conseil constitutionnel on freedom of expression:

[ ] to suggestthat languagehasa specialrole to play as a symbol of national ... identity is a very different matterto sayingthat its purity shouldbe protectedby law, particularly when thereis no affront to public order or other contravention of positive (as opposedto natural) law, nor any constitutional obligation to protectthe language(1998,p.311). Yet what this thesis will show is that the special role of languageas a symbol of national identity continuesto spill over into many areasof debateon culture and identity, and thus informs French political elites' perceptionsof identity. This suggestionthat the French languagehasa `specialrole' resultsin the rigid ideasof political elites,which in turn culminate in hostility to other influences. Elite attitudesto the Frenchlanguageare centralto conceptions identity issues, its language French as national and relationshipwith policy on and cultural of discussedabove. This link will be demonstratedin the following casestudiesof languageand issues. how beginning These language chapters, reveal with policy, will cultural policy in face ideas French identity the traditional elite about national static and remain contemporary increasing challenges. of

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CHALLENGES FOR FRENCH CHAPTER FOUR: MEETING INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL IDENTITY - FRENCH LANGUAGE POLICY IN EUROPE AND

BEYOND

4.1 Introduction Chapter Three described how language policy in France has traditionally been driven by a wish to defend the French language against potential damage and loss of status in the face of growing internal and external influences upon it, in the hope of safeguarding the French language as a factor of national identity. A review of legislation and political debates in the 1990s such as those on the loi Toubon showed that this was still the overriding concern amongst political elites. The chapter also indicated how, during the 1990s, and especially during the period 19934 (around the time of the Toubon proposal), language policy became increasingly focused on the need to defend the French language at an international level, given the growing influence of English in business, the media, science and international relations, and other trends such as European integration and globalisation. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects of international challenges to the French language on political elites' perceptions of national such identity, in the period from 1993. In this chapter, I will examine legislation and debates other than those concerning the loi Toubon, which had focused on the use of language within France.

As I noted in ChapterThree, the newly-titled FrenchMinistere de la Culture et de la Francophonie' had, following the arrival of JacquesToubon in March 1993, undertakena issues. francophone Furthermore,following the passingof the loi to a relaunch of commitment Toubon itself, the Ministry's policies began to reflect a more defensive attitude toward the Frenchlanguage. Moreover, it beganto focus on further meansof improving the national and international status of French, which led to the particular pursuit of openings for French languagepolicy at a Europeanlevel, alongside developmentof France's leadershipof the francophonemovement. Debatessurroundingthesepolicy areasare the subjectof this chapter, French language case study a of providing policy during the period following the loi Toubon. The chapterparticularly examinesFrench political elites' efforts to develop languagepolicy through the arena of the EuropeanUnion, which, alongside other cultural policy areasof audiovisualpolicy andlanguageon the Internet,also examinedby this thesis,becameespecially important,as a result of France'sEU presidencyin the first half of 1995. On the one hand, 'This wasthe first timefrancophoniehadbeen given full ministerialstatus.

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European integration poses a threat in some respects to French political elites' attitudes identity, in On described Chapter Three. language I this the other, as national and regarding for integration has the European that opportunities new also presented will chapter show development and influence of the French language and its symbolism of French identity. Furthermore, there are links between the policies and discourse concerning language and European integration and the French pursuit of the francophone project. Elite debatesreveal all in indicating French integration, European the these political a continuing ambiguity views of of how building idea Europe `Europe', to to the and mean, united might of what a more response this could affect identities within it. Furthermore, there is a tension in French elites' turning towards Europe in language policy-making, since the reasons behind this may be both be French the that could possibility policy-makers principled and pragmatic: we will see important for like by belief the the that are principle, such as multilingualism policies motivated construction of Europe, or by the pragmatic possibility of the defence of France's own national interests.

I will arguethat Frenchlanguagepolicy in the internationalarenasoffrancophonie and Europe, although presented in terms of a French struggle to defend diversity and cultural in fact dominated by language traditional to thinking reveal elite on remain pluralism, identity. be French This tested, through an analysis of the will of national claim conceptions discourse of French political elites concerning language policy in the 1990s and its importance for developing identity. French medium a as

Firstly, I intend to unravel the unvoiced

identity international in found French to the the response of political elites assumptions about facing how language. French demonstrate I the the political response to these will challenges issues,although confronting subjects of relatively recent debate such as the status of French in a increasingly and war, globalised, world order and the challenges of an enlarged, more post-cold integrated Europe, remains informed by constructions from the past. This chapter will give an overview of policy measureson the issue, reflecting elite initiatives concerning French national identity. Detailed analysis of discourse will illuminate the deeper truths about this identity, it be to more complex than may be apparent. For these reasons, the chapter will showing analysetexts which are part of the wider body of elite discourse on identity and the international aspects of policy-making regarding the French language.

Given the new importance of

language policy-making at the European level for French political elites, three texts selected for

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detailed analysis are specifically concerned with language, identity and Europe. One of the four is a more general text treating francophonie. The selection and analysis of these is explained in section 4.2.1. However, I also refer to both legislation and debate connected with other aspects language in debates the international arena, such as onfrancophonie. of policy and Before discussing the detailed analysis of texts on the French language and Europe, the following sections introduce the nature of international challenges for French andfrancophonie, how became they and significant in the cultural policy vision followed by French political elites from the mid-1990s.

4.1.1 France in the world: the extent of the challenges for francophonie in the 1990s

the French language and

As I indicated at the end of Chapter Three, the French State's policy during the 1990s on language became more involved than earlier with responding to challenges at an international level. According to Haut Conseil de la Francophonie (HCF) figures, French is spoken by 2 per cent of the world's population, and is the ninth language in the world, with 160 million speakers (L'Express, 13-19 November 1997).' In particular, policy-makers have been concerned with the maintenance of the status of French as a language of international communication in like the UN and the EU. At the UN for example, only a tenth of documents organisations by the Secretariat are in French, and almost all computer programmes are in English produced (The Economist, 23 March 1996). This is because French policy-makers feared that French lose increased to out an would preference for English alone as a working language, which organisations may try to implement in order to cut translation and printing costs (Ager, 1996a, in Back 1991 and 1993 the HCF discussed this challenge for the French language in 107). p. terms of the relative lack of international power exercised by francophone countries, and as part `plot' a worldwide of against French and in favour of American (quoted in Ager, ibid. ).'

This

thinking in terms of a `plot', its proponents argue, can be demonstrated by history, pointing to the Louisiana Education Act of 1880 removing French from use in schools, and the 1946 UN vote which narrowly kept French as both an official and working language. Apart from this, it is argued that such a plot is helped by the desire of many Canadians and Americans for Quebec 'The HCF figuresshowedthat Chinese wasfirst, with 975 million, followed by English,with 478 million. 3SeeHCF, Etat de la francophonie,Paris,La Documentationfrancaise 1991, 243-70,1993, 53. pp. p. -

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to adopt English, British programmes for teaching English abroad and the political and economic power of the US.

Furthermore, the specific threats to French in international

in its in informal have been identified from lack meetings, as resulting organisations of use computer-baseddocumentation and communications such as faxes, low stocks in libraries and documentationcentres and its decreasinguse by younger diplomats (Ager, 1996a,pp. 107-8). In response to this, French governments were, as Ager describes (1996a, p. 109), feared direct diplomatic French they to to the urge action strengthen as status of reluctant possible retaliation from other countries. Instead, they tried to encourage officials in overseas embassiesand international bodies to use French and to support francophone organisations. However, as I suggested at the end of Chapter Three, the 1990s saw French policy-makers seeking a more aggressiverole in defending and developing the French language as a factor of French national identity at an international level, within the EU and other international organisations, and through French leadership of the francophone movement. The promotion of had in Europe been discussed late 1980s-early 1990s4,around the the within multilingualism time of the French presidency of the EU in early 1989, and the French-led promotion of European audiovisual industries, but became particularly significant in the period after 1993. From this time, language policies based on multilingualism were prioritised by French policyin both francophonie, `Europe' the policy arenas of makers and and were characterised as a further aspect of the policy of `cultural exception' achieved by the French/European GATT campaign. This argued that `cultural goods' or services should not be treated as any other goods in laws on world trade such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was under in re-negotiation 1993 (returned to in Chapter Five).

The previouschapteralso explainedhow the loi Toubondebatesbecamelinked to the defend French at an internationallevel. It was noted how various politicians, and the to need literature issue, had justified the Toubon law as necessaryfor the the government on official defenceof linguistic pluralism and diversity beyond France,and not only concernedwith the defenceof Frenchidentity in France. This was linked to the supportof `cultural exception'too. Both the `cultural exception'themeand the francophonepolicy aspectsof justifications for the French State's languagepolicy objectives should be seen in context as part of the general 'See, for example by Rocard, 1989b; De Beauce, cited in Le Figaro, 16-17 July 1988; Decaux, 1990a,

1990b.

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direction of cultural policy in the 1990s. The development of French language policy in the area of francophonie is itself linked to the francophone movement's continuing politicisation. This was encouraged by the GATT debate in 1993 and resolutions in favour of `cultural exception', and a more political focus for the movement adopted at the October 1993 summit, through a resolution stating that the respecting of French as an international language should be a priority, assigned to the Conseil permanent de la francophonie (HCF, 1994d, p. 506). The 1995 summit, in Cotonou (Benin) took this further, with the decision to create an elected post of Secretary General for the francophone movement in order to create a clearer, more visible identity Liberation, 2-3 December 1995b; Le Monde, 6 December 1995). President political Mitterrand also used the 1993 summit to speak about the `cultural exception' issue raised by the GATT negotiations, and about problems facing the French language in international institutions. The resolution which was produced at the summit on the use of French in international organisations mirrored the demands made by Avenir de la languefrancaise in its 1992 appel, which urged that French should be respected as a working language in the UN, and that adequate resources should be provided for translation and interpreting into French (Wilcox, 1998, pp.290-1).

Following the GATT campaignand the francophonesummit of 1993, French policymakers seemedto gain a new confidence with regard to francophonecultural ambitions, by Jacques Toubon's role as Minister of Culture, and now also Francophone strengthened Affairs. Indeed, Toubon statedin an interview that the successof the `cultural exception' American hegemony and cultural uniformity had allowed the French against campaign its desired to continue government cultural policy (Toubon, 1994c). The decreeof 16 April 1993concerningthe dutiesof the new Ministere de la Culture et de la Francophoniestatedthat the Ministry should `mettreen oeuvre,conjointementavec les autresministeresinteresses,les l'Etat par menees en vue d'assurerle rayonnementde la culture francaiseet celui de la actions Francophoniedansle monde' (put into effect,jointly with other ministries concerned,actionled by the Statewith a view to ensuringthe spreadof Frenchand francophoneculture in the world) (cited by Toubon, 1993u, as he referred to Malraux's vision of the need to spread and democratiseFrenchculture). With the renewed confidence in francophonecultural action, French political elites becameincreasinglykeen to developcultural diplomacy aroundthe world, as was highlighted

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by Toubon's programme of visits to the main francophone countries and hopeful candidates for admission between 1993 and 1995, with the aim of relaunching francophone cooperation (Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, p.2). Toubon described the international action of the Ministry its for France Culture Affairs Francophone and of and as providing a special meeting point including the with world, various cultural partners, which allowed special partnerships all over traditionally francophone regions like the Maghreb, also Europe (of the EU and beyond), South East Asia and even the USA and Japan (cited in Ministere de la Culture, 1994a). According to Toubon, the French State's international cultural action was undertaken in response to the demands of overseas partners, thus presenting France as a leader in cultural policy.

But he

indicated that French cultural policy aims were still linked to a traditional view of culture being identity for French abroad, or a mission civilisatrice, when he argued that, following a vehicle the defence of. `cultural exception', France had to assert its `ambition culturelle' (cultural identity French to since culture should continue carry abroad. ambition),

Similar ideaswere includedin thejustifications for the 1995cultural budget,which was designedwith the recognition of the important political role of culture in national and international terms in mind. The document presenting the budget gave examplesof the Ministry's strategyof active overseasexpansionof cultural industries,such as Frenchbooks', industries, new technologiesfor museums,and also statedthatfrancophonie would audiovisual be activelypursuedin areaslike CentralandEasternEuropeand SouthEastAsia. (Ministerede la Culture,1994g). This vision was alsodiscussedby Toubon in anAssembleenationaledebate budget (JO, 18 October he 1994, described how he 5633), the cultural second sitting, p. when on had deliberatelyrelaunchedfrancophonie with 11 MF of extra funding. During this debate,he his in three the themes major of outlined plans traditional terms, echoing someof the ideasof Malraux which I outlined in ChapterOne, as he spokeof building national solidarity arounda democratised, plural andinfluential, `conqueringculture'. Particularly striking in this statement `conquerante' the to describeculture,which suggestedsomekind of a cultural battle of use was I demonstrate how such imagery is significant in French political elites' will or mission. constructionsof national identity in relation to the case study areasin this thesis, and will illustratethis first of all in my analysisof texts on France,Europe,languageandfrancophonie. New measures for encouraging exports of French books were announced in June 1994 (Premier Ministre, 1994d), and in a report by a working group of the Ministry of Culture (Ministere de la Culture, 19940.

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Francophonepolicies, and cultural policy generally, were described by political elites in government at this time as being forward-looking, since they were based on the struggle for diversity. The Ministry's policy aims were outlined, still with reference to pluralism and the defence of `cultural exception', in terms of looking overseas, `vers l'echange afin de s'enrichir de celui-ci et promouvoir nos valeurs' (towards exchange for enrichment and to promote our values) (Ministere de la Culture, 1994g). However, besides the policies of francophonie, which reachedall over the world, as we saw earlier (Ministere de la Culture, 1994a), French political in elites the mid-1990s were considering opportunities for, and threats to, their language and cultural policies which were found closer to home. The challenges to French national identity brought by problems related to language, whilst present in numerous areas and discussed in a francophone policy-making context, needed to be tackled at a European level. As President Chirac explained during a television interview at the Cotonou summit (Chirac, 1995e), promoting plurilinguisme or multilingualism, within the EU, would be an excellent means of reestablishing French within Europe, and also a good thing for francophonie. These ideas suggest that the aim behind the plurilinguisme goal of diversity is one related to French policy-makers' own wish to bolster the position of French within Europe and the world. It is this policy theme has become particularly important in debates surrounding French linguistic policywhich in the mid-1990s, and on which the rest of the chapter particularly focuses, as it making implications both for the legislation French language considers challenges and opportunities integration. European to related

4.1.2TheEuropeanchallengefor the French languageand French identity European integration has presentedproblems for French concerns about identity as expressedin languagepolicy. In the 1990s, faced with the ongoing widening of the European Union and the reunification of Germany, French political elites became increasingly keen to protect the status of French in EU (previously EEC) institutions. In 1990, President Mitterrand was so concerned that he wrote personally to European Commission President JacquesDelors urging more respect for the French language within the EEC (Mitterrand, 1990b). Such anxieties were due to fears that further enlargement, encompassing countries such as those in Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe, which often prefer English or German as the normal language of international lead increased to may communication, pressure on translation and interpreting budgets, and the

113

la de (Ministere institutions EU languages further influence of English on the use of within

Culture,1995d,p.28). Ager (1996b, p. 167), and Miguet (1996, p.78) explain how French was extensively used in building `Europe' in the sense of the institutions of the European Community and Union, drawing on French legal and administrative traditions. For a long time, French was the main language of the European Community institutions. Although all languages of the EU member French, in English languages, French the practice. most widely used are and statesare official German and English are working languages of urgent and informal meetings. On the UK's UK Prime Pompidou between President in 1973, EEC and an agreement accession to the Minister Edward Heath made the previous year did aim to help the status of French, through intensive training for senior civil servants (HCF, 1994b). However, since then, the status of French within community institutions has tended to be undermined by the popularity of English 6 have important to Directorates Some tended 1996, 77) language (Miguet, use p. as a working Moreover, development). (for English and example external relations, science, research only in from 72 in dropped French in Parliament European per cent written answersto questions the for for language in English 62 1994, the 1990 to used new programmes main and was per cent Eurobarometer According 168-9). (Ager, to bloc 1996b, Soviet a pp. countries previously English the in 1996, European EU June thought that most useful was questioned citizens survey foreign language to learn, ahead of French, German, Spanish and Italian (Sources d'Europe, 1996k). To counteract this, French policy-makers began to seek policies to improve and focusing by Europe, the EU French the the the on and wider within position of safeguard French diversity to through as an encourage multilingualism, alongside policies promotion of ' Moreover, besides promoting defensive language beyond Europe. international working for `Europe' the French that could offer new opportunities political elites argued strategies, identity. for language French for francophonie French and ultimately, and culture, expressionof

6Miguetrefersto a studyby MarianneGehen(no referenceprovided). 'Measures undertaken to improve the position of French in international institutions in the 1990s included a in Ministries from Foreign in French 1994 French Affairs Culture the to of use and urging officials circular international meetings (30 November 1994, cited in Ministere de la Culture, 1996c). The use of French was like in the International Civil Aviation Authority, and at events like the 1996 Atlanta Olympic groups encouraged Games(seeDGLF, 1996f, De Charette, 1996d).

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4.2 The French language and national identity in Europe and beyond in the 1990s

4.2.1Contextualisationof the textschosenfor detailedanalysis At the time of the main issues in question, between March 1993-May 1997, the Centre-Right RPR-UDF coalition were in government. This period of the 1990s includes the time when the languageand Europe discussionsbecame increasingly significant, in view of the debatesaround `cultural exception', ongoing questions of European integration, the loi Toubon and France's includes first half during It EU 1995. the terms of office of two the the also of presidency of in in Republic, Francois Mitterrand President the a situation of with as office presidents of `cohabitation' with the Balladur and Juppe governments, and Jacques Chirac being elected President in May 1995. Therefore the issue of French language policy as related to Europe is Centre-Right Although texts the case the primarily with and policy of governments. concerned study focuses on the policy and texts of a period of Centre-Right government, the analysis also ideas Socialist input President Francois Mitterrand, the the of and of Lionel Jospin's considers Socialist government which came to power in May 1997, which left President Chirac as a Centre-Right head of state now compelled to work with a Prime Minister and government of the Left. The case study, where appropriate, refers to data which allow the examination of possible discontinuities in has limited the the time and policy, within constraints of which continuities been available to draw comparisons.

I madethe choiceof texts for examinationaccordingto criteria which includethe setting have influenced its the timing event, of which could possible exposure and/or reporting, and and the status of the producer of the text. The most important interest of each text, however, lay in its inclusion and development of central themes concerning French identity. A further factor, into I took account throughout all the case study chapters, was the opportunity to include which different political figures throughout as relevant to different cases. I present the background to the texts below, together with a discussion of their interests in terms of my analysis. As I will demonstrate,they are all important texts in their own right, becauseof their development of key themes which enable us to trace elite views of French identity related to language policy, and illustrate points supporting my hypothesis that such perceptions are undynamic. which

Two of the four texts chosenwere speeches madeat the tenth meetingof the HCF which took placebetween22-24 March 1994 in Paris. The HCF, on its creationin 1984,was given

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the task of determining and discussing key areas for action, and making recommendations, on francophoneissues (HCF, 19940. Usually, these events are attended by members of the HCF invited issues discussion, and experts on under although three workshops at the 1994 event were open to the public (HCF, 1994a). The conference is an internationally prominent event, hosted by the President of the Republic, who also chooses its theme (Judge, 1996, p.31), and the involvement of high-profile political figures attracts press coverage. The event's theme was `La Francophonie et 1'Europe' (francophonie and Europe), and included discussions on the future status of French in Europe in relation to other languages, multilingualism and francophone cooperation within Europe (HCF, 1994a). This conference should be situated in the context of the chronology of international events related to cooperation between francophone countries, and also more widely, with European partners, and debates on language policy.

The HCF

meeting for example took place just four months after the culmination of the `Uruguay' round GATT for demands `cultural French the negotiations which causedso much controversy over of exception'.

However, the debates on the negotiations had led to an alliance between

francophone and European countries concerning the resolution for `cultural exception' passedat the Mauritius summit in October 1993. The HCF conference also happened shortly before the debates on the Toubon proposals for the use of the French language, and eighteen parliamentary French by by the the narrowest of margins (51 per cent), after ratification months referendum, of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). These factors, and the very significance francophonie increasingly as a cultural, and also of geopolitical, movement, together with the French government's enthusiasm for a revival of francophone policies, made the event likely to include important discussions on issues of French identity.

The first text is the opening speechof the conference,madeby FrancoisMitterrand in his capacityas Presidentof the Republic (Mitterrand, 1994). Foreign policy/Europeanaffairs it traditionally questions of presidential are concernand is especiallyinterestingto considera language the to and Europe debate by Mitterrand, as a president who had contribution developeda personalvision of a more united Europeover forty years,particularly through his encouragementof Franco-Germancooperation(Nelson and Roberts, pp.9-10). Mitterrand's interestin Europewas particularly developedin his secondterm of office as president,in line his down in history to wish go with as a greatleaderin the constructionof Europe(Clark, 1992,

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8 153). Francophonie too was a special interest of Mitterrand's, and it was he who initiated the p. biannual summits in 1986, and also the HCF (Leger, 1996, p.260).

A further text from the HCF conferenceis a speechby JacquesToubon, in his role as Minister of Culture and Francophone Affairs (1994e).

Toubon played a specific role in

language policy-making debates, in connection with his proposal under consideration at the in 1994 on the use of the French language, and language policies related to Europe time same andfrancophonie. I include another text by Toubon, which was made at a press conference in Paris on 14 December 1994 to announcethe French government's plans for the forthcoming EU presidency from January 1995 (Toubon, 1994u). The encouragement of language policies based on `multilingualism' was a key element of the cultural policy undertaken as part of this presidency period. This press conference was reported by Le Monde (Le Monde, 17 December 1994).

Finally, I considera more generaltext on languageand identity, which is a speechmade by JacquesToubon at a conferenceorganisedat the Assembleenationale called `AlternativesA l'uniformisation - Trois espaces:francophone, hispanophonie,lusophonie' (Alternatives to uniformisation - Three arenas: francophonie, hispanophonie, lusophonie (= Portugese speaking))(1995m). Although not sucha high profile speechasin the caseof thoseat the HCF, this event enabledToubon to develop ideas about languageand identity around the world in more general,abstractterms,andthereforecontainssomevery interestingmaterial. 4.2.2 European integration as a threat to the French language and identity: fear of uniformity imposition English the of and The development of the EU was firstly portrayed by various politicians as a threat to the French language because of the possibility of the increased use of English within EU institutions. JacquesToubon, argued that it was English which was the language threatening to become the language European of an enlarged EU, due to growing translation and interpreting costs main (Toubon, 1995m). Although he hinted at possible German and Spanish demands for increased languages in EU institutions, former Minister of European Affairs Alain their of use Lamassoure explained quite openly in his speech to the HCF that the development of the EU 8SeeClark'sreferences to Alain Duhamel(1989)LesHabitsneufsdela politique,Paris,pp.210-3;Jacques Julliard(1988)`La Courseaucentre',chapterin La Republiquedu centre,Paris,p.90;AndreFontaine,articlein Le Monde,20 May 1989,p.7.

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la de he `L'elargissement dominance English lead further to the of when warned: would Communaute renforcera le camp des anglophones' (The enlargement of the community will `le Here, (Lamassoure, 1994). English-speaking the the camp', of choice camp) reinforce hostility English in `camp' `side' to the speakers,and sense of opponents suggests a or meaning listing illustrated his kind battle. His through a speech arguments of also a confrontation, or in different language facts French the the areas about status of as main working whole seriesof in its for European but English, EU the use growing use of example affairs, also about of Commission dealings with external countries. Consequently, Lamassoure spoke of the issue as `preoccupante' (constantly worrying), and the need for French-speakers to remain `vigilants' (vigilant) regarding the use of French in European Union institutions, his choice of adjective indicating a need for careful, rigorous monitoring of a serious problem.

Elsewhere,referencesto the threat of English were sometimesmore subtly made. An indicated in daily Toubon, Le Monde, that the when of newspaper writing national examplewas he argued `il faut savoir resister aux seductions des arguments en faveur d'une langue vehiculaireuniquequi entraineraita termele ravalementde toutesles languessaufune, au rang des langueslocales' (it is essentialto be able to resist the lure of argumentsin favour of one language which will lead to the swallowing-upof all languagesexceptone, and their working local languages) (Toubon, 1994d). This negative referenceto to the status of relegation `swallowing-up',almost `devouring',is an exampleof a veiled referenceto the growing useof English. Another fear amongstFrench policy-makers about the French language,culture and identity in Europe was that other groups within the European Union wish to impose uniformity, diversity, limit integration. European Some of these fears had been voiced in through and connection with the debates on the loi Toubon, as the report of the group examining the law by Xavier Deniau (JO, 1994d) revealed when it complained of the chaired proposed European Commission's suspicion of language policy measures of member states, which it free to the as obstacles movement of goods. The Commission was behind the use of regarded 30 Treaty the of of Rome to limit the use of the Bas-Lauriol law of 1975, as we saw in article Chapter Three. However, in June 1993, French policy-makers claimed a victory at EU level for their policy agenda when their campaigns encouraged the European Parliament to vote in favour of a resolution affirming subsidiarity in linguistic matters and the right unanimously

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for European states to impose the use of their national languages within their countries. Since then, such texts formulated by the Commission allow decision-makers at national level to decide the choice of language (see Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, p.25; also Szulmajster Celnikier, 1996, p.53; JO, 1994d, pp. 12-4; Toubon, 1994e). The parliamentary debates on the 1994 law in France had likewise included, besides the frequently cited `Anglo-Saxon plot' to weaken French language and identity, protests of possible threats to French identity coming from European integration. Ivan Renar of the PCF for example had worried about French identity being lost identite incolore (a `une and saveur' culture within europeenne et sans colourless and flavourless European identity) (JO, Senat, 12 April 1994, p.971) and Jacques Legendre of the RPR had warned that `une reglementation linguistique' (linguistic regulation) imposed be on France by the European Commission (JO, Senat, 12 April 1994, p.951). could

Suchsentimentswere addressedin more detail in discourseon the role of Franceandthe Frenchlanguagein Europe. PoliticianssuchasJacquesToubon (Toubon, 1994u)warnedof the risk of a generalcultural uniformity resultingfrom Europeanintegration: L'Europe doit avoir la culture de sapropre diversiteparcequ'elle se caracterise par une diversite de cultures. Il faut savoir qu'il existait dans certainscas une tentation dans la construction de 1'Europe de vouloir tout unifier jusqu'ä l'absurde au risque de faire perdre ä 1'Europeune part de son äme. (Europe must have the culture of its own diversity becauseit is characterisedby a diversity of cultures. It shouldbe rememberedthat therehas been a temptation in somecasesof Europeanconstructionto want to unify everythingto the point of absurdityat the risk of losing part of its soul). Here, Toubon showed his hostility to the European Commission, which he implied was taking the ideals of the free market too far and mistakenly saw obstacles to free trade in cultural and linguistic diversity. Toubon portrayed these qualities of diversity as characteristic of, or natural to Europe. His balancing of themes with the mirroring phrases `la culture de sa propre diversite' and `une diversite de la cultures' appeals to ideals of harmony. This is in opposition to `l'absurde' which is threatened; the opposite of reason, of what is rational. The use of `ame' too has a central role, appealing to traditional religious imagery, through threats of `tentation' to follow a single culture. Through this image of the loss of a `soul', Toubon made his statement dramatic Mitterrand too echoed ideas about the natural diversity inherent with European more .9 'Elsewhere,this imagewas usedby Bruno Megret the FN, when he spokeof a corrupt form of Americanof Englishthreateningthe very soulof the Frenchpeople(Megret,1993).

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identity, as he argued that language training in EU institutions should be improved, so that European officials would be trilingual (Mitterrand, 1994). He claimed that: `La pluralite fait identity). These is inherent European then (Plurality de 1'identite are within europeenne'. partie it identity, interpreting their European French support can when elites political examples of is identity, French to through a pluralism which referring arguments about a threatened endangered. The passage from Toubon's speech cited (Toubon, 1994u) above continued with a implied its Commission European that the a single the policies assertion and criticism of languagewithin Europe, not just a lack of cultural diversity in general:

A certains moments on pouvait lire dans certain textes emanant de la la `considerant dans des des necessite comme phrases resolutions, commission, de faire emergerune culturecommune'... Vous comprenez ce qu'il peut y avoir ä la limite, de presque totalitaire dans ce type de formulation. De la meme maniere certain ont developpe langue lequel a Europe implicitement l'argument unie, selon explicitement ou unique. (At some points some texts from the Commission have contained resolutions with phrases like `in view of the need to encourage a common culture'.

You understandwhat can be the ultimate, almost totalitarian result in this type of formulation. In the same way, some people have openly, or implicitly, developed the argument that a united Europe means a single language). Here,Toubon suggeststhat the idea of the useof one languagewithin Europeis encouragedby the EuropeanCommission,although he does not explicitly accusethe Commission of this, instead referring vaguely to `certains'. This in itself produces the effect of implying an is is by totalitarianism. to the threat, which reference more sinister, and strengthened unknown Similar ideaswere expressedat a pressconferencein March 1995,when the Ministry of Culture warned that following some of the ideas of the European Commission entailed based (Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, 25). a single market on p. a single culture supporting This shouldnot be allowed to happenthrough `le sacrifice' (sacrifice) of Europeanlanguages is l'homme dans `une des de 1'exercice des droits de whose existence cultures, conditions and la in (one human Republique the the comme nötre' of exerciseof rights a conditions of une Republic like ours). The choice of `le sacrifice' to describethe effect of the use of a sole

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language on European languages and cultures suggests a fatal and unpleasant outcome. The 1'homme' `les droits de to appeals to French history and the Revolutionary reference Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and serves to remind the audience that it is just is language French French identity the not any after all and which at stake, culture and Europeancultures and languages. In a similar vein, Toubon criticised the European Commission for normally using English in its dealings with external countries, and for regarding regulation of the use of Europeanlanguagesas bringing increasing costs and inconvenience, rather than as necessaryfor the respecting of European diversity (Toubon, 1994e). As before, Toubon referred evasively to Europeanbureaucrats' desire for uniformity in building Europe: `Il faut en effet reconnaitre, et inquietant, dans l'esprit de de la que certains c'est responsables europeens, construction l'Europe passepar l'uniformisation. [ ] (We must recognise, and it is worrying, that in the ... .' mindset of some European officials, building Europe will come about through uniformisation

From the references contained within the above examples to the European Commission's discourse and policies on the desirability of a common culture, we can see examples of some opposition of French elites to ideas about the building of a more integrated Europe through a `European identity'. Such policies, whilst favouring a free market, have also aimed to create and strengthen cultural unity through policies such as those for audiovisual broadcasting, the `Campaign for a "People's Europe"' which envisaged the construction of European Community symbols such as flags, logos and documents like driving licences, plus the single currency and `European Year of campaigns (Shore, 1993, pp.787-91; Shore and Black, 1994, pp.285-8; Wintle, 1994, p. 10). These policies are, as several commentators have in that the European Communities or Union have represented only a small noted, problematic minority of the various states,people and nations who would call themselves European (Wintle, 1994, p. 10). Furthermore, it is difficult for anyone, French politicians included, to adequately describe what a European culture, civilisation or identity, or indeed what Europe, might be, it since could be viewed as a geographical, political or cultural entity (Heller, 1992; Shore, 1993, p.792; Spiering, 1996, p. 104; Wintle, 1996). Yet for French political elites in the mid-1990s, the key theme of debates on language Europe, as well as specifically the EU and in other areas of cultural policy, as I will within

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demonstrate further in Chapters Five and Six, became the French promotion of diversity, through multilingualism, as opposed to uniformity.

4.2.3 Interpreting thefear of uniformity Uniformity has several meanings for French political elites in the debates on language. In the discussions of Europe, it can be a term to describe the result of the increased use of English it brought EU, through the the organisations of or could cultural uniformity within mean European integration and suggestions of the development of a common European culture and identity being a desirable result of a single market. Besides this, it can mean a more general 'Anglo-American' source of cultural and linguistic uniformity. This was indicated back in 1990 for example by Alain Decaux, Socialist Minister for Francophone Affairs, who spoke of `un sabir anglo-americain' (pidgin American-English); `une langue hegemonique' (a hegemonic language) which he saw as threatening linguistic uniformity and, echoing McLuhan's earlier (1964) creating a `village mondial' (global village) of communications, threatening predictions European cultural identity with its `banalisation' or `uniformisation' of culture (Decaux, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c). The use of `sabir', which has pejorative origins, meaning a mixture of Arabic, Spanish, French and Italian used in the Middle East and North Africa, is significant, having racial connotations of an `impure' language. Catherine Tasca too, Socialist Secretary of State for FrancophoneAffairs, echoed these ideas when she spoke of a great Anglo-American rival in the discussions on her proposals for language legislation in 1992 (Tasca, 1992c). Alain Juppe, Foreign Minister Affairs, declared that `cet anglo-americain appauvri' (this degenerate of as Anglo-American/American English) threatened to become the language of international (Juppe, 1994). Juppe's use of `appauvri' is a strong attack on American forms communication its English, as meanings of degenerate,weak and impoverished are all negative, and have of racial overtones. Here then are examples of more appeals to purity, in line with themes discussed earlier of a `soul' being tempted by the use of English. What is more surprising though, is the way in which these references were remarkably similar to those in FN discourse " language identity. and on

French political elites' professeddislike of uniformity led the governmentto pursue 1°SeeMegret, 1993, for example, who referred to `le "pidgin" americain ä pretention universelle' (the `pidgin' American with its universal pretentions).

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for during its linguistic diversity EU presidency of 1995 (Ministore de la Culture, policies 1995d).

This was presented as achievable through promoting

plurilinguisme,

or

multilingualism, which could help all languages, not only French. In 1994 for example an interministerial committee reported its findings on possible strategies for the future of French within a multilingual Europe (Mission interministerielle de coordination pour la presence du francais en Europe, 1994). With the promotion of `cultural diversity' as one of the four key objectives for the French EU presidency of 1995, the French Ministry of Culture made linguistic pluralism a priority for this period, with the aim that all member states should development in the trilingualism encourage of education and training, and proposed that the foreign languages teaching two of obligatory should be adopted as an intergovernmental (Ministore de la Culture, 1995d, p.27; Premier Ministre, 1995a, pp.7,42). This was convention in addition to accompanying measures for audiovisual policy, which are discussed in Chapter Five.

Mitterrand, presentingthe French government'sprogrammefor the EU Presidencyto the European Parliament, justified the policies for multilingualism

in terms of France's

`la des langues' (the rivalry between languages), suggesting hostility and a of rivalite awareness struggle between languages (Mitterrand, 1995a). He also spoke of the wish to defend the European in countries, addition to France, which lacked `la dimension geographique de smaller (the dimensions autres' geographical quelques of some others). Here, Mitterrand's reference to `others' who have `larger geographical dimensions', suggests he was referring to the United States,where English, the main rival of the French language, is spoken, rather than simply the UK, which is after all a smaller country than France. He continued to say that other languages like Flemish and Dutch were threatened, and argued that everywhere, there was no other culture from English and American culture. Toubon, in an interview with the British apart available Financial The Times (Toubon, 1994s), explained his enthusiasm for promoting the newspaper learning of foreign languagesin anti-American terms: `I'm a strong believer in learning foreign languages. What I don't want is a language which would be neither a foreign language nor my own. I want French, English, Russian - but as languages, in the plural. I want the English of Shakespeare,not of Microsoft'. Here we see Toubon's refusal to accept that languages may change over time, through their influence on each other.

His hostility to `the English of

Microsoft' is quite openly anti-American, as it expressesan approval of, and clear preference

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for, what is known, codified and part of a hierarchy or canon; a more traditional English of the UK (if that can be said to exist), not the USA. So again, as discussed earlier in the case of European French to by linking threats the and Tasca, Decaux and politicians of we see the identity; as coming from not only `Europe', but also from America. There is a hierarchy of but USA is Europe the discourse; in threat, identity French a threatsto presented political elites' is still arguably the biggest threat. As a result of the 1995 presidency of the EU, French policy-makers were able to secure discussionsand resolutions on linguistic issues within the EU, at European Council meetings", in in Cannes in formulating the the including playing a crucial role presidency conclusions of June 1995. Amongst these were the Resolution of the European Council on 31 March 1995, languages learning diversity improvement teaching the of the and of quality and of concerning in the EU; the Conclusions of 12 June 1995 of the Council, including the pledge to take account in diversity linguistic the all policies and promotion of multilingualism and of the respecting of information, languages, including European new teaching the consumer of actions, community June 26-27 Conclusions EU; the the of techniques, and external relations of communication linguistic importance highlighted in Cannes, the Council EU of 1995 of the which meeting diversity within the EU (Ministore de la Culture, 1996c).

4.2.4Multilingualism and French universalismas alternativesto uniformity by fulfilled being kind `universal for Yet the policies mission' of multilingualism conceal a for French behind in language The the thinking true French elites policies policy. French, in is being betrayed Europe the aboveall of about promotion as really multilingualism `Une Europe for demonstrated by Chirac This languages. oü claimed: example, who was other le francaisne serait pas une langue forte, vivante, parlee, serait une Europe culturellement be language, is living (A ' Europe French a would and spoken not a strong, where appauvrie. is indicate `appauvri' (Chirac, 1995a). Again, Europe) to a negative used culturally weakened degenerate Europe of as a weak, cultural entity. situation The useof the EU platform for Frenchelites' policy concernsaboutlanguagecontinued beyondthe EU presidencyperiod of 1995. We can seethis if we considerlater developments "`Council of Ministers' refersto meetingsof ministerswith particularareasof competencefrom all of the EU memberstates,and `EuropeanCouncil' to normally twice-yearly`summits'of EU headsof government.

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implications digital identity, in French the of communications regarding on particular the position of the French language on the Internet, since French discussion and policy on language, cultural identity and the new communications technologies also adopted a strong European focus, as I discuss in detail in Chapter Six. Moreover, following the election of JacquesChirac as President and the ensuing government reshuffle, Minister of Culture Philippe Douste-Blazy (Toubon's successor)assertedthat the promotion of multilingualism remained one of the three major themes of his policy for the French language, as mentioned in Chapter Three (Ministere de la Culture, 1996c). These ideas were supported by Herve de Charette, Foreign Affairs Minister, when he declared that: Je voudrais enfin rappeler l'importance qu'il yaa preserver l'image et l'usage de la langue francaise en Europe. Le maintien du francais comme langue privilegiee au sein d'une Union europeennen'est pas une täche si simple. Mais le representantde la France estime pouvoir s'exprimer en francais partout dans les reunions europeennes.(Finally I want to underline the importance of preserving the image and use of the French language in Europe. Maintaining French as a favoured language within the European Union is no simple task. But the French representativejudges he can expresshimself in French in all European meetings) (De Charette, 1997c). Margie Sudre, Secretary of State with responsibility for francophone issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on opening the European Centre for the French Language in Brussels for the training of EU officials, highlighted how French policies for multilingualism had encouraged the EU to carefully consider the issue of the diversity of languages, and stressedhow the future '2 international French language depended its EU (Sudre, 1996c). as an of on status within the

Following the Socialists' victory in the legislative elections of May 1997, the Jospin indicated government a wish to continue such policies of promoting multilingualism and diversity within Europe. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin demonstratedthis, when he cultural `L'Union europeennedont la diversite des langues et des cultures fait en partie la stated: jouer peut un role essentielpour eviter une uniformisation des modes de vie et des richesse, ' (The EuropeanUnion, whose richnessis partly due to its diversity of culturelles. pratiques languagesand cultures- can play an essentialrole in avoiding the uniformisation of lifestyles and cultural practices) (Jospin, 1997c). Here, Jospin's words continue the French elite presentationof the EU as a place of rich and diverse languageand culture, in opposition to "This ideawasalsonotedby Juppefor example(Juppe,1994).

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uniformity from unnamed, cultural others. As we saw earlier, such an idea is significant in the portrayals of French identity in debateson language, and linked to European identity (although what this European identity really is, is not clearly specified). However, French and European identity are described as being at risk from other identities which bring uniformity.

These

identities are not defined here, but as I have indicated above, include the English language and all things 'Anglo-Saxon'

or even 'Anglo-American'.

They also include an artificially

constructed `common European identity', which threatens to impose uniformity in the EU. As is the casehere, sometimes what is not said is as significant as what is. This is becauseit is not always possible for a French politician to openly criticise the EU, the UK or the US for example, since such attacks may have harmful consequencesfor trade and political cooperation. Here, and in many other instances which I will discuss in relation to other issues in Chapters Five and Six, `uniformisation' is a code to describe France's cultural enemies, as they are formed in the contemporary elite perception of French identity. The use of such `codes' allows France's others to be constructed and reconstructed at different times, according to different conditions.

4.2.5Frenchelite resistanceto languageswithin Europe,other than English Yet, as we saw in ChapterThree, the argumentsused by French politicians in favour of the multilingualism and diversity they claim to defend,are in oppositionto the FrenchState'slack of constitutionalrecognition for languagesother than French which are spoken within the country. This lack of recognition is itself an exampleof an assertionof French identity at a Europeanlevel, since the legislation granting the Constitution's exclusive referenceto French was made within the context of the ratification of the Treaty on EuropeanUnion (1992). Furthermore,the refusalto recogniseother languagesdid not appearto be in line with the spirit of pluralismpromotedby the MaastrichtTreaty (Wilcox, 1994,pp.269,276-7, seealso Giordan, 1992). This paradoxicalsituation can be attributedfirstly to the French State'straditional lack of recognition for minorities. This was evidenced by the refusal to sign the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, of the Council of Europe (of 29 June 1992), which included measures for the protection of regional and minority languages and was rejected by France on 24 June 1992, that is, as Wilcox notes (1994, 276), the day p. after the adoption of the

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" had been in favour France French language. Similarly, the a not of constitutional amendment signatory to a Council of Europe resolution in 1981 (24 July) which set out a definition of the term `region' acknowledging the existence of dialects (see also Grau, 1992, p. 106). As Machill is denies in (1997, 495), the existence of thinking a which argues such a policy rooted p. identifiable minorities in France. This view is echoed by Brulard (1997b, p.204), who notes that whilst France may view itself as the defender of diversity, its linguistic policy `reflects a interest identity', its lack in both traditional minority and of national given of narrow notion immigrant languages. This situation persists, despite claims to the contrary by figures like Douste-Blazy, who, when questioned in the Assemblee nationale on the validity of the French Eurovision song contest entry being by Dan Ar Braz, singing in Breton, answered that `les languesregionales font partie integrante du patrimoine national, que c'est un vecteur, essentiel, des cultures et de regions; or la culture des regions, pour l'Europe des cultures, est quelque is d'important' (regional languages integral heritage, this the and are an part of national chose is important feature vector of cultures of and regions; culture after all an regional an essential cultural Europe (Douste-Blazy, 1996p).

The problematic relationship which French political elites have with regional and languages was most recently evidenced(at the time of writing) by the constitutional minority belated for European Charter Regional and Minority Languages, the the adoption over of row by Socialist After following legislative 1997. the the administration of elections proposed France had in but following Charter 1999, May the the refusals, eventually signed constant Chirac President from French Prime Minister Jospin the to refused a month, request allow Constitutionto be modified to take accountof the Charter. This followed the decisionof the Conseil Constitutionnelthat the Charterwas unconstitutional,as it was contrary to Article 2, in (discussed in 1992 ChapterThree),which statedthat `The languageof the Republic is added French' (The Observer,27 June1999). This disagreementis interestingasit suggeststhat some political elites, those in the Jospin Socialist government,could be willing to considerFrench identity in a more flexible way than previously. Jospin commentedon the legislation that he hadproposedin 1998,arguingthat `le respectet la promotion du pluralisme supposentque soit la des contribution reconnue cultures et languesregionalesä notre patrimoine national' (the "The Chartercame into force on 5 November 1992 after the signing of a Convention (see Machill, 1997, pp.495-6for furtherinformation;alsoGifreu, 1996,p. 132).

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respecting and promotion of pluralism requires that we recognise the contribution of regional languagesand cultures to our national heritage) (cited in Liberation, 1 October 1998b). Such ideas were also referred to by Catherine Trautmann, Minister of Culture under the Jospin government (Trautmann, 1998g). These statementssuggestedan acknowledgement of the more hybrid nature of contemporary French identity.

Claude Allegre too, Socialist Education

Minister, was quoted as controversially claiming that France's second official language was in Jospin's Guardian, July 1999). Even English (The 14 a admission more astonishing was now it language', `world Chinese that the to that would probably and world needed a students speech be English in the future. Yet in the same statement, he reverted to a more hostile view of English and ideas about the superiority of French and the need for purity of linguistic identity its lose `Let's by English he Being take and comfort. used all, will get a rough ride added when in in The (quoted English beauty Chinese French their purity' while and will retain original Independent on Sunday, 27 September 1998b). Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Minister of the Interior, a Socialist figure who is well known for his nationalistic Euro-scepticism, even argued that accepting the Charter would lead to the `Balkanisation of France' (The Observer, 27 June 1999). So the debate continues at the time of writing. The issue indicates the fierce reactions, does inspire in It legislation language identity French the polity. connected with can and which indicate a possibility that some political elites are considering a less rigid view of French identity, yet it may also be the case that the French government felt compelled to pursue the in line Charter due flexible, the to to the with other of more modem and need appear adoption European countries. Chirac's refusal to allow the Constitution to be changed could be regarded his his to of wish an example assert presidential authority at a time of unpopularity amongst as the French electorate, and perhaps also as a sign of a wish to cling to aspects of French (greatness) influence, his in He develop francophone to the and and role movement. grandeur do increase in in for his French to this to too, a wish other ways example aim expressed influence in Latin American countries through language education and cultural action (The Economist, 26 June 1999; Chirac, 1996a, 1996e;

De Charette, 1996c; Toubon, 1995m;

Vedrine, 1998c).

The disputesover the value of regional and minority languagesin the FrenchRepublic lead us to question French policy-makers' positioning of themselvesas defendersof may diversity within Europe. Indeed, the debateson languagewithin Europe also indicate how

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French political elites have used the European arena for policy-making and debate to advance traditional views of French identity based on a francophone `universal mission'. I will illustrate this below, as I discuss how French elites have sought new opportunities for the expression of language and culture at a European and international level, as a means of countering perceived threats to the French language and identity. French policy-makers have increasingly advocated language be `solidarity' European during 1990s, the a new of policy since opportunities could found for the expression of its language and culture within the developing European Union. Such policies, as I will demonstrate, were also linked to policies for language in other fields such as francophone policy-making. They became important too in the development of policy for the audiovisual and Internet industries, as the next case studies in this thesis will show, in ChaptersFive and Six.

4.2.6 Opportunities for the French language and identity: linking the EU and francophone

We have alreadyseenhow further Europeanintegration can be perceivedby Frenchpolitical elitesas a threatfor the Frenchlanguage,and thus national identity. However, suchthreatscan be by these politicians to introduce discussions of links between, and new used also francophonie andFrenchidentity. opportunitiesfor, the Frenchlanguage, Toubon for example,aswell as outlining in detail his policies for multilingualism, used his speechto the HCF to broaden his discussion to general concepts of French identity as related to both Europe and the francophone movement.

Toubon spoke on this occasion in

characteristically evasive terms of mysterious figures - `esprits' (spirits) - in both Brussels and France who believed that progress required uniformisation (Toubon, 1994e). Similarly, he argued that `certain' (some people) and `beaucoupde Francais' (many French people), saw the European ideal and the francophone movement as opponents. Such people, Toubon claimed, were often members of successful, wealthy and powerful groups, suggestedby the phrase `aux franges les plus dynamiques de la societe (on the most dynamic fringes of society), and belong to to Europe as a kind of club of rich countries, rather than to the francophone preferred `Dynamiques' community. would normally be considered a positive value, but is countered by the `franges', suggesting an exclusive group who do not care about French identity. criticism of such views was strong, as the following extract indicates:

[

] ils eprouventparfois le besoin de denigrercette cooperationfrancophone, ...

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His

de reclamer 1'abandon de l'Afrique pour mieux montrer leur adhesion a un fondamentalement ils egards, a leur ont parait plus moderne; certains projet qui d'etre le fait devoir de de eire le expier vrais europeens, comme sentiment pour francais et d'avoir une histoire qui leur cree d'autres liens. ([ ... ] they demand that francophone denigrate to to the cooperation, need sometimes show Africa is abandonedin order to show more strongly their belonging to a project to in that think be they to to them really ways, some modem; more which seems be real Europeans, they must atone for the fact of being French and having a history which gives them other links. ) The use of negative verbs like `denigrer', and `expier' - which is used negatively here, for disdain Toubon's for any to sins - clearly shows suggesting the religious need compensate idea of European integration threatening other factors of French identity connected with francophonie. But, Toubon continually argues in this speech that there should be no difficulty in reconciling `Europe' and 'francophonie', since this opposition only exists in the mindset of de `Or leads believe to that uniformisation rien n'est plus contraire au genie those who progress: l'Europe, au genie francais, aux aspirations francophones que cette philosophie! ' (Yet nothing francophone from France, further from Europe be the the and of spirit of removed could la `Parce idea ). Toubon this than this que elsewhere: reiterated philosophy! aspirations, la francaise la langue francophone la de de la ne sont pas exclusives, et politique politique ' doivent etre la la de France francophone exclusives. pas ne et politique europeenne politique (Since the policies for francophonie and the French language are not exclusive, French policy for francophonie and France's European policy need not be exclusive' (Toubon, 1994u).

There is a tradition of EuropeanUnion aid for francophonecountries,especiallyin the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco etc.), for example through the Lome Agreements, and France often acts as a voice for francophone Africa in the EU (Miguet, 1996, d'Europe, 1996i). Indeed, Chaigneau, Sources 1992; 85-9, to my analysis of reference with pp. debates shows how various politicians have sought to emphasise the potential benefits of francophone-European cooperation, beginning with language issues, but widening their for issues Mitterrand to other cultural cooperation. example, at and general political comments the HCF, pointed out how over the previous ten years, both `Europe' and francophonie had been moving towards common goals, through their attachment to the idea of cultural diversity, links between that the francophone movement and Europe should be promoted and argued through encouraging a feeling of belonging to two communities, for example via the European

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francophone television channel, TV5 (Mitterrand, 1994). Much of Mitterrand's speech was concerned with encouraging and rallying his audience at the HCF to undertake francophone action within Europe. He also suggested that spreading the influence of the French language from could only result a general spreading of francophone cultural influence, and through taking account of technological and economic change. So French speakers,Mitterrand argued, needed to ensurethat they were present in forms which could be visible: `sur les lieux et sur les canaux qui permettront aux Europeens d'apprecier la richesse et la diversite de leurs creations' (in the places and on the networks which will allow Europeans to appreciate the richness and diversity of their [francophone] creations). Also speaking at the HCF conference, Alain Lamassoure explained such a vision through arguments that European construction and francophonie could actually work in the interests of each other, as had been the case in the GATT negotiations:

Non seulement la construction europeenne et le renforcement de la Francophonie ne sont pas incompatibles mais ils peuvent titre conjugues dans l'interet de l'une comme de l'autre. Nous 1'avons vu au moment des negociations du GATT, lorsque la France cherchait a faire prevaloir "l'exception culturelle": ce n'est que grace ä l'aide de ses allies europeens que la France a reussi son combat pour le pluralisme culturel, et au-delä, pour une certaine idee de la Francophonie prise au sens large. (Not only are European construction and the strengthening of francophonie not incompatible, but they can be combined in the interests of each other. We saw this at the time of the GATT negotiations, when France sought to encourage `cultural exception': it is only thanks to the help of her European allies that France succeeded in her fight for cultural pluralism, and beyond that, for a certain idea offrancophonie in a broad sense) (Lamassoure, 1994).

Here again, France is described as leading a fight, for Europe and for the francophone Lamassoure's movement. referenceto defending `une certaine idee de la Francophonie'is significant too; as a referenceto one of de Gaulle's most famouslines, of his `certainidea of France',it suggestsan old conceptionof francophonie as an enigma,and somethinggreatand This referenceis present elsewheretoo, for example in an RPR newsletter,which grand. described the government's vision of francophonie as follows: `ä travers la politique francophone,c'est "une certaineWe de la France"dansle monde que le gouvernemententend defendre'(through francophonepolicy, the governmentwishes to promote `a certain idea of France')(RPR, 1994,p. 11). So Lamassoure'sspeechindicateshow a traditional elite vision of

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French identity as based on France's enduring special role in the world, and particularly in the francophonemovement, is linked to French policy within the developing European Union. President Mitterrand too stressedwhy the European project could be an opportunity for francophone identity: `L'Europe est une magnifique occasion de faire valoir la specificite francophone. Si les francophones sont actifs, ils montreront ce qu'ils sont capables de faire pour ameliorer la communication et l'information dans les domaines qui sont les leurs.' (Europe is a magnificent opportunity to demonstrate francophone distinctiveness. If French speakersare proactive, they will show what they are capable of doing to improve communication and information in the areaswhich are theirs) (Mitterrand, 1994). The use of `les leurs' (theirs) here indicates that Mitterrand believes francophones have a right to ownership of aspects of information, and `specificite' is a positive term, which emphasises the communication and francophonie. The phrase `ce qu'ils sont capables de faire' (what the nature of notion special of they are capable of doing) also indicates his belief in the francophone abilities he is trying to encourage. Mitterrand used his speechto emphasisethe future for francophonie within Europe, and to offer some ideas about language policy as a way to general cultural and political links. The following passage, for example, uses imperative forms of the verb to encourage his listeners to reflect, and consider the future, in which French speakers can work together in different linguistic and cultural areas,particularly within Europe:

Imaginez des formes de complementariteentre cooperationsfrancophoneset cooperationseuropeennes. Demandezdes revues scientifiques europeennes plurilingues qui accueilleront des articles de Francophonesnon-europeens. Reclamezdes coproductionstelevisuellesou cinematographiquesassociantles Europeenset leurs freres de langue des autrescontinents;celles-ci ne doivent plus etre exceptionnelles. (Imagine complementaryforms of francophoneand Europeancooperation. Ask for multilingual Europeanscientific journals which will acceptnon-European,francophonearticles. Demand television and film joint productionsbringing together Europeansand their brothers in language from othercontinents;thesethingsmust no longerbe the exception.) 4.2.7Francophonie,'Europe' and a universalmission The rest of Mitterrand's speech(Mitterrand, 1994) from this point consideredhis vision of francophone-European cooperationin areaslike policy for education,universitiesand training, for schooltextbooks,for health, finance and developmentfunds. A partnershipof businesses, he claimed,could be a further meansof putting `des solidariteseuropeenneset francophones'

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(European and francophone solidarity) to work, his choice of `solidarites' adding to the picture he presentedof harmonious cooperation. Mitterrand also proposed a francophone development fund, and then even broadenedthese points to include discussion of development and the spread of democracy:

11n'y aura pas de democratie sans developpement vrai. Si des actions de solidarite ä 1'echelle europeenne existent dans le domaine de la cooperation juridique, il en sera de meme ä 1'echelle francophone. Pourquoi ne pas conjuguer ces actions pour aider nos partenaires du Sud a se doter d'Etats de droit et de structures de vie democratiques dans le respect de leur independance? (There will be no democracy without real development. If actions of solidarity in the European sphere exist in the area of legal cooperation, it will be the same in the francophone sphere. Why not marry these efforts to help our partners in the south to gain systems guaranteeing the rule of law and structures of democracy, whilst respecting their independence?) Here, Mitterrand suggests that France's role within the francophone movement is one of facilitator of change, helping less developed countries in the southern hemisphere to embrace Western values of democracy. Yet the northern or Western concept of democracy is not entirely sharedthroughout the South, not even in some DOM-TOM, where norms of democratic behaviour are not always followed (Ager, 1996b, p. 191). Even though such countries are called `partenaires' (partners) now, the phrase `ä se doter d'Etats de droit [ ]' (to gain systems ... guaranteeingthe rule of law [ ... ]) implies that the countries in question are gaining something `endowing themselves' with a privilege. Mitterrand continued to talk about further or positive, action in a similar vein:

Europeenset Francophonespeuventet doivent agir sur la scenemondiale pour defendredes valeurs communes. Nous avons evoquele theme de l'exception culturelle, celui de la solidarite en faveur du developpementharmonise,celui des droits de l'homme, nous pouvons aussi songer a la defense de l'environnement- au Sommetde Rio, de telles convergencesont ete observees a la bioethique. (Europeansand francophonescan and must act on the world stageto defend our common values. We have invoked the issue of cultural exception,of solidarity for harmoniseddevelopment,for human rights, we can also considerthis for the defenceof the environment- at the Rio Earth Summit, somelinks were observed- in bioethics). Mitterrand doesnot actually say what the `commonvalues' are, nor could he ever, in reality,

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and his reference to `cultural exception' for example is a theme which French policy-makers, initially francophone than ones, rather

pushed on to the international agenda, although

francophones supported the campaign. `Droits de l'homme' (rights of man) too, as noted in is identity, French Republican exported and a set of values earlier, a phrase synonymous with colonial times. So there is an ambiguous relationship revealed here between French political elites and francophone countries, in this discussion of the future for francophone-European cooperation. On one hand, it is the case that francophone countries have spoken out against for for be language, it French example so that and supported and might uniformisation policies they envisagefurther cooperation on many different issues, and with the EU. As Judge reminds 37-8), (1996, for is francophonie French that the pp. a continuing problem us elite vision of France is so powerful, compared with its francophone `partners', which are often countries who have a dependentrelationship with France. Politicians in France still do not acknowledge this, like illustrate. ideas The his Mitterrand's these tone to examples as of speech, and references for francophone projects still suggest a wish to continue to spread French influence on the international stage through the francophone and European arenas for policy and debate, and a wish to continue a leadership role in areas like development and education. This then is indicative of an uncomfortable relationship for French political elites with francophone countries. France cannot easily `abandon' such nations, but the examples of discourse above reveal a tendency towards an attitude which is not clearly detached from a colonialist outlook, and France's own power relationship with its so-called `francophone partners'.

These trends are also evident in the discourseof Toubon (Toubon, 1994e). Like Mitterrand, Toubon emphasisedthe links which France has with both Europe andfrancophonie, which are both `engagementsprofonds' (deep commitments), and give French overseaspolicy `toute son orginalite' (all its originality), a phrase which uses a rather universalist tone to praise the special nature of French policy traditions. Toubon praised the French role in constructing European institutions, and the role of French as the main working language in the EU, together French efforts to secureEU funds for French-speaking Africa. For France, Toubon argued, with building Europe has come naturally, since many of the common ideals of the European idea or in project originated France. Yet equally, he stated, these ideas were applicable to the project of francophonie: `Participer a l'edification d'une communaute francophone vivante, c'est aussi, d'une certaine maniere, rendre hommage aux formes fecondes dans lesquelles s'est traduit ce

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living in dans de ' (Participating building the cinquante pays. of a meme message pros francophone community, is also, in a sense,paying homage to the fruitful forms in which the is is in fifty `feconde' Here, the the almost countries). use of adjective same message sent out significant, suggesting that the `message' or meaning brought by France to both the European if is is francophone it fruitful, fertile Judge projects something positive, as or rich. asks and France's participation in the institutions of francophonie is really about a vision of `a transformed world', or neo-colonialism? (1996, pp.33-4). Toubon's imagery certainly reveals a tendency towards a neo-colonialist tone, portraying France as a leader and bearer of help and new life. Indeed, Toubon's claims to want to reconcile potentially divided loyalties for France between its position in the European Union and within the francophone movement, suggestthat they are rooted in a motivation based on a French identity of a kind of traditional mission, of France as a carrier for universalist cultural ideals.

This is clearly revealed in Toubon's

summing-up of the French policy for multilingualism in Europe as follows: Tels sont brievement resumes, les axes d'une politique, qui s'enrichira du fruit dc vos travaux, et qui tend a reconcilier les messages francais, europeen, francophone qui ne sauraient trop longtemps diverger car ils sont des reflets differents de la meme aspiration a 1'universalite. (These are, briefly, the main points of a policy, which will be enriched by your work, and which aim to reconcile the French, European, and francophone messages, which will no longer diverge as they are different reflections of the same aspiration to universality. )" It was noted above how there is a tradition of French policy-makers seeking to gain aid for francophone countries through the EU, and it is true that there has been a dilemma over which France is most committed to, francophonie, or Europe. These were voiced for example in debates over a proposal to adopt a constitutional reference to the French commitment to the francophone movement (Le Monde, 8 February 1996). In any case, stronger economic links with francophone countries would be problematic as France is a founder member of the EU. Whilst French policy-makers have fought to gain preferential market arrangements for excolonies, and for the DOM-TOM, the primary economic responsibility for France is after all the EU, not francophonie (Ager, 1996b, p. 190). According to Ager (1996b, p. 190), the lack of preferential investment and economic relationships initiated by France for francophone 14Toubonincluded similar ideas in an article he wrote for Le Monde (Toubon, 1995o).

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is francophonie that a `toothless tiger'. countries suggest

This suggestion was echoed by

journalist Stephen Smith's report on the Cotonou summit in 1995, when he estimated that the in francophone budget head, 2F the was comparison with the cost of the only per real value of summit, which was 200 MF Liberation, 2-3 December 1995b). Le Monde journalist JeanPierre Peroncel-Hugoz too noted the `decalage entre le discours et faction de la France' (the he francophone between France) the the the and action as rhetoric of concerning project, gap linguistic from budgets for 800 MF the the and on announcement of cutting reported of overseas despite President Chirac's pledge three months' earlier at the Cotonou summit cultural projects, that these funds would not be reduced

15 Monde, 24-25 March 1996). e

These limitations have not stopped French elites pursuing, in debates in the mid-1990s, a general vision of the French language andfrancophonie advocating a `universal mission'. As be demonstrated in below, language francophone French the section and will policy policy are frequently discussed in terms of francophonie being an identity which is an alternative to the linguistic is and uniformity cultural which spreading around the world.

4.2.8 Beyond Europe -francophonie as universal alternative to global uniformity

This idea of a francophonealternative was developedby Toubon (Toubon, 1995m), who defendedhis 1994law on the use of the French language,arguing that it was an examplefor follow. it international for He to that countries also many said was attracting attention reasons beyondthe problemsfacing the Frenchlanguage: [ ] eile lance le messageuniversel du pluralisme linguistique, eile ose ... montrer la voie du non renoncementet eile annonce,enfin, que la fatalite d'une langueuniquepour le village planetairepeut titre et doit titre evitee. Gracea eile un granddebatest ouvert. Le debatidentitaire. Le seul qui vaille, celui de 1'homme,de son droit a la difference ayant pour corollaire l'obligation de respecterla specificited'autrui? ( it launchesthe universalmessageof linguistic pluralism, it daresto ... show the way of non-renouncement[of languageand identity] and lastly, it demonstrates that the inevitability of a single languagefor the global village can be andmust avoided. Thanksto this [law], a greatdebatehas started. The debateon identity. The only worthwhile debateaboutmankind, of his right to difference,with the "Chirac did later announce a further 42 MF funding for francophone programmes at the Hanoi summit in November 1997 (Chirac, 1997d).

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16 individuality of others). consequenceof the obligation to respect the France language his Toubon to is policy within This passage significant as makes reference implies, he Also `universal beyond France, having goals which go message'. and are part of a in is the language (English) take to a threatening world, over that a sole saw earlier, as we `global village', which is a frequent reference to globalisation of communications, and also to But when he talks about respecting others and their identities as desirable, it is not clear how far he is prepared to take this. Towards the end of his

American-led cultural imperialism.

to large battle between imagery Toubon weak, and the small, strong and of a used speechtoo, identities better for more are together where that the three a world work could phonies suggest identite ] `[ sans vivre sa propre pourra oü chacun et se retrouvera oü chacun respected: ... (where dominant' le fetu de d'etre can everyone vent par paille un emporte comme craindre by like being fear identity live straw of a wisp their own swept along of without rediscover and `Anglo-American' believes Toubon that Do dominant that these the statements mean wind). identities should be respectedas well? If so, they could indicate that he has a vision for a new is this Toubon's that identity Yet the to embrace all cultures. French arguments show rest of to his decision Speaking to the to questions about the respond conference of organise case. not identity which characterise the end of the century, he described why he selected the former lusophonie: francophonie, hispanophonie, colonial powers of ] j'ai lance l'idee dun colloque sur les trois phonies latines qui par leur [ ... dynamisme et leur formidable volonte de continuer ä marquer le monde de leur fortes des a et alternatives constituer yeux, empreinte civilisatrice peuvent, mes langue de la la de ä la du tentation culture unique et modele unique, credibles I languages Latin idea ([ ]I had the three the which on of a conference unique. ... believe, through their dynamism and their great willingness to continue to impress their civilising legacy on the world, can be strong and credible alternatives to the temptation to have a single model, a single culture and a single language).

This extractrefutesany possibility of Toubon's vision of identity acceptingall cultures,as it have language by hostility to to we seento now a which a single and model,culture againrefers identity. Furthermore, for 'Anglo-American' French the conception of political elites' mean have languages to that the to their a civilising choice capacity of was madeaccording admission 16Ona similar note, a Ministry of Culture press conference also suggestedthat some other countries wanted to protect their languagesfrom English (Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, p.26).

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influence on the world is a quite blatantly traditional, and, indeed, colonialist view of languages in identities introduced Later his by Toubon. Toubon acknowledged that the three speech, and languagesin question shareda past of colonisation and domination, but that these languageshad become `des langues d'ouverture et de modernite' (languages of opennessand modernity), and that French had become a means of resistanceand freedom for those colonised. He summarised this complex situation thus: `Comme vous le voyez, la relation entre la domination parfois sous interpreter les formes les brutales langue devons la en plus et est complexe et nous ses consequences avec nuances.' (As you can see, the relationship between language and domination sometimes in its most brutal forms is complex, and we must find a nuanced interpretation of the consequencesof this). Toubon indicated in this sentencethat he was aware of how the use of languages,and the symbolism attached to them, can change, as he noted how francophone countries which were once colonies of France later on embraced the ideals of francophonie, as a potential route to influence and economic links with other countries, as we in saw the previous chapter.

However,Toubon did not take this understandingbeyondfrancophonie, as there is no is in how `imposed' English to the understanding use of which on reference people the so-called global village might ultimately be welcomed by some people, and its use adapted. Toubon failed then, to fully appreciate the hybrid and changing nature of both languages and identities, in discussed Chapter One. He also effectively dismissed the powerful legacy of colonialism as he `Je faits a les du added: pense when sincerement que nous n'avons pas rougir passe qui a, actuels en temoignent eloquemment, seme en realite avec succesles principes fondamentaux de la democratie et des droits de 1'homme.' (I really do not think that we should be ashamedof the past which, as current facts eloquently demonstrate, actually successfully spread the fundamental principles of democracy and the rights of man). So, after all, according to Toubon, it is not worth being too disturbed by the colonial past of disasters like French Algeria, because like France, Spain and Portugal did do some good in spreading values of nations great democracy and human rights. Interestingly, some of these ideas were echoed in a speechby the FN's Bruno Megret (Megret, 1993). Furthermore, Toubon's words suggest a belief in the `white man's burden', or the colonial idea that civilising `dark continents' is a formidable but " The task. vocabulary chosenhere contributes to this positive gloss too, with the choice worthy

"The `white man's burden' is a reference to the famous poem by Rudyard Kipling (1898). See Moore, 1968;

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`fondamentaux'. `semer' The `eloquemment', `succes' too suggests something verb and of bears fruit, is distributed like and seed; something which positive, something scatteredor sown, his discussing `feconde' Toubon's vision of choice when of as we saw earlier with francophonie. The messagein this extract then is that we should not forget that, before France led the battle against linguistic and cultural uniformity, through an alternative francophone backward it democracy `giving' to corners of the world, otherwise uncivilised, was vision, through colonialism. Margie Sudre too, Secretary of State for Francophone Affairs (Sudre, 1995e), dismissed the reality of France's colonialist past, and praised contemporary elite attempts at spreading a language francophonie. for French through and message policies universal

In spite of her

declaration that francophonie was primarily concerned with leading the way in the struggle for le `Oui, Empire, diversity, based she stated: on a nostalgic vision of and not pluralism and francais a su d'une maniere irremplacable, toucher l'universel et servir l'humanite. ' (Yes, French has always known, in an irreplaceable way, how to touch what is universal and how to serve humanity).

She also made reference to `toutes les langues qui ont construit notre

humanite' (all the languageswhich have built our humanity), which, she said, included German, Arabic and Spanish, but she did not mention English.

She even admitted that the French

language, together with history and geography, had made France larger than it was in reality, do heritage be denied. She that this too, could as we saw other politicians not referred and in its influence `certains' (some French to the world as a and people) who regard earlier, hindrance; an antiquated and burdensome legacy, even though without it the world would be irremediable incurable `un (an (Sudre, 1995d). to condemned monolinguisme' monolingualism) Such an assertion, referring to English, through `monolinguisme', implies that French is a gift has saved the world from a curse of uniformity. which

She betrayed French elite aims of

leadership of the francophone movement as clearly part of a `mission' which could benefit the international country's standing: `Oui, la francophone nous eleve au-dessusde nous-memes et met bien en lumiere notre destin exigeant de grand pays moderne, genereux et pacifique. ' (Yes, francophonie raises us above ourselves and clearly illuminates our demanding destiny as a great modem, generousand peaceful country) (Sudre, 1995e). Elsewhere, she argued that promoting defending the French language allowed France to carry values beyond those of the defence and NederveenPieterse, 1992, pp.78-9; Bruckner, 1983.

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is by idea identity defending interests, French French the traditional thus spread which of a of '8 French language (Sudre, 1996a). the With the election of Chirac as President, and the new government under Prime Minister Alain Juppe in place, together with the new ministerial structure making francophonie part of a issues francophone described by Sudre were as more significant, and a ministerial portfolio, specific aspect of foreign policy (Sudre, 1995d, 1995e). The importance of spreading French andfrancophonie as a feature of foreign policy was again highlighted, by Minister for Foreign Affairs Herve de Charette, who described how there was a great demand for France's influence throughout the world, and much to do to extend the `rayonnement' (influence) of the French languageabroad (De Charette, 1995a). The idea of there being a great demand around the world for French andfrancophonie was significant in both the debatesand policy of French elites around this time. Not only was it in have but it discussed to as we seen,as a general alternative uniformity, was especially voiced, connection with particular regions, for example Asia. At the end of a tour of Indo-China, JacquesToubon announcedthat he had never seen a region where the francophone messageof diversity in (cited Le Figaro, 5 April to and was responding so much a real need universality 1994). But this `need' was really a code for a still traditional view of French identity as something to be spread,through language, as Alain Juppe described the Indo-China area, along with central Europe, as `une fenetre d'opportunites' (a window of opportunities' for the 19 French language (Juppe, Asia was encouraged as a priority by 1994). the promotion of President Chirac for francophone action, and as an area for extending French presence and influence, as Herve de Charette described (De Charette, 1995a)2° This policy, as part of the francophonie, did have elements of continuity with earlier proposals, as in 1992, of relaunch Catherine Tasca had pledged further investment for guarding the prestige of French against Anglo-American domination in science, and to encourage `la renaissance du francais en Indochine'

Le Monde, 15 July 1992).

Tasca was struck by the presence of American

publications and leaflets in English as well as the prevalence of English in French hotel chains "See alsoSudre,1995d. 19Seealso Juppe, 1996b. 20Seealso Le Figaro, 17 January 1996; Toubon JO, AN, 18 October 1994, second sitting, pp. 5633,5637 and Ministere de la Culture, 1994g.

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Vietnam in in help Indo-China, to the and of and she said she ready people advertising was and Cambodia to keep a francophone `rempart identitaire' (identity defence or rampart), building an image of an identity `battle', with her use of `rempart', in the face of `l'uniformisation nippoin both But, September 1992). (Japanese-American (Le 10 Monde, uniformity) americaine' Vietnam and Cambodia, younger generations are more and more interested in the Englishin being 1993 French to the as can obliged of aid, world and resent accept conditions speaking (Ager, 1996b, Cambodian French-language 1995 when students protested about education and is found elsewhere too, The Economist, 22 November 1997). Resistance French 165; to also p. such as in Morocco where French has been abandoned in favour of Arabic in official texts (Miguet, 1996, p.74), and the teaching of French is in decline in many African countries, as Stelio Farandjis, secretary general of the HCF, lamented in 1994 (Farandjis, 1994).

The generalpolicy direction concerningfrancophonieand the promotion of Frenchdid in include Jospin did the transition to the though this change a administration,even not not francophonie, for for `Cooperation' the only one perhaps more modem-sounding minister (CharlesJosselin). Hubert Vedrine, Socialist Foreign Affairs Minister, explainedthe overall follows: as approach La presenceculturelle francaiseä l'etranger constitue un axe majeur-de notre diplomatie et l'action meneepar le Ministere des Affaires etrangeresdans ce domaine vise essentiellementla promotion de notre langue, d'une part, la diffusion de notre culture,d'autre part. (The Frenchoverseascultural presenceis a major themeof our diplomacy, and the action undertakenby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this areabasically targetsthe promotion of our language,on onehand,andthe spreadof our culture,on the other) (Vedrine, 1997b). 4.2.9Francophonieand identity after the cold war A further important aspect of the debateson the vision of France leading a francophone alternativeconcernsthe context of a post-cold war world. The end of the cold war in 1989 immediatelyencouragedthe French Socialist governmentof the time to launch cultural action in the former central and easternEurope and to encourageFrench languageteaching. As Thierry de Beauce,then Secretaryof Statefor External Cultural Relationsinsisted,this was an importanttime for Frenchcultural action: `Il est important que la Francesoit lä, tout de suite.' (It is importantthat Franceis there,right away.) (cited in Le Quotidien de Paris,30 July 1990). More recently, the newest member of francophonie is Moldova, where very little French is

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spoken (The Economist, 23 March 1996).

The francophone model was described in

in involving in in debates documents the mid-1990s as existing a and political elites government influence, du American `le dynamisme world order economic and cultural or modele new where americain' (the dynamism of the American model) threatened to step into the breach left by the impose itself de la (Ministore Culture, to the the of communism, and on collapse rest of world 1994i)." Such discourse advanced the argument that francophonie was an attraction for new from interested in Soviet domination the those especially emerging members, and who were francophone movement in order to avoid American influence. Francophonie could offer to these countries, Toubon suggested, `une alternative ä l'uniformisation culturelle et linguistique du monde' (an alternative to the cultural and linguistic uniformity of the world) (Toubon, 1995k)." As we saw earlier, this idea of francophonie as an historically non-aligned cultural force, and as an alternative to uniformity, became very important from 1993 and political francophonie being more active and assertive as a political together the theme with onwards, of in conflict prevention, crises and multilateral cooperation. movement

`Uniformity'

frequently portrayed as being American-inspired or led, but not exclusively.

was

Elsewhere,

Toubon described the enemy as also having been a Soviet one, as he argued that in countries of central and easternEurope, French had been used as a language of freedom, against totalitarian uniformity:

C'etait pour nombre d'hommesun moyen de preserverleur liberte d'esprit, de maintenirleur facultede penserd'une maniereautonomeet une faconparfois de resistera la russificationforcee,laquellene faisait pas mysterede son intention de detruireleurspropresidentitesnationalesafin de les fondre dansle moule de l'hommo [sic] sovieticus'. (For many it was a way of preservingtheir freedom keeping the ability to think in an independentmannerand sometimes of spirit, of a way of resistingenforced`Russification',which madeno secretof its intention to destroyindividual national identities in order to cast them in the mould of `Sovietman' [a pun on homosapiens,or `human']) (Toubon, 1995m). Sucha statementis extremelynegative,as it refersto destroying,to moulding, to enforcement, `moule' uses also which can mean `idiot', besides `mould'. It is also a paradoxical and "This had also been suggested by Jacques Toubon during the debates on his law, as we saw earlier, for example in his contributions to the AN debate (JO, AN, 3 May 1994, second sitting, p. 1360).

'Margie Sudreechoedtheseideasabout a francophone alternativein a post-cold-warworld, 1996b. Seealso Ministerede la Culture, 1994i.

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in its denial the the truth, when compared earlier, with which we saw assertion, regardless of same text, of the reality of French colonisation, as well as the reality of the suppression of different identities within France following the Revolution, which Chapters One and Three outlined. The emphasis in the discourse surrounding the policy theme of francophonie as an in leader, demonstrated in France Toubon the as as an article published alternative was one of in leading he described Le Monde (Toubon, 1995o), France as which again national newspaper the francophone movement in an entire cultural battle for diversity and freedom: France was `la mieux placee pour porter ce message, pour apporter cette reponse aux peuples qui veulent destin independant' (the best placed to carry this message,to bring this responseto assumerun the peoples who want to assume an independent destiny).

This comment about enabling

independent does `assume destiny' however to an not acknowledge criticisms of countries `aid' `cooperation' by State, French the continuing of and which, as Corcoran suggests, policies are not ostensibly different from colonial arguments or doctrines which pledged to be missions They backward-looking, and charity. solidarity still reveal a neo-colonialist, condescending of attitude (1996, p.293, with reference to Girardet, 1972)23

Toubon's article cited the francophonebattle over GATT and the `cultural exception' Mauritius in 199324as the turning point when the francophone the at summit resol}rtion beyond language became He (Legendre, 57). 1996, went and culture p. and political movement dramatically described using the French languageand participating in the francophone also for les `une to as a way countries resist mondialisationqui, non seulementaggrave movement inegalitessur la planete,mais lamine les specificitesculturelleset conduit au «suicideculturel»' (globalisation which not only aggravates the planet's inequalities, but erodes cultural individuality and leadsto "cultural suicide"). He expressedsimilar ideasin the `Alternativesa l'uniformisation' address,wherehe spokeof liberalism's threatof uniformity in a post-coldwar world: L'ironie serait qu'au moment oü les valeurs occidentalesde democratie,de liberte et de pluralisme sont en train de s'imposer sur 1'ensemblede la planete, auxquellesnoussommestres attachees,que cesvaleurspuissenten memetemps 23SeeRaoul Girardet (1972) L'Idee coloniale en France de 1871 ä nos jours, Paris, Hachette, p. 413. `The text statedNovember 1994, but this is a mistake.

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susciter un esprit de conformisme et creer un mode de vie et de pensee uniforme, bref que le `politiquement correcte' [sic] nous entraIne, si nous n'y prenons garde, vers un monde orwellien. (The irony is that at a time when Western values to which we are attached, of democracy, liberty and pluralism are extending around the globe, these values can at the same time encourage a spirit of conformity and create a uniform way of life and thought, in short, what `political correctness' is leading us towards: an Orwellian25 world, if we are not careful) (Toubon, 1995m). This extract reveals Toubon's belief in the superiority of Western cultural and political values, but also his continuing fear of `uniformity', which, as it is linked to the West and to values like so-called `political correctness' -a code for denouncing left-wing action on inequalities - is likely to be connected to processesof Americanisation and globalisation. His words encourage fear through reference to `un monde orwellien' too. He proposed to counter this through the francophone movement as an alternative to `1'uniformisation rampante qui se developpe sous nos yeux' (rampant uniformisation which is growing up before our eyes). This possibility is Toubon is imperialist, francophonie claimed, since not strengthened, and the French language can be a key element in resistance: `C'est-ä-dire le meilleur antidote a l'uniformisation, le de l'independance le et refus de la soumission au plus fort. ' (That is the best antidote to symbole uniformisation, the symbol of independanceand the refusal of submission to the strongest).

Later on, the fears about France'sposition in a new world order becameincreasingly linked to concernsaboutglobalisation,which beganto be mentionedmore clearly, in contrastto earlier referencesto the `global village' which were discussedabove. Josselinfor example, for francophonie in the stakes of globalisation an article written for Le Monde at the time noted francophone Hanoi the summit: of La Francophonieest l'une des dimensionsde la politique exterieurede notre pays. Force est pourtant de constaterqu'elle ne suscite pas dans 1'opinion publique ou la classe politique l'interet qu'y attachent la plupart de nos partenaires.Paradoxeä une epoqueoü sont si presentesla crainte de perdreson identite, la volonte des collectivites comme des individus de rechercherleurs racines,l'inquietude, enfin, que globalisationne rime trop avec uniformisation. (Francophonyis one of the dimensions of our country's foreign policy. Nevertheless,we have to face the fact that in Franceneither the generalpublic nor the political establishmentattachto it the sameimportanceas most of our uA referenceto British novelist GeorgeOrwell, authorof Nineteen-Eighty-Four(1949), a nightmarishvision of totalitariansociety.

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is do. A time there at a when so much evidence of people's partners paradox fear of losing their identity, of the desire of both communities and individuals to finally, their of the concern to prevent globalization too often seek roots and, by English France-Statements translation provided meaning uniformity version) (Josselin, 1997c). In this extract, globalisation, rather than factors like the fear of America, European integration identity, defined is distinctive linked loss to as a uniformity of and and new world order, or a francophonie it for Josselin the concluded that the and values represents. major concern francophone community, with France as leader, would not allow globalisation to condemn the Alain Juppe de (a `un to thought, of or approach). single model modele penseeunique' world too, when Prime Minister, claimed that the French promotion of multilingualism in the EU was identity linguistic diversity because European to and was essential right and essential not only the construction of the Union, but because `la promotion du plurilinguisme, comme le respect de 1'exception culturelle, font partie de notre maniere de nous situer face a la mondialisation' (the promotion of multilingualism, like the respecting of `cultural exception', is part of our way in Chirac facing (Juppe, HCF 1999, 1995d). At to the maintained up globalisation) meeting of that the francophone movement could enable all of its member countries, through working together, to `prendre le train de la mondialisation et du progres' (take the train of globalisation (Chirac, 1999a). since globalisation progress), was an opportunity and

Theseissuesraisedby globalisation,and its use as a blanket term to describethreatsof uniformity threatening the French language and culture, rather than individually-specified factors which we have seen like the spread of English, Americanisation and European integration,becamemore prevalentin political debatestowards the end of the 1990s. During this period,the conceptof globalisationbecamemore andmore debatedin generaland absorbed into the vocabulariesof politics and businessaround the world. In particular, it became importantin debateson the consequences of new technologiesfor Frenchidentity, as debateson languageand culture on the Internet illustrated. I discusssomeof the particular challengesto Frenchlanguageand identity presentedby new technologiesin ChapterSix, in my casestudy Internet. the on 4.3 Conclusions In summary,we have seen that French political elites have, through debatesand resultant

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in language issues, 1990s the on accompanying policies reacted to a number of challenges on the international stageto the French language as the foundation of national identity. The French language, and ultimately, French identity, are perceived as needing defence against the increased status of English, encouraged by the further political and economic integration of Europe, continued Americanisation, and globalisation.

Furthermore, the challenges to the

French language are linked to threats to the notion of francophonie as a culture and community, identity basedon diversity. which representsan

My study of texts has showedhow with theseproblemsin mind, Frenchpolitical elites have sought to identify new opportunities for French policy on language. These are the European Union, and the geographically wider Europe, and international action through the francophone movement. We can see this in the continued references in the texts to issues concerning the need to defend and promote French, European and francophone culture through the promotion of the French language. Whether presented in terms of economic interest or of liberty, defence is, language French the the and cultural exaltation of as we saw in Chapter Three, clearly related to French political elites' own long-standing agenda of concerns over identity, particularly with regard to its fears of the dominance of English-speaking national culture, and US-led cultural imperialism.

This chapter has illustrated the continuation of a

traditional conception of French identity based on such fears, which is described in political debateson languagepolicy from the mid-1990s and the time of the loi Toubon.

Besidesthesefactors,we also saw evidenceof the effectsof the ambiguousrelationship which Frenchpolicy-makershavewith the institutionsof the developingEU. Deep-rootedfears over the possible loss of sovereignty and identity are revealed in the hostility to the encouragementof a so-called `Europeancommon identity' or `common culture', and in the difficulties for French political elites to cooperatewith European legislation on continuing languages. Concepts ideals minority and related to `Europeanunity' have long presented for French policy-making in general. The areaof culture is no exception,and is an problems for site conflict given the FrenchState'straditional close involvementwith culture and obvious identity issues. A further tensionlies in the lack of agreementwithin the EU on what exactly `Europeanculture', `Europeanidentity' may be, and how far it is desirableto develop this. However,asShorenotes(1993,p.783), `socialidentitiescrystallizemost sharplyin situationsof oppositionandconflict particularly when a group feelsitself underthreat', which is certainlythe

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casefor Frenchidentity aspresentedhereby languagepolicy-makers. Having seen that French political elites identify various threats to the French language and identity and seek particular opportunities to address these at a European and global level, how can we explain the paradoxical situation of French policy-makers attempting to use transinstitutions to address what are - whatever various actors may claim supra-national and interests France? international Firstly, the of essentially national cooperation and legislation are in debates issues in for discussed the the this surrounding portrayed case study as opportunities France to protect itself against cultural domination from more powerful sources like the USA. France, Europe and the francophone movement are presented as places where linguistic dominance is (or may be) challenged, through favouring an open identity based on cultural diversity, even though French politicians themselves wish to limit the influence of certain linguistic cultures such as those dubbed `American', `Anglo-American' or `Anglo-Saxon'. This is done when France is described as encouraging the input of and exchange with the languages and cultures of other European and francophone countries, whilst identifying the opposition to in the spread of American-led `uniformisation' a pluralistic vision as such rooted

or

`monoculture'. This uniformity results from a kind of cultural imperialism, perpetuated by economic strength, and threatens even more through its influence in a more integrated Europe. This belief may be seen as part of the ongoing tension of attraction and repulsion which, as we in saw Chapter One, exists between France and the United States and English-speaking mass However, French if frequently the culture. political elites, ever cultural missionaries, speak as they are from the country which dares to speak out most strongly against linguistic and cultural domination, referring at various points to French `universal' traditions and duty to criticise what is referred to as `monolingualism'.

Linked to this strategyas a responseto `uniformisation', there is an undercurrentof referencesto the positions of France, Europe and francophonecountries in a post-cold-war is France often describedas facing a new, uncertainera,asthe internationalpolitical and world. landscape has changedso profoundly since 1989. In this possibly `postmodern' geographical time or condition, old sources of conflict and cooperation may have changed or even disappeared,with inevitable consequencesfor national identity. The end of totalitarianism Soviet Union, then, has given way in the minds of French political elites to an the under intensified cultural domination representedby the English language. This idea was taken up

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in Yet in debates be Chapter Five. GATT demonstrated audiovisual and again on policy, as will besides the discussion of the threats related to the use of English and the diminishing influence of French within the world, it is suggestedthat many new zones may be found for cooperation ideals, based French the traditional through on cultural policies and rayonnement of francophonie Europe as an alternative and within and around the world. multilingualism As French political elites have looked towards international legislation for the development of their language policy agenda, they have made attempts to rally support from from but EU EU, the countries, and other not as which may nations yet within neighbouring identity `European' francophone based on ideals of diversity. or sympathisewith an apparently At the same time, French political elites have interpreted the challenges concerning language policy from America and from European integration as offering new opportunities for the development of French identi `francophone identity' arcÖ

`European culture' and `European identity', like `French' and . cepts which policy-makers are able to manipulate according to

their own ends. The European Union and the francophone movement were adopted by French for for to as a platform cooperation alliance policy-makers and act as a smokescreen continuing State protection and promotion of the French language and identity in the global market-place. Moreover, the EU and the francophone movement could facilitate the promotion of France as a European and international diplomatic actor ready to defend cultural diversity against forces representedby Anglo-Saxon cultural rivals, and also by an over-unified and globalising integrated Europe, itself submerged by Anglo-Saxon rivals in the pursuit of `cultural unity' and deeper integration.

As Machill (1997, pp.495,498-9)

have French claims, policy-makers

`European' language proposed policy initiatives through the promotion of multilingualism in improve legitimacy to the order of French language policy.

Machill also suggests that EU

languagepolicy has been regarded as an answer by French policy-makers to `the increasing use information and communication technologies which render obsolete the classical of new instruments of French media policy' (1997, p. 503). However, Chapter Six will demonstrate that EU language policy is in fact only one of a range of approaches which French political elites have adopted in order to respond to the challenge which new technologies have brought to State language and media policy.

In addition,Frenchpolitical elites speakingwith a louder voice at an internationallevel may alsopresenta new diplomatic opportunity for wider influence, as well as for the relaunch

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international integration. in be This European today's may of relevance construction and of `postmodern' climate, where France feels a declining influence, and an uncertainty regarding its economic and/or political `squeezing' within the evolving EU. This leads French policy-makers to continue the project of the francophone movement as an entity of symbolic, rather than real, power. So, in conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated how French political elites in the 1990s have attempted to challenge the cultural values of linguistic uniformity, perceived as inherent dominance English US-led level, the through their selfof and mass culture, on a within global in leaders in building Europe, the as and of an alternative global vision: a kind of presentation `third way'

(Giddens, 1998) of `non-aligned' countries, demonstrated through efforts

francophone cooperation with nations. However, as this case study revealed, the concerning debates linguistic and policies apparently various concerned with pluralism constitute part of the identity, linked long-standing, French to the conception of universalist crusade,even undynamic another `civilising mission' for the protection and promotion of a French vision of language and identity, both within France and on the wider international stage. This has become subject to self-revaluation as the `French' increasingly confronts the `global', yet political elites have indicated a wish to limit the influence of other languages when it conflicts with their view of French identity, given the hostility voiced in the debatesdiscussed, on European integration, the Anglo-American other and the refusal to accommodate minority languages and cultures.

Indeed,the referencesby Frenchcultural policy-makersin the debatesI have examined in this chapterto the new context of Franceand Europe in a post-cold war, more global era, together with references to the `global village' and the actual use of the term of `mondialisation',suggestthat `globalisation'was becomingan increasinglysignificant concern for Frenchpolitical elites in terms of languageand identity debatesin the 1990s. We might `globalisation' is that now perhaps encapsulating more effectively than suggest `Americanisation'the fearsof Frenchpolitical elites about identity. Doubtlessthere are links, especiallygiven the role of languageand culture in the processof Americanisation,and now in the processof globalisation,as communicationtechnologiescontinueto developat a rapid pace and make certain different languagesand cultures more readily accessiblefor some. Yet, as discussedin ChapterOne, the seductivenature of Americanisationfor France has long been recognised,whilst the notion of globalisationrepresentsfor many not so much a betterworld as

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a threatening one of uncertainty and change, of `shifting jobs and downsizing' (Taylor, 1997, p.20). For French policy-makers, globalisation and the `global village' seem particularly to imperialism imposed by further domination France being the upon spell risk of cultural and market forces, bringing linguistic and cultural uniformity. In this sense, `Americanisation' may have been subsumedwithin fears about globalisation, as the term has become more important in the French economic and political vocabulary. However, as we will see in Chapter Six with regard to the Internet and related new technologies, the increasingly globalised communications market has also revealed itself as an exciting prospect for French language and cultural policy relating to the defence and promotion of French identity.

Before considering these issues

though, the following chapter investigates audiovisual policy debates in France in the 1990s. The case study will show how language policy priorities were often closely linked to those of audiovisual policy.

Furthermore, it will consider how French political elites reacted to

challenges to their conceptions of French identity and the policy-making on the audiovisual industries which resulted from these, and, as in the case of language policy, how new opportunities were sought to meet these challenges, and to maintain an undynamic vision of French identity.

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POLICY AND CHAPTER FIVE: FRENCH NATIONAL IDENTITY, AUDIOVISUAL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE 1990S - THE GATT DEBATE AND BEYOND 5.1 Introduction The previous case study described the French political reaction to the international challenges in the 1990s facing the French language, and policy-making related to these. The responses of French political elites to these issues were shown to be motivated by traditional notions of French national identity. The purpose of the present case study is to explore the effects of a further set of challenges to these constructions of French identity.

These challenges are

for industries, film the to with policy audiovisual and particularly with concerned reference television. The French State has a tradition of involvement in the production, management and in This be State's the audiovisual of culture. may seen regulation of French radio and regulation television broadcasting under both State monopoly and free market conditions throughout the Fifth Republic, via the progression from the post-war dominance of the state-owned RadioTelevisionfrancaise in an era of censorship, to the embracing of privatisation during the 1980s, as described by Kuhn (1995). In addition, television, in particular, since its original harnessing by Charles de Gaulle as `the instrument par excellence for putting across the presidential image and message to the greatest number of the electorate' (S.Hayward, 1989, p. 58), has, as I in Chapter Two, greatly influenced the successesand failures of various politicians. explained This has contributed to the growing `mediatisation' of political life and the ensuing enhancement importance individual in France (Gaffney, 1991a, pp.20,25; S.Hayward, the of personalities of 1989).

Moreover, as I beganto outline in ChapterOne, the French State has regardedFrench identity, French culture as a symbol of audiovisual national and has attemptedto defendthis in the post-warperiodwhen massculturewas developingandbringing with it the influenceof other identities from overseas.The Frenchfilm industry in particular, given the existence culturesand designed to support film production and export, has since the government various agencies of debateson anti-Americanprotectionismof the 1940sand 50s detailedin ChapterOne,beenheld independence the measure of a as or otherwise of France's cultural and national identity (Looseley, 1995, p.27). Since the late 1980s,this area of policy-making has become more debates focusing with on certain areasof policy towards audiovisualculture suchas significant, the protectionand promotion of the French film or television product in what is becoming an

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increasingly global market-place. Furthermore, audiovisual policy is, like language policy, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, an example of a area where these issues became increasingly debatedin an international context in the 1990s. This has been linked to France's alignment with francophone in European `others' to such and countries whilst other opposition various cultural as the USA and other non-European countries, especially Japan (see, for example, Forbes, 1995a, pp.235,260). However, the renegotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 threatenedboth French and European Union policies for protecting audiovisual production, and generatedconsiderable debate in France and throughout Europe, particularly concerning the problematic Franco-American cultural relationship and attitudes towards mass culture. These debateswere significant in terms of identity issues as they synthesised perhaps the strongest antiAmerican reaction on the part of French political elites regarding European television and film industries (therefore including French production). As indicated in Chapters Three and Four, French policy-makers successfully appealed to francophone and European allies to demand a `cultural exception', which would exclude cultural `products' like films from the agreements.

Strengthenedby the alliances made over the GATT issue, French policy-makers continued to promote the ideals they defended in the GATT debates, based on arguments for cultural exception. This happened alongside the development of policies to defend and promote the French language as a factor of national identity, and as a symbol of the ideals of `cultural diversity, and as explored in Chapter Four. Policy-makers adopted similar tactics, exception' in the promotion of their policy for the audiovisual industries. In particular, they arguments, and international level for opportunities at an sought promoting their cultural policy objectives in This to the the European Union arena of policyaudiovisual sector. related was significant making, especially as a result of the French EU presidency of 1995.

This chapterwill illustrate how, throughoutthe 1990s,the vision driving Frenchpolicy for audiovisualindustrieswas one basedon traditional State-centredviews of French identity held by political elites,particularly definedin oppositionto long-standingcultural opponentslike the USA. This was evidentin debatesconcerningboth the GATT issue,and policy and debates elaboratedwithin Europe,as a geographicalareaand as the EuropeanCommunity, later Union. Furthermore,as I demonstratedin the previouschapterwhich examinedlanguagepolicy, French political elites sought to identify new opportunities for the defence and promotion of a

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identity, debates French through and policy on the of national profoundly undynamic view in be by findings industries. These the of my analysis, section claims will supported audiovisual 5.2, of examples of key texts which are part of these debates, supplemented by reference to `satellite texts' and legislation. The selection of the main texts analysed will be discussed in background following French further 5.2.1, to the consideration audiovisual policyof section its identity in issues 1990s. French the the and affecting relationship with national making

5.1.1 Audiovisual industries and the French tradition of regulation France began to use quotas for its film industry from as early as 1928 (Puttnam, 1997, p. 153), film for developed tradition a strong of and subsidy and television protectionism, regulation and from desire in One, has been 1945. This, Chapter to the of the connected as we saw production French State to protect and promote French productions against more powerful producers like the USA, and also to the tensions surrounding the validity of mass culture. In the case of film, the Centre national de la cinematographie or CNC, has existed since 1946 as a public body for funding, Unifrance 1949. Film has French and and cinema abroad since promoted regulation Subsidies available to French film producers include the Fonds de soutien, SOFICA (Societe de financement de l'industrie cinematographique et audiovisuelle) and CNC selective subsidy (Collins, 1999, p.208). Despite this, figures for French cinema in 1993 show that American films made up 57.7 per cent of cinema admissions, French films 34.2 per cent and other EU films 4 per cent. Figures for 1996 showed that French films had only 0.9 per cent of the American Monde, 12 (Le December film 1996). Yet US's French the the penetration of market was market lower than for the EU as a whole, and considerably lower than in the case of the UK. (Collins, 1999, p.205). More recent figures show that in the EU, the USA had 70 per cent overall of the film market in 1996, up from 56 per cent in 1987 (The Economist, 12 September 1998). The French film industry may still be the fourth in the world in terms of the number of films (CNC, it 1994), year per yet was estimated that during the last week of November produced 1998, French films had only a9 per cent share of the cinema market in France, compared to 81 by held American films, by films 10 from other countries (The Independent cent and per per cent on Sunda ,3 January 1999; L'Express, 4 February 1999).

French television is less well supported than film, although public funding is still for the channelsAntenne2, Arte and FR3 (Collins, 1999,p.208). French television significant

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film in French invest 3 turnover their production. themselves per cent of channels must Regarding content, Emanuel (1994, p. 140) notes the long-standing dilemma over the ideal of 1960s, In the television. broadcasting, the confidential of over role and especially public service `cultural' levels done low be the programmes. of of viewing about reports wondered what could From the 1980s, the debate focused on the effects of commercialisation, as the deregulated and imported landscape brought television cheap quality and concerns over poor privatised radio and from USA. the commonly programmes, most

These increased as companies pursued a mass

liberalisation has France Paradoxically, (Collins, 207,209). 1999, allowed massive pp. audience in the domestic television market, in contrast to what it has demanded in the European sphere. In 1994, only 48.6 per cent of programmes on French television were of French origin, with 14.7 US from in from EU, 36 the the non-EU states, of which and elsewhere per cent per cent in 40 32.5 Nearly anglophone per cent of programmes screened originated per cent. provided feature imposes films TV limits French the quotas on on and regulation number of countries. films and viewing times. Also, 60 per cent of films shown must be of European origin, of which 50 per cent must be made in French (Mazdon, 1999, p.75).

Radio too has seen quotas introduced in an attempt to limit foreign influence. The Pelchatamendmentto the loi Carignon of 1 February1994cameinto force in January1996,and devote least 40 French that per at musical must radio stations a and nature of generalist stated language). language (or French between 6.30-22.30 French to their songs regional airtime centof Half of these should be from new artists. This law was aimed particularly at commercial in developed had 1980s the under the period of new networks which stations, especially liberalisation like by Public Socialists. Radio-France the service stations permitted audiovisual half had French to a requirement use songsas over of their generalvariety programming already (Hare, 1997,p.74). Prior to the Pelchat/Carignonlegislation,Jack Lang had consideredthe idea but had this quotas, not been actedupon. Instead,a voluntary systemof quotaswas of radio by CSA individual the and stations,but not always followed (Machill, 1996b,pp.26worked out 8). The 1996 law allowed enforcementthrough fines, even though this was criticised by the EuropeanCommissionas contraryto Europeanlaw on free movementof goodsand services Le Monde, 3 January 1996; Liberation, 19 January 1996). The legislation was presentedby the Frenchgovernmentas being necessaryto guardthe French song againstthe effects of the mass its influence,but radio stationsprotestedthat the quota would potentially to ensure market,and

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lead to uniformity and loss of listenersto satellite and foreign broadcasters(L'Evenementdu 19 February 1996). Le Monde, 'eý 1994a; 10-16 March udi, In Europe, cinematic and televisual creations have often been perceived and portrayed This be like form `products' to than any others. marketed as of expressive art, rather more as a idea has been particularly strong in France, where film has been a way of articulating identity. Puttnam explains: For many of its practitioners, such a view of cinema is intimately tied to their deeply felt psychological, cultural and even political sense to articulate a ability of identity. Whilst recognizing that the best individual films are almost always firmly rooted within the particularities of a specific culture, it is also true that within Europe's film industry there has, on the whole, been a broadly shared vision of the function and purpose of cinema (1997, p. 333). Yet there are arguments to suggest that this `tradition' is in fact an `invented' one. The in be `products' France `art' than of cinematic comparatively creations rather may as conception if for consider, example, the development of the early French cinema at the turn of recent, we this century, led by the highly commercial outlook of the Paris company Pathe-Freres (Abel, 1995; Puttnam, 1997, pp.65-6). The notion of the film as artistic creation arguably developed later, during the 1950s and 1960s alongside the birth of the journal Cahiers du cinema and the development of the auteur school of criticism which began to treat cinema as a serious art form, in the same way as novels and poetry. Indeed, the Nouvelle Vague (New Wave) of the 1950s was more of an aesthetic than an economic success, and did not provide the answer to the Hollywood (Puttnam, 1997, p.254). The `auteur' film-maker was considered of power growing an inspired artist who put his/her personal stamp on the films, and gave the film its meaning. A law passed on 11 March 1957 classified the medium of film as amongst `oeuvres de l'esprit' (spiritual works), and recognised the director and writers as authors, rather than the producer. This was contrary to the situation in the United States, for example, where the idea of industrial copyright allowed the production company to be the `author' of a film, and exercise ultimate its finished over version (Jeancolas, 1997; Puttnam, 1997, pp. 302-3). Thus the admission power hierarchy to the culture of `legitimate' culture may be more recent than we might think, of visual `tradition' to the appeals a and of `artistic creations', rather than to culture as products, can be defensively without real foundation (Shore, 1993, p. 792). This is true in the case of employed debates on audiovisual policy amongst French political elites, as this case study contemporary

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will illustrate.

5.1.2France,audiovisualregulation and the EuropeanCommunity/Union Regulation of the paysage audiovisuel francais (PAF, as it is called, meaning the French has become increasingly interlinked environment) audiovisual with policies developed within the European Community and European Union. French political leaders involved in the building of Europe since 1945 - that is, Europe in terms of the construction of the European Community/Union - have often spoken of the desire to strengthen cultural links between countries and to develop European cultural policies.

These aims were reflected in France's

for the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the `Maastricht' treaty) to include a `Cultural request Dimension' to encourage mutual respect and cooperation in areas of cultural policy through a legal competence, thus laying the basis for future European cultural legislation (Premier Ministre, 1992a; Shore, 1993, p.784). This was achieved in the form of Article 128 of the Trea (CEC, 1992).

Audiovisualpolicy issuesbecameparticularly important in EuropeanCommunitypolicyduring France's 1989 European Council presidency (Drake, 1994, p.48), when President making Mitterrand prioritised the development of a Council of Europe programme known as `Eureka', designed to promote the distribution of European technology in the visual culture which was industries, for example high-definition television (HDTV).

In November of that year, a major

conference of European and EEC culture ministers was organised by France and held in the town `Europe: Continent Culture' (Europe: Culture Continent). French Minister of Blois, called of Culture Jack Lang, in his invitation to this event, explained that French policy goals included building a `cultural Europe': `Le temps est venu de jeter les bases d'une Grande Europe de la Culture. C'est encore un reve. Ce peut titre une realite de demain si les intellectuels, les les responsablesde notre continent sont capables de donner un souffle nouveau a la createurset construction europeenne.' (The time has come to lay the foundations of a great, cultural Europe. It is still a dream. It can be a reality tomorrow if intellectuals, creators and leaders of our breath can new life into European construction) (Lang, 1989c). continent

Around the sametime, the French governmentbeganto give more attentionto external televisionpolicies in general. Alain Decaux, Socialist Junior Minister with Responsibility for FrancophoneAffairs, was given the task by Prime Minister Michel Rocard of coordinating

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television policies beyond France.

Rocard explained to Decaux on his appointment the

de dans devenue le job: `La television monde un vecteur essentiel est significance of this diffusion des langues et des cultures. Or la France [

] reste encore insuffisamment presentesur ...

les petits ecrans du monde. [...] les actions menees le sont en ordre disperse et sans strategie d'ensemble..' (Television has become an essential carrier in the world for the spread of languages and cultures.) France remains insufficiently present on the small screen around the ) (letter lack in disparate [ ] this the coherence.. and respect are policies undertaken world. ... from Rocard to Decaux on 18 March 1989, cited in Decaux, 1989a, and quoted in Le Monde, 21 March 1989; Decaux, 1989b). In July 1989 Decaux announced his intention to create a Conseil de 1audiovisuel exterieur de la France (CAEF - Council for French Overseas Audiovisual Policy), and presented a report on external policy for television on 26 July to the Conseil des for five-year funding 50 M FF television (Cabinet). This plan overseas a pledged extra ministres (Decaux, 1989b; Le Monde, 28 July 1989). It also highlighted the desirability of extending the TV5 satellite channel's coverage, a policy which Decaux and his successor Catherine Tasca ' pursued.

The report's introduction flagged the risk of European television viewers only

France American Japanese television of and others who were sets, and series on watching `ouverts a la culture francaise' (open to French culture) not being able to accessFrench television in for (Decaux, French 1989a, 8). It to the challenges audiovisual policy p. referred programmes the world market as `une bataille' (a battle) and `un combat' (a fight). This metaphor of a battle became increasingly important in the debateson audiovisual policy of the 1990s, as this chapter will discuss.

In the sameyear, the Socialist governmentwas instrumentalin the introduction of the `Televisionwithout Frontiers' initiative, a EuropeanCommunity project resulting in a directive in into in October force legal 1989 1991. This the which came envisaged removal all of adopted barriers to the transmissionof televisionprogrammesacrossthe memberstates,so technical and that no state could block broadcastsby cable or satellite originating in another state. The directive also establishedquotas stipulating the prioritising of the broadcastof `a majority' of Europeanprogrammes(article 4), and of 10 per cent of eachbroadcaster'sairtime to be reserved for independentEuropeanproductions (article 5) (CSA, 1994, p. 10). France had originally 'Tascatook over in May 1991asJuniorMinister for FrancophoneAffairs at the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, for had responsibility overseasradio andtelevisionpolicy. and

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directive include Frontiers Television the to without wanted a mandatory quota system as a means of defence against American programmes (Looseley, 1994, p. 126; Le Monde, 5 April 1989), but the article dealing with quotas eventually adopted, Article 4, was not a legally enforceablequota, but a political aspiration, to be attained where practicable (Schleslinger, 1994, Communists in face The French Socialist being 39). the too the criticised p. government of weak American in threat, the to pressures from other countries' opinions voiced cultural and giving of European Parliament, where the qualified majority voting system could defeat them the within 'Humanite, 4 October 1989; Marest, 1991). Nevertheless, the legislation was still arguably aimed at limiting American broadcastsin in order to protect European identities from Americanisation, and attracted US particular, opposition, on account of the directive's potential conflict with international trade agreements GATT (Le Monde, 8 September 1989,5 October 1989b). Indeed, although Article 4 the as such was not ultimately a strict means of enforcing quotas, Carla Hills, the US President's special trade envoy, denouncedthe adoption of the Television without Frontiers directive as protectionist discriminatory, it fight US that the through the GATT system (Le Monde, and warned and would 12 October 1989b). Schleslinger (1994, pp.30-3) notes how there were cultural reasons for the direction of the legislation, as `the role of audiovisual media in constructing a anti-American European identity had been officially defined by counterposition to a culturally invasive other, namely the United States'. At the same time there were industrial reasons, as the Television without Frontiers project aimed to open up the market in order to create more opportunities for European audiovisual production in a global market. The goal of a European audiovisual space is also related to creating a European market, which can encourage the production of hardware and software, and thus confront the Japanese technological challenge. This issue has been developed by French political elites in debateson new media technologies, as will be particularly demonstratedin Chapter Six. Furthermore, obtaining agreement on the principle of quotas in the Television without Frontiers directive, even if they were not strictly enforceable, was crucial to French political elites' own domestic policy objectives. Edith Cresson, Minister for European Affairs at the time, admitted that if the article on quotas had not been adopted at all, France could have been challenged in the European Court of Justice over the legality of its own quota policies in already existence, which could have been construed as contrary to free trade (Cresson, 1989a, 1989b).

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Throughoutthe 1990s,French policy-makers tried to reinforce the strategybehind the Eureka and Television without Frontiers projects through supporting further EU legislation, including the development of funds for film and television production within the EU and an increasingly vociferous insistence on the maintenance of quotas for European-generatedmaterial (Le Figaro, 1 November 1994; The Guardian, 4 April 1995; Forbes, 1995a, p.260). They for in to argue stronger quotas continued a new Television without Frontiers directive, given that Article 4 of the original text was not strictly enforceable. Furthermore, the French were dismayed that some countries having a more liberal economic climate and less concern about the importance of the European export market, such as the UK, interpreted the quotas liberally, and even allowed American Ted Turner's cartoon channel to broadcast from their soil (Collins, 1999, pp.201-2; Les Echos, 2 November 1993). This issue is returned to in section 5.2.2 below.

Echoing their domesticpolicies of continuing subsidy2,French policy-makersbecame heavily involved with establishingand sponsoringthe EU programmesMEDIA I (1991-95)and MEDIA II (1996-2000),which were set up to provide subsidiesand support for Europeanfilm and televisionproduction,and which were anotherresponseto the EU's increasingaudiovisual tradedeficit with the United States? A more controversialissueconcernedEuropeanpolicy on satellite television transmissionstandards,and was aimed at protecting and supporting the Europeantelevisionhardwareindustry. Frenchpolicy-makersaimedto securea single technical for (D2 MAC) high definition (HDTV), but failed to securea European television standard Commissiondirective on this in 1993. This proposal too was motivated by fear of foreign domination in audiovisual industries. The French European Commission PresidentJacques Delors hadjustified the HDTV project in 1989in terms of it being neededfor competitiveness defence of the EuropeanCommunity againstboth Japanesetechnology and the and cultural

'See,for example,PremierMinistre, 1994g. 3TheEU's audiovisual deficit with the USA has increased consistently since the mid-1980s and was estimated at 3500M Ecu in 1992 (7 billion FF, or $3.5 billion - see Sources d'Europe, 1996e; Le Monde, 16 February 1995). By 1994 this had increased to $3.72 billion Le Monde, 16 February 1995), and between 1995-96 the deficit grew from $4.8 billion to $5.65 billion (The Economist, 12 September 1998). This is set to continue with the development of new television channels. However this deficit has not been equally felt by all EU member states. The UK's deficit in the 1990s in film and television programmes has been more than balanced by net receipts from other film and television services, and the USA is, unlike France for example, a considerable audiovisual export market for the UK, with several English-language films doing well. For France, Europe is a major export market (Collins, 1999, p.205).

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' (Grant, 156). 1994, American programming monopoly p.

This campaign failed due to a

Commission between the the disagreement and of procrastination member states, of combination Six. in Chapter further is issue discussed This digital American television. the rapid progressof

5.2 France, the GATT debate and European audiovisual policy-making in the 1990s The controversy over protective legislation like Television without Frontiers continued to inform French and European Union debate on audiovisual policy and national identity as the 1990s progressed. This was most clearly seen in the GATT issue, where the United States' ideas European different French fundamentally about to and quotas clashed with opposition legislation its impact debate, GATT The identity trade on subsequent and policy. and culture, French identity discussions the political elites, amongst sector and audiovisual on national and key I the these through study of several are the subjects of the rest of this chapter. examine In in 5.2.3. is below debates, section whose selection explained contributions to the political it is however, to texts these the necessary to of context significance and order appreciate GATT in detail talks the the and audiovisual policy-making surrounding events more consider in December 1993. These GATT following in Europe are explained the actual agreement of the following two sections.

5.2.1 Cultural exceptionand the GATT debate In 194823 countriescut tariffs on eachothers' exportsunder the GeneralAgreementon Tariffs barriers border first GATT, to Trade, the since multilateral agreement reduce or which was and Napoleonictimes. Since then, there have been eight `rounds' of global trade talks, involving bring liberalisation. The designed to most recent,and most ambitious more more countriesand in included Uruguay 1986-93, Round trade the on services, new rules which of round was intellectual property rights like patents and computer software. This round also led to the in WTO, 1995, Organisation, World Trade to the act as organisation or as an of establishment information in disputes. Further telecommunications, technology trade on agreements arbitrator in had 30 followed in financial 1998 WTO 132 1997, the with over services and members, and join (Allen, 16 May 1998). The 1992; Economist, to waiting countries 'Similarly, Delors argued that the Commission was justified in intervening in audiovisual production, and culture its because of economic importance (Venturelli, 1997, p.9 1). generally,

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Allen explains that by the time the Uruguay Round took place, the GATT system as a into being free liberal trade question: called was means of preserving The Round came at a time when the GATT system had been repeatedly by blocs the development by trading both and the of regional challenged (NTBs), barriers trade to tariff unilateral restrictive proliferation of non (VERs) and unilateral retaliatory measures such as voluntary export restraints 50). (1992, p. measuressuch as anti-dumping-duties The US and EC in particular had developed their own methods of dealing with export subsidies been had industrial Furthermore, already tariffs dumping. goods and quotas on whilst and lack fair free the trade, in began US to or and worry about particular multilaterally reduced, the investment intellectual like field, in and level rights, property services, areas new playing of a be US to The by GATTS these been the had wanted covered previously not which agriculture, be 1980s in that there of by round a new the should the early and suggested agreement covered GATT negotiations. This resulted in the Uruguay Round, so called because of the decision to in 1982 November del Uruguay in Este, Punte GATT it being hold taken at a ministerial meeting

(Allen, pp.50-1). The opinion held in Franceandother Europeancountriesthat film andtelevision are art forms, not products,fuelled much of the conflict betweenFrench and American political elites, French The GATT film a the side advocated television negotiations. over professionals, and and is, that for `cultural that `cultural product', any exception' policy of une exceptionculturelle or Without from GATT be the such a clause,existing agreements. must exempted suchproducts jeopardised. Meanwhile, be the Frontiers Television would without protectivepolicies such as United Statesnegotiators argued against the continuation of quota restrictions, which they GATT far As back free the trade. the as original post-war notion of regardedas contrary to European United States between film had been disputed the and many sector a agreements, 5The issue of agriculture caused more disagreement between France and the USA, as seen in French hostility to the Blair House pre-agreement of November 1992 on agriculture and oil seeds trade. This provoked EC de in Gaulle's dispute invoke France `Luxembourg the the over that with threats would compromise', as harmful its in 1966, it its EC to to vital national and use refuse any policy which considered voting veto majority interests (see Woolcock and Hodges, 1996, pp. 317-9). The French principles involved in the Agriculture and Audiovisual policy debates were linked though, as issues on which French political elites did not want to Alain Juppe, demonstrated he declared Foreign Minister, then that the rapeseed quotas as when compromise, between ther USA and the European Community were of `capital importance to France for economic, political and (The Week Europe, in 8 April 1993, 1, Collins, in 1994, p. 100). cited reasons' p. cultural

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Uruguay In the been had to Individual allowed retain quotas. eventually countries countries. that European both US new higher, the recognised countries Round, the stakes were and as (VOD) like and on-line video-on-demand technologies would soon make multimedia services for huge hence audiovisual products market new opening a television and radio servicespossible, (Puttnam, 1997, pp.339-40). industry, French for the French policy-makers' economic reasons cinematic supporting the import-export that has of with relationship a rather unbalanced which, as we saw above, USA, were clearly evident. Nevertheless, French anxieties concerning the cultural aspectsof the Francoin the firmly be the traditional of ambivalence GATT proposals seemedto more rooted CIA American by helped the that Relations American cultural relationship. revelations were not in bribe French in involved been had to Agency) trying order to Intelligence officials (Central in Chapter As 3-4). (Puttnam, 1997, GATT information noted the pp. negotiations about obtain is debates, Americanisation language in illustrated Chapter Four the case of One, and as policy it in by French an held with as synonymous who regard elites, political suspicion often 1996, (Morley, have both positive and negative effects encroaching modernisation which can between 6 long-standing lay battle the behind So struggle the more obvious commercial p.328). 9). (Gaillard, 1994, for States United p. France and the economic, political and cultural power The producer of the successful French film Les Visiteurs, Alain Terzian, summarised the interets `les GATT from States' United the and culture as one where stance on situation arising issues factors to jeu', linking la de France related wider with economic sont en clearly vitaux Economiste, 1993b). September 3 identity (Le Nouvel national

Frenchpolitical elites, and cinema and television professionals,campaignedvigorously for cultural `products' like films to be exemptedfrom the GATT agreement,through `cultural had Community, European the do had They through the to this given which exception'. ' in the Uruguay Round negotiations. EuropeanCommissionthe task of acting as its voice Within the EuropeanCommunity, French policy-makersdid not find automatic agreementon their proposalsfor `exception'. Trade CommissionerLeon Brittan of the UK had favouredonly `culturalspecificity', which was not as strongas `exception',and the EuropeanParliamentvoted 'SeealsoForest,1993,p. 115;Kelly, 1995,p.3. 'Although the Commissiondid not have exclusive competence,as the Council of Ministers would have to deal (Woolcock Hodges, 1996, 302,305). the and pp. approve

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for a resolution in favour of this on 14-15 July 1993. The French government reacted to this, through lobbying of other European countries and the Commission, led by the protests of Alain Carignon, Minister of Communication. Eventually on 30 September, the European Parliament Community in favour `exception', to the the the of stronger and wish of adopted a resolution identity September Le 16 July 1993,17 July 1993,17 defend Monde, cultural preserve and 1993; Le Film francais, 23 July 1993; La Tribune des fossees, 1 October 1993). Then at the start distinguished European October, that cinema and television ministers agreed on several points of from other goods and services Liberation, 7 October 1993). The French campaign gained further support after appeals to the francophone movement, when the francophone summit at Port-Louis, Mauritius, unanimously adopted a resolution in favour of `cultural exception' on 17 October Liberation, 18 October 1993). Finally, on 14 December 1993, the Uruguay Round industries being, be left for time the audiovisual as agreement could not reached out agreement (Godchau, 1995, pp. 162-3; Le Monde, 16 December 1993a). The European Community, and issue for future but French, the the this, was actually postponed rejoiced over especially discussion, and a full and permanent `cultural exception' was not secured in any written by GATS (General for Trade The Agreement the audiovisual sector was still covered agreement. in Services), where it had no special status. The Europeans however did not commit themselves to American demands for liberalisation measures, and retained subsidies, levies and quotas (Puttnam, 1997, p.343). Puttnam argues that the Americans' acceptanceof this was largely due to the fact that the Clinton administration, despite a strong Hollywood lobby against the Frenchled demands, could not allow the entire GATT agreement to falter over the issue of film and television, given the risk of producing an international trade war (1997, p. 342).

The impact of the strong political, and also professional,reaction to the United States' include `cultural in to products' the new GATT agreementcontinued to inform debate wish French for battle industries in the free the political elites' ongoing protectionof such surrounding battle has This become increasingly interlinked issues with market. relating to Europeanand francophonepartnerindustries. Sucha relationshiphas arguablyhelpedFrench cultural policymakersto utilise their Europeanlinks to their own advantage,as the successfulcampaignover GATT encouragedthem to seek support in the rest of Europe and amongstthe francophone for defending their cause of movement audiovisual industries against the apparentcultural imperialismemanatinglargely from the USA.

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5.2.2 The French battle for audiovisual regulation in Europe since the Uruguay Round Encouraged by the support they were able to gain during the GATT debates for their in favour French EU French the of exception culturelle, policy-makers used arguments une presidency of 1995 as an opportunity to push its cultural policy objectives onto the European its in la diversite (affirming `affirmer For to wish cultural example, culturelle' agenda. diversity), the French government announced what it called `une politique audiovisuelle (an (Premier 1995 the the ambitious audiovisual policy) start ambitieuse' at of presidency Ministre, 1995a). This, as we saw in Chapter Four, was in addition to policies for safeguarding French and European linguistic pluralism in the face of the threat posed by English. Audiovisual policy was particularly important under the 1995 French EU presidency. A central aim was French influence on the revision of the Television without Frontiers

directive,which beganin 1994andwas concludedin 1997(Les Echos, 12 December1994). However, this legislation proved controversial as there was much division amongst the France for industries, the states. example wanted stricter regulation of audiovisual member like the UK, Denmark,Swedenand Germanypreferredmore liberalisation, whilst countries feared limit that they more rules would choice, and restrict competition. Frenchpolitical as elitesclaimedthat they had stuck to their pledgeto be defendersof cultural diversity in order to justify their demands. In an attempt to work towards a consensus,Commissioner Marcelino Oreja of Spain set out a proposal for discussionin March 1995. This proposal suggestedthat the ambiguitiessurroundingthe 1989directive's article 4 guideline of quotas `where practicable' should be removed. The French had argued for the closing of the loophole inherent in the phrase `where practicable' that had previously enabledAmerican films, comedyand soapoperasto increasetheir market share,and given lawyers a field day in interpretingthe vagueguidelines(The Guardian,28 March 1995). The Orejaproposalsaid that generaltelevision channels' schedulesshould include at least 50 per cent EU origin Thematic channelssuch as film, documentary,cartoons,music could choose programmes. if this to respect quota they invested25 per cent of their programmebudgetin European not have three years to achievethis level. The French governmenthad and would production, be to quotas strengthened, wanted and a clauseto allow televisionto be subjectto the rules of the receiving,not broadcastingcountry, to enablechannelslike Ted Turner's much criticised

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TNT, broadcasting from the UK, but American-owned, to be subject to European restrictions. Oreja also suggestedthat European audiovisual competitiveness should be strengthened in the EU market by promoting European programmes, and stopping quotas after ten years. Furthermore, the audiovisual sector's profitability could be increased through adapting to liberalisation through the technological of telerealities, especially commercial and new increased for Oreja Finally, the advertising and sponsorship. rules proposed shopping and protection of children through effective application of rules on violent and pornographic include interactive Commission's did However, the multimedia not new proposal material. had like VOD, French the which policy-makers wanted. Oreja and Industry and services, Bangemann agreed that imposing heavy

Telecommunications Commissioner Martin

industry in its kill European the on multimedia services would effectively off regulations infancy (Franceschini, 1997, p. 143; Le Figaro, 12 January 1994; The Guardian, 28 March 1995,4 April 1995; Sourcesd'Europe, 1996e).

The French mobilised support in the European Parliament for their arguments, by Socialist focused but Debates MEPs. the aided group of not only on culture, particularly if implications for jobs in industry, European productions were not the the audiovisual on (The Wall Street Journal, 15 February 1995; Le Monde, 16 February protected adequately 1996; Le Figaro, 6 February 1995). Meanwhile, Hollywood lobbyists campaigned against these arguments and urged the European Commission to abolish quotas (The Independent, 2 February 1995). France became increasingly isolated within the Union, most other member being further in legislation like largely tightening against of existing quotas, although states favour of more supportive measuressuch as investment and telecommunications levies (The Guardian, 28 March 1995,4 April 1995; The Independent, 15 February 1995; Liberation, 23 March 1995; Le Monde, 16 February 1995). Around the same time however, the MEDIA II programme was also under discussion, and Germany, the UK and the Netherlands were against Commission proposals to double EU subsidies under this scheme (The Guardian, 4 April 1995). Germany even threatened to link its support for the whole MEDIA II initiative to its wish to liberalise quota rules Le Figaro, 22 June 1995a).

Eventually, French

began to recognise that they risked the complete dismantlement of the European negotiators if isolation their system continued (Le Figaro, 6 February 1996; Liberation, 21 quotas November 1995; Le Monde, 10 February 1995,11 April 1995).

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The revised directive, the text of which was agreedby the EuropeanParliament's Conciliation Committee and the Council of Ministers

on 16 April

1997, was a

disappointment for French policy objectives. The new directive re-confirmed the provisions of the 1989 directive on European works in article 4, and only maintained quotas for a further five years. New digital media services were still not included, and plans for a guaranteefund to encourageEuropean co-productions were shelved (CEC, 1997; Franceschini, 1997, p. 144; Le Monde, 13 June 1997).

Yet Frenchpolitical elites did not give up the fight to exert more control over new communications technologies, and indeed to harnessthem in order to disseminate undynamic conceptions of French national identity, as Chapter Six will discuss.

Before this, the

following sectionswill demonstratehow such views of identity were prevalent in the political debateson audiovisual policy surrounding the GATT issue, and following this, France's EU illustrated These through analysis of the texts introduced below. are presidency.

5.2.3 Contextualisationof the textschosenfor detailedanalysis I chosethe texts for examinationaccordingto criteria that include the setting and timing of the event,which could have influencedits possibleexposureand/orreporting, and the status of the producerof the text. A further factor, which I took into accountthroughoutall of the casestudy chapters,was the opportunity to include different political figures throughoutas relevantto different cases. The backgroundto the texts is presentedbelow, togetherwith a discussionof their interestfor my analysis. As I will demonstrate,they are all importanttexts in their own right, becauseof their developmentof key themeswhich enableus to traceelite identity French concerning audiovisual policy, and which illustrate points views of hypothesis that suchperceptionsareundynamic. my supporting A text by JacquesToubon discussingthe GATT issue,was written in his role asRPR Minister of Culture, in an addresson 30 October to the `Rencontrescinematographiques' (Film Forum), organisedby the ARP (AssociationAuteurs, realisateurs,producteurs, or Association of Writers, Directors and Producers) in Beaune from 28-30 October 1993 (Toubon, 1993cc).8 Subjectsdiscussedat this event were the implications of the GATT 8A similar eventwasthe `Assembleedes realisateurs'in Venice on 6 September1993,at which Toubonalso madea speech(Toubon,1993n).

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Frontiers improving Television for film the television, without ways of and negotiations directive, accessof young people to film culture, authors' rights and commercialisation of European films in Central and Eastern Europe.

More than 100 film-makers from 24

European countries attended, plus members of the film and television industries, and (ARP, 1994). The institutions European French and audiovisual authorities representativesof American GATT negotiators had been invited to explain their views, but refused (Le Monde, 2 November 1993a).

Although such events are immediately aimed at a specialist audience composed Jacques industries, in involved the the those of participation cinema/television primarily of Toubon, as French Minister for Culture, was naturally open to close scrutiny and reporting by GATT impending Uruguay Round the international the the of the context of media, given talks and French political elites' concerns surrounding cultural issues in the agreements. Le Monde for example reported on Toubon's speech, with significant quotations (Le Monde, 2 November 1993a; see also Les Echos, 2 November 1993). Such events represented a good for his Toubon to opinions on the talks and to secure the support of creative offer opportunity industries in other countries.

A text by PresidentFrancoisMitterrand representsone of the few major presidential doctorate honorary GATT issue, his during the at on acceptance of an made pronouncements GdanskUniversity on 21 September1993 (Mitterrand, 1993b). Mitterrand did not become involved with the other aspectsof GATT, such as agriculture, and only spoke about the `culturalexception'issueafter he was approachedby audiovisualprofessionalsand met them Le September September 1993b; 7 (Le 1993b, 16 December Monde, 23 Elysee the on at Figaro, 8 September1993; Les Echos, 8 September1993). The lack of contributions by Mitterrand may have been due to the President'swish to appearabovethe generalpolitical issues his key the to to negotiations,choosing confine which contributions wrangling of directly concernFrenchnational identity such as culture, rather than more generaleconomic GATT. destined by The to the media, surrounding speech attract was coverage arguments in due hence included France factors. These to wide attention and abroad, several and Mitterrand's statusas Presidentof the Republic, his position at the head of the francophone in movement the midst of the political debate surrounding the `cultural exception', and interest in both integration European and culture, noted in the previous chapter. personal

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Furthermore, Mitterrand's speech was the first time the President was to launch himself into for demanded `cultural French the and professional crusade a clearly political explicitly intention issue hinted having the to at an comment on previously only exception', Liberation, 22 September 1993). Following this, he spoke about the GATT issue during his speechon 16 October 1993 to the francophone summit in Mauritius (Mitterrand, 1993e). The important it for Gdansk GATT French time the was at an as was at made campaign, speech day Culture Commissioner Minister Jacques Toubon European that the same of met on made Leon Brittan and EC GATT negotiator Christiane Scrivener in Brussels, to argue the French `specificity' (Liberation, for `cultural 22 September 1993). Meanwhile, exception', not case Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had just announced on 20 September during a television interview on TFI, that he would go to any lengths to get the idea of exception culturelle acceptedby the rest of France's European partners (Le Monde, 23 September 1993b).

Interestingly,the location of the speechis in a city symbolising a history of conflict background totalitarianism, against a which Mitterrand perhapsthought would and struggle supporthis argumentsagainstAmerican cultural hegemony,although press reports at the time suggestedthat the Polesthemselveswere not expectingsuch a forceful statementon a (Liberation, French September how 22 1993). Le Monde Lech concern noted particularly Walesa,the PolishPresident,spoketo studentsfollowing Mitterrand's speechand arguedthat his own primary concernwas not cultural imperialism from the USA, so much as economic hegemonyfrom the EuropeanCommunity. He arguedthat Polandshouldbe treatedas a true EC partnerand that the EuropeanCommunity should not use double standardsin its trade Poland (Le Monde, 23 September 1993a). with relations My analysisconsiderstwo further texts,by FrancoisMitterrand, which were speeches during France's EU 1995. January-June This period was, as I explained presidency of made in section 5.2.2, significant for French elite debateson audiovisual policy and French identity. This was due to France'sprioritising of cultural policy and argumentsfor European diversity and multilingualism, and the fact that the controversialrevision of the Television directive Frontiers in was progress. without The first text selected is Mitterrand's speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourgto presentthe programme for the French Presidencyof the EU, made on 17 January 1995 (Mitterrand, 1995a). This was an important occasion, not least given

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Mitterrand's interest in European integration and cultural issues. Mitterrand linked both of these interests in his speech, and explained how the priorities of the French EU presidency included culture and language issues, especially multilingualism, as discussed in Chapter Four (see reports for example in Le Figaro, 18 January 1995). Mitterrand also fulfilled expectations that he would speak about France's wish to save the quotas system in the pending Television without Frontiers revision, in the face of the hostility of some other member statesto French demands. Three weeks earlier, France had launched its campaign to do this. JacquesToubon had just met to discuss quotas with European film distributers at Avoriaz on 15 January and planned a meeting of EU Ministers of Culture in Bordeaux the following month to discuss the problem before the Council of Ministers were due to meet in April (Le Figaro, 17 January 1995).

The secondtext is Mitterrand's speechto a conferencecalled `Colloque sur l'avenir du cinema: Le cinema vers son deuxieme siecle' (Conferenceon the future of cinema: Towardsthe secondcentury),held in Parison 20-21 March 1995,organisedby the Ministry of Cultureandthe associationPremier Siecledu Cinema(First century of cinema).9 As part of this event,Mitterrand made his speechon the evening of 21 March when he hosted a Elysee. The conferencebrought togetherpoliticians and film-makers from the at reception Franceand abroad. SeveralAmericanshad declinedthe invitation to attend Le Monde, 24 March 1995;La Documentationfrancaise,1996). Mitterrand's speechcoveredthe position in the arts society in generalterms, and paid particular attentionto the determinationof of Franceto lead its Europeanpartnersin defending the Europeanfilm industry in a global market. 5.2.4Frenchand Europeanidentity: opennessthreatenedbyfree trade All of the texts emphasisethe idea that Franceand `Europe' are under threat in someway. Franceis presentedasdefinitely part of Europe,althoughwhat exactly constitutes`Europe'is it times clear; at always not refers to the EU, at othersto a wider, geographicaland cultural Europe Both sense. andFranceare suggestedto be underthreat from certaincultural `others' who are profiting unfairly from the movement towards free trade; America particularly, technologyarementionedtoo. The needfor the defenceof althoughthreatssuchasJapanese 'JacquesToubonmadethe closingspeechat this event,on 21 March (Toubon, 1995n).

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French and European cultural identity is emphasised, together with the implication that it is France, which is leading the European fight for 1'exception culturelle in the GATT negotiations and beyond.

Furthermore, a threat is identified in the form of European

complacency about trade regulations and protection of the European audiovisual industry. The way in which these arguments are presented is significant, as it demonstrateshow French followed traditional views of French identity based on old, familiar enemies, a elites political desire for leadership and a refusal of hybridity. For example, in justifying the French government's position regarding the GATT agreements,Toubon argued (Toubon, 1993cc) that the issue concerning the French ideal of 1'exceptionculturelle `ne se limite pas ä 1'identite, il est pour l'universalite' (is not only about identity, it concerns universality). `L'universalite', as we saw in Chapter Four, is a loaded in the mouth of a French politician, suggesting links with the French Revolution and word Jacobin, universalist conceptions of civilisation, which are worthy of distribution around the world.

Indeed, Toubon suggested that other countries' cultural identities were equally at

stake. To critics of the government's stance, he argued that French policy was based on opennessto other cultures and ideas rather than a closed, defensive attitude, of which it may be accused:`notre combat n'est pas pour la fermeture, il est pour l'ouverture' (our struggle is being it is closed about off, about openness). Using the imagery of light, France, Toubon not argued, only wanted to prevent the European cinema market from becoming the victim of an over-powerful monopoly. Rather than just protecting and shutting itself off from the world, France would prefer, he stated, to `[ ] maintenir ouverte la fenetre qui permet d'avoir ... de le points vue sur monde, et qui d'autre part, permet de recevoir des lumieres plusieurs differentes venant de sources differentes.' ([ ] keep open the window which can allow ... several view points on the world, and which also allows us to let in different lights from different sources). The positive terms of `lumieres differentes, venant de sources differentes', imagery the of the windows here stressthe French spirit of openness again, and contrast and GATT what allegedly represents - `un systeme d'uniformisation' (a system of with Similarly, Mitterrand, in his speech in Paris, used the imagery of air to uniformisation). defend the creative tradition of French and European cinema. He began by saying that in the stuffy room where the reception was taking place, windows and doors should be opened to in. Then he claimed dramatically: allow air

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C'est precisement d'air qui s'agit [sic]: il faut que l'air continue de circuler entre les createurs et leurs interpretes, entre les industriels et ceux qui diffusent, qui font connaitre les images, qui les font vivre, qui les font aimer et qui perpetuent tout simplement une tradition vieille d'un siecle, pour le siecle suivant et peutetre pour quelques autres. (Air is precisely what this is about: air must circulate between creators and actors, between industrialists and those who broadcast, loved live, images known, them them and the who make who make who make for for the than tradition others to century and next older a century, perpetuatea come) (Mitterrand, 1995c). This is a positive image, based on something natural and essential to life, and here Mitterrand implied that without the continued exchange of ideas and cooperation between cinema Indeed, European forces French a position. creative are risking precarious and professionals, he described cinema as `un art perissable' (a perishable art-form). Other images of beauty 1993cc). (Toubon, in Beaune in Toubon this the made at speechwhich speech,and were used

Toubonalso arguedthat the successof variousEuropeanfilm-makers,previouslydue for demands jeopardised due American-led European to to support systems,was now GATT he France But, that the claimed was really concerned agreements. renegotiationof French for different types the the and of products of cinematic promotion right about European- to flourish in the world market-place:`Notre combatn'est pas du tout un combat identitaire. 11defend la cause du cinema francais, du cinema europeenet du cinema is identity battle defends based ' (Our It the causeof struggle at all. not on an mondial. French, Europeanand World cinema) (Toubon, 1993cc). This statementis somewhat is furthermore, film industry doubtless French the since and a cultural symbol, contradictory, film designed French to the existence agencies of various government support given described in is frequently held this chapter, exports and as earlier as a measureof production the independence or otherwiseof its cultural andnationalidentity (Looseley,1995,p.27). Yet in juxtapostionto this conceptionof Frenchidentity asbeing basedon openness, beautyandpluralism, therewas a strongcurrentof feeling againstthe Other illustrated in the debateson audiovisualpolicy and identity. As Chapter One explained, for every `us' in identity, therehasto be a `them'. The descriptionof this in the debateson audiovisualpolicy illuminates the familiar nature of the old enemiesinvoked, and a conflictual model for humanity,which still inform political elites' visions of Frenchidentity. Attacking the Other, for French elites, is a means of helping to define why French identity is different, and

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superior.

5.2.5A Frenchand Europeanbattlefor identity is throughout all developed is firstly the through present which This attack metaphor military `le battle frequent to the against or struggle notion of a references of the speeches,with is (1999, 212), tradition there Collins As of (steamroller). a p. notes rouleau compresseur' 1° Such imagery. to a such French audiovisual policy-makers and commentators resorting identity, French the in inherent is traditional given of constructions arguably metaphor first `other' is identity defence threat, `story' a military which Republican against a of of the 14 format the Marseillaise, the Examples the of foremost. the military words of such as and Gaulle de Charles Napoleon Soldier, Unknown Tomb as a the the July celebrations, and of Resistancehero may be considered here. The theme of a battle is strong too in a speech on 1993), (Megret, National Front by Megret GATT Bruno the of cultural protectionism and (a `une real cultural war)", alongside a similar veritable guerre culturelle' who spoke of kind twentieth or the the taking of armageddon a century, end of at place war economic Tchemobyl `un images by the culturel qui se veritable of strong collapse, suggested (the to `1'eclipse a vision of a pathetic, referring eclipse), culturelle' cultural and preparei12 threatenedpeople, who risk losing everything if they do not react to the threat to their culture. This idea was also invoked by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur of the RPR during the GATT debates, who warned of the end of European cultures if quotas and other support decline impending Toubon be 1993c). had (Balladur, to to referred abolished mechanisms for France (Toubon, 1993dd), and to a battle, on numerous occasions during the GATT GATT figures, did PCF (e. Toubon, 1993n, 1993s), the several who regarded as episode g. issue as important in their general war against capitalism (Marest, 1994a; Ralite, 1993a). Mitterrand too spoke in similar terms as he claimed that `Ce qui est en jeu, c'est l'identite liberte la a de le droit nos nations, c'est pour chaque peuple sa propre culture, c'est culturelle

1°Schleslinger (1994,p.33) notesthat military metaphorsof a 'cultural war' have alsobeenusedelsewhere in Europe,for exampleby Germanfilm directorWim Wenders. He referredto writer Henri Gobard'sbook La GuerreCulturelle:logique du desastre(1979), which warnedof Europebecominga zoneof Americanoccupation,to supporthis portrayalof identity undera terrible threat. '2A referenceto the nucleardisasterat the Chernobylplant in the USSRin 1985.

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de creer et de choisir nos images'. (What is at stake, is the cultural identity of our nations, it is the right of each people to their own culture, it is the freedom to create and choose our images) (Mitterrand, 1993b).

Like Megret who warned of slavery (Megret, 1993), Mitterrand arguedat Gdansk (1993b) that a society which abandoned its means of representation to others would be `une in his ideas he domination (an these of enslaved society), and repeated societe asservie' he francophone (Mitterrand, At Gdansk, 1993e). to the concentrated on summit speech threats and the need for protection (Mitterrand, 1993b). He praised the European film industry, and argued that Europe had been both rich in cultural heritage, and successful in the ideas, identities, of of creation, arts and and of national alongside competitiveness, nurturing but that now this faced threat. The theme of two sets of opposing ideas about culture and identity continued, as Mitterrand argued against the resultant `assimilation' (assimilation) by Europe of American culture, presenting older `valeurs fondatrices' (founding values) of Europe as in opposition to `le mercantilisme, le pouvoir de l'argent' (mercantilism, the power in he (old `vieux Europe to the as appealed as a continent), money), notion of continent' of for `Nouveau he blamed Monde' (New America), World, to a meaning which opposition trying to crush the EU quotas system, thanks to its obsession with `le principe de libre " (the free trade). principle of concurrence'

He reasserted these ideas in his speech to the

European Parliament (Mitterand, 1995a). At Gdansk, Mitterrand clearly presented the need to act over the GATT issue, arguing that whilst identity is threatened the need for cultural be issue, in He European this terms of must reasserted. self-determination portrayed as a images of `les creations de 1'esprit' (creations of the spirit), which cannot be just goods like Like Toubon, he other. urged the defence of `le pluralisme des oeuvres et la liberte de any du (pluralism public' of works and public freedom of choice) (Mitterrand, 1993b). choix These statements echoed the words of Megret too, who argued against GATT whilst appealing to a nostalgic vision of an `old' Europe, as he spoke of the unequal balance between American film productions and `le cinema de notre vieux continent' (the cinema of However, it is continent). old probable that Megret did not have the same conception of our Europe in the present day as did Mitterrand, even though Mitterrand himself did not clarify "The referenceto a `vieux continent' was used elsewhere,for example by Alain Carignon, who was Minister for Communicationduring the GATT debate(Carignon,1993d).

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his own definition: the FN have been renowned for their opposition to the EU, and Mitterrand, for his enthusiasm for it.

5.2.6Frenchidentity and the rejectionof consumerism The way in which French and European identity and culture were opposed to the values of free choice and mass culture promised by free trade was further developed by Toubon (Toubon, 1993cc). He argued that contrary to popular opinion, the GATT question was not about a French debate over the quality and marketability of French audiovisual output. He insisted that `la logique du consommateur' (consumer logic) should not be the only model to be followed, since what is not always popular, can still be important.

He situated this

in framework a of a revolutionary tradition, as he declared: `Par definition, l'oeuvre argument d'art est allee le plus souvent a contre-courant, elle a ete contestataire, elle a ete minoritaire quelquefois meme, revolutionnaire'. (By definition, a work of art has most frequently gone it has been challenging, it has sometimes been in the minority, even the grain, against implication The Toubon's here is in is that of statement revolutionary). what popular, and the be cannot art and cannot be challenging and valuable. majority,

This assertion refers,

covertly, to foreign films which dominate the European market, most notably American ones. If consumer logic had been consistently applied, Toubon argued, then many works of art which today are part of the `patrimoine de 1'humanite' (humanity's heritage) would not exist. Furthermore, following consumer logic leads inevitably to the end of French cinema and cultural policy. To protect against this, Toubon insisted, the European system of protection `pour was vital, quotas qu'entre le fort et le faible, il reste une liberte pour le faible' (so and that between the strong and the weak, there can be some freedom for the weak), again battle. to a metaphor of referring

Linked to this, was Toubon's claim that Francedid not seekto act in an anti-liberal in France fact espousedliberal values in the sensethat it favoured freedomof that manner; choice and openness,whilst more powerful players in the audiovisual market sought to imposerestrictionsandanti-competitiverules: Autrement dit, le liberal, c'est nous et les anti-liberaux, ce sont ceux qui defendent le monopole et voudraient 1'etendre! La bataille que nous menons, eile se livre pour l'ouverture et non pas pour la fermeture, pour 1'espaceet non pas pour 1'enfermement'. (In other words, we are the liberals, and the anti-

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liberals are those who defend monopoly and want to extend it! The battle which we are waging is for opennessand not being closed-in, it is for freedom and not imprisonment.)14 Toubon tried to claim that he spoke for `the people', that he knew what was right when it GATT derriere He `les to the spoke cette affaire' profonds caches question. of enjeux came (the real, hidden stakes behind this business), as he stressed his responsibility of being responsive to the concerns of citizens, whilst aware of what corresponded to the mysterious `interet general' (the general good). He reflected on the strength of opinion in France which GATT issue: the the suggested significance of Il ya aujourd'hui, dans cette affaire, et pas seulement en France, on indiscutable d'opinion. les Et d'opinion, tel que s'iI ya on c'est phenomene phenomene bien inconsciemment, les rendent vont gens se compte, confusement, que enjeux au-delä de cette negociation du GATT, dont on leur rebat les oreilles, ä juste titre, tous les matins dans les journaux et tous les soirs a la television. (Today there is an undeniable wave of opinion about this-issue. And if there is such a wave of opinion, it is because people realise, although with confusion, and unconsciously, that the stakes go beyond the GATT talks, which justifiably bombard them every morning in the papers and every evening on the television).

The fact that `thepeople' recognisethe stakesof GATT in a stateof unconsciousconfusion, Toubon, he fully believes to that suggests are capableof citizens not ordinary according important issues; instinctive Such have they such a only an reaction. understanding can Minister French the to enabled view policy as respondingto an urgent, present patronising deeply felt need,and to speakon behalf of `les gens' who he has constructedas a nation in his speech.Later on, he declaredthat the Frenchcausefor `cultural exception' was popular in France, and in the whole world, becausepeople do know what they want, and it is supportiveof Frenchpolicy: `[ ... ] les gensont envie de pluralisme et de participation. Its de ' ([ ont envie pouvoir dire leur mot et non pasd'etre ecrasespar un rouleaucompresseur. ... ] peoplewant pluralism andparticipation. They want to havetheir say and not be crushedby " Again, Toubon's roller). words dressup a limited perspectiveinto a universal a steam "He reiterated this argument several times, for example at the Franco-Italian summit in Rome in November 1993 Le Figaro 27 November 1993a; and during the debates on the Television without Frontiers revision , (Toubon, 1995j).

"See alsosimilar argumentsin Toubon'sreply to criticismsby directorsMartin Scorcese StephenSpielberg, and

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believe. latter `steam The `the the roller', naturally oppose people' perspective, of what in debates describe American became to audiovisual on policy, a common metaphor which in (Mitterrand, 1993b, `rouleau hegemony. Mitterrand too to a compresseur' referred cultural 1995c), when he argued that Europeans did appreciate their own national films and television depriving that the viewers of what of aid and were not and policies protection programmes, they wanted, but of giving that back to them. The arguments of both Toubon (Toubon, 1993cc) and Mitterrand (ibid. ), 16 were interestingly supported by Megret of the FN, who argued that `la culture d'un peuple' (the be but be `les a cannot negotiated, must provided with moyens necessaires of people) culture a sa renaissance' (the necessary means for its renaissance) (Megret, 1993). He presented for little from different those such propositions measures, of which were some concrete by in RPR the the same speech, concerning stricter audiovisual ministers criticised supported for for his language However French the arguments example. quotas and protection of familiar industries European the audiovisual were particularly strong, and used protection of is let in is harmful, biology keep to arguments out and what referring cells, what which racial in from favouring general. But someone of a party protectionism good, as we might expect ideas Toubon's logic, dangers following the repeating about of a materialist consumer whilst Megret went further, insisting that 70,000 French jobs were directly threatened by `cette invasion d'images' (this invasion of images). He claimed that measures like Television had imposing import Frontiers been in American the tough of not quotas on enough without images into Europe, and furthermore, that the Americans had been able to benefit from the `laxisme anglais' (English laxness) of the UK, which had acted as a `veritable porte-avion des images americaines en Europe' (a real aircraft carrier for American images in Europe). `Laxisme' is a term often used by the FN to indicate too much liberalism, leading to decadenceand harm. The idea of the British `porte-avion' echoed a familiar anti-American and British argument used by de Gaulle, that the UK had been a kind of `Trojan horse' for American influence in Europe. The choice of `porte-avion' to describe this suggests a huge in bringing planes, in a military style invasion of mass culture. On the mainstream vehicle Right, Balladur showed signs of agreementwith this, worrying in an interview that the world in theLA Times(Toubon,1993w). 16Alsomirroring Mitterrand'swordsat the Mauritius summit(Mitterrand, 1993e).

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broadcasting market was showing `un certain type de civilisation'

(a particular type of

(Balladur, Toubon 1993c); America to and warned of the possibility of civilisation), referring Americans like Ted Turner bringing investment in European production, but that this was influence (Toubon, for American 1995b). horse Trojan also another

Further agreementwas demonstratedwhen, besides arguing for protectionism for GATT the regarding elites why of explained stakes economic reasons, several political level important. identity Culture be to the of could not reduced were even more culture and identity, it because French the French people and the the survival of concerned economics, French nation, he argued throughout his speech. Like Mitterrand and Toubon, and the Communists elsewhere(e.g. Marest, 1994a, 1994b; Ralite, 1993a), Megret argued that people is in `un homo terms, than than purely economic oeconomicus' more since man more exist (an economic being)", rather `un titre de culture et de spiritualite' (a cultural and spiritual being) (Megret, 1993). Mitterrand also explained, when he criticised the idea of applying liberalism jouer `On la to cultural output: peut pas ne comme cela avec nature economic de 1'etre humain, la livrer de force (We aux seuls rapports cannot commerciaux'. creatrice delivering like humans, it forces) the that to with creative nature of mere commercial play (Mitterrand, 1995c). Mitterrand said that it would be foolish to deny the existence of such forces, but that they must be fought against in the debates over European audiovisual policy, did those who not recognise this. attacked and

5.2.7 The special nature of French identity, in opposition to its Others

The notion of French identity being special, and even superior to other identities, was a in debates theme the on audiovisualpolicy. significant Mitterrand (Mitterrand, 1995c), appealedto notions of France as a country with a long history, he France itself': `be `Nous to cultural and when explained why wanted great voulons que soit prise en comptela faconde penser,de reagir ou de sentir desFranrais,issus d'une lente fabrication des siecles'. (We want the way of thinking, of reacting eux-memes feeling of the French, themselvesthe product of a slow building process over the and be into ) developed He taken to this, saying `Nous voulons qu'un pays, la account. centuries, "This echoes the reference Toubon made to `Soviet man' in his arguments on identity and language, discussedin Chapter Four.

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France, qui a su exprimer, parmi les grands pays du monde, tous les autres arts fondamentaux, qui s'inscrit parmi les modeles de civilisation, puisse, d'autant plus qu'il dire'. (We France, the dire d'un great among a country want aa ce qu'il art populaire, s'agit known has the the models of civilisation, and which world and ranks amongst countries of how to expressall major arts, can say what it has to say, even more so in the case of a popular important having France ) So Mitterand to culture, an appeals memories of grandeur, of art. identity film. French like His be through that this view of media expressed must and argues he imperialist the theme to the American of as returns an enemy, culture as still regards GATT debates of `le rouleau compresseur qui voudrait soumettre ä une sorte de forme de 1'esprit les du (the the de to submit which wants steam roller autres pays monde' colonisation did Although Mitterrand kind the to not world a of colonisation). spirit of other countries of ideas his language directed were similar of against particular ethnic groups, some use strong to those found in FN discourse on culture, in the way that he appealed to an innately superior " Mitterrand identity, America. heritage inherited French cultural and criticised and in films lamenting fact French translated theme, the that this not often were continued American cinemas (where dubbing is more common), arguing that the richness of French language and film culture, with all its history, creativity and inventiveness, should be a source of pride, a century on.

Concernsfor the economicimbalanceaffecting the Frenchand Europeanaudiovisual industrieswe saw earlierdid not disguisevariouspolitical elites' dismay at the `invasion' of Europeancultureby aspectsof an alien lifestyle, of films andproductswhich arevehiclesfor American publicity, ripe for assimilation by Europeans. Toubon's successorPhilippe Douste-Blazy19 spokeof the corruption of the Frenchvision of justice, and children through Americaninfluence. Douste-BlazydenouncedAmericantelevision's influenceon children in during Assemblee debate Television the the an on revision of speech nationale without a Frontiersdirective: J'ai ainsi 1'exemple du fils d'un ami, qui demandant une voiture de police, s'attendait naturellement ä recevoir une voiture de police americaine avec sherif marque sur les portes. Combien de jeunes-gens [sic] disent «votre honneun>au 18See Megretfor example,1993. 190fthe CentristCDS (now FD), part of the RPR-UDFcoalition.

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(I fourmillent. Les d'un tribunal, ou ((je plaide coupable »? exemples president have then the example of the son of a friend, who, asking for a police car, naturally expectedto get an American police car with sheriff's badge marked on the doors. How many young people say "your honour" to the judge of a court, ) (Douste-Blazy, 1995b) "I The are endless. examples or plead guilty"? These ideas were remarkably similar to those expressed by Megret (Megret, 1993). In any images, French to saw no cultural political elites possibility of resistance rather, that the case, images, it in by television all saw what cinema, video, advertising and world was conditioned invading from across the Atlantic.

Their view of identity then follows the `hypodermic

imperialism described in Chapter One, which posits that the strong model' of cultural American culture can crush everything in its wake, and consumers cannot do anything but absorb this.

Elsewhere, mass culture, the opposite of `French' culture' and identity, was denounced in racial terms by Jacques Toubon, who characterised the powerful monopoly dominating French and European cinema in a derogatory manner, as `le monopole nippo(Japanese-American monopoly) (Toubon, 1993cc). Such a model of domination, americain' fears to old about the supremacy of Japanesetechnology and American production, appealing was little different to the one developed at length in FN discourse on culture and GATT, FN's dislike the given open of enemies like the USA. The FN's Bruno Megret predictably, for example (Megret, 1993), likened the American film `Jurassic Park' and its related invasion from the East, as well as from the USA, referring to to a commercial merchandise the film's dinosaur characterswhich apparently were everywhere, invading France. Megret, from expect of a might politician we an openly extreme-right party, used language more as based `race'. His references to far eastern countries were to those which have on strongly been at times regarded as `Asian tiger economies' to be emulated on account of their but `yellow success, at others, a potential peril' to be feared, sometimes on account economic ideas These appeal to the FN audience, who would expect to hear particular communism. of `enemies' denounced by Megret.

Toubon however, as a government minister of a

in party, could not continue such an extremist vein, even if he alluded to similar mainstream in to them and returned other contexts, as Chapter Six will demonstrate. arguments,

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5.2.8 France, Europe and the challenges of a new world order As I suggestedearlier, a further theme in the debateson audiovisual policy and identity made further in facing France Europe to the and a new world order; position of reference Cold These domination War, the the and after end of globalisation. uncertainty and potential in in language, Chapter ideas by connection with as explored raised political elites echoed Four, therefore I offer just a few examples here of how they were discussed in connection with audiovisual policy. Toubon interpreted `uniformisation' as signifying the power of American cultural influence, which may be brought about by globalisation, when he asked `Allons-nous vers un ' (Are ), Un A towards monde unique? we world? moving one world? unified monde? seul if imposed by `un be (a the seul modele culturel' single cultural model) could wondering la He `de the market. suggested a situation of passing mainmise sovietique au power of Gaullist (from Soviet American tyranny to americain' a revealing monopoly), monopole France between (Toubon, 1993cc). `blocks' two constantly caught of opposing vision Mitterrand too argued that the issue raised by GATT was not one of setting up `les cultures d'Europe' (the cultures of Europe) against `celle du Nouveau Monde' (that of the New World, i. e. America again), but the wish to preserve `1'idee universelle de la culture' (the idea it forces is this of culture) against again market also significant as phrase universal implies a `monoculture' emanating from the USA. He too made reference to a new form of totalitarianism threatening Europe in the form of American economic power, rather than Soviet military might (Mitterrand, 1993b). These statementswere found in FN debatestoo, in Megret suggested colourful terms that France was facing a totalitarian threat brought by as from America; dramatically culture referring to `ingurgitation culturelle' (cultural mass `essence (totalitarian fuel), totalitaire' of suggesting a takeover, and poisoning, swallowing) by American France culture (Megret, 1993). of

On anotheroccasion,at the height of the GATT tensions,Toubon referreddirectly to `mondialisationdu marche' (globalisation of the market), which he linked to American homogenisation. He and cultural arguedthat Franceneededa more proactive aggressiveness internationalcultural policy, since it had a responsibility for the civilisation it had inspired (Toubon, 1993ii)20 Megret too referredto globalisation,as he spoke of `une agonie de la 20See alsoToubon, 1993n.

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culture' (thedeath-throesof culture): [ ] il est vrai que les bouleversements geopolitiques mondiaux ont conduit a ... des interrogations nouvelles, ä une remise en cause globale des references de l'ideologie a faute de triomphe combattants, un passees, mais aussi, Etats-Unis, et qui desormais peut envahir le monde. ([ ] consumeristenee aux ... it is true that global geopolitical changes have led to new concerns, to a but lack the of old references, also, given of opponents to complete questioning it, the triumph of consumerist ideology founded in the United States, and which from now on could invade the world) (Megret, 1993). This is a clear reference to fears of US-led imperialism, which could also be interpreted as part of globalisation.

But, urged Megret, the `agonie' (death-throes) of culture must

" fight, linked the to this since very word's origins are meaning. encouragea

So severalpoliticians of different political persuasionsemployedargumentsrelatedto the effectsof what could be termed `globalisation' on cultural identity, and indicate feelings in following the the and suspicion regarding world war structures end of cold of uncertainty be described as a `postmodern'condition, in which old sourcesof conflict and cowhat may have inevitable disappeared, for national may changed or even with consequences operation identity. Fearsof a more globalisedmarket-placein particular,were developedin debateson information technologieslike the Internet,asChapterSix will discuss. and new media 5.2.9 Opportunitiesfor protecting and promoting French identity through European audiovisualpolicy Besidesthe considerableattention given to the notion of threats to French and European identity, Mitterrand and Toubon presentedEurope as a site or source of opportunity for Franceto gain future influence for its own audiovisualpolicy agenda,through the GATT issueandargumentsfor Europeanprotectionmechanisms. Europewas firstly describedas an opportunity for protection. Although Mitterrand Toubon European all criticised some aspects of policy asbeing too weak, we saw earlier and that they demonstratedtheir supportfor the French agendaof protection, when they argued that the laws suchas thoserepresentedby the Europeanquota systemare necessaryto allow the weakerplayersin the market somedegreeof freedom. Furthermore,we have seenthat in 2'Referringto the link betweenthe Greekagönizesthaiandthe Frenchlutte.

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Toubon by FN, Mitterrand the and to the strongly protectionist stance adopted contrast favouring image France Europe an open as places of and concentrated on promoting an like FN in diversity they, though towards audiovisual policy, even represented attitude Toubon influence As limit the and to cultures. noted earlier, of some politicians, wished Mitterrand, due to their political status as mainstream political and State actors, did not have if freedom the to the same range of extreme views, even they shared some of them. express They also neededto be careful to retain the support of their partners in the EU. Toubon and Mitterrand tried to rally the support of their audiences, which included France and other EU countries, and those belonging to a wider Europe. They advocated codistribution in the and of networks, thus marketing, establishment production, operation So, domination. European US against alliance a market-place offers an economic creating an immediately in future `invasion'. both America's for defence the and opportunity - against Moreover, refusal to fight together was suggested to spell disaster for Europe. To support this argument, the need for a `Europe des cultures' was highlighted, as both Mitterrand and Toubon, as more pro-European integration than Megret, urged a kind of cohesion in terms of in highlighting identity, Maastricht Treaty, the the the validity of especially of aims cultural in for `products' increasingly globalised market-place audiovisual culture and cultural an general.

At Beaune,Toubon emphasisedthe future for Europeanpolicy, following GATT and the agreementof an exceptionculturelle clause, describing his ideas for production and distribution concerningfilm andtelevisionin the world marketplace. Highlighting the theme Toubon Europeans future, inclusion `liberte', to to the the urged act, safeguard since only of difference, for `cultural together exception' clause could make a with stronger a policies of Europeanaudiovisualproducts(Toubon, 1993cc). Both Mitterrand (Mitterrand, 1993b)and Toubon (ibid.) used a kind of `slippage' betweenthe `discursivecharacters'of Franceand Europein their statements,madepossiblesince `Europe'was not clearly defined. When first introducinghis discussionof the GATT debate,Toubon indicatedhis personalcontributionto like `je (I `je (I fight), with phrases plaide' plead) and milite' and proclaimed policy-making ý[ ... ] je souhaitereaffirmer nos objectifs, je veux dire ceux du Gouvernementdans la (I I to wish reassert our objectives, mean those of the Government in the negociation' he is French that the suggesting speaking of policy-making position. However, negotiation),

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it became less clear to whom he was actually referring as `nous', as he widened his discussion to include the protection and promotion of European audiovisual industries as du GATT doit etre declared: `Cette tremplin He France. un those pour nous affaire of as well la d'une a d'aboutir politique europeenne audiovisuelle, realisation pour nous permettre be issue GATT (This la de du a must preference communautaire'. principe assortie implement European the to to with audiovisual policy matched a allow us springboard principle of community preference).

Toubonfollowed a traditionalbelief in tradebasedon `preference',which, asMesserlin founder France 1945 296), (1996, after as a member continued when was a policy p. explains be based idea it European Community EC, that trade the the on a should policy promoted of discrimination `preferences', or really, against those countries not so preferred. system of When Francejoined the Community, it had dreams of making a comeback on the world stage through leading a new large political power, whereas countries like Germany and the UK saw the Community as a step towards world trade liberalisation. By the 1990s and the GATT dispute, the situation was quite different, as Germany was larger, the UK was stronger and independentNordic countries were involved.

Toubon arguedthat the GATT issue affectedthe whole of Europe as a geographical, historical and cultural entity, besides the political institution of the European Union, when he le dire "europeen" Cette depasse `Et veut communautaire. ne pas uniquement affaire stated ' in des (And "European" does European Douze. the the only mean sense of not cadre Community. This issue goes beyond the level of the twelve member states.) The EU is used institution, `leader' itself by kind led France, Toubon of as attempted to rally other a as in Europe. Mitterrand discussing GATT, France, too, that when suggested only nations European dared j'en he `[ ] to other countries, out, aux speak as urged appelle amongst ... Etats des de 1'Europe aux responsables et continent: notre on ne construira sans pas createurs ]I ([ State to europeenne' and say creators conscience officials around our continent: une ... build Europe without a European consciousness). Here, the use of `on' leaves we will not Mitterrand building in Europe the the question of envisaged who exactly as now and open future - it could mean a variety of people, for example Mitterrand and German leader Chancellor Kohl, French EU commissioners, French governments, French voters, voters in (Mitterrand, 1993b). countries other

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Perhapsdue to his presidential status as a politician more removed from the actual level his by GATT virtue of role as a president, preoccupied with traditionally or negotiations, of ) integration, (ibid. European Mitterrand key the concept of spoke about questions presidential in abstract terms, arguing for `une conscience europeenne' (a European conscience) towards the end of his speech. He too advocated European construction through cultural cohesion, `l'esprit de `1'esprit europeen' (the spirit of resistance, the European spirit) resistance', citing it ideal is European `conscience'. Whilst the the not of necessity of a rather mystical and quite clear what such a `conscience' might be, its juxtaposition with historical references to `la tradition du Moyen-Age' (the tradition of the Middle Ages) and Iles philosophes des Lumieres' (the Enlightenment philosophers) inspires reflection on the history of the ideal of `Europe' (Mitterrand, 1993b). There are similar appeals too to a `vieux continent' in FN discourse (Megret, 1993). Like Toubon, Mitterrand implied a Europe wider than the EU, he `1'exemple de Gdansk et de la Pologne' (the example of Gdansk and cited reinforced when Poland) and said `notre continent' and `Rassembler 1'Europe, toute 1'Europe, autour de ses valeurs fondatrices.. .' (Rallying Europe, all Europe, around its founding values), indicating a `rassemblement' Europe in to the appeal wider of countries of a goegraphical/cultural sense besides those of the existing European Union. The senseof history is helped further by his Gdansk the to city of as a site of struggle22,as he said `au nom de 1'esprit de reference de 1'esprit et europeen que symbolise cette ceremonie' (in the name of the spirit of resistance resistance and the European spirit that this ceremony symbolises), and by his appeal to fondatrices', `valeurs a vague term suggesting the universality of French identity mystical (here disguised as European identity) (Mitterrand, 1993b).

Whilst Europe's `spirit' may have survivedwars and totalitarianismbefore the end of the Cold War, Mitterrand claimed at Gdanskthat this was now threatenedby the domination led by America's drive towardsincreased the technology, power and advance of economic of liberalisationof the world audiovisualmarket-place. Commentslike Mitterrand's emphasise the whole of Europebeing affected,rather than just France. These statementsdevelopthe France invoking Europe's cultural past: Franceis within a through of as a victim, portrayal Europedominatedby American influence,but will rise again,and find new glory. However, "Although this may seemironic in retrospect, sinceevensymbolsof strugglehavebecomemulti-layeredin a post-coldwar economy,whereshipyardshavenow closeddown.

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is is is being taken to, the appealed arguably since of past which mythical, no account much Second harsh Europe World War for example. The creation of the the the of reality of of inspired day by form due `Europe' to the to after all, was, necessity an alliance present military threats. Given France's comparatively recent experiences of war, and the centrality in identity, Republican French the the conception of the metaphor construction military of of `Europe' assumesa great significance. Yet the vision of Europe which is discussedin French discourse look in developments 1945, to the to can only really pre-wars era, or since political divisive to avoid re-invoking painful and personal experiences. Thus a Europe beyond order be referred to, which Mitterrand did when he spoke of the Middle Ages, the war must Enlightenment and the Maastricht Treaty (Mitterrand, 1993b).

5.2.10 Francois Mitterrand's vision of a `cultural Europe': further opportunities for French identity? promoting Mitterrand developedtheseideas further during the French EU presidencyof January-June 1995,when he had more scopeto expandupon his ideas for building a cultural Europe,a theme which he particularly linked to both languagepolicy, as discussedin the previous his In and audiovisual policy. speechat Strasbourg(Mitterrand, 1995a),Mitterrand chapter, in GATT the that the aftermath of agreement,Europeansmust not rest, becausethe argued European aspects of construction required more attention. He explained the cultural relevanceof audiovisual policy to this goal as follows: `D'abord, pensons au domaine Nous bien savons que la conscience,l'imaginaire, le savoir sont de plus en plus audiovisuel. formeespar l'image et qu'il n'y aurapasd'Europesansimageeuropeenne'.(First of all, let's think aboutaudiovisualpolicy. We know well that conscience,imagination and knowledge formed image, increasingly by and that there will not be a Europe without a European are image). Discussingthe role of Franceandthe Frenchpresidencyin the Europeanaudiovisual Mitterrand arguedthat Francewould fight for better funding of programmeslike market, MEDIA, for resisting liberalism, and strengtheningquotas. In encouragingthe European he sector, arguedthat he was not in favour of protectivemeasures,sincehe, like audiovisual Toubon, did not wish to deny `Papport considerableet souvent remarquabledes cultures d'ailleurs' (the considerableand often remarkable contribution of cultures from venues he that suggesting welcomed the influence of other identities. But, he still elsewhere),

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favoured some form of protection, since the European public should not be denied the right to des [= etre Ic 'I1 their prive par public europeen] ne peut pas en own creators: see the work of decisions arbitraires, prises ailleurs, ou par la logique aveugle d'un marche aveugle.' (They blind by it by decisions deprived the be taken which are arbitrary elsewhere, or of cannot logic of a blind market.)

Here,Mitterrand's statementindicatesthat he still preferred`European'identity to one from Europe 'ailleurs' the the countries which share may not outside of comes which French ideals about audiovisual culture. He also criticises the EU decision-makers here, who follow the law of the market to extremes. This is similar to the arguments discussed in the by in further Chapter Four. debates language A on criticism policy examination of Mitterrand included in this speechwas that EU financial aid to cinema, the most popular artform of the century, had been insufficient, and had failed to create a true European ideas integration be So European French an enemy of elite again can audiovisual space. if far identity, integration European too and citizens are complacent goes about culture and for the cultural protection. need about

Mitterrandalso usedoccasionslike his Strasbourgspeech(1995a)to widen his subject in ideas identity his Europe terms, those not only more general on and about speak and development, it For Mitterrand, to to a or was encourage essential audiovisual policy. related his European identity European construction. of general vision as part of renaissanceof Europehadto be understoodbetter,andappreciated,by Europeans: Il faut que les Europeensaiment l'Europe. Pourquoi aiment-ils leur patrie? Parceque c'est leur foyer et c'est leur horizon, leur paysage,c'est leurs amis, ä I'Europe, il bien identite. leur devait Si tout et manquer n'y aurait cela c'est bout de d'Europe. Or bien est au qu'elle notre main si nous nounsentons pas de l'avancer d'audace, aussi mais parfois prudence. Je le avec assez savons repete, l'image nest pas naturellement le seul terrain de construction de l'Europedescultures. Afin de fortifier notreapproche,redecouvronsles lieux et les objets de nos memoirescommunes. Je souhaiteque soit concu et mis en de lieux de de developpement ces un memoireseuropeens. oeuvre vasteprojet (Europeansmust love Europe. Why do they love their homeland? Becauseit is their homeand their horizon,their countryside,it is their friends,their identity. If all that were lacking in Europe,therewould be no Europe. We really feel that it is within our reachif we know how to move forward boldly, but also at times carefully. I repeat,the image is not the only meansof constructinga cultural Europe. In order to strengthenour approach,let's discover the places and objectsof our collective memories. I want a great project of developingthese

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Europeansitesof memoryto be put into effect.) So Mittcrrand's words appealto building the future of Europe, a cultural Europe,through He history ideas European said also values. to and shared of of memory, mystical references building Europe Europe to building teaching schoolchildrenand citizens, about required that thus twinning continuing through and universities, arrangements and exchange cooperation for important France's Europe. hic policies his personalvision of a united also mentioned linked for Mitterrand, in Building Europe EU. though closely was still, multilingualism the leader, France identity based French ideas traditional as his a strong as of notions on about to help EU He `destiny'. that the European eastern should argued with a special country a lived isolation in had for they the under to which of cultural effects compensate countries it for Through European foundation such policies, culture. a and proposed communism, (wipe did `effacer' European be to that out) nations' mean construction not shown could `l'Europe des it. `l'Europe Mitterrand, According but to to cultures' was identity, strengthen des nations contre celle des nationalismes' (Europe of nations, rather than that of nationalisms). Sucha statementby Mitterrand,given his well-known interestin Europeanintegration, forward-looking Europe, in France's belief more suggest a may role within a moreunited and ideas inward-looking French identity, French about and one refusing prejudice view of identity, its is for France Yet Europe through to a even reaffirm still a means superiority. lines. leadership By European seeking open a construction along seemingly more relaunchof its for by EU `cultural Europe', in the goals support on audiovisual urging and new role identity. defend be French to traditional notions of elites can still accusedof seeking policy, involving identities, hostility includes through to their a widening other continuing This it important how Confirming Toubon to continueaudiovisual this, was so Europe. explained in WesternEuropein order to provide an exampleto Russia,Poland and others. protection down likely the road of allowing too much private to these go countries were otherwise, 1995b). Just like Megret influence American (Toubon, as an extremist and enterprise identity, French did other, mainstream too to the the of roots so rediscovery of appealed invoking like Mitterrand Toubon, history and culture of through the elites and political Europe. This conclusionis further supportedby examinationof Mitterrand's argumentsin his

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diverse from EU in in Paris March 1995, the the audience machinery and %%-here, away speech he in Parliament, European the could employ even more opponents present of some (Mitterrand, 1995c). identity French the sector and audiovisual traditional arguments about Here, he concentrated on appealing to ideas about the greatness of the French cinematic tradition, and France as the birthplace of `cet art majeur' (this major art-form) and, as discussed earlier, to the notion of France as a 'model for civilisation', and Europe as a 'vieux in debates, GATT Mitterrand Continuing (old theme the the seen country). military pays' in like in favour for Europe batailic', `une 'mobilisation' quotas, of policies calling spoke of in had been Europe complacent about the audiovisual other countries who and criticised imposed images being He from Europe, them. on urged of so outside many threat believe in be to tradition the to and of optimistic, and professionals politicians audiovisual European cinema, as he was counting on them to do so. Yet, he insisted that France was still in leader. fight for Europe, Toubon to the and act as culture continue audiovisual prepared followed this argument too, when he claimed that France understood the true stakes of the GATT issue (Toubon, 1993n). The reason for Mitterrand's commitment to European integration, though, was the need for France to find support: 'Mais si eile est Beule,comment fera-t-elle? C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelie je suis un europeen si engage. Seuls, nous fait: de d'habitants, ä tout environ, pas qu'est-ce sommes un pays quelques soixante millions if it ' (But is A I'humanite toute aujourd'hui? alone, qui s'eveille entiere que c'est, par rapport is it do? European. Alone, That I the reason such an enthusiastic we are a am what will is inhabitants, in 60 this, some of million not quite: what roughly, relation to the country indicates in declaration humanity Such Mitterrand ) that today? a of existence whole have France the a medium-sized power, which position of cannot as really acknowledges influence in in its the globalised allies, especially world affairs on own, and requires much by USA. is dominated the audiovisual market which so

Yet, how far should we be convincedby Mitterrand's claims of needing European intentions based for building his honourable Europe? His on apparently arguments support, if in his the the entirely convincing consider presentation not we same speech, and are idea identity French invoked his by to elsewhere, nostalgic of a romantic, statements `notre facon (our `notre de de langue' to richesse' richness), voir et sentir, notre references (our way of seeingand feeling, our language),to the needto be proud and to fight against

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European Mitterrand 'lc the that view culture - and comprcsseur'. retains of roulcau enemies by default,Frenchculture" is supcrior,when he argues: Or l'Union europcenne est aujourd'hui unc structure politique capable dc supporter la comparaison avec toutc autrc: quelques trois cent cinquante du des d'habitants, le monde, premier commerce quelques-unes millions premieres industries, tine capacity creatrice. Et ccttc Europe-lä, on dirait qu'elle a pcur d'clle-memo, ou qu'clle se place en etat d'infcrioritC par rapport ä d'autrcs formes dc civilisation, qui sont pourtant gCneralcmentnecs d'elle. (The European Union today is a political structure capable of supporting comparison inhabitants, 350 the major market of the world, other. some any million with some of the major industries, a creative capacity. And this Europe, we could say, is scaredof itself, and places itself in a state of inferiority compared to other forms of civilisation, which are however, generally born as a result of it).

The referenceby Mitterrand to `other forms of civilisation' refers in a derogatorymannerto he implies is USA, which not a true 'civilisation', andthe claim that other civilisations are the in any casethe result of Europeancivilisation, is a blatantly universaliststatementindicating in identity (Mitterrand, belief 1995c). European deeply-felt the superiority culture and of a So, this section has demonstratedthat the opportunities for debate on audiovisual by have been in French Europe taken used to re-asserttraditional political elites policy identity, French French for defend to of as well as audiovisual productions economic notions in in debates Ultimately, French involvement Europe elites' audiovisual expresseda reasons. 'Europe' did Not Alain Juppe to to use significance present such visions. without argue wish French the governmentsought during the GATT negotiationsto defend `une certaine that We de l'Europe, solidaire,democratique,decideeä affirmer son identite (a certain idea of Europe, of soldarity,democracy,determinedto strengthenits identity) (Juppe,1993e). This idea' 'a in back Chapter Four, de Gaulle's to to certain as we relates saw mystical reference discussionsof Frenchidentity, and the presentchapterhas demonstratedhow the promotion identity in face French the the as special and superior, of challengesof a globalised of by in debates in the market, was political elites encouraged audiovisual policy audiovisual 1990s.

5.3 Conclusions French audiovisualproductionsareregardedas symbolsof national identity, and creativeart,

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in increasingly thus require continued globalised market-place,where protection an and traditional cultural opponentslike America find increasedinfluence. Indeed, the themes of continued fears of Americanisation and the problematic French in One, Chapter this, which, as we saw elite relationship with mass culture accompanying have characterised the entire post-war period, were strongly present in the French political debates on identity and audiovisual policy in the 1990s. Further fears related to American cultural power and the globalisation of communications were also present, concerning Japanese and eastern technological domination. The significance of all of these themes has intensified as issuesof world trade liberalisation, the liberalisation of communications in an integration European have Union, become debates European cultural and more on expanding important, in a world order no longer dominated by bi-polarisation.

In reacting to these challenges,French political elites demonstratedcontinuing, in inherent identity, belief French based the the superiority of notions of on undynamic French identity, a refusal of more hybrid identities which may result from audiovisual American to potentially massculture, and a reassertion more reflexive response consumers' in demonstrated, hostility As to this traditional the chapter cultural examples enemies. of from from elites within and outside and political parties of various government, political indicated did have they the political these always not all of attitudes,although persuasions, freedom to expressthem fully. What is not said, and what is more subtly alluded to, is still This Mitterrand that meant and othersappealedto more acceptableessentialist significant. ideas about the tradition and beauty of French,and sometimesEuropean,identity, even if beliefs had in their of something common with the more extremely expressedantisome American views of the FN, who denouncedtheir enemiesin strong terms of biological and inferiority. theories of racial

Furthermore, Toubon, Mitterrand and others from the

mainstream parties could not openly and easily advocate strong protectionism against forces, had French to the cultural concentrate on and opposition to overparticular liberalisation and consumerism,yet welcoming of pluralism and diversity, opennessand Europeanpreference,to alludeto the samecultural enemiesthey sharedwith the Far-Right. As in the caseof languagepolicy, Frenchpolitical elites looked towards international institutions beyond France, and particularly within Europe, to addresstheir cooperation interests for defending their and support arguments national and promoting French and

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European identity through audiovisual policy.

The texts discussed illustrated how, again,

`Europe' was used by political elites in different ways, as the EU was appealed to at times, and at others a wider Europe in a geo-cultural sense, encompassing new opportunities for cooperation and rayonncmcnt. Furthermore, Chapter Five illustrated further examples of French political elites presenting themselves as understanding the true issues concerning identity and audiovisual policy, attempting to speak for other European countries and to denounce those who did not fully support French objectives. They did this, as in the case of language,through policies and debatesconcernedwith themes of diversity and pluralism, and the defenceof European identity, in opposition to uniformity threatened by the non-European other. Yet, as the statementsof Mitterrand in particular revealed, new opportunities offered by French involvement in defending European identity and building the notion of a cultural Europe, remained arguably a disguise for French political elites' own traditional agenda of the promotion of French leadership and the defence of static conceptions of French identity as superior and special.

Howeverthe arrival of the digital ageof communicationsin the 1990sbeganto make the continuation of this agendamore problematic, as it brought with it a fresh set of for audiovisual and cultural policy-making in general. Broadcasting, challenges telecommunications andcomputingtechnologiesconverged,allowing fastercommunications based digital on networks of multi-functioning equipment. As a result, the same systems data, telephone, could carry computer radio and television signalsusing digital form, system form the which computersunderstand. The prospectof thesenew servicespromisedto or broadcasting its as a mass medium, and consumption,as technologycould offer more change individual, interactiveuse,or demassification.3 Sucha revolution was identified by French in the mid-late 1990sas posingsignificant challengesto the traditional model elites political State-led regulationof technologyand communicationslike audiovisualbroadcasting,and of the Stateconstructionof national identity. Dismayedby the rapid technologicalprogress by like US Japan, the the failure to securea Europeanstandardfor other countries and made HDTV, and to include multimedia services in the revised Television without Frontiers directive, as mentionedat the beginningof this chapter,Frenchpolitical elites becameeven more concernedaboutthe identity issuesraisedby digitalisation,in particular the prospectof For a discussionof this in relationto televisionbroadcastingin particular,seeHare, 1999.

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A

further, and easier,diffusion of American culture (for example, Douste-Blazy, 19951,De Charette,1997b). This area has been a concern of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's Socialist administration in in 1997 May and power at the time of writing. elected

The remit of the Ministry of

Culture was broadened to include Communication once again, reflecting the new Juppe's increased desire Alain to regulate. technological environment and a potentially in Chirac, President in May 1995, had the to the according post abolished government interests of giving the media more freedom (Le Monde, 23 May 1995). The new Minister of Culture and Communication, Catherine Trautmann, launched a public consultation on the digitalisation of television (Ministerc de la Culture, 1999f, 1999j). Although she indicated a for following in French flexible be the to a songs, quotas area of radio more willingness de la Culture, 1999k), the (Ministere expressed concern about she of consultation period in digital Americanisation television, the on several occasions age on of more prospect (Trautmann, 1998d, 1999a). This encouraged both Trautmann and Jospin to pledge their for `cultural defending the to the of exception' principle cause of continued allegiance de la Trautmann, 1998a; Ministere (Jospin, 1997a; audiovisual production wherever possible Culture, 1998g). They particularly sought to do this during the negotiations in 1998 1'imvestissement, Multilateral Agreement (Accord Afultilateral AMI the on or sur concerning Investment) of the OECD countries. This was another example of a trade issue where French in began isolated, had May largely the talks they complained since were as policy-makers 1995 that the agreement would threaten French and European support for audiovisual in be technological this that an era of rapid would problematic and even more production, for has her Trautmann Such disagreements look to example revealed set continue, as change. for 2000 (1998d). WTO trade the about negotiations planned next of round concerns Alongside these fears, the objective of leading a stronger cultural Europe through audiovisual important has for Socialists (Trautmann, 1997a; Jospin, 1997a). the remained policy

A further challengeto elite notions of identity brought by digitalisation in the 1990s following development Chapter Six, Internet. The the the of case study, examinesthe was development, French Internet's the challenges of and political elites' responseto special these.

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CHAPTER SIX: FRENCH IDENTITY IN THE 'INFORMATION CHALLENGE OF TIIE INTERNET

SOCIETY': TIIE

6.1 Introduction The casestudies in Chapters Four and Five have explored the reactions of French political elites to challenges to traditional notions of French culture and identity in the areas of language and final is The to analyse the effects of a more the purpose case study policy. of audiovisual identity. is in French This to the area of challenge acknowledged elite constructions of recently information technology, and particularly the development of the Internet. The Internet is an important and powerful method of communication, given its many possibilities for interactivity in both for conjunction with other on a global of existing media scale rapid exchange and use text and images. These possibilities make it an exciting, positive attraction for French political in benefits. terms of possible economic, cultural and educational elites,

It also offers

for French identity. This strengthening and spreading cultural values and national opportunities be French the viewed may as a continuation of post-war cult of modernity, with elites attraction France in leader by to technology, the technological success wishing make a world seduced still USA. Yet decentralised the the together these models such as with possibilities, and of role transnational nature of the Internet also mean that it presents enormous difficulties for it is In development this technological respect, an of a which poses a example regulation. French to traditional on an unprecedented scale models of media and technology challenge based State At time, the this means that the on control same and protection. policy-making Internet can also challenge French policy on culture and language, and the undynamic visions of identity which this has traditionally developed.

This chapterwill arguethat the birth of the Internet,whilst having led to calls for its developmentwithin France,and supportinginvestmentby the State,has provoked a negative reaction on the part of political elites which suggestsa still traditional and undynamic looks French identity. frequently This towards references- not of vision more conception but located in history, the surprisingly, problematically nevertheless, structuresand altogether institutions of the past,than it doesto the future. This claim will be tested,throughmy analysis discourse French Internet its importance the the of concerning political elites and as a of for French identity. expressing medium Firstly, it is intendedto unravel the unvoiced assumptionsabout identity found in the

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issue. Internet The France's to the secondaim of the analysiswill of elites political response thus be raised,which is to demonstratehow the political responseto the adventof the Internet, despite being a particular moment in time associatedwith the arrival of a qualitatively new issue in is in fact Thus I the the past. offer an understandingof rooted constructionsof problem, in the contextof France'shistory. This chapter%%ill give an overview of policy measureson the issue,which reflect elite initiatives for French identity. Detailed analysis of discourse will reveal the deeper truths about this identity, demonstrating it to be more complex than may be apparent. For these reasons, following contextualisation of the Internet issue in France, the chapter will analyse texts which larger identity body discourse Internet. The the the of of elite on and selection of these are part texts is explained in section 6.2.1

6.1.1 TheInternetin France: a threat to French identity? The emergence of qualitative changes in the area of new technologies - the so-called `digital for is in (1999) (1997, identity Hare Thatcher French 1990s. the significant and revolution' in in detailed discussion how `high 181-2) technology' the the provide changes area of of pp. late 1990s, combining developments in computing, telecommunications and broadcasting, `converge in the new digital communications media' (Hare, 1999, p.309), which allow improved transmission of information in digital form, through texts, pictures, graphics or sound. Thus the same communications system may be multi-functioning, with radio programmes, for being by Internet (PCs) digital TV transmitted the and personal computers receiving example, have in Debates issues France digitalisation to the grown up around related effects of signals. broadcasting, television and radio cable, satellite and multimedia services, as new patterns of on individualised be (Hare, 1999, 312-7) have consumption may emerging pp. and anxieties more issues from `information to the regarding such as access and exclusion new society'. surfaced In this context, particular concerns have focused on the rapid development of the Internet and its identity. French with relationship

Political debateon the Internetin Francecameto the fore underPrime Minister Edouard Balladur's administrationof 1993-1995.In October 1994an important report was presentedto by a working group led by Gerard Thery, pioneer of the French Minitel electronic Balladur information system(Thery, 1994). This report stressedthe need for greaterpublic investment in digital information initiative in face international technologies the of strong competition and

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future France's technological Japan), from USA and cultural survival to (notably the secure and decided to to following The 1996). connectall Jubert, the aim government year, (see also 88). 1996, by (Dauncey, 2015 `information p. households to the French superhighway' Jacques developing, issues identity focus as Simultaneously,the governmental was on increasingly the becoming Culture presence - or Ministry about concerned Toubon's was of English in Internet, the language French of it preponderance the with comparison on lack of - of in difficulties Internet Early American, service-users encountered services. language, especially in language using accents or non-Latin finding non-English web-sites and search engines, and in France 72) (1997, the Dauncey of As in accessibility notes, p. messages. e-mail characters French the in English, the together competition with American web-sites written has American industry faces a software, presented and services against telecommunications in terms of culture, language, technology and public French `exceptionalism' to challenge have felt by to development Internet's potentially This elites political the was aspect of policy. In its identity for French particular, protection and promotion. and harmful consequences domination, imperialist the fear his Anglo-American himself accusing of Toubon expressed United States of seeking complete freedom to dominate the global multi-media and new his feeling the Minister that however, At the stressed the time, same technologies market. for for battle but Europe, for France, a great opportunity not a site and Internet could represent (Toubon, 19941). an equal partnership

to

What is particularlysignificantaboutthis statementis the way in which Toubonreferred for fight, battle issue in the Internet terms need mobilisation. consequent with or of a the

identity French discourse and the elites on throughout political of Such a military metaphorruns Furthermore, detail this is in case study. Internet, within elsewhere and analysed more the for be `France' the did affected, example would of Toubon not specify exactly what elements (ibid. ). he by define `Europe' he did Neither business. meant what economy,education,culture, This aspectof Toubon's statementindicates an evasive quality employed throughout the discourseon the Internet, and is consideredclosely later in the casestudy's detailed political French These the totality texts. of concerns about of parts significant are of elements analysis his These Toubon developed Internet translated the under and successors. which identity and discussions into level took working groups and which ministerial numerous conferences, on one EuropeanUnion; and on a more global level France during the the and mid-1990s, within place in identity, for language, French the the culture and new consequently prospects regarding

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information society. The precise nature of these concerns, and how they illuminate our below. fully identity, be French will addressed understandingof elite perceptionsof however, the challengespresentedby the information society and, indeed,the ongoing digitalisation of communicationsin general as perceived by French policy-makers,are not in developments identity. Technological threats more also pose may to about anxieties confined have for French legal traditionally terms who elites, policy-making and specific economic industries, including industry, State the favoured communications regulationand protectionof but who arenow confrontinga more globalisedworld economy,which functionslargely on the in here, be issues helpfully free Some these the outlined basis of the valuesof may of market. how for Internet the the may present to of our consideration context order establish appropriate identity, for French that the response of perception of and specifically and challenges particular by these political elites. challenges to 6.1.2 TheFrenchStateand coniniunicationstechnologies in developments French, `For the in 124) the Green (1988, that Diana argued the mid-1980s p. discovery to the Technology Information of steam field of constitutea revolution, analogous Third is information the `the to ' She to that as often referred revolution went on assert power. Revolution', a statementwhich is regularly borne out in the discourseof Frenchpoliticians on ' It be by French The `Revolution', Internet. term neutral. can never politician, when used a the in for the to the threats a country mobilisation, and need nation violence and war, suggests looked the has to social and vision of and a means revolutionary revolutionary regularly which indicates `Revolution' in itself. The domain the therefore to of use order renew political distinct in Internet terms the of struggle and process of a as part of psychological significance in for France. political elites change Revolution or not, developmentsin information technology have implications for impact feel technologies on competition rules, and French political elites,who uneasyas new jeopardisethe traditional role of the Stateas a regulator(Dauncey, 1997,p.72). Thus French in level be `traditional IT terms the one on considered of anxieties may about policy-makers' is This for (Green, forces' 1988, 125). French governments set market p. of many antipathy for the modernisationof industry and technology, background the the post-war of quest against 'See,for example,Chirac, 1995c,1996c;Juppe,1996b.

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industries In develop telecommunications, the to scale. a national the on prestigious wish and information technology and broadcasting fields, the efforts of the French State to develop strong fears from 1970s. These intensified from industries the resulted efforts nationally-based decade, following industry French that the oil crises of surrounding the precarious state of issues by Japan. These in investment by large-scale as competitors such electronics exacerbated led Giscard d'Estaing. Recognition to President these to problems of concern were of particular France's IT industrial 1978 Nora-Aline to famous sector modernise policy on report of the (Green, 1988, p. 127; Dauncey, 1996, p.87).

Thatcher(1997,p. 179)describeshow, before the 1980s,the telecommunicationssector in France (as in other EC member states) was dominated by a public telephone operator (PTO) in joined telephone the a government posts, service postal owned and with was publicly which des (DGT), Generale Telecommunications department, Direction the telegraph which and Green, (1997, 180; from Telecom 1988. Thatcher France to p. see also became goes on explain 1988, p. 126), how, in the manufacture of equipment for high technology sectors, European pTOs and governments supported `national champions', which were generally privately owned, in GEGJAlcatel France. Such `national champions' enjoyed effectively guaranteed as such by the to thanks establishment and were protected a closed process, public procurement orders foreign firms. barrier' 'non-tariff against as a national standards which acted of specific

Aller the electionof the FrenchSocialistgovernmentin 1981,further Stateinterestin IT developmentcanbe attributed,in part, to its possiblestrategicapplications(telecommunications in leadership Furthermore, French defence sought a areas), which role. governments and between Western European `technological countries and surfaced over a gap' anxieties in dominant United States, Japan the the respectively and traditional economicrivals such as hi-fi, (televisions, video recordersand satellitereceivers) manufactureof audiovisualequipment Such concerns were compounded by fears of declining

and programme production. for further lead job the to modernisation which could need growth and competitivenessand ' Thatcher (1995, during (Green, 246) Therefore, 1988, 128,132). the as p. explains, p. creation instrument for Telecom France policy aims besidesthoseof running the 1980s, was usedas an 21nthis respect,the EuropeanCommission,under FrenchmanJacquesDelors' presidency,later highlightedthe developthe 'information society' in the EuropeanCommunity, in its 1993 White Paper on 'Growth, to need ornpetitiveness and Employment',and the following year, a group headedby CommissionerMartin Bangemann by the memberstatesto presenta report to the EuropeanCouncil, which recommendedmeasuresfor invited was information infrastructures 677). (Balle, 1997, p. irnproving

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`grands in involved, for It the management of so-called example, telephone network. was links household develop to Plan' `Cable 1982 definition to high a television, the projets' such as in industry fibre telecommunications the newly the restructuring of network, national optical IT implement Teletel to of applications practical plan which aimed nationalised groups, and the `telematics' by the multimedia the the usage of of widening most notably public, usable information services like the Atinitel videotex information system, which received considerable State backing during the early 1980s (see Green, 1988, pp. 129-31; Dauncey, 1997, pp.72-4). Furthermore, France Telecomprovided revenues for non-telecommunications purposes, such as Mitterrand, President firms 1995, 246). (Thatcher, French seeing p. electronics supporting development Community for European the pioneered partners, cooperation with opportunities distribution technology designed `Eureka' to the of new promote the was which programme, of highindustries broadcasting developing including Community, European such as within the definition television (HDTV).

However, since the 1980s, the increasing deregulation and globalisation of liberalisation the broadcasting, the world of together ongoing with and communications dirigiste (centrally-planned) for have of traditionally model problems any presented economy, broadcasting France's for We the of experience can note example economic management. industries during the 1980s, which saw technological innovation and the withdrawal of the dominant State, laying the foundations for new commercial exploitation which contributed to broadcasting, the legitimacy the with the of service model public of of the undermining deregulation and privatisation of the French radio and television industries (see, for example, Kuhn, 1995; Hare, 1999, pp.308-9; Venturelli, 1997). Competition policies encouragedby the European Union's Single Market, and the more general acceptance of the role of the market, have also favoured liberalisation (Dauncey, 1997, p.72; Thatcher, 1997, p. 192). In the case of information technology, such issues are particularly contentious for French policy-making elites because has development, this and also other competitor nations are sector undergone rapid as in development both France the terms the of than of provision of perceived as so much stronger the development hardware those PCs to the on such as of specific services such as and access Internet.

Thatcher(1997,pp.179-81)indicateshow from the 1970sonwards,traditional industrial in forces Western Europe began transformed transnational to with strong meet which policies the managementof high technology. These concernedtechnological and economicchange,

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international regulatory reform (of an area before the 1980s subject to regulation only at the The (see Dauncey, 1997, 73). ideas level), main p. also about competition and new national by (1997, 181) identified Thatcher Europe for high throughout technology p. are policy effects in incentives for further follows: services and equipment supply; competition powerful as importance in increase internationalisation; for the the of and an and concentration pressure background Against this of a more globalised, services and equipment. appropriate supply of from State has French to the a policy of picking move away needed market, competitive field, Schmidt in dirigiste the which, as approach communications and a national champions in in industrial in it do has felt (1997b, 236-7), terms to policy general, of compelled pp. notes (ibid. how French Schmidt highlights ) Yet to also competitiveness. national promote order industry, influence have business trying to still and not completely stopped governments defence in industries high interventionism in technology the and strategic showing signs of industries, `monopolistic' important large failing the together public such as with or sectors, during firms had the to the competition and opening-up which escaped restructuring sector 1980s. Indeed, many French politicians such as former ministers Philippe Douste-Blazy (1996b) and Francois Fillon (1996b), claim that the deregulated market-place for electronic information is in fact distorted by the domination of a few large industrial groups, whose is lack by and a of regulation. supported over-liberalisation existence

This is further

demonstrated by the analysis within this casestudy.

Although not necessarilycontrolled by large groups, it is felt by all French policydevelopment is Internet the threatens that the technological which particularly a new makers domestic in Being French `telematics' Afinitel the the the market. of system achievements in described Afinitel development the the was as earlier, of so much and protection, subject 1980s,a `symbolof France'sindustrial and social vision' (Dauncey,1997,p.74). Since 1980, betweena quarteranda third of Frenchhouseholdshaveregularly consultedAfinitel services(of in investment have Service 25,000). there to are around providers not wished see which in follow Atinitel to the the the equipment and model of wiped public service out rush services, (Dauncey, US-dominated 1997, 74-6), they trend some regard although as merely a pp. what for Internet's `interactivity, the recognise new advantages empowermentand creativity' may (Dauncey, 1997, p.78). Recent figures point to France still lagging behind neighbouring in PC-based Minitel's factor in terns this. of with services, promotion arguably a countries According to an estimateby the Associationfrancaise de la telematique(French Telematics

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Internet, French 1.2 to the between 900,000 as Association), citizens are connected million and in USA) 30 (and Germany in UK the 2 than the to million more and opposed around million (Liberation, 17.18January1998). However, it seemsthat French policy-makers have been forced to concede defeat as far France Jospin Lionel in Prime Minister is Socialist 1997, Minitcl urged concerned, as as the Telecom to develop the transfer of Atinitcl services to the Internet (Jospin, 1997b; see also Le Monde, 28 August 1997).

Jospin's comments were not entirely well

received by

by Roncil, Louis demonstrated the of though, president as communications professionals Syndicat national de la tclematique (SNT or National Telematics Union) and head of AGI, one declared his French biggest the at astonishment government's the who service providers, of interference with industrial strategy, and urged further development of Afinitel services, instead August 1997). 28 for (Le Monde, its doubt Internet, society on usefulness casting of the

Meanwhile,Frenchpolicy-makershavesufferedother disappointmentsin the regulation in in failure 1993 for industries, to their digital secure example as evidenced communications of for high (D2 MAC) Commission directive European technical standard setting a single a definition television (HDTV). Besides meeting with opposition from British and German decision-making EC by being hampered the the process, slowness of television operators',and digital American being by by bid the thwarted compression of rapid progress was overtaken this for France, importance failure (Balle, 1997, 729). Such since, was of symbolic a p. techniques developing had looked French State (1997b, 236-7), towards Schmidt the a more explains pp. as interventionistEuropeanindustrial policy (as opposedto a nation- and member-state-focused in informed decade', by lessons dirigisme `a the the of previous one), or more market-oriented industriessuchas high technology. Similarly, Balle (1997, p.730), describesthe abandonment in failure State dirigiste highlighting in in HDTV (and Asia) Europe the policy of as of analogue demands face the the true technological the and of the viewing of market of change, realities the in 1980s (1997, 661) He 1970s to to the also governmental attempts and points p. public. imposethe SECANTsystemas the Frenchstandard,which, he argues,proved misguidedby the 1990swhen the French electronicsindustry began to confront the arrival of `multi-standard' broadcasting territories. the televisionequipmentand opening-upof 'D2 MAC went againsttechnologicaltrendsin the UK, which also followed more market-basedideassupported by the Conservativegovernmentand was influencedby a lobby of Japanese producers. The Germansmeanwhile PAL Plus 1995, 157-8; Thatcher, (Cawson, 1997,p.200). to their protect system pp. wished

200

Yet, as outlined at the beginningof this section,besidesthe issuesrelatedto the global in debates liberalisation about economic and regulation, changes the economy and ongoing identity. These have French to are anxieties also raised specific related communications sector in debates the evident surrounding the effects of new technologies on the provision particularly in languages, language broadcasting different information the within use of and services and of these services. These debatesare significant for French policy-makers, given the importance of the French language as the foundation of traditional elite conceptions and constructions of French identity, as explored in Chapter Three. Furthermore, as suggestedearlier, the Internet is identity is French to these technologies challenges of new which posing particular one element in view of its capacities for interactivity and multimedia use, whilst linked to a continually developing and widening, and essentially unregulated world network. Such capacities permit in theory at least - accessto and exchange with aspects of languages and cultures, found both deviate from France, those territory the and outside of geographical of which may within for by French The these elite conceptions of elites. possibilities consequencesof championed French identity will be examined below.

6.2 The Internet's challengeto French identity 6.2.1 Contextualisationof the textschosenfor detailedanalysis The period in which this casestudy is situatedmakes it an investigation largely confined to discourseproducedby Centre-Rightpolitical actors, since the RPR-UDF coalition were in between became 1993 Internet 1997, the the and period when more widely government in in It Francois Mitterrand two presidencies,with office available. was alsoa period straddling `cohabitation' Balladur Alain Juppe Edouard the of and governments,and then with a situation JacquesChiracbeing electedin May 1995,replacingMitterrand. PresidentMitterrand did not issue. fairly The Internet the technologies address subject was still a and arguably new really issue debate in issue during his last Mitten-and's the of may office, and months silence on new be in issues his he be terms to explained concentration on other of more considered also `presidential', such as more loosely defined questions of foreign policy and European integration. Another possible factor concernedhis limited policy-making input given the included The situation. also a period of significant EuropeanUnion activity period cohabitation for Frenchpolitical elites as Franceheld the EU presidencyduring the first half of 1995. This Mitterrand identity his saw to offering some reflections relating period statements within

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language ideas his including and on the the presidency, of aims policy cultural outlining did declarations One in these discussed the of studies. case previous as policy, audiovisual but, 1994), this, (Mitterrand, than Internet my other to the veiled reference contain a possibly is issue. It Internet the possible addressing specifically statements such no revealed research in his issue late involved become so with a new closely that Mitterrandwas simply reluctantto term of office. Although the casestudy is concernedprimarily with the policy and texts of the CentreSocialist Jospin's Lionel is Right government, some consideration given to the contribution of State Chirac Head leaving President in May 1997, of of as a to came power which government My Left. Minister Prime the Centre-Right to of and government work with a compelled the draw limited to comparisons the available was the which period of constraints within analysis, to and continuities any possible to chart transition attempts the a new government, of in Jospin Internet the identity in the as shown and discontinuities elements of elite thinking on

issue. the of government'smanagement I madethe choiceof texts accordingto criteria, which include the setting and timing of influenced its the have statusof and reporting, and/or exposure possible could the event,which inclusion in its lay however, interest important The text, of each most the producerof the text. I factor further identity. A took French development which themes concerning of central and include different in to the political opportunity into account,as the previoustwo chapters,was below, background I texts to the different the figures throughoutas relevantto cases. present demonstrate, As I they in interest discussion terms will their analysis. of my of togetherwith a key development because in themes important their which texts their of of own right, all are for Internet, identity French to the and to trace policy related of elite perceptions us enable hypothesis illustrate that the suchperceptionsareundynamic. supporting points which The text from JacquesToubonwas a speechgiven in his capacityasMinister of Culture for Service Minister Industry, Postal Rossi, by Jose the the and during a workshoporganised Telecommunications,and held on 7 December1994in Paris (Toubon, 1994t). This eventwas from Nicolas Sarkozy, in Le Monde, participants other such as with short statements reported Communication, Budget Prime Minister for Responsibility Minister the and and with then EdouardBalladur(who did not attendbut offered a preparedcontribution deliveredby M.Rossi) Monde, 9 December1994). The discussionsconsideredissuesof importancefor French industry such as the opening of electronic communicationsnetworks to competition and the

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fibre-optic However, this technology. the at contribution significant of cable most exploitation is identity in investigation to to terms the of present of elite attitudes challenges cultural event Toubon's speech, given his capacity as Minister of Culture and Francophone Affairs, which issues identity. Internet the concerning and addresses The second text from a Minister of Culture is an article written by Toubon's successor Philippe Douste-Blazy, which appeared in Le Monde on 9 February 1996 entitled `Defis sur 1'Internet' (Challenges on the Internet) (Douste-Blazy, 1996b).

This was chosen as it is

important to examine some of Douste-Blazy's output since he too was a key actor strategically issues digitalisation like Internet time the the of communications were at a when and placed becoming more important. During his period of office (under the Juppe government of 199597), he was thus a major figure in the debate and legislation surrounding identity and new technologies.

Furthermore his text is an example of an article aimed at a national and

international audience due to its publication in Le Monde, the national journal of record. The in like included Le Monde, the text, of as a polemical a newspaper additionally piece nature it it is in dense themes that terms the and range of addresses. unusually number of means

Another political actor connectedto new technologiesand communicationsis Francois Fillon, Minister for the PostalService,Telecommunicationsand Space(successorto JoseRossi in Juppe is 1995-97). The by text the this considered government of case a speech made under him at the twelfth meeting of the organisationthe Haut Conseil de la Francophonie (HCF), in between Paris (Fillon, 1996b). first 30 April-3 For 1996 May took the time, the place which hosted by President Chirac, for the the theme was encouraged personally adoption who of event discussion,`Francophonieand the Challengesof New Technologies' ('La Francophonieface des de defis 1996b; L'Echo 1'Afrique, (see ACCT, 9 May 1996). technologies') nouvelles aux This conferenceshould be situatedin the context of the chronology of international events francophone between with countries, and also more widely, with cooperation connected technologiesand media. The HCF meeting for exampletook place just prior to the Midrand (South Africa) 1996, industrialised `G7' 13-15 May the where on nations(including conference FranceandCanada),along with about30 others(amongstthem severalfrancophonecountries), discuss information `development to the and world society'. The HCF eventwas also gathered 4TheHCF hadvoiced its particularconcernsaboutnew technologies the Frenchlanguageback in 1994 and (1994d).

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followed by a conference organised by the Internet Society in Montreal on 25-28 June 1996 (see HCF, 1996a, preface, p. 5).

It also developed themes discussed at the sixth biannual

`francophone summit' held in Cotonou (Benin) in December 1995, and took place whilst an interministerial group was carrying out work (March-June 1996) which culminated in a report Douste-Blazy Francois Fillon Philippe to and submitted

(Mission interministerielle sur

l'Intemet, 1996). Fillon's contribution was made at the end of a workshop session devoted to considering the future position of French-speakers in the global information society. The general public for but to these the most part, the audience were composed of attend workshops, able were (see invited issues language HCF the and or communications/media experts on members of HCF 1996b; ACCT, 1996a). Probably the most technical of the texts, in view of the amount of information included about current and future policy measures,the speech still includes general discussion of a universalist and historically-based nature on French identity and the Internet. It is also interesting to analyse this speech, as it was made by a government minister who had an important policy-making interest in the issues with which this case study is concerned, and in identity is in discourse to the this thesis any on not covered elsewhere whose contribution detail.

Speeches by the Presidentof the Republic,JacquesChirac,were the final choicesfor the texts for detailedconsideration.Chiracwas selectedfor two reasons- firstly for the purposesof in he President President Francois Mitterrand this thesis, secondly, was with and as comparison `information France Two the time when was presenting so challenges. a society' with many at texts are considered.Firstly, a sectionfrom the President'sspeechon 2 December1995at the FrancophoneSummit in Cotonou,Benin, which was important as Chirac, in his first Summit speechas Presidentof the Republic, highlighted the Internet/new technologiesand identity (Chirac, 1995c). Secondly, Chirac's HCF in to the opening address problem meeting Paris on 30 April 1996 is examined, due to the significance of his role as President hosting this internationallyprominentevent,which offered Chirac an excellentopportunity to gathersupport ideas identity French (Chirac, 1996b). the to exchange concerning and challenges

6.2.2Thescaleof the Internet's challenge:the uncertain `Digital Revolution' The feeling that new information technologiespresenta particular challengefor Frenchidentity was effectively summarisedby FrancoisFillon (Fillon, 1996b). He arguedthat the whole of

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francophonie

as a cultural

and political

movement

was

challenged economically,

technologically and culturally by what he called the digital revolution (`la revolution du numerique').

Throughout this speech, he continually referred to the technological changes

taking place as part of a revolution, which he emphasised was above all a cultural one. As is `revolution' by French term, the charged specifically a very use of a politician earlier, noted images by brought does than struggle and violence. evoke change about more of great which Indeed, the term `revolution' is arguably constitutive of `Frenchness' itself, and thus has identity by in Internet links the the the and challenges posed with context of cultural powerful digitalisation.

The technological revolution itself, Fillon argued, necessitates the entire

he `Certes, francophonie's cette revolution role, when said: rethinking or reinvention of technologique nous oblige a repenser la maniere dont la francophonie peut rester vivante et de dans rayonnement sa capacite ce contexte nouveau, marque par une mondialisation conserver des reseaux d'echange culturels et economiques.'

(Certainly, this technological revolution

forces us to rethink the way in which francophonie can remain alive and maintain its capacity for influence in this new context, marked by the globalisation of the networks of cultural and has information Dauncey (1997, described 73) the the exchange). p. planning of economic in forms France Republican to as an attempt new of communication with reconcile society fraternity, in held by French State, liberty, the the equality and and of analysis this case values in further discourse to the on such concepts reveals numerous, revolutionary references study identity and the Internet.

Fillon viewed the stakesfor identity in terms of the effective future presenceof French languageandculture on the new globalised,world networkswhich arepart of this technological He suggestedthat this revolution neededregulation and control, using the verb revolution. `maitriser',suggestingto master,manage,control and contain. In this way, possiblerisks could be avoided. Theserisks wereportrayedby Fillon hereasperhapsmore threatening,sincehe did identify Adopting them. tactics of vaguenesswhich we saw various political elites clearly not in Chapters Four he Five, `certains (certain to them and merely referred as risquesmajeurs' use major risks). He alsoclaimedthat `managing'the technologicalrevolution was importantasthe had world networks possible advantagesto be exploited. He further highlighted the new issue by using a rhetorical question,thus inviting reflection: `[ ] sauronsthe of uncertainty ... nous, en effet, maitriser cette revolution technologique,mais aussi et surtout culturelle, pour eviter certainsrisquesmajeurs et exploiter des opportunitesnouvelles?' ([

205

] will we know ...

how to really manage this technological, but especially and above all, cultural, revolution, in order to avoid certain major risks and exploit the new opportunities?). Other actors too spoke or wrote of the Internet as part of a new age of digitalisation, a `revolution' with the capacity to change so many aspects of life. Douste-Blazy for example, described the importance of digitalisation as an entry into a new era. He explained that in this new age, the challenges of the new communications networks such as the Internet may threaten the future of the French language and culture (Douste-Blazy, 1996b). Chirac too (Chirac, 1996c), spoke of profound changestaking place in society, urging francophone `mobilisation' to confront them, thereby resorting to a familiar military metaphor of battle and long struggle is in discourse identity like French Internet, the that which we saw elite prevalent on and which in the casesof language and audiovisual policy. He highlighted the Internet as a crucial issue for the preservation of French identity, when he urged: `Nous devons ensemble exiger et obtenir des dans langue chaque utilisateur nouveaux puisse s'exprimer sa reseaux et preserver ainsi que identite culturelle. ' (We must demand and ensure together that each user of the new son is in language to themselves their able express and so preserve their cultural identity). networks

Chirac also situatedthe coming of the digital age in the context of a seriesof previous challenges presentedby processeslike the agricultural and industrial revolutions, describing the `information revolution' as a genuinely historic event: `ce phenomene majeur de notre temps' (this major phenomenon of our time). However, the President emphasised the uniquely farimplications he it `revolution' this that of particular when reaching explained abolished time and invokes feelings a suggestion which of the ending of established certainties and a vague, space, future where the position of identities may not be clear. This was a device used by strange Toubon too (Toubon, 1994t), with a reference to how the new technologies would throw into ('bouleverser') so many aspects of life, of knowledge, of the organisation of work confusion and relationships, and thus create a new society. Referring again to a revolutionary situation, to `la revolution multimedia',

Toubon offered his thoughts on the particularly uncertain

implications of the interactivity and individualised control of communications offered by the digital era, in a passagewhich is particularly revealing of the Minister's conception of French identity:

Le monde qui s'ouvre devant nous et que nous nous donnons les moyens de conquerir est au demeurantcomplexe: nul ne peut mesurer aujourd'hui les consequences exactesdu bouleversementeconomiqueet social qui s'operesous

206

le la de le type quand culture qui sera nötre nos yeux; nul ne peut anticiper d'entre a nous et quand nous pourrons, non service universel sera ouvert chacun les les informations, modifier et mais seulement recevoir ces multiples transmettre a notre tour. (The world which is opening before our eyes and is, to the after all, a complex one: means conquer which we are giving ourselves there is no way of measuring the exact consequencestoday of the economic and the is happening disruption of predicting no way our noses; under which social be to be this open will service universal ours when sort of culture which will be to receive multiple not only able we will one of us and when every each and ) information, but them transmit ourselves. also modify and pieces of battle informed by be identity here French and to Toubon's view of old visions of appears in future the fight, he the to culture of considers as enter such a conquest, and of mobilisation information betrays the His digital nature of a particular anxiety about statement services. new difficult his theme interactive to central control, and available, and widely are services which being concerned with conflict, arising from the difficulties of controlling the new services. In freedom Toubon to these and empowerment, notions of possible concerns, rejects response Internet find in interactive the the and other multimedia services. of capacities which some may

Such statementsthus refer to a context of technological and social change, of information by been has technologies and created new uncertainty which and reorganisation Chirac Indeed, increasingly in as their position an globalisedcommunicationsmarket-place. in limited developed information (Chirac, 1996d), the a which are currently networks argued but countries, which could spreadaroundthe entire planet, arepart of a phenomenon of number is he The to is both the explained, of globalisation. challenge, causes effects and one of which Chirac it is benefit to the exactly all, although clear whom of not make globalisationwork in in francophone France, in by his `tous' It countries, statement. could meaneveryone means him the to the problems of a about need re-consider agrees with everyone who perhaps or is He that the situation so argued on another occasion globalisedcommunicationsmarket. in have the states weak role and played a relatively since public authorities remarkable developmentof new information technologies,and indeed,is made worse since `personnene dinge ni ne maitrise cette veritable revolution' (no-one is leading or managing this genuine is below, (Chirac, lack This 1996c). the of order one of and control, shall as we see revolution) key contentions of French politicians and policy-makers regarding the contemporary informationtechnologylandscapeandits implications for Frenchidentity.

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6.2.3 The French language and identity in a global communications market: threats to diversity, and the difficulties of regulation The particular concerns of French political elites over identity and the new communications in language, French from that the a these already technologies stem policy-makers' opinions domination by is further its Internet, in the threatened the of terms of presence on weak position foreign providers of services and manufacturers of software. This situation, it is argued, can diversity identity French the to threat and pluralism values of and cultural only represent a Notions hegemony. American is defence deemed identity of to this against a espouse, as which but, by defined the as previous case study clearly policy-makers, necessarily are not pluralism discourse French keystone illustrated, the the on elite much of of are nevertheless chapters identity and cultural policy.

Douste-Blazyfor examplesuggestedthat too much information availableon the Internet in English andfrom American sourceswas a problem for Frenchculture and identity, dueto the limited accessto information in French,on Frenchcultural or historical issues: Quand on sait qu'Internet est anglophone ä plus de 90%, et que si vous y des les d'obtenir de Gaulle Bonaparte toutes chances vous aurez ou pianotez informations venant de bases de donnees d'universites americaines, on pourrait faute de defi formidable attend et que, relever, nous conclure aisement qu'un langue de echapper. de la de nous notre qui risque et perennite notre culture c'est (When we know that the Internet is more than 90% English-language-based, and that if you enter the names Bonaparte or de Gaulle you will have every chance information American from databases of universities, we can easily of obtaining it, is if don't before tackle the that us, and, we a great challenge conclude is being hands. ) language taken at of risk out of our of our culture and continuity (Douste-Blazy, 1996b).

Here, Douste-Blazyrefers to the two iconic figures of Bonaparteand De Gaulle, both white ' identity. French Caesarean leaders, presented as representativeof males, military and Bonaparte,with his aggressivestrategies,and de Gaulle, with his ascensionto power as the invoked be for French which a virtual as elite of military coup, are names may metaphors result territorial ambitions. This is not without significance,as such ambitions, in terms of cultural influence, are themselvesthreatenedby the Internet. Elsewhere,Fillon accusedAmerican

'SeeThody, 1989.

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linguistic deliberate their having to to strategy reinforce a acted according service providers of Internet: the on and cultural presence En outre, plusieurs pays ont, parfois bien avant les pays francophones, compris l'enjeu que representait la presence massive de leurs produits, de leurs langues C'est de de leurs ainsi communication. supports cultures sur ces nouveaux et d'ailleurs le Internet, bon investi les ordre reseau en acteurs americains ont que before Frenchhave, (Besides, often well countries several ne outre-Atlantique. in huge the new their the presence of stakes speaking countries, understood languages in their terms and cultures. of products, methods, communications This is why the Americans have invested so well in the Internet, itself born ) Atlantic. (Fillon, 1996b) the across This statement may perhaps hint at a `high-tech' conspiracy theory, comparable to those historically discredited or otherwise obsolete myths, associated with the hatred of Jews, Communism, and most recently, Islam. Surprisingly, it recalls some of the ideas expressedin FN discourse on culture, about `mercantilism' and fascist conceptions of a US-Jewish how (Fillon, 1996b) this (Megret, 1993). Fillon to continued explain of capital monopoly had led `Americans', by brought to the deliberately the the accepted actions of about situation, he hoped to lingua franca Internet, English the prove unrealistically would which as a on use of be temporary. This theme of an `Anglo-Saxon plot', which Chapter Three identified in the debates on the loi Toubon of 1994, is recurrent elsewhere in the discourse on identity and the Internet produced by French political elites. Alain Juppe's comments on on-line information Anglo-Saxon `grands (large be he groupes anglo-saxons' can also noted, as accused services (Juppe, for 1996d). having control a world strategy of groups)

In a striking example of cross-partyconsensus,the Communists also indicated their linked by (PCF, 1995a), An for `conspiracy the theories'. official statement party support such the Internetproblem to the GATT issue. They arguedthat the Americanshad been compelled to acceptthe idea of `cultural exception' in the GATT agreementslargely on accountof the in `mobilisation' feeling, France. However, PCF the that the or mostly claimed popular Americanswere now attemptingto get round the rules establishedby the GATT agreements,by `lancantune offensive sur les «autoroutesde l'information»' (launching an offensive for the information superhighway- revealingmore battle imagery). Like the politicians of the Right, the Communistsalso called in this statementfor `une mobilisation' to protect `la diversite et 1'enrichissementmutuel des identites culturelles' (the diversity and mutual enrichment of

209

international for identities), arguing national control of services and against cultural deregulation. Yet despite advocating enrichment of cultural identities, an apparently pluralistic deliberate described American `offensive' PCF the the attempt at a as still statement, de leurs la faciliter lä de domination in `Il Europe: mainmise s'agit par commercial and cultural l'accentuation des Europe telecommunications considerable et, par et en multimedias groupes de leur domination culturelle qui en resulterait, d'amplifier radicalement leur domination sur tous les aspects de la vie sociale.' (It is about facilitating the control of their multimedia and telecommunications groups in Europe, and, by the considerable increase in their cultural domination which would result, of radically enlarging their domination of all aspects of social life. ) Even if the PCF statement has an element of anti-Americanism more obviously rooted in deliberate Communists' Right, French thinking the than those the on perhaps of anti-capitalism `invasion' of French cultural identity by the USA is much the same, illustrating the considerable issue. this consensus on cross-party

Threatsto pluralism and diversity are typically portrayedas coming from Anglo-Saxon from large American the and powerful especially of groups who enjoy an actions producers, and for (Douste-Blazy, 1996b) Douste-Blazy, to competitive advantage. example, referred unfair de les in `les their terms of size, grandes manoeuvres americaines entre geants writing of rivals la communication de l'informatique

des telecommunications' et

(the great American

(Fillon, between Fillon telecommunications), the and giants computing and of manoeuvres 1996b) spoke of large industrial groups which he described as `en particulier anglo-saxons' (especially Anglo-Saxon). It is curious here that France, although objectively a relatively rich is large country, presented by politicians such as Douste-Blazy and Fillon as small and and is for device This threat. gaining the support of their audiences, as they are a rhetorical under in fear forces. Similarly, is focus foreigners there these to more powerful, external a on urged is `Anglo-Saxons' America, Gaullist to to typically as reference and using a made statements, lumping-together of all things British and American in a vague racial and political composite of 'Anglo-Saxon', in opposition to French identity, which certainly has a traditional, instinctive appeal to some prejudices of the electorate.

Fillon (Fillon, 1996b)also cites the namesof various companiessuch as Sony, Philips, Matsushita,Compuserve:here the suggestionis of successfulmultinational - as opposedto French- groups,which are cosmopolitanand not rootedin one place,perhapsevenparasiticas they move location according to the most favourable operating conditions. Sometimes,

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is decoding is however, the actual source of the threats of particular allusions unclear, and happening for of technological Toubon that regardless are changes explained example needed. `Que in `mobilisation' nous again: once style they military a or not, urging are wanted whether le voulions ou non, les changements sont lä et si nous ne nous mobilisons pas, d'autres nous imposeront les reseaux que nous pourrions occuper et les contenus que nous pourrions determiner.' (Whether we want it or not, changes are there and if we do not mobilise, others will impose on us the networks which we will be able to occupy and the programming which we `d'autres' here does He (Toubon, determine) 1994t). be who exactly not make clear able to will in discourse that this French suggests but the area policy-making my wider consultation of are, is Fillon Japan. US the is technical and Toubon referring to the usual cultural and competitors: like (some `certains' to people) who would equally evasive at times, making vague references `our' cultures to be trapped in a global information society as part of the process of cultural and linguistic uniformisation (Fillon, 1996b).

is is because be This for deliberate, is to It effective, and what so evasive. a politician is known is frightening `they', than `Others', and the what more an anonymous unknown, Japanese it is for that the to Furthermore, or not possible policy-makers explicitly state named. Americansare enemies,even though they may allude to them, when countries like theseare involved with Franceboth as strategicallies and as economiccompetitorsin a free market. The is in France American Japanese technologyon economicand cultural activities influenceof and disappear, televisions, to personal cars, own as so many people and unlikely well-established be Explicit by for these politically attack would nations. example manufactured stereos disastrous,as former Prime Minister Edith Cressonfound when sheopenly denouncedJapanin by Therefore 1996, 81,84). to threats (see Wilcox, 1991 arepreferred more subtle allusions pp. Nintendo', `generation he the Toubon the to need reclaim usedwhen spokeof political elites,as literary denying Japanese or any culture, a statementwhich revealsa rather reductiveview of is based inferring trivial, Japan that this traditions on gamesand culture and of philosophical (the `high' traditional elite perceptionof than museums of and art culture more on cartoons Frenchculture) (Toubon, 1994p).6 Also in this speech,Toubon arguedthat French electronics firms and electronics training must be developed, since the history of new electronics d'Osaka departs Valley is les de Silicon full `des ou vers promesses of ruptureset companies 6Toubonmentionedthis referenceto the `generationNintendo' on anotheroccasion(Toubon,1995f).

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(failures,anddeparturestowardsthe promisesof Silicon Valley and Osaka). This phraseseems be fail, investment training, swallowed that or to suggest companiesmay and without suitable by firms, the leave French the foreign by their of offers seduced personnelwill rivals, and up American and Japanesecompetitors. Such statementshint at a retreat into long-established USA. by Japan felt French hostility the towards and elites cultural The extent to which the State can manage all regulatory functions alone is a difficult Juppe Alain by former Minister Prime for French who policy-makers, as recognised question explained: Mais n'attendez pas des pouvoirs publics une reponse definitive ä tous les de de du de l'Etat Il tout contröler, tout reguler, role problemes poses. n'est plus de tout decider. En revanche, il est de son devoir de rester en etat de vigilance de l'emergence le de favoriser regles plus possible permanente et d'autodiscipline. (But do not wait for a final solution from government to all the problems. It is no longer the role of the State to regulate everything, to control it is its duty decide Instead, to remain constantly to everything. everything, ) development to the of a system of self-regulation. encourage vigilant and (Juppe, 1996d)

This claim, althoughapparentlycriticising the traditional Frenchelite responseof regulationby is indicated basic by Juppe if does look to State, that the still the closely, reflex we more reveal, look to the Stateas a cultural manager. The Stateis still, as we saw in Lamassoure'ssimilar like figure battle in in Juppe's Chapter Four, a sentry, vision, of a guardian or a statement (in `en etat de permanente' a permanent state of vigilance). vigilance on guard, always Moreover,it hasa `duty' to do this. Here is evidencethen of Frenchelites still looking towards the State to manage and to regulate, according to a preconceived model, even in the is digital described. technology which media qualitativelynew situationor new world of Similarly, Douste-Blazy,whilst he statedhis belief that the private sectormust first of de bataille' front line battle, develop ligne (in `en the this cette services, of again premiere all `fight'), `la (public had to that a puissance still explained publique' or authority) power referring in information for free development the the organisation role and of new market a supporting (Douste-Blazy, (1996b), 1996k). Elsewhere Minister the arguedthat one of the errors services imagine legislation be is in to that would much possible the way of regulationand prediction, of whilst changesareunderwayon a daily basis. Even so, he againadvocatedthe role of the State in developing mechanismsfor strengtheningthe French presenceon the Internet, warning

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by State the to the traditional the regulate and organise measuresused abandonment of against investment in He these like that the policies notion criticised and production. quotas media, Indeed, (a false it de facade' denouncing `un be modernism). as modernisme outdated, may Douste-Blazy argued against over-liberalisation in information technology, citing this as a factor which would weaken the French audiovisual and cinematic production industries and jeopardise the creation of new jobs, referring to the damage done by deregulation to those industries in other countries. Returning to the familiar military theme, which we saw in the if information Douste-Blazy battle technology, to asked retain control of previous chapters, of a the protection offered by State intervention could really be dropped, given the early stages of la baisser just begun: battle Taut-il, development, technological en un mot, only resembling a in drop le ä ' (Must our guard, when the que combat commence peine? we, a word, garde, alors battle is only just starting?).

This section has identified a dilemma for French governmentalelites regarding the in information Elite the the attitudesreflect a of global market-place. new services organisation in Internet to the to and multimedia services, need control, regulateand protect strongsenseof important have forces their significant position as cultural and economic which may view of identity, despite State French that the some suggestions cannotprovide all culture and effectson the solutions. The particular policy ambiguitiesrevealedin elite discourseon the Internet are in fully below. the section exploredmore The problem of `others' of various kinds imposing their languagesand cultureson the Internet was also presentedby French politicians as aggravatedby the globalisation of in itself, This they argued, encouragesuniformity. communications.

Francois Fillon for

(Fillon, described 1996b) the globalisationof communicationnetworks as the enemy example inevitably language diversity, Anglo-Saxon and and with a monopoly synonymous of of in imposed is been He has that this the maintained near monolinguism which evident culture. defacto on the Internet. Such a situation is describedby various political elites as harmful to democracy,liberty and the right to free cultural expression,not only in Francebut also in other French-speakingand non-English speakingcountries,especiallypoorer ones,where accessto the Internet may be limited.

This is particularly noticeable in discourse produced for

francophone to partners,and the reasonsfor this are discussedin section6.2.6 communication below, which examinesthis discoursemore closely. This sectionhas demonstratedthe attitudesof Frenchpolicy-makerstowardsidentity as

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hostility. ideas in informed by language be Internet tradition, the to and of conflict on expressed The weakness of France as an economic and cultural victim is firstly described, but is then impose by `Others' foreign their domination the origin who of of as exploited presented language and, ultimately, their culture on the Internet and other multimedia services. This is favoured by French the threatening as values of pluralism and elites an active plot, seen diversity, which are presented as prized by French identity.

The process of globalisation is,

domination. in develop by France this the to argue, exploited enemies of order policy-makers Thus French elite discourse suggests an underlying hostility towards `other' identities which in identity indicative be Internet, the traditional rooted conception of present on of a may Gaullism, anti-Americanism and a negative, closed attitude. Having identified this conception identity, following it by French French the to the section now and challenges perceived elites, of how into discourse the translates to the this the of on policy responses problems considers Internet.

6.2.4 Policy ambiguities: regulation versus opportunity As I highlighted earlier, one of the key concerns of French policy-makers regarding the Internet is the lack of control they may have over its use and contents. In particular, politicians attribute the relatively weak position of the French language on the Internet largely to the lack of domination by forces to which combat more powerful economic effective regulation available in lack hindrance free for Douste-Blazy the that this market. argued example, operate without `S'ajoute ä France the threats to even made worse: encore notre trouble un vide regulation of juridique et deontologique apparent qui fait de ces reseaux des espacesde liberte, mais aussi des lieux oü nos lois peuvent etre contournees,niees, defiees. La liberte de cet espacede creation et de recreation doit eire preservee.' (Added to our confusion is the apparent lack of a code of legal and professional ethics, which makes these networks spacesof freedom, but also places where our laws can be distorted, denied and defied. The freedom of this area of creation and recreation must be preserved) (Douste-Blazy, 1996b.) In this passage,Douste-Blazy describes the French in Internet to the the challenge a strange way, as `notre trouble', evoking a bizarre of responses image of an almost psychological illness, of disorder and chaos. This contributes to the building of an image of the Internet as a new, powerful and disturbing force which must be controlled. Likewise, the use of `un vide juridique et deontologique' (a lack of a code of legal and professional ethics), reiterated elsewhere in the article, suggests that at present there is a

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is Internet, have lack the which any possibility of controlling of measureswhich could complete is `un for `product'. The be to a significant vide' of use expected a new what may contrary impossible by Minister, terrifying the void; something empty, unsolid and suggesting a choice to picture. The connotations of this word suggest that it is inconceivable, as it is so frightening, if there are no measures or laws available to control the Internet. It is also interesting that Douste-Blazy refers to a `vide deontologique', as we might wonder how it can be clearly stated that there is no framework of values or code of professional ethics at all around the Internet. `Others' such as the Americans, may associate the Internet with a framework based around libertarian ideals, of freedom of speech and expression. Even though French elites claim to State framework the threatens the traditional as a cultural of role value such notions, such a if is in form of regulation place. manager, no

The accumulationof adjectivesin `contournees,niees,defiees' is also of significanceas is it involves Particularly device, the three powerful negative words. as a rhetorical part of All implies this `contournee', twisted, of and unnatural. something strange which of choice identity. The French Internet Minister threat to the the to use of a sinister as present allows `liberte' is important too, as the description of what is threatened. As we saw earlier with the history its French Republicanism, `liberte', `revolution', going and with given connections word identity, fail be heart French to to the an emotionally-charged word when used of cannot right by a French political actor. Thus an image is created of the Internet threatening something implication identity. has be Liberty French to the to preserved, and paradoxical sacredand vital is that regulation by public authorities is needed to do so.

Without safeguardingthe new networks as placesof freedomof creation,the Minister be less `invade': `En that to other will permitted worthy values revanche,peut-on suggests a la diffusion d'idees 1'acces du par ces reseaux, qui sont plus grand nombre, admettre inacceptablespour les tenantsdesprincipesde la democratie,de l'Etat de droit, de la dignite de l'homme?' (On the other hand,can we allow accessof large numbers,through thesenetworks, to the spreadof ideaswhich areunacceptableto the guardiansof the principles of democracy,of the rule of law, of human dignity?) Again, Douste-Blazyusesthe cumulative effect of three powerful terms, all key elementsin the constructionof French identity since the Revolution: `democratic',`Etatde droit', `dignitede l'homme'. A threatto theseis indeeda threatto French identity. The `guardians'of theseprinciples are not defined; they could be severalpeople or bodieshere,perhapsthe French State,the French people,French-speakers, the West, different

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implication intended Europe. The does the of actual meaning matter, as notions not necessarily of Douste-Blazy is that the defenders of such noble values are naturally all of those who share them. Such people, it is implied, could not easily be French elites' cultural adversariessuch as the United States. This is because, whilst the Americans have political ideals based around democracy, in dignity, freedom law, they the eyes of the notions, of and rule of may, similar French elites, have forgotten these values in a commercial and cultural sense. Noting the implications for the communications sector as a developing area where jobs are likely to be created, the Minister's plea for French-style regulation continues throughout the he lack deregulation lead too to against as argued of much which could a complete article, ' Internet in disturbing He the terms, and also of content of services. refers, abstract, control `liberte', to to negative aspects of the Internet which may exist without regulation: returning `Des exemples recents nous ont en effet montre que la face obscure de ces lieux de liberte d'expression existe aussi.' (Recent examples have shown us that there is also a dark side to these spacesof freedom of expression). The phrase `la face obscure' suggests a dark, evil force which must be fought against, which is a familiar, emotional reference found in various its Christianity, traditions, such as with opposition of lightness and darkness as `good' religious and `evil'. For Douste-Blazy, the only means of defence against such a force can be State-led regulation, and the upholding of French traditions and laws, as he showed when he wrote: `[ ... ] il nous faut trouver les moyens de garantir, sur notre sol, nos lois republicaines' ([ ] we must ... find the means of safeguarding our republican laws on our own soil). This statement suggests in in the territory, refuge national a Republican and reassuringly French legal system, as seeking the only conceivable solution or way forward. Thus the answers to the new problems posed for French identity by new technologies such as the Internet are found by French elites in a return to old, tried and trusted structures.

In relation to this, Stateaction to safeguardand improve the position of French on the Internethas attemptedfirst to build on the provisions of the 1994 languagelaw developedby JacquesToubon. In 1996the DGLF issueda parliamentaryreport regardingthe applicationof this law, which described the information society as a new opportunity for French and multilingualism, requiring urgent development (DGLF, 1996). In the same year, Prime Minister Alain Juppe issued a ministerial circular stating that the loi Toubon applied to any 'Similar views arealsoexpressedin anotherDouste-Blazy speech(1996n).

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information communicated via Internet servers by public services or bodies (Premier Ministre, 1996d). Juppe then reminded ministers and secretaries of State the following March that the legal requirements for the use of the French language are applicable whatever technical methods 8 in has Culture (Premier Ministre, 1997). Ministry The of of communication are employed addition highlighted the need for European Union citizens' rights to instructions and information in their own languages, as well as the need to respect the characteristics of each language,such as the correct use of accentson Internet sites and when using e-mail programmes (for example, Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, p.27; Liberation, 22 March 1996). Regulation remained high on the government's agenda in 1996, with

the establishment of an

interministerial group which was to examine legal issues surrounding new communications technologies (Ministere de la Culture, 1996h).

Yet the questionof whetheror not legislation such as the loi Touboncan be effectively has by Internet the to the the proved public sector organisations outside use of applied Georgia fiasco legal demonstrated in the 1997 the surrounding with problematic, as was Institute of Technology in Metz, France. Two pressure groups9 brought the case against the French campus of the American university, arguing that the institution's exclusive use of English on its web-site was contrary to the provisions of the loi Toubon, which banned in but in in in began Paris January French. The thrown out was case advertising not written hoping June to technicality, the two on a early although associations concerned pledged appeal, to establish a test case which would prevent such sites being produced solely in English Le Monde, 1-2 December 1996; Liberation, 13 June 1997; The Guardian, 10 June 1997). The by this the French government, point to a of case, and regulatory measures experience continuing tendency towards prescriptivism on the part of the State and also interest groups, as we see a public struggle to exert control over rapidly-changing technologies which suggest future uncertainty as development continues.

Still, French political elites have attemptedto find means of regulating the Internet beyond the methods available within France, particularly focusing on cooperation with European, and particularly European Union, partners and francophone countries. This 'This referred to the text of article 2 of the law No. 94-665 of 4 August 1994 (la loi Toubon), also to the d'application 19 March 1996, of which noted the obligation to use French in all forms of circulaire (Premier Ministre, 1996a). whether on paper or on screen communication,

9Defensede la languefrancaise,andAvenir de la Languefrancaise.

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included has the promotion of the policies of plurilinguisme or multilingualism cooperation in language Europe, the case as of general within policy, discussedin Chapter Four, as measures to protect the French language and identity on the Internet. These policies were particularly important during the French EU Presidency of 1995.10The lack of French-languagematerial on the Internet has been linked by political elites to the relatively weak presence of all European languages,other than English, on the Internet. France and other European countries have been threatening powers portrayed as geographical and cultural areaswhich are victims of monopoly French and European identity. These concepts of identity however, are, in the sameway as we defined, their shift may in usage as the two saw previous case studies, not always clearly " The numerous intentions discourse elites. to the the political of according motivating in French `uniforme', present referencesto the familiar themes of `rayonner', to `diversite' and identity the languages on European discourse and political elites' on the need to safeguard Internet, together with the denunciations of unwanted non-European influences, echoing those in the caseof general language policy we saw in Chapter Four, indicate that the true intention of French policy is to use the concept of `Europe' in appeals and policy, so that French identity French have influence As Douste-Blazy Internet. strategies of the explained, can a strong on they for important French Internet offer a means as the elites, political multilingualism on are for the French language to be protected (Douste-Blazy, 1996r).

Despiteinitiatives for Europeancooperation,and the promotion of `European'diversity European Toubon, figures by the for Internet, the as such as suggested and solidarity on policy Union in particular does present problems for France and its linguistic objectives concerning the Internet. This was demonstrated in 1997, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs Herve de Charette, echoing a similar complaint (mentioned in Chapter Four) made by President Mitterrand seven years' previously and thus demonstrating the extent of cross-party consensus issue, Commission, European President Jacques Santer, the the to of complaining wrote on about the continuing domination of English within the EU, this time on Commission web-sites. He argued that this is, in fact, contrary to the apparently pluralistic language environment of the 10Forfurther details,see,for example,Ministere de la Culture, 1995d, 27; Ministere de la Culture, 1996c; p. DGLF, 1996a,ch.3, N. 1; Mission interministeriellesur l'Internet, 1996. "See Toubon, 1994t, 1994b and 1995c, for examples of appeals to French and European identity (in the senseof both the EU and the wider geographical Europe), similar to those we saw in Chapter Four; also Mission interministerielle pour la presencedu francais en Europe, 1994.

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institution, which is supposedto have adopted the principle of the equality of the 11 official EU languages (De Charette, 1997d).12 As I explained in Chapter Five, French policy-makers also disappointment in in failure Europe 1995 the the their to of with secure application with met industries. frontiers' EU `Television directive Europe's to without multimedia video updated However they were able to organise international cooperation around policies for the Internet issue language international through on several occasions, cooperation with other and 13 francophone like G7 for Quebec. and partners, organisations example

Meanwhile, it has been recognised by French policy-makers that the successful development of Internet services by the French State may provide valuable opportunities for international influence language French the and extending of of and culture on an safeguarding level, and is argued to be crucial in terms of guaranteeing the future role of French as an international language. Douste-Blazy, for example (1996n), declared that he did not wish to linguistic by time the the global criticising merely cultural risks of and spend uniformity posed information society, but wanted to talk about the optimism and confidence he had for the future. This he described in positive terms, referring to the willingness of France and French-speakers to seize the enormous opportunities offered by digitalisation. In particular, these opportunities concerned the promotion of an information society which would respect `our' essential values ('respecte les valeurs essentielles qui sont les nötres'), adding that he especially referred to linguistic diversity. `valeurs is What be these and exactly essentielles' cultural might unclear, as Douste-Blazy's words have an almost mystical tone in this context, suggesting an appeal to is `naturally' `our' is The likewise French. whatever of use of myth rather vague, suggesting a deliberate attempt to include various, perhaps all, of the different sections of his audience, and beyond this towards the French citizens and the international community. also reach

`Our

is different different different things to values' a notion which may mean essential people, at times.

As we saw earlier in Douste-Blazy's reference to `les tenants des principes de la

democratie [

]' (Douste-Blazy, 1996n), the effect of his words is to distinguish as enemies, ...

do those exclude, all who not share whatever the values of French, and in this case, and francophone, identity are magically deemed to be. However deliberately vague Douste-Blazy's 12See Mitterrand,1990b. "See, for example,DGLF, chi IV. 1; Ministere de la Culture, 1996a,1996j, 1997e, 1998b;Le Monde, 11-12 May 1997.

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is As diversity linguistic be, his `values' to clear. safeguard cultural and may wish referencesto in discourse French is key the this political elites on of wish a element mentioned earlier, identity and the Internet, being frequently employed in the statements of various actors, and translated into a central policy theme.

6.2.5 Promoting French identity on the Internet French policy-makers have nevertheless attempted to go beyond regulatory measures, which the be to technological envy of as change and as part of a reaction seen perhaps negative may is legal France's forces. kind Another tradition of economic of explanation powerful more being a regulated and text-based State, where legal texts are prominent in the institutions of life. public

As Dauncey (1997, pp.86-7) suggests, `the "freedom", "individualism"

and

"anarchy" of the Net perhaps pose more problems for France than for other societies less prone to obsessiveconstitutional definition of liberties and rights and to the complex legal regulation of audiovisual activities'. Many political actors have argued that the Internet may represent a useful opportunity for the development and promotion of French identity, suggesting their opennessto change and in ideas. Faced terms to and access services which with relative weakness of equipment new in introduction (see Douste-Blazy, 1996n), French the to this policychapter also was noted for initiatives have for Internet technology: the the use of and related encouraged makers launched invitation in for bids for Industry 1994, Ministry to encourage the an when example, in in France's development the technological the to public sector strengthen projects information society, closely followed by a second appeal to support the work of small and in industries. In the companies multimedia an attempt to widen general accessto medium-sized in for households businesses, French France Telecom the government also asked and services March 1996 to establish tariffs which would allow access across France to the Internet for the 1996a, 3, local (DGLF, IV. 2; Fillon, 1996b). However, as I now telephone ch. a call of cost illustrate, the political responsesto the opportunities offered by the Internet still conceal fixed, traditional thinking by elites on identity.

Fillon for example(1996b),explainedhow digitalisation, in conjunction with scientific vitality, managementof technologyand a strong attachmentto identity ('une forte conscience identitaire'), might be used to serve the favoured ideals of cultural pluralism and multilingualism, citing possible advantagesof the easierproduction of dubbing and subtitles

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language television French frequent be of the to a as choice of more used allow which could highlighted he the like television, the Besides traditional also audiovisual media viewing. infinite possibilities for the French language to be distributed on a global scale via the Internet, describing the new networks of the Internet as offering an unprecedented means of promotion in However, French-speaking language for influence referring the countries. and cultures of and if, Fillon (cultures) `cultures' (language) langue' these `la wonder we may countries, of to and his HCF he francophonie', `la to the or audience, as claimed cultures of of means all necessarily by Ministry the by `high traditionally of the the promoted culture' culture represented rather, Culture and other associatedbodies within metropolitan France. This is a significant question if we consider some of the measures undertaken within

Franceto harnessthe possibilities of the Internet to promote French culture, and the discourse databases have initiatives to For them. on-line access encouraged example, which accompanies Joconde heritage French the as art and museum such cultural concerningparticular aspectsof databaseand the Bibliotheque nationale de France (national library), interactive galleries,a databaseon CD-ROM on the Pantheonmonument,and multimedia training for artists at the 1996c). 1998b; Douste-Blazy, Culture, 1996c, de la (Ministere nationalart academies The choice of `Joconde' for the name of a databaseon French art and history is an interestingexampleof cultural appropriation,however, as the title of the famous `Mona Lisa' is hanging in French da by Vinci, Leonardo a national gallery, which, although portrait digitalisation Douste-Blazy, According to the Italian of all of work of art. neverthelessan Frenchcultural heritageis necessary,sincethe future cultural influence of Francewill develop du dimanche, 11 August 1996). Such measuresand (Journal the through use of multimedia linked idea French `high to traditional traditional culture', are a of comments,promoting identity and the `universalvalue' of Frenchculture, revealedin the discourseof policy-making discussed below. Internet the technologies and andnew eliteson Douste-Blazy,for example,describedthe Internet as nothing to be afraid of, rather, a influence he be faced. Without this the to of confrontation of challenge challenge, argued, great French culture risks decline and the French languagemay lose its universal character('son information ideal for He the that universel'). an site new represented argued networks caractere its in describing heritage high French heritage this to advantage, cultural terms cultural showing of museumsand libraries (Douste-Blazy,1996k). Ratherthan relying on measureslike quotas to regulate,he argued,it would be necessaryfor good quality programmesand servicesto be

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in the industries the to of European by French market-place compete multimedia and produced he flourish, `our' to This although information maintained, culture allow would society. new The Minister 1996m). 1996c, (Douste-Blazy, in wrote also defining typical this, style without heritage, to distribute France's prevent to 1996b), the (Douste-Blazy, cultural urgent need of it, like from (`d'autres' interested archaeological effectively stealing once again) parties other French is there (`tresors appropriation of of no mention treasures archaeologiques'), although in 14 failed to Douste-Blazy Yet la such like Joconde. address `treasures' consistently what Internet `culture' ideas for the his is with are consistent the on of promotion whether statements An he have, French elite conception policies. as spoke of government citizens may those which dominant is is identity and univocal thus culture, French a monolithic, of which revealed of fails Such which to take eclecticism contrasting any possible of account a conception static. be in France, identities identity in and found be may enhancing globalisation as or may hybridity. to any contributing

Similarly, Toubon (Toubon, 1994t)arguedthat the developmentof a Frenchmultimedia industry could be a means of growth and progress,and the best way of safeguarding`our' independence, intellectual or clear what making although without and cultural power, economic EU included France, European have It `our' since to. and countries, could referred whom he Elsewhere, in industry `European' this mentioned the Toubon talked about speech. importanceof the developmentof Frenchmultimedia in terms of the creationof jobs andwealth (Toubon, 1994b).He also spokeambiguously(Toubon, 1994t)of his vision for the information faire de "peut-titre" `Comment `humanistic, in un terms ce plural vision': of a superhighway, "possible" qui correspondea une vision humanisteet plurielle, librement choisie et non imposee do ' (How economiques, d'imperatifs techniques d'autres we make ou politiques. au nom par humanistic into "possible", to "perhaps" our and pluralistic vision, this which corresponds a freely chosenand not imposed by others in the name of economic, technical and political imperatives(no questionmark in text, as a rhetorical question)). This is a curious statementas Toubon alluded to the possibilities for French identity on the Internet in vague terms, of a `vision' which is freely chosenandnot imposedby unknown `others'. 14Douste-Blazyclaimed that an unnamed American company a few months' previously, attempted to buy but is digitalise The behind in French to truth this a clear, not all works national museums. statement the rights had been Gallery in The Independent (15 National February 1995) British that the to the claimed rights report bought by Microsoft of the US, which was apparently interested in those of the Louvre.

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However, his statement failed to acknowledge the paradox of his own views on identity. How can he be a true liberal, as he claims to be, whilst his own policies advocate State involvement? His words ignore the `imperatifs politiques' which these policies may represent in imposing their particular vision on Internet services by seeking to marginalise that of other in favour in influences. line His the of earlier, argues speech, references we saw with cultural `la vigilance et l'interrogation permanentes' (constant vigilance and questioning), again using the military metaphor of a sentry on guard to emphasisethe need for control of the Internet. To do this, Toubon said that methods of experimentation, observation and dialogue with the public important he here, State have but his be the that, reminded will still an needed, audience will de lä le ' (The State `L'Etat to y ses will aura sa sera pas moindre roles. play: part et ce ne role its here be least its He this the of roles). also makes veiled referencesto and will not part play the State's management of culture when he talks of the role of cultural administration (`1'administration culturelle').

This is somewhat contradictory given his references to the

desirability of infrastructures and techniques developing in `un cadre liberal et dereglemente' (a liberal and deregulated framework), in which free competition will prevail. Furthermore, it is ironic, given the historic hostility of the French State, with its ethos of a central, single vision, to identity defending French diversity. about whatever political elites claim pluralism, real

Like Douste-Blazy,Toubon doesnot considerthe actualwishesof Internetconsumersin France,despitehis frequent,supposedlyinclusive,referencesto `nous' and `tous', andhis claim that the market shouldbe led by a responseto consumerwishesregardingmultimedia products identity `others' These 'Anglo-Saxon' an prefer of or even services. consumers might an and language in English times, the the and social at given economic utility of representation however, has France. Toubon, French traditional evidently a more notion of contemporary identity in mind when he talks about building a competitive multimedia industry which can (`conquerir') he talks about the possible export of French and, when externalmarkets, conquer heritage,which is amongstthe richestin the world, andthe bestpreserved. A similarly undynamic and backward-lookingview was expressedby Toubon when addressingthe questionof the effects of new media technologieson relations betweenculture defined (Toubon, Toubon 1994b). the public culture, as we saw earlier, in largely `high and `les d'art, les les terms as oeuvres artistes, musees,les theatres,les cinemas, les cultural' les les (artists, bibliotheques' chateaux, works of art, museums,theatres,cinemas, cathedrales, cathedrals,chateaux,libraries). Evident from his ideas was the fear of new technologies

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he identity, French hence State as French as a manager of culture and threatening the role of the described individualised, invoked a nightmarish vision of even selfish, cultural consumption, " described Toubon (an egoisme' `un extraordinary selfishness). extraordinaire negatively as digital, in the disturbing the new potential of view of such a situation as even more individualised services to undermine the objective of cultural democratisation as a route to feature discourse French in of a to the elites and political of often referred cohesion, national According One. in to Chapter I Malraux, the time explained as of cultural policy since is information technologies individualised future use of new Toubon's statement, such a of the be it does his true all should policy cultural a what of conception not match as problematic, by This theme `high is, bringing to continued was policy that audience. a wider culture' about, Catherine Trautmann, Socialist Minister of Culture from May 1997 under Prime Minister Jospin, who aimed to democratise culture further by increasing Internet connections to great art The 1998h, 1999j). la Culture, 1998g, de (Ministere Versailles real like Louvre the and sites Internet features individualised the is interactive for French may that the of and elites problem threaten traditional French cultural policy aims which seek to unify citizens around a narrow do indicate French Such identity. that elites political responses of conception anachronistic and identity to initial cultural follow and their through approaches new concerning rhetoric not for Internet. the policy

However,Fillon (1996b) advisedagainstgiving in to the temptationsof old attitudesof in identity (a frileux' identitaire» timid old seeking refuge tun «repli nostalgic, nostalgiqueet for francophonie be in favour as a on offer may which opportunities of of an awareness values) `place' of cultural exchange(`un lieu de dialogueentreles cultures'), given that Francealready . has experienceof developingtechnologiessuchas the Minitel, and, moreover,that the Internet doesnot belong to anyoneand doesnot have to be exclusively anglophone. Appealing to the francophoneaudienceat the HCF, Fillon maintained that a strategy of development and in language `la heritage francophones their to and establish cultural cooperationcould enable being digitalisation (modernity). described He through modernity as and accessible modernite' ideas This to statement appeals the global communications networks. well-established introduction in French in to the the political culture, mentioned cult of modernity concerning 'Toubon madesimilar remarkselsewhere(1994t), as he consideredthe uncertaintyof `virtual reality'. Juppe too referredto a selfish,dehumanised societybeing encouragedby digitalisation(Juppe,1996d).

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this chapter. However,Fillon may be more nostalgicthan his words indicate, since,despitehis details ideas for he to technical and change, usestraditional Frenchcultural references reference du famous like: Bellay's language, he text on when usesarguments suchas Il est souhaitable que tous les pays francophones developpent des contenus specifiques qui, dans leur langue d'origine ou dans d'autres langues, viendront enrichir de leur diversite l'offre de contenus et participeront, chacun ä leur maniere, de la defense et de l'illustration de notre identite culturelle - dans notre dans le reste du monde. Pour cela, la numerisation de nos comme propre espace fonds documentaires, artistiques, litteraires, etc. doit etre une priorite pour 1'ensembledes pays francophones. (It is desirable that all francophone countries develop specific services which, in their language of origin or in other languages,will enrich in their diversity the services offered, and each participate in their own way in the defence and illustration of our cultural identity in our own space as in the whole world. To do this, the digitalisation of our documentary, artistic, literary resources, etc., must be a priority for all francophone countries.)

Such a reference,to the book Defenseet illustration de la langue francaise(1549), is a subtle in identity literary definitions French terms to traditional more of classic, notions of of allusion culture, despitethe mention of `diversity', `all francophonecountries' or `other languages'. This illustrates the importance of the French languagein terms of the construction of an inclusive, potentially assimilatoryidentity, and of languageas the thread of this identity most by identities developments Internet bring threatened the such as cultural which may obviously into conflict. The commitmentto mobilising supportfor working on the issuewithin the francophone movementwas takena stepfurther in May 1996at the twelfth meetingof the HCF held in Paris (30 April-3 May). At this event, as we saw earlier, various politicians (and invited experts) discussedtheir ideas for developingthe Internet as an opportunity for the French language. Douste-Blazyfor examplearguedin his speech(Douste-Blazy, 1996n) that actual content of be must services produced,rather than relying on translationsof foreign (probably `AngloSaxon') servicesinto French,in order to preventall languagesexpressinga single vision of the Chirac world. also urged (Chirac, 1996c)that production and distribution of Frenchmaterials be must developed,through united action: `Il faut produire et diffuser en francais. II faut unir nos efforts,multiplier les programmes,les informations,les echangesdansnotre langue. Il faut la diversite valoriser et la richessede nos patrimoines culturels, de nos litteratures, de nos

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in ' (It is We broadcast French. to must unite our efforts, multiply musees. crucial produce and the products, information and exchangeswhich exist in our language. We must add value to the diversity and richness of our cultural heritage, of our literatures, of our museums.) Chirac's `our' familiar diversity the the to cultural richness of and need strengthen statement reflects heritages, literatures and museums (again quite traditional conceptions of culture as `high in fact be belonging francophone but to which presented as all countries may may culture', in interesting, is France). His `valoriser' those the of use which, as a word used of verb mean financial contexts, refers to the need to strengthen French culture commercially, and thus to increase its influence. Chirac also refers to the old battle concerning the position of French in in literature, French technology teaching that the and of science arguing scientific researchand imposed francophone be Furthermore, the to on new referring action concerning network. must the Internet in Canada,Chirac notes how Canadian francophones have taken account not only of the threat to French in Canada, but also the opportunity which the Internet could represent for the spread and implantation of French, if its imposition on the networks can be achieved: `la diffusion et l'enracinement de notre langue, pour peu que nous sachions en imposer Z'usage'. This is an interesting point which, although it clearly refers to the lack of legislation to protect the use of French by new communications media, also indicates a kind of universalist wish to it, denoted by indeed, impose `pour French, the the to statement use of peu que nous spread impose its imposer is This Z'usage' (if feature could we use). en only a of elite sachions discourse on French identity, francophone policy-making and the Internet which is now follows. fully in the section which addressedmore

6.2.6 Thefrancophone mission' against uniformity

As this chapterhasso far demonstrated,the usualcomplaintsaboutcultural uniformity resulting from American-ledimperialism arevoiced by policy-making elites in Francewith regardto the Internet just as they have been in connectionwith other 1990s languageand cultural policy issues,as I discussedin ChaptersFour and Five. The Internet is regardedas another`site' for the expressionof Frenchnationalidentity and,as such,is too important to be left to the forcesof the free market. Paradoxically,as discussedearlier, even politicians of an apparentlyliberal tradition supportthe interventionof public authoritiesin the managementof the Internet. This is no lessevidentin the caseof the discourseon identity,francophonie and the Internet offered in a contextof francophonepolicy-making.

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Chirac, for example argued that, whilst there are definite benefits which may arise in terms of social and professional links and cultural initiatives via the Internet, future generations of speakers of languages other than English risk cultural and economic marginalisation if is done improve to the provision of non-English Internet services, search engines and nothing navigation systems (Chirac, 1995c). Consequently, he urged a united effort on the part of the francophone community to improve the situation. He referred to the need to be conscious of the `dangers' of the digital revolution, which could lead to the irreversible widening of the gap between rich and poor countries, as well as cultural uniformisation. 16 Likewise, Fillon at the HCF (Fillon, 1996b), spoke of the need to stand guard or watch closely over, like a sentry as by Douste-Blazy ('veiller') the development of navigation systems and search earlier suggested francophone that so web-sites could flourish and permit francophone countries' entry engines, into the digital world.

Similarly, Chirac's HCF speech (Chirac, 1996c), focused on the gulf

between the North and South, which would result from the development of the information ('corriger') laws to the without measures correct superhighway, of the market. The choice of `corriger' implies that the laws of the market cannot possibly work; that they are in fact flawed harmful, times therefore requiring an external correction or remedy. Fillon's speechtoo at and described a need for `une solidarite' towards the Southern francophone countries and a united front on the regulation of international standards, described in military style as `un front in He for the explained need cooperation terms of a duty, since dialogue and sharing commun'. in development are `le fondement ethique de la francophone' (the fundamental ethos of francophonie).

All of theseexamplesindicateFrenchelites' wish to appearas leadersand defendersof identity on the world stage,as they speakof their efforts and willingness to defend weaker, poorer countriesagainstthe threat of cultural uniformity. Fillon explained how francophone countriespossessassetssuchasthe richnessand diversity of their cultural heritage,yet they still needthe help of the French Statewhich can support their projects. He describedthe French governmentas leading the way, with a programme of voluntary help, yet such apparently helpful sentimentsdo not conceal the sense of a `mission' for French elites to have an internationalinfluence, as he indicatesthe reasoningbehind the help offered: `[

]pour que

... notre pays,pionnier de la telematique,puisseaffirmer sa presencesur les reseauxmondiauxde 16Hereiteratedthis point on anotheroccasion(Chirac, 1996c).

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la communication et contribuer, a terme, au rayonnement culturel et economique de la francophonie.' ([

]so that our country, aspioneerof telematics,can assertits presenceon the

... world communication networks, and ultimately contribute to the cultural and economic influence of francophonie). So, accordingto Fillon's statement,French governmentalpolicies seekingto help francophoneidentity arereally seekingto safeguardFrenchidentity in the sense less metropolitan, pluralistic onethan that presented. a of Chirac also noted how 90% of information transmitted via the Internet is in English. " If French-language output is excluded from new media forms, the President claims, then `our' future generations will be economically and culturally marginalised (Chirac, 1995c).18 Instead, he argued that `la jeunesse du monde' (the youth of the world) must be offered `des raves francophones' (francophone dreams), which are expressed in films, soap operas (curiously here in being spite of a rather `low' cultural reference), and these strengthen the presented cultural richness and creativity of all francophone peoples. The use of `peuple' in the plural is here. The has plural significant probably deliberately been chosen in order to be acceptablein a francophone context where more than one country, and really, more than one identity, is is It for Chirac to refer to `notre peuple' in the singular, for fear of not acceptable addressed. his audiencewho may view this as meaning metropolitan French identity and nothing alienating if is that the real meaning. even more,

However, the use of vocabulary in `les raves

francophones', together with the reference to films and soap operas, could be an attempt at a broader vision of identity, suggesting something fluid and in motion.

Yet, facedwith possible`uniformisation', Chirac maintainedthat production of material in French is so necessarythat it is `une questionde survie' (a question of survival), urging Southernfrancophonecountriesto participatein this `combat', returning once more to military imagery to gain support. His efforts to rally cooperation and help extended beyond francophonie, as he explainedthat other linguistic groups,besidesfrancophones,were equally threatened: Les hispanophones tous ceux qui s'expriment en hindi ou en et les arabophones, russe,en chinois ou enjaponais, sont confrontesa la meine menaceque nous. J'appelle la francophonie ä prendre la tete d'une vaste campagne le pour "This figure was

alsomentionedby Douste-Blazy(Douste-Blazy,1996b).

"This is echoedvirtually word-for-wordin the HCF speechby Chirac(Chirac, 1996c).

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de demain. inforoutes les diversite la linguistique culturelle sur et pluralisme (Hispanic speakers,Arabic speakers,all those who express themselves in Hindi in in in Chinese Japanese,all are confronted with the same threat Russian, or or for linguistic lead huge francophone I to campaign a call upon as we are. 19 (Chirac, 1995c). pluralism and cultural diversity on the networks of tomorrow) This is interesting as now the Japanese,denounced as cultural `invaders' elsewhere in the elite discourse on identity and the Internet, are used in a pragmatic way by Chirac as potential allies. Francophonie is now an actor itself, leading the way for diversity, but this is another `smokescreen' concealing the often-cited role of France itself as defender and leader, as illustrated in ChaptersFour and Five. Such an appeal was echoed in Chirac's address to the HCF, where the President developed his argument as he stated that the issue extended even further:

Vous le voyez, le theme qui vous rassemble cette annee represente un enjeu la de la l'avenir langue, de preservation mais aussi pour notre majeur pour diversite culturelle du monde, et donc pour la defense de 1'humanisme, inseparable de cette langue francaise qui, depuis plusieurs siecles, en porte les valeurs. (As you see, the theme which unites you this year represents a great for but future language, for the preservation of the the also of your challenge itself humanism, defence for diversity the the of of world, and so cultural inseparable from this French language, which has transmitted its values for (Paris, 1996c). several centuries)

This is quite an ambitious,striking declaration,as Chirac equatesFrench with humanismand justify his The in invokes history, to constructionof the generalisation. order vice versa,and his driving future, helps flow the the takes of sentence, and which past, present sentence, listenerforward throughthe argument. The useof by now familiar terms which arekey themes in the discourseon Frenchidentity suchas `humanisme',`diversite' and `valeurs' indicatesthe language defence French These Internet. his behind the the of on universalist sentiments by Chirac's from France talking themselves easy shift about and are strengthened sentiments francophonieto talking aboutthe whole world. He also highlighted in this HCF speechhow the French governmenthad taken up its duty to inform SouthernFrench-speakingcountries,especiallyin Africa (where accessto the "Note that this Cotonou summit speech has been used as a point of reference in the development of debate by several government figures, for example Douste-Blazy (Douste-Blazy, 1996n), and Jupp6, who used words very Chirac's (Juppe, 1996d). to similar

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Internet is often limited), of the significance of the conference's focus, in advance of the Midrand discussions set for May of the same year. At the 1997 meeting of the HCF (Chirac, 1997a), the President alluded to a similar senseof a francophone `mission', as he attempted to in battle impose Asian `partners', French, Chinese, Hindi and Japanese on the the to rally information superhighway, in a fight against uniformity minoring that undertaken by the French for in Once Europe. `universal the multilingualism within campaign again, senseof a mission' Chirac's thinking on identity is quite clear, as he used references to battle and to a struggle to his rallying cry. The call extended beyond francophonie, as he sought the support of support linguistic and ethnic groups for his aim of `diversite'. The irony is that in calling for the other imposition of French and other languages on the Internet, he fails to acknowledge the less included French `missions' bolstering the past of elite appealing which of French at the expense languages which were crushed, both in the colonial experience abroad and in the Third of other Republic's educational system, as explained in Chapter Three. Decoding of Chirac's exaltation `mission' for in in Europe Chapter Three, that this the multilingualism suggests, as we saw of betrays more pragmatic intentions for the protection of French, rather than a principled policy for languages. Furthermore, we might wonder how the different the sake of numerous stand groups mentioned can really be `partenaires' (partners) of French political elites, given the criticism of their economic and cultural values which was discussed earlier in this case study, in is Chapter is Five. Chirac It that attempting to cast his `universal message' and evident towards other cultural groups and identities, in the hope of supporting his own, quite traditional notions of French identity. The notions run through his statements during the three consecutive years considered, suggesting that as the elite debate on the Internet moved on, Chirac's identity remained largely unchanging. conception of

Furtherexamplescanbe noted,for example,Fillon (Fillon, 1996b),who, when speaking in Internet the termsof the transmissionof Frenchlanguagematerial,also the potential of about referred to an objective of `spreadingthe word' about French cultural values to a wider audience, which he said was possible through multilingualism in conjunction with digitalisation, which could be a remarkable tool for `la conquete' (conquering) of a new audience,returning to the imagery of battle. Margie Sudre(Sudre, 1996d) similarly presented familiar argumentsabout the French governmentwishing to encouragecultural and linguistic diversity claiming that the information networkscould becomea bridge betweendevelopedand developingcountriesand thus createa more united world. Likewise, Douste-Blazy (Douste-

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Blazy, 1996n), declared his support for creating `des passerelles entre les langues et les cultures' (bridges between languages and cultures). His reasons for this though are significant in that they appear to refer to harmful influences which may otherwise develop, including an allusion to Islamic extremism, highly topical in the political climate of the 1990s: `Nous savons trop que les espacesde pensee clos sur eux-memes sont propres a favoriser 1'appauvrissement de la pensee eile-meme, voire a conduire cette pensee vers les extremismes et tous les integrismes.' (We know only too well that spaces of closed, inward-looking thought are ideal for the impoverishment of thought itself, even leading this thought towards extremism and all forms of fundamentalism.) (Douste-Blazy, 1996n). The use here of the phrase `tous les integrismes' is a significant choice, as `integrisme' in contemporary French political culture is synonymous with form fundamentalism, that associated with some forms of Islam. Douste-Blazy one of only inference a similar elsewhere (Douste-Blazy, 1996b), when he warned of the need to avoid gave the new networks being spoilt of `tarnished' (`terms') by abusive or exploitative extremism (`teile exploitation abusive, extremiste'). Whilst not as clear as the HCF speech's statement, these phrasestoo, when used by a French politician, may refer to forms of religious extremism in feared the French secular Republican system, encouraging perceptions of fear surrounding so the potential use of the Internet. Moreover, it is problematic that Douste-Blazy claims an open, forward-looking outlook for the French and francophone identity he presents, whilst denouncing that of others as `closed' and `inward-looking', when previous close reading of elite statements has already shown a closed, undynamic attitude of the French elite conception of identity in terms of reactions to `cultural invaders' of varying foreign origins.

So we can see,from this analysisof the elite discoursemade in a francophonepolicymaking context,that traditional referencesto a universal `mission' for Frenchpolicy-making,to the defenceof humanity and particular `values' (not necessarilyclearly defined), are madeby various political actors in discussingFrench on the Internet, as they claim to be open and inclusive towards other cultures and identities. However, the motivations behind statements for North-South initiatives and those between developed and developing support pledging countriesare questionable,as it may be arguedthat `French' identity is the overriding concern of policy-makers,and not that of other francophoneregions, given the influence of cultural initiatives developed largely from centralised organisations in Paris such as the ACCT, discussedin ChapterThree. In addition,hostility to different groups,and the apparentwillingness to cooperatewith

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those whose identities have been denounced elsewhere in the discourse on the Internet, support the contention that the French elite view of identity is still on the whole traditional and backward-looking, in spite of grand claims about looking to the future and seizing new for by a new cultural medium such as the Internet. As cultural exchange offered opportunities demonstrated by Fillon (Fillon, 1996b), the overriding policy concern illustrated in the discourse on the Internet considered in this section is along the lines of those we saw in Chapter Four: one of guaranteeing the continuation of the francophone (code for `French') `ambition' and `universal message', whatever this message actually is: `Je suis, pour ma part, convaincu donner les de saurons ensemble nous nous moyens cette ambition et que nous saurons que faire des futurs reseaux mondiaux de 1'information un espaceoü la pluralite des langues et des le de la francophone message universel et auront leur place...' (I personally am cultures know how that together to give ourselves the means of realising this we will convinced be information future that to the the and we will able make global networks of a space ambition languages the plurality of and cultures, and the universal message of francophonie will where have their place... ).

6.3 Conclusions To summarise,this casestudy has shown that French governmentalelites have used various for debate language identity issuesas they are and policy-making on and cultural platforms by information Internet Such the technologies. and opportunities have been sought affected France, European institutions EU through cooperation with other with partners and within francophonecountries.The high degreeof activity in terms of working groups,conferencesand its Internet French language the to the on and challenges and cultural identity indicates reports the level of Stateconcernregardingthe issue,which has not diminished following the transfer to the Jospinadministration. A degreeof ambiguity is revealedin French policy-making reactionsto the Internet. Socialist Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1997 Hubert Vedrine cited the Internet and Microsoft factors such as creatinga situation `quasimentsansprecedent'(almost as companies American of economic and cultural dominance, whilst also recognising unprecedented) for French the possibilities exploitation of the Internet `pour nos entreprises,pour enormous (for industries, for influence (Vedrine, 1997a). The Internet as a rayonnement' our our notre symbol of modernisationand national prestigethereforeseducesFrance,just as other symbols

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described. As in One done Chapter have development American the my as past, culture and of harnessing Internet has the the together as a carrier with aim of shown, such objectives, analysis for particular aspects of French cultural identity, contribute to French elite discourse on the information society and the policy which develops from it.

The Internetappearsto pose a particular challengeto identity in terms of its constantly it) in it facilitates (for those the who can access exposure to a and way which nature evolving theoretically unlimited range of information and activities on a global scale. As we have seen, the key concern running throughout French elite discourse and examples of policy for the Internet, is the need to tame and regulate the open communications market. This is explained by political actors in terms of the wish to safeguard French commercial interests, and to prevent in information diversity the uniformity whilst encouraging society. Yet, the constant cultural in language discourse French the to the the of and `French cultural strengthening references being for bolstering Internet the to the the as one on policy-makers of of point priority values' despite language This to of and openness other cultures. and culture, claims pluralism one factor, together with policy-makers' uncomfortable reception of the increasingly individualised in `consumers' technologies, consumption of evident communications where new may nature from different `high' a variety of services encompassing aspects of and `low' culture, choose in `French' line by that of origin with supported necessarily and perhaps not official policy, not would suggestthat the Internet threatens certain traditional perceptions of French identity in that it may offer experiencesindicative of a more hybrid definition of linguistic and cultural identity indeed itself. culture and

It is interesting that political actors whose discourseis discussedin this case study kind leader, France's fight for `universal', `essential' to to refer a of role as able continually francophone French of and culture,without explicitly addressingwhat thesereally are. values Notions of the actionsof cultural and economiccompetitorsasharmful to Republicanvaluesof democracyand liberty, even `humanity' are describedin a similarly abstract fashion. The Internet is - as recognisedby some of the figures in this case study - also synonymouswith delocalisation the such as and globalisation concepts of communicationsand culture, which further limit influence the of more traditional conceptionsof public servicebroadcasting may information, as the effectsof the demassificationand individualisation of consumptionare and (see Hare, 1999). emerging Such factors contribute to the scale of the challengewhich the Internet presentsfor

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French policy-makers and their traditional concerns about the protection of French language and French identity, which continue to inform debates and policy on various cultural matters. The 1990s, as discussed in the preceding case studies, have seen related controversies such as the in life in for 1oi issue, French Toubon the as example public revealed campaigns to use of international future improve French the to the organisations, position of within calls guarantee status of French within the scientific community, arguments for the exemption of `cultural from the GATT agreementsand France's efforts to protect and develop broadcasting products' legislation linguistic within the European Union. Thus the debate on the Internet issue may and be viewed as a further manifestation of French elites' continuing anxieties over the future of its identity, which remain on the policy-making agendasof successive administrations. Yet, on balance, the Internet represents a strong challenge for French cultural policy-

in its terms of constantlyevolving nature, and its position amongsta whole range of makers developments technological within the communications arena, which are, after all, new emergingthrough the efforts of commercial enterpriseof various national origins rather than through thoseof the State(seeHare, 1999,p.315). Thus the Internet remains new, uncharted difficult looks further for French elites. These territory to which pose set problems and from the regulationof the Internet,as technologyadvances,to the difficulties of range problems French democratisation cultural policy objectives such as achieving and the protection of `French identity'. Moreover, the continuation of a `top-down' policy approach imposing identity held by elites which have been French traditional conceptions of undynamic demonstratedby this casestudy may causedifficulties both in Franceand abroad. Firstly, such identity views of may conflict with the preferencesof someconsumerswithin the French rigid identity hybrid, their who may perceive as more perhapsin terms of identities, and electorate, thus may not feel uncomfortablewith using Internet services supposedly imposing `other' identities,including 'Anglo-Saxon' ones. Furthermore,the elite failure to respondadequatelyto identities both from the accept range within and outsideof Francewhich may be present of and international Internet, France's the to trade and political partnersthrough may serve alienate on the presentationof an externalimage of Franceand the French Stateas hostile and backwardlooking.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Overview My study set out to explore the perceptions of national identity that were held by political elites in France in relation to the language and cultural issues prominent on the policy-making agenda in the 1990s. Elite perceptions of French identity represented an important field of research because of the long-standing role of the State, and political elites more generally, in developing issue debating key in linguistic and cultural areas. In view of this, I this through policy and conducted an analysis of elite visions of identity which were communicated in the political debates surrounding three case studies: language, audiovisual and Internet policy.

These

discussion in the public arena. I specifically aimed to consider if, and if considerable attracted identity French in be to extent, elite what visions of might changing the 1990s in the light of so, both the influence of new approaches to cultural policy-making pursued from the 1980s, and recent supra-national challenges to this policy. My case studies focused in most depth on the from 1993 This because, from this point, political debate on cultural onwards. was period issues and French national identity intensified in these areas. In language policy, the loi Toubon limit foreign 1994 in `loan' to the which attempted use of of words French public life paved the for the elite targeting of the European Union policy-making sphere, as an opportunity for way identity French to threats to possible national responding related to the use of the French language. In the case of audiovisual policy, debates on American-led cultural imperialism during General Agreement the the re-negotiation of on Tariffs and Trade, the surfaced development of EU quotas, and anxieties over digitalisation. The arrival of the digital age, and in particular the Internet, generated debate about new threats and opportunities for French identity.

As a meansof exploring elite perceptionsof identity in eachof my selectedcasestudy focused I on a close reading of several key statements,selected from the political areas, discoursein thesefields. The casestudiesthemselvesprovided an overview of legislation on the issues,reflecting the connectionbetweenlanguageand cultural policy measuresand elite in State identity. French the However, it was necessaryto go beyond of concerns management thesemeasures,in order to uncoverthe true complexity of perceptionsheld by Frenchpolitical illustrated in debatesaround cultural policy. Detailed analysis of the discourseof as elites, in illuminated 1990s the the deepertruths about this identity, demonstratingit to elites political

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be more complex than was first apparent. My analysis showed that the political responsesto the in despite being issues these qualitatively new some cases,were policy challenges examined, rooted in the ideological constructions of the past. Furthermore, my case studies revealed many tensions, ambiguities and contradictions inherent within the targeted discourse, which I summarise below. The conception of French identity which was presented in the debates on cultural and language policy examined in Chapters Four, Five and Six was firstly one based on opposition to identities. The theme of a `battle' was strong, as elites described French identity as under other threat and requiring defending from other identities. This theme was associated with various Republican and Revolutionary references, to the idea of France in danger, but struggling valiantly. The other identities that threatenedFrench identity were shown in the case studies to be based on old enemies in many cases. The strongest example was still American identity, closely linked to the French elite fear of mass culture and the spread of the English language. Thus supposedly American values of consumerism and `popular' culture continued to be denounced by politicians in 1990s France. Yet the case studies demonstrated that these elites continued to have a contradictory relationship with American identity, as aspectsof this identity continued to seduce them in the 1990s,just as in the immediate post-war period (see Kuisel, 1993). Referencesto modernity, to progress, to meeting the challenges of globalisation, were linked to the complex elite view of America as an enemy to be feared, but also a model to be all emulated.

Another exampleof a traditional enemy,althoughnot as commonly presentedas the USA, was Japan. Japanwas more subtly criticised, through its identification as a nation whose high degree of technological development helps to diffuse mass culture, and hence, American identity. Referencesconcentratedon the idea of a Japanese/Americanmonopoly of culture and technology, which had been established through the presence of dominant industrial groups. This theme too was ambiguous, as French elites also illustrated that their fear of Japanese technological strength was related to their own envy i. e. their desire to make French technology catch up, and become more important in a more globalised market-place. Yet in the case of Japan, America and `Anglo-Saxons' or `Anglo-Americans', French politicians frequently into complaints of conspiracies by these groups to implement `plots' to gain cultural retreated dominance, economic and which, ultimately, threatenedFrench identity. Another `battle' over identity concerned France's relationship with Europe, both in the

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in 1990s, French Europe. For the EU the the elites notion of wider geographical and sense of `Europe' could be both a threat to French identity, and an opportunity. Fears were highlighted in frequently English integration, European to that the trend more use suggesting about institutions of the EU for example, and the development of a single market, together with the idea developing free barriers trade the to cultural unity or a common of and removal of European identity, could all be harmful to the individual identities of the EU member states, identity. importantly, French to most

Furthermore, criticisms abounded of other European

facing felt, failed European French to the comprehend challenges elites countries which, identities. Such countries were accusedof allowing more Anglo-American cultural influence to develop, through their opposition to French proposals for audiovisual regulation for example, thereby acting as `Trojan horses', as De Gaulle complained thirty years previously. Yet many opportunities were used to rally other EU members as partners, and thereby to encouragethem to follow the French agendain areasof cultural and language policy which concerned identity. In addition, they appealedto non-EU states,in a wider Europe, for support in cultural matters. Yet my analysis has demonstratedhow French elites' really sought cooperation within Europe, in whichever sensethe term was used, as an opportunity to defend and promote French identity, ideas identity French To traditional to this they all. end, continued present of as rooted above within Europe, in opposition to non-European `others' like the USA, together with a view of France as a leader for Europe, which would stand firm in the face of challenges to European identity.

Despite attempts to conceal them, based on claims to be selflessly defending all

European identities equally, these ideas were still prevalent in the discourse, and were by in the analysis my casestudies. uncovered A further challenge to French identity was identified, concerning change in world in This discussed terms of the breaking down of old political was particularly structures. War, business Cold the the the the after and end of globalisation of media, and of and structures markets. In relation to this change, elite debates illustrated tensions over free trade and liberalisation of economies, the re-alignment of nations, the development of even bigger multinational corporations taking possession of the media, and the growth of new technologies allowing more rapid and easier communications across continents. However, new information and media technologies, whilst objects of desire for French elites who do not wish France to be left behind in terms of technological development, pose new and potentially even stronger challengesto elite conceptions of French identity as they are so much more difficult to regulate

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than were previous terrestrial, non-digital methods of communication.

Moreover, the

development of the global technology and information market has increasingly favoured the diffusion of the English language and English-speaking culture. As this has happened, old fears be frequently in for began Americanisation, to terms of a new example, voiced more concerning totalitarianism, of the threat of a single world, of a uniform language and culture, and of itself, in has become the term the contemporary political and as more prominent globalisation economic vocabulary.

However, as writers like Featherstone assert (1995, pp. 13-4),

in fact, French fear, lead to cultural uniformity, but as may not elites may actually globalisation to increased diversity, which these same voices would claim to welcome.

Yet given the

French both Left limit Right American cultural the to wish of policy-makers of and apparent influences and indeed hybridity, and to encourage a `top-down' approach to cultural policy based on their undynamic views of identity, these groups sought in the 1990s to impose their own uniformity.

In oppositionto challengesof the kind outlined above,French elites have, alongside their useof referencesto a `battle' of identities,promoteda vision of Frenchidentity as founded for diversity. This strategywas behind the policy themesof the pluralism and respect on plurilinguisme and exceptionculturelle which were debatedand adoptedin severalareasof French languageand cultural policy-making in the 1990s. However, the casestudiesin this thesis have identified the true vision of French identity to be largely a monolithic one, as by discourse issues language the on and cultural examined,and the policies which evidenced from ideas. these resulted To defend this conceptionof French identity, and actively promote and extend its influence,traditional appealswere usedin elite discourse:to tradition itself ; to the notion of Franceasa greatcountry,anda creativeforce;to abstractimagesof beauty,basedon openness, fertility; light to myths aboutthe unity of French culture and national identity; to the and air, of Frenchunity basedon military-style rallying; to the developmentof unity encouragement with Europeanand francophonepartners,and even, at times, non-traditionalpartnerssuch as Japan,which may at times - for pragmaticor tactical reasons- be constructedas something otherthana culturalenemy. The methods chosen to defend and promote French identity were traditional too. The identified them as looking towards the regulation and ordering of French culture studies case language, and ultimately, identity. It was the State which was repeatedly called upon to and

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to by French continued who being politicians, lead this, still regarded as a cultural manager Culture the Ministry dominant the under of Malraux legacy draw on the vision of and the of Fifth Republic, based largely on the desirability of democratising high culture. Moreover, the further looks back in language identity even 1990s vision of and cultural policy as expressed impose to to inherits to it to monitor and the wishes regulate, codify, than the Fifth Republic, as State's features been have the of particular cultural visions at the expense of others, which indeed for to the language in ancien prior centuries, the many culture and areas of activity regime. We have seen this in the case study chapters, which illustrated that the State still in French imposing the language various of through use regulating spelling, use, manages discussing francophone the it developing the or movement, overseas, circumstances,promoting ' State The languages. audiovisual to still manages minority awarding recognition of merits in language European-created French and radio of use and the content and monitoring culture, bodies, imposing broadcasting, and challenging television quotas, creating new regulatory In liberalisation. the in is with relationship trade still an uncomfortable systems, what world i. `gatekeeper', has to State to information e. the as technologies, act attempted area of new individualised interactive development methods which encourage more of new monitor the language the French to (of on use of regulate suspicious), are elites which political consumption develop francophone for to French Internet, to new products and cooperation and the call fundamentally designed to undynamic version preserve a services which are all, paradoxically, identity. French of In all of the three areas examined, French political elites in the 1990s continued the familiar arguments that cultural and language issues are too important to be left to the open free be these they thus to trusted, the are of allowed areas, as and control cannot market market; identity. development French importance to the of continued expression and central

In this

look defensive but follow legislation to do they discourse vision, also a not only and respect, identify new opportunities for the promotion of French identity, a tension that leads to instead Yet, for in both debate policy. of and opting a genuinely more ambiguities evident future, in identity, be line the of and which would with a multipluralistic of vision eclectic, 'Outside the scopeof this study, we have also seen the involvement of the State in changing the rules on the use in French language feminist-led The in for (see, to the many years of response example, genders pressure of Economist, 4 July 1998).

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Europe developing France, and a more globalised world, where consumers can select a ethnic from a range of identities on offer in language and culture, my study of discourse in all three in 1990s illustrated has French the to concentrate on that elites chose political case study areas defend identity, despite French to their to traditional wish referring notions of promoting openness,diversity and cultural exchange. In doing this, French elites used their claims for cooperation, and their appeals to European and francophonepartners, to the presentation of European and francophone identity as in disguising defend French their to of as a means wish a world of uniformity, alternatives identity par excellence. My analysis has demonstrated that the true views of French identity in follows: by 1990s the as elites were political promoted identity identities; is French to that superior other it hence `other' the that and consumerism culture, values rejects and mass of identities which are deemed inferior, in spite of claiming to support diversity; in favoured it is be Europe the to that as special arenas of shared and celebrated andfrancophonie; it is inherited based Revolutionary Republican tradition, that and on and on values and purity, rather than hybridity;

it is its influence be far that that universal, should spread as and as possible, andindeed,that to do this is a fundamentalduty. By continuing to present and defend such a static vision of French identity in the 1990s, French in French find to the world, elites sought encouraging a continuing role a means of political through France as a defender of identity, and a leader of francophonie, of European civilisation, in EU the time of countries, when, at a reality, France was a medium-sized power, facing and diminished political, cultural and linguistic influence.

Yet French elites continuedto show that they believed France could still meet the its language, culture, and ultimately, `Frenchness', through its defence of and to challenges its leadership identity, French of other nations. In this way, French elites of and encouragement influence legacy American the ongoing on language and culture, on the economy, of challenged and on world politics - in the so-called `American Century'? They challenged European integration if implemented in a way that they did not favour. They challenged those aspectsof 2SeeLuce (1941), and my argumentson this elsewhere(Strode, 1999a).

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free, global trade to which they were opposed, and attacked the `selfish' use of new digital technologies, which was outside their control in a globalised market whose regulation they have left by found French far difficult. The overall message political elites' efforts to counter the so identity, to traditional, their views of unchanging national was that eternal still challenges France can still stand proud and firm, continuing to find new opportunities for its expression, in spite of threatsand change.

7.2 Contribution to wider fields of research This thesis seeks to contribute to several broad fields of knowledge as they relate to France, identity, the on nature of cultural studies, and politics. By focusing on the reflections notably between identity language French elite notions of and cultural and policy, the study relationship has further illuminated the special intersection of identity and policy in the French context. It has provided a wide-ranging analysis of the continuing significance of identity in policy-making institutions in language France, its to through contemporary relating and culture original and discourse identity French in the 1990s the closely comparing of political elites on approach different three casestudy areas. across

In broad terms, it offers a contribution to ongoing, interdisciplinary debatesabout identity, and especially French identity, which have been significant in the late twentieth century. More specifically, it builds on published work focusing on cultural policy under the President Mitterrand Socialist 1980s, the the of of and government period notably that of Wachtel (1987) and Looseley (1995), to provide an overview of policy priorities and institutional developments during the 1990s. In addition to an interpretation and analysis of discourse on identity, my study provides a record of events during the period covered, adding to describing French policy and debate on language and culture in the Fifth work existing Republic. Moving on from the point where Looseley's study of the years of Jack Lang's Ministry of Culture (1995) concluded, this thesis fills two gaps in the existing literature, firstly providing a focus on the post-1993 period, and secondly, a detailed consideration of the centrality of identity across a range of key policy areas and legislative periods. Thus it offers a general assessmentof cultural and language policy after Lang, especially of the terms of office of Ministers of Culture Jacques Toubon and Philippe Douste-Blazy, together with a particular examination of the relationship between thesepolicy areasand questions of identity at this time.

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Chapter One noted some of Looseley's conclusions as questions raised by the Lang era of interest in be likely the to post-Lang period. of were which policy-making,

For example,

Looseley's question (1995, p.244) of how Lang's successors might marry the seemingly State `grand the a narrative' of a shared national culture and as promoting views of opposed individualised to trying of communications era more a new accommodate simultaneously identity Internet. The the to and my case study of was of particular concern consumption, findings of my work in this new research field confirmed that the State has still to resolve this dilemma, as successive Ministers and other political elites have identified the Internet as a identity destabilising for but their visions of culture and arena one potentially problematic, is for identity to target and a crucial continued regulation manipulation according specific which in a more complex era of communications. Furthermore, this thesis has confirmed goals Looseley's preliminary assessmentthat `a dramatic new approach' to, and a redefinition of, from did following Jack Lang Jacques Toubon look to the transition not cultural policy-making likely, and his suggestion that `a more classical, Gaullist conception' could be on the horizon (1995, pp.228-9).

Indeed, my study has illustrated how the development of cultural and

language policy during the post-Lang period, and political debate surrounding this policy, forward, being by than an guided actual retreat, rather a step conceptions of French represented identity which reverted to traditional, rigid models, as opposed to embracing more dynamic and hybrid ones.

Beyondthis, the presentstudy contributesto the specific literature on languagepolicyin France, building on Wilcox's work (1998), which explored the particular role of making language pressure groups in policy-making of the early 1990s, up to and including the 1oi Toubon, the work of Brulard (1997a, 1996b), Machill (1997) and Thody (1995) which focused loi Toubon, Ager (1996a, 1996b) language the which examined and of on policy institutions and francophonie.

The research described within this thesis examined the period of language

policy-making following the Toubon law, specifically offering an assessment of French language policy in relation to identity and European integration, and how this related to the French EU Presidency of 1995 and France's ongoing leadership of the francophone movement. Alongside this, besides highlighting the continuing importance of identity in French conflicts issues, trade over my researchon the audiovisual policy debatesrelating to GATT and quotas more specifically illustrated the appealby French political elites to shifting conceptsof France's European identity, as a means of pursuing their own identity policy agendaduring the 1995 EU

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Presidency. Thus the thesis is also a contribution to the area of French policy on cultural and language issuesas it related to other arenasof policy-making and debate, such as the EU and the francophone movement during the period studied. Finally, the work adds to the literature on the his Mitterrand, Francois President of consideration role providing special second septennat3of in cultural and language policy debates on identity and France's involvement with European integration, and offers an initial assessment of President Jacques Chirac's development of francophonie.

7.3 Project limitations and directions for future research The findings of my research confirmed the original hypothesis that the conceptions of French identity expressedin language and cultural policy held by French political elites in the 1990s did not deviate from traditional views. This said, there are certain limitations to this study fact by I be these the that that off-set are amply argue although would mentioned, should which this study makes a significant contribution to research on the relationship between French identity, language and cultural policy in France of the 1990s.

It would seemnecessary,however,to make a number of points regardingthe confines issues in Chapter Firstly, to to this conducted. return noted project was which research within Two, there is the question of the degree of coverage provided by the thesis. As my in issues to the quality, range chapter outlined, such as access archives, variations methodology by the cooperation of personnel and conserved organisations, cataloguing of materials and in together time with constraintsand areas of government and within political parties, working influenced for fieldwork, factors this travel are which available and researchproject. resources Human error too can lead a researcherto miss certain items when working for long periodson issues Further to this. the related collection of a wide rangeof such as research archive-based datawhich could haveinfluencedmy coverageof material were connectedto the availability of from inconsistencies found I to the my study, most some relevant notably organisations sources by French As but this, political parties. researching material conserved a result of also when in due interest lack devoting to the some smaller parties of of resourcesto cultural and perhaps languageissues,my study has focusedon the opinions of figures from the mainstreampolity in France. An opportunity for future researchin the area of identity and cultural policy could ; Presidential term of seven years.

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involve pursuingthe opinionsof political elites from smallerparties in more detail. I would arguethat my studyhasprovided a valuablecomparisonof the ideasof the most identity involved debates during figures the period cultural with on and policy significant based into from taken on sample, research a wide-range of material of a cross-party studied, different formats. Furthermore, as I noted in Chapter Two, the nature of archive-based research is be that this type to to any outlined above such project of cannot claim points related is degree there the comprehensive; always possibility of some of chance or aleatoire completely in data, in involving the the collection of perhaps more so case a subject of such occurring identity This limitation topics. too to as and cultural point relates another of the complexities is It the texts. true that some of the material was received selection which concerns of work, due funding in (and to to time visits archives personal constraints of and also perhaps without the case of some of the material which did involve me personally accessing it, due to the filing in However, I have I that already place), am was pre-selected. confident made all systems for different to this, through targeting compensate my research strategies on a of range efforts large information from through and archive centres, obtaining and amounts of organisations issues. doing In I this, sources about particular was able to take the necessary steps secondary to obtain any material beyond that which was initially offered to me by my contacts in France.

Another limitation concerningthe selectionof material concernsthe choice of data for detailed analysis and its interpretation. As I explained in my methodology chapter, the is innocent, data. it be Thus not passively absorbing and explaining should researcher in is by that the this a project such as one, material selected and analysed the author, recognised has data be to to scope choose aspects of privilege, and could accusedof misinterpreting who Whilst to the points, giving more weight some at expense of others. some my study has aimed to provide an analysiswhich is as scientifically rigorous as possible,basedon a wide-ranging believe be I body identity by to the which of representative of opinion on expressed sample French political elites, and on close reading and comparisonof texts, it is still the casethat based this of nature, on thematic, qualitative analysis, may be subject to different research interpretationsby different readers. However, I believe that the range of material I have figures in three different case the and views of various my comparison of political covered, based 1990s, the areas spanning on researchcarriedout through many sources,providesa study body of evidenceto supportthe claims of my thesis. solid A criticism of this study could also be that the research did not cover a broader

244

definition of political elites in France, according to those outlined in Chapters One and Two. My project, however, set out specifically to investigate the publicly-communicated opinions of i. In the statements of politicians. view of the often-politicised role of other political elites, e. in France, or civil servants and policy-advisors outside the party-political/government elites ideas identity into impact held by broader the the the about of group of spheres, research future be in did thesis this worth research, elites might pursuing which not set out to political it be In addition, would worthwhile to consider the specific role of political elites of this cover. broader category in relation to European Union policy-making

on culture and language,

involving relations with other member states. particularly Because the Internet is a relatively new communications development, the potential for long this topic the thesis study of within was as not as that of the audiovisual and period language areas. However, the intensity of debate and policy activity around this issue meant that the analysis in this thesis identified a large body of material for exploration, and offered an in development France. This technology the of an exciting of period of new area of assessment further for I offers and possibilities research, outline several potential directions for research future enquiry here. What has been the response,if any, of different sectors of the population in France to the opinions and policies of French political elites on the Internet and identity? How far is State regulation possible, in practice? Do service-providers and consumers take real heed identity French concerns about elite and the consequences of the development of the of Internet? What are the implications for government, and for political elites more generally, of if Internet, to the the general public, and specific groups within it such as regulate attempting business, do not welcome this? To engage in research of this nature, it would be necessaryto investigate the view of identity and cultural policy `from the floor', and to examine the opinions diverse different to variables such as age, class and occupation, ethnicity groups, according of This line gender etc. of enquiry was outside the scope of this thesis, but presents a valuable and direction for further researchon French identity and new technologies.

Finally, this researchproject could only offer an initial assessmentof the period of debate language in France following the election of Prime and and policy-making cultural Minister Lionel Jospinand the appointmentof CatherineTrautmannas Minister of Culture and Communicationfrom May 1997. This was due to the fact that the researchset out to examine the years 1989-97,and that, at the time of its final writing-up (1999), the Trautmann/Jospin in Although this thesis has made referenceto the input of was still office. administration

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Trautmann and Jospin to debates and policy on language and culture, the constraints of `real time' researchmean that I do not offer a comprehensive account of this period. My researchhas found that from the debatesanalysed in the period 1997-99, the vision of cultural and language by French by Trautmann Ministry and the and presented political elites, more specifically policy Jospin government, was based on undynamic, traditional conceptions of French identity. However this thesis cannot claim to be conclusive in this area; therefore, a valuable area of future research would be the post-1997 period in retrospect, following the end of the current legislative term.

It would be especiallyinteresting, for example,to examine the future developmentof the Internet, of policies for regional and minority languages, for cultural democratisation, and for reform of the paysage audiovisuel francais, as they relate to identity, as these areas were by being development my case studies as under at the time of writing. noted

Does the rhetoric

for in debates European Charter for Regional the the example, on pluralism, of and Minority Languages, and the Trautmann Ministry's

wish to consult the public on proposals for

identity be that policy, mean of elite views might subject to change and reaudiovisual evaluation on the eve of the twenty-first century? Further opportunities could include the development of French identity, language and cultural policy in the context of the continuing integration. European Related to this, the specific study of the Trautmann ministerial of process debates to could provide an analysis wider pertinent era about the nature of what it is to be French in the aftermath of the French World Cup victory of July 1998 by a multi-ethnic national team, which, for some, suggested a possible redefinition of French identity, as discussed by Dauncey and Hare et al. (1999). In view of the continuing centrality of French identity to debates on culture and language policy, and to many other areas of policy and public political discussion in contemporary France, I feel that this direction of research would be well worth pursuing.

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(1993) Interview on `GrandJury', RTL, 10 October,suppliedby RTL Bartolone, Claude (1997) `Certaineschaines vivent aux frontieres de la loi', interview with Renaud Revel, L'Express,2 October De Beauce,Thierry (1989a) `M. Thierry de Beauce definit 1'Eureka de 1'audiovisuel', interview with Annick Cojean and Pierre-Angel Gay, Le Monde, 18 April

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Carignon, Alain (1993a)Speechto `Universited'ete de la Communication',Hourtin, 30 October

(1993b) `Mobilisation «exceptionnelle» en faveur de 1'exception culturelle', interview with Emmanuel Schwartzenberg,Le Figaro, 17 September (1993c) Interview with Alain Berger, Le Figaro Magazine, 27 September (1993d) `Alain Carignon: «Nous ne defendons pas une nouvelle ligne Maginot))', interview 6 October Figaro, Le Schwartzenberg, Emmanuel with (1993e) `Alain Carignon: la «specificite selon Brittan n'existe pas»', interview with Armelle Thoroval, Liberation, 22 October (1994) Article `L'Europe n'a pas de temps a perdre', Le Monde, 18 January De Charette, Herve (1995a) Speechto Ambassadors' meeting, Paris, 31 August, reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1995) (1995b) Speechto EU conference, Barcelona, 27 November, reproduced in Politique etrangereTextes et documents (1995) (1995c) Press conference at EU conference, Barcelona, 27 November, reproduced in Politique etrangere- Textes et documents (1995)

(1995d) Responseto a written question in the Assembleenationale on 18 December 1995, in 1996, 33190 Journal Officiel, February 5 no. published (1996a) New Year's speechto diplomatic service in responseto Bertrand Dufourcq, Paris, 4 January,reproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents(1996)

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March,reproducedin France-Statements, referenceSFC/97/66 (1997b) `«Il nous faut une conception offensive de la diffusion de la culture francaise»', interviewwith Jean-Jacques BozonnetandYves-Marie Labe, Le Monde, 18 March (1997c) Speechfor Journee de la francophonie, Paris, 19 March, reproduced in FranceStatements, referenceSFC/97/69 (1997d) Letter to European Commission President Jacques Santer, 25 March, reproduced in France-Statements,reference SFC/97/80

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(1996c) Openingspeechto HCF, 12th meeting,on `La Francophone face au defi desnouvelles technologies',Paris,30 April (1996d) Message to `INET - Conference on the Information Society', Midrand, South Africa, 13 May, reproduced on web site of Ministere des Affaires etrangeres (1996e) Speech to Ambassadors' meeting, Paris, 29 August, reproduced in France-Statements, reference SFC/96/176 (19960 Speech at Elysee reception, 40th meeting of Confederation internationale des societes d'auteurs et compositeurs (CISAC), Paris, 19 September (1997a) Opening speechto HCF, 13th meeting, on `Asie et Francophone', Paris, 23 April (1997b) Article for review Politique Internationale, 1 November, reproduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/97/225 (1997c) Speech at state dinner hosted by Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong, state visit to Vietnam, 12 November, reproduced in France-Statements,reference SFC/97/238 (1997d) Speech to Francophone Summit, Hanoi, 14 November, reroduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/97/235

(1997e) Interview with CFI/TVF/RFI, FrancophoneSummit, Hanoi, 15 November, reproduced in France-Statements, referenceSFC/97/236 (1997f) Pressconference,FrancophoneSummit, Hanoi, 16 November, reproducedin FranceStatements, referenceSFC/97/244 (1997g) New Year's speechto the Frenchpeople,Paris, 31 December,reproducedin FranceStatements, referenceSFC/98/001 (1998a) New Year's speechto diplomatic service staff, Paris, 7 January, reproduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/98/004

(1998b) Televisedspeechto the nation, 14 July, reproducedin France-Statements, reference SFC/98/147 (1998c) Speech to Ambassadors' conference, Paris, 27 August, reproduced in FranceStatements, referenceSFC/98/182 (1999a) Speechto 15th conferenceof HCF, Paris, 10 June, reproduced in Declarations de politique etrangere,referenceSFC/99/188 (1999b) Speechto Ambassadors'conference,Paris, 26 August, reproducedin Declarationsde politique etrangere,referenceSFC/99/224 Cluzel, Jean (1992) Article `L'audiovisuel francaiset l'Europe', Le Figaro, 22 May (1993a)Article `L'appel angoissede JeanCluzel', Le Quotidiende Paris, 19 October (1993b) Article `Meriter 1'« exception»', Le Figaro, 27 October Cresson, Edith (1989a)Interviewwith ChristianeCaron,France-Soir,4 October Lacan,Le Monde, 5 October (1989b) Interview with Jean-Francois (1991) Speechto Assembleenationale and Senat, 22 May, transcript provided by Premier Ministre, Serviced'information et de diffusion (1996) Interview on multimedia, Mediaspouvoirs, Ist quarter Danzin, Andre

(1996) `«La languefrancaisea saplacesur Internet»', interview with Sophy Caulier,La Tribune

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desfosses,19March Decaux, Alain (1989a) `La politique televisuelle exterieure de la France - rapport au Premier ministre', Paris, La Documentation francaise (1989b) `La France dans la bataille mondiale des images', interview with Roland Mihail and Thierry Deransart, Le Figaro, 27 July

(1989c) `La France se refait une television ä l'etranger', interview with Philippe Gavi, Le Nouvel Observateur,3-9 August (1990a) Closing speech at Forum de la Communication scientifique et technique, 10 January, reproduced in Politique etrangere: Textes et documents Economiste, Interview 4 May 1990, reproduced in Politique etrangere: (1990b) with Nouvel Textes et documents (1990) (1990c) Closing speech at Assemblee generale du Comite d'organisation du projet Europe plurilingue, 30 November Delors, Jacques (1989) Speechto European Audiovisual Conference, Paris, 2 October, supplied by CNC (1993) Interview, TFJ, `7 sur 7', 12 December (1994) Speechto European Audiovisual conference, 30 June-2 July, reproduced in CEC, Actes de la Conference europeennede l'audiovisuel, 1994, pp. 10-1 Douste-Blazy, Philippe (1995a) Speechto European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 June (1995b) `Douste-Blazy: «j'entends livrer combat»', interview with Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, Le Figaro, 22 June (1995c) Interview with `Tribune Sud RadiolLe Point', Sud Radio, 24 June, 12h10 (1995d) Speechto hearing of Commission des affaires culturelles, Senat, 27 June (1995e) Speechto Conseil national du Centre des Democrates Sociaux, 1 July (19950 Speechto `Journeesd'etudes du Parti populaire europeen', Bruges, 29 August

(1995g) `Philippe Douste-Blazy:«La solidarite est le fondementde notre action»', interview with Le Figaro,30 August (1995h) Interview, `Grand Jury', RTL, 24 September, 18h30-19h30 (1995i) Interview with A. Asseo, France-Inter, 17h00,7 October

(1995j) Interview with Echanges,review of Federation nationale des collectivites territoriales pour la culture,no.4, October (1995k) Speechto Senat,on Revision of the directive `Television without Frontiers' and the Resolutionof the Commissiondesaffairesculturelles,14November (19951) Speechto Assembleenationale, on Revision of the directive `Television without Frontiers' andthe Resolutionof the Commissiondesaffaires culturelles, 16November (1995m) `A la Culture,j'ai maintenanten chargela santede la societe', interview with Jacques Chancel,Les ecritsde l'image, no.9, winter (1996a)New Year's speechto the press,17 January (1996b)Article `Defis sur Internet', Le Monde, 9 February (1996c)Speechto MILIA conference,Cannes,9 February (1996d) `Douste-Blazy:«Pourquoi nous devons refonder la politique culturelle»', interview with Paul Guilbert andFrancoisHauter,Le Figaro, 15 February (1996e) `Douste-Blazy: «L'Europe est une chance pour le cinema»', interview with Emmanuel Schwartzenberg,Le Figaro, 4 March

(19960 Speechto PressConference,for week `Le francaiscommeon J'aime', 6 March (NB it -

250

is believedthis dateis incorrect,asthe text suggestsit is 1997) (1996g) Interviewwith `7 sur 7', TFJ, 10 March

(1996h) Declaration to Conseil des ministres, 20 March (1996i) Interview on France 2 news, 20h00,7 April (1996j) Press conference `Politique culturelle dans les quartiers', 9 April, on Ministere de la Culture web site (1996k) `Un lieu privilegie pour notre patrimoine', interview with G.Pangon, Telerama, `Multimedia' special, 10 April (19961) Speechto event `Entretiens du Luxembourg - Culture et nouveaux medias', 24 April (1996m) `Les contenuspriment', interview with O.Malnuit, Netsurf, May (1996n) Speech to 12th meeting of HCF, on `La Francophone face au defi des nouvelles technologies', during session `Les strategies en faveur du francais et des cultures francophones', 2 May (1996o) `Pour Douste-Blazy, tout est culture', interview with Catherine Nay, Le FigaroMagazine, 18 May (1996p) Debate in Assemblee nationale, 21 May, second sitting, Journal Officiel extract provided by Ministere de la Culture (no page ref. ) (1996q) `«La politique n'a pas ä contröler la culture»', interview with Annette Levy-Willard and Jean-Michel Thenard, Liberation, 17 June

(1996r) Interviewwith PC Team,September (1996s)Interviewwith Paul Guilbert andJean-PaulMulot, Le Figaro,20 November

(1996t) Response to a question from S.Mathieu, Senate debate, 5 December 1996, on `Technologies nouvelles de 1'information', reference 19228/1289, Journal Officiel (1997) Speechto MILIA, Cannes, 10 February Dumas, Roland (1989a) Press conference, Copenhagen, 14 September, reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1989)

(1989b) Pressconferencewith EuropeanCommissionerM. Dondelinger,EuropeanAudiovisual Conference,Paris,21 September,extractsreproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents(1989) (1989c) Speechto EuropeanAudiovisual Conference,Paris, 30 September-2October,supplied by CNC (1989d)Pressconference,Luxembourg,3 October,reproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents(1989) Farandjis, Stelio (1994) Speechat press conference`Priorites de la presidencefrancaisepour la culture et le 1994, 14 December Paris, suppliedby HCF plurilinguisme', Fillon, Francois (1996a)Article `UneLettre de M. FrancoisFillon', Le Monde informatique,22 March (1996b) Speechto HCF, 12th meeting, on `La Francophonie face au defi des nouvelles technologies',at closureof session,`Quelleplace pour les francophonesdansla societe de la de 1'information communication?', 30 April mondiale et Grossman,Robert (1993) Article `Ameliorer l'image de 1'Europe', Le Quotidien de Paris, 21 December Guillaume, Francois

(1995)Article `Television:«1'exceptionculturelle»en danger',Le Figaro, 21 November

251

Hue, Robert (1995) Statement on audiovisual quotas, reproduced in article `Robert Hue repond aux cineastes', L'Humanite, 3 April Jospin, Lionel (1997a) General policy speech to Assemblee nationale, Paris, 19 June, reproduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/97/138 (1997b)'Preparer 1'entreede la France dans la Societe de l'information', speech to `Universite d'ete de la Communication', Hourtin, 25 August (1997c) Speech to Ambassadors' conference, Paris, 29 August 1997, reproduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/97/177 (1998a) Speech at announcement of governmental programme at Comite interministeriel pour la societe de l'information, Paris, 16 January, reproduced in France-Statements, reference SFC/98/012 (1998b) Statement on Accord multilateral sur l'investissement (AMI), Paris, 13 February, reproduced in France-Statements,reference SFC/98/030 (1998c) Speech to Ambassadors' conference, Paris, 27 August, reproduced in FranceStatements,reference SFC/98/183

(1999a) New Year's speechto the press, Paris, 12 January,reproducedin Declarationsde politique etrangere,referenceSFC/99/16 (1999b) Statement on `Fete de l'Internet', Paris, 10 February, reproduced in Declarations de politique etrangere,reference SFC/99/60

(1999c) Speech,`Fetede l'Intemet'. Paris, 17 March, reproducedin Declarationsde politique etrangere,referenceSFC/99/101 (1999d) Speech to `Universite d'ete de Communication', Hourtin, 26 August, reproduced in Declarations de politique etrangere,reference SFC/99/227 Josselin, Charles

(1997a) Interview with TV5 news, 22 August, reproducedin France-Statements,reference SFC/97/173 (1997b) Speech to Ambassadors' conference, Paris, 29 August, reproduced in FranceStatements, SFC/97/ 180 reference (1997c) Article written for Le Monde, 12 November, reproduced in France-Statements, reference SFC/97/237

(1998) Speechto Ambassadors'conference,Paris,27 August, reproducedin France-Statements, referenceSFC/98/186 Juppe, Alain (1993a) Responsesto questionsin Assembleenationale, Paris, 13 October, reproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents(1993) (1993b) Speech to first plenary session, Francophone Summit, Port-Louis, 14 October, reproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents(1993) (1993c)Interview with TV5, Port-Louis, 16 October,reproducedin Politique etrangere- Textes et documents(1993) (1993d) Interview with France-Inter,Port-Louis, 17 October,reproducedin Politique etrangere Textes documents (1993) et (1993e)Article `Pouren finir avecdesideesfausses',Le Figaro, 27 October (19930 Pressconference,Brussels,reproducedin Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1993) (1993g) Interview with France 2, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et -

252

documents(1993) (1993h) Press conference, Brussels, following GATT agreement, 15 December, reproduced in Politique etrangere- Textes et documents (1993) (1993i) Toast at dinner for France-Amerique, Paris, 15 December, reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1993) (1994) Speech to Reunion des conseilleurs culturelles, scientifiques et techniques, Paris, 28 July, extract reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1994) (1995a) Speechat lunch seminar of Maison de 1'Europe, Paris, 6 April, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere- Textes et documents (1995) (1995b) Interview with LCI, Paris, 20 April, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1995) (1995c) Speech on general policy to Assemblee nationale, 23 May, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere- Textes et documents (1995) (1995d) Speech to CSLF, 24 October, reproduced in appendix of `Rapport au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 4 aoüt 1994 relative a l'emploi de la langue francaise, 1996', available on DGLF web-site; also in DGLF/CSLF Les Breves, no.3,4eme trimestre, 1995

(1996a) Toast at dinner hosted by CanadianPrime Minister, Jean Chretien, during visit to Canada,Ottawa,9 June (1996b) Article `Pour la Defense d'un monde pluriel', Le Monde de 1'education, July-August (1996c) Speechon presentation of `Prix GeorgesPompidou' to Pierre Schneider, Paris, 19 July (1996d) Opening addressto `Universite d'ete de la Communication', Hourtin, 26 August Kiejman, Georges (1991) Interview with `Grand Jury RTL-Le Monde', RTL, 13 October, supplied by RTL Lamassoure, Alain (1993) Interview with RTL, Paris, 13 December, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1993)

(1994) Speechto HCF, conferenceon `La Francophonieet 1'Europe',Paris,22 March (1995) Speechon audiovisualpolicy, Paris, 28 January,reproducedin Politique etrangere Texteset documents(1995) Lang, Jack (1989a) Interview with `Le Club de la Presse' Europe 1,14 May, 19h00 (1989b) Interview with Soleils et francophonie magazine, June

(1989c) Invitation issued by Ministere de la Culture to `Europe Continent Culture' for conferenceheld on 2-3 November,n.d. (1989d) Closingspeechto `EuropeContinentCulture' conference,2-3 November,Blois (1989e)Interview with O.Manteau,France-Inter,9 September,MOO (19891)Interviewwith CatherineNay, Europe 1,1 November,8h20 (1990a)Speechat meetingof EEC CultureMinisters,Venice, 3 September (1990b) Speechon awardof `Commandeurde 1'ordredes arts et deslettres' to JackNicholson, 10 September (1990c)Speechat PrincetonUniversity, 13November (1990d)Inauguralspeechat FrenchMusic Office, New York, 13November (1990e)Interview with France-Inter,New York, 14November,13h00 (19901)Interview with Europe 1,15 November,19h30 (1990g)Interview with `Europe-Midi', Europe 1,18 November,12h30 (1990h)Interview with J.P.Tipson,RTL, 18November,MOO

253

(1990i) `En France, la croisade de «Jack I'Americain»', interview with Michele Stouvenot, Journal du dimanche, 18 November (1991a) Interview with P.Martin, France-Inter, 19 April, 8h43 (1991b) Speechto `Universite d'ete de la Communication', Carcans-Maubuisson, 26 August (1992a) Interview with Europe 1,3 March, 7h30 (1992b) `Lang: «une culture n'en menace pas une autre»', interview with Jacqueline Remy, L'Express, 19 March (1992c) `The America of Ideas is Dear to My Heart', interview with Newsweek, 6 April (1992d) Speechto conference `La Grande Europe A Paris', 13 October (1993a) Article `L'identite europeenne', Le Monde, 24 March (1993b) Article `Il faut se battre! ', Le Nouvel Observateur, 23-29 September (1994) Speech to European Audiovisual Conference (European Commission), 30 June-2 July, de l'audiovisuel, 1994, de la Conference Actes in Commission, European reproduced pp. 104-7 (1995) Interview with Benoit Rayski in Globe-Hebdo, 22-28 September (1996a) Interview on Europe 1 radio, 20 March, 12h30 (1996b) Public lecture, `Is Cultural Policy Possible Without Politics? ', London School of Economics European Institute, 7 May (1998) Article `La culture francaise en berne', Le Monde, 30 June Marchais, Georges

(1991) Letter to ARP, reproducedin article `Quotaset creation', L'Humanite, 23 December Marest, Lucien (1991) Article `Quandfinira-t-on dejouer avecla France?', L'Humanite, 10 July (1994a)Article `GATT: quandle brasdroit de Balladur semet ä table', 4 January (1994b) Article `Le cinemaestl'affaire de tous', L'Humanite, 4 June (1995) Article `La droite et 1'exception culturelle', L'Humanite, 4 January Megret, Bruno

(1993) Speech`Pour un protectionnismeculturel', to Front National conference,`Colloquedu Conseilscientifique',30 October,suppliedby FN archives Mitterrand, Francois (1989a)Interview, `Le grandechiquierconsacreaM. JacquesDelors', Elysee,Paris,23 January (1989b) Speechat receptionfor CSA, Paris, 13 February (1989c) Pressconference,Elysee,Paris, 18 May (1989d) Openingspeechto third FrancophoneSummit,Dakar, 24 May (1989e)Pressconferenceat third FrancophoneSummit,Dakar, 26 May (19890 Interview with various Europeannewspapers,27 July, extractsreproducedin Politique etrangere- Texteset documents (1989g) Speechat openingof EuropeanAudiovisual Conference,Paris,30 September (1989h) Speech to European Parliament, Strasbourg, 25 October, reproduced in Politi ue etrangere- Textes et documents (1989)

(1989i) Messageto `EuropeContinentCulture' conference,Blois, 2-3 November (1990a)Speechat EuropeanStudents'Conference,Cite dessciences,Paris, 10 May (1990b) Letter to EuropeanCommissionPresidentJacquesDelors, 7 June, supplied by press office of the Presidentof the FrenchRepublic (1990c)Speechat conference`Anatomiede la Haine', Oslo, 28 August (1990d)Interviewwith Norwegiantelevision,Oslo, 28 August (1991a) Speechto HCF, seventh conference`Monde francophoneet francophone dans le

254

monde- creationet echanges',19 March (199lb) Speechon 5th anniversaryof `Eureka'programme,The Hague,18 June

(1993a) Speechat reception for 21st ministerial meeting of `Eureka' project, Elysee, Paris, 23 June (1993b) Speechon receipt of honorary doctorate, Gdansk University, 21 September (1993c) Replies to questions from students at Gdansk University, 21 September (1993d) Press conference with Lech Walesa, Polish President, and Mme Von Weizsacker, Presidentof Federal Republic of Germany, Gdansk, 21 September (1993e) Opening speechto Francophone Summit, Port-Louis, 16 October (19930 Joint press conference with Anerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius, Francophone Summit, Port-Louis, 18 October, reproduced in Politique etrangere Textes et documents (1993) (1993g) Joint press conference at European Council meeting on GATT with Edouard Balladur and Alain Juppe, Brussels, ll December (1994) Speechto HCF, 10th conference, on `La Francophonie et 1'Europe', Paris, 22 March (1995a) Speechto European Parliament, presenting programme for French presidency of EU, 17 January

(1995b) Joint pressconferencewith JacquesSanter,EuropeanCommissionPresident,Elysee, Paris,3 February (1995c) Speech at Elysee reception for Premier siecle du cinema - Colloque sur 1'avenir du (whole 20-21 Paris, 21 March), March event cinema Aloscovici, Pierre

(1998) speechto Ambassadors'conference,Paris,27 August, reproducedin France-Statements, referenceSFC/98/185 (1999) Responseto a topical question in the Assembleenationale, on Regional Languages Charter, 12 May, reproduced in Declarations de politique etrangere, reference SFC/99/160 pailler, Aline (1996) `Aline Pailler: des quotascontre l'uniformisation des images', interview with Michel Guilloux, L'Humanite, 6 February Kalite, Jack (1989a) Article `Il faut saisir la balle au bond', L'Humanite, 26 April (1989b) Article `La beaute court vite', L'Humanite, 20 September (1989c) Article `Les abeilles et les frelons', Le Monde, 13 October

du Gatt', Liberation, 20 April (1993a) Article `Laissonsla culturehors descompetences (1993b) Article `Le vol du public', Le Monde, 15 October Rocard, Michel (1989a) `La Lettre de Michel RocardA GeorgesMarchais', 4 April, reproducedin L'Humanite, 17April installation Speech (1989b) at of HCF, 24 October Sarkozy, Nicolas Le (1995) `La remiseen ordre de Nicolas Sarkozy', interview with EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, Figaro,2 February Sudre, Margie (1995a) Extracts from interview with Enjeux francophones, 15 June 1995, reproduced on Ministere des affaires etrangeres web site, October 1995

(1995b) Speechat inaugurationof EuropeanCentrefor the Frenchlanguage,Brussels,25 June,

255

SFC/96/143 in France-Statements, reference reproduced

(1995c) Interview with RMC, Paris, 11 July, extracts reproduced in Politique etrangere - Textes et documents (1995) (1995d) Speech to CSLF, Paris, 24 October, reproduced in Politique etrangere - Textes et documents (1995)

(1995e) Article `Necessitede la francophonie',Le Figaro, 28 November interview Le francais»', la titre Sudre: `Margie with (19950 meilleure en «J'ai toujours voulu Parisien, by Bruno Fannuchi, 1 December (1996a) Preface to Une politique pour le francais, report of Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Paris, La Documentation francaise (1996b) Speechat 48th national meeting of IHEDN, Paris, 20 February, reproduced in Politi ue etrangere- Textes et documents (1996) (1996c) `Margie Sudre: «il ya une vraie demande du francais dans le monde'))', interview with France-Amerique, 27 April -3 May (1996d) Speech at first ministerial session, co-presided by France, Conference on Information Society, Midrand, South Africa, 13 May, reproduced on web-site of Ministere des etrangeres wires ,4 (1996e) Speech at second ministerial session, co-presided by France, Conference on Information Society, Midrand, South Africa, 14 May, reproduced on web-site of Ministere des Affaires etrangeres

(19960 Speechat inaugurationof EuropeanCentre for French Language,Brussels,25 June, SFC/96/143 in France-Statements, reference reproduced Tasca, Catherine (1989) `La colere de Catherine Tasca', interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, 3-9 August (1990) Speechat conference, `Eurovision 90', Rome, 30 September

(1991) Speechat `Assises francophonesde la communication', 15 November, extracts in Politiqueetrangere- Texteset documents(1991) (1992a) `CatherineTasca: «mes priorites pour 1992»', interview with Thierry Deransart,Le Figaro,29 February (1992b) Speechto CommissiondesAffaires etrangeres,Senat,15 October,extractsin Politi ue etrangere- Texteset documents(1992)

(1992c) Speechat seminar `La langue et la loi', Paris, 4 December (1993) Statement to Conseil des ministres on `projet de loi relatif a 1'emploi de la langue francaise - "la langue de la Republique est le francais", Paris, 17 March, extracts in Politique etrangere- Textes et documents (1993)

Toubon, Jacques (1993a) `JacquesToubon: «Jen'arrive pasdansun Ministere sinistre»', interview with Annette Levy-Willard andAntoine de Gaudemar,Liberation, 15 April (1993b) Interview with `Radio Com', France-Inter, 12 May, 8h43 (1993c) Interview with E.Cachart, France 3,16 May, 19h30 (1993d) Interview on news with P.Dessaint, TV5,25 May, 18h30

(1993e)Debate`Objections- Continuiteou changement:quelle serala politique culturelle sous Balladur?', France-Inter,28 May, 19h20-20h00 (19930 Interview with Andre AsseoandJ-C Loiseau,`Les etoilesdu cinema', France-Inter,29 May, 17h05 (1993g) `«Bientötune biennalea Paris»:Le Ministre de la culture s'est felicite de la qualite de la participationfrancaise',interview with Michel Nuridsany,Le Figaro, 15 June

256

(1993h) Interviewwith France 3,17 June,9h30

(1993i) `JacquesToubon: «Je veux une culture plus accessible»', interview with Jean Bruno, Le Quotidien de Paris, 31 July (1993j) `Ce que Toubon va dire aux Americains', interview with Jean-Claude Maurice and Florence Muracciole, Le Journal du dimanche, 8 August

(1993k) Interviewwith Henri Marque,RTL, 12 August, 7h52 (19931)Interviewwith RTL, 12 August, 17h05 (1993m) Interview with `A titre provisoire' France-Inter, 31 August (1993n) Speechto Assembleedes realisateurs, Venice, 6 September (1993o) `Toubon: «Nous ne signerons pas!»', interview with Emmaunel Schwartzenberg, Le Figaro, 14 September (1993p) `«On veut nous imposer un combat inegal entre 1'esprit et la marchandise»', interview with Michel Pascal, Le Point, 18 September (1993q) `GATT: Le combat de JacquesToubon', interview with Jean-Luc Macia, La Croix, 23 September (1993r) PressStatementon Francophone Summit, Mauritius, 30 September (1993s) Article `Laisser respirer nos Ames!', Le Monde, 1 October

(1993t) Debate`Objections- Culture, audiovisuel:ce que la Droite veut changer',France-Inter, 1 October,19h20-20h00 (1993u) Speechat inaugurationofMaison de la Culture d'Amiens,9 October (1993v) Debate`ForumRMC-L'Express', RMC, 10 October,13h00-13h30 (1993w) `Answer to Mr Scorsese and Mr Spielberg', published in English in Los Angeles Times, 11 October, reproduced text supplied by CNC archives (1993x) Speech to Francophone Summit conference of Foreign and Francophone Affairs Ministers, Port-Louis, 14 October

(1993y) Interview with J.M. Lefevre,RTL, 15 October,18h00 (1993z)Interview with J.-P. Elkabbach,Europe 1,18 October,8h33 (1993aa)Responseto PeterSutherland,Paris,20 October (1993bb) Interview with `Radio-Corn',P.Martin, France-Inter, 20 October, 8h43, suppliedby CNC (1993cc)Speechto `Rencontrescinematographiques' conference,Beaune,30 October (1993dd)Article `La culture,une We d'avenir', Le Quotidiende Paris,30-31 October (1993ee)Speechto Assembleenationale,8 November,openingsession (1993ff) Interview with `Politiqueautrement',RMC, 16November,8h15 (1993gg)Speechon `La politique du cinema',24 November (1993hh)Interview with `ForumRMC-L'Express',RMC, 29 November, 13h00-13h30 (1993ii) Speechto Senaton CultureBudget,6 December,extractsprovided by CNC archives (1993jj) Interview with RTL, 8 December,13h00 (1993kk) Interview with RFI, 11 December,12h32 (199311)`JacquesToubon: «L'Europe culturelle est lä»', interview with ClaudeJacquemert,Le Figaro, 17 December (1993mm)`Gatt:resultatde la negociation',statementin La Lettre d'information (newsletterof Ministere de la Culture), 30 December,p.5 (1994a)New Year's speechto press,Paris, 11 January (1994b) Speechto openMILIA, Cannes,16 January (1994c)Interview on Europe 1,24 January,07h45 (1994d) Article `L'esprit des langues', Le Monde, 24 February

257

(1994e) Speechto HCF, conference on `La Francophonie et 1'Europe', Paris, 22 March (19940 Interview with C.Baldewyns and M. Fourny, L'Evenement du jeudi, `JacquesToubon: Americains le laisserons des 31 technologies»', aux pas monopole nouvelles «Nous ne March (1994g) `A U. S. Tempest in a French Demitasse', article in English for The New York Times, in Herald Tribune, International 4 April 1994 reproduced (1994h) `JacquesToubon: «Revolutionner le systeme du cinema est dangereux»', interview in Le Figaro, Hauter 10 May Francois with (1994i) Article `La verite du cinema', Le Monde, 12 May

(1994j) Commentson programme`Tire la langue',France-Culture,25 May, 21h30 (1994k)Commentson newsprogramme,LCI, 30 July, 18h00 (19941)Interview on RTL news, 18h00,30July (1994m)Interview with RTL, 1 August, 13h13

(1994n) Article `La langue de tous', Le Monde, 4 August 1994 (1994o) Speechto `Universite d'ete de la Communication', Hourtin, 31 August (1994p) Speech at closure of conference `Journees d'etudes - Multimedia: 1'enjeu culturel', Ecole nationale superieure des beaux-arts, Paris, 27 September

(1994q)Interview with M. Cotta,RTL, 27 September

(1994r) Speechat `Rencontres Europe Horizon Culture', Theatre du Rond Point, 5 November (1994s) interview with Edward Mortimer and David Buchan, Financial Times, `Mind your language', 29 November (1994t) Speechto conference `Colloque sur les autoroutes et services de l'information', Paris, 7 December le la francaise (1994u) Speech to press conference `Priorites de la presidence culture et pour plurilinguisme', 14 December (1995a) Interview, `Special cinema', France 3,1 January, 22h23

(1995b) `JacquesToubon: «La technique du quota n'est pas la seule»', interview with EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, Le Figaro, 8 January (1995c)Speechto MILIA, Cannes,13 January (1995d) Speechto UNESCO, at opening of conference`La langue francaiseau risque des cultures', 16 January (1995e)New Year's speech,Paris, 19 January (1995f) Speechto European Parliament, Strasbourg, Commission on Culture, Youth, Education and Media, 1 February

(1995g)Speechfor Franco-Germanmeeting,Berlin film festival, 12 February

(1995h) Speechto informal meeting of European Culture Ministers, Bordeaux, 13 February (1995i) `Donner leur chance aux oeuvres europeennes', interview with Patrick Berthomeau, Sud-Ouest, 13 February

(1995j) `«Le monopole,c'est les Americains»',interview with Liberation, 15 February (1995k) Speech to `Etats generaux de la francophonie scientifique, la Sorbonne', Paris, 17 February

(19951)Speechat inaugurationof Cinemathequede TelAviv, Israel, 11 March (1995m) Closing speechto conferenceat Assembleenationale, `Alternatives ä l'uniformisation hispanophonie, francophone, lusophonie', trois 18 March espaces: (1995n) Closing speechto conference`Le Cinemavers son deuxiemesiecle', Paris, Theatrede 1'Odeon,21 March (1995o) Article `Francophone: la deuxieme voie', Le Figaro, 31 March

258

April La Croix, 4 interview Laurent Lemire, `Pour (1995p) with une autreactionculturelle', (1995q) Interview `Talk Durand' with G.Durand,LCI, 7 April, suppliedby CNC Le (1995r) `JacquesToubon:«Non a la guillotine»', interview with EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, Figaro, 11April Trautmann, Catherine (1997a) Speechat `Universited'ete de la Communication', Hourtin, 26 August, accessedon Ministerede la Cultureweb-site

(1997b) Article `Le patrimoine, au coeur de chacun, Le Figaro, 18 September, accessedon Ministere de la Culture web-site demain? de ', d., `Quel Ministere Speech to audiovisuel pour n. accessedon (1997c) conference la Culture web-site du Senat, des Paris, 29 January, reproduced Affaires Commission Speech to culturelles (1998a) la Culture de Ministere web-site on de la Cannes, 8 February, Ministere Culture web-site MILIA, Speech to reproduced on (1998b) (1998c) `«Sortir du soupcon d'influence»', interview with Odile Benyahia-Kouider, Liberation, 19 March Conference, European Audiovisual Birmingham, April, 8 Speech of at closure (1998d) de la Culture Ministere web-site on reproduced

francaise a l'horizon de Culture l'an `La 2000', Rome, Opening to (1998e) speech conference 16April, reproducedon Ministere de la Culture web-site faveur du des `La Politique 6 Conseil Ministres, May, Speech to en cinema', (19980 (Ministere de la in d'information Culture La Lettre 13 May, newsletter), reproduced pp.3-5 d'Amiens', in 9 October, Lettre `Assises La Speech culturelles extracts at (1998g) d'information (Rfinistere de la Culture newsletter), 21 October, pp. 1-2 10 November, de Statement Ministere reforms, on proposed audiovisual reproduced on (1998h) la Culture web-site

(1999a) Statementon proposedaudiovisualreforms, 21 April, reproducedon Ministere de la Cultureweb-site Assemblee Speech on proposed audiovisual reforms, nationale, Paris, 18 May, (1999b) reproducedon Ministere de la Culture web-site Vedrine, Hubert

Ambassadors' Paris, 28 Speech August, in Franceto conference, reproduced (1997a) Statements, referenceSFC/97/178 in Senat, d., Paris, in Response Journal Officiel, the to n. a written question published (1997b) 18December,reproducedin France-Statements, referenceSFC/97/275 in Assemblee Paris, 5 May, reproducedin FranceResponse the to 998a) a question nationale, (1 Statements, referenceSFC/98/99 Ambassadors' Paris, 27 August, Speech in Franceto conference, reproduced (1998b) Statements, referenceSFC/98/184 August, in Le Figaro, 27 Interview France-Statements,reference with reproduced (1998c) SFC/98/187 in Senat, in Paris, Response Journal the Officiel, to 20 May, a written question published (1999) in etrangere, de Declarations politique referenceSFC/99/168 reproduced Philippe Villiers, De

`La France fait fausse Le Monde, October Article I route', (1993)

259

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23 June1994,Pierre-FredericDanjou, `La Television francophonedansle monde' La Croix 26 July 1993,`GATT: Lang au cote de Toubon' 30 November 1994, Richard Werly, `Francophone au Vietnam' Courrier international September 1995, Michael Mayer, `Le NC va-t-il detröner le PC?' Daily News 10 February 1996, `Philippe Douste-Blazy: "Une lame de fond"' Daily Telegraph 10 February 1996, Kathy Marks, `Hoskins backs cut in US shows on TV' L'Echo de l'Afrique 9 May 1996, `La Revolution dans les moyens de communication' Les Echos

22 July 1993,`GATT: JuppeappuieCarignon' 8 September1993,`Mitterrandpourrait prendrela defensedesproductionseuropeennes' 23 September,JacquesDocquiert and Martine Royo, `Leo Brittan: sur Blair House, il aurait fallu unenegociationtresdiscrete' 2 November 1993, Pierre de Gasquet, `Toubon veut lutter contre le risque de «monopole nippoamericainW

6 December 1993, Nicole Vulser, `Les deputes adoptent la creation de la chain de la connaissance' 10 December1993,N.V., `Exportationdesprogrammesfranrais: l'Etat reduit sesaides' 15 December1993,N.V., `Radios:le Senatplus ferme sur les quotasde chansonsfrancaises' 23 December1993,N.V., `Les quotasde chansonfrancaiseapplicablesen 1996' 5 April 1994,`Audiovisuel:contre-attaqueamericaine' 5 September1994,ChristianeFeral-Schuhl,'Cc quela loi Toubon imposeaux entreprises' 12 December1994,`NicolasSarkozyplaide au Senatpour un soutienaux oeuvreseuropeennes' 9 January1995,`Televisionsansfrontieres:Pariss'ard-boute' 20 January1995,P.de G., `Televisionsansfrontieres,Nicolas Sarkozyveut aboutir avantmars' 6 September1996,Pierrede Gasquet,`Coupd'envoi Aun axeParis-Romedansle cinema' The Economist 29 January1994,`The distantvoicesof France' 25 November1995(supplement),`No Escape?A Surveyof France' 23 March 1996,`Mind your language' 22 November 1997, `French blows its horn'

11 April 1998`Why RupertMurdoch is polite' 16 May 1998,`World trade:fifty yearson' 23 May 1998,`Sizedoesmatter' 4 July 1998,`Feminismmeetsgenderin France' 12 September1998,`Culturewars' 5 December1998,`Africa comesto Francefor a party'

6 February 1999, `European Film industry: Worrying statistix'

269

26 June 1999,`FrenchLessons' Ecran total 28 May 1997,CarolineCollard, `Credofrancophonesur les inforoutes' L'Evenementdujeudi 4-19 November 1993, Anne Andreu, `Le Gatt et la television en cinq questions Iles' 10-16 March 1994a,Yann Plougastel, Taut-il proteger la chanson francaise?' 10-16 March 1994b, Olivier Drouin, `Autoroutes electroniques: attention a ne pas aller dans le decor!' L'Expansion 6-19 January 1994, Jean-Pierre Tailleur, `Comment franchir le mur de 1'Atlantique' L'Express

3 November 1994, Francoise Monier, `Langues sans frontieres' 11 July 1996, Christophe Barbier, `Y a-t-il une politique culturelle de droite? ' 7-13 November 1996, `Special Multimedia' 13-19 November 1997, Marc Epstein, `Hanoi: la fiction de la francophonie' 19-25 February 1998, Martine de Rabaudy, `Le faux AMI'

17 December1998,Elise Karlin, `L'epine Trautmann' 24 December1998,RenaudRevel, `Tele: les dossierschaudsde 1999' 4 February1999,RenaudRevel, `Cinema:`l'assautamericain' Le Figaro

16-17 July 1988, Bernard Bonilauri, `Thierry de Beauce: l'homme de la «diplomatie culturelle»' 14 April 1989,Ivan Rioufoul, `CatherineTascaveut renforcerles quotasdesTV francaises' 4 October1989,V. G., `L'Europe adoptela TV sansfrontieres' 27 August 1991, Thierry Deransart and Anne Fulda, `Quotas: Lang deplace le debat de la television ä la radio'

17 August 1993,P.-Y.L., `Renouveaude la pressefrancophonedans1'ex-Indochine 31 August 1993,S.H., `Le plan de bataille d'Alain Carignon' 8 September1993,`Gatt: l'intervention de Mitterrand' 13 September1993,`La colerede JacquesToubon' 17 September1993,Alain Rollat, `Unepleiadede vedettesä la rescousse' 22 September1993,BaudouinBollaert, `Gatt: la «feuille de route»de Leon Brittan' 15 October1993,LaurentMossu, `Gatt: «Vers la specificiteculturelle»' 18 October1993,Paul Guilbert, `Mitterranddefendune «vision du monde' 21 October1993,SophieHuet, `Gatt:Juppehaussele ton' 27 October1993,Annie Kriegel, `Doubleconfusion' 29 October1993,Thierry de Montbrial, `Amenagerle protectionnisme' 27 November1993a,EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, `Consensusau plus haut niveau' 27 November1993b,R.H., `L'«exceptioncinematographique»' 6 December1993,EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, `Premieremanchepour Carignon' 7 December1993,StephaneMarchand,`Le reve americaindu cinemafrancais' 22 December1993,EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, `Les senateurspechentpar exces; 12 January1994,EmmanuelSchwarzenberg, `Lesprojets europeensde Carignon'

29 January 1994, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `Grave differend entre Toubon et Carignon' 31 January 1994, JacquesDhaussy, `Francais, si vous chantiez! '

5 April 1994,EmmanuelNaxara,`Indochine:combatpour la francophone' 13 April 1994,SophieHuet, `Defenseet illustration du francais'

270

14 April 1994,SophieHuet, `Mesuresde defenseen faveur du francais' 15 April 1994,SophieHuet, `Senat:le langageaudiovisuelen question' 4 May 1994, Anne Fulda, `Emploi de la langue franraise: Toubon devant les deputes' 1 July 1994, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `L'audiovisuel au secours de 1'Europe' 1 August 1994a,F.Varenne, `JacquesToubon: Globalement positif 1 August 1994b, L. F., `Le francais, langue du service public' 1 August 1994c, Francois Nourissier, `Est-ce le vrai probleme' 25 October 1994, `Autoroutes de l'information; le rapport Thery mise tout sur 1'Etat' 1 November 1994, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `La banniere du 1%' 15 December 1994, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `Union sacreepour la directive' 17 January 1995, Francois Hauter, `L'exception culturelle repart en campagne' 18 January 1995, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `Francois Mitterrand engage la France' 26 May 1995, Francois Hauteur, `Philippe Douste-Blazy a Cannes - Les dangers de la «monoculture»' 22 June 1995a,Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `Une premiere victoire' 22 June 1995b, Francois Hauter, `De nouvelles priorites' 30 August 1995, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg, `Philippe Douste-Blazy sur une ligne dure'

21 November 1995, Emmanuel Schwartzenberg,`La France sauve les quotas de diffusion audiovisuels' 17 January1996,Arnaud de la Grange,`Margie Sudrea la reconquetede l'Indochine' `Union nationalepour 1'exceptionculturelle' 6 February1996,EmmanuelSchwartzenberg, 8 February1996,O.P., `La francophoniene figurerapasdansla Constitution' 12 February1996,SergesHirel, `La Guerredesreseaux' 18 March 1996,Marc Fumaroli, `Pourquoile francais?' 21 March 1996,J.-R.V.P., `Les trois grandsaxesde Philippe Douste-Blazy' 22 March 1996, Jean-Renevan der Plaetsen, `De l'universalite de la francophonie' 22 March 1996, Jean-Renevan der Plaetsen, `Margie Sudre a 1'ecole'

25 March 1996,Jean-LouisRoy, `Le chantierde la francophone' 24 April 1996,GeorgesPotriquet,`Francophone:le rendez-vousde Hanoi' 9 November 1996, Paule Gonzales, `Parlement europeen- le front uni des francais' [sic] Le Figaro Magazine

26 June1994,MauriceDruon, `La bataille du francaisest engagee' Le Film francais 23 July 1993,Virginie Senges,`Gatt: le Parlementeuropeendemandela "specificite culturelle"' France-Soir 4 October1989,`L'Europe desquotas:«chaquefois querealisable' 1 August 1994,`Goodor not good,ce qu'ils en pensent' Globe-Hebdo 29 September1993,`Lettreouverteä Leon Brittan' The Guardian 23 March 1995,`EU seekscut in Americanfilms' 28 March 1995,Julie Wolf, `TV protectionplan lacksEU consensus'(internationaledition) 4 April 1995,Julie Wolf, `Francesufferssetbackin fight for tough EU television quotas' 10 February 1996, `Actors join fight against cheap US imports' 10 June 1997, `Last Word on Cyberspace' 30 June 1998, Paul Webster, `Toy soldiers' ranks thin as star-struck Disney dancers strike' 2 July 1998, Martin Kettle, `Britain joins Hollywood-resisters'

271

4 August 1998,Ian Black, `Cultural diplomacy:no businesslike showbusiness' 14 July 1999,David Walker, `Speakeasy' 2 September 1999, Stephanie Stoll, `Can France catch up?' L'Humanite 4 October 1989, Bernard Durand, `Exit les quotas' 27 September 1989, JeanRoy, `L'abri quotas'

30 July 1993,`RogerPlanchon:la grandebraderie' 1 September1993,`La dereglementations'acceleredansl'audiovisuel'

17 September 1993, Michel Guilloux and Jean-Paul le Marec, `Des artistes et un ministre a Strasbourg' 12 October 1993, Michel Guilloux, `La vigilance s'impose plus que jamais' 6 December 1993, F.B., `Un projet taille sur mesure pour TF1' 8 December 1993, Michel Guilloux, `Le gateau servi sur un plateau?' 9 December 1993a,Patrick Apel-Muller, `Trahison de Leon Brittan' 9 December 1993b, Patrick Apel-Muller, `La recherche d'autres voies que le GATT' 13 December, Michel Guilloux, `Exception, separation?' 15 December 1993, Patrick Appel-Muller, `Quel traitement «particulier» pour la culture?' 17 June 1996, `Recul sur les quotas' 1 April 1997, P.L., `Technologies: les abcessur Internet' The Independent

2 February1995,SarahHelm, `Frenchurge against"cultural rape" of Europe' 15 February1995,SarahHelm, `Frenchlose fight with Hollywood' 4 December 1995, Mary Dejevsky, `Chirac spreadsthe word about French' The Independent on Sunday

1 September1996,Mary Dejevsky, 'US Culture:the latestbogey for Le Pen's Front' 6 September1998,JohnLichfield, `Frenchstorestakeson the culture fascists' 27 September1998a,SophieGoodchild, `Manic StreetPreachers'bad languageupsetsthe land of their fathers' 27 September1998b,newsin brief, `Englishis top language,admitsJospin' 3 January 1999, Claire Soares, `Brit-chic lures French film-makers across the Channel' 14 February 1999, Andrew Mourant, `No French please - we're from Jersey' International Herald Tribune

9 November1993,JohnRockwell, `TurningFrance'sCultural Supertanker' 22 December1993,`France'sNew Notion of Top 40 Music: a Quota' Journaldu dimanche 11 August 1996,`Le Louvre branchesur Internet' Liberation 14 December1991,Odile Benyahia-Kouider,`Les deputesdansla quadraturedesquotas' 17-18April 1993,Marie-EveChamardandPhilippe Kieffer, `Carignona desimpressions' 31 August 1993,Luc Vachez,`Quotaseuropeenset privatisationde la SFP,Carignonlanceson plan pour l'audiovisuel' 7 September 1993a, Ange-Dominique Bouzet, `Toscan plaide pour un Yalta avec les Americains' 7 September1993b,Olivier Seguret,`JackLang prechela revolte a la Mostra' 8 September1993,`Toubonet les Americains' 22 September 1993, Isabelle Lesniak and A. B., `Gatt: Mitterrand pour 1'«exception -D. culturelle»'

272

23 September1993a,`Gatt: Americains,Australienset Argentins,tous contrela France' 23 September1993b,Jean-LouisComolli, `Don Quichotteet les moulins du Gatt' 7 October 1993, Armelle Thoravall, `Guerre de positions sur le Gatt audiovisuel' 14 October 1993a,Jean Quatremer et al., `GATT: Balladur prone 1'exception francaise' 14 October 1993b, J.Q., `Realisateurs et producteurs europeensse mobilisent a Bruxelles' 15 October 1993, J.Q., `Bruxelles, pendant la crise, le debat continue'

18 October1993a,StephenSmith, `La «plus grandeFrance»ä la rescousse'

18 October 1993b, Stephen Smith, `L'exception culturelle mobilise la francophonie' 18 October 1993c, Pascal Riche, `Un film de guerre entre Europe et Amerique' 2 December 1993, Odile Benyahia-Kouider, `Radio: la tentation des quotas' 6 December 1993, Luc Vachez, `Audiovisuel: la loi passesans encombre' 15 December 1993, `Gatt: reactions apres l'accord de Bruxelles' 24 February 1994, Nathaniel Herzberg, `Toubon boute l'anglais hors du francais' 25 March 1994, Christian Simenc, `Propositions tous azimuts pour promouvoir le francais' 8 April 1994, Jean Quatremer, `L'Europe appelle a la resistance audiovisuelle' 16 April 1994, Christian Simenc, `Le Senat vote le projet de defense du francais' 4 May 1994, Sophie Benard, `Toubon defend le francais de Claudel et MC Solaar' 5 May 1994, Sophie Benard, `Francais: Toubon sur la defensive'

6 July 1994,N.H., Toi Toubon:desdeputesde gauchedeposentun recours' 4 August 1994,Henri Giordan,`Languefrancaiseet neojacobinisme' 30 December 1994, Martine Esquirou, `La France veut proteger la directive audiovisuelle europeenne' 7 January 1995, `Quotas audiovisuels: pressions americaines et resistance europeenne' 16 January 1995a,Renaud de la Baume, `Les services telematiques vont deferler sur 1'Europe' 16 January 1995b, Luc Vachez, `France Telecom connecte la planete Minitel avec 1'univers Internet' 20 January 1995, Martine Esquirou, `Avant et apres la presidentielle, les dossiers de Nicolas Sarkozy'

31 January 1995, V. B., `JacquesSanterreveille la polemique sur les quotas europeensdans l'audiovisuel' 23 March 1995,J.Quatremer,`Quotasaudiovisuels:la position de Bruxelles' 21 November 1995, Ange-Dominique Bouzet, `A Bruxelles, les ministres relegitiment les quotas' 2-3 December1995a,StephenSmith, `La francophonieveut se doter «d'un visage et d'une voix»' 2-3 December1995b,StephenSmith, `Chiracrassemblesonpre carreau Benin' 15 January1996,`De 1'exceptionculturelledansl'audiovisuel' 19 January1996,JeanQuatremer,`Bruxellessceptiquesur les quotasde chansons' 9 February1996,FrancisMizio, `Neologuesen goguette' 22 March 1996,FrancisMizio, `Le developpementdu francaispasserapar le Web' 28 March 1996,Martine Esquirou,`«L'audiovisueldoit s'exportersur mesure»' 30 August 1996,RenaudDaly, `L'«hegemonismeamericain»,nouvel ennemidu FN' 31 August-1 September1996,RenaudDaly, `En universited'ete, Le Pen radicaliseencoreson ideologie' 13 June1997,`Le Net en sursisde loi Toubon', supplement`Multimedia' 15-16November1997,Marie-AndreeAmiot, Le QuebecrepecheMoliere en radesur le Net' 17November1997,JacquesAmalric, `La francophoniesansvoix ni visageau final de Hanoi'

273

19 November1997,JacquesAmalric, `Vous avezdit francophonepolitique?' 17-18 January1998,LaurentMauriac, `Jospintire un plan sur 1'Internet' 23 January 1998 ('Multimedia' supplement), Laurent Mauriac, `Le plan Jospin face aux internautes' 12 February 1998, Ange-Dominique Bouzet, `Le retour de la grande mechante mondialisation' 16 February 1998, `Cet AMI dont personne ne veut' 1 October 1998a,Nicolas de la Casiniere, `Ecoles Diwan, la bosse du breton' 1 October 1998b, Annick Peigne-Giuly, `La France va delier les langues regionales' 1 October 1998c, Paul Quinio, `Nouveau casse-tetepour l'Education nationale' 13 July 1999a, Vittorio de Filippi and Herve Nathan, `Tous les humains ne naissent pas egaux devant Internet' 13 July 1999b, `Une «pluralite pour renforcer la nation' Le Monde 21 March 1989, M. C.I and P.-A. G., `M. Alain Decaux coordonnera l'action televisuelle exterieure' 5 April 1989, Jean-FrancoisLcan, `Les createurscontre le gouvernement' 3 May 1989, Pierre-Angel Gay, `La nouvelle bagarre des quotas' 12 July 1989, Maurice Allais, `Notre langue face a 1'Europe (I)' 13 July 1989, Maurice Allais, `Notre langue face ä l'Europe (II)'

28 July 1989,Michel Colonna d'Istria, `Creationd'un Conseilde l'audiovisuel exterieurde la France' 4 August 1989, `La polemique sur les quotas: Mme CatherineTasca accuseles chains de vouloir «politiser»le dossier' 8 September 1989, M. -C.I., `Les pressions americaines contre les quotas audiovisuels' 5 October 1989a,Philippe Lemaitre, `L'Europe lance sa television... sans quotas'

5 October1989b,Jean-FrancoisLacan,`Compromisavantla vraie bataille' 5 October1989c,Michel Colonnad'Istria, `La courseaux imagesen hautedefinition' 12 October 1989a, Pierre-Angel Gay, `L'impossible pan des exportations francaises de programmesde television' 12 October1989b,`Washingtonsaisit le GATT' 14 October 1989a, Annick Cojean and Pierre-Angel Gay, `M. Lang defend le principe de la «preferenceeuropeenne»'

14 October1989b,M. C.I., `Les Etats-Unisaccentuentleurs attaquescontrela CEE' 28 October1989,`M.Rauschdefenda Washingtonla directive «Televisionsansfrontieres»' 5-6 November1989,`Le gouvernementsatisfaitde 1'avisdu CSA sur les quotas' 19 June 1990, `M.Mitterrand demandeun