Poland - University of Amsterdam [PDF]

Poland Transition and Position in the European Union

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Poland Transition and Position in the European Union

Country Report IV (CoRe Series) European Policy Studies University of Amsterdam September 2011

© 2011, Mirza Bajagilovic, Marianne Bakker, Iris Bijlsma, Floor Bouwman, Emina Cerimovic, Iris van Kleef, Merian Lelieveld, Hilde Pijnenburg, Eva Reitsma, Pieter Roggeveen, Maxime Smit, Iara de Witte. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteurs. Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikel 16B Auteurswet 1912 j0, het besluit van 20 juni 1974, Stb. 351, zoals gewijzigd bij het Besluit van 23 augustus 1985, Stb. 471 en artikel 17 Auteurswet 1912, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht (Postbus 882, 1180 Amstelveen). Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16 Auteurswet 1912) dient men zich tot de uitgever te wenden. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying or recording, without prior written permission of the authors. ISBN: 9789080761100

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Twelve students enrolled in the Master’s degree European Policy at the University of Amsterdam researched the integration of Poland into the European Union. We would like to thank all the persons, organisations, companies and public administrative bodies, which have cooperated by sharing their knowledge through interviews. This project would not have been possible without their support. Additionally, we would like to thank the University of Amsterdam for its financial support. To conclude, we would like to express our gratitude towards Dr. A.C. Van Wageningen, Dr. C.W.C. Reijnen and Drs. M. van der Laaken for their encouragement and supervision. This report is a collection of efforts for which we take collective responsibility. However, since this project is part of our Master programme, we would like to emphasise that this report should also be taken as a study project.

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PREFACE With pleasure, I present the fourth of a series of country reports, in short the CoRe series, of the Master European Policy Studies. This report is about Poland: a complex country that is difficult to fully comprehend. When visiting Poland, as my students did, one will meet two or maybe even three different ‘Polands’. On the one hand, the borders of the different ‘Polands’ are geographical. If you focus on the people of Poland on the other hand, you will discover that important economic and cultural differences have added another border: one that divides the different generations within the country. History has marked each generation with its own unique story. Furthermore, history has inspired the creation of many Polish myths that have been engrained in what has been the country’s story throughout the years. Today, some serious endeavours lie ahead for the Polish people. The harmonious development of the country as a whole, the strengthening of its economy, the modernisation of its infrastructure, the quality and content of education, the development of a sound welfare state, good healthcare, and the improvement of its judicial procedures and the development of a competitive agriculture are some of the major tasks Poland has to address. Under my supervision and as a part of their master European Policy Studies, twelve students of the University of Amsterdam have organised a field research trip to Poland to investigate the aforementioned differences between the different ‘Polands’ and to address the question of the Polish integration in the European Union. They have had a political, legal and economical focus underpinned by a cultural and historical background. Their research, as this report shows, has been interdisciplinary. They have combined desk research with interviews in Warsaw and Lublin. In only fourteen weeks they have obtained insight in the internal affairs of Poland, its relationship with the European Union and important problems still waiting to be resolved. It was interesting to coach and accompany these students. For them, the course itself was an adventure, as no preset course material was available. They have had to find information, discuss it and mould it into their own unique and collective story. The wealth of this report not only stems from the information that the students gathered and analysed, it is also the result of the chosen interdisciplinary approach. This enabled the students to draw conclusions surpassing a single disciplinary point of view. They thus proved that some inferences about our complex social reality can only be made after having done interdisciplinary research. Finally, I want to thank Dr. Carlos Reijnen, colleague and assistant professor of Eastern European Studies, for his contribution to the field trip. His historical explanations have been a great help to the students in understanding some complex issues of Polish society. Furthermore, I want to thank the twelve participating students for their engagement to finish a complex study of a not less complex state. Dr. A.C. van Wageningen Amsterdam, December 2011

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CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT................................................................................................... 5 PREFACE ........................................................................................................................... 7 CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ 9 FIGURES, TABLES, CHARTS AND BOXES ................................................................ 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 15 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 19 PART I: HISTORY AND CULTURE.............................................................................. 21 1. HISTORY...................................................................................................................... 21 1.1 Early Years of Poland ........................................................................................... 21 1.2 The Piast Dynasty ................................................................................................. 21 1.3 Jagiellonian Dynasty (1385-1572)......................................................................... 23 1.4 The Noble Republic (1569-1795) ........................................................................... 24 1.5 Years of Foreign Tutelage (1764-1795) ................................................................. 26 1.6 The Great War (1914-1918) .................................................................................. 28 1.7 The Inter-War Period (1918-1939) ........................................................................ 30 1.8 World War II, a Human Catastrophe..................................................................... 32 1.9 The Warsaw Rebellions ......................................................................................... 35 1.10 Aftermath of World War II................................................................................... 36 1.11 The Communist Regime (1948-1990)................................................................... 36 1.12 The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of Communism............................................... 38 1.13 Jews in Poland .................................................................................................... 39 2. CULTURE ..................................................................................................................... 45 2.1 National Culture and Identity ................................................................................ 45 9

2.2 Religion ................................................................................................................ 58 2.3 Polish-Jewish Relations and current Anti-Semitism ............................................... 65 2.4 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 67 PART II: LEGAL SYSTEM, POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ................................. 69 3. LEGAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................... 69 3.1 Constitutional Law................................................................................................ 69 3.2 The Rule of Law .................................................................................................... 86 3.3 Civil Law ............................................................................................................ 109 3.4 EU legal Standards ............................................................................................. 116 3.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 120 4. POLITICS ................................................................................................................... 123 4.1 Party System ....................................................................................................... 123 4.2 Political Parties .................................................................................................. 125 4.3 Local Politics ...................................................................................................... 130 4.4 EU Accession ...................................................................................................... 132 4.5 Current Political Situation .................................................................................. 133 4.6 Asylum and Migration Policy .............................................................................. 143 4.7 Foreign and Security Policy ................................................................................ 146 4.8 Poland within the EU Today................................................................................ 151 4.9 Foreign and Defence Policy vis-à-vis other Countries and Organisations............ 157 4.10 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 166 5. CIVIL SOCIETY .......................................................................................................... 169 5.1 Civil Society Development during Communist Rule and the (Early) Years of Transition ................................................................................................................. 170

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5.2 Present-Day Civil Society.................................................................................... 175 5.3 EU Influence on Polish Civil Society ................................................................... 180 5.4 Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 182 PART III: ECONOMY, INFRASTRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY.... 185 6. THE ECONOMY .......................................................................................................... 185 6.1 Shock Therapy..................................................................................................... 185 6.2 Fiscal Policy ....................................................................................................... 188 6.3 Monetary Policy of the Polish National Bank ...................................................... 193 6.4 Economic Sectors................................................................................................ 198 6.5 The Financial System .......................................................................................... 206 6.6 The Polish Business Climate................................................................................ 211 6.7 International Trade ............................................................................................. 217 6.8 Regional Development ........................................................................................ 221 7. ENERGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT ........................................ 229 7.1 Energy ................................................................................................................ 229 7.2 Infrastructure...................................................................................................... 233 7.3 Environmental Policy.......................................................................................... 236 7.4 Infrastructure and Environment........................................................................... 239 PART IV: WELFARE STATE....................................................................................... 241 8. WELFARE STATE ....................................................................................................... 241 8.1 European Welfare State Typologies..................................................................... 241 8.2 The Welfare State of Poland ................................................................................ 243 8.3 Labour Market .................................................................................................... 246 8.4 Conclusion Labour Market.................................................................................. 258 11

8.5 Social Security .................................................................................................... 259 8.6 Family Affairs ..................................................................................................... 265 8.7 Education............................................................................................................ 270 8.8 Health Care ........................................................................................................ 281 8.9 Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 286 FINAL CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 289 REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 295

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FIGURES, TABLES, CHARTS AND BOXES Figures Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure 7: Figure 8: Figure 9: Figure 10: Figure 11: Figure 12: Figure 13: Figure 14: Figure 15:

Figure 16: Figure 17:

Border Changes in History of Poland The Partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793 and 1795 The Legislative Procedure in Poland Organigramme of the Civil Courts Regional Division PiS Regional Division PO European Parliament Elections in Poland in 2004 and 2009 FDI per Capita Share of Individual Market Groups in Polish Exports GDP at Purchasing Power Parity in Voivodeships per Capita Typology of Polish Sub-Regions Typology of Polish Sub-Regions Gas Pipelines in Europe The Caspian Crude Oil Corridor to Europe Changes introduced since 1999: Introduction of the New School Type ISCED 2 and Extension of General (Comprehensive) Education by one Year (related to 15-Year-Olds) Organisation of the Education System in Poland, 2009/2010 Organisational Chart of the Polish Health Care System

Tables Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5: Table 6: Table 7: Table 8: Table 9: Table 10: Table 11:

Division of Competences between the Polish Administrative Levels Type of Cases Corruption Perceptions Index in Poland Corruption Perceptions Index in the EU EP Elections in Poland in 2009 and the European Political Groups Public Finances compared with other Countries (2010) Agriculture in Poland compared in a Global Perspective Share of Agri-Food Products in % of Total Foreign Trade Polish Service Sector, Economic Entities by Ownership

FDI Data of Poland, The Czech Republic and The Netherlands Agenda of Implementation of the New Curricula 2009-2016

Charts Chart 1: Chart 2: Chart 3: Chart 4: Chart 5: Chart 6: Chart 7: Chart 8: Chart 9: Chart 10:

European Parliament Elections in Poland in 2004 and 2009 EP Elections in Poland in 2009 and the European Political Groups Budget Deficit and Public Finance Sector Deficit Assets of Financial Intermediaries as a Percentage of GDP in 2009 Total Assets of Credit Institutions as a Percentage of GDP 2001-2008 Total Assets of Investment Funds as a Percentage of GDP Monthly Commodity Trade Balance from January 2009 to June 2010 Commodity Structure of Polish Exports in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008 Commodity Structure of Polish Imports in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008 Commodity Structure of Foreign Exchange Balance in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008. 13

Chart 11: Chart 12: Chart 13: Chart 14: Chart 15: Chart 16: Chart 17: Chart 18:

Temporary Employment: Developments since onset of Lisbon Strategy and Impacts of the Crisis 2009 Share of Employees taking Part in Short-Time and Partial Unemployment Schemes 2009 Part-Time Employment: Developments since onset of Lisbon Strategy and Impacts of the Crisis Expenditure on Active and Passive Labour Market Policies as Percentage of the GDP, 2008 Life Expectancy at Age 60 Adult Mortality Rate (per 100 000 age 15-60) Cancer Mortality Rate (per 100 000 all ages) Health Expenditure as a Share of GDP, OECD Countries, 2008

Boxes Box 1: Box 2: Box 3: Box 4: Box 5: Box 6: Box 7: Box 8: Box 9:

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland Philips and Corruption Solvit + Case (wrong Implementation of EU Law) CIA Detention Facility Missile Defence System The Smolensk Plane Crash Case Study on the Lublin Region The Case of the Pogotowie Opiekuncze in Lublin The Case of the Roma Children

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ALMPs BG BMI CAP CBOS CPI CPI CEFTA CFSP CIS CSOs Department S&RD EaP ECA ECB ECHR ECJ ECR ECtHR EEA EES EESC EIS EPA EPP ERM II ESF ESIP EU EURO 2012 EUROSAI FAPA FDI FGC FUS GDP GUGiK ICN IMF INTERREG IROP IPN ISPA KAPE KRUS LFS

Active Labour Market Policies Border Guard Business Monitor International Common Agricultural Policy Public Opinion Research Center Consumer Price Index Corruption Perceptions Index Central European Free Trade Agreement Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Civil Society Organisations Department of Strategy and Regional Development Eastern Partnership programmes European Competition Authorities European Central Bank European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms European Court of Justice European Conservatives and Reformists fraction European Court of Human Rights European Economic Area European Employment Strategy European Economic and Social Committee European Innovation Scoreboard European Partnership Agreement European People's Party Exchange Rate Mechanism European Social Fund European Open Social Insurance Platform European Union FIFA European Championship Football European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions Foundation of Assistance Programs for Agriculture Foreign Direct Investment Polish Family and Guardianship Code Social Insurance Fund Gross Domestic Product Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography Poland International Competition Network International Monetary Fund Community Initiative that aims to Stimulate Interregional Cooperation in the European Union Integrated Regional Operational Programme Institute of National Remembrance Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession Assistance National Energy Conservation Agency Individual social insurance company for farmers and their families. Polish Labour Force Survey 15

LGBTs LiD LLL LNG LPR MAK MIA MO MoND NATO NBP NCJ NDS NFZ NGO NIK NKVD NRP OBP-pipeline OECD OFEs OP OPFs OPI&E PAYG PBO PHARE PhD PiS PO PO PSL PUWP PZPR RES ROP SAPARD SDPL SGP SLD SMEs SRP S&D TEC UD UN UNCHR UOKiK UP VAT

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people Left and Democrats Lifelong learning Liquid Natural Gas League of Polish Families Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) Ministry of Interior and Administration Marshal Office Ministry of National Defence North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Bank of Poland National Council of the Judiciary National Development Strategy National Health Funds Non-Governmental Organisation Polish Supreme Audit Office People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs Polish National Reform Program Odesa-Brody-Plock pipeline Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Open Pension Funds Operational Programmes Open Pension schemes Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment Pay as you go system (pensions) Public Benefit Organisation Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Economic Restructuring Postgraduate course Law and Justice Party Civic Platform Emergency Shelter Polish People Party Communist Party of Poland United Polish Workers’ Party Renewable Energy Sources Regional Operational Programmes Support for Agriculture and Rural Development Social Democratic Party of Poland Stability and Growth Pact Alliance of the Democratic Left Small and Medium Enterprises Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Treaty establishing the European Community Democratic Union United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Office of Competition and Consumer Protection Labour Union Value Added Tax 16

VG/V4 WAK WIG WSE ZOZ ZUS

Visegrád Group Catholic Election Action Warsaw Stock Exchange index Warsaw Stock Exchange Health Care Management units Social Insurance Institutions

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INTRODUCTION Poland, the biggest country of the ‘new’ Member States that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, has been the subject of many studies in recent years. Because of its size and its importance in the central and eastern European region, the country has been observed closely by the EU and its Member States; both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ ones. The accession of Poland to the EU had to become a success, since it could serve as an example for other ‘newcomers’. Therefore, this report thoroughly examines Poland and its position within the EU. For this aim, it is important to get a proper idea of the country’s history and culture, since these factors influence the identity of the country and its people, hence the country’s priorities. What is also of significant importance is the transition from a communist state to a liberal democratic state that Poland has experienced before it became an EU Member State. This transition took place on all domains and on all levels; it affected every aspect of the Polish society. It will be argued that the EU has been an important external factor in developing this relatively ‘new’ democratic state. During the different stages of the research, it appeared that in order to understand Poland and its developments certain themes needed to be taken into account. Therefore, these themes serve as frameworks in this report. The first framework is that of ‘Poland A, B and C’ which makes a division between the level of development of different areas of Poland, both between east and west and between the metropoles and the periphery. The question asked in this report will be whether it is legitimate to make this clear vertical division. The second framework is that of the existence of a gap between generations in Poland. This report will examine the division between those who experienced communism and those who were raised after 1989 and profited from the opportunities that transition brought along. The third framework examines the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the influence the Church and consequently religion has had on Polish society, whereas the fourth framework deals with the myth of Poland as ‘the Christ of Nations’. In this myth, Poland’s suffering throughout history is explained by making a parallel with Christ; by its sufferings Poland will relieve the rest of the world. In this report it will become clear that this myth is only partly valid to describe the self-definition of Poland. Finally, and most importantly, the role and influence of the EU in Poland will be looked at. In that context, the question will be answered whether the EU has been a solution to existing problems in Poland, or maybe even worsened them, and whether it might have been the cause of new problems. The above mentioned frameworks will be taken into account throughout the report. However, the importance of each of the frameworks on the different domains dealt with in this report varies. The method of research of this report is extensive. We have examined a thorough amount of literature, including books, scientific articles, official reports from the Polish government, the EU and other international organisations, as well as articles from newspapers and magazines and primary sources, such as the Polish constitution and the Treaty of the European Union. In addition, over a hundred interviews have been conducted with authorities and experts in Poland. These interviews cover a wide range of topics and were mainly conducted in Warsaw, and partly in the city of Lublin in the eastern part of Poland. It is exactly these interviews that make this report valuable, as they have provided accurate 19

information which would have been impossible to have found in written sources. All the interviews together give a view on how things work and how issues are dealt with in Poland, but even more important, show a ‘real’ picture of Poland. To investigate the different frameworks and their influence on Poland, it is important to look at the different domains of society separately. Therefore, the outline of this report is as follows. In the first part, the Polish history and culture will be looked at. In the second part Poland’s state structure will be explained. This includes the constitution, institutions on national and local level, the rule of law, the judicial system, as well as the development of civil society and influence of it nowadays. The third part includes the structure of the economy and the economic development of Poland as well as the situation regarding energy (security), infrastructure and the environment. The final part deals with Poland’s welfare system, including, labour participation, education and healthcare.

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PART I: HISTORY AND CULTURE 1. HISTORY 1.1 Early Years of Poland From the Old Stone Age in the 180th millennium BC to the 10th century AD, the Polish plain provided a staging post for many nomads and settlers. The settlers of the Polish plain at the time were the Balts, Celts, Germans and Slavs. The nomads consisted of the Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns and Mongols. All these tribes colonised the more eastern provinces, to merge with Letts, Litts, Romanians and Tatars. This merging resulted in a mélange of different languages and faiths on the Polish plain. 1 During the 8th century another tribe, namely the tribe of Polanie (literally: people of the field) settled on the Polish territory, in the region which is now called Greater Poland. 2 The Polanie established control over the other tribes and built fortified settlements in the regions of Giecz, Gniezno, Poznán and Ostrów Lednicki. They were able to do so, because of their strong economic position which resulted from their salt trade. In general, the second half of the 10th century was a period of expansion and development of the Polish state. It was in this time that Poznán became the capital of Poland. Other important developments were the establishment of the first Polish Bishopric and the first cathedral in 968 AD. According to many historians, the Polanie were ruled by the so-called Piast dynasty. The Piast dynasty is considered to be the first Polish dynasty, ruling in Poland from the 10th century until 1370. This dynasty played a crucial role in the founding of the medieval Polish state.3

1.2 The Piast Dynasty It is said, that the first leader of the Piast dynasty was Mieszko I (960-992 AD). He developed internal cohesion within Poland and introduced the structure of the European state system. When Mieszko I in 966 AD married the Bohemian princess Dobrava, he converted himself to Christianity. Along with Mieszko I his conversion, the Christian religion was made the official religion of the ruling Piast family and their subjects. The Christianisation of Poland in 966 AD is often mentioned as the ‘the Baptism of Poland’. 4 The conversion to Christianity brought a variety of international benefits for both Mieszko I and his subjects. Firstly, his authority was immediately confirmed by the church because, according to the Christian faith, leaders are directly chosen by God. Secondly, the influences of monks and foreign priests, who came to Poland and brought along skills and advanced cultivation methods, made Poland part of the community of developed and wellorganised Western-European states. Furthermore, the Christian church introduced a taxation system which provided financial benefits for Mieszko I and his subjects. Nevertheless, this

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N. Davies, Heart of Europe: a short history of Poland, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986, pp. 283-285. The current name of ‘Poland’ or ‘Polska’ refers to the tribe of Polanie. 3 G.J. Lerski, Historical dictionary of Poland, 966-1945, Westport, Connecticut – London: Greenwood Press 1996. 4 Ibid. 2

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introduction of the taxation system, along with the abandoning of polygamy and the ownership of slaves, initially caused resentment among the population. 5 The declining popularity of the dynasty and the Catholic Church among the Polish population persisted during the reign of Bolesław I Chrobry (Boleslaus the Brave 992-1052), the son of Mieszko I. His authority and that of the church were endangered due to internal turbulence and military confrontations with Germans, Russians and Czechs. In order to preserve unity, Bolesław I Chrobry allied with the German emperor Otto III, who recognised the independence of Poland in the year 1000 (see also figure 1). It is said that, in return for Bolesław’s alliance, Otto III crowned Bolesław I Chrobry the first Polish king. However, other sources state that Bolesław was crowned by the pope in the year 1024, after he established an independent archbishopric in Gniezno, which was later expanded to more Polish regions. Although the coronation by Otto III or the pope was symbolic, the impact was immense because Poland now achieved full recognition as a European state. Figure 1: Border Changes in History of Poland

Source: http://maps.gloary.com/?p=1003. After the death of Bolesław in 1025, a period of internal conflicts between his potential successors arose. Moreover, its foreign intervention and the consequent loss of territories made Poland descend into chaos from 1025 until the end of the 12th century. 6 By 1138, however, Poland was economically, socially and politically at the same level as other European regions. It had established a framework of state structure under the leadership of Bolesław III (1107-1138). The country was by then divided into seven provinces: Silesia, Kraków, Sandomierz, Masovia, and Kujavy with Łeçzyca and Gdańsk Pomerania. Along with the rulers, Christian high clergy and the court administrated the provinces and established a financial system. Consequently, the peasantry was excluded from all forms of decision making and lost the right to land property and other personal liberties. 7

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A.J. Prażmowska, A history of Poland, Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2004, pp. 10-12. Ibid., p. 13. 7 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 6

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After the death of Bolesław III in 1138, the kingdom was divided between his three sons. As a consequence of this division, Poland from then on witnessed a period of feudal disintegration, which lasted for almost two centuries. During this time, Poland faced new threats: the Mongol tribes, under leadership of Genghis Kahn, together with the Tatar tribes, devastated the country.8 Nevertheless, the reunification of the Piast land and the re-establishment of the Polish central state were achieved in the following years. Kazimierz III (1310-1370) regained control over lands in the north and east regions and doubled the former territory. He introduced massive rebuilding programs, established the Kraków Academy (Kraków University) in 1364 and he re-created a strong Polish state, with a strong military. Since Kazimierz III did not have a son who could heir to the throne, he therefore appointed his nephew, Louis the Hungarian, as his successor. After 12 years of rule, his daughter Jadwiga was crowned the first queen of Poland in 1384. When Jadwiga two years later obligatory married the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Władysław II Jagiełło (1351-1434), the Polish-Lithuanian union was established under the Jagiellonian dynasty.9

1.3 Jagiellonian Dynasty (1385-1572) The Jagiellonian dynasty was of political importance for both Poland and Lithuania. The Lithuanian ruler Władysław II Jagiełło re-conquered regions that were lost under the Piast dynasty, such as the Rus territories, Pomerania and Silesia. For Lithuania, the PolishLithuanian union meant the approval of the Christianisation of Lithuania by Rome. The Jagiellonian dynasty caused conflicts by using military and political skills in order to gain support in many European capitals; these conflicts eventually resulted in a war from 14091411 against the Teutonic knights. The war was at its height in 1410, which in Poland is referred to as the battle of Grunwald. The battle of Grunwald resulted into a victory of Władysław II Jagiełło over the Teutonic knights. This battle, one of the largest in medieval times, is perceived by the Poles as a heroic one and its commemoration is an annual event. 10 One year later, in 1411, a peace treaty was signed in Torún. With the Treaty of Torún, Poland regained Pomerania, Gdańsk and Warmia. The Teutonic knights had to convert themselves into a secular duchy. However, the Teutonic knights were not defeated yet. A second Toruń Treaty was signed in 1466 under King Kazimierz IV, the successor of Władysław II Jagiełło. This treaty concluded the thirteen years’ war (1454-1466) against the Teutonic knights. The completion of the Polish-Lithuanian union into a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569 was the main Polish achievement of the 16th century. However, when the last Jagiellonian king died in 1572 it also meant the end of the Jagiellonian dynasty and the dynastic rule in Poland. 1.3.1 Reformation and Renaissance (1492-1572) The kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty ruled the largest state in Europe which stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It was therefore that in the 15th and 16th century Poland experienced many cultural, military and intellectual developments. The proximity of many other cultures and religions, such as the Calvinist, Lutherans and Hussites, influenced the life

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Ibid. Ibid. 10 Ibid., pp. 43-45. 9

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in Poland and made path towards the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation and the Renaissance. 11 Due to the Reformation religious tolerance was the norm in 16th century Poland. The once dominating Christian views were challenged by new ideas, such as protestant ideas, humanist values, classical culture and Jewish religious ideas and values. This brought along emerging protests against the Catholic Church’s monopoly. Nevertheless, the ruling monarchy always remained Catholic. However, the political situation during the Reformation changed. Due to the influence of the nobility a system of szlachta was developed, wherein the gentry had extensive rights to influence state matters. In 1537 the gentry demanded a reelection of the king, in which they could now directly participate. Hence, Poland embraced a unique political system, with a comparatively weak monarchy, controlled by powerful nobility. Simultaneously, economic life developed due to Poland’s expansion of trade relations; Poland became the main supplier of grain to Europe. 12 A Counter-Reformation began in the middle of the 16th century. Being completely obedient to the Pope, they initiated a propaganda campaign and therewith countered the Reformation ideas. Due to the Counter-Reformation many religious refugees from other countries such as, Germany, France and The Netherlands, fled to Poland. These refugees brought new ideas with them which became the basis of religious tolerance. Also for the Jews, this religious tolerance was important. During the ruling of the last two Jagiellonian kings, Jews were encouraged to come to Poland because of their economic skills. Even though, a law was introduced in Lithuania in 1566 that obliged Jews to wear a yellow hat, the fate of Jews was better in Poland and Lithuania than in other European countries; the Commonwealth pursued a rather tolerant policy towards ethnic minorities. 13 During the Renaissance, the cultural level experienced a great blossoming, and education became highly important. The University of Kraków, established by Kazimierz III, acquired a good name. Also other educational institutes were established, mostly humanist colleges, which were called academies. They were notably founded in Gdańsk and Toruń. The production of paper and printing presses further encouraged intellectual developments; Copernicus, astronomer Nicholaus and writer Jan Kochanowski experienced there intellectual peak in this period. Nevertheless, developments during the Renaissance were mostly noticeable for the nobility and brought little changes in the lives of the large peasant population.14

1.4 The Noble Republic (1569-1795) The end of the Jagiellonian dynasty marked the beginning of the transformation from a kingdom towards a commonwealth of nobles. At first, there was a time of interregnum. This interregnum was soon followed by the time of Swedish rulers, also called the Vasas. With the collapse of the Vasas in Poland, a new culture emerged in Poland: the Sarmatian culture. 15 During the time of interregnum many changes were made. Firstly, the nobility could now choose their own king; this meant that also foreign powers could choose their candidates for the throne. Nevertheless, some basic, non-negotiable principles were written down in the Henrician Articles for any prospective king. In addition to the Henrician Articles, also a 11

Ibid., pp. 67-87. Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., pp. 109-130. 12

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Pacta Conventa was established. The Pacta Conventa was a list of personal aims and was formulated with every prospective king separately. Secondly, the parliamentarian institutions, such as the Sejm and the senate, gained many privileges. This caused a rivalry between the dominant szlachta and nobles. Prospective kings had to convince both nobles and the szlachta in their Pacta Conventa. The first ruler that convinced both groups was Stefan Batory (15751586), Prince of Transylvania and aspiring leader of the Hungarian Crown. He proved to be successful and re-established central authority. After the death of Stefan Batory, three Catholic members of the Swedish Vasa dynasty dominated in Poland. 16 The first ruler of the Swedish Vasa dynasty was Zygmunt III Vasa (1587-1632), who later also became the Swedish king (1591-1599). He tried to capture Moscow, which in 1619 led to a peace treaty between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia. Also, he initiated the Union of Brześć (1596) in order to unite the Catholic and the Protestant Churches. The Lutheran uncle of Zygmunt III Vasa, Carl IX, took over leadership in 1600. Carl IX expanded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the ultimate eastward border of the Commonwealth, Ukraine. However, the Swedish kings were never completely trusted by the Polish nobility and szlachta. Also, the Commonwealth was always internally divided during this time. The beginning of the Thirty Years War divided Europe into Catholic and Protestants camps, and made the situation even worse.17 The son of Carl IX, Gustav Adolph, succeeded his father in 1611, as the next king of Sweden. However, the son of Zygmunt III, Władisław IV Vasa, was in 1632 chosen to be the next king of the Commonwealth. Władisław IV Vasa as well as Gustav Adolph preferred to rein a joined kingdom of both Sweden and the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Gustav Adolph was Protestant, were Władisław IV Vasa was Catholic. This caused rivalry between the two, which resulted in a successful Swedish attack on Poland. The Swedes occupied Kraków and Warsaw. Acting like conquistadors the Swedish invasions devastated Poland, consequently Poland lost regions in Prussia, Latvia and southern Estonia.18 In 1648, Jan Kazimierz, the brother of Władisław IV Vasa, was chosen to be the king of the Commonwealth. He defeated the Swedish occupants. Jan Kazimierz relinquished former regions and claimed the Swedish throne. While claiming the Swedish throne, the Russians along with the Cossack started the Chmielnicki Revolt (1648-1649), the Ukrainian war of liberation from the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. At the end of the 17th century, along with the end of the Vasa period, the beginning of the Sarmatian culture in Poland developed. The Sarmatian culture finds its origin in the szlachta of Poland, this cultures believes that the gentry and the nobles have a common ancestry. Peasants and other burghers were just conquered people. Having a past of political instability during the Commonwealth period, the Sarmatian culture searched for a balance in political institutions. The szlachta enjoyed many political and economic privileges (they could even elect their monarch) which was different in the rest of Europe. The Sarmatian culture diminished the royal power and increased the power of the aristocratic families. The liberum veto was a frequently used principle for nobles to express their disagreement with the decisions made by the Sejm. Nevertheless, in 1668, the Sejm did not tolerate other religions than the Catholic faith. The Sarmatian culture highlighted during the ruling of Jan III Sobieski. When the Turks invaded the country, he showed good military leadership and made

16

Ibid. Ibid. 18 Ibid. 17

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himself a national hero. However, the death of Jan III Sobieski meant the decline of the Commonwealth.19 The successor of Jan III Sobieski was August II (1697-1733). He wanted to conquer Turkey as well as regions of Sweden. Under pressure of Austria, August II agreed on signing a peace treaty with the Turks. However, he found allies in Denmark and Russia to invade Sweden. Afraid for the invasion, the Swedish king found allies in England and France. Eventually, the Russian army destroyed Sweden under the rule of Tsar Peter the Great. For the Polish burghers and peasants it was a difficult time; the plague entered houses and depleted many families.20 In 1733 Russia and Austria chose Friedrich August, also named August III, to be crowned king. August III heavily depended on three neighbouring powers: Russia, Austria and Prussia. This provoked the rise of a movement leaded by the szlachta family of Czartoryski, also known as ‘the family’. This family steered Polish foreign policy together with two other gentry families.21 The last king of Poland was Stanisław August Poniatowski, a relative from the Czartoryski family. He pursued many changes of the judicial system and suspended the liberum veto. Although, Poniatowski did not had much political power he did pursued many changes of the judicial system, reformed the Sejm structure and suspended the liberum veto. The final and most striking outcome of this reform was the establishment of the Constitution of 3 May 1791.22 The gentry under the rule of Poniatowski resisted. However, their power had been weakened. A last attempt of the gentry to stay in charge can be seen in the Bar Convention of 1768 by forming a Confederation. 23

1.5 Years of Foreign Tutelage (1764-1795) Due to the introduction of the Confederation, a civil war broke out in Poland. This civil war considerably worsened the Polish domestic problems, which caught the attention of the neighbouring Emperors Frederick II (Prussia) and Catherine the Great (Russia). Together with Joseph II, the Austrian Emperor, the three empires were able to enter in a swift military campaign. This swift military campaign was also possible due to many domestic problems such as the civil war in Poland itself. The military campaign of the three empires leaded to a first partition of Poland (1772), by which Poland lost a third of its territory (see also figure 2).24 Due to the partition, the Polish political system entered in the process of reforming itself into a more manageable and more democratic system. 25 These reforms, however, were too late to stop the imperial ambitions of the neighbouring countries. Despite heroic efforts of the Polish general Tadeusz Kościuszko, Poland lost another war against the mighty empires in 1793, which resulted in a second division of the Polish territory between Russia and Prussia. More than half of Poland fell in foreign hands and Poland was unable to withstand the final assault two years later, dividing the remaining areas of Warsaw and Poznań between the three empires. Thus, after more than 800 years of Piast, Jagiellonian and chosen kings' rule, Poland 19

Ibid. Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 2000, pp. 10-15. 23 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, pp. 109-130. 24 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 16-17. 25 Written in the sphere of the French Revolution, the 3rd May Constitution is the first democratic constitution in Europe and celebrated as such during the Polish national constitutional holiday, the 3rd of May. 20

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disappeared from the European map. Instead, Poland was incorporated in provinces of the enemies and would remain under foreign rule for 123 years.26 The part of Poland which served under Prussian and later German occupation has been commonly characterised as the Poland of order, strict rules, lack of creativity and higher prosperity, whereas the former Russian part of Poland is been considered to be more backwards, with stronger ties to religion and seemingly more scope for flexibility. 27 In the conclusion, the present-day consequences of the historic boundary between ‘Russian Poland’ and ‘German Poland’ will be under scrutiny. Figure 2: The Partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793 and 1795

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/30/Rzeczpospolita_Rozbiory_3.png. As stated in the previous section, Poland disappeared as a country for more than a century. During that long and traumatic period of occupation, the Polish nation tried to resurrect itself on numerous occasions. Notable risings were in corporation with the French army of Napoleon Bonaparte28 and during the European times of unrest and revolution in 1831, 1848 and 1866.29 However, all generations of Polish patriots in this time failed to bring an independent Poland back to life. Ironically, Poland lost its independence in 1795, almost simultaneously with the occurrence of nationalistic feelings in Europe, which were slowly transforming itself in the new ideology of nationalism. While other nations were developing nation states, the Polish nation was obviously deprived of this possibility. Nevertheless, the Polish nations hope for restoring independence was alive through the large majority of 123 years of suppression. The strive for independence led to massive protests, secret expression of Polish culture and a series of armed rebellions.

26

M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 16-17. Ibid. 28 Viewed as a striking example of bravery and independency for Poles in general, Bonaparte has been portrayed a hero in the Mazurek Dąbrowskiego, the Polish national anthem. 29 In 1831, Belgium had won its independence against the Netherlands. In 1848, revolutions appeared in many European capitals. In 1866, Prussia defeated the Habsburg Empire to become the number one German state. All these events caused turmoil in other parts of Europe, including occupied Poland. 27

27

While other parts of Europe modern nationalism was the most apparent political doctrine of the 19th century, artists expressed themselves in the Romantic style. Romantic artists such as the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz and virtuoso Frederic Chopin were embraced as artists, expressing the Polish arts. Mickiewicz, following the romantic spirit, concentrated in his poetry and novels on patriotic themes and the glorious national past. Frederic Chopin used the tragic history of his nation as a major inspiration. Both became national heroes and a source of inspiration for Poles under foreign rule, while their art expressed the greatness of Poland the ‘nation without border’. Meanwhile, industrialisation changed the landscape of the Polish lands. With szlachta gone, the dominant gentry was replaced by a rapidly growing bourgeoisie in new industrial cities in Silesia and Łódź, where the coal and textile industry was blossoming in the Prussian and Austrian areas. Warsaw, as an economic hub in the Russian empire, rapidly grew to a population close to 1 000 000 inhabitants, becoming one of the largest cities in Central Europe. Poland, historically a farmer society, suddenly experienced similar ‘class issues’ as were apparent in Western society30, even though a large group of Poles, predominantly in the Russian sphere of influence, kept working as a cottier.31 With Bismarck's Kulturkampf of the 1870s, another strike was brought to the Polish identity. The last people who lived in a free Poland had died and the hope for a united and free Poland slowly faded away. As Biskupski puts it: ‘Since it [independence] was the ultimate lost cause, the Poles would have to decide whether patriotism was a sensible, let alone, attractive, disposition. There were after all, a number of powerful arguments in favour of accepting the verdict of the partitions as final.’32 With all uprisings and tries failing, leading only to more oppression, a certain acceptance of the Polish faith entered the hearts and minds of Polish society. That acceptance led to mass emigration to the tolerant Americas. These waves of emigration gave the Poles a large diaspora, but increasingly weakened the domestic situation in Poland more and more. Although it is hard to point a finger on it, but the late 19th century has been considered by many to be the decisive shaping of the contemporary Polish ‘mind-set of suffering’. The Polish suffering in a seemingly hopeless situation, with obedience to the dominant foreign force as the sole virtue, was reinvented as the central theme of many Catholic myths and is apparent in elements of Polish society in the 21st century.33

1.6 The Great War (1914-1918) In August 1914, Germany and Austria declared war on Russia. Consequently, the three powers occupying Poland now found themselves in the Great War, which lasted for four years. At the moment of the outbreak of the war, Poland did not exist as an independent nation, but instead was still divided up along its three occupiers. With the Great War, and after 123 years, Poland was freed from falling in oblivion.34 The response to the Great War differed between the several occupied regions in ‘Poland’. Polish communities living in the Austrian territories cooperated with the Austrians, who had been the least oppressive, in order to defeat their common enemy Russia. The nationalist movements in these areas generally expected a Polish autonomy within the Austro30

At least, that is how Karl Marx perceived it to be. M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 26-28. 32 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 33 Chapter 2 will elaborate further on this theme. 34 N. Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 283-285.

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Hungarian Empire as the outcome, rather than an independent Polish State. 35 Polish communities living in the Russian territories generally wished to defeat Germany. Only the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), under the leadership of Polish General Józef Piłsudski, was hoping for a revolutionary struggle for national independence.36 During the war, the Russians tried to minimise war damages conflicted by the Germans and Austrians, and therefore moved all the Polish plants and industry into the Russian interior. Workers and their families were, however, not obligated to move along with their jobs.37 In 1915, German and Austrian troops conquered the territories of Poland, including Warsaw. As a consequence, the outcome of the ‘Polish question’ from now on depended on these two powers.38 In these years, German authorities introduced a Polish administration and in schools allowed the Polish language as a substitute for the Russian languages that was taught, it continued to economically exploit the Poles and remained militarily dominant. Also, they forced to destroy industry within Poland. Minerals such as coal and timber were however still exploited in Poland, in order to benefit the German army.39 The hard life for most Polish people worsened during the winter of 1915-1916, when starvation killed many Poles. This harsh treatment along with the obligatory work Polish men had to do in German industry, fed the thoughts on Polish independence. 40 In 1916, a two emperors’ manifesto was signed by German and Austrian authorities. This manifesto declared that a Polish Kingdom could be created within the conquered territories. 41 As a consequence, political groupings arose in order to develop a Polish unity. These groupings were supported by the West, were Poles had been actively lobbying for an independent nation. In the end, it can be said that political groupings in Poland were divided among two groups: the ‘activists’ of Piłsudski and the ‘pacifists’ led by Roman Dmowski. The Polish General Piłsudski established the Polish National Organisation (PON) to fight for independence. Besides Piłsudski, Roman Dmowski, the leading ideologist of the right wing National Democrats established the Polish National Committee (KNP). Before the Great War, Dmowski favoured a pro-Russian orientation. Nevertheless, he changed his thoughts when the independence of Poland became realistic. Dmowski was the main opponent of Polish General Piłsudski. 42 Until 1917, these political groups had not been successful. Nevertheless, in 1917, it became clear that there was an opportunity for Poland to become independent. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States in his State of the Union Speech mentioned a ‘united Poland’.43 Soon, the French, who saw Dmowski as the future leader of Poland, followed by stating that Poland should be independent.44 In 1918, the Polish National Committee was recognised by the French as the government of Poland, but Poland was still under control of Germany. The Polish independence was almost reached when the Fourteen Points of President Wilson (January 1918) were presented. In the thirteenth point President Wilson

35

A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 157. Ibid., pp. 157-159. 37 Ibid., p. 159. 38 Ibid. 39 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 40-45. 40 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 160. 41 Ibid., p. 161. 42 N. Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 111. 43 Ibid., p. 110. 44 G. Sanford, Historical dictionary of Poland, Lanham: Scarecrow Press 2003. 36

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demanded ‘a united, independent and autonomous Poland, which demand was considered to be an allied intent’. 45 The Great War ended in the east of Europe in March 1918 due to the signing by Germany and Russia of the Brest-Litovsk Peach Treaty. It was because of the collapse of the three partitioning powers that independent Poland could emerge. German authority fell because the German troops were withdrawn from Polish territories and Polish General Piłsudski took over power. Piłsudski established the Polish state and a provisional authority. Dmowski accepted Pilsudski’s authority, even though he and Piłsudski would never agree on plans for the future of the Polish State.46 Life in Poland during the years of Great War had not been easy. Polish people were forced to flee and on top of this, the world pandemic of influenza reached the Polish people in 1918. In the period of 1914-1919, the Polish population had fallen by 4.6 million people, which was a decrease of 14.9 %.47 Next to this, houses, industry and infrastructure were dramatically damaged because of the war. Even though after 123 years Poland had reemerged, Poland still has a difficult road ahead.

1.7 The Inter-War Period (1918-1939) On the 14th of November 1918, Piłsudski became Chief of State of what was known as the Second Polish Republic. However, the Republic at that time did not have official borders or a constitution, nor did it have international recognition. Poland was developed by three different monarchs who all had a different economic and political view. Therefore, the Polish independence required a new start.48 In this process, the voice of minority groups, such as the Ukrainians, Rutherenians and the Jews, were considered of less importance. 49 Nevertheless, most Poles agreed that it was the rebirth of the Noble Republic of the 18th century. The settlement of Poland’s frontier was a difficult task. In the south, frequent border conflicts with Czechoslovakia took place and in the east and south-east, a Russian civil war started to unfold, while Baltic, Ukrainian and Byelorussian people had no desire to belong to the Republic of Poland. Also border conflicts were commonplace at the German border. Furthermore, in 1919 Piłsudski started a military campaign by occupying Vilnius, which was the beginning of an abhorrence of Poles in Lithuania. In 1920 the Polish army also started a campaign against the Red Army. The Poles were in that time successful in the repulsion of the Russians, which is known as the ‘Miracle of Vistula’. 50 The settlement of the Polish nation was seen by surrounding powers of Poland with aversion. Even though the Polish army was euphoric about the resurgence, the Polish resurgence mostly took place because of the weakness and decentralisation within Russia and Germany. Both Russia and Germany resented Polish resurgence. Countries such as the US, France and Britain took their hands of Poland. Poland therefore became an isolated player in world’s politics. Added to this were the ongoing discussions with Germany about Gdańsk. It was still officially a German city, but it depended heavily on Polish trade. Gdańsk therefore

45

N. Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 111. A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 163. 47 N. Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 113. 48 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 164. 49 Ibid., p. 163. 50 Ibid. 46

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became a free city. Its security was guaranteed by the League of Nations and political matters were arranged by an internal elected senate. 51 The development of the Polish nation became even more difficult because of the economic crisis in 1923. Governments had to operate in an atmosphere of violence and frustration. No consistent policy was pursued during this period. Political frictions also became visible when in 1922, during the presidential elections, Gabriel Narutowicz was assassinated by a National Democrat fanatic. Narutowicz was a successful contestant of Piłsudski. Nevertheless, the National Democrats and the Peasant Alliance came to a government coalition, which collapsed again one year later. During this period, agricultural reforms were introduced, but did not have the desired effects, because of the release of too little land to satisfy the peasant and the hunger. Financially the State was in chaos and Poland experienced hyperinflation for the next several years. Minimal stability was established by reforms of Władysław Grabski and the introduction of the new złoty by Bank Polski. However, foreign investment and reforms in infrastructure and industry were minimal. 52 In 1925 the Treaty of Locarno was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Britain and Italy. The Treaty guaranteed the safety of the German-Belgium and the German-Franco borders. The border of Germany with Poland however was left out. Only France guaranteed the integrity of Poland, as they saw the Treaty of Locarno as an attempt of Germany to expand eastwards. A couple of years earlier, in 1921, Poland and France signed a political agreement. This leaded to a military convention for joint action if Germany would attack Poland or France. However, Poland had hoped for more financial and military help from France in exchange for an eastern ally. 53 In May 1926, Piłsudski and his troops carried out a coup d’état, to stop the National Democrats to take over the government. Other parties, including the communists, were fighting next to Piłsudski. He introduced a new programme, called the Sanacja. The Sanacja was a programme focused on strengthening the Presidency and wiping out corruption. By 1929, Piłsudski and his military regime, introduced a ruling party. Undermining the Sanacja programme, attempts were made by the military regime to rewrite the constitution. Sejm deputies were intimidated and military officers took over power in all ministries. Democracy in Poland was destroyed. In the meanwhile, the economic depression struck European countries. Foreign aid for Poland was stopped and Polish economy and industry were even more destroyed.54 The military regime under leadership of Piłsudski remained until the 1930s. Piłsudski died in 1935 and Marshal Rydz-Smigły was the designated successor. Also Colonel Jósef Beck, Minister of Foreign Affairs had many power during this regime. Both focused on political collaboration with Hitler, while failing to develop Poland. As said before, Poland’s foreign position was very weak. Therefore, Colonel Beck tried to improve relations with Germany since Hitler came to power in 1933. This resulted in the German-Polish Pact of Non-Aggression in 1934. Four years later, in 1938, the Poles along with the Germans attacked Czechoslovakia. Poland helped the Germans attack because of the mistreatment of German minorities in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Poland hoped for the return of the region of Teschen. Unfortunately for the Poles, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain took the initiative of signing the Munich Agreement. Signed by Germany, Britain, Italy, France, Hitler was not allowed to take over the Czechoslovakian regions inhabited by German 51

N. Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 119. Ibid., pp. 120-123. 53 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 60-80. 54 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 169. 52

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minorities. This break-up of Czechoslovakia led to the march of Hitler to Prague in 1939. 55 Germans power grew because of this increasing influence in the eastern regions, which meant that Polish power in the eastern regions diminished. Unforeseen was also the expansion of Germans aggression towards Poland. 56 In 1939 the Poles were warned by the Nazi Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim Ribbentrop that the Germans wanted Gdańsk to be part of the Reich. Poland searched for help within Paris, but the French had no intention to defend Poland. The British Chamberlain did make an attempt by warning Germany ‘not to alter the balance of power in Europe’. 57 However, it remained only a political gesture. In the meanwhile, Germany and Russia signed a Pact of Non-Aggression, including a secret annex with an anticipation of Germany to attack Poland. Also the Nazis in the Senate in Gdańsk made the decision to revert to the Reich. Polish commissioners were murdered and the League of Nations, even though they had to defend the Poles, made no issue out of it.58 In the next period of time Polish armies were defeated both by the Nazis as well as the Soviet troops. Polish officers waited for military help of the French and Britain, but without any result. The agreements signed with both countries seemed to be of no value. The western countries already considered Poland to be defeated. Instead, France and Britain preferred to prepare themselves for the inevitable war with Germany. On the 3th of September they declared war on Germany. Later on in September the Soviet troops reached Warsaw. Polish military, political and spiritual leaders and the elite had already fled to Romania thinking they would be able to fight in exile. 59

1.8 World War II, a Human Catastrophe In the early morning, on 1 September 1939, Messerschmitts crossed the German-Polish border to attack the Polish harbour near Gdańsk, known as ‘Danzig’ in German. This attack formed the start of World War II. The place of this attack was highly symbolic, as it referred back to the loss of German territory at the end of World War I. The German national movement had never accepted the conditions of the humiliating Treaty of Versailles of 1919, where Germany lost 10 % of its territory, most of it to Poland. To lose Gdańsk was seen as the most painful loss of all. Hence, World War II started at the place where the traumas of World War I were never resolved. The Poles, who expected the attack, were nevertheless insufficiently prepared. As a preparatory measurement, Poland had signed collective defence agreements with France and the UK. Consequently, Polish officers waited for military aid of the French and British army, but to no avail. The agreements signed with both countries seemed to be of no value. Most likely, the western allies already considered Poland to be defeated and they thought their aid would be pointless. Instead, France and the UK prepared themselves for the inevitable war with Germany. On 3 September 1939, France and the UK formally declared war on Germany, without taking any visible military action. In the meantime, the Polish army defended their territory against the German Blitzkrieg. However, after a few weeks of battling, defeat seemed inevitable for the Polish army. On 17 September 1939, Stalin acted upon the Molotov – Von Ribbentrop Pact by 55

Ibid., pp. 169-172. Ibid. 57 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 60-80. 58 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 172. 59 Ibid. 56

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attacking Poland from the east side. For Poland, the consequences were massive. After the three partitions of the 18th century, Poland was again confronted with another joint attack from both sides by its enemies. 1.8.1 Poland capitulates, Soldiers keep fighting When Warsaw capitulated on 27 September 1939, the Polish army was only partially defeated. The government and a large part of the army, most notably the air force, managed to escape Poland through Romania, heading for Paris.60 The Polish soldiers, allied with France when Germany successfully attacked the Western European countries in the spring of 1940. After the French defeat, the Polish government-in-exile and the remaining armed forces moved to London. In the succeeding Battle of Britain, Polish pilots played a pivotal role, being reportedly responsible for one third of the allied kills. The Polish Kościuszko Squadron, named after the war hero Tadeusz Kościuszko, acquired the same legendary status as its spiritual father, by being the most successful allied Squadron. Winston Churchill praised Polish fighters, hinting that the UK would not have been able to win the Battle without them. 61 Meanwhile, life in occupied Poland was extremely harsh, particularly for the three million Jews in Poland and other vulnerable minorities. The Slavic races, Untermenschen in Hitler’s view, needed to disappear to make Lebensraum for the Germans. Poland was the closest German neighbour, with the second-largest Slavic population. Heinrich Himmler, a leading politician of the Nazi party, put it clearly and concisely: ‘All Poles will disappear from the earth.’62 During the war, an estimated five to seven million Poles, an approximate 20 % of the Polish population, lost their lives. The vast majority were civilian casualties. Particularly traumatic events, such as the Warsaw and Kraków ghettoes, the murdering of Polish intelligentsia in Katyń and other places, the horrors of the Warsaw uprising and the setting up of many concentration and death camps on former Polish territory, are still commemorated on a large scale today. It is questionable whether the Poles have forgiven Germany and Russia, for the war crimes committed. In June 1941, Hitler's Germany began to reopen the Ostfront and started to wage a war on the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet Union and Poland both belonged to the allied camp. Many Polish prisoners of war in Russian camps were forced to take the Russian side and fight alongside the Red Army. General Władysław Anders, for two years a captive in a Russian working camp, was released reluctantly. He formed the Second Polish Corps from soldiers in Russian prisons. The Corps would later fight under allied command, most notably in the Battles of Tobruk and Monte Casino. 63 It has been estimated that Poland was the fourth strongest allied power in World War II.64 However, despite the efforts of the Polish military, Poland would not achieve the goal of its military actions: to regain full independence and sovereignty after the war against Germany would prove to be victorious.

60

L. Olson and S. Cloud, A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World II, New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group 2004, pp. 185-189. 61 Ibid., pp. 203-205. 62 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 63 Ibid., pp. 219-227. 64 The Polish army comes in behind the UK, the Soviet and the US army, but ahead of the French army.

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1.8.2 United States enter World War II; Poland's Fate to be decided When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the Allied Powers gained considerable strength. However, Germany was still winning terrain on many fronts. Many historians regard the culmination of the Battle of Stalingrad, ending in February 1943 as the turning point of World War II, putting the German troops to a decisive standstill. 65 Later that year, key allied leaders Churchill (United Kingdom), Stalin (USSR) and Roosevelt (US) met for the first time during World War II in Tehran, setting up the Tehran Conference to discuss a swift conclusion of the war and its aftermath. The Polish government-in-exile was not invited, although the future of Poland was discussed at the Conference. It has been suggested that, during the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt gave in to Stalin's demands to shift Poland's border westwards, in exchange for prolonged Russian fighting on the east front. The Soviet Union would consequently be able to capture the Polish eastern borderlands, and, as an additional feature, gain political control over Poland. According to some sources Churchill was largely unaware of the deal that had been made and reacted furiously when he found out. 66 Other scholars claim that Churchill approached Stalin to inform the Soviet leader that ‘the British Government was committed to the reestablishment of a strong and independent Poland, but not to any specific Polish frontiers’. 67 The Polish government-in-exile was in disbelief when rumours came across Tehran from London about a possible loss of Poland’s east lands and the loss of sovereignty. Being deprived of real power and high-quality intelligence, the Polish government-in-exile proved unable to turn the plans made in Tehran.68 It is debatable whether the UK and US were forced to ‘grant’ Poland to the Soviet Union, their main ally. Several theories exist, explaining Stalin's political victory in the Polish case. Firstly, there has been mentioned that Roosevelt was already in poor physical condition and did not have the strength to counterweight Stalin. Secondly, Roosevelt may have made a pure geopolitical deal, to exchange the Polish fate for doubled Soviet war efforts in order to save American lives. Thirdly, Roosevelt may not have cared about ‘Eastern Europe’ and may have misunderstood the effects of an extended Soviet sphere of influence. What Roosevelt's reasons may have been, during the Yalta Conference in 1945, the future of Poland became clear to the public. Ironically, the Western Allies declared war on Germany in 1939 to fight for a free and independent Poland. After winning World War II, Poland had lost a third of its territory and appeared to be neither free nor independent. Despite heavy protests by the government-in-exile, Stalin gave political power in Poland to a group of Lublin communists, who had the task to rein Poland as a Soviet puppet state. The government-in-exile and the numerous Polish fighters, stationed in the Western Allied territories, were unable to return to their homeland. 69 Those who did awaited prosecution. The UK and US withdrew the recognition of the government-in-exile at 5 July 1945, recognising the Lublin government instead. 70

Source: L. Olson and S. Cloud, A Question of Honor, p. 231. 65 A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, London: Columbia Books 1998, p. 14. C. Bellamy, Soviet Russia in World Two, New York: Knopf Publishers 2007, p. 107. 66 L. Olson and S. Cloud, A Question of Honor, pp. 215-218. 67 J.M. Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1974, p. 14. 68 L. Olson and S. Cloud, A Question of Honor, pp. 217-222. 69 Ibid., pp. 211-213. 70 W. Rojek, ‘The Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, 1945-92’, in: P.D. Stachura ed., The Poles in Britain, 1940-2000: from betrayal to assimilation, London: Frank Cass Publishers 2004, p. 33.

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1.9 The Warsaw Rebellions The war may have ended and Warsaw came out victorious, but the Polish capital was politically and physically heavily crippled after the war. Warsaw had lost political autonomy to Moscow and the city of Warsaw was literally in ruins. World War II had raged devastatingly all across Poland. The villages suffered from mass deportations of goods and peasants, while in the large Polish cities, Polish rebellions engaged in a civil war against the German and occupier. Many revolts were led by the Jewish ghetto leaders, the Polish Resistance Home Army ('AK' in Polish) or a combination of the two Resistance forces. After every desperate attempt to break free from the ghetto, the Schutzstaffel (SS) punished severely by mass executions, deportations to death camps nearby and cuts in the food ratio. AK experienced relatively better circumstances. However, its uprisings were impeded by lack of supplies and fire power. The last major uprisings took place near the end of the occupation. The Jewish ghetto in Poland organised in early 1943 the largest Jewish uprising during the Holocaust Period, supported by AK.71 The purpose of the many uprisings in the ghettoes, including the final revolt in 1943, was not to liberate the Jews captured in the ghettoes. Military-wise, this objective would be completely unrealistic. Marek Edelman, the leader of the 1943 ghetto uprising, described the objective as follows: ‘The uprising was doomed to fail. It was more a symbolic gesture to make the world recognise us.’ 72 When the revolt died out in May 1943, most ghetto inhabitants were transported to the death camp in Treblinka.73 By August 1944, Germany was severely weakened and quickly lost grounds on both fronts. When the Red Army entered the neighbourhood Praga on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, German forces prepared to leave the city centre of Warsaw, situated on the west bank of the Vistula river. AK used this moment for a massive uprising in order to liberate the Polish capital before the Soviets would get this possibility. When the uprising started, Soviet troops halted their march to the city centre and set out their camps on the east side of the Vistula. The German troops, noticing the Soviet hesitance, re-entered the city centre to break the uprising. Engaged in a heavy battle, the uprising ceased to exist after two months of fighting. A massacre had occurred, in which approximately 40 000 AK fighters and close to 200 000 Warsaw citizens were killed compared to 25 000 German soldiers. Afterwards, SS troops used flame-throwers to destroy the remaining buildings on the west bank of the Vistula. The Red Army crossed the river, two months after arriving on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw. Of the 1.2 million inhabitants Warsaw had in 1939, just 200 000 citizens were left in 1945. Close to 90 % of the buildings in the city was destroyed beyond repair. Historians share different opinions why Stalin did not allow his troops to cross the river and engage in the combat in the Warsaw city centre. Some scholars regard Stalin's decision as a military one – the Red Army may have had insufficient capabilities to continue its swift rush to Berlin. 74 Others point to the fact that allied aircraft were not allowed to help the AK rebellions by air support, as it would be necessary to land after such an operation on Soviet-conquered territory. By the refusal of landing on Soviet territory, Polish fighters from the many

71

Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team. The Stroop Report. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/nazioccupation/stroop. html. 72 M. Edelman, The ghetto fights, London: Bookmarks 1990, p. 28. 73 Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team. Treblinka Death Camp Day-by-Day. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.holocaustresearchproject.net/ar/treblinkadaytoday.html. 74 J.M. Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944, pp. 150-153.

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squadrons based in the UK were unable to help their compatriots in the battle for their capital.75

1.10 Aftermath of World War II After World War II, Warsaw had to be completely recovered, brick-by-brick. During the first post-war years, Łódź was the largest city in Poland. Many other Polish cities were severely damaged and the rebuilding proved to be an expensive and enduring task. As a sign of its appreciation for the Polish people, Stalin gave Warsaw the largest building of Poland by erecting the ‘Josef Stalin Palace of Culture and Science’.76 The communist architecture became dominant in the new-to-be-built cities. Poland had changed immensely during the course of six war years. The Polish border were moved several hundred kilometres. westwards. The country lost 20 % of its population, was controlled by an assigned communist government and much of the country was in ruins. In 1945, starvation was abundant. Nevertheless, Stalin denied Poland, or any other state within the Soviet sphere of influence, Marshall Aid. Directly after the war, Poland had its name changed to the People's Republic of Poland. In 1955, on the ruins of World War II, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, also known as the Warsaw Pact, was signed. Poland had to accept post-war reality.

1.11 The Communist Regime (1948-1990) Since 1948, Poland was completely under Soviet influence. The communist authorities gained control over all aspects of Polish society and Poland was transformed into an obedient tool of the Soviet Union. 77 The weak relationship between the US and the Soviet Union lead in Europe to a division of two camps: the Soviet Union and its satellite states, including Poland versus the western world. This division was clearly marked by the iron curtain. 78 Polish borders had been changed again after World War II as they lost the areas of Ukraine and Byelorussin, but gained some German territories. On the outside, it looked like Poland had been more ethnically homogenous than before. Germans were expulsed and Ukrainians and Byelorussians were forced to become Soviet citizens. 79 The first government in Poland was a coalition between the Communists (PPR), the Socialists (PPS) and the Peasant Alliance (PSL).80 In reality however, there was a communist control over Poland. In the meanwhile, the Russian People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) harshly punished collaborators with the Nazis and those who were against the communist regime. In order to win the elections in 1947, the PPR used intimidation and violation to destroy the PSL party with its continuing strong presence in Poland and in the end used corruption to win the majority of the votes. The PSL was destroyed by these elections. Also other independent organisations were in the next years destroyed or managed by the communist regime. The left-wing PPS was absorbed into the PPR- dominated, United Polish Workers’ Party (PZPR) of Gomulka. This party would rule until the fall of communism in 1989.81 75

L. Olson and S. Cloud, A Question of Honor, pp. 201-212. Which was renamed to ‘Palace of Culture and Science’ during the period of destalinisation. 77 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 193. 78 Ibid., p. 189. 79 Ibid. 80 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 127-128. 81 Ibid. 76

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In 1948, Soviet policies became stronger and the communist ideology was spread through Poland. 82 The opposition of the communist regime, including those who had contact with the West, was tortured. This Stalinist system affected all aspects of daily life. In fabrics production quotas were raised and work conditions worsened. The education system became a Soviet style education system. This has as its advantage that free education for all children was promoted. Furthermore, priest of Catholic Churches were arrested, being accused of collaboration with the Nazis. Also the economy was changed, by the introduction of the 1950s Six-Year-Plan. This Plan was aimed at the creation of an independent economic base in the Soviet satellite states. Also the health care system, which was destroyed during the World War II, was rebuilt. 83 When Stalin died in 1953, a succession strive arose within the East European communist countries and the Kremlin. Nikita Khrushchev took over power and changes were made in Poland. In this time, the persecutions and violations were officially revealed and it was said the communist leaders had a privileged lifestyle. Censorship was reduced, and debates followed about the former Stalinist time. 84 In 1956 protests came up and Radio Free Europe spread facts to Western Europe. In Poland, a sense of euphoria arose. Protestors demanded political and religious freedom and better wages and an attempt were made to better relationships with Germany. The Rapacki plan was signed in 1957, which meant that Germany, Poland as well as Czechoslovakia could not have nuclear weapons on their territory.85 During the 1960s the communist regime continued to control. 86 The communists tried to keep public support by investing in economy and security matters, this included building programs and educational access. The communists promoted the maintenance of full employment. This combined with the expansion in coal mining, steel and chemical industry provided some economic progress. A wide range of new, exotic goods entered Poland, due to contacts with foreign, mostly communist countries. Censorship was still commonplace, but journalists learned to deal with it. A small opening up towards the West can be seen in the possibilities of travels towards the West and the influence of western culture in Poland. 87 Films and books from the West were shown and translated in Polish. Also many people from the West came to Poland due to popular festivals in Poland such as the Chopin annual festival and the jazz festivals. The beginning of the 1960s can be defined as a time of hope and optimism. However, the Soviet control over the region was still dominantly present. 88 The economic increase and stability was over in the late 1960s when political protests were increasing and disagreement became visible about social and economic policies. Protests against the regime increased. Starting with student demonstrations at the University of Warsaw, these demonstrations were soon followed by other universities. Nevertheless the communist government harshly pushed protests down and expelled rebellious students and professors.89 Also within politics things were not going smoothly. Internal party conflicts were taken place as the nationalist group of Mieczysław Moczar criticised the PZPR against Gomułka’s fraction. Because Moczar could not directly attack Gomułka, he started to use the 82

A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 194. Ibid., pp. 194-196. 84 M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 136-137. 85 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, pp. 202-203. 86 Ibid., p. 199. 87 Ibid., p. 200. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 83

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Israel-Arab war. The PZPR Gomułka along with the Soviet Union chooses the side of defending the Arabs. Mozcar therefore used an anti-semitism campaign by accusing Jews of having loyalty towards Israel. Jews were exposed, humiliated and their Polish citizenship was taken away. Along with the internal conflicts within the Gomułka fraction, economy stagnated even more. In the 1970s the Gomułka fraction was replaced by Edward Gierek.90 The Gierek fraction started off good, but this was soon over when in the 1975 economic problems rose in Poland. Gierek was more western oriented than his predecessor. Foreign debts however rose and investments were made badly. Even though the economy was stagnating, the Poles were used to a better way of life. Goods were becoming scarce and the charitable organisations tried to help in the provision of goods. During this period, lots of corruption took place mostly within the police organisation, the politics and companies. Workers Protests against the regime increasingly took place. In 1976, the Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Committee of the Defence of Workers, KOR) was established, in order to assist and help workers in their demands.91 In the late 1970s two events took place in Poland that helped the disaffected population: the election of the Polish Pope in 1978 and the demonstration of workers in Gdańsk. The Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła assumed the title of John Paul II, which gave a boost to the Roman Catholic religion in Poland. Also demonstration came up of workers starting in Gdańsk shipyards in order to break the power of the state. The Roman Catholic Church was supporting these protests.92

1.12 The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of Communism Negotiations with the workers, the KOR and government representatives followed up the protests. The negotiations ended when the workers could set up free trade unions and when other demands relating to social issues were met. The free trade unions united and became known as Solidarity. Solidarity increased their political control and became along with the Communist Party the co-leaders of Poland. The number of members of Solidarity rose every day. The successor of Gierek, Stanisław Kania, had to deal with the power of Solidarity. Solidarity wanted a federated structure within Poland. In the meanwhile, the economy in Poland was severely decreasing, which made workers increasingly demand for a better life. 93 The political power of Solidarity improved until 1981. In 1981, the martial law was introduced, which made Solidarity an illegal organisation. Many activists were taken into camps. The military took over power in Poland under control of the Soviet Union. General Wojciech came to power and he dominated with punishments towards them who tried to establish an opposition. Many Solidarity activists flew to western countries. The Church played an important role in slowly starting negotiations again between the government and the opposition. Also the Church protected Solidarity families that were in danger. 94 In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev became First Party Secretary in the Soviet Union. This changed the communist domination over the satellite states. The Polish government had to solve internal conflicts, which meant that they had to re-establish negotiations with Solidarity.

90

M.B. Biskupski, The history of Poland, pp. 152-164. A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, pp. 203-205. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., pp. 205-207. 94 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 91

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In 1989, free trade union were legalised again and under pressure of Gorbachev, a fully political democratic system had to be implemented. 95 During the first elections in 1989, 35 % of deputies for the Sejm could be chosen freely. These seats were all filled with Solidarity candidates. Jaruzelski became the first president. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, once adviser of the Gdańsk strikers, became Prime Minister. The political system in Poland became one based on a West European model and the Communist Party was transformed into a social democratic party. In 1990, Lech Wałęsa became the first freely elected President of Poland.96

1.13 Jews in Poland According to many authors, the Polish-Jewish relationship has been very susceptible to influence by both positive and negative issues. This is probably the result of the long shared history and shared territories of Poles and Jews. 97 This section studies the historical background of the Polish-Jewish relations up to the th 20 century and looks at the consequences of the rise of Polish nationalism for Polish Jews. Also, it describes what happened to the Polish Jews in World War II. In section 2.3, the Polish-Jewish relations and current anti-semitim will be discussed. 1.13.1 Until 1795 From as early as the 11th century, there has been a Jewish population within Polish boundaries. Especially from the end of the thirteenth century, a Jewish community emerged in Poland. Jewish movement to Poland was the result of several factors, such as expulsion of the Jews from West and Central Europe, deterioration of their position in the Arab world and the fact that Jewish merchants were travelling the world for their trade activities. 98 In addition, Jewish people who already lived in the bigger Polish cities were accompanied by Jews who were attracted by the large Jewish community. 99 In mediaeval Poland, Jews were granted a legal position in the state. They were protected by public law (or charters) which allocated rights and obligations to them. ‘Jewish Law’, as it became known, assured protection from the state by placing Jews under the jurisdiction of the voivodeships, but also allowed the Jews to have their own jurisdiction. By doing this, one may say that the state welcomed the Jews to ensure trade and commercial contacts with the rest of Europe.100 The Jewish community became of significant importance for the rural economy and especially for the trade relations with the nobility. As a result, a ‘marriage of convenience’ between Polish nobles on the one hand and Jews on the other hand was established. The nobility, as owners of the towns, were given the right to rule over Jewish citizens. Although the marriage that emerged from the growing mutual dependence did not mean there was

95

Ibid., p. 210. Ibid., p. 211. 97 R.D. Cherry and A. Orla-Bukowska eds., Rethinking Poles and Jews: troubled past, brighter future, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2007, p. 4. 98 A. Polonsky, J. Basista and A. Link-Lenczowski eds., The Jews in old Poland 1000-1795, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers 1993, pp. 13-14. 99 Interview B3. 100 A. Polonsky, J. Basista and A. Link-Lenczowski eds., The Jews in old Poland 1000-1795, p. 3. 96

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mutual respect, it did mean that Jews were tolerated. Moreover, the Polish nobility recognised and stressed the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. 101 However, the tolerance of Jews in Poland was not welcomed by everyone. Polish natives, and in particular the Roman Catholic Church, saw the acceptance of the Jewish population as a possible increase of Jewish influence and thus as a threat to Christianity. This threat was felt partly due to the fact that the Jews who came to Poland did not adapt to Polish and Christian traditions or rituals. Indeed, they continued to speak the language of the countries they were born in and retained their own religious and cultural customs, which were seen as harmful and incorrect. Moreover, Jews engaged in usury, an activity which was forbidden for Christians. In addition to the anxiety and contempt with which Jewish traditions and beliefs were regarded, the Jews themselves were looked upon with aversion by Christians because of their engagement in usury, and they increasingly became the target of hostility and mythical stories.102 Also, they were accused of being the murderers of Christ103 and of poisoning and murdering other Christians and stealing from them, which resulted in charges or violation against Jews. 104 Yet, Jews regained more autonomy and Polish Jewry developed religiously, intellectually and economically. Jews also enjoyed a form of self-government in the form of the Council of Four Lands, a sort of Jewish Parliament. However, that not all was well, became clear during the Chmielnicki Revolt of 1648-1649 (see section 1.4), when at least 100 000 Jews were killed. This revolt is seen as the first modern pogrom. From the 16th century on, Poland, regardless of its hostility towards Jews, had become home to the largest Jewish community in the world. While the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth declined in both political and economic ways after 1648, the Jewish community started to grow in numbers and importance. Although estimations differ, by 1764 the Jewish community constituted around 5 % of the Polish population; with most Jews living in the eastern part of Poland-Lithuania. However, with the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the double taxation imposed on them by the nobility, the Jewish community finally also pauperised. 105 With the Enlightenment, new ideas on governance and citizenship were put forward across Europe. This also resulted in a changed attitude towards the Jewish communities. European rulers sought to transform the Jews into participating citizens, instead of letting them be a separate, isolated religious community. A process started with the purpose of social and political Jewish integration.106 In Poland, this process was first given a boost by the last Polish king Poniatowski who, while reforming the country, tried to integrate the Jewish population. The Jewish population itself also contributed to ideas of integration with the Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment movement which favoured secular education and the use of other languages than Hebrew or Yiddish. Attempts to transform the Jewish population were regarded with suspicion by both the Jewish community itself and by the Polish natives. Yet, some important changes took place regarding the position of Jews.107 101

A. Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, Volume I, 1350 to 1881, Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization 2010, p. 35. 102 A. Polonsky, J. Basista and A. Link-Lenczowski eds., The Jews in old Poland 1000-1795, pp. 14-20. 103 Interview B3. 104 A. Polonsky, J. Basista and A. Link-Lenczowski eds., The Jews in old Poland 1000-1795, p. 20. 105 A. Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, Volume I, 1350 to 1881, p. 39. 106 Ibid., pp. 183-186. 107 Ibid., pp. 186-188.

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1.13.2 Russian Empire (1795-1918) In the years of the Polish partitions (see also section 1.5) and with the defence of the Polish state, the ‘Jewish question’ became increasingly difficult. When Poland disappeared from the political map of Europe with the final partition in 1795, the bulk of the former Polish Jews became citizens of the Russian Empire, which was strongly anti-semitic. The Russian antiJewish policies resulted in pogroms, repression and dislocation of the Jewish population. Due to demands for equal rights by Jews, which were given to them in the 1860s, the debate about the position of the Jews in Polish society was again taken up by the public opinion. On the one hand, the Russian government and a large section of Polish society feared a growing Jewish influence in trade and commerce. On the other hand, many Poles were convinced that full Jewish assimilation and integration in Polish society would be the only way to achieve the goal of Polish independence. In the nineteenth century, Jews supported native Poles in the various fights for Polish independence. Because of that goal and because of the ‘goodwill’ that was demonstrated by the Jews through their patriotic support for the insurrections, a ‘Polish-Jewish brotherhood’ emerged. 108 However, modernisation and capitalism led to new tensions between Poles and Jews; hostility between Christian and Jewish Poles continued to exist and Jews were seen as inferior by the bulk of the Poles. Polish-Jewish relations deteriorated around the turn of the century, with the rise of both Jewish and Polish nationalism. New pogroms, in the 1880s and the first years of the 20 th century were the result. Although Jews were represented in the government and continued to join Poles in their battle for independence in the first decades of the twentieth century, tensions between Poles and Jews intensified. 109 1.13.3 Interwar Period (1918-1939) After Poland regained its independence in 1918, the relation between Poles and Jews further deteriorated. The declaration of independence was followed by pogroms throughout the country. During the search for Polish independence in the 1920s, all non-Polish minorities, including Jews, were threatened. The regained independence was seen by most Poles as their self-evident right, while Jews and other minorities were seen as intruders who were not part of (independent) Polish society.110 The interwar period saw an increase in anti-Jewish sentiments and widespread discrimination of Jews in Polish society, which was caused by different reasons. First, Jews constituted a minority in Poland, hence they were seen as a weak aspect of society. Second, because of their activities in trade and commerce, they were a possible threat to Polish participation in the world economy. Finally, Jews were regarded as supporters of communism. 111 During the Depression of the 1930s and with the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Jews became the focal point of public attacks and violence and economic boycotts.112 Jews were discriminated throughout the country and in different ways, primarily by anti-Jewish legislation.113

108

M. Opalski and I. Bartal, Poles and Jews: a failed brotherhood, Hanover: Brandeis University Press 1992, pp. 98-105. 109 A. Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, Volume I, 1350 to 1881, pp. 320-321. 110 A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 172. 111 M.B. Biskupsi, The history of Poland, pp. 86-87. 112 Ibid., p. 87. 113 R. Blobaum ed., Antisemitism and its opponents in modern Poland, New York: Cornell University Press 2005, p. 148.

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For instance, the Polish Fascist Party ‘Falanga’ beat up and intimidated Jewish students and set up ghetto classrooms at universities. In 1937, at some universities it was made obligatory to have separate seating for Jewish students. Anti-semitic policies instituted by the government marginalised Jewish students in order to make room for other students and made it more difficult for Jews to obtain a lawyer’s license. In the same year boycotts were promoted against Jewish shops. One year later, the Polish government stripped Polish Jews living abroad of their passports, leaving them stateless. In the press the removal of Jews from Poland was commonly discussed. The Roman Catholic Church in the meanwhile officially disapproved the attacks on the Jews. However, the Church approved legislation that separated the Christian community from the Jewish communities.114 1.13.4 World War II (1939-1945) At the outbreak of World War II, over three million Jews lived in Poland. They constituted about 10 % of the whole Polish population, and were the second largest Jewish community in the world. 115 Immediately after the Germans occupied Poland in 1939, they started persecuting Polish Jews and placing them in ghettos, as they did in other occupied countries. The conditions in the ghettos were dreadful. In July 1941, the pogrom of Jedwabne took place. 116 During this pogrom, up to 1600 Jewish men, women and children were attacked and eventually murdered.117 After the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, on which occasion it was decided that ‘the final solution’ to the Jewish question had to be executed, more and more Jews were put into the six concentration camps that were established in Poland: Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, Majdanek and Chelmno. In these camps, Jews but also Russian and Polish prisoners, starved to death, from hunger or disease. Others, especially Jews, were put in gas chambers or otherwise executed.118 By the end of the war, almost three million Jews had been killed by the Germans or anti-semitist violence by Poles. This violence virtually destroyed Polish Jewry. 119 1.13.5 Polish-Jewish Relations in Poland after World War II (1945-1989) As mentioned before, over three million Jews lived in Poland before the outbreak of World War II. With the extermination of almost all Polish Jews and with the territorial changes after the War, few Jews were left within Polish borders; around 10 % of the Jewish community in 1939.120 In the years after the War, this small remnant was even further reduced due to antisemitism, anti-Jewish violence, emigration and later the anti-semitic policies of the communist regime. 121 In the years after the war, Jews repeatedly became victims of hostilities, robberies, attacks and murder. In schools and on the labour market they were frequently discriminated. Violence was most visible with the pogroms of Kraków (August 1945) and Kielce (July 114

A.J. Prazmowska, A history of Poland, p. 172. B.G. Frank, A travel guide to Jewish Europe, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Company, Inc. 2002, p. 580. 116 J.T. Gross, Buren: de vernietiging van de joden in Jedwabne, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij 2001, p. 12. 117 The participation of the Polish population of Jedwabne in this pogrom has been debated on after the outcome of the first edition of Gross his book and will be elaborated on further. 118 S. Lehrer, Wannsee house and the Holocaust, North-Carolina: McFarland & Company Publishers 2000, pp. 9899. 119 C.S. Heller, On the edge of destruction: Jews of Poland between the two World Wars, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993, pp. xii and 1. 120 Estimations with respect to these numbers differ from 1200 up to a few thousand. 121 C.S. Heller, On the edge of destruction, p. xii. 115

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1946), with which dozens of Jews were killed. Partly due to these bad circumstances, large parts of the remaining Jewish community emigrated to countries like Israel and the United States.122 In the meanwhile, the country had fallen into social chaos and political instability. While the communists established their power, they seemed to be indifferent towards the situation of the Jews and what had happened to them. In general, the issue of the Holocaust and the Jews in Poland was avoided and denied by both the Polish population and the communist regime. In museums, for example, information regarding the war was fit in a ‘socialist narrative’, not referring to Jewish losses but only to ‘Poles’. 123 At the same time, many Poles were convinced that Jews were traditionally strong supporters of communism and now were assigned positions within the Secret Police. This commonly held (stereotyped) belief in the connection between Jewry and communism is called żydokomuna and resulted in stronger anti-semitism. 124 In the years 1956-1957 and 1968-1969 there were two waves of anti-semitism which made most of the few remaining Jews leave the country. This was allowed and even stimulated by the communist regime. 125 Following the political crisis and its coinciding antizionist campaign of 1968, approximately 20 000 of the Jews living in Poland in 1968 escaped, emigrated or were expelled. The Jewish population now shrank to a few thousand. 126

122 J.T. Gross, Angst: Antisemitisme in Polen na Auschwitz, een historische interpretatie, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij 2007, pp. 42, 50, 71 and 94. 123 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006, p. 105. Interview B5. 124 J.T. Gross, Angst: Antisemitisme in Polen na Auschwitz, een historische interpretatie, pp. 249 and 312. 125 Ibid., p. 313. 126 A. Grobman and D. Landes, Genocide: Critical issues of the Holocaust, New Yersey: Simon Wiesenthal Center 1983, p. 95.

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2. CULTURE The position of Poland in Europe is geographically not easy to define. Some may think that the country is part of Eastern Europe; others may state that it is Central Europe and a third group may even define Poland as being at the very border, but still within Western Europe. As seen in chapter 1 Poland has a complicated and large history, being occupied by other states several times. It has a Slavic language, but a Latin alphabet. The country is mainly Roman Catholic, but it has small Orthodox, Protestant and Jewish communities as well, most of them having lived in Poland for more than one century. However, before World War II, the country was much more multi-ethnic, hereby indicating that Poland has been exposed to different cultural influences over the years. On the Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland, which is initiated by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish culture is described as a ‘borderland culture’. 127 Because Poland finds itself at the ‘crossroads of Europe’, a mix of cultural traditions evolved in this Central European country, based on a combination of eastern and western culture.128 As explained in chapter 1, in the 18th and 19th century, Poland was divided in three parts, each part belonging to one of the empires Prussia, Austria and Russia. The partition of Poland exposed the country to different cultural influences. This could, partially, explain the mixture of eastern and western culture in Poland. However, there are also other historical events which could have played an important role. This chapter will elaborate on Polish culture. A description will be given about different aspects of the culture in Poland, such as the national mythologies, language, literature and religion. Next to the descriptive analysis, an important framework for this research will be the question if there are cultural differences between regions, and if not, in which way the above mentioned ‘borderland culture’, or mix of eastern and western culture, reflects in Polish society in general. The chapter also includes a description of the JewishPolish relationship in the last 65 years and the influence of anti-semitism nowadays.

2.1 National Culture and Identity 2.1.1 The People Poland can be considered an ethnically homogeneous country as, according to the Polish census in 2002129, 96.7 % of Poland’s population is ethnically Polish. 130 Only 1.2 % of the Polish population declared explicitly to have an ethnic identity131 which was not Polish. 132 The other 2 % did not provide an answer to the question about nationality or provided an answer that was not valid. 133 Although only a small part of the Polish population does not 127

Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Culture. Retrieved 9 May 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/Culture,483.html. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Promotion. Polish Culture. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from http://publikacje.poland.gov.pl/files/Zakladki/Publikacje_off-line/EN/Polish_Culture.pdf. p. 3. 128 Ibid. 129 During this research, data obtained from the census in 2002 were the last officially announced data in Poland. The results from the census held in 2011 were not announced yet. 130 K. Cordell and A. Dybczyński, ‘Poland's Indigenous Ethnic Minorities and The Census of 2002’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 6, no.1 (2005), p. 83. 131 In the questionnaires, the term ‘nationality’ was used. 132 K. Cordell and A. Dybczyński, ‘Poland's Indigenous Ethnic Minorities and The Census of 2002’, pp. 83-84. 133 Ibid., p. 84.

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define its identity as Polish, there are still relatively many different ethnic minorities living in Poland. 134 The main ethnic minority groups 135, which are characterised by declaring having an other nationality than the Polish one in the 2002 census and, possibly, by speaking a native language other than Polish, are (from biggest to smallest) Silesians, Germans, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Roma, Russians, Ruthenians (Lemkos), Lithuanians, Kashubes, Slovaks, Jews, Armenians, Czechs, Tatars and Karaims.136 Remarkable is the fact that Silesians, the group which was typified as the biggest minority group, and Kashubes were recognised as a separate group with a specific national identity during the same census for the first time in Polish history, ‘although the Polish legislation on minority rights does not consider them as such’. 137 According to the National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages Act, adopted 6 January 2005, the following minorities are considered national minorities in Poland: Belarusian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Jewish138.139 A national minority group fulfills the condition that ‘it identifies itself with the nation organised in its own country’. 140 Secondly, there are also four groups which are recognised as an ethnic minority. These are the following: Karaims, Lemkos, Roma and Tatars. These groups distinguish themselves because they do not ‘identify [themselves] with the nation organised in [their] own country’. 141 One of the characteristics of all minority groups recognised by the state is that ‘[their] ancestors have resided within the present territory of the Republic of Poland for at least a hundred years’.142 From the Polish legislation can be concluded that the Silesians and Kashubes are considered as neither national nor ethnic minorities in Poland. Several times Silesians have pleaded for recognition as a national or ethnic minority, but this was even refused by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2004. 143 Another minority group in Poland is for example the Vietnamese. This minority is not legally recognised by Polish law and therefore does not enjoy minority rights as laid down in the National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages Act. The Vietnamese minority group came to Poland during the communist days. It is considered that the reason for their coming is the good relations between Poland and Vietnam during communist era.144 It is estimated that at this moment there are about 20 000 - 25 000 Vietnamese living in Poland. Other minorities in Poland are refugees from Chechnya and Georgia.145 In the past, the Polish population was much more mixed. From 1385 until 1795, Poland was a part of ‘the so called Republic of many nations’ together with Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine. 146 The tolerance for different religions at that time made it possible 134 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004). Retrieved 4 March 2011 from http://www6.gencat.cat/llengcat/noves/hm04primavera-estiu/docs/moskal.pdf. p. 5. 135 The ethnic minority groups mentioned in this context are not the same as the ethnic minorities which are legally recognised by Polish legislation. 136 K. Cordell and A. Dybczyński, ‘Poland's Indigenous Ethnic Minorities and The Census of 2002’, p. 85. 137 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004), p. 6. 138 The Jewish minority, in this case, is seen as a minority that identifies itself with the nation organised in Israel. 139 U.S. English Foundation Research. The Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act: 6 January 2005. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.usefoundation.org/view/479. Article 2, par. 2. 140 Ibid., Article 2, par. 1.6. 141 Ibid., Article 2, par. 3.6 and 4. 142 Ibid., Article 2, par. 1.5 and 3.5. 143 K. Cordell and A. Dybczyński, ‘Poland's Indigenous Ethnic Minorities and The Census of 2002’, p. 86. 144 Interview G1. 145 Ibid. 146 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004), p. 4.

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for different ethnic minorities to settle in Poland. 147 After World War I, when Poland regained its independence, and after Poland’s borders were finally determined in 1921, 35-38 % of the Polish population was part of an ethnic minority group, according to the census of 1921. 148 Ten years later, this number dwindled to 31 % of the population, according to the census of 1931, with a notable percentage of Jews at that time of 9 %. 149 After World War II, the number of minorities shrunk to 5 % of the Polish population. The main reasons were the extermination of Jews and the changes in national borders.150 Nowadays, most of the people who claim not to have a Polish identity live in provinces along the Polish borders, with the biggest concentration in the provinces Silesia, Opole and Podlasi. In addition, the large part of most ethnic groups live concentrated in one or two provinces.151 Small minorities, like Jews and Armenians, live in the Polish metropoles.152 2.1.2 The Language(s) Article 27 of the Polish Constitution declares that the Polish language is the official language of Poland. The same article states that ‘[t]his provision shall not infringe upon national minority rights resulting from ratified international agreements’. After Poland entered the European Union, the Polish language became an official EU language. 153 In addition, Poland had to legally recognise all languages as equal in its own country and to protect and promote these, as the EU’s policy on languages protects and promotes minority and regional languages legally.154 Firstly, this section will elaborate on the Polish language. Secondly, the situation of minority and regional languages will be described. Finally, the use of other foreign languages, like English, in Poland will be examined. The Polish Language Polish is a West Slavic language that, for instance, belongs to the same language tribe as the Czech language, although these two languages do have significant differences. 155 Unlike the Czech language, the Polish language belongs to the Lechitian language subgroup of the West Slavic languages. More in general, Polish is a part of the Slavic group and therefore an IndoEuropean language. 156 Although Polish is a West Slavic language, its vocabulary has got some significant influences from other non Slavic languages, e.g. Latin, German, Italian and English.157 According to the 2002 census, 97.8 % of the Polish population refers to the Polish languages as the language spoken most often at home.158 A number of 1.3 % of the 97.8 % declares to also use another language, next to Polish.159

147

Ibid. K. Cordell and A. Dybczyński, ‘Poland's Indigenous Ethnic Minorities and The Census of 2002’, p. 80. 149 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 150 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004), p. 5. 151 Ibid., pp. 3 and 6. 152 Ibid., p. 6. 153 Ibid., p. 1. 154 Ibid. 155 M.L. Rivero, Reflexive clitic constructions with datives: syntax and semantics (2003). Retrieved 8 May 2011 from http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~romlab/pubs/Rivero.2003.pdf. pp. 2-3. 156 J. Leśniewska and Z. Mazur, ‘Polish in Poland and abroad’, in: G. Extra and D. Gorter eds. Multilingual Europe Facts and Policies, Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, p. 111. 157 Ibid. 158 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 16 May 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 159 U.S. English Foundation Research. Poland: Language Research. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://www.usefoundation.org/view/468. 148

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What is remarkable about the Polish language is the fact that it is a Slavic language, with a Latin alphabet, though this alphabet is adjusted ‘to obtain additional graphemes’. 160 The use of the Latin alphabet can be explained by the Baptism of Poland in the 10th century, when the Christianisation of the country was initiated, which made the Latin language come to Poland. Until the 16th century, Latin and the Polish language would coexist.161 Latin was used at schools and by the Church as ‘the language of the written word’, while Polish was used among the Polish people in other spheres.162 Latin was considered the official language at that time. 163 In this period, the Latin alphabet probably set the stage for the future alphabet of the Polish language. 164 Even though, there were already sentiments in the 16th century that opened the way to Polish nationalism, as the Polish language ‘became a recognised literary language’ and the Polish Renaissance literature flourished,165 it was eventually not until the 19th century that the Polish language would develop itself fully. The Polish language played an important part in the creation of a national consciousness of the Polish people, which came to life during the period when Poland was partitioned. 166 ‘At the beginning of the 19th century the Polish language […] became […] the supreme instrument for the conscious rebirth of Poland and the symbol of Polish awakening’.167 It played a crucial role in the development of a Polish nation, as every nation needs a national culture before establishing itself. 168 The most prominent writer at that time was the poet Adam Mickiewicz as he used the Polish language explicitly to stimulate Polish national consciousness.169 At the beginning of the 20th century, the spelling of the Polish language was standardised. 170 Nowadays, the Polish language can be considered as an important part of Polish identity as it is spoken by 97.8 % of the Polish population. Another reason why the Polish language can be considered as an important part of Polish identity is the adoption of the Law on the Polish Language on 7 October 1999. This law protects the Polish language, as it obliges the use of the Polish language within the Republic of Poland in certain cases. 171 If Polish entities are involved in legal transactions, or transactions are made in which a Polish entity is one of the parties involved, the Polish language must be used. 172 This is especially the case when names of goods and services are involved and/or advertising is done. If in those particular cases a foreign language is used, like English, a Polish translation must be provided.173 Minority and Regional Languages The Polish Constitution states in Article 35, section 1, that ‘the Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and 160

J. Leśniewska and Z. Mazur, ‘Polish in Poland and abroad’, p. 111. A.P. Coleman, ‘Language as a Factor in Polish Nationalism’, The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 13, no. 37 (1934), p. 156. 162 Ibid. 163 J. Leśniewska and Z. Mazur, ‘Polish in Poland and abroad’, p. 111. 164 A.P. Coleman, ‘Language as a Factor in Polish Nationalism’, p. 160. 165 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 166 Ibid., pp. 155-156. 167 Ibid., p. 162. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid., p. 165. 170 J. Leśniewska and Z. Mazur, ‘Polish in Poland and abroad’, p. 111. 171 Compendium. 5.1.9 Language laws. Retrieved 19 May 2011 from http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/poland.php?aid=519&cid=1360&lid=en&curl=425. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 161

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develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture’. In addition, the National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages Act was adopted after Poland’s EU accession, on 6 January 2005. This Act is of great importance for ‘the preservation and development of the cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities [and] the preservation and development of the regional language’.174 This act also regulates that discrimination against minorities is forbidden. 175 Article 3 of that same Act recognises the languages of national and ethnic minorities mentioned in section 2.1.1 as official minority languages of Poland that have special rights. 176 Article 19 recognises the Kashubian language as an official regional language. 177 This means that Silesian is neither a minority language nor a regional language. Almost all the rights that a minority language has are also granted to the regional Kashubian language. 178 Minority languages and the Kashubian language have many rights in Poland. One of them is that the ‘persons belonging to a minority [or speaking the Kashubian language] have the right to use and spell their first names and surnames as spelt in their minority language, particularly in documents of marital status and on identity cards’.179 Other important rights regarding their language are the right to ‘freely use the minority language [or the Kashubian language] in private life as well as in public’, and to ‘learn their minority language [or the Kashubian language] or be taught in their minority language [or the Kashubian language]’. 180 The implementation of the latter shall be done through the same Act, namely the Act on the Education System of 7 September 1991, for minority languages as for the Kashubian language. 181 In Poland it is possible to learn a minority language or to be taught in a minority language at the primary, secondary and university level. 182 This is only done if requested by parents or by a student. In primary schools, at least seven pupils, and in secondary schools at least 14 pupils are needed before the school needs to provide a class in a minority language. 183 By some, ethnic diversity in a country is defined by the presence of different language communities.184 However, the number of people belonging to a minority group is smaller (1.2 %) than the number of people using a minority language in Poland (1.5 %). 185 This can be explained by the fact that some minorities use a similar language to the Polish one. This makes it easy to assimilate those minorities into the Polish identity. 186 In addition, these groups have lived in Poland for more than one century, which makes it even easier to assimilate these minorities. German is the minority language which is declared to be most often used by the Polish population. 187 The Silesian language comes in second, even though not recognised as a minority or regional language by the Polish state. After Silesian, Kashubian, the recognised 174

U.S. English Foundation Research. The Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act: 6 January 2005. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.usefoundation.org/view/479. Article 1. 175 Ibid., Article 6, par. 1. 176 Ibid., Article 3, par. 2. 177 Ibid., Article 19, par. 2. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid., Article 7. 180 Ibid., Article 8. 181 Ibid., Article 17 and 20. 182 Compendium. 4.2.5 Language issues and policies. Retrieved 1 June 2011 from http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/poland.php?aid=425. 183 Ibid. 184 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004), p. 6. 185 U.S. English Foundation Research. Poland: Language Research. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://www.usefoundation.org/view/468. 186 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004), p. 6.

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regional language, is spoken mostly by the Polish population. Byelorussian and Ukrainian also have ‘a relatively substantial number of users’, and are respectively fourth and fifth in the charts of the most spoken minority/regional languages in Poland. 188 Remarkable is the fact that more Polish citizens claim to use the German language as a minority language than there are Polish citizens claiming to have a German national identity. This can be explained by the probability that some Germans living in the Silesia region have changed their national identity into Silesian, as they have been living there for several generations.189 The Silesian and Opole province contain the biggest number of bilingual people in Poland. 190 Foreign Languages A survey done by the European Commission in 2005 declared that 57 % of the Polish population speaks at least one language which is not their mother tongue well enough to be able to have a conversation, which is 1 % above the EU25 average. 191 32 % of the population declared to speak at least two foreign languages and 4 % at least three foreign languages. An almost average number (EU25 44 %) of 43 % of the Polish population declared not to speak any language next to their mother tongue.192 At the Barcelona European Council in March 2002, the EU ‘set a long-term objective for all EU citizens to speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue’,193 also known as the 2+1 policy. As 32 % of the Polish population speaks at least two foreign languages according to the EU survey, Poland has a percentage above the EU25 average, which is 28 %.194 According to the same research, English was the most spoken foreign language in Poland in 2005, next to the mother tongue, with 29 % of the population being able to speak English well enough to have a conversation. Second most spoken foreign language was Russian, with 26 % of the population. German comes in third with 19 % of the Polish people. 195 However, the Poles do think that English (72 %) and German (46 %), and not Russian (9 %), are the two foreign languages that are the most useful for them to know for their personal development and in their career.196 During the same survey in 2005, it turned out that 20 % of the Polish population (EU25 18 %) started to learn a new foreign language or improved their skills in the use of a foreign language during the two years before the questionnaires were taken, approximately since the EU started with its promotion of a multilingual Europe. 197 A similar percentage, 19 %, of the Polish population (EU25 21 %) intended to learn or improve foreign language skills in the upcoming year, which was remarkably low for a new Member State at that time. 198 However, this lack of interest in learning or improving foreign language skills did not stop the development of foreign languages in Poland. According to Eurostat data from 2007,

187

Ibid., pp. 5-6. Ibid., p. 6. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid. 191 European Commission. (2006). Special Eurobarometer 243-Europeans and their Languages. Retrieved 4 May 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf. p. 9. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid., p. 13. 196 Ibid., p. 32. 197 Ibid., p. 24. 198 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 188

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the number of people knowing at least one foreign language rose from 57 % to 63 %, while the percentage of people not knowing any foreign language shrunk from 43 % to 37 %.199 Another conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of Eurostat data of 2007 is that the first generation Poles (25-34 years old) has a better knowledge in foreign languages than the second (35-54 years old) and third generation (55-64 years old) Poles. 200 As the Russian language was taught at schools in Poland during communism, in general, the older generation Poles uses Russian more as a foreign/second language than English, while the younger generation makes more use of English. 2.1.3 National Mythologies National myths are simplified beliefs, which give an impression of the cultural heritage of a nation and of the national identity.201 They do not have to be true nor close to reality. National myths are often used to explain certain historical events. Imperial nations can use myths to legitimise power over others. Defeated nations, however, create myths to construe their defeat and to help the nation to overcome this and survive. 202 Besides the function of explaining a nation’s failure or suffering, myths can have a number of other functions: a myth can be used as an instrument of self-definition; it can be used as an instrument of identity transfer (to create an identity and/or to disseminate this identity); and to simplify the world and history of a country. Lastly, myths are often used or misused in politics as politicians can use a myth to lead or mislead the people they govern. 203 In the next part, seven different Polish national myths will be examined. As the people of Poland have been dominated a number of times by imperialist countries, it is not surprising that the Poles have invented numerous myths to explain this. However, there are also myths with different functions. The myths will follow each other in a chronological order to illustrate the importance of historical events in the myths and to better understand the reason for the invention of these myths. The first myth dates from the 15th century when Poland was at the beginning of its Commonwealth pact with Lithuania. The Sarmatian Myth The Sarmatian myth came into being in the 15th century, but it was not until 1587 that the myth would get its final form. This is an example of a myth of ethnogenesis and antiquity, as it tries to answer who the Polish ancestors are and serves as an instrument for selflegitimation. 204 The nobleman Stanisław Sarnicki wrote a book, which was published in 1587, about the origins of the Poles and Lithuanians in which he included the story about Sarmatians, a nomadic Indo-European folk, which had settled in Eastern Europe before the birth of Christ.205 Before Sarnicki’s book, different Polish writers believed that the Polish nation’s origins could be related to the ancient Sarmatians, and thus wrote about it. However, Sarnicki 199

European Commission, Eurostat. Number of foreign languages known (self-reported) by age group (%). Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://epp. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=EDAT_AES_L22. The numbers are self-calculated on the basis of the numbers from Eurostat, and not directly retrieved from Eurostat. 200 Ibid. The numbers are directly retrieved from Eurostat. 201 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, in: G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin eds., Myths and Nationhood, New York: Routledge 1997, p. 141. 202 Ibid. 203 G. Schöpflin, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, in: G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin eds., Myths and Nationhood, New York: Routledge 1997, pp. 22-24. 204 Ibid., p. 34. 205 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 143.

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added that the Sarmatians were only ancestors of the Polish nobles and, consequently, not of all people living in Poland. 206 After Sarnicki’s invention of the Sarmatian myth, it was considered that the Polish nation consisted only of nobles, as they were the only ones descending from the Sarmatians, and that people which did not belong to the Polish nobility, like for example peasants and Jews, were no true Poles. It was believed that Polish noblemen were biologically different and mixed marriages were therefore forbidden. 207 After the period of the Commonwealth, the Sarmatian myth became less racial, which allowed Jews to become noblemen. 208 Most historians state that this myth does not contain historical facts.209 The Sarmatian myth does not prevail among the Polish people nowadays. 210 Poland as the ‘Bulwark of Christendom’ Poland’s identification of itself as the ‘Bulwark of Christendom’ dates from 1620 after the Ottoman Turks invaded the country from the East. The Crown Chancellor of Poland at that time presented Poland as the protector and defender of Christianity and the Christian world to the king of England, James I.211 From this time, Poland as the ‘Bulwark of Christendom’ had been a prevailing myth in Poland. Not only did the Poles recognise this role as the protector of Christianity during the wars with the Ottoman Turks, but also later to present Poland as the protector of the Roman Catholic religion and peoples in Europe against the Orthodox East in order to justify Poland’s actions. 212 In the 20th century, the myth was used to present Poland as the protector from and defender against communism and fascism, as well as, ‘in the spiritual sense’, during Solidarity’s opposition before the collapse of the communist regime. 213 With the ‘Bulwark of Christendom’ myth, Poland presents itself as protector and defender of Christian (Roman Catholic) Europe, which sacrifices its prosperity for the rest of the continent. According to Norman Davies in his ‘Polish National Mythologies’, the reinforcement of this myth should not be excluded; especially now Poland is the country at the very border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-zone (NATO-zone). 214 The Polak-Katolik Myth In 1655, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was attacked by Russia and Sweden. Almost the entire country was destroyed, but the monastery ‘Pauline’ of Jasna Góra near Częstochowa was spared. 215 The monks of the monastery prayed to Saint Mary for protection during the invasion and as the monastery stayed unaffected, it was believed that Saint Mary offered protection through the holy icon of the ‘Black Madonna’ in the monastery. 216 Soon after the Swedish attempts to siege the monastery, the war ended. Poland regained its strength quickly after the war. In order to recognise the role of Saint Mary in Poland’s liberation, the Polish king at that time, John Casimir, crowned Saint Mary, the protector of Poland, as the ‘Queen of Poland’ and dedicated his kingdom to her in 1656. In this context, the myth of

206

Ibid. Ibid. 208 Ibid., p. 144. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid., p. 156. 211 Ibid., pp. 144-145. 212 Ibid., p. 145. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid., p. 156. 215 Ibid., p. 146. 216 Ibid. 207

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Saint Mary being the protector of Poland developed. In addition, the same context fuelled the growth of another myth as well, namely the Polak-Katolik myth. 217 From that moment, Roman Catholicism was seen as a fundamental part of the Polish national identity. 218 This association empowered the Polak-Katolik (‘the Catholic Pole’) myth which implied that if someone was not Roman Catholic, the person was not a Pole either. 219 However, a significant number of Polish citizens at that time was not Roman Catholic, but e.g. Protestant, Jewish and Muslim. 220 Therefore many citizens were not considered Polish and the Polak-Katolik myth caused a rather big division among the Polish population. 221 In the 19th and 20th century, this division became stronger, as the ideology of nationalism developed and the myth was used in political life as well. 222 The Polak-Katolik myth and the ‘Black Madonna’ myth were both of religious importance, by serving as a means of legitimising and stimulating Roman Catholic beliefs. In addition, the Preolak-Katolik myth was also of political importance, by negating the Polishness of non-Catholics. Nowadays, considering the religious importance, the monastery ‘Pauline’ of Jasna Góra is still directly connected with Roman Catholicism because of its mythical connotations. The fact that the monastery is still the most important and visited pilgrims place in Poland223 shows that the myth still prevails among the Poles and that Roman Catholic beliefs are considered important. Considering the political importance, according to Davies, the Polak-Katolik myth seems to be of small significance in the rather ethnically homogenous Polish society after World War II, in which Poland’s borders are safeguarded. 224 However, the happenings in the summer and fall of 1998 near Auschwitz, which are described more extensively in section 2.3, show that this myth, even though not directly used in a political sense, is far from forgotten. A group of Polish nationalists, which referred to themselves as Polak-Katoliks, put up numerous crosses near Auschwitz as a protest against the possible removal of the disputed big ‘papal cross’ in the same area.225 The big ‘papal cross’ was especially a thorn in the side of several Jewish communities as well as for Poland’s chief rabbi Pinchas Menachem Joskowicz.226 By referring to themselves as Polak-Katoliks, the planters of the numerous crosses implied that, according to them, the Polish identity could not be separated from Roman Catholicism, therewith negating the Polishness of Jews. They emphasised the clear distinction between Poles, who attach a great value to Roman Catholic beliefs, and Jews, who do not. The event showed that even in a rather ethnically homogenous Poland the myth can still be used. Moreover, if the Polish society would become more multiethnic, e.g. because of the open borders that came with EU accession, it cannot be excluded that this myth might be used again.

217

Ibid. Ibid. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Interview B4. 224 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 156. 225 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006, pp. 2 and 8-10. 226 Ibid., pp. 1 and 8. 218

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The Uman Myth Uman is a little town in central Ukraine, close to the border of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was struck by a peasant rising in 1768. 227 The peasants were Orthodox, which were oppressed by the Polish Roman Catholic Church and nobles and forced to serfdom. 228 The Orthodox peasants butchered the Roman Catholics and the Jews in Uman, which led to a big massacre, as the Russians who intervened to stop the bloodshed, paradoxically, used the same means as the Orthodox peasants did. 229 According to the myth, in this period the prophet Mojsej Wernyhora moved from Ukraine to Poland. As Davies puts it: ‘He spoke of a ‘Golden Age’ before the age of disasters, when all the peoples of the former Commonwealth, especially Poles and Ukrainians, had lived in unity. And he foretold the day when honour, harmony and happiness would return.’ 230 It is not surprising that during the years of Poland’s partition in the 19th century, Wernyhora was seen as ‘a symbol of hope’. 231 Even though Wernyhora’s ideals were never put into practice, similar ideals were shared by several political movements at the beginning of the 20th century, when attempts were made to restore the Commonwealth. 232 The Uman myth can be characterised as a myth of territory as the story refers to a ‘Golden Age’ when Poland was a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had borders through Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.233 According to Davies, ‘[t]here may never have been a truly ‘Golden Age’ on Poland’s eastern borders, [b]ut the need for Poles to cultivate fraternal relations with their eastern neighbours has never been greater’. 234 In this context, maybe the Polish stretching Commonwealth will never be established again, but the Uman myth can certainly serve to explain Poland’s need to establish good relations with the countries on its eastern borders as proved with the recent Eastern Partnership Agreements initiated by Poland. Poland’s good relations with countries at its eastern border will be described in section 4.8.5. Poland as ‘the Christ of Nations’ During the Polish war with the Russians in 1831, the famous Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz composed the patriotic drama Dziady.235 He came up with different metaphors to explain the suffering of the Polish nation over the years, most notably the idea that Poland must endure all its suffering, so that the rest of the world could be saved. 236 With this story, Poland’s role as ‘the Christ of Nations’ was significantly empowered. A few decades before a similar role was already introduced, though in a different context, by Tadeusz Kościuszko in his resistance against Poland’s partition.237 This ‘Christ of Nations’ myth implied that the Poles were victims of several disasters as they needed to sacrifice themselves and suffer for the freedom, or even sins (just as in Christ’s case),238 of the rest of the world.239 The myth caused a division in the opinions of patriotic Roman Catholic Poles and more devout Roman Catholic 227

N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 148. A. Zhukovsky. Koliivshchyna rebellion. Retrieved 20 June 2011 from http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages%5CK%5CO%5CKoliivshchynarebellion.htm. 229 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 148. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid., p. 149. 233 G. Schöpflin, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, p. 28. 234 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 157. 235 Ibid., p. 149. 236 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 237 Ibid., p. 150. 238 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. 34. 239 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, pp. 150-151. 228

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Poles, since, according to the latter, nothing could be compared to the crucifixion of Christ. 240 In addition, ‘the Christ of Nations concept reinforced the divisions [in society] already opened up by the older idea of Polak-Katolik. By strengthening Poland’s mystical Catholicity, it weakened the bonds of a multinational society’. 241 As mentioned above, the Polak-Katolik reference was used by Polish nationalists during the ‘War of the Crosses’, as Geneviève Zubrzycki calls the event in her The crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland, which occurred in the summer and fall of 1998 near Auschwitz. 242 However, this is not the only myth that can be derived from the commotion surrounding Auschwitz. Remarkable is the fact that, as Zubrzycki describes it, most Poles see Auschwitz as a place that reflects Polish martyrdom instead of as a ‘symbol of the Holocaust and now of universal evil’, the latter perception being shared by Jews as well as ‘the world’.243 It should be noted that the significance of the meaning that Auschwitz has for most Poles is reflected in the different (Polish) name which are used to refer to the small town andto what happened there, namely ‘Oświęcim’. 244 The use of a different name explicitly emphasises the different meaning Auschwitz has for Poles. 245 During the ‘War of the Crosses’, the different views on Auschwitz and what it symbolises (for Poles a place reflecting Polish martyrdom, and for Jews and others a symbol of the Holocaust) even caused/enforced (a) ‘competitiveness of Poles with Jews over who holds the ‘monopoly’ on suffering’.246 Herewith, Poland’s perception of itself as a suffering nation, the ‘Christ of Nations’, and the importance thereof for its national identity was emphasised again. The function of the ‘Christ of Nations’ myth is to explain the suffering and defeat of the Polish nation during its history, but also to demonstrate its potential to survive, as the Poles believed that they would suffer like Christ did, but would also rise like he did. 247 How this myth is being used in current Polish politics, will be described in chapter 4. The Piast Concept The Piast concept dates from 1892, when the Peasants and Nationalists were the ruling political parties in Poland.248 These parties had a shared vision about the first great ruler of Poland, Piast, who was the son of a peasant and ruled over the true native land of Poland more than a thousand years ago, during a time of peace and unity among the Polish nation. 249 The politicians used this myth as propaganda in order to explain that through the centuries the peace and unity in Poland was disturbed more than once, because the Poles lost their lands to different invaders, like for example Germans and Russians. Not only was this blame given to invaders, but also to other foreigners, like for example the Jews. 250 The Piast concept was used by Polish politicians at various times to promote the idea of giving Poland back to true Poles by making sure that all foreigners were driven out of the country. 251 Herewith, this

240

Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., pp. 150-151. 242 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. 2. 243 Ibid., pp. 99 and 138. 244 Ibid., p. 99. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid., p. 115. 247 N. Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, p. 150. 248 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 249 Ibid., p. 152. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 241

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concept was interconnected with the Polak-Katolik myth.252 The last explicit use of the Piast concept was in 1945 when the Polish communists used the myth to draw the lines of the borders of the People’s Republic of Poland. Minorities like Germans and Ukrainians were forced to emigrate and true Poles that lived outside of the country’s borders had to return to their true land, which was the People’s Republic of Poland. 253 According to Davies, millions of Poles believed in the Piast concept and a lot of Poles still believe in this myth. 254 With this myth, again the Polish suffering is being emphasised, as the Poles had to suffer during the numerous dominations before their country was restored. 255 According to Davies, even though a lot of Poles still believe in this myth, it is not really of great use, just like the Polak-Katolik myth, as Poland can be considered a mono-ethnic country.256 However, this myth is not the first ethnocentric myth in Polish history, and one should notice that this can still be used in the future, especially now when the Polish borders are open to foreigners more than before EU accession. ‘Maritime Nuptials’ The ‘Maritime Nuptials’ myth refers to the ritual that took place on 20 January 1920, when a part of the Baltic Sea was given back by Germany to the Republic of Poland through the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles.257 To celebrate this happening hundreds of Poles decided to jump into the Baltic Sea ‘to celebrate Poland’s mystical union with the sea’, and with this ritual a new Polish myth was born. In January 1945, the ceremony was rerun when Poland acquired another part of the Baltic Sea.258 According to Davies, most Poles do not consider themselves as ‘a historic seafaring nation’, as the country ‘had no important coastline from the fourteenth century onwards’.259 However, after Poland regained its independence and, in addition, received back a part of the Baltic coast, according to Davies, a myth and ritual were needed in order to legitimise this restoration.260 2.1.4 Literature One of the earliest known Polish literary works dates from the 13th century. Until the 18th century, Polish literature flourished, just like other European literature at that time, because it could develop freely. 261 However, at the end of the 18th century the Polish nation lost its state, due to the partition of the country. The Polish land would remain divided for more than a hundred years and, as the Polish nation had no state anymore, the Polish people needed to preserve their national identity. From the 19th century, the Polish literature therefore served as the conservator of national cultural identity. 262 Writers were seen as ‘political and spiritual leader[s]’ of the Polish nation, which meant that their word was seen as the truth.263 One of the most well-known poets at that time was Adam Mickiewicz. The influence of his patriotic drama Dziady on Polish society has been described in section 2.1.3. Other 252

Ibid. Ibid., p. 153. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid., p. 156. 257 Ibid., p. 154. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid., p. 155. 261 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Promotion. Polish Culture. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from http://publikacje.poland.gov.pl/files/Zakladki/Publikacje_off-line/EN/Polish_Culture.pdf. p. 5. 262 Ibid. 263 Ibid. 253

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important writers during this period were Henryk Sienkiewicz, who received a Nobel Prize for his Quo Vadis and who’s work is still read nowadays by a significant amount of the Polish population, and Władysław Stanisław Reymont, who was well-known for his The Peasants.264 After World War I, Poland regained its independence in more than one way. The Polish literature celebrated its independence as well, which resulted in a more free literature style. The Polish literature did not have to serve just as the preserver of the Polish national cultural identity anymore. The most dominant writer of this ‘Freedom of Polishness’ literature was the modern writer Witold Gombrowicz. 265 The period directly after World War II was characterised by a literature trend that produced works mostly written during the five years of war.266 In 1949, during the meeting of the Polish Writers’ Union in Szczecin, it was ‘recommended’ that literature would be produced which was in line with socialist realism. 267 In 1950, however, it became officially an obligation to only write socialist realism literature.268 For a period of five years, a large amount of published literature in Poland would reflect the doctrine of socialist realism, with only a few exceptions. These exceptions were the works of e.g. J. Parandowski, A. Rymkiewicz and J. Zagorski. 269 As Zbigniew Folejewski puts it in his ‘Socialist Realism in Polish Literature and Criticism’, ‘[i]n practice, ‘socialist orientation’ amounted to no more than the presentation of certain ‘proper’ facts of the social reality in such a way as to give an impression of dynamism and optimism’.270 In this context, ‘biological patriotism’ was forbidden. 271 From 1955 until the end of the communist era, Polish literature was characterised by two literary trends. On the one hand there was literature written by Polish emigrants. As these Polish writers were free of communist censorship, they could write freely about all subjects.272 A significant example of this emigrant’s literature is Adam Michnik’s publication New Evolutionism from 1976, which would serve as an example for the democratic opposition that would develop within a few years.273 On the other hand, there was the literature produced by writers living in Poland, and hence under communist censorship. 274 An important new type of literature developed in 1976: illegal underground writings. 275 This underground literature played a crucial role in the tipping of the communist regime in 1989.276 Polish literature in the period after communism is characterised most prominently by tendencies as ‘the attempts to find spiritual roots or regional identity within recent history… as well as attempts to introduce the language of the mass media and the symbols and heroes of mass culture into literature’.277

264

Ibid. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 266 Z. Folejewski, ‘Socialist Realism in Polish Literature And Criticism’, Comparative Literature, vol. 13, no. 1 (1961), p. 73. 267 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 268 Ibid., p. 74. 269 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 270 Ibid., p. 74. 271 Ibid., p. 74. 272 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Promotion. Polish Culture. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from http://publikacje.poland.gov.pl/files/Zakladki/Publikacje_off-line/EN/Polish_Culture.pdf. p. 6. 273 A. Arndt, Premises and Paradoxes in the Development of the Civil Society Concept in Poland (2008). Retrieved 23 June 2011 from http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2008/iv08-402.pdf. p. 5. 274 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Promotion. Polish Culture. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from http://publikacje.poland.gov.pl/files/Zakladki/Publikacje_off-line/EN/Polish_Culture.pdf. p. 6. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 265

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2.2 Religion 2.2.1 Religion in Communist Poland Ever since World War II, Poland has been a relatively homogeneous country regarding religion. For this rather long period, approximately 90 % of the Polish people identified themselves as being Roman Catholic.278 Against the background of religious suppression by communist rule, the extent of influence and functioning of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland during communism can be considered as being remarkable when compared to other communist countries in Eastern Europe at that time. 279 Growth in the support of Roman Catholicism and the church in Poland during the communist rule is explained by Zdzislawa Walaszek in her ‘An Open Issue of Legitimacy: The State and the Church in Poland’. She argues that the Roman Catholic Church became an ‘alternative legitimate [authority] system’ to the communist authority, which meant that, during communism, the Centered the politics of Poland.280 During the same period, the Polish government had a surveillance policy with regard to religion. Different agencies were put in place in order to limit the role of the Church in Polish society. The two most well known agencies of this time were the National Security Agency and the Office of Faith Affairs.281 After World War II, the Soviet Union was able to predominate Poland through the spread of a communist ideology. With the spread of this communist ideology, the Soviet Union determined the political and social systems in Poland, without predomination of the Polish soil, hence made it seem like Poland still kept its territorial sovereignty rights. 282 Despite the suppression of Polish communist rule, the Roman Catholic Church was able to expand on different levels in Poland. The increase in the number of priests and places of worship illustrates this development, which also indicates a growing social support for the Roman Catholic Church at that time. This growth of the Roman Catholic Church is quite paradoxical as in most communist regimes the Church was suppressed. 283 In this same period the Roman Catholic Church was considered an important social institution in Polish society.284 Its role and significance were summarized in a domestically-produced report issued abroad in 1986: “The Church’s moral teaching is an important countermeasure against social and psychological threats (…). The moral and social authority of both the Pope and the clergy remains high. In as sense, and perhaps paradoxically, this is beneficial to the national government. The different community-building aspects of the Church as well as the rich and well-developed pastoral programs designed for farmers, students, creative minds, and even workers constitute an immensely effective force of social integration, personal development, and moral awareness. While the Church is an integral part of Polish society and a voice of Poland, it is also a very important mediator in the realm of social issues and politics” (Raport … 1986).285

Some believe the Church was able to grow and strengthen its social and moral role in Poland during the 1980s, because of its association with politics and not so much because of an 278

E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization. New polarization of the Polish religious landscape in the context of globalization and European integration’, Geographica, nos. 1-2 (2009), p. 3. 279 Ibid. 280 Z. Walaszek, ‘An Open Issue of Legitimacy: The State and the Church in Poland’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 483, no. 1 (1986), p. 118. 281 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 3. 282 Z. Walaszek, ‘An Open Issue of Legitimacy’, p. 121. 283 Ibid., p. 120. 284 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 4. 285 Ibid.

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increase in the people’s belief in religious values.286 According to Walaszek, a possible reason behind the growing support among the Polish people for the Church could be linked to the rise of the Solidarity movement at that time. 287 As the Solidarity movement received increasing support from the Polish people, it became the first free ‘institutionalised form of representation’ that was granted full legitimacy from the Polish people since World War II. 288 Therewith, it ‘forced’ the people to question the legitimacy of the communist regime, while at the same time, the communist regime lost much of its legitimacy, or at least, what was left of it.289 Meanwhile, during the people’s ‘search for legitimacy’, the Roman Catholic Church, a traditionally legitimised institution, got the support of the majority of the Polish people, without a clear distinction of class.290 As the Polish people saw the Roman Catholic Church as ‘the remaining repository of national aspirations’ the Roman Catholic Church was automatically ‘forced’ to politicise its role, 291 as it was ‘perceived as an alternative [legitimate] authority system’ to the communist authority. 292 This meant that, besides its religious role, the Polish Church got to fulfil a political role as well in the 1980s. Because of this political role, the Polish Roman Catholic Church as an entity was clearly different from what it had been before World War II.293 Under communist rule, the Polish Roman Catholic Church did not just fulfil its spiritual task. It also developed an important social and political task. The Roman Catholic Church reacted to communist repression by promoting human dignity, human rights, freedom and sovereignty through its teachings. The latter is considered as one of the main reasons why the Roman Catholic Church was able to secure such a great extent of power during the last years of communist rule.294 The Roman Catholic Church offered the Polish society exactly the opposite of what the communist government did. While communist rule introduced the doctrine of Marxism, the Catholic Church sustained the teachings of the normative system of Christian ethics; the communists advocated internationalism, the Polish Catholic Church patriotism; the communists tried to purchase credibility through promise of future benefits, while the church not only offered hope but actively promoted the welfare of the people; the communists implemented policies that initiated cyclical crises, and the church provided sanctuary for the victims of those crises.295 By the use of these opposite values, ideals and goals, the Roman Catholic Church had been able to win the trust and support of the Polish people. 296 However, one of the most important opposite values which the Roman Catholic Church promoted was probably values of individuals, instead of collectivist values.297 The idea of the right of individuals to determine their own believes gained more support in Polish society. This lead to a growing consciousness with regard to the rights of the individual, but also the rights of the national state. Consequently, the Polish people became more aware of the fact that the regime of the

286

Ibid., p. 7. Z. Walaszek, ‘An Open Issue of Legitimacy’, pp. 119-120. 288 Ibid., p. 120. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid. 291 Ibid. 292 Ibid., p. 131. 293 Ibid., p. 120. 294 Ibid., p. 131. 295 Ibid., p. 120. 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid., p. 121. 287

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Polish communist state conflicted with national sovereignty rights and the state’s right to selfdetermination.298 According to Walaszek, the political role of the Roman Catholic Church during communist rule strongly contributed to the reinforcement of the connection between Polish national identity and Roman Catholicism, as the Roman Catholic Church protected the Polish ‘cultural and political identity and its democratic heritage’.299 This reinforcement was made possible as earlier in the Polish history the Roman Catholic Church was given this same political, as well as moral, ‘leadership’ role during turbulent times which, consequently, made it possible for the Roman Catholic Church to present itself as defender of the Polish nation, 300 and its national identity. 301 It was because of this defense of the Roman Catholic Church that the Roman Catholic religion developed into a direct association with ‘the struggle for cultural survival and national independence’.302 According to Walaszek, Poland was the only place in Eastern Europe where the Roman Catholic Church was focused to such a great extent on concepts like national sovereignty, freedom and human rights, ‘as well as on the inseparability of the nation from its church’, in the communist era.303 Concluding, the Roman Catholic Church was an important player in Polish society throughout communist rule. This was not so much because of the fact that the Polish people were of especially strong faith. More importantly, it can be explained by the transformation of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland after World War II into a religious social and political actor that exerted itself and the Polish people against suppressive communist rule. This made it possible for the Roman Catholic religion to develop into an actor that was associated with the Polish nation’s ‘struggle for cultural survival and national independence’. 304 It is important to note that the Roman Catholic Church was not an authority system that was recognised by the constitution, but de facto it had the same functions as a recognised authority system and coexisted with the communist authorities.305 2.2.2 Religion in Contemporary Poland after Communism: Polish National Identity and Roman Catholicism Elzbieta Bilska-Wodecka states in her ‘Secularisation and Sacralisation. New polarisation of the Polish religious landscape in the context of globalisation and European integration’ that, according to Władysław Piwowarski, the intensive religious behaviour of Poles was strongly maintained by ‘political and patriotic factors’ over the years,306 which was, as mentioned above, particularly the case during communist rule. After ‘key historical events such as the imposition of martial law and the creation of the first non-communist Polish government in 1989’ more people tended to perform religious behaviour. 307 As political and patriotic factors play a less significant role in the post-communist Polish society, in 2000 it was already predicted that religious practices will become less and less important in Poland. 308 The latter will be proved to be accurate in the next section.

298

Ibid., pp. 121-122. Ibid., p. 131. 300 Ibid. 301 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. 34. 302 Z. Walaszek, ‘An Open Issue of Legitimacy’, p. 131. 303 Ibid. 304 Ibid. 305 Ibid., pp. 118 and 134. 306 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, pp. 6-7. 307 Ibid., p. 6. 308 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 299

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In 2002, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 89.8 % of the Polish population was Roman Catholic, and 75 % was practicing.309 The other religions were Eastern Orthodoxy, with a small number of 1.3 % of the Polish population following this religion, the Protestant religion and other religions, both represented by 0.3 % of the Polish population. A number of 8.3 % of the people had an unspecified religion. 310 However, these numbers are not based on the census of 2002. It is stated that during the new census in Poland, which took place from 1 April to 30 June 2011,311 it was not asked what religion one adheres. 312 Statistical data with regard to religion is collected by the Main Statistical Office (GUS) and is not based on a census done among private individuals, but based on surveys done among religious institutions in Poland. 313 According to the Pro Cultura Foundation, current statistics on religion are not up to date, because it is perceived as good to have more Roman Catholic believers in Poland. 314 Also according to Elzbieta Bilska-Wodecka, the collected data by GUS may best be seen as statistical estimations. 315 After the communist system had collapsed in Poland, people started looking at religion from a different point of view. The individual was much more important and therefore religion was looked upon as a belief with a certain meaning for the individual and its life, and not so much as something with a meaning only for the collectivist Polish society. 316 A year after the communist system had fallen in Poland (1990), the number of Polish citizens being Roman Catholic was estimated around 94.2 % of the population, which was remarkable compared to other Central and Eastern European countries that were overruled by the communist regime, which were characterised by a bigger part of their population not being religious.317 However, recent statistics by GUS show that the number of non-religious individuals in Poland in 2007 was approximately three times bigger than in 1990. Consequently, the number of Roman Catholics in Poland decreased to 88.4 % of the Polish population in 2007.318 However, not only did the number of Roman Catholics decrease, but also the percentage of the number of people attending Sunday Mass, as will be elaborated on below.319 Especially young people do not recognise the importance of Roman Catholic values and the Church’s teachings anymore and are participating less in Sunday Mass.320 Not only is the decreasing number of Roman Catholics and practicing Roman Catholics in the post-communist period remarkable for the contemporary religious landscape of Poland. The gradually changing meaning of Roman Catholicism as a part of the Polish national identity is probably the most significant change that occurred in the period after communism. As will be elaborated on in section 3.1.3, in 1997, with the introduction of the new Constitution of Poland, an important step was made in the separation of Polish national identity and Roman Catholicism. As mentioned above, the idea that Roman Catholicism was an important part of Polish identity was empowered during the communist days. However, with the preamble of the 1997 Constitution ‘the relationship between religion and national 309

Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 310 Ibid. 311 Central Statistical Office of Poland GUS. National Census of Population and Housing 2011. Retrieved 8 May 2011 from http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/index_ENG_HTML.htm. 312 Interview B1. 313 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 4. 314 Interview B1. 315 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 4. 316 Ibid., 5. 317 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 320 Ibid., p. 7.

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identity, and between church and state’ was (re)defined.321 The new Polish Constitution recognised that people which did not have the Polish national identity, but were citizens of Poland, still were a part of the Polish nation. It also emphasised that non-religious citizens were just as much a part of the Polish nation as those who were believers. 322 However, despite the decreasing amount of influence religion seems to have on Polish society and the separation of Polish identity with Roman Catholicism, it can be stated that religion continues to be a considerable part of Polish society. Religious Practices: Baptism, Sunday Mass Attendance and Holy Communion It is stated in Bilska-Wodecka’s ‘Secularisation and Sacralisation. New polarisation of the Polish religious landscape in the context of globalisation and European integration’ that baptism is considered a ‘cultural must’ in Poland. 323 This can be noticed in the remarkable number of baptisms in the last two decades, which was fluctuating between 104.3 % (this percentage was caused because also adults got baptised in this year), in 1990, and 94.4 %, in 2006.324 Although considered a ‘cultural must’, a general declining trend can be observed when looking at the percentages of baptisms performed during the last two decades. 325 When looking at the percentages of Polish citizens attending Sunday Mass, a general decrease in the percentages since 1990 can be observed as well. While in 1990 50.3 % of the Polish population attended Sunday Mass, in 2008 this numbers was 40.4 %.326 These numbers, however, differ per region. When looking at the numbers of 2004, one notices that the most religious region is south-eastern Poland, the areas in and around the cities of Tarnów, Przemyśl and Rzeszów. 327 Although the number of individuals attending Sunday Mass in these regions decreased two to six percentage points between 2004 and 2008, it could still be considered as one of the most religious regions of Poland when looking at the percentage of individuals attending Sunday Mass.328 Other parts of Poland that were more religious than others in 2004 were the diocese of Pelplin, in northern Poland, and Opole, in southern Poland. However, these regions also experienced a decrease in the numbers of citizens attending Sunday Mass between 2004 and 2008. These same numbers indicate that the least religious parts of Poland are the northern and western part of the country, namely the dioceses Szczecin-Kamień, Koszalin-Kołobrzeg and Elbląg, which were part of Germany before World War II.329 Besides the south-eastern region of Poland, it could be stated that the eastern and southern part of Poland are slightly more religious considering the percentages indicating Sunday Mass attendance in 2004 and the increasing of percentages between 2004 and 330 2008. It is stated that there are differences in religious character between the metropolitan areas and the rural areas in Poland as well, as people in rural areas tend to be very Roman Catholic and are more traditional than the people living in metropolitan areas. 331 This is also

321

G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. 32. The Constitution of the Polish Republic, Preamble. 323 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 5. 324 Ibid., p. 6. 325 Ibid. 326 Ibid., p. 7. 327 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 328 Ibid. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid., p. 8. 331 Interview B1. 322

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explained by the fact that in rural areas, social pressure of other members in the village plays an important role in going to church.332 The number of people in Poland receiving Holy Communion increased over the last two decades, with a notable 15.3 % of the population receiving Holy Communion in 2008 compared to 10.7 % in 1990.333 When looking at the percentages of individuals that received Holy Communion in different regions, the areas in and around the cities of Opole, Katowice, Tarnów and Poznań show the biggest numbers.334 In this case, there is a similar development going on in east Poland as well as west Poland.335 According to Bilska-Wodecka, this development of more people receiving Holy Communion in Poland ‘suggests a change in the quality of faith in Poland. More Roman Catholics are trying to live according to the principles of their faith’. 336 In 2005, a research was conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) in Poland. This research concluded that Pope John Paul II had played an important role in the religious views and value systems of most of the Polish people. 337 For most of the Poles a happy family is more important than success and fame, and is the top priority in life. 338 However, in practice it seems that the Roman Catholic ethics have less influence in the behaviour of a Pole than what is personally thought to be ethical at the moment. 339 The Referendum on EU Accession: Influence of the Roman Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II In the years between the collapse of communism and Poland’s EU accession, the Roman Catholic Church appeared to be supportive of the idea of Poland entering the EU. 340 Different visits to Brussels by the Polish clergy, in 1997 and 2001, reduced ‘the fears of the faithful’ about EU accession. 341 The Polish ‘top clergy’ put a large effort, at different moments in 2001 and 2002, in assuring the Polish faithful that Poland’s EU accession does not mean that the Poles have to lose their national and religious identity or sovereignty. 342 They even encouraged the citizens of Poland to vote during the referendum as it was their ‘civic duty’. 343 In addition, the important role of Pope John Paul II should be considered separately in this context, as he was explicitly pro EU accession. Several times, through teachings and speeches, the Pope declared to be a supporter of Poland’s future membership of the EU. 344 He explained that Poland could serve as a good Christian example for the other EU countries, as it was just as much responsible for Europe’s religious identity as it was for its own. 345 According to Bilska-Wodecka, ‘[t]he EU membership referendum in Poland was undoubtedly affected by the statement issued by John Paul II on May 19, 2003, where he voiced his support for membership in the European Union’.346 As she puts it, it would not be until after the results of the EU membership referendum in 2003 that the significant influence 332

Ibid. E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, pp. 7-8. 334 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 335 Ibid., p. 9. 336 Ibid., p. 8. 337 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 338 Ibid., p. 11. 339 Ibid. 340 Ibid., p. 12. 341 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 342 Ibid. 343 Ibid., p. 16. 344 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid., p. 14. 333

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of Pope John Paul II’s statements could be noticeable, as results of the polls performed among the Polish population before the referendum could be compared with the actual results. 347 ‘At least some of the inhabitants of eastern and southern Poland who had opposed EU membership before, came to support the idea on the day of the referendum.’ 348 While in 1999 only 55 % and in 2002 62 % of the Polish people stated that they would vote for entry, at the actual referendum this numbers was 77.5 % of the people who voted.349 According to BilskaWodecka, this result also indicated that the Polish people had more faith in Pope John Paul II than in the Polish top clergy.350 This can be explained as in 2002, after many attempts were made by the clergy to convince the Poles that EU accession was a good thing, the number of pro-voters was 62 % and in 2003, after the Pope’s explicit pro-EU statement, this number had increased with 15.5 %.351 The most remarkable influence of Pope, was probably the one on the Roman Catholic nationalists that were strongly eurosceptic, e.g. members and listeners of Radio Maryja, and members and readers of the ‘Niedziela’ weekly.352 Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldová recognise in The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe that the Polish Roman Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II were significant non-political factors that influenced the referendum as well. 353 However, one should note that a significant increase in the percentage of citizens being proEU accession between 2002 and 2003 could be noticed in other Eastern and Central European countries, which were preparing for EU accession in that same period, as well. 354 In this sense, the real influence of the Polish Roman Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II can be questioned. The Future It can be concluded that during Poland’s period of transition, the number of Roman Catholics has decreased and the number of people claiming not to be religious has increased. BilskaWodecka perceives the latter as a typical Western European social characteristic, which Poland has adopted.355 Next to this phenomenon, also the number of people attending Sunday Mass has decreased over the transition years, which means, according to Bilska-Wodecka, that Polish people do not find the church’s teachings in moral questions as important as they did.356 However, the number of people receiving Holy Communion did increase over the transition period, which would suggest that the quality of faith is changing in Poland. Also the suggested influence of the Roman Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II in Poland’s road towards EU accession could be considered remarkable. However, this influence is questionable at the same time. After his death, the number of Roman Catholics in Poland as well as the number of practicing Poles decreased, even though it has still stayed relatively high. 357 Bilska-Wodecka states that it is not clear yet which road the Polish population will 347

Ibid., p. 16. Ibid. 349 Ibid. 350 Ibid. 351 Ibid. 352 Ibid., p. 14. 353 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 132. 354 European Commission. (2004). Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1 – National Report, Poland. Retrieved 24 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/exec_pl.pdf. p. 7. 355 E. Bilska-Wodecka, ‘Secularization and Sacralization.’, p. 16. 356 Ibid. 357 Ibid., pp. 6-7 and 17. 348

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choose in the near future regarding religion as ‘the religious attitudes of the Polish society are still in a transition state’.358

2.3 Polish-Jewish Relations and current Anti-Semitism After the fall of communism and with the regaining of its national dependence, Poland and the Polish people changed their view on religion (see section 2.2.2). This changing point of view also led to a redefinition of Polish-Jewish relations.359 2.3.1 After 1989: redefining Polish-Jewish Relations In the years after 1989, the Polish-Jewish relationship was strengthened by the Polish Pope John Paul II. John Paul II was the first pope to visit Auschwitz and a synagogue, and he frequently spoke about the relation between Catholicism and Jewry in public. He repeatedly showed his interest in the Jewish community and showed his hope to end anti-semitic hatred. In 1993, he decided to recognise the state of Israel. 360 The nature of the Polish-Jewish has in the last twenty years also been changing due to what Geneviève Zubrzycki calls the ‘War of Crosses’ and which caused a debate on antisemitism in Poland. 361 This ‘war’ was in 1984 preceded by the establishment of a Carmelite Convent near to the former concentration and extermination camp of Auschwitz. The presence of a convent near to that place was demonstrated against by several Jewish groups, which subsequently led to protests against relocating the convent and to the placing of a tall cross on the grounds of the convent. Although the Carmelite nuns left the place in 1993 after intervention of John Paul II, the cross remained and was to fuel the ‘War of Crosses’. When it was announced in 1998 that the cross would be removed from its site, this resulted in a national debate which finally led to the placement of another 322 crosses (decorated with flags and crowns) in the months following. These crosses caused a worldwide debate (the ‘War of Crosses’) surrounding Polish-Jewish relations and the presence of religious symbols near to places like the former Auschwitz camp. The initial conflict on the large cross, however, remained unsolved. 362 In 2000, the book Neighbors: the destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne was published. This book by the Jewish-American author J.T. Gross revealed how ethnic Poles had murdered their Jewish neighbours in the town of Jedwabne in 1941.363 The publishing of the book was followed by an investigation of the events in Jedwabne by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) from 2002-2004. 364 The book provoked a new debate on Polish-Jewish relations across the country. Poles who had believed in the martyrdom and innocence of the Polish people, were now unsure whether that vision had been completely right 365 and now became aware of the fact that guilt might have been the source of aggression and anti-semitism after World War II.366 New books by Gross, his Fear: anti-semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (2006) and the newly published Golden Harvest (2011), about the plundering of Jewish belongings by 358

Ibid., p. 17. G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. xi. 360 D.A. Parks, John Paul II: the Pope from Poland, Brookfield: The Millbrook Press Inc. 2002, p. 43. 361 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. 2. 362 Ibid., pp. 2-14. 363 Ibid., p. xiii. 364 J.T. Gross, Angst: Antisemitisme in Polen na Auschwitz, een historische interpretatie, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij 2007, p. 81. 365 G. Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz, p. xiii. 359

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Poles, have provoked similar reactions.367 They might have contributed to growing antisemitic feelings in Poland, as anti-semitism is still present in Polish society. 2.3.2 Current Anti-Semitism Although Poland is a very homogenous country and there are only few Jewish people in the country368, the relation between Jews and ethnic Poles seems to remain unstable in current Poland. A memorandum to the Polish Government, published by the Council of Europe in 2007, states that, according to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and researchers, anti-semitism in Poland has increased. 369 There might be several reasons for this: traditional ideas, anti-semitic organisations and publications, problems with Israeli visiting Poland and current politics seem to influence the negative position towards Jews. Firstly, the view that Jews are the murderers of Jesus nowadays still seems to lead to a difficult relationship between Catholicism and Jewry.370 This view, together with the still existing idea of a strong connection between communism and Jewry (especially in smaller villages), might contribute to anti-semitic feelings in Poland.371 Secondly, there are several anti-semitic organisations in Poland that frequently demonstrate, and that are allowed to demonstrate as long as they have asked for permission for such a demonstration. 372 In addition, anti-semitic publications are available from booksellers, such as the ‘Ruch’ network of kiosks.373 Thirdly, Israeli visiting Jewish institutions and former concentration camps, seem to contribute to a negative position towards Jews. Although institutions say they have no reason to feel violated in any way, the Israeli groups often feel discriminated when coming to Poland. They are known for bringing their own guides and security guards and, in addition, for misbehaving while visiting museums or former concentration camps, which might create a negative image among the Polish population.374 Finally, several Polish politicians have been linked to anti-Jewish sentiments the last years. For instance, former deputy Prime Minister Roman Giertych was accused of antisemitic tendencies by Israeli officials and later boycotted. 375 Michał Kamiński, member of Law and Justice (PiS) and the European Parliament, was accused of supporting ‘anti-semitic causes’376. Both politicians denied the accusations. According to the provisions of the Polish Criminal Code, proceedings against acts of anti-semitism may be discontinued or even not initiated if the ‘social harmfulness’ of the offense is considered insignificant. This is explained as follows: even though one may feel 366

Interview B3. Trouw. E. Overbeek, Polen worstelt met moorden op Joden (22 January 2011). Retrieved 3 June 2011 from http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1837381/2011/01/22/Polen-worstelt-met-moorden-opJoden.dhtml. 368 M. Moskal, Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU (2004). Retrieved 3 June 2011 from http://www6.gencat.cat/llengcat/noves/hm04primavera-estiu/docs/moskal.pdf, ret. 369 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155005&Site=COE. par. 58-59. 370 Interview B3. 371 Interviews B3 and B5. 372 Interview B3. 373 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 58-59. 374 Interviews B3 and B5. 375 BBC News. Israel anger over Polish minister (10 July 2006). Retrieved 3 June 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5166434.stm. 376 The Independent. V. Mock and J. Lichfield, Cameron victory ‘will marginalise Britain in Europe’. Retrieved 3 June 2011 from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-victory-will-marginalise-britain-ineurope-1943079.html. 367

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offended by an anti-semitic comment, if society at large has not been affected, the consequences of the crime are minimal. However, in its commentary the government states that every unlawful act is by definition socially harmful. The provisions in the Code only protect from disproportionate proceedings and double initiated proceedings. 377 In its commentary on the Memorandum of the Council of Europe, the government states that Poland is a relative safe country as regards anti-semitic attacks. Nevertheless, the government is undertaking several countermeasures including legislative changes. 378 According to the Ministry of Justice, the existing provisions of the Penal Code prohibiting racial discrimination will be strengthened with new regulations. More effective prosecution will be permitted in cases of dissemination of anti-semitic materials. Also, Polish civil society and academia are very much engaged in combating anti-semitism. 379

2.4 Conclusion Poland has a small amount of minorities and is considerably a homogenous country regarding ethnicity. Nevertheless, it still has several different minority groups. Since 2005, Poland has adopted a special act in its law which guarantees certain rights and freedoms for the recognised minorities, also regarding their language. However, not all minorities are recognised a legal minority status by the state, like for example the rather big Vietnamese minority. This means that they do not enjoy special rights as a minority neither. Poland has numerous national myths. While some still prevail in Polish society, other have completely faded out. Especially the myth of Poland being ‘the Christ of nations’ seems to still be of great importance nowadays, as will also be described in chapter 4 on Politics. Another myth that still prevails in contemporary Polish society is the myth regarding the ‘Black Madonna’ icon in the ‘Pauline’ monastery near Częstochowa as it is still an important pilgrims place in Poland. The religious mentality of the Poles is in transition, and the direction it will take in the future is not clear yet. There is a decrease in the number of Roman Catholics and the number of practicing people, but these numbers are still relatively high when compared to other European countries. However, it is important to notice that the numbers are not based on census done among private individuals, but on data collected by GUS received from Roman Catholic institutions. The credibility of this data collection can be questioned, especially in the light of Roman Catholicism being an important part of Polish national identity throughout the years, and particularly in communist era. However, since the fall of communism the Polish identity has been redefined, particularly with the Constitution of 1997.

377

Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 59. Ibid., par. 58. 379 Ibid., par. 61-63. 378

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PART II: LEGAL SYSTEM, POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 3. LEGAL SYSTEM The legal system is defined as ‘rules, procedures, and institutions by which public initiatives and private endeavours can be carried out through standardised and legitimate means’. 380 In Poland, due to the transition to a liberal democracy after communism, many features of the legal system have been reformed. The accession process to the European Union guided the reforms even further. In order for Poland to become a member of the EU, it had to conform to the accession criteria, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. One of the criteria is that the candidate country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and human rights.381 This chapter describes various aspects of the current legal system in Poland. This is done in four sections, namely constitutional law, rule of law, civil law and EU legal standards. In addition to an outline of the administrative functioning of the legal system, a number of important issues are described. These are e.g. the administrative division in Poland and its obstacles, the functioning of the judiciary, the level of protection of human rights, and the presence of corruption. Next, attention is paid to civil law. An outline is given of family law and the way in which it is influenced by cultural values. Another feature of civil law is land property, being both a fundamental right and an element of the market economy. Finally, attention is paid to the approximation of Polish law with EU legislation, the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and the adaption of the acquis communautaire.

3.1 Constitutional Law 3.1.1 State Institutions In 1989, Poland gained full sovereignty and independence. 382 After the collapse of the communist regime and two years of transition that followed, Poland developed itself into a parliamentary representative democratic republic. This means a political system based on the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers.383 The current rights and competencies of these powers are set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, drawn in 1997.

380

G.C. Hazard Jr., ‘The Role of the Legal System in Responses to Public Risk’, Daedalus, vol. 119, no. 4 (1990), p. 229. 381 European Commission. Accession criteria. Retrieved 22 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm. 382 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 128. 383 S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis eds., Developments in Central and East European Politics 4, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. 38.

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Legislative Power Most of the political power in Poland lies within the parliament, which consists of two houses.384 First, there is the Senate, also called the upper house. It contains a hundred members and elections are universal, direct and conducted by secret ballot. The Senate has less power than the lower house, the Sejm.385 The Sejm controls the Council of Ministers and is therefore the most important legislative power. It is composed of 460 seats and the members are elected by proportional representation. Both the members of the Sejm as well as those of the Senate are chosen for a four-year term.386 The debates of the Sejm are supervised by the Marshal, who is elected by the Sejm and is a member of it as well. The Marshal is responsible for maintaining the rights of the Sejm and representing for it in external matters.387 Executive Power The president of the Republic of Poland is the head of state. 388 This means that he heads the executive power and that he is representative for the country. He represents Poland in international affairs and is responsible for the functioning of the government. The president is elected by popular vote for a maximum of two five-year terms. He is also responsible for the security of the state and therefore head of the Armed Forces. The rights of the president are determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.389 The power of the president was diminished by the Constitution of 1997. This was a result of the negative experience of having a president with another political point of view than the government had. President Wałęsa, member of Solidarity, acted very hostile towards the then ruling communist-successor parties in the government during his term. Wałęsa was able to exercise so much control, that the government was forced to dismiss several political individuals. The changes of 1997 made sure it was possible for the assembly to override the president’s power to veto, by a three-fifths majority vote. Furthermore, the competence of the president to appoint three ministers in the government was abolished. 390 Council of Ministers The executive power of Poland is exercised by the Council of Ministers, which is headed by the prime minister.391 The Council of Ministers conducts internal affairs and foreign policy and coordinates and supervises the State administration. It is its responsibility to ensure the implementation of statutes and to issue regulations. The Council also has the supervision of the State Budget and protects the State Treasury.392 Furthermore, the Council has to ensure the internal and external security of the State. It controls the relations with other States and international organisations and ratificates international agreements. This also means that it exercises control in the field of national defence. 393

384

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter IV, Article 95. Ibid., Chapter IV, Articles 96-97. 386 Ibid., Chapter IV, Articles 95-98. 387 Ibid., Chapter IV, Articles 109-110. 388 Ibid., Chapter V, Article 126. 389 Ibid., Chapter V. 390 S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis eds., Developments in Central and East European Politics 4, p. 40. 391 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VI. 392 Ibid., Chapter VI, Article 146. 393 Ibid. 385

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The Prime Minister is not only representative for the Council but also has to coordinate and control the Council’s work and ensure the implementation of policies. 394 The position of the Prime Minister of Poland is protected by the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’, which obligates an agreement on the alternative candidate when the Prime Minister is dismissed. 395 Each Minister is the director of a particular branch of government. The Council may repeal a regulation or order of a minister, on the request of the Prime Minister. 396 The Sejm exercises control over the Council of Ministers and can pass a vote of no confidence by a majority of votes. The president has to accept this resolution before the resignation of the Council of Ministers and the appointment of a new prime minister is accepted. 397 3.1.2 Administrative Division of Poland Section 4.2 elaborates on the development of Polish local politics since the end of communism, the influence of the EU in this process and how this led to the necessary reforms of 1999. With these reforms, the current administrative division of Poland was established and the local governments gained their own competences. 398 This division of administrative powers and their tasks and responsibilities will be clarified more thoroughly in this section. Currently, Poland can be divided into five levels.399 The first administrative level is the Polish Republic as a whole. The second level includes six groups of voivodeships. However, this division is just for statistics and has no role within regional administration. Thirdly, Poland consists of sixteen voivodeships. Each voivodeship is divided into powiats, districts concerning several municipalities. These municipalities are referred to as gminas. A gmina is a city of more than 16 000 people or a smaller city with its surroundings included. Furthermore, there are also ‘cities with a powiat status’. This is a result of the fact there used to be many more voivodeships than there are now, which all had their capital cities. These cities, if they have more than 40 000 citizens, are now ‘cities with a powiat status’.400 Before 1999, the division into different levels was solely administrative and had nothing to do with local decision-making. All decisions were made on the central level and the voivodeships carried them out. However, the gminas were an exception: their selfgovernment was already established in 1991. At that moment the gminas were given the rights to handle their own finances and manage the ownership of buildings. Therefore, no changes occurred for the gminas in 1999. The reforms that were made this year only concerned the powiats and voivodeships.401 Administrative Powers Each voivodeship is headed by a voivode, a governor who is appointed by the central government. Next to that, each voivodeship has its elected parliament, called the Sejmik. Each Sejmik elects its own executive board, called the Marshal Office (MO). The Sejmik is the organ making the decisions, which are carried out by the MO. The MO is headed by the Marshal, who is also elected and can be seen as the head of the region. 402

394

Ibid., Chapter VI, Article 148. S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis eds., Developments in Central and East European Politics 4, p. 38. 396 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VI, Article 149. 397 Ibid., Chapter VI, Article 158. 398 Interview D8. 399 Ibid. 400 Ibid. 401 Ibid. 402 Ibid. 395

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The Sejmik is elected directly every four years.403 Elections take place at the local level, at the same time as the elections for city councils, the councils of the gminas and the councils of the powiats. The heads of the gminas are elected indirectly, also every four years.404 The difference between the Voivode and the Marshal is not hierarchical. What distinct them is that the former has a ‘top-down’ function, while the latter is operating in a ‘bottomup’ manner. I.e., the Voivode is a representative of the national government, namely the Council of Ministers,405 and therefore responsible for the implementation of national policies on the regional level. The Voivode supervises the functioning of the local governments of the voivodeships, the gminas and the powiats. The Marshal on the other hand, is a representative of the regional government and responsible for the regional policies. All issues that are carried out at local levels are within the Marshal’s competences.406 Division of Competences between the Administrative Levels Obviously, each administrative level has its own competences. The subsidiarity principle is always the guiding line in Polish local governing.407 I.e., everything that can be done on a local level, for instance on the level of the gmina, will be decided upon by the authorities of the gmina. When a policy area has influence on a broader scale than just the gmina, decisions and policies will be carried out on a higher level. Most of the time, the voivodeship authorities have a coordinating role towards the actions that are carried out by the lower levels of the powiats and gminas. To give an impression of this division of competences, some policy areas are set out in Table 1. Current Issues concerning the Polish local Self-Governing The Problem of the Gminas According to an expert at the MO of voivodeship Lubelski, Poland is facing an inefficiency problem due to the competences of the gminas.408 There are too many gminas, which are very small, but nevertheless very powerful in deciding what happens within their territory. On top of that, they receive more funding than the voivodeships. The authorities of the gminas have the absolute right when it comes to spatial planning.409 This means they can decide without any limitations about, for instance, how their territorial space is divided between nature, houses, enterprises etc. The problem is that the gminas often want to meet investors’ demands instead of taking the future into consideration. The MO of Lubelski holds the opinion that this is mostly the result of a flaw in legislation. The law is not forcing the gminas to create a plan which has to be agreed on by higher authorities. Decisions can be made by one person, namely the head of the gmina.410

403

Ibid. Ibid. 405 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VI, Article 152. 406 Interview D8. 407 Ibid. 408 Ibid. 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 404

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The Problem of the Voivodeships A second problem can be found in the lack of regional cohesion. The funds coming from the EU are divided by the Ministry of Regional Development.411 They are given to the Marshal of each voivodeship, which spreads them to rural areas. This system is based on the assumption that the Marshal has a better view on the needs of the region than the national government does. However, when a voivodeship decides to invest in something that the ministry disagrees with, the latter has nothing to say about it. It is the region’s decision and the ministry only has to approve the conditions, not the initiative in itself.412 This leads to the problem of each region taking decisions in their own interests and not thinking about the bigger picture of Poland. The problem of lacking regional cohesion can also be seen on the national level of policy making. According to the Department of Strategy and Regional Development (Departement S&RD) of the MO Lubelski, there is a lack of policy coherence between the several ministries when it comes to regional issues.413 Regional problems are not taken into account by each ministry. The Ministry of Regional Development is on the same level of power as every other ministry, while actually regions should be an important aspect within each policy department. According to an expert at the MO Lubelski, the Ministry of Regional Development should have an umbrella function above all of the other ministries. 414 On top of that, the Department of S&RD of the MO Lubelski is of the opinion that the regions are not getting the attention they should get from the national government. Not only because the ministries do not take regional problems in account, but also because of the limited influence the regions have within governmental decisions. When it comes to governmental decisions like the providing of financial funds, each ministry has its own representative. This means that all of the sixteen voivodeships have only one representative, namely that of the Ministry of Regional Development. For this person, it is not only hard to speak with one voice, but the influence of this one person is also quite limited in comparison to what it is representing. 415

411

Interview H1. Interviews H1 and D8. 413 Interview D8. 414 Ibid. 415 Ibid. 412

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Table 1: Division of Competences between the Polish Administrative Levels Policy area gmina powiat voivodeship national level Education*

Pre-school and Gymnasium and primary school secondary school

Health care**

Basic health care

Powiat hospitals

Environment

Water pipes, savage pipes and savage treatment, gathering wastes from households Local development plan Local roads Help for poor people and families, municipal flats

Waste disposals

Spatial planning*** Roads Social assistance

Unemployment

Culture

Libraries, local centres of culture

Universities Voivodeship National hospitals and clinics clinics

Geodesy maps, Regional spatial building permits plan Powiat roads

Regional roads

Trainings, work offers, unemployment allowance

Studies and analysis of unemployment in the region Regional library

* As the table shows: the division in education between the administrative levels is linked to the level of education. ** Powiat hospitals serve the citizens of the gminas that are within the powiat; they make diagnostics and offer services in ‘simple cases’. Bigger clinics (with more advanced equipment and specialists) are run by the voivodeship or by central institutions like the Ministry of Health Care, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Medical Universities. The division of the competences in the area of health care is based on technical decisions. *** Local development plans point residential areas, environment protection areas, investments areas and industrial areas. Regional spatial plans set up the rules and principles for preparing these local development plans. Source: Marshal Office of Voivodeship Lubelski, Department of Strategy and Regional Development. 3.1.3 The Polish Constitution A brief History of the Polish Constitution The first notion of a representative body that governed the state of Poland, which consisted of an early form of parliament, emerged in the fifteenth century when the nobility played the primary role. In 1493, the representatives of the nobility from all provinces formed the Sejm,

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composed of two houses, which would remain the supreme legislative body until the late eighteenth century.416 Poland was also a pioneer when it comes to constitutionalism. The first Polish constitution was established 3 May 1791 by the king and the Sejm. It was the world’s second constitution, and the first of all European states.417 It recognised the principles of the sovereignty of the nation and the separation of powers, but did not attempt to abolish classes. It acknowledged the Roman Catholic religion as the main one, but it guaranteed state protection for other religions. However, this constitution only lasted fourteen months, because in 1792 the Russian, Austrian and Prussian armies occupied and divided the Polish territory. 418 A new constitution was adopted in 1921 when Poland re-emerged on the European map, based on the principles of sovereignty of the nation, the cabinet-parliamentary system and the principle of equality. This constitution was amended in 1926 and 1935, pronouncing the state a common good of all citizens and the president the supreme authority of the state, abolishing the separation of powers and narrowing the scope of civil rights. 419 After the World War II, Poland fell under communist rule, which established the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland in 1952. Formulated after the example of the Stalinist Soviet constitution, it was based on the sovereignty of the working people, the unity of state authority and central planning. 420 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Round Table talks took place from February until April 1989. The amendments to the 1952 constitution led to a resurrection of the separation of powers, an election for a new president - provisionally by the parliament- and a Constitutional Committee that would draft a new constitution for Poland. In 1992, a sort of ‘interim constitution’ was established, called the Little Constitution. This temporary constitution would be a working document until the drafting was completed in 1997 and the final constitution was established. 421 As was mentioned above, the Constitution of 3 May 1791 made Poland a pioneer in constitutionalism. Nevertheless, it was one of the last postcommunist countries to complete and adopt a new constitution after the collapse of the communist rule. 422 The Polish Constitution is with its thirteen chapters Europe’s second most extensive constitution (after Portugal).423

416

C. Kortmann, J. Theurens and W. Voermans eds., Constitutional Law of 10 Member States: The 2004 Enlargement, Deventer: Kluwer BV 2004, pp. VIII-4. 417 European Commission. (2007). Legal order – Poland. Retrieved 9 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_pol_en.htm. 418 J. Rajski, ‘European Initiatives and Reform of Civil Law in Poland’, Juridica International, vol. 14 (2008), p. 151. 419 C. Kortmann, J. Theurens and W. Voermans eds., Constitutional Law of 10 New Member States, pp. VIII-5. 420 Ibid., pp. VIII-10. 421 Ibid., pp. VIII-11. 422 E. Gierach and P. Chybalski eds., Polish Constitutional Law: the constitution and selected statutory materials, Warszawa: Kancelaria Sejmu 2009, p. 17. 423 C. Kortmann, J. Theurens and W. Voermans eds., Constitutional Law of 10 New Member States, pp. VIII-11.

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The Constitution of the Republic of Poland The Constitution of the Republic of Poland defines the organisation of the government, delegates competences to institutions, determines the relationship between legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and it guarantees civil rights and freedoms. 424 The thirteen chapters of the constitution will be briefly analysed below. The Preamble Box 1: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2nd APRIL, 1997 As published in Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 483 Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland, Which recovered, in 1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of its fate, We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources, Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good - Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic, Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one thousand years' heritage, Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world, Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries for the good of the Human Family, Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland, Desiring to guarantee the rights of the citizens for all time, and to ensure diligence and efficiency in the work of public bodies, Recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences, Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue as well as on the principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities. We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the Third Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for these principles as the unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland.

The Polish preamble is relatively extensive, specifying the historical origins of the Polish statehood. It includes the basic values and moral principles of Poland, and it refers to the historical heritage of the country. For example, the explicit mentioning of ‘God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty’, and the fact that the preamble recognises ‘our responsibility before God’, stresses the importance of religion within the Polish nation. However, the preamble also underlines the equality between believers and non-believers, which means that the equality of all Polish citizens, even those who do not live in Poland itself but ‘throughout the world’ is crucial to the nation.

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Another reference to the historical heritage of the country are the sentences: Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic, Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one thousand years’ heritage.

This clearly refers to the different eras of foreign domination and the struggles for independence of the Polish nation. This experience is still a significant aspect of Polish culture (see for further information section 2.1.3 about myths). The preamble defines Poland as a political nation. By not referring to the Polish people, but to all citizens of the Republic, you can say that Poland is stressing the connection between the citizens and the nation.425 Another political feature is the fact that it states the awareness ‘of the need for cooperation with all countries’. Overall, the preamble stresses the religious nature of the Polish society, as well as the importance of historical heritage. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, neither religion nor history is defined as a feature of citizenship, which means that Poland presents itself as a political rather than a cultural nation. Chapter I: The Republic This chapter contains the general provisions for the establishment of the Republic of Poland, which characterises the system of government. The most important concepts and provisions of the thirteen chapters are examined. It specifies that the supreme poser is vested in the Nation, which is according to the text of the preamble of the constitution, a political community of citizens.426 With this notion, the constitution gathers every citizen of Poland, regardless its religion or ethnic background under the notion of ‘the Polish Nation’. Of particular interest in this chapter is article 8.1. This article prescribes the supremacy of the Constitution of Poland, as the basis of the country’s state system; it ‘shall be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland’. This chapter, among other things, also gives the basic provisions concerning the separation of power, the equality of citizens and the separation of state and church. The limitation to the sovereign power is laid down in article 30, which prohibits violation of human dignity.427 Chapter II: The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens This chapter guarantees the protection of civil and political rights and freedoms such as equal treatment and legal aid. It provides for the means for the defence of constitution al freedoms and rights, as well as the limitations to them. New in this chapter is the provision for the right of a constitution al complaint for everyone who is subject of rights and freedoms. 428 There is no exhausting list of human rights specified in the constitution. However, the Constitutional Tribunal has the tendency to derive such human rights principles from the general principle of a state ruled by law. 429 Human rights will be further discussed in section 3.2.1. 424

European Commission. (2007). Legal order – Poland. Retrieved 9 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_pol_en.htm. 425 Author Unknown, A Comparative Analyses on Preambles of Constitution of Visegrad Countries. Retrieved 4 March 2011 from http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00001014/01/comparative_analyses_on_preambles_of_constitution_of_visegrad_countri es.htm. 426 E. Gierach and P. Chybalski eds., Polish Constitutional Law, p. 9. 427 Ibid. 428 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter II, Article 79. 429 E. Gierach and P. Chybalski eds., Polish Constitutional Law, p. 9.

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Chapter III: Sources of Law The constitution defines four different sources of law: statuary law, acts of local law, acts of universally binding law (such as the constitution), and acts of international law. Jurisprudence is not an official source of law in Poland, but can influence the law-making process. As mentioned above, the constitution holds the supreme position. However, some international agreements have a special position. Article 91.1 of the Polish constitution states: After promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw), a ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute.

This means that some international treaties are directly applicable, and others have to be implemented in Polish law first. Article 91.3 of the constitution prescribes that: If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organisation so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.

Because the Treaty of the European Union has been ratified, it enjoys precedence over national law. Secondary EU law also prevails when a conflict with national law occurs. This being said, it must be stressed that the Polish legal philosophy states that ‘the fact of ceding does not result in […] the loss of sovereignty of a state over the ceded power as it is not of an absolute character and it may be revoked’.430 It is important to stress that according to the Polish constitutional law, European law is ranked lower than the constitution. 431 However, in practice, European law prevails over the constitution. A good example to explain this situation is the case of the European Arrest Warrant, which was found unconstitutional by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. It is said that there are three ways to deal with such a problem: Poland could leave the EU, it could try to influence the EU in order to change the directive, or it must change the constitution. 432 The first option is obviously a mere theoretical one. The second option is rather difficult to achieve. Therefore, in the end, the constitution was amended in order to resolve the inconsistency with EU law. However, the general approach is to try to avoid conflict between EU law and Polish constitutional law. More on this subject is discussed in section 3.4.1 on the approximation of Polish law to EU legislation. Chapters IV-VII These chapters contain provisions concerning the government and state institutions, such as the Parliament, the president, the Council of Ministers and the local government. The Polish system of government is based on the principle of separation of powers, which is ensured by the constitution, which does not grant supremacy to any of the powers. The organisation, powers and frame of government were outlined in the first sections of this chapter. The government bodies and institutions and their competences will be discussed in chapter 4 on politics.

430

C. Kortmann, J. Theurens and W. Voermans eds., Constitutional Law of 10 New Member States, pp. VIII-10. Interview C8. 432 Ibid. 431

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Chapter VIII Contains provisions concerning the Courts and Tribunals. The organisation of the Polish court is discussed in section 3.1.5. Chapter IX: Organs of State Control and for Defence of Rights In article 202, the Supreme Chamber of Control is established. This is an important institution that audits all government bodies as well as the National Bank and legal persons. It has to present the annual budget and the results of the audit to the Sejm. Another important institution established in this chapter is the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights (article 208 of the constitution). His or her main task is to guard the human freedoms and rights that are specified in the constitution. The competences and features of the Commissioner (hereafter the ombudsman) is further discussed in section 3.2.2. Chapter X Contains provisions concerning public finances, such as the regulation of taxes, the state budget and the state treasury. Chapter XI Contains provisions concerning extraordinary measures, such as the introduction of martial law, a state of emergency or a state of natural disaster. The president of the state has the authority to take such extraordinary measures, at the request of the Council of Ministers. The Sejm has the possibility to annul it with an absolute majority of votes. This provision in the constitution is necessary to exhaustively specify the situations in which a limitation on human rights is admissible.433 Chapter XII: Amending the Constitution As specified in article 235, the constitution can be amended at the initiative of the Senate, the President or at least one-fifth on the Sejm. The latter can adopt it by a majority of two-thirds, but not before sixty days after its first reading. If the amendment concerns chapters I (The Republic), II (The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens) or XII (Amending the constitution), a referendum may be held, but this is not obligatory. After the amendment is adopted by Parliament, the president has twenty-one days to sign. The President may not refuse to sign, which means that in this case there is no presidential veto. Chapter XIII Contains provisions about the transitional period after the constitution has come into force. The Constitution of Poland has proven to be rather accurate. However, there still is some controversy regarding the system of government as regulated in the constitution. In particular the relation between President and Council of Ministers is sometimes criticised. The Polish model differs from the traditional system of parliamentary government, because his competences are enumeratively specified in the constitution and because the president is chosen in a universal election. These factors sometimes cause frictions within the executive part of the government. The competences of the Council of Ministers and of the president are explained in section 3.1.1.

433

E. Gierach and P. Chybalski eds., Polish Constitutional Law, p. 17.

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3.1.4 Legal Order This section will provide a brief overview of the Polish legal order is, explaining the legal unity of the legal rules produced by the state organs. The Constitution of Poland distinguishes universally binding law, which is binding on all entities and citizens, from enactments of internal law, which only concerns the organisational structure of the entity that issued the enactment. 434 The legislative procedures are laid down in articles 118-124 of the constitution. Deputies, the Senate, the president, the Council of Ministers and a group of at least 100 000 citizens have the right of initiative. Proposals for new bills are dealt with by the Sejm, where committees may be appointed for the examination and formulation of amendments to the proposed bill. If the Sejm approves of the amendments by a simple majority, it is transferred to the Senate, which may accept it, amend it or reject it. If the latter is the case, the Sejm may overrule this rejection with an absolute majority. When accepted, the bill is transferred to the president to be signed and published. The President has three weeks to sign the new bill, but he has the possibility to put it before the Constitutional Court first, or to use his presidential veto. However, the Sejm may reject his veto with a 3/5 majority of votes. A new bill becomes binding at the moment it has been published. Every newly issued act has to be published in one of the three official publications: The Journal of Laws of the Polish Republic, The Official Gazette of the Polish Republic and local official journals. The Constitution of Poland provides for different types of law; of interest here are acts of local law, regulations and acts of internal law. Acts of local law can be issued by local governments, as prescribed by article 94 of the constitution. Regulations can only be issued when the body concerned is authorised to do so by an act, as is prescribed in article 92 of the constitution. Bodies that may issue regulations are for example the president, the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. Regulations are ranked lower than acts, and cannot contain provisions that are incompatible with the act, or infringe it. Regulations are therefore subject to audit by the Constitutional Court or Administrative Courts. As has been stressed above, enactments of internal law concern only the internal organisations of the bodies that issued the enactment. Case law is no source of law in the Polish legal order, but often influences rulings all the same.435 According to article 178, judges are subject only to the constitution and statutes, but not to lower ranking acts such as regulations. Therefore, judges may rule that a regulation is not compatible with the constitution and decide not to apply it. In this way, judges can influence the legal order with their decisions and case law. Statues, however, cannot be challenged by judges. 436 The ranking of international and European law is described in section 3.1.3.

434 European Commission. (2007). Legal Order-Poland. Retrieved 9 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_pol_en.htm. 435 Ibid. 436 Ibid.

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Figure 3: The Legislative Procedure in Poland. 437

Source: www.sejm.gov.pl/english/jpg/proces.jpg. 3.1.5 Judiciary System The administration of justice in Poland is implemented by the Supreme Court, the common courts, administrative courts and military courts.438 In addition, the constitution provides for a Constitutional Tribunal and a Tribunal of State. In the first section, an overview is given from the different courts and their role, from the common courts up to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), including the current debate on efficiency of the court system. In addition, the relation between politics and the judiciary is dealt with. During communism the judiciary was viewed as an integral part of the state apparatus. Since 1989, the communist political structures have been replaced. In the final section it is estimated whether politics still influences the judiciary. Supreme Court The Supreme Court exercises supervision over judgments of the common and military courts.439 It is the cassation court, located in Warsaw. It is the highest judicial body to appeal against a ruling by courts of second instance. The first president of the Supreme Court is appointed by the president for a term of office of six years, from candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Supreme Court.440 Judges of the Supreme Court, the common courts, administrative courts and military courts are appointed for an indefinite period by the president on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ).441,442

437

Official website of the Sejm. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from www.sejm.gov.pl/english/jpg/proces.jpg. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VIII, Article 175. 439 Ibid., Article 183, par. 1. 440 Ibid., Article 183, par. 3. 441 Ibid., Article 179. 442 According to Article 187 of the constitution, the National Council of the Judiciary is composed as follows: 1) the first president of the Supreme Court, the minister of justice, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court and an individual appointed by the president; 2) fifteen judges chosen from amongst the judges of the Supreme Court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts; 3) four members chosen by the Sejm from amongst its deputies and two members chosen by the senate from amongst its senators. 438

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Common Courts The common courts are the district courts, regional courts, and appeal courts. Common courts consist of two instances. Depending on the nature of the case, the courts of first instance are the district courts and regional courts. The courts of second instance are the regional courts (for decisions of district courts) and court of appeals (for decisions of the regional courts). The courts of second instance handle the appealed cases and can uphold, amend or revoke the decision. In 2006, there were 315 district courts, located in larger cities. They are the judicial units closest to the citizens. In most district courts there are municipal courts, 380 of them countrywide. They handle minor civil and criminal cases and misconduct. The 45 regional courts are located in all major cities. There are eleven courts of appeal, located in major cities.443 The system of common courts does not seem to be perfect (see figure 4 for an overview of the civil courts). According to Adam Bodnar444 in The Judiciary in Poland After 20 Years of Transformation, the question is whether it is desirable to have small courts in small towns, close to the citizens, or to have bigger courts in major cities with more judges and personnel. Another issue is the internal division of courts into departments. 445 This is also stated by the Polish Judges Association ‘Iustitia’. Because there are too many courts, the judiciary is not able to function effectively. Now, the workload of courts in the cities is too large because there are not enough judges, while in smaller towns, judges have almost nothing to do. Furthermore, in every court specialised judges are working, handling cases of their expertise. When a judge falls out, there is nobody to handle these cases. According to the association, bigger courts with more judges would improve the functioning of the judiciary. 446

443

European Commission. (2006). Organisation of justice – Poland. Retrieved 2 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/org_justice/org_justice_pol_en.htm. 444 Adam Bodnar is Doctor of Legal Science. Secretary of the Board in the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights; assistant professor at the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law and Administration, University of saw; senior expert in the FRALEX network of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 445 A. Bodnar, ‘The judiciary in Poland after 20 years of transformation’, in: J. Kucharczyk and J. Zbieranek eds., Democracy in Poland 1989-2009: Challenges for the future, Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych 2010, p. 40. 446 Interview C10.

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Figure 4: Organigramme of the Civil Courts.447

Source: European Commission (2006). Organisation of justice – Poland.

447 European Commission. (2006). Organisation of justice - Poland. Retrieved 2 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/org_justice/org_justice_pol_en.htm.

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Administrative Courts The administrative courts review the actions of administrative bodies for their conformity with the law. Since 2004, the administrative courts are divided into two instances: the administrative courts and the Supreme Administrative Court. This was provided for by the Constitution of 1997. Furthermore, since 2004, the challenge is firstly filed before the administrative body and not before the court itself.448 There are sixteen administrative courts (WSA), one located in every voivodeship. They handle cases between citizens and public offices, between offices, or between municipalities. This is the court of first instance for these cases. Administrative courts can revoke, annul or uphold the appealed administrative act. They cannot issue any new administrative decision. The administrative courts have an information department where the status of cases and the files can be checked by the citizens.449 The second instance is the Supreme Administrative Court, which is also a tribunal on the constitution.450 It was established as early as 1980. Bodnar writes that ‘[a]lthough its powers were limited, it was the first time in Poland when the constitutional provisions were enforced by judicial body, which transformed the nature of the Poland’s constitution into a legal and binding document’.451 Military Courts Military courts include provincial courts and garrison courts. They handle cases involving crimes committed by soldiers and military employees. According to Bodnar, the number of cases adjudicated is constantly falling. Because of the above mentioned discussion of effectiveness, there is discussion about the liquidation of these courts.452 Tribunal of State The Tribunal of State rules in cases of violations of the constitution, or crimes committed by people holding the highest offices of state.453 The composition of the Tribunal of State is chosen by the Sejm at the start of each current term of office. The first president of the Supreme Court is chairperson of the Tribunal of State.454 Constitutional Tribunal The Constitutional Tribunal adjudicates regarding the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the constitution; the conformity of legal provisions issued by central state organs to the constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes; and the conformity of the purposes or activities of political parties. Furthermore, everyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been infringed, have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal.455 Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal are binding and final. 456 Because 448

Author unknown. The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland. Retrieved 21 April 2011 from http://www.acaeurope.eu/en/members/pdf/Poland.pdf. 449 European Commission. (2006). Organisation of justice – Poland. Retrieved 2 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/org_justice/org_justice_pol_en.htm. 450 Ibid. 451 A. Bodnar, ‘The judiciary in Poland after 20 years of transformation’, p. 41. 452 Ibid., p. 42. 453 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VIII, Article 198, par. 1: ‘The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers, the President of the National Bank of Poland, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, members of the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television, persons to whom the Prime Minister has granted powers of management over a ministry, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.’ 454 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VIII, Article 199, par. 1 and 2. 455 Ibid., Chapter VIII, Articles 188 and 79.

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regulations are also subject to checks by the courts, they can be disputed by the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the judicial or administrative tribunal. If a court rules that a regulation or provision infringes higher legislation, it may refrain from applying it in the case in question and treat it as null and void. 457 The fifteen judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are chosen by the Sejm for a single term of office of nine years.458 European Court of Justice A decision of a Polish court can be challenged before the ECJ in Strasbourg. This can be done by means of a preliminary question of the Polish court, or by the European Commission who refers Poland to the ECJ. According to Bodnar ‘one may say that Polish courts became de facto community courts as they are quite active in direct application of the EU law and in directing preliminary reference questions to the European Court of Justice’. 459 However, according to the CIA Factbook, Poland accepts compulsory ECJ jurisdiction with reservations.460 Also, since the Lisbon Treaty and the Polish-British protocol from opt-out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, judges have a limited possibility to refer to this Charter 461 (see also section 3.2.1 on Charter of Fundamental Rights). The Judiciary and Politics After communism there was no general review of the judicial or prosecutor’s personnel. Firstly, the personnel was subject to the lustration procedure (see also section 3.2.1 on Lustration) to verify whether they were collaborating with the secret service or not. Secondly, there were collaborators who resigned by themselves, because they knew they would have to submit a declaration. Thirdly, internal pressure within the judiciary pushed these people out, without formal instruments. It was pretty well-known to everybody who was really involved in some special collaboration and was giving verdicts in criminal cases which were too much in favour of the Communist Party. Lastly, from 1989 it was not possible for judges to be member of a political party, but before 1989, quite many of them were members of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, it was determined that this was not necessarily a problem because, during communist rule, many judges decided on the basis of law as it existed. This law did not differ that much from the law of a democratic state – in such issues like family law, social security law, and labour law.462 It is said that nowadays judgments are not manipulated by politics. However, there are some examples in which politics and the judiciary mingle. For example, in 2007, former President Kaczyński refused to appoint ten judges, recommended by the NCJ. It is stated that this was because of political reasons and Kaczyński has never presented formal reasons. It is said this has changed since Komorowski is president, and that influence on the judiciary depends on the party ruling in Poland. 463

456

Ibid., Chapter VIII, Article 190, par. 1. European Commission. (2007). Legal order – Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_pol_en.htm. 458 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter VIII, Article 194. 459 A. Bodnar, ‘The judiciary in Poland after 20 years of transformation’, p. 47. 460 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 461 A. Bodnar, ‘The judiciary in Poland after 20 years of transformation’, p. 47. 462 Interview C1. 463 Ibid. 457

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A recent discussion is the administrative supervision of the common courts by the Minster of Justice. The supervision concerns e.g. the budget, buildings and personnel. 464 According to the NCJ and the Judges Association ‘Iustitia’, under the supervision of Ministry of Justice politicians may abuse power. It would be better if the first president of the Supreme Court, without having any political power, became the administrative supervisor. 465

3.2 The Rule of Law 3.2.1 Human Rights Any country seeking membership of the EU must conform to the Copenhagen criteria (or the EU membership criteria). One of the criteria requires that the country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing i.a. human rights. These criteria also applied to Poland. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the level of human rights protection in the country. In order to do so, first, Poland’s position towards the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is described. Second, this chapter explicates several current issues concerning human rights. Charter of Fundamental Rights Being one of the core values of the EU, protection of human rights has been reinforced by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, Poland has secured an opt-out, via Protocol 7 on the application of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. 466 In its Declaration, Poland states that ‘[t]he Charter does not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of public morality, family law, as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity’. 467 Article 1, sub. 1 of the Protocol provides that the Charter does not extend 468 the ability of the ECJ or any court or tribunal of Poland to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter. Article 1, sub. 2 says that Title IV, Solidarity, of the Charter which contains economic and social rights,469 does not create justiciable rights. This means that courts cannot exercise judicial authority in legal issues regarding the economic and social rights from the Charter. According to the Constitutional Tribunal, there is a debate among scholars on how this protocol should be applied. In addition, there still has been no opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal on the matter, but it referred to the Charter sometimes in its judgments even when it was not yet binding. According to the Tribunal, the opt-out was solely for political reasons, not constitutional. 470 464

A. Bodnar, ‘The judiciary in Poland after 20 years of transformation’, pp. 37-38. Interview C10. 465 Interview C10. 466 Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, C 306/156. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0156:0157:EN:PDF. 467 Declaration 61, Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, C 115/358. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0335:0359:EN:PDF. 468 Emphasis added. 469 Official Journal of the European Union. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Title IV Solidarity, C 83/397. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:EN:PDF. 470 Interview C8.

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Current Issues In 2002, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe was invited by the Polish government to monitor the situation of human rights. In the resulting report, a number of concerns were identified and a series of recommendations were made to improve respect for human rights. In 2006 the Commissioner visited Poland again to examine the manner in which the recommendations were implemented. In 2007, the findings were written down in a Memorandum to the Polish Government. The section on human rights is based on this memorandum. 471 Judicial System One of the problems concerning human rights is the long duration of judicial proceedings. According to the Polish ombudsman (see also section 3.2.2 The Ombudsman), this is caused by the number of changes in the law system the country had to implement after 1989, mismanagement and the problem of ineffectiveness (see also section 3.1.5 on Common courts).472 In general, the length of the processes has hindered human rights protection, 473 since ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. 474 Cases relating to the length of procedures continue to be brought before the European Court of Human Rights.475 For example, in 2010 it considered 37 cases, which counted for 35 % of the total number of judgements of the ECtHR. 476 Therefore, reforms are still needed. 477 Furthermore, the Commissioner for Human Rights calls for improvement of the dissemination of the ECtHR case law.478 This was also stated by some at the Conference on Effective Criminal Defence on 4 April 2011. It was called for more interaction between Polish judges and judges of the ECtHR, more follow up by Polish judges of judgments of the ECtHR, more use of provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and more human rights training for Polish judges.479 Police and Secret Service In 2006, the Commissioner for Human Rights found that there were many reports of police violence. Furthermore, it appeared that the number of prosecutions is extremely low in comparison to the number of reports of ill-treatment. Between 2003 and 2006, 3646 reports were made, but there was not one single conviction. In practice, it appeared to be very difficult to prosecute police officers.480 Another issue concerns the secret service and the right to privacy. In its 2009 report, the ombudsman mentions that the secret service has been tapping telephone conversations too 471

Unless indicated otherwise, the section on Human Rights is based on the Council of Europe Memorandum to the Polish Government (2007). Retrieved 3 March 2011 from https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155005&Site=COE. 472 Interview C7. 473 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 6. 474 Interview C7. 475 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 14-15. 476 Council of Europe. (2010). Violations by Article and by country. Retrieved 18 May 2011 from http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/596C7B5C-3FFB-4874-85D8F12E8F67C136/0/TABLEAU_VIOLATIONS_2010_EN.pdf. 477 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 16. 478 Ibid., par. 19. 479 Visited conference on Effective Criminal Defence 4 April 2011, Law Faculty Human Rights Department of the University of saw. 480 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 20-22.

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often without informing the persons considered. Moreover, it is mentioned that ‘the information obtained from tapping which does not include evidence allowing initiating the criminal proceedings, is not always destroyed’. According to the ombudsman, the reason for this is the lack of relevant provisions in the acts regulating the functioning of secret services.481 This issue is also mentioned by the Bar Council Association. Private data, such as billings of mobile phones, money retreat, tapped phone calls, etc. of people with professions of public trust, e.g. lawyers, doctors, journalists, are gathered by the secret service. These data are not very well protected and it is used by the police, not only in criminal procedures, but also in order to start a procedure by information achieved this way. 482 Prisons, Pre-Trial Detention and Access to a Lawyer A very important issue is the overcrowding in prisons. In February 2011 the overcrowding of detention centres and prisons combined was 102.7 %.483 The areas the prisoners lived in were smaller than 3m2 (the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture has recommended a minimum of 4m2). Cases of degrading conditions of detention are brought before both national courts and the ECtHR.484 According to the ombudsman there is a gradual decrease in overcrowding. However, ‘as a result of the authorities’ efforts to maintain a low population ratio, the number of convicted persons awaiting prison sentences imposed by courts amounts to as many as 34.5 thousand persons, including 30 thousand persons whose deadline to appear to serve a sentence has expired (as of January 2010)’.485 According to the Commissioner for Human Rights, the solution for overcrowding will be part of an overall reform of the justice system. Also, Poland needs to consider building more prisons and instituting alternative penalties. 486 Other issues with regard to prisons the ombudsman mentioned are poor living conditions, difficulties in providing appropriate healthcare and violation of right to privacy487 (see also section 3.3.3 on Prisons). Furthermore, the long duration of pre-trial detention is a problem. While the average duration of pre-trial detention in Poland is five and a half months (the European average is five months),488 cases have been brought before the ECtHR where pre-trial detention has lasted four to six years.489 Although Polish law stipulates a maximum period of pre-trial detention, this is only relevant for the pre-trial and first trial stage. During an appeals procedure, the possibility of further extensions is not limited. 490 Although for the last several years the number of persons detained on remand in Poland has been decreasing, 491 numbers 481 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.rpo.gov.pl/pliki/12865321660.pdf. pp. 69-70. 482 Interview C4. 483 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 21. 484 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 34. 485 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 22. 486 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 30 and 35. 487 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, pp. 22-23. 488 Ibid., p. 20. 489 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 36. 490 A.M. van Kalmthout, M.M. Knapen and C. Morgenstern eds., Pre-trial Detention in the European Union: An Analysis of Minimum Standards in Pre-trial Detention and the Grounds for Regular Review in the Member States of the EU, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2009, p. 733. 491 In Poland, at the end of 2000 there were 22 032 persons detained on remand. At the end of January 2010 it amounted to 9498 persons. Source: Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 20.

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are still high. It is stated that the long duration of pre-trial detention is caused by a focus on detention on remand rather than on release because of fear that the detainee might do harm. Furthermore, the problem of prolonging pre-trial detention is part of the above mentioned general problem of long duration of judicial proceedings.492 Another issue is access to a lawyer. It is stated that officially appointed lawyers rarely visit detainees in prison, and often the lawyer has a lack of knowledge on the situation of the client.493 According to NGOs and lawyers, appointed lawyers are very poorly remunerated, which may account for their lack of making prison visits. 494 Furthermore, a number of cases have brought before the ECtHR in which routine interference and censorship of detainees’ correspondence with lawyers has taken place. 495 According to the Ministry of Justice, an analysis ‘indicates that the censorship is connected with improper conduct during the sorting of mail’. 496 Tolerance and Non-Discrimination In 2007, the EU Racial Equality and Employment Equality directives were largely implemented. There are areas in which the Polish legislation goes beyond the requirements of the directives. However, in the 2007 Memorandum ‘[t]he Commissioner noted that Poland had little anti-discrimination legislation in areas such as housing, contractual relations, and access to public places’.497 Also, there was no covering of discriminations concerning goods and services. 498 In 2010, Poland was summoned to appear before the ECJ because Poland had not implemented EU-law on discrimination on the ground of sex. 499 According to the Helsinki Foundation, Poland has adopted the EU-directive on anti-discrimination, but not the horizontal legislation. It is stated that only selective provisions have been chosen to implement, which shows that the government has no active policy toward discrimination. The Helsinki Foundation is of the opinion that Poland has only implemented the directive because of fear of financial penalties from Europe, and because of the coming Polish presidency of the EU. 500 In spite of the stipulations in the directive, Poland did not create a single specialised and independent body with the exclusive aim of promoting equal treatment of all persons. The ombudsman is the institution with the strongest instruments to intervene in cases of discrimination. However, according to the memorandum, the ombudsman is active in a number of different areas and cannot solely concentrate on discrimination issues by for example research and training programmes. 501 Sexual Orientation According to the 2007 Memorandum, the situation for LGBTs (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people) in Poland had worsened.502 According to the Helsinki Foundation, 492

Ibid., p 21. Visited conference on Effective Criminal Defence 4 April 2011, Law Faculty Human Rights Department of the University of Warsaw. 494 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 41. 495 Ibid., par. 42. 496 Ibid. 497 Ibid., par. 44. 498 Ibid., par. 44-45. 499 Amnesty International. Yearbook 2010. Retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://www.amnesty.nl/documenten/jaarboek/2010_entries.pdf#page=210. p. 210 500 Interview C6. 501 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 47-49. 502 Ibid., par. 51. 493

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LGBTs are in a difficult position because of the negative attitude of the church, political parties, and society towards them. 503 The Commissioner for Human Rights was especially concerned about homophobic statements made by leading public figures. 504 However, in its commentary, the government rejects this assertion by stating that in the last twenty years, the ombudsman had only received three complaints concerning violations of rights due to sexual orientation.505 The Helsinki Foundation argues that there are not many issues raised before the court, because homosexuals are afraid of their identity being exposed; not because they do not experience discrimination or harassment.506 In 2006, the anti-discrimination handbook of the Council of Europe on human rights for young people was withdrawn by the Ministry of Education and the minister was dismissed because of a chapter on homosexuality. The right wing government regarded this chapter as promotion of homosexuality and this topic should not be discussed at schools, the Secretary of State explained. Instead, homosexuality was explained in a very negative way in a publication Wygrajmy Młodość (Let’s Win Youth),507 which the government considered suitable for the education of young teenagers.508 In its commentary, the Ministry of National Education ‘upholds its position concerning the statement in the publication Let’s Win Youth that homosexuality is an unnatural inclination’. Also, the government is ‘surprised that the Commissioner takes issue with the assertion that persons displaying homosexual tendencies should be shown particular care and assistance in fighting the problem. Polish society has Christian roots and it adheres to the relevant values’. Therefore, the Commissioner should not ‘expect praise in our society for inclinations other than those stemming from natural law’. According to the government ‘[t]he Commissioner’s assessment of the situation of sexual minorities in Poland is not based on fact. It is a political position that interferes in Poland’s internal affairs’.509 Besides the attitude of the government, the media are also negative towards LGBTs. According to the Helsinki Foundation, Polish media publish about gay issues in a tabloid manner. The foundation thinks that, in a cultural way, homosexuals are considered to be the enemies of the Roman Catholic and nationalist society.510 Despite all this, the Helsinki Foundation states that times have changed and compared to 2004-2006 there is more tolerance. The foundation mentions that recently someone from the political party Civic Platform was dismissed from the party because of making jokes about homosexuals, while three year ago this would not have been cause for commotion. Also, the left party is now openly supporting homosexuals and has submitted a same-sex partnership law initiative. Furthermore, since 2005, the Gay pride has not been banned. 511

503

Interview C6. Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 51. 505 Ibid. 506 Interview C6. 507 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 53-54. 508 International Commission of Jurists. (2007). Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Human Rights Law: Jurisprudential, Legislative and Doctrinal References from the Council of Europe and the European Union. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://www.icj.org/dwn/img_prd/sogi-europeancompilation.pdf. p. 168. 509 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 54-56. 510 Interview C6. 511 Ibid. 504

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National and Ethnic Minorities The national and ethnic minorities which are recognised by the state512 are protected by the National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages Act. Article 1 says: ‘The Act regulates issues connected with the preservation and development of the cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities, the preservation and development of the regional language, as well as ways to implement the principle of equal treatment irrespective of a person's ethnic origin. It also specifies the tasks and responsibilities of governmental administration bodies and territorial self–government units regarding these issues.’ (see also section 2.1.1 The People). There are special programmes for the Roma community, particular in the field of education, employment, health and housing. However, in 2006 the ombudsman for Children reported that there were irregularities in the education of Roma children. At that time, 25 of the 35 Roma children in Kłodzko attended special schools for disabled children, because of their lack of language skills, and because their health and development were suffering from parental neglect.513 In its commentary, the government explains that the situation with the Roma in Kłodzko is exceptional, and a characteristic of a part of the community of the Carpathian Roma in southern Poland, especially in rural areas and post-industrial towns. 514 In its 2009 Report, the ombudsman stated that the institute continued field studies connected with ensuring Roma children access to public schools. After visitations, it appeared that local authorities take steps to ensure Roma children proper access to education free of discrimination.515 Apart from the problems considering access to public education, many Roma in Poland still suffer from exclusion and face difficult living conditions. In 2006 NGOs reported that occasionally they are targets of racially motivated violence. 516 According to the Helsinki Foundation the problem is relatively small because in Poland Roma live only in certain small areas.517 According to the Helsinki Foundation, the problem is larger with inflow of new people than with national and ethnic minorities traditionally residing in Poland. This is because there is no strong, coherent immigration policy in Poland. Also people tend to live in their own circles. According to the foundation, the government is not discriminating, but not doing enough on the recognition or status of immigrants and refugees. 518 This issue will be dealt with in the next section. Immigrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers In 2007 the Commissioner on Human Rights stated that the Polish authorities have ‘to improve access to information, legal assistance and education for those […] residing in reception centres’. Also, the Commissioner urged ‘the authorities to ensure that those also granted a permit to tolerated stay do benefit from measures leading to a proper and effective

512

The following minorities are considered national minorities: Belarussian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, Jewish. The following minorities are considered ethnic minorities: Karaites, Lemkos, Roma, Tatars. Source: the National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages Act, 6 January 2005. 513 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 68-71. 514 Ibid., commentary to par. 71 and 73. 515 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 121. 516 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 72. 517 Interview C6. 518 Ibid.

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integration into Polish society’. 519 (see also section 4.6 Asylum and Migration Policy). The NGO Caritas mentions certain aspects which stand in the way of proper integration of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Firstly, in Poland refugees are placed in declining towns or the countryside where there is no labour market for refugees. This creates problems of aggression and crime. Secondly, there is only limited psychological and social assistance for asylum seekers and immigrants. Thirdly, there is little action towards temporary immigration, e.g. seasonal workers. People can be travelling back and forth for years without receiving any integration assistance. According to Caritas, these people are easily exploited. Fourthly, institutions like job centres are not prepared to deal with immigrants and there is no place for non-Polish speakers at the labour market. Lastly, a discrimination test recently done by Caritas showed the existence of quite some discrimination (e.g. the difference in entrance policy when two ‘white’ persons or two ‘black’ persons entered a club). A discrimination test on CVs did not really show discrimination. Caritas holds the opinion that the bureaucracy on receiving a residence permit for foreigners is improving.520 Trafficking in Human Beings Considering trafficking in human beings, Poland has a ‘triple role’ as country of origin, country of transit and country of destination. Trafficking in human beings has involved mostly sexual exploitation of women. At the beginning of the 1990s Poland was mainly the country of origin of these women, which were trafficked to Western Europe. 521 After accession to both the EU and the Schengen zone, Poland became the country of destination for women from the former USSR countries, southern en western Europe, Africa and Asia. 522 Recently, trafficking in human beings includes also forced labour, criminal activity, organs, and children.523 In combating trafficking in human beings, amongst others, Poland has ratified the United Nations (UN) Protocol on Preventing Trafficking in Persons of 2000,524 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005. In addition, Poland is obliged by EU directives on combating trafficking in human beings. 525 Furthermore, Polish Criminal Code makes it possible to punish perpetrators of trafficking. The law on domestic violence is also applicable in human trafficking cases. Next, Poland has a comprehensive law on trafficking in human organs, which, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, is a welcome development in ensuring that all forms of human trafficking are criminalised.526 However, in 2009 the Rapporteur noted that there were other steps Poland should take to effectively address human trafficking. This concerned the lack of a clear definition of trafficking in its criminal law, rising labour exploitation, and limited availability and access to 519

Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 105. Interview G1. 521 UN GIFT. National Action Plan Against Trafficking In Human Beings for 2009-2010. Retrieved 4 June 2011from http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgehub/resourcecentre/Governments/Poland_National_Action_Plan_Against_Trafficking_en_2009_2010.pdf. p. 1. 522 Ibid., p. 61. 523 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 524 UN News Centre. (29 May 2009). Poland becoming transit, destination country for human trafficking - UN expert. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30961&Cr=human+trafficking&Cr1. 525 UN GIFT. National Action Plan Against Trafficking In Human Beings for 2009-2010, pp. 2-3. 526 UN News Centre. (29 May 2009). Poland becoming transit, destination country for human trafficking - UN expert. 520

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assistance for victims of trafficking. ‘Additionally, judicial proceedings for trafficking cases are unduly long, lasting two years on average.’527 Reproductive Rights One of the cases frequently brought before the ECtHR is the denial of the women’s reproductive rights. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women commented in 2007 that it had concerns regarding ‘the unavailability of termination of pregnancy in practice’. This causes a high number of illegal terminations according to the Ministry of Health, and a dramatically higher number according to NGOs. 528 The Polish law on termination of pregnancy is restrictive. It permits a termination under three conditions: if the pregnancy endangers the mother’s life or health, if the foetus is damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening disease, or if there are strong grounds to believe the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act. According to NGOs, in reality doctors are hesitant to perform terminations on these grounds and refuse to issue the certificate required for termination of a pregnancy (relying on the ‘conscience clause’). In addition, doctors are allowed to question the validity of the certificate and refuse the service. This decision cannot be appealed. 529 In its commentary, the Polish government argues that the Minister of Health ‘sent written instructions to the [voivodeships] concerning the obligation to rigorously implement the provisions of the cited law’ in 2003 and 2005. Furthermore, since 2005 the Regulation on the general conditions of contracts for the provision of health services regulates the event of the conscience clause being invoked. The doctor who refuses to perform the abortion ‘is obligated to indicate a realistic possibility of the abortion being performed in another facility’.530 The ECtHR noted in the case Tysiąc v. Poland (2005) that ‘once the legislature had decided to allow a termination of pregnancy, it must not structure its legal framework in such a way as to limit the use of that possibility’. Furthermore, ‘it should ensure some form of procedure before an independent and competent body [which issues] prompt and written grounds for its decision’. 531 However, in its commentary, the government states that the national obstetrics and gynaecology consultant and the Patients Rights Bureau attached to the Ministry of Health did not receive any reports or complaints concerning refusals to abortion compatible with the law.532 Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Media The Penal Code makes it an offence to insult i.a. the Polish nation (art. 133), the president (art. 135, sub. 2), foreign (art. 136, sub. 3) and public officials (art. 226). The penalty for defamation and insult is imprisonment, which is said to be is contrary to the constitution and the freedom of speech.533 Therefore, in 2002, the Commissioner for Human Rights recommended a legislative reform by abolishing the provisions that make this offence punishable by prison sentence. Nevertheless, the Polish Constitutional Court found that the provision was not unlawful from the point of view of the Polish constitution. 534 Furthermore, 527

Ibid. Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 97. 529 Ibid., par. 92-95. 530 Ibid., par. 93-95. 531 Ibid., par. 96. 532 Ibid., commentary to par. 95. 533 Interviews C6 and C4. 534 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 115-116. 528

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according to the Ministry of Justice, public prosecutions against journalists did not result in any indictments and very rarely prison sentence has been passed. However, these prosecutions are still a burden to the judicial system, and even the possibility of starting legal proceedings is a breach of the principle of freedom of speech. Therefore, it has been suggested that this provision should be amended. 535 That the provision leads to strange situations is illustrated by a case which is pending before the court for more than three years. The case considers the former President Wałęsa calling former President Kaczyński an idiot (durak).536 Lustration A new Lustration Law came into force on 15 March 2007. It gives the power to the IPN to issue a certificate of collaboration or non-collaboration with the former communist security organs. Furthermore, the IPN handles the disclosure of documents of the state security bodies from the period 1944-1990.537 The vetting office of the IPN receives vetting declarations of persons who are currently serving or seeking public functions. These declarations are verified by the vetting office. Because the aim of the Lustration Law is transparency, there are no sanctions when someone declares that he or she has been collaborating with the communist security organs. Only in case of doubts with regard to the truthfulness of the declaration, proceedings before criminal courts are started. 538 However, collaboration is not treated as a criminal offence539 and the lustration court does not use penal code punishments. Also when a person lied, he or she can still act as public official. Nevertheless, the court sometimes declares that this person cannot act in highest public functions and imposes a ban for three to ten years.540 Next to the vetting declarations, the vetting office prepares and publishes catalogues containing personal data and information of people who were noted as collaborating with the security organs. 541 Furthermore the office prepares and publishes a catalogue of persons of whom documents have been preserved which state they were under surveillance of the communist security organs.542 In the beginning, there were many concerns about the new Lustration Law. For example, in the 2007 memorandum the Commissioner of Human Rights reiterated concerns about the scope of applicability of lustration, which was considerably widened. 543 In addition to all public officials, many other professions are now included within the scope of the vetting procedure, people who might not be a direct threat to democracy today. 544 Also, there were

535

Interview C6. Ibid. 537 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 119. Official website of the Vetting Office. Retrieved 7 March 2011 from http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=en&dzial=45&id=234. 538 Ibid. 539 However, recently the Supreme Court stated that the lustration process is not a criminal proceeding, but the Constitutional Court stated the contrary. Source: Interviews C9 and C7. 540 Interviews C9 and C7. 541 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 122. 542 The catalogue is available at http://katalog.bip. ipn.gov.pl/. 543 According to the IPN, under the rule of the previous lustration law, approximately 40 to 50 thousand people were included within the scope of the vetting procedure. Under the new law, the estimation is 300 thousand people. Although the scope of persons subjugated to vetting obligation has widened, not all public officials are obliged. Exceptions are e.g. lower officials and people born after 1 August 1972. Source: Interview C7. 544 E.g. academics, journalists, and members of bodies of commercial companies, chartered accountants, and tax advisors. 536

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concerns about the authority of the IPN to publish lists of people who at any time were noted as collaborating with the communist security organs, because this does not require any act or declaration by the persons concerned. An additional matter of concern is that these people may be denied access to their documents. 545 Besides the above mentioned concerns, the ‘Human Rights and Settlements with the Past Programme Information Bulletin’ of the Helsinki Foundation mentions i.a. ‘the limitation of access to the IPN files for journalists and academics on the basis of an arbitrary decision of the director of the IPN’; a too broad and imprecise definitions of ‘state security forces’ and of ‘collaboration’; and the penalty of loss of public office and a ten year ban on serving any public office as a result of submission of a false statement in one’s lustration declaration. 546 In 2007, challenges about this law were brought before the Constitutional Court by a group of Members of Parliament and the ombudsman, 547 as a result of which certain provisions of the law were ruled by the court as being unconstitutional. These provisions lost their binding force.548 The ECtHR has also made several judgements of a breach of article 6 of the ECHR; on the right to a fair trial, effective defence and the equality of arms principle. It concerned the problem of limited access to a person’s own file. This causes a disadvantage in knowledge for this person when standing before the court.549 In 2009 the Polish Supreme Court reopened a vetting case after an ECtHR judgement for the first time. 550 Currently, according to some, the problem concerning the lustration law and breach of human rights still regards the matter of respect for private life 551 and right to fair trial. 552 Another problem indicated is the fact that district courts are also lustration courts. It is said that these courts are not prepared enough for this task.553 In addition, the problem of long duration of judicial proceedings (as mentioned in section 3.2.1 on the Judicial System) is applicable here. According to the ombudsman, considering lustration, people sometimes have to wait for their trial for more than a year.554 Furthermore, there is still a problem with the wide scope of persons subjugated to vetting obligation. 555 However, according to the IPN, the parliament who passed this law decided that the previous law did not include everybody functioning in a public post. Furthermore, article 61 of the Polish constitution states that everybody has the right to have information about people in public functions. There is no definition of such function and therefore the scope is quite broad. According to the IPN, it is the public opinion that, although these people might not be a threat to democracy today, it is in the interest of the society to Source: Helsinki Foundation. (2008). Human Rights and Settlements with the Past Programme Information Bulletin. Retrieved 18 May 2011 from http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/przeszlosc-rozliczenia/biuletyny/human-rightsand-settlements-with-the-past-program-information-bulletin-issue-i-2008.html. p. 3. 545 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 122 and 125. 546 Helsinki Foundation. (2008). Human Rights and Settlements with the Past Programme Information Bulletin, p. 3. 547 Ibid. 548 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 124. 549 Interview C9. 550 P.W. Osik, The Supreme Court reopened the vetting proceedings for the first time after the ECHR judgement (2 February 2010). Retrieved 22 May 2011 from http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/13376.html. Original version: rp. pl. P.W. Osik, Sąd Najwyższy wznowił proces lustracyjny (22 January 2010), http://www.rp. pl/artykul/423188.html. 551 However, according to the IPN, when someone decides to work as a public person it has to be taken into account that the right to privacy is limited. 552 Interview C9. 553 Ibid. 554 Interview C7. 555 Interview C9.

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know the past of these persons.556 In its commentary to the 2007 memorandum, the Polish government states that transparency of public life has to be ensured. Therefore, ‘lustration should not be restricted to persons performing public function sensu stricto’.557 According to the IPN, because of the larger number of persons subjugated to vetting obligation, the number of false lustrations is also higher.558 From 2008-2010, there were 27 judgments of ‘lustration lie’, and seven from January to April 2011. In these cases, most people were banned from public functions for three to four years. It considered i.a. Polish diplomats, mayors of small cities and presidents of cities. 559 According to the IPN people lie because they assume that there are no documents about their past. Indeed it is sometimes impossible to find proof. Therefore, the majority of cases end without judgments of ‘lustration lie’ because there is no evidence. 560 On the question how long the Lustration Law should exist, it is said that it is for the politicians to decide. Currently there is no political will to end the vetting process. It is expected to be a matter of time before lustration will become less important. 561 3.2.2 The Ombudsman The ombudsman, or the Human Rights Defender (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) as he (or she) is called in Poland, is the national human rights institution. The institute of the ombudsman is the constitutional authority for legal control and protection, and is independent from other state authorities. The ombudsman acts pursuant to the constitution and the Human Rights Defender Act of 15 July 1987. In Polens Rechtsstaat am Vorabend des EU-Beitritts, prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Zoll (ombudsman of the fourth term, 2000-2006) 562 thoroughly described the institute of the Polish ombudsman and its history.563 According to Zoll, World War II and the experiences with totalitarian systems showed that the guarantees for fundamental rights and human rights had been too weak; neither the parliament, nor the court had been able to limit state power. Therefore a system of control is necessary to intervene in state activity, if this activity infringes human rights.564 Next to a parliament and an independent judiciary, an institution which is non-formalised and freely accessible to the people is required. 565 Poland was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe where the ombudsman institution was established, 566 which was introduced as early as 1987.567 The introduction of the ombudsman was one of the concessions of the communist regime to the opposition movement. Although the regime intended it to be a symbolic institution, the ombudsman

556

Interview C7. Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, par. 125. 558 Interview C7. 559 Ibid. 560 Ibid. 561 Interviews C9 and C7. 562 Human Rights Defender. List of Defenders. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.brpo.gov.pl/index.php?md=8548&s=3. 563 A. Zoll, ‘Der Bürgerrechtsbeauftragte als ein Verfassungorgan in der Republik Polen’, in: C.D. Classen, H. Heiss and A. Suprón-Heidel eds., Polens Rechtsstaat am Vorabend des EU-Beitritts, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2004, pp. 35-44. 564 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 565 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 566 E. Finkel, Defending Rights, Promoting Democracy: The Institution of Ombudsman in Poland, Russia and Bulgaria. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/finkel.pdf. p. 17. 567 Human Rights Defender. List of Defenders. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.brpo.gov.pl/index.php?md=8548&s=3. 557

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received thousands of complaints with which she started to push against the regime. 568 Of course, the ombudsman could function more properly after 1989.569 In order to emphasise his independence, the ombudsman is appointed by the Sejm and approved by the Senate for a five-year term of office, which is longer than the single term of both houses. Furthermore, the same person cannot hold the office more than twice. In addition, the ombudsman is not allowed to be member of a political party or trade union, and is not allowed to hold other positions or exercise other professions, with the exception of university professor.570 In order to fulfil its task, the ombudsman investigates whether actions undertaken or abandoned by entities, organisations or institutions obliged to observe and implement human and citizen rights and freedoms have not led to infringement of the law or the principles of social coexistence and justice. If such infringement is found, the ombudsman can undertake appropriate measures. 571 Therefore, he is competent to have access to the files of bodies of the executive power, as well as the prison service, refugee camps, children’s homes, etc. 572 Furthermore, the ombudsman can apply to, or lodge a complaint with the administrative court, the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court; and declare his participation in constitutional complaint proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. 573 According to Zoll, in comparison with other European countries, the Polish ombudsman has a very strong position. In the Constitution of 1997 it is regulated that everyone who feels his fundamental right or freedom is violated may apply to the ombudsman, only should the right or freedom breached be statutory. There are no restrictions to this: everybody under Polish authorities’ control, hence also a third country citizen, has access to the ombudsman. Furthermore, collective subjects – with or without legal personality – as well as self-administrative bodies such as communities which complain about failure of the central government may apply to the ombudsman. Moreover, it is not possible for any (new) legislation to limit access to the ombudsman, neither can the secret service and the police or asylum seekers procedures limit this right.574 An additional task was provided for in 2000 by an amendment of the Human Rights Defender Act. This provided for the cooperation between the ombudsman and civil organisations.575 It means that the ombudsman contributes to the development of the civil society. According to Zoll, it was meant to make up for the suffered losses of the civil society during communist times, and to prepare Poland institutionally and the Polish citizens mentally for the accession to the EU. However, Zoll argues that the contribution of the ombudsman to the civil society could be a political activity, which might not be desirable for an independent institute.576

568

Interview D5. A. Zoll, ‘Der Bürgerrechtsbeauftragte als ein Verfassungorgan in der Republik Polen’, pp. 38-39. 570 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 571 Human Rights Defender. The Defender. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.brpo.gov.pl/index.php?md=1369&s=3. 572 A. Zoll, ‘Der Bürgerrechtsbeauftragte als ein Verfassungorgan in der Republik Polen’, p. 42. 573 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p 8. 574 A. Zoll, ‘Der Bürgerrechtsbeauftragte als ein Verfassungorgan in der Republik Polen’, p. 39. 575 For example, on 10 February 2011, the Panoptykon Foundation organised a debate in Brussels under the auspices of Polish ombudsman, prof. dr. hab. Irena Lipowicz, on internet freedom. Source: EDRI-gram. (23 February 2011). Polish Civil Society Stirs Up Debate On Internet Freedom. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.4/polish-debate-internet-blocking. 576 A. Zoll, ‘Der Bürgerrechtsbeauftragte als ein Verfassungorgan in der Republik Polen’, pp. 43-44. 569

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Table 2: Type of Cases.577 In 2009, the ombudsman received 65 208 cases. Among the 37 069 complaints examined by the ombudsman, the majority falls mainly within the scope of the following areas: Number % Penal law 7728 20.8 Labour law and social security 5257 14.2 Civil law and real property management 4959 13.4 Executive penal law 4295 11.6 Administrative law and housing issues 3374 9.1 Commercial law, public tributes, 3067 8.3 protection of consumer rights Other 8389 22.6 Source: Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009. Zoll stated that new challenges for the ombudsman are economic entities which threaten fundamental rights and freedoms, for example a large chain of supermarkets which violates labour rights.578 Currently, a large number of complaints before the ombudsman are from prisoners complaining about their treatment. Therefore, additional law of 2008 provided for the ombudsman to visit prisons to see if prisoner’s rights are safeguarded. Another extra task was created in 2011 in the framework of the equality directive. The ombudsman is a party in safeguarding implementation of the directive and analyses and monitors equality matters. Current priorities for the ombudsman are the protection of the rights of disabled persons (the ombudsman institute indicates a lot has to be done on this subject, for example Poland has not ratified the UN disability convention), elderly people, LGBTs and migrants. According to the ombudsman institute, there are not many cases (less than 50 per year) by migrants and asylum seekers. However, this is due to underreporting, since these people might be afraid of public authorities. In addition, the ombudsman also participates in the creation of EU directives and its implementation. For example, the participation in the recent initiatives to fight children pornography and its conflict with media freedom and right to privacy. Another example is the forthcoming amendment on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC). Because in the light of a new Directive it might appear that the current competences of the Polish’ secret service are too broad, which also causes a conflict with the right to privacy. 579 The Ombudsman and the Eastern European Partnership In 2009 the Polish and French ombudsmen initiated a cooperation plan between ombudsman institutes from Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, for the period of 2009-2013. The cooperation plan included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 580 According to the Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009 the cooperation plan ‘perfectly matches the assumptions and objectives of the European Eastern Partnership, i.e. the plan to strengthen the cooperation of the European Union with its eastern neighbours in order to support democratic changes as well as the promotion of the

577

Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 135. 578 Ibid., p. 44. 579 Interview C7. 580 Human Rights Defender. (2009). A Co-operation between Ombudsmen from Eastern Partnership (EP) Countries, 2009-2013. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.rpo.gov.pl/pliki/12659746020.pdf. p. 2.

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concept of human rights and civil society’. 581 Furthermore, the cooperation plan proposes to increase the ability of ombudsman institutions in those countries ‘to participate in building democratic states based on the rule of law and provides for support for judiciary institutions, nongovernmental organisations and national preventive mechanisms, as well as strengthening the freedom of speech and free media in the Eastern countries’.582 3.2.3 Corruption The Copenhagen criteria require that the candidate country guarantees the rule of law. Therefore, elimination of corruption was an important condition for EU membership of Poland. In this chapter, first the remarks of the European Commission on corruption before Poland’s accession to the EU are mentioned. Second, Poland’s score on the Corruption Perceptions Index is outlined. Third, a research is described which searched for an explanation for the high perception of corruption. Finally, the current situation regarding corruption is set out. Commission Report on Poland’s Preparations for Membership The Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland’s preparations for Membership of 2003 583 states that ‘[c]orruption is perceived to be increasing from an already relatively high level in Poland. It is considered to affect all spheres of public life. There has been very little progress in combating corruption, and the existing perception has been borne out in various highprofile corruption cases recently’. The number of public officials found guilty of corruption had remained stable, but an improvement was noted with regard to political accountability for corruption offences. In addition, ‘several corrupt politicians were dismissed immediately after the media revealed their offences, while similar events in the past went unsanctioned’. Furthermore, greater transparency was reached in financing of political parties. However, there were ‘some built-in loopholes’ in this law. ‘In particular, a provision allowing the creation of foundations that can employ party personnel and be sponsored by private companies makes it possible to create an alternative and non-transparent financial construction that is not subject to control.’ Implementation of provisions of a law aimed at counteracting high-level corruption, the Act on the Execution of Duties of Deputies and Senators of August 2001, needed to be improved. Also, there was no follow-up or implementation of several internal amendments and motions, and external recommendations.584 Corruption Perceptions Index According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2010, Poland has a score of 5.3 on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) and is therewith ranked 41 of all 178 included countries. In table 3 it is shown that the perception of corruption differed from the years 1996 to 2010. A reason for this could be that corruption has indeed risen from 1996 to 2005 and after that declined again. However, it could also be that only the perception of corruption has risen and declined. As stated in the article ‘Why is corruption in Poland “a

581 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 12. 582 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 583 European Commission. (2003). Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland’s preparations for membership. Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf. pp. 16-17. 584 Ibid.

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serious cause for concern”?’585: ‘External moralising from institutions such as the EU may reduce corruption in Accession States while simultaneously increasing perceptions of it.’ 586 According to the Batory Foundation this indeed had been the case, but the score of 2010 comes close to reality. 587 According to the CPI, in 2005 Poland was the most corrupt country of the new East and Central European Member States. In table 4, however, it is shown that in 2010 Poland is not doing so bad compared to other new East and Central European EU countries and even older EU Member States.

585

C. McManus-Czubińska et al., ‘Why is corruption in Poland “a serious cause for concern”?’, Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 14, no. 2 (2004), pp. 107-132. 586 Ibid., p. 107. 587 Interview C11.

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Table 3: Corruption Perception Index in Poland Year

Score

Year

Score

2010

5.3

2002

4

2009

5

2001

4.1

2008

4.6

2000

4.1

2007

4.2

1999

4.2

2006

3.7

1998

4.6

2005

3.4

1997

5.1

2004

3.5

1996

5.6

2003

3.6

1995

x

Source: Transparency International.588

Table 4: Corruption Perceptions Index in the EU Country Greece Italy Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary

Score (2010) 3.5 3.9 3.6 4.6

Country

Score (2010)

Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania

4.3 5 5.3 3.7

6.5 4.7

Slovakia Slovenia

4.3 6.4

Source: Transparency Internationa.l589

588

Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 589 Ibid.

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The Perception of Corruption The fact that the society as a whole became less tolerant to corruption, as stated by the 2003 Commission Report (section 3.2.3 on Corruption - Commission Report on Poland’s preparations for Membership), is also argued by McManus-Czubińska et al. However, they state that because the Polish people have become less tolerant to corruption, due to internal moralising of the Polish people as well as external moralising by the EU, the perception of corruption is also high. 590 In their research they make use of the Polish National Election Survey of October 2001. Of the respondents, 72 % indicated that corruption is bad for the country and for those involved, and 26 % believes it is bad for the country, but unavoidable. 591 This shows that the tolerance of corruption is reasonably low. On the presence of corruption, 56 % of the respondents indicated that corruption was very widespread, and another 38 % that corruption was quite widespread. 592 Considering their experiences, 38 % indicated that usually they were treated fairly by officials, 37 % sometimes and 24 % rarely or never. In addition, 36 % indicated that more than rarely officials made unnecessary problems in order to get money or presents, 21% rarely, 43 % never. However, only 5 % indicated that an official actually asked for money or a present.593 Besides, 54 % indicated that they or their family never used connections in approaching an official, 75 % indicated that they never offered a small present and 90 % that they never offered money or an expensive present. 594 52 % indicated that they would refuse to pay, even if they could afford it.595 Strikingly, the research found that of people who indicate that their family income is not sufficient to survive on 75 % indicates that corruption is very widespread, against 40 % of the people who think their income is enough for a good standard of living. Of the former group, 66 % indicates they never used contacts. 84 % never used presents and 93 % never used bribes, against respectively 19 %, 59 %, and 74 % of the latter. So the ‘poor’ combined relatively high perceptions of corruption with relatively low experience of it.596 Moreover, 46 % of the respondents indicated that feelings about the behaviour of officials in Poland was based on what is heard from, or read in the media. 21 % indicated that this was based on gossiping, and 33 % on own experience. 597 Distrust of members of the Sejm was the highest. This was indicated both by those who thought they were usually fairly treated and by those who thought they were rarely fairly treated. 598 This research made it clear that there is a difference between corruption itself and the perception of corruption.599 Perceptions of corruption run behind experience of corruption. Also, different factors, such as income and education, are of influence on the perception of corruption. For example, poverty increases the perception of corruption, while decreasing the experience of it. According to this research, the same counts for corruption on government level. The experience of people with low-level corruption (local government offices) was higher than with high-level corruption (members of the Sejm). However, the perception of

590

C. McManus-Czubińska et al., ‘Why is corruption in Poland “a serious cause for concern”?’, p. 131. Ibid., p. 116. 592 Ibid., p. 110. 593 Ibid., p. 114. 594 Ibid., p. 115. 595 Ibid., p. 116. 596 Ibid., p. 120. 597 Ibid., p. 121. 598 Ibid., p. 128. 599 Ibid., p. 130.

591

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corruption of members of the Sejm (e.g. seen on television) influenced the perception of corruption more than real experiences with low-level corruption.600 Current Situation In National and international anti-corruption efforts: the case of Poland, 601 Gadowska states that the accession process of Poland to the EU has been of important influence in combating corruption, because it contributed to a faster and more effective implementation of anticorruption measures. Nevertheless, she indicates that ‘a portion of the actions undertaken had a fictional nature directed towards fulfilling the requirements of the European Commission rather than an actual fight with this phenomenon’.602 However, Gadowska states that the most important conventions on combating corruption are ratified by Poland.603 In addition, next to the conventions, ‘success in fighting corruption is largely based on the effectiveness of Polish institutions, which should realise anti-corruption policies’. 604 Gadowska mentions several institutions which are involved in combating corruption in Poland. For the public institutions, these are e.g. the police, several ministries, the Tax Inspection, the Polish Supreme Audit Office (NIK), and the Central Anticorruption Bureau (created by the politcal party PiS). 605 For the non-governmental organisations, these are e.g. Transparency International Poland, Stefan Batory Foundation, and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.606According to Gadowska, the activities of non-governmental organisations certainly contributed to make the Polish society aware to the problem of corruption. This resulted in a reduction of social tolerance for this phenomenon and a decrease in the intensity of corruption in the most recent years.607 According to the Batory Foundation, recently, people say there is no problem with corruption in Poland because of the history of developments in fighting corruption. During communism, corruption it was not an issue, even though the system was highly based on it. After communism, everything was possible. Economic developments and prosperity were very important, and ethics and transparency were not the first issues to think about. In the late 1990s, the public debate started and it became top priority. 608 In 2003 and 2004, when the former Communist Party was the leading party, there were some corruption scandals considering this party. Partly because of that, in 2005 the PiS party had won the elections. Their first fundamental issue was fighting corruption. However, according to the Batory Foundation, the methods they used were so controversial that people do not want to talk about corruption anymore. For example, one of the measures to fight corruption was the deployment of the secret police. It happened that innocent people were arrested in the middle of the night.609 The Batory Foundation says that for the parliamentary elections of 2011, corruption is not an issue at all.610 Nevertheless, corruption is still a problem. In 2000 the Batory Foundation started the Anti-Corruption Program. Every year they held a survey on corruption. In 2000, 30 % said they personally were involved in corruption. In 2009, it was 7 %. However, both in 2000 and 600

Ibid., p. 131. K. Gadowska, ‘National and international anti-corruption efforts: the case of Poland’, Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 2 (2010), pp. 178-209. 602 Ibid., p. 192. 603 Ibid., p. 182. 604 Ibid., p. 192. 605 Ibid., p. 193. 606 Ibid. 607 Ibid., p. 198. 608 Interview C11. 609 Ibid. 610 Ibid. 601

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2009 there was a ‘secret question’ which was destroyed after the respondent filled in ‘yes’ or ‘no’. There were two questions, and one of them would be submitted: one question about involvement in corruption, and one question like: ‘were you born in January?’. Statistically it was possible to derive how many had answered ‘yes’ on the corruption question. In 2000 it was 52 %, and in 2009 48 %. So this is considered to be the real outcome telling there is not much progress.611 In the 1990s, administrative and street level corruption was widely spread. Now, corruption of the street police has decreased much. For example, when driving too fast, there is made use of photo radar. There is no more direct communication and cash money involved. Nowadays, corruption is mostly present in three areas: public procurement tenders, the health system, and the process of establishing legislation. Firstly, considering public procurement tenders, one of the reasons for corruption is the involvement of big contracts, a lot of money, and big competition of many companies. They try to persuade the commission to select them. The level of corruption is probably highest in this area when it comes to the money that is involved. The World Bank on corruption found that 10 % of the contracts’ money goes to bribery. 612 Secondly, in individual cases, the health system knows the highest level of corruption.613 There is corruption in relations between patients and doctors, and doctors and pharmaceutical companies. According to the Batory Foundation, the health system is spoiled by corruption, but because it fits people in high positions, there are no real incentives to change. Most people with money go to private clinics to avoid waiting lists. However, when it comes to a surgery or serious illness, also for richer people, the private clinics are too expensive. The Polish Doctors’ association agreed now that it is forbidden to receive presents before the treatment and that this is not forbidden afterwards (in the penal code this is also forbidden). A reason for corruption is that doctors’ salaries used to be very low. Even though the salaries are now higher, doctors still work in two or three other places in order to earn enough money. 614 Lastly, the process of establishing legislation is influenced by non-transparent and secretly operating ‘lobbyists’. Corruption scandals have been related to the process of preparing new legislation. It causes slow and delayed changes. 615 The Batory Foundation states there is a difference between generations: for the health system, older people give presents as they do not see this as corruption. Young people are more involved in corruption in public procurement tenders. The foundation has made a profile: the corrupt person is a well educated 30-40 year old male, wealthy, and owner of a business company.616 According to the Batory Foundation, there is no stress on the prevention of corruption and there is no political wish for a strategy against it. There is no single institution that is responsible for implementing this and there is no money for that. In addition, there is no public discussion on how to fight corruption and there are no research journalists at the moment. Currently, it is only about the fight against existing corruption which is based on police type activities and investigation, special sections and investigating offices. 617

611

Ibid. Ibid. 613 Ibid. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid. 612

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During the accession process of Poland to the EU, corruption was always an issue. In that light, combating corruption was mostly a matter of legal changes. According to the Batory Foundation, now Poland has a much stricter law on corruption than other EU countries. Almost everything which might lead to corruption is forbidden and banished by law. Implementation of this law is becoming stricter, there is progress in changing the legal system and also in attitude towards corrupt cases. However, the Batory Foundation states the problem with corruption in general is a matter of culture (not recognising corruption as such), a lack of dialogue on ethics, and lack of a mechanism of preventing corruption. 618 Box 2: Philips and Corruption Technology company Philips is involved in a corruption scandal in Poland. It is said that bribes have been paid in connection with the sale of medical equipment. Dealers of Philips’ equipment would have paid an amount of three million zloty (€ 760 000) on bribes to 16 different hospital directors.619 In exchange for that, the hospital would change technical requirements of its tenders so that only Philips could win. This was reported first in 2007 to the Polish Public Prosecutor by a whistleblower. 620 Philips disclosed in its 2010 Annual Report that the company was accused of corruption and that Philips was reviewing possible criminal activity by former employees.621 23 Poles, including three former directors of Philips Electronics Poland, are reportedly to stand trial in Katowice in July 2011. The Polish prosecutor suspects Philips of setting up a special ‘bribe fund’. 622 3.2.4 Legal Aid This section studies the legal aid system in Poland. First, the section discusses general provisions on legal assistance which are applicable to all EU Member States. Second, the legal aid system in Poland is briefly elaborated on, including the contemporary discussion regarding the insufficient protection of the right to legal aid. Specifically, the problem of not having a system of legal aid before court proceedings start is discussed. Legal Aid in the EU According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the ECHR of the Council of Europe to which all EU Member States are bound, every person has the right to a fair trial, including the right to legal assistance. Article 6.3 (c) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that ‘[everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right] to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when interests of justice so require’.623 Although this provision seems to deal solely with criminal cases and does not provide for a right to free legal assistance in civil cases, with its jurisdiction in the case of Airey v. Ireland (1979) the ECtHR has extended this provision to civil cases as well when effective access to court is proven indispensible. 624 As follows from the above cited treaty, every EU citizen has the right to legal assistance. This means that if one does not have sufficient financial means at his or her 618

Ibid. ‘Philips vreest boetes voor corruptie Polen’, in: NRC Next, 18 May 2011, p. 12. 620 NOS. G. Dennekamp and M. Bessems, Philips in Polen verdacht van omkoping (17 May 2011). Retrieved 26 May 2011 from http://nos.nl/artikel/241026-philips-in-polen-verdacht-van-omkoping.html. 621 Ibid. 622 Ibid. 623 ECtHR, Article 6.3(c). 624 ECtHR case of Airey v. Ireland, application no. 6289/73. 619

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disposal to pay for that legal assistance and the interests of justice so demand, one may claim that assistance from the state. All EU Member States are obliged to take measures to ensure legal assistance is given. Legal Aid in Poland Legal aid can be divided into two categories. First, legal aid in daily matters or in the pre-trial stage (before a proceeding is started) and second, legal aid in the course of court proceedings. In Poland, the former type of legal aid (‘pre-trial legal aid’) is not covered by any system, while the latter type is reasonably well-organised through several legal acts and the system of ex officio representation (on the basis of an appointment by the court or bar).When ex officio representation is provided, the costs of the representation are covered by the State Treasury.625 The Polish constitution does not contain provisions on legal aid in civil cases, it does, however, with respect to legal assistance in criminal cases. According to the Polish constitution ‘anyone against whom criminal proceedings have been brought shall have the right to defence at all stages of such proceedings. He may, in particular, choose counsel or avail himself - in accordance with principles specified by statute - of counsel appointed by the court’.626 Ex officio legal aid can be granted in three cases: when the court decides this is needed, when the accused applies for it and the court approves this application and when representation is mandatory. In criminal cases, representation is mandatory before the lower courts when the cases are connected with proceedings which are brought before the Supreme Court.627 Moreover, legal aid is mandatory when the accused is in danger of imprisonment for at least three years.628 Also, article 79 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure states that legal aid is mandatory in criminal cases when the accused is juvenile, blind, deaf and mute or when there is good reason to doubt his (mental) sanity.629 In civil proceedings, it is not required to be represented in any case, with the exception of filing the appeal in cassation. The judge concerned in civil cases may inform the persons involved of the possibility of legal aid. However, he is not obliged to do so. 630 Other Types of Legal Aid As mentioned above, a system to provide legal aid to citizens in their daily matters and in the pre-trial stage does not exist. For this reason, already in the 1990s NGOs started to provide legal services. In 1997, the first legal clinic came into function, supported by the Ford Foundation.631 In 2002, the Foundation of Legal Clinics was established. This Foundation consists of twentyfive so-called legal clinics, in which free legal aid is provided by students of law faculties, under the supervision of faculty teachers and practitioners. The foundation also promotes the engagement of pro bono lawyers.632

625

A. Bodnar and D. Bychawska, The Legal Profession in Poland (2009). Retrieved 16 March 2011 from www.osce.org/odihr/36308. p. 13. 626 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter II, Article 42, par. 2. 627 S. Frankowski ed., Introduction to Polish Law, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 128. 628 Interview C1. 629 A. Bodnar and D. Bychawska, The Legal Profession in Poland (2009), p. 12. 630 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 631 The Ford Foundation is an organisation in the United States, aimed at strengthening democratic values, reducing poverty and injustice, promoting international cooperation and advancing human achievement. Source: Ford Foundation. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from http://www.fordfoundation.org/. 632 Legal Clinics Foundation. Legal clinics in Poland. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from http://www.fupp. org.pl/index_eng.php?id=index_eng.

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Another institution providing legal aid is the Union of Citizens Advice Bureaus (Zwiazek Biur Porad Prawnych). This organisation has been operating since 1998, when it was established under the patronage of the ombudsman (see section 3.2.2). It is a national association of independent NGOs, with the aim to promote free advice services and to provide knowledge on rights to all citizens.633 Other organisations providing free legal aid include local organisations or NGOs specialised in rights for particular groups, such as asylum seekers, refugees or migrants.634 Although in recent years plans have been made to establish a system of free legal aid, that system did not come into practice. Despite several attempts by NGOs and the Ministry of Justice in the last few years, Poland still does not have a system to ensure legal aid to the indigent, due to a lack of financial means and a lack of political will. 635 Particularly, poor people are not able to obtain legal aid paid by the state in their daily matters or before the start of a proceeding. 636 Therefore, it is said that legal clinics as described above are increasingly important for the legal aid system in Poland. 637 3.2.5 Legal Professions Legal professions in Poland are divided into six categories: judges, public prosecutors, bailiffs, notaries and two kinds of lawyers: advocates and legal advisers. In general, for all of these professions it is required to have a graduate diploma in law. The professions, however, differ with regard to specific requirements on legal training, qualification exams and length of specialisations and studies after graduation.638 This section focuses only on the professions of advocates and legal advisers and describes the current debate on the relevance of the distinction between the two. Lawyers: Advocates and Legal Advisers To date, within Polish legislation a distinction is made between two kinds of the so-called free legal profession of lawyer.639 Lawyers, as mentioned above, are divided into advocates (adwokat) and legal advisers (radca prawny). The former resembles the English profession of a barrister, while the latter virtually equals the English profession of a solicitor, also known as a legal adviser.640 This distinction between the two professions can be traced back to the beginning of th the 20 century. With the regaining of Polish independence in 1918, the Advocates Act was established. At that time, a body of legal aid called Prokutoria Generalny was responsible for the representation of the Treasury. The Prokutoria Generalny consisted of a group of legal officers, the so-called legal advisers. Later, these legal officers were to represent parties other than the state as their competences were extended. 641 Provisions on Polish lawyers nowadays have been set forth in two separate laws: the Legal Advisers Act of July 6, 1982 and the Advocates Act of May 26, 1982. In these acts, the rights and duties of the advocates and legal advisers are laid down. Each profession has its own bar (corporate organisation), of which the organisation and tasks are also included in the 633

Union of Citizens Advice Bureaux. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from http://www.zbpo.org.pl/page/en/. Interview C1. 635 Interviews C1 and C4. 636 A. Bodnar and D. Bychawska. The Legal Profession in Poland. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from www.osce.org/odihr/36308. p.11. 637 Interviews C1 and C5. 638 Z. Brodecki ed., Polish Business Law, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International 2003, p. 35. 639 J. Jabłońska-Bonca, Wprowadzenie do prawa: Introduction to law, Warszawa: LexisNexis 2008, p. 231. 640 Z. Brodecki, Polish Business Law, p. 36. 634

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legislation. The bar associations in turn, have established additional rules on the (ethical) conduct of their members.642 The Advocates Act states that the profession of an advocate consists of ‘providing legal assistance, in particular of providing legal advices, preparing legal opinions, drafting legislative bills and attending before courts and official institutions’. 643 The Legal Advisers Act, in its article 6.1, uses the exact same text on the profession of legal advisers. 644 Consequently, members of both professions have similar competences: they are competent to give legal advice, to provide legal assistance to their clients and to undertake procedural actions. Although the division between the two professions to a large extent blurred in the last years, the professions still slightly differ. A basic difference between the two professions is that an advocate is authorised to represent a person charged in criminal matters, while a legal adviser in a criminal trial is solely allowed to represent the other parties involved. 645 Moreover, a legal adviser is not allowed to represent parties in family and custodianship cases.646 This difference results in a de facto specialisation of legal advisers, who are engaged with commercial and civil law. It should be emphasised, however, that this division is not strict: as mentioned above, a legal adviser may represent some parties in criminal matters, while an attorney may deal with other matters than criminal ones.647 Another distinction is to be found in the fact that legal advisers can work at different places and for different employers at the same time, while advocates – from the emergence of their profession on – are and should be independent and thus cannot. Finally, the distinction concerns the ethical codes of the two professions; the Advocates’ Act has many restrictions on advertising, while the legal advisers are allowed to offer their services through advertisement.648 In recent years, Poland has been working on legal reforms with regard to access to justice and legal professions. Several proposals have been introduced and drafts have been prepared to unify the professions of legal advisers and advocates. To date, however, these proposals have been subject of a heated debate and they either failed or were withdrawn, for arguments with respect to both money and the possible use of merging them. In general, one could say that advocates are distrustful of the plan and opponents of merging the two professions. It is said that they do not want the connection because they are afraid of losing their independence. Legal advisers in general are in favour of unification, of which it is said that would strengthen their position.649

641

Interview C5. Ibid. 643 Advocates Law 1982, Article 4. 644 Solicitors Law 1982, Article 6, par. 1. 645 Z. Brodecki, Polish Business Law, pp. 36-38. 646 J. Jabłońska-Bonca, Wprowadzenie do prawa: Introduction to law, p. 233. 647 A. Bodnar and D. Bychawska. The Legal Profession in Poland, p. 3. 648 Interviews C4 and C5. 649 Interview C5. 642

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3.3 Civil Law 3.3.1 Civil Law and Family law In this chapter, the way in which the civil law system developed in Poland is briefly outlined. After this, one important aspect of the Polish civil law, family law, will be highlighted. Family law in Poland is interesting because it provides an insight in the way the Polish legal system in general is organised, as well as the way in which the civil law in Poland is influenced by history and tradition. Brief History of the Polish Civil Law In the publication ‘European Initiatives and Reform of Civil Law in Poland’ by Jerzy Rajski, the process of the development of the Polish civil law system is described. Rajski states that, before the World War II, the Polish legal system was highly influenced by the Austrian, German and Russian civil law systems, as well as the French law which applied on the territory around Warsaw.650 During communist rule, socialist civil law applied in Poland, which after the collapse of the communist rule had to be reformed completely. This complex task was given to the Commission for Civil Law Reform in 1989, and was carried out in a gradual manner. The reform measures were characterised by a tendency of ‘returning to the roots’; or returning to the civil law system as it was before the World War II. The first phase consisted of eliminating every socialist aspect of civil law, in order to adjust it to the emerging market-oriented economy. 651 To this purpose, fundamental changes were made in property law, legal protection and many other socialist influenced parts of the civil law system. The Europe Agreement, signed in 1991, initiated a gradual harmonisation of Polish civil law with European rules.652 However, as numerous legislative acts were dispersed and separated from the Civil Code, the effectiveness in practice was largely undermined. In consequence, the actual influence of EU directives on the development of Polish civil law has been rather limited. 653 Family Law The Polish family law deals with the question of marriage, parental issues and divorce. As will be explained below, one can say that family law in Poland is influenced to a certain extend by the Roman Catholic Church. Polish family law is regulated by the Polish Family and Guardianship Code (FGC), 654 which came into force in 1965. Guardianship courts (Family and Minors Department of District Court) decide in family matters and in custodianship cases. The matrimonial cases are decided upon in provincial courts. In November 2008, the FGC was amended in order to ensure a provision of motherhood, inexistent in the previous version of the Code. The development of new techniques e.g. artificial insemination, made it necessary to establish that the mother of the child is the woman who gave birth to the child. 655 The sections below

650

J. Rajski, ‘European Initiatives and Reform of Civil Law in Poland’, p. 151. Ibid., p. 154. 652 The Europe Agreement. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(18):EN:HTML. 653 J. Rajski, ‘European Initiatives and Reform of Civil Law in Poland’, p. 155. 654 N. Faulkner, The Family and Guardianship Code (2010). Retrieved 4 July 2011 from www.gandalf.com.pl/fragmenty-pdf/250759.pdf. 655 A. Stępień-Sporek, Developments in Polish Family Law (2009). Retrieved 16 May 2011 from http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2009/11/developments-in-polish-family-law.html. 651

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describe briefly the most important aspects of the FGC regarding marriage, divorce and children. Marriage The FGC is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with matters concerning marriage. Article 1 of the FGC establishes the condition to be of opposite sex; following article 18 of the Polish constitution, stating that marriage is a union of a man and a woman under the protection of the State thereby preventing the legal possibility of a same-sex marriage.656 Articles 7 and 8 of the FGC establish the provisions for a church wedding. If there is question of a church wedding, the authority of the church must deliver the report of the marriage to the register of the administrative district in question.657 In this way, a marriage before the church automatically receives a legal status. Divorce The prerequisite for divorce as provided in article 56.1 of the FGC is described as ‘the irretrievable and complete disintegration of matrimonial life’. However, divorce will not be granted if the welfare of common minor children is jeopardised, 658 or if it has been requested by the spouse who is the sole guilty party for the disintegration of marital life, unless the other spouse has given his or her consent.659 The court deciding on a divorce must investigate whether one of the spouses is to be blamed for the disintegration. The spouse who is found to be responsible for the break-up of the marriage has the duty to financially satisfy the needs of the other spouse, corresponding his or her earning capacity and financial possibilities. 660 It is interesting to stress that the divorce rate in Poland is rather low compared to other countries of the EU; 33 married couples out of 100 get divorced. 661 This could be explained by the possibility to get a legal separation instead of a divorce. This concept is therefore briefly examined in the next section. Separation The concept of separation was introduced in the FGC in 1999 as an instrument to prevent rash divorces and to ensure durability of marriage.662 Legal separation is for this reason also tolerated by the Catholic Church. It is a situation in which the marriage is not ended, but in which the partners live apart. Legal separation has to some extent the same consequences as a divorce, but the partners cannot marry again.663 Separation is easier to obtain than a divorce,

656

R. Wojteczek, ‘Differences between Czech and Polish Family – Comparative Analysis’, in: Conference Proceedings, Europeanization of the National Law, the Lisbon Treaty and Some Other Legal Issues (2008). Retrieved 6 July 2011 from www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/cofola2008/files/pdf/Conference_proceedings.pdf. p. 1378. 657 Ibid., p. 1380. 658 The Family and Guardianship Code, Article 56, par. 2. 659 Ibid., Article 56, par. 3. 660 A. Maczynski and T. Sokolowski, Grounds for Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses in Poland (2002). Retrieved 16 May 2011 from www.ceflonline.net/Reports/pdf/Poland02.pdf. p. 16. 661 R. Wojteczek. Differences between Czech and Polish Family – Comparative Analysis, p. 1383. 662 M. Kozuch, General information of the Polish system of family law and courts. Retrieved 16 May 2011 from http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Family_law_Conference_bxl_2008/Speeches/EN_Kozuch.p df. p. 7. 663 The Family and Guardianship Code, Article 614.

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as the only condition for it is ‘the complete breakdown of a marriage’. 664 However, the court will not grant a separation if common minor children may suffer.665 Children and Parental Authority The court that decides upon a divorce also has the duty to decide about custody and parental rights.666 The constitution stipulates the right for children to be heard, but its opinion does not have the status of a testimony or evidence. 667 The Ombudsman for Children is a special public authority taking care of children’s rights as well. It must be stressed that the Polish family law does not provide for an institution of parental responsibility. There is, however, a notion of parental authority, which carries along the rights and duties towards a child. When the parents are not married, the mother automatically holds parental authority. The father has to recognise the child first to hold parental responsibility.668 It can be concluded that in Polish civil law and family law, the influence of history and traditions is rather noticeable. The provisions for marriage before the church, as well as the possibility of legal separation instead of divorce and the parental authority offer a fair vision of the importance of family life in Poland. 3.3.2 Land Property and Registry The right to private property is a liberalist tradition, to which Poland reverted after communism. It is a fundamental right according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (art. 17) and the ECHR (art. 1, protocol no. 1). Furthermore, a functioning real estate market is one of the elements of a functioning market economy, which is part of EU’s accession criteria. Therefore, several features of land property and registry in Poland are described here. Land Registry In the 2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland’s Preparations for Membership the European Commission stated that ‘[l]ittle progress has been achieved as regards the functioning of the land registry, and the authorities need to pursue their efforts at modernising the system’. 669 Poland’s existing local land registers were not compatible with registers of neighbouring powiats, other regional levels and the national level. 670 According to the 2003 Report, the absence of a properly functioning land registry makes it difficult to establish

664

Ibid., Article 613. Ibid., Article 614. 666 Ibid., Article 58. 667 A. Maczynski and T. Sokolowski. Grounds for Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses in Poland, p. 2. 668 European Commission. (2007). Parental responsibility – Poland. Retrieved 17 May 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/parental_resp/parental_resp_pol_en.htm. 669 European Commission. (2003). Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland’s preparations for membership, p. 9. 670 Kadaster. Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.kadaster.nl/index_frames.html?inhoud=/international-english/Project_Pol.html&navig=/internationalenglish/nav_serverside.html%3Fscript%3D1. 665

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ownership over land. 671According to Kadaster International, the absence of it in Poland caused severe inefficiencies and high transaction costs on the market. 672 In its presentation in 2009 for the Permanent Comittee on Cadastre in the European Union, the Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography Poland (GUGiK) explains that the current problems with regard to the cadastre are due to the partitions, when the territory of Poland had been divided into three parts (see also sections 1.5 Years of Foreign Tutelage (1764-1795) and 6.4.1 Agricultural Sector in Poland). Then, the real estate cadastre was formed under influence of cadastral systems applied in the occupying countries. The part of the Polish state which had been included to Austria was embraced by the Austrian cadastre and the part which had been included to Prussia was embraced by the Prussian cadastre. However, the real estate in the former Russian part was not embraced by a unified land cadastre. This means that around 46 % of the area was not covered by cadastral documentation. 673 ‘The lack of complete coverage with maps for this area was a major reason that hindered establishing of land cadastre.’674 From 1935 on, measures aimed at a unified cadastral system was undertaken675 but only in 1989 the Geodetic and Cartographic Law was established. 676 At present, the legal status of real estate is registered in land and mortgage registers which are administered by the courts.677 Furthermore, the transfer of ownership of real estate requires a notary deed. 678 Steps have been undertaken in order to improve the system of land registry. Currently GUGiK aims at modernisation and improvement of the administrative procedures en registration of cadastral data, for example by a national and digital database.679 Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw One of the issues regarding property management in Poland is the long duration of proceedings concerning the rights to land in Warsaw: the so-called ‘decree proceedings’. 680 By virtue of the 1945 Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (Dekret o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy), the Warsaw municipality (and after 1950 the State Treasury) became the owner of all plots of land located in Warsaw. The decree provided for the possibility to obtain the right of temporary ownership (własność czasowa) of the property on request. 681 Proceedings concerning invalid decisions issued 671

European Commission. (2003). Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland’s preparations for membership, p.

9. 672 Kadaster. Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.kadaster.nl/index_frames.html?inhoud=/international-english/Project_Pol.html&navig=/internationalenglish/nav_serverside.html%3Fscript%3D1. 673 Permanent Comittee on Cadastre in the European Union. (2009). The Cadastral System in Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.eurocadastre.org/eng/..%5Cpdf%5Cprague_4_5_june_09%5C05_Cadastral%20system%20in%20Pola nd%20OK.pdf. p. 3. 674 Ibid., p. 2. 675 Ibid., p. 5. 676 Ibid., p. 6. 677 Wardyński & Partners. (2008). Issues in Ownership of Real Estate Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PracticeGroups/RealEstate/Survey2/Poland.pdf. p. 2. 678 Ibid., p. 1. 679 Permanent Comittee on Cadastre in the European Union. (2009). The Cadastral System in Poland. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.eurocadastre.org/eng/..%5Cpdf%5Cprague_4_5_june_09%5C05_Cadastral%20system%20in%20Pola nd%20OK.pdf. pp. 14-24. 680 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 82. 681 ECtHR cases of Szenk v. Poland, application no. 67979/01; Koss v. Poland, application no. 52495/99; Plechanow v. Poland, application no. 22279/04; Serafin and others v. Poland, application no. 36980/04.

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pursuant to the 1945 Decree and proceedings concerning the request for temporary ownership submitted by former owners of the land, sometimes already lodged in the 1940s, are still pending.682 Complaints about the long duration of the above mentioned pending cases have been sent to the ombudsman and the ECtHR. In its 2009 Report, the ombudsman stated that ‘analysis of the cases [...] reveals that the Warsaw City Hall was manifestly dilatory in examining the cases, and the long periods of inactivity on the part of the authorities were unjustified’. The ombudsman and the Supreme Administrative Court requested the Mayor of Warsaw to take remedies ‘if necessary’.683 Complaints sent to the ECtHR concern pending cases in which the status of the property has been changed, while the request of ownership was still pending. For example, the property of the former owners has been subject to e.g. ‘local master plans’, administrative proceedings of division of the property, and selling of the property by the state to private parties.684 In certain cases, Poland had to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Protection of Agricultural Land The 2003 Act of Accession to the EU provided that Poland is allowed to maintain the existing restrictions on acquisition of agricultural land (and woodlands) for a twelve-year transitory period, until 30 April 2016. These restrictions are applicable to the acquisition of agricultural land by nationals and legal persons from other EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries. This transitional period constitutes a temporary exception to one of the fundamental EU freedoms and the Accession Treaty does not foresee the possibility for any extension of this transitional period.685 The main reason for the restrictions is the fear of disturbances on the agricultural land market of the country. 686 For example, because the price of Polish property, including agricultural land, is very low compared to Western European countries and a boom in prices would occur if it was left to the free EU-market. Furthermore, in Poland there were also fears that descendants of expelled Germans would buy the former German land Poland gained after the settlements of its borders in 1945.687 Even though there are restrictions for foreigners to buy land, there are some exceptions. EU/EEA foreigners are not obliged to obtain a permit when they are leaseholder for seven years in eight western and northern provinces, or for three years in eight central and eastern provinces. During that period the EU/EEA foreigner should have pursued farming in person on the land concerned and have legally resided in Poland. General exceptions from the obligation to obtain a permit are, for example, a foreigner who has been residing in Poland for

682 Human Rights Defender. (2010). Summary of Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender in 2009, p. 82. 683 Ibid. 684 ECtHR cases of Szenk v. Poland, application no. 67979/01; Koss v. Poland, application no. 52495/99; Plechanow v. Poland, application no. 22279/04; Serafin and others v. Poland, application no. 36980/04. 685 Europa – Press releases RAPID. (14 April 2011). Frequently asked questions: Extension of transitional periods for the acquisition of agricultural land. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/244&format=HTML&aged=0&language=E N&guiLanguage=en. 686 Ibid. 687 BBC news. Rachel Ellison, Buying up Poland at a discount (29 June 2002). Retrieved 15 June 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/2072553.stm. The Economist. (21 March 2002). A most emotional issue: An agreement on selling Polish land to EU citizens provokes controversy. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.economist.com/node/1046773.

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at least five years, a foreigner whose spouse is a Polish national, or when the foreigner is the legal successor of the real estate. 688 3.3.3 Criminal Justice Poland has does not know a very extensive criminal justice tradition. 689 Under communist rule, the country was not able to follow the process of reform and liberalisation that most of the Western European countries had been undergoing. However, as a result of the period of transformation and preparation for membership of the EU, the Polish criminal justice system has developed significantly. According to Krzysztof Krajewski in his ‘Crime and Criminal Justice in Poland’, the communist criminal justice system can be characterised mainly by its extremely punitive features.690 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the priority when it regarding criminal justice was to reform this punitive system. In order to do so, several changes including prison reform and reform of the sentencing policies were introduced. Likewise, the criminal code was drastically reformed, for example to guarantee civil rights and liberties such as the right to a fair trial. A general liberation of political prisoners was executed, and the prisons emptied up.691 However, during the decade following the end of communism, Poland had to deal with a significant growth in the crime rate. Over the period from 1989 to 2002, the crime rate increased by 253 %.692 This development had a substantial influence on the reform process concerning criminal justice, which increasingly became a political issue as the public opinion switched back and called for a more punitive system again. In 1998, the new Criminal Code was introduced, which was clearly substantially more liberal than the Communist Code. This new Criminal Code abolished the death penalty in Poland. Instead, it now follows the Western European standards of penalties, such as fines and imprisonment. However, the tendency to impose more restrictive punishment and longer prison sentences has grown significantly over the last decade. 693 This has caused some great difficulties that still need to be resolved, such as extremely long court delays and the bad conditions and overcrowding in prisons.694 Prisons In 1990, many prisoners of the communist era were set free. However, the prisons, of which most were built before the World War II, remained very poor in terms of material conditions.695 A study by the German University of Greifswald about long term imprisonment and human rights ranks Poland as the worst country in Europe when it comes to the conditions in prisons. 696 The lack of maintenance, of sufficient light in the cells, of outdoor facilities, of proper sanitary means and of many other basic needs of inmates means a severe violation of human rights. Several rulings of the ECtHR have already condemned the poor 688

Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency. (2011). Purchase of real estate by foreigners. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.paiz.gov.pl/polish_law/purchase_of_real_estate_in_poland. 689 K. Krajewski, ‘Crime and Criminal Justice in Poland’, European Journal of Criminology, vol. 1, no. 3 (2004), p. 378. 690 Ibid. 691 E. Blankenburg, Legal Cultures in Five Central European Countries (2000). Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.wrr.nl/english/dsc?c=getobject&s=obj&!sessionid=1SuKEX@hW9pD8XH1!b8xG1jmf1WxRDe8Ge5 9bo5!z8Z!no7p!8nhb9oWM9xXGwuy&objectid=3127&!dsname=default&isapidir=/gvisapi/. p. 110. 692 K. Krajewski, ‘Crime and Criminal Justice in Poland’, p. 378. 693 K. Drenkhahn, Long-term Imprisonment and Human Rights - Findings of an International Study (2009). Retrieved 15 March 2011 from http://www.teise.org/docs/empty/ilgalaikis%20ikalinimas%20angl.pdf. p. 4. 694 Interview C12. 695 E. Blankenburg, Legal Cultures in Five Central European Countries, p. 108. 696 K. Drenkhahn, Long-term Imprisonment and Human Rights - Findings of an International Study, p. 12.

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prison conditions in Poland (further information about the conditions in Polish prisons is described in section 3.2.1 on Human Rights - Prisons, pre-trial detention and access to a lawyer). Police Another issue regarding criminal justice is the Polish police force. During the communist period the police was rather militarised, and corruption and the use of violence were at the order of the day. Currently, corruption is still not completely banned from the police force, discussed in section 3.2.3 on corruption. However, the police force was drastically reformed after the fall of communism, and the new Police Act was issued in 1990. Below, the main features of the organisation of the police force nowadays are outlined. The main goal of the Polish police force is to serve and protect the people, and to maintain public order and security. 697 In order to reach this goal, the regulation of the functioning of the Polish police force is provided by three important penal legislation acts, which are the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Act. Police functions are further regulated by statutes and decrees of the government. 698 The Police Act regulates the duties and competencies of the police force, which includes for instance the search of body or house search, arrest or detention as well as other measures against a suspect. It also regulates the use of firearms and other measures of violence, which are strictly limited by regulations.699 The Police Act also contains regulations regarding internal disciplinary measures.700 The Criminal Procedure Code provides regulations for procedures, such as the obligation to obtain a warrant which is issued and approved by a court of law,701 as well as the process regarding the treatment of victims of crime. It also regulates in detail the procedures for special measures such as interception of phone calls and other measures subject to the Privacy Act. 702,703 The Police Act provides for a basic division into four departments, which are the criminal police, the prevention police, the supporting services and the special investigation service. 704 Furthermore, the police force is centrally organised. The Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration is the chief commander of the Police. The structure of the force is further organised according to the administrative division of Poland. 705 The general headquarters of the force are situated in Warsaw, within which there are different units occupied with different kinds of crime. Ranked below these main headquarters there are

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Polish National Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://www.policja.pl/portal/pol/90/4889/Polish_National_Police.html. 698 Legislation On Line. Poland: Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/12. 699 i.e. Regulation concerning the special conditions and procedures related to the firearms use by Police force members. Source: Legislation On Line. Poland: Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/12. 700 Legislation On Line. Poland: Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/12. Code of Criminal Procedure (1997), Chapter 10. 701 Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 220. 702 Legislation On Line. Poland: Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/12. 703 Interview C4. 704 Polish National Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://www.policja.pl/portal/pol/90/4889/Polish_National_Police.html. 705 Legislation On Line. Poland: Police. Retrieved 17 June 2011 from http://legislationline.org/topics/country/10/topic/12.

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subsequently 16 voivodeship police headquarters, which in turn are further divided into 342 powiat headquarters. On the lowest administrative level there are 565 police stations. In addition, there are 22 prevention and counter-terrorist units. 706

3.4 EU legal Standards 3.4.1 The Approximation of Polish Law with EU Legislation A candidate status for accession to the EU obliges the candidate in question to fulfil all of the requirements stipulated by the Copenhagen Criteria. The fourth of these criteria demands that the candidate state adapts the entire acquis communautaire, which is the accumulated legislation of the EU. 707 This chapter will examine the legal aspects of the Polish accession to the EU. In order to do so, the difficulties that occurred during the period of the implementation of the acquis communautaire are analysed, as well as the difficulties that still occur regarding the alignment of Polish law with EU legal standards. The Approximation Process: Measures and Methods The Association Agreement between Poland and the European Communities and their Member States was called the Europe Agreement,708 and was signed on 16 December 1991. This agreement was concluded in order to help Poland fulfil all of the criteria, which would ensure integration between the two parties. In the preamble of the Europe Agreement it is stated that: ‘the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective’. 709 This phrase emphasises the obligation of approximation before becoming a member of the EU. The harmonisation of the Polish legal system with EU law is a rather important aspect of this approximation. Chapter three of the Europe Agreement was entirely devoted to the approximation of laws. The first provision in this chapter is article 68 which states that ‘a major precondition for Poland’s economic integration into the Community is the approximation of that country’s existing and future legislation to that of the Community’, and that ‘Poland shall use its best endeavours to ensure that future legislation is compatible with the Community one’. 710 Article 69 articulates the scope of approximation of laws. However, as the scope in fact includes the entire acquis communautaire, this article must be seen merely as a guideline. 711 In order to implement these provisions, the Polish Council of Ministers adopted a regulation on 29 March 1994 (16/94), regulating ‘the additional requirements with respect to governmental drafts of normative acts because of the necessity of their conformity with the EU law’.712 The obvious problem with this regulation was that it covered only part of the 706

Ibid. This chapter focuses solely on the fourth criterion. 708 The Europe Agreement. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(18):EN:HTML. 709 Ibid., p. 2. 710 Ibid., p. 20. 711 A. Lazowski, Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects (2001). Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI. p. 6. 712 P. Saganek, The Pre-Accession Adaption of the Polish Law by the EU Law (2009). Retrieved 25 March 2011 from http://networkeurope.net/index.php?id=64&tx_ttnews%5Byear%5D=2009&tx_ttnews%5Bmonth%5D=10&tx_ttnews%5Bday% 5D=09&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4&tx_ttnews%5BcalendarYear%5D=2011&tx_ttnews%5BcalendarMonth% 5D=3&cHash=b8f27fb5189dff61a17b1f142a992f90. 707

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Polish acts; the regulation only mentions governmental drafts, thus leaving drafts by non governmental bodies outside its scope, as well as existing bills which are not drafts anymore. Bearing in mind that the Polish legal system had been subject to many extensive and thorough reforms since the collapse of the communist regime, many new relatively new legislative acts were already in place at the time the regulation was promulgated. 713 The regulation established a procedure in which a draft or bill was transmitted to a special parliamentary committee for European Integration for an opinion about conformity with EU law standards. This opinion was not binding, and neither the procedure nor the regulation itself turned out to be very effective. 714 This ineffectiveness has led to several problems concerning the approximation of Polish law, including delays and the adoption of inconsistent legislation. These problems are further discussed below. There were several attempts made in order to resolve the ineffectiveness and delays in the harmonisation process. In 1998, a National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis715 was established, outlining among other things the timetable for Poland’s pre-accession actions. The actions are listed by sector, and covered all legislative aspects of approximation, as well as possible administrative changes and necessary financial aspects. 716 The timetable was subject to a continuous and detailed inspection and control by the European Commission, who presented annual progress reports assessing the progress and the difficulties that were encountered during the pre-accession period. In 1999, an official parliamentary scrutiny procedure was established, which made it possible for the Parliament to exercise efficient control over the conformity of draft bills.717 In order make the process of approximation yet more efficient, the government issued the ‘European Law Acts’ in 2000, assembling every legislative proposal concerning approximation into one single act.718 The earlier mentioned measures to make the harmonisation process more effective could not prevent the process from being a very complex and time consuming one. The legislative methods that were employed for approximating Polish legislation were for example the amendment or repeal of the current legislation that did not align with EU law, or the adoption of new acts of legislation. Another rather important method was the proEuropean interpretation of Polish law by the domestic courts. According to this trend, the judges of the domestic court tended to interpret Polish law in such a way that it did not conflict with European law, and to include EU law standards into their considerations. 719 This method was widely used by Polish courts. Some courts however adopted a rather negative attitude towards European and international law, refusing for example to apply the European Convention of Human Rights and confounding the European Convention with EU law. 720 The negative attitude of domestic courts was only one of the many problems and difficulties that were encountered during the approximation process. In the next section, the most important problems of the process are highlighted.

713

A. Lazowski, Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law, p. 10. Ibid. 715 European Commission. (1998). Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s Progress towards Accession. Retrieved 28 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_1998_en.htm. p. 7. 716 A. Lazowski, Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law, p. 11. 717 Ibid., p. 16. 718 Ibid., p. 12. 719 Interview C8. 714

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Problems In its annual reports on the progress of Poland towards accession to the EU, the Commission indicated the difficulties and problems regarding the progress in the approximation process. In every annual progress reports from 1998 until 2003, the year before Poland’s accession to the EU, the Commission stresses the great importance of the incorporation of community legislation into national legislation, ‘but the even greater importance of implementing it properly in the field, via the appropriate administrative and judicial structures’. This is an essential pre-condition for creating the mutual trust indispensable for future membership. 721 This condition turned out to be an essential and persisting problem during the entire process. Poland experienced some great difficulties in implementing administrative reforms that were needed to lay the foundations that would allow all of the chapters of the acquis to be effectively implemented. 722 This administrative inaccuracy prevailed in all of the following annual reports, in which the Commission indicated that this was cause for serious concern. Another important problem regarding the implementation of the acquis was for example with regard to the Civil Service in Poland. The Act on Civil service from 1996 was not implemented properly, thereby causing problems such as the ‘absence of a coherent and effective national policy for the recruitment, remuneration, training and development of the Civil Service’.723 This problem prevailed in 1999, when the Commission stipulated that the public administration was still very weak. There had not been taken enough measures to meet European law standards regarding staffing, training and quality of the civil service. Moreover, the public administration appeared structurally understaffed, which undermined the efficiency and the capacity.724 The judiciary system was a cause for concern as well. In several reports, the Commission stressed the need for reform in order to become more efficient. The persistent understaffing of common courts, the lengthy procedures and the poor technical resources were likely to form an impediment for the uniform application of EU law in Poland; therefore these issues should be resolved. However, the Commission stipulates that progress in strengthening has been too limited. 725 Other important problems reported by the Commission were the insufficient measures undertaken by the Polish government to tackle the organised crime; the new Criminal Code introduced in 1999 made the judicial process regarding organised crime even more complicated. Also issues such as competition, public procurement and consumer protection proved to be insufficiently aligned with EU legislation. 726 By 2002, Poland’s efforts to approximate its legislation with that of the EU had progressed only very slowly, addressing only to a limited extent the short- and medium-term priorities set by the Commission. Too little emphasis was placed on secondary legislation, thereby undermining the efficiency of the implementation of the acquis.727 As mentioned above, the administrative capacities were insufficient as the structures were too weak, 720 A. Lazowski, Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law, p. 21. Judgement of 10 October 1996, No 429/96 of the Court of appeal in Kraków. 721 European Commission. (1998). Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s Progress towards Accession, p. 39. 722 Ibid., p. 46. 723 Ibid., p. 40. 724 Ibid., p. 59. 725 Ibid., p. 46. 726 Ibid., p. 89. 727 European Commission. (2000). Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s Progress towards Accession. Retrieved 3 May 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_2000_en.htm. p. 89.

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especially in important areas regarding the internal market such as agriculture. 728 As the Commission states in its report of 2002, ‘Poland's progress has been characterised by a slow start’.729 In 2002, 27 chapters were provisionally closed, but delays remained in the areas of agriculture and the adoption of legislation concerning the judicial system. Overall, the process had proven to be very slow and complicated. With the accession date moving closer, some implementation had to be done in a rush, which resulted in inconsistent and inefficient legislation. To date, these problems prevail, for the deficit of implementation of EU legislation remains a problem for Poland. Almost 5 percent of the EU legislation is not –or not effectively– implemented, which is the second highest rate of all EU member states.730 This problem can be explained by the fact that the administrative structure is still too inefficient, and the judicial procedures are too lengthy. A large number of cases regarding infringement of EU law have been brought before the ECJ. 731 Therefore, the difficulties during the process of approximation have been prevailing into the present, and Poland still encounters problems with regard to the implementation of EU legal standards. 3.4.2 Internal Market: Solvit One of the most important features of the EU is the internal market. It seeks to guarantee free movement of goods, people, services and capital, which together form the four fundamental freedoms of the EU. This chapter describes certain obstacles with regard to the functioning of the internal market, Poland and its citizens by making use of the information from Solvit. Solvit is an initiative of the European Commission. It is created to monitor the misapplication of internal market rules by public authorities, and it handles problems with a cross-border element that are due to the misapplication of these rules. Within Solvit, EU Member States work together to solve these problems without legal proceedings. There is a Solvit centre in every EU Member State, as well as in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Solvit Centres can help with handling complaints from both citizens and businesses.732 Solvit does not handle consumer cases.733 The Centres are part of the national administration and are committed to providing solutions to problems within ten weeks. Using Solvit is free of charge. 734 Solvit handles cases such as: recognition of professional qualifications and diplomas, access to education, residence permits, voting rights, employment rights, taxation, and free movement of products, capital and services.735 The character of cases is more or less the same every year.736 In 2010, the largest amount of cases concern social security (34 %). Next is residence rights (23 %). Thereafter recognition of professional qualification (16 %), motor vehicle registration and driving license (6 %), taxation (5 %), market access for products (4 %), and services (3 %), and other (9 %).737

728

Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 135. 730 Interview C2. 731 Ibid. 732 European Commission. About Solvit. Retrieved 24 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm. 733 Interview C3. 734 European Commission. About Solvit. Retrieved 24 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm. 735 Ibid. 736 Interview C3. 737 European Commission. Solvit 2010 Report. Retrieved 24 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/docs/solvit_2010_report_en.pdf. p. 7. 729

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When the problem is not caused by misapplication of EU law, but by insufficient transposition of EU rules, this is called a Solvit+ case (see box 3). In this case, a reform of the national law is needed. For the Polish centre, in 2004 there were around ten of such cases, but recently on average one or two per year.738 The Polish centre acts as ‘home centre’ for Polish citizens who experience difficulties on the above mentioned issues in other Member States. It is mostly about social benefits, family benefits, pensions, etc. For example, in 2010 there were four cases against The Netherlands. Three of them concerned social security rights and were received from Polish citizens who have been working in the Netherlands and were encountering problems with their applications for social benefits. In 2009, the cases were mostly about residence rights. Polish people complained about a delay in issuing residence cards. The delay was not politically motivated but simply an administrative matter.739 The Polish Solvit Centre deals mostly with western EU countries, because of a Polish migrant flow to the West. Since the Polish centre does not deal directly with authorities of the country where the problem rose, they do not encounter a possible political background of the problem. 740 Box 3: Solvit+ Case (wrong implementation of EU law): Retrieved from the Solvit 2010 Report. 741 ‘SOLVIT Poland Brings National Rules on Car Registration into line with EU Law A company was trying to register in Poland a car which had previously been registered in Germany. The Polish authorities did not accept the harmonised German registration certificate consisting of two parts in accordance with Annexes I and II to Directive 1999/37/EC, as provided for by Article 3 of the same Directive, but asked for a Polish translation. This certificate is explained in detail in the annexes to the Directive and can be read simply by comparing the harmonised letters and numbers. There is therefore no need to understand the language in which the certificate is written. This problem could not be solved within the SOLVIT deadline, since it required an amendment to the Polish law in question. However, SOLVIT Poland convinced the authorities that the law needed to be amended. The relevant rules have now been amended and the new version entered into force on 1 January 2010. Solved within 19 months.’742

3.5 Conclusion In the last twenty years, Poland has experienced dramatic changes in its legal system, mainly as a result of reforms after the fall of communism and in order to adapt to EU standards. It can be stated that the EU accession process brought about the implementation of a large amount of new legislation by means of the acquis communautaire, which made the country improve their legislation on various important areas, such as human rights. Therefore, Polish membership to the EU led to a new awareness about social justice, principles of judgements and countering maladministration. However, there still remain problems to resolve regarding the legal system in Poland. As has been outlined in this chapter, the enforcement of law and the protection of human rights sometimes lack accuracy. This problem is caused by a much more general problem of lacking reforms and a failing efficiency of the general administrative structures. Without 738

Interview C3. Ibid. 740 Ibid. 741 European Commission. Solvit 2010 Report, p. 36. 742 Ibid. 739

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efficient structures, it is impossible to carry through necessary reforms in order to seize the current problems. This inefficiency of the administrative structures has a direct effect on the functioning of the judiciary as well. Problems in this area can be noted in a general inefficiency of the judicial system, more specifically regarding proceeding delays, workload, access to legal aid and corruption. The current long duration of judicial proceedings cause to diminish the proper enforcement of law and human rights protection; since ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. Corruption is still present as well in Polish society nowadays, although this problem has been tackled for the largest part during the process of accession to the EU. Furthermore, despite the positive influence of the EU on Polish legislation, it must be stressed that the above mentioned failing structures of legislation and enforcement of law have been the cause on various occasions of difficulties with the full alignment of EU legislation with national law. A relatively large amount of EU legal standards is still not, or not fully, implemented in national law. Another reason for this is that, for example with regard to anti-discrimination legislation, the Polish conservative and religious society sometimes stands in the way of full insurance of protection against discrimination. In order to tackle above mentioned problems and difficulties, crucial changes have already taken place and discussions on reforms are currently ongoing. In the future, these discussions together with wider political and societal support might pave the way for further improvement.

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4. POLITICS 4.1 Party System 4.1.1 From Communism to Solidarity The Polish political system is based on political parties, which were highly influenced by the events that occurred in the period from 1968 to 1980.743 The Solidarity movement played a major role in the development of the Polish politics after the collapse of the Soviet regime. In 1968, there were heavy protests against the communist regime in Poland, held by intelligentsia, students and the working class. In 1976, again major protests took place and the first oppositional institution was born: the Committee for Workers’ Defence. A true revolutionary ethos occurred: one of human rights and dignity, freedom, equality and nonviolence. This ethos appealed to an increasing number of Polish people. As a result of this, several new organisations were established, the most important of which emerged in 1980: Solidarity.744 Solidarity was the first secular and legal oppositional institution, which meant it operated outside of the control of the Communist Party. Its extent was massive and nationwide with ten million followers. Solidarity had a significant influence on the development of the Polish counter-elite: it gained a lot of political power and therefore even had a seat at the Round Table Accord of 1989 (which will be explained further on in this section). At the same time, the left wing of the Communist Party began to hear Solidarity’s demands, and the latter even succeeded in convincing the party as a whole to cooperate with the Solidarity movement. Meanwhile, Solidarity was still gaining more support and civil society organisations continued to emerge. On top of that, societal activism was growing as well. 745 These factors led to a victory for Solidarity at the elections of 4 June 1989. With the Round Table Accord between the Communist political elite and the Solidarity counter-elite, a blueprint was made for political transformations. However, several factors resulted in a period of instability. First of all, Solidarity was no longer the only opposition movement; there were now several movements and political parties with ideas similar to Solidarity, who began to compete with each other instead of forming one bloc against the Communist Party. Second, new groups developed, which were both anti-communist as well as anti-Solidarity. Third, the old communist elite was replaced by a new one; in fact, the Communist Party, which had led the country for many years, was beginning to disintegrate. 746 After the elections of 1989, which had been free to a certain extent, a coalition was formed between the Communist Party and Solidarity,747 with President Jaruzelki and Solidarity Prime Minister Mazowiecki. 748 Solidarity finally gained genuine political power, but failed in its political tasks. Until that moment, the movement always had an oppositional position. It rested on a revolutionary, human, patriotic, symbolic and non-violent ethos. Solidarity was not prepared to be a government. For example, Solidarity had to protect market reforms, being the government, but it also had to protect the working class, being a trade

743

J. Wasilewski and E. Wnuk-Lipiński, ‘Poland: Winding road from the Communist to the post-Solidarity elite’, Theory and Society: Renewal and Critique in Social Theory, vol. 24, no. 5 (1995), pp. 672-674. 744 Ibid. 745 Ibid., pp. 674-676. 746 Ibid., p. 675. 747 F. Millard, ‘The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991’, Soviet Studies, vol. 44, no. 5 (1992), p. 837. 748 A.J. Prazmowska, A History of Poland, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan 2004, p. 210.

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union. All of this led to the decrease of Solidarity’s identity and therefore to a loss of confidence from its followers.749 In 1991, the first fully free elections were held.750 At that time, the Communist Party had already dissolved itself, as a result of the changes that took place in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union after 1989. Meanwhile, the Solidarity movement was split in two as a result of some followers favouring Mazowiecki while others favoured Wałęsa for the upcoming presidency. In 1990, Wałęsa was chosen as the new president.751 Several sorts of parties contended at the elections of October 1990. Firstly, there were the heirs of Solidarity. As a result of the split within the movement, several political parties came into being.752 Secondly, there were the successors of the former Communist Party. 753 Thirdly, several political parties with new political ideas were established, like parties with a catholic background, ‘green’ motives or based on an ethnic minority. 754 Due to the origination of all these new political movements, the outcome of the elections resulted in a fragmented parliament. The Democratic Union (UD), one of the successor parties of the Communist Party, came in first, the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), one of the parties belonging to the Solidarity movement came in second and the Catholic Election Action (WAK) came in third. The outcomes of the elections resulted in a parliament consisting of fifteen different parties, one trade union and three regional groupings. It was also notable that the attendance was very low, despite the fact that it were the first free elections since decades. The fragmentation and low turnout resulted in an unstable and uncertain political situation. 755 4.1.2 The EU and the Polish Party System The influence coming from the European Union also contributed to the development of the Polish party system. On the road to EU-membership, Poland had to go through serious transitions in several areas, of which one was the transition to party politics. Two conditions the Polish party system had to meet were stability and the presence of electoral competitive parties. On the way to EU enlargement in 2004, which also consisted the setting of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, the EU had a lot of influence on the development of the Polish party system. 756 Since Poland gained its sovereignty in 1989, its political system was characterised by instability. Compared to the other Central and East-European countries, Poland was confronted by a relatively large amount of changes in government and by the occurrence of multiple new political parties. Many governments lost their popularity during their term and no government ever saw successive re-election. 757 Because of the growing influence of the EU from the 1990s onwards, parties started to characterise itself as either eurosceptic or euro-enthusiast. This was also due to the prospective referendum that would be held in 2003, which will be further elaborated on in

749

J. Wasilewski and E. Wnuk-Lipiński, ‘Poland: Winding road from the Communist to the post-Solidarity elite’, p. 692. 750 F. Millard, ‘The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991’, p. 837. 751 Ibid. 752 Ibid., p. 841. 753 Ibid., p. 843. 754 Ibid., p. 844. 755 Ibid., pp. 845-846. 756 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 1. 757 S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis eds., Developments in Central and East European Politics 4, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. 39.

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section 4.4.1. By means of looking at the parties positions in the period prior to the referendum, the parties can be analysed as being either eurosceptic or euro-enthusiast. The campaign that was held for this referendum was organised and financed by the then ruling Alliance of the Democratic Left, which held a very pro-EU position. 758 Among the other parties, a distinction can be made between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ euroscepticism. According to P. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová (2006), the Polish People Party (PSL) and PiS can be seen as ‘soft’ eurosceptic, since these parties have specific hesitations about the EU, for instance about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 759 However, the PiS was specifically worried about Polish national sovereignty and its culture. This could be seen in its cultural policy at that moment, which was focusing strongly on cultural and national heritage. 760 Lewis and Mansfeldová describe The League of Polish Families (LPR) and The SelfDefence of the Republic of Poland (SRP) as ‘hard’ eurosceptic, since these parties held a general reservation against the EU. They mainly saw the EU as a threat to the Polish identity.761

4.2 Political Parties For a significant part the Polish political parties are to be distinguished by analysing the programs that are related to the positions the political party takes in relation to the Polish European integration process. This is probably the best visible since the moment the first European Parliament Elections were held in Poland in June 2004. 762 Analysing the programs on the EU integration topic of the major political parties in Poland, the contradictions that aroused immediately after the Polish accession to the EU are one of the most significant features in relation to the distinctions that are characterising the Polish political parties in a general view. Due to the importance of this process, this subject shall be analysed more closely in section 4.5.2. In respect to the main topic of our country report however, this section will focus primarily on the political parties in Poland, their position in the debate on the EU integration process and the reflection of this on the political spectrum as analysed in sections 4.4 and 4.5. However, the general features and backgrounds of the main political parties in Poland shall be described primary in section 4.2.1. 4.2.1 Significant Political Parties in Poland and their General Features The largest political fraction in Poland is at the moment Platforma Obywatelska (PO), the Civic Platform. Established by the trio Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk, and Maciej Płażyński in 2001, today PO is generally considered as a fraction that represents the liberal electorate, private entrepreneurs and business circles, as well as the people who favour a wholesome and robust state basing its policy strongly on a free-market economy and the principle of competition. 763 As described in section 4.5, PO is the ruling party on local, national and European level in the recent years. Also, PO is holding the position of the Prime 758 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 131. 759 Ibid. 760 Interview B1. 761 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 132. 762 K. Cebul, Constructions and reconstructions of the EU perception—Creators of concepts, in: 5 Years of Poland’s Membership of the European Union in the Social Context, the Office of the Committee for European Integration, pp. 196-197. 763 Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland. Political Parties. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/Political,Parties,395.html.

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minister in the person of Donald Tusk since the parliamentary elections of 2007. Moreover, since the presidential elections held in 2010, it is also holding the position of the president in the person of Branislaw Komorowski. PO has at the moment 207 deputies in the Sejm764 and 53 deputies in the Senat.765 Also, PO is part of the European People's Party (EPP) in the EP and it is represented by 25 MEPs since the elections for the European Parliament in 2009.766 The second largest fraction in the present political spectrum of Poland and an important factor in the period before the PO domination is the PiS. The PiS party is established in the year 2001 by the Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław. It is often described as a right-wing party that considers the Polish independence as a very important issue. Historically speaking, PiS is a successor of the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. More generally speaking however, the PiS fraction represents the Polish right-wing electorate that favours a traditional social order, economic intervention, a strong and wholesome state, the principle of law and order and a resolute fight against crime and corruption. 767 PiS conservative stance moved in 2005 towards the Catholic Church and the party is to be regarded as eurosceptic as well. 768 In the aftermath of the elections held in 2005, PiS achieved a majority and Lech Kaczyński became the president. The party established a minority government with Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as prime minister, an arrangement that eventually turned out to be unworkable. As a result, in July 2006 PiS formed a majority coalition with the populist Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (SRP) of Andrzej Lepper and the nationalist Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR). In this period Lech Kaczyński’s twin brother, Jarosław, served as Prime Minister.769 The negative association with these controversial political partners with whom PiS entered into a coalition however, would eventually affect the reputation of PiS in a negative way when the SRP leader became accused of corruption and sexual harassments. As a result, PiS was forced to end the coalition and called for new elections.770 From this moment on, the PiS domination in the post accession period came to an end. As a consequence, in the elections of 2007 PiS managed to secure only 32.1 % of votes and ended up second. Although this was an improvement over the results from two years before771,772, the results were nevertheless a defeat for the party, as PO gathered 41.5 % of support.773 From this moment on, PiS started to loose its leading position in the Polish politics more and more to the Civic Platform. PiS is holding 147 seats in the Sejm774 and 37 in the

764 Sejm. Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/poslowie/posel.html. 765 Senat of the Republic of Poland. Senate and senators. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://www.senat.gov.pl/k7eng/senat/kluby/list-klu.htm. 766 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European elections. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html. 767 Ibid. 768 Ibid. 769 Ibid., pp. 392-393. 770 Gazeta Wyborcza. M. Kącki, Praca za seks w Samoobronie (12 March 2006). Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,3770674.html. 771 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm orderd on a day of: 25 september 2005. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/index.htm. 772 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm ordered for the day of: 21 October 2007. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/index.htm. 773 Ibid. 774 Sejm. Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/poslowie/posel.html.

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Senat.775 Moreover, PiS is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists fraction (ECR) in the EP and is represented by 15 MEPs since 2009.776 The real drama for PiS occurred on 10 April 2010 when several leading members, including president Lech Kaczyński, died in a plane crash as discussed in box 6. In the aftermath of this disaster, Jarosław Kaczyński lost the presidential elections that were organized as a consequence of the death of his twin brother to the PO candidate Bronislav Komorowski. 777 For the formal coalition parties SRP and LPR the consequences of the early elections in 2007 were even bigger. SRP fell from 56 seats in the Sejm to 0. 778,779 LPR lost all of the 34 seats in the Sejm and is not represented in the Polish parliament since the last elections.780,781 In the EP, SRP and LPR are not represented since the elections of 2009 as well.782 This too could be considered as a huge fallback having in mind that LPR was represented in the EP by 10 MEPs and SRP by 6 after the first elections were held in 2004.783 The other two relatively important fractions in the present Polish politics are Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD), the Democratic Left Alliance and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL), the Polish Peasants' Party. The SLD party is known for its social democratic outlook both in the social and economic areas.784 Although the party emerged in 1999 from a coalition of the same name, during the last elections it participated with Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (SD), the Democratic Party, Socjaldemokracja Polska (SDPL), the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Unia Pracy (UP), the Labour Union under the name of Lewica i Demokraci (LiD), the Left and Democrats movement. 785 It won 13 % of the votes during the last elections and it has 53 representatives in the Sejm. It is part of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the European Parliament and is represented by 7 MEPs in the EP. 786 The PSL however, is regarded as a modern rural party that represents the interest of people living in the rural areas. Although the party regards itself as a centre party, it has been a member of the government coalition with the SLD in 1993 and 2001. 787 The PSL is known for its efforts to improve the position of farmers and agricultural employees, residents of rural areas and country towns. Due to this, the PSL sees itself as the defender of the political 775

Senat of the Republic of Poland. Senate and senators. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.senat.gov.pl/k7eng/senat/kluby/list-klu.htm. 776 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European elections. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html. 777 National Electoral Commission. Presidential Election repeat ballot at the day of 4 July 2010. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://prezydent2010.pkw.gov.pl/PZT/EN/WYN/W/index.htm. 778 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm orderd on a day of: 25 september 2005. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k5.htm. 779 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm ordered for the day of: 21 October 2007. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k1.htm. 780 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm orderd on a day of: 25 september 2005. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k5.htm. 781 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm ordered for the day of: 21 October 2007. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k1.htm. 782 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European elections. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html#ancre1. 783 Ibid. 784 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej. Statut Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej. Retrieved 9 June 2011 from http://www.sld.org.pl/partia/statut_sld.html. 785 Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland. Political Parties. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/Political,Parties,395.html. 786 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European elections. Retrieved 7 June 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html#ancre1. 787 A. Lipinski, One Europe or Many? Discourse and Political Struggles in Postcommunist Poland, Bydgoszcz: Kazimierz Wielki University 2009, p. 6.

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traditions of the large agrarian communities in Poland before World War II. 788 PSL is the junior ruling party, represented by 31 deputies in the Sejm789 and 2 deputies in the Senat. 790 It is part of the EPP fraction in the European parliament with 3 representatives. 791 4.2.2 The Position of the Political Parties in the European Discourse When Poland officially entered the EU on 1 May 2004 and the programs of the political parties were being promoted in the awake of the first elections to the European Parliament in which the country participated on 13 June 2004, one could notice that most parties primary put the emphasis on the economic benefits or losses which would be gained or sustained by Poland as a consequence of joining the EU.792 Moreover, the discourse was strongly determined by the issues that were related to the international security position Poland would have as a result of entering the European framework. Member of the Office of the Committee for European Integration Krzysztof Cebul described this situation as a ‘set of significant contradictions between the voiced opinions about the European integration’ that were seen as a distinctive feature of the 2004 election.793 Concerning the economic sphere of the European integration in the early period of the accession however, the political spectrum of Poland could be divided in four different groups in respect to the position the parties adopted. The ones regarding the possible gains of the economic benefits as a consequence of the integration process were the PO, SLD, the UP and the SDPL. In the beginning, PO was one of the parties advocating for the Union funds to be spent on activities to overcome economic backwardness.794 The arguments of the SLD and the UP in this respect were related to the fact that ‘Europe ought to be an area of the common social standards and sustainable growth policy’.795 The most pragmatic argument was probably the one from SDPL, which defined the goal of the integration process in a manner in which the Polish development was dependent of the Polish present in the European community. SDPL saw the European integration process as the ‘only way to give the Fellow Countrymen an opportunity to live lives of affluence and dignity, having been enjoyed by the citizens of the European Union countries for many years now’. 796 The second group was less enthusiastic about the possible benefits as regarded by the four parties discussed above. According to the more radical parties as PiS and PSL, the emphasis was to be much more on the defence of the Polish national interests in relation with the EU. The maximisation of own national benefits should be a priority and the PiS set itself the goal to make the EU allocate as much money as possible in favour of Poland’s economic development. The party guaranteed the Polish people an uncompromising attitude in Europe and promised that ‘the fight for the budget that would be advantageous to Poland would be 788

Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland. Political Parties. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/Political,Parties,395.html. 789 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm ordered for the day of: 21 October 2007. Retrieved 10 June 2011 from http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k6.htm. 790 Senat of the Republic of Poland. Senate and senators. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.senat.gov.pl/k7eng/senat/kluby/list-klu.htm. 791 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European elections. Retrieved 10 June 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html. 792 K. Cebul, Constructions and reconstructions of the EU perception—Creators of concepts, in: 5 Years of Poland’s Membership of the European Union in the Social Context, the Office of the Committee for European Integration, Department of Analyses and Strategies, Warsaw 2009, p. 172. 793 Ibid. 794 Ibid. 795 Ibid. 796 Ibid.

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the first task of the PiS representatives in the European Parliament’. 797 The defence of the Polish national interest in Europe was also a key objective for the PSL. Before the elections, the party’s president Janusz Wojcienchowski strongly appealed on the Polish people to choose deputies ‘whom the flag of the Union will not replace the colours of the Polish flag and who will not forget the polish national anthem’.798 Contrary to the both views was the one related to the LPR position. The extreme attitude towards the European integration was characterised by the party’s willingness to preserve the Polish independent development, which could actually be seen as the policy of isolation. The wish to defend the native, national Polish interest and not external, foreign, EU ones was probably the best illustrated with the party’s stance that ‘Poland can develop only outside the EU’.799 Something totally different on the European integration debate was the position of the SRP, whose attitude could be considered as ambiguous. On one hand, the party was in favour of integration, strongly emphasising the Polish place in a united Europe. On the other hand, it expressed considerable doubts concerning Poland’s membership of the EU and demanded that the treaty arrangements would be renegotiated. For this reason, the party called for changes in the labour market, funds to be received from the EU budget, production limits and transitional periods.800 Although there were different opinions on benefits and losses as a result of the European integration process, it can be said that there was a certain consensus among most parties. The majority of the Polish parties (PO, SLD, SDPL, PiS and PSL) saw the EU membership primary in terms of guaranteeing Poland’s international security. 801 Moreover, most of the parties are nowadays distributable in two groups in respect to this connection between the place of Poland in the European integration process and its international security program. Parties as the PO and SLD are primary in favour of a united Europe that should be seen as ‘an active actor on the international political scene, supporting a multilateral model of international relations, defending the principles of international law and the position of the United Nations as the pillar of peaceful and consensus –based on the coexistence of Nations’. 802 This idea, promoted especially by PO, is based on the desire to consolidate an institutional framework on the European level so the common efforts of numerous nations could be focused on achieving peace, stability and prosperity. The idea is that by achieving this, the EU would be faced with the task of taking more responsibility for the security of Europe in particular and the rest of the world in general. 803 On the other hand, the proponents of the concept of ‘Europe of nations’ (PiS, PSL and SRP) could be regarded as a group of parties who’s primary goal is to emphasise the necessity of maintaining and defending Poland’s sovereignty. However, at the same time this group seems to accept the process of the European integration and Poland’s presence in the EU. 804 At the same time, these parties believe that the sovereignty ought to be understood as a kind of right to self-determination. Concessions made on EU level are mostly experienced as a

797

Ibid., pp. 172-173. Ibid. 799 Ibid., p. 173. 800 Ibid., p. 174. 801 Ibid. 802 Ibid. 803 Ibid. 804 Ibid., p. 175. 798

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fairly negative phenomenon, often in terms of betrayal. For this, the biggest concern of parties like the PiS is that the EU could limit the Polish sovereignty in the long term. 805 In general, it can be stated that the most common attitudes could be described as being within the framework of the EU or being in relation with the EU. On one way or the other, almost all parties in Poland are fully aware of the fact that they, as full member of the EU, do have direct influence on the form and conditions of a Europe in which they have a place.806 According to most party programs that were analysed, it is clear that all groups are attempting to exert real influence on the decision making process on which the EU is eventually based. In the event, it would be logical to believe that all parties strive the same goal; the achievement of economic growth, improvement of social security of its member state, etc. However, the main difference among the political parties in Poland, especially in relation to the EU perspectives, could be found in the existence of the various approaches. The characteristics that represent the ideas of the parties in their positions to the European integration process of Poland are to an important extent fundamentally different of each other. Where parties as PiS and PSL continue to promote themselves as ‘guards of the Polish national interests’ on the European playing field and their programs still mainly focus on the acquisition of as much funds from the Union as possible without being interested in possible negative consequences of this, there the parties as PO and the SLD seem to become more and more aware of the dominating European values and principles in the EU. The present coalition with PO as the largest party seems to become aware of the fact that the best option for Poland is to share the common European interest. Therefore, the dominating idea, which is expressed primarily by the senior governing party PO, is that ‘the EU interests stand in no contradiction with Poland’s interest and Poland’s interests stand in no contradiction with the EU ones’.807

4.3 Local Politics 4.3.1 The Development of local Self-Government after Communism With the transformation of Poland, after the collapse of the SU, also came privatisation and decentralisation. After 1990, several important steps were taken in order to reform the local politics of Poland. In the spring of that year, a governmental structure at local level was introduced, which was a very big step for a former-communist centralised state. The local communities gained legal responsibilities that were formerly carried out by the centralised state.808 The introduction of local government brought forth various reforms of the administrative levels, which introduced the voivodeships, the powiats and the gminas.809 In 1990, laws were introduced which regulated the new rights and competences for the local governments. Local communities gained the right to own property and to manage financial activities. The incomes of the communities consisted of local taxes, financial support from the national taxes and other subsidies. The financial support from the state for the communities 805

Ibid. Ibid., p. 196. 807 Ibid., p. 197. 808 M. Tatur ed., The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe: The Impact of Culture, Economic Structure and Institutions, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2004, pp. 61-62. 809 Explanations about terms concerning administrative division can be found in par. 3.1.2. 806

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declined, since their income became their own responsibility from now on. City councils were elected and had the right to set up an executive branch, headed by a mayor. 810 However, despite the growing competences of the local authorities, some policy areas were still in the hands of the state. Among these areas were education, health care and social services, which were still carried out by the relevant ministries.811 As a result of many teething problems, regionalisation seemed to be more of a step backwards than forward, in the beginning.812 The role of the local governments of the voivodeships, powiats and gminas was still rather weak. This was a result of several problems. Firstly, voivodeships and gminas were competing for financial resources. Secondly, there was the difficulty of the voivodeships not having any administrative, institutional or financial instruments in the area of regional policy, since these instruments were still in the hands of the ministries. Before 1990, there was a system of Provincial National Councils with an independent legal status and the authority to manage the finances of the voivodeships. The reforms removed these authorities. However, this did not mean that those competences were headed over to local authorities. The voivodeships still did not receive an official legal status and resources were still absorbed in the national budget. This meant that regionalisation was actually still characterised by centralisation, especially because of the fact that many instruments remained in the hands of the national ministries.813 4.3.2 Regional Development and the European Union A notable fact about the process of regional development from 1990 onwards, was that the first initiatives were not coming from the government. Instead, they were a result of the influences from the EU. 814 The then ruling post-Solidarity government was not interested in regional policy. 815 However, much effort was put into regional development by the EU. The EU is a fervent promoter of political decentralisation and regionalisation. Its most important instrument is structural funding; financial support for poor or declining regions within the member states of the Union. An important principle within the procedure of structural funding is ‘partnership’. The EU expects countries receiving structural funds to possess competent local institutions, which should be able to participate in the planning and implementation of the support the EU provides for regional development.816 In 1989, the EU started the PHARE programme; the Aid for Economic Restructuring in Poland and Hungary.817 This programme was meant to manage the relation between the EU and its candidate member states in the accession process. It was established as an instrument to help the candidate member states to comply with the acquis communautaire and other conditions. Therefore, the PHARE was also aimed at preparing the candidate countries and their institutions for structural funding, since these states would become receivers of this funding after joining the EU. 818

810

M. Tatur ed., The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe, p. 62. Ibid. 812 Ibid., p. 63. 813 Ibid. 814 Ibid., p. 64. 815 Ibid. 816 M. Baun, ‘EU Regional Policy and the Candidate States: Poland and the Czech Republic’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 24, no. 3 (2002), pp. 261-262. 817 D. Bailey and L. De Propris, ‘A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity-Building in the Candidate Countries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2004), pp. 77-78. 818 Ibid., p. 77. 811

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The PHARE programme was the main source of financial assistance from the EU to the Central and East European Countries. Another source was de European Investment Bank, which provided loans as pre-accession assistance. Other pre-accession funds were the SAPARD (Support for Agriculture and Rural Development) and the ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession Assistance).819 When Poland applied for EU membership in 1994, the EU was of the opinion that Poland’s regional policy was not sufficiently developed yet. Therefore, regional policy became a short-term priority.820 Regional development was in the hands of the Regional Development Agency, which was established by the government in 1993 and was responsible for coordinating EU funding and regional policy. Two other agencies contributed to regional development: the Agency for the Restructuring of Industry and the Agency for Development of Small and Medium Size Enterprises. Furthermore, on the local level, agencies were established for the implementation of the EU-funded programmes. In 1996 however, the Council of Ministers of Poland reported that there was still a lack of development in the areas of privatisation, business and foreign capital. The same report also stated that the funds were not handled in a satisfactory manner and that the coordination between the ministries failed. As a result of this report, the financial support of the EU and the critique on the passive attitude of the government, regional development became a topic on the agenda for the national government after all. From 1999 on, regional development was no longer financed by pre-accession funds, but by the Polish state. On the road to EU membership, the EU got more and more say in the regional development of Poland. In March 1995, the Polish parliament demanded a report from the cabinet on the current situation. The Sejm eventually formulated four principles, which were all based on EU guidelines. Again, several new agencies and committees were established outside and within ministries. Nevertheless, these measures still did not provide the absolute solution that was needed in order to accomplish the necessary regional reorganisation. 821 Due to the accession negotiations that started in 1998,822 the EU’s influence and its power to request certain conditions was amplified even further. This incentive led to drastic reforms in 1999.823 As stated above, before the reforms, most of the responsibilities concerning the regions, actually still lay at the ministry level. This situation changed with the reforms of 1999, when the current administrative division of Poland was developed. The Polish administrative division is set out in section 3.1.2.

4.4 EU Accession 4.4.1 The Referendum on EU Accession The decision for Poland whether to join the EU or not, took place by means of a referendum among the Polish citizens. 824 This referendum was held in 2003. There were two requirements the referendum had to meet in order to determine whether Poland should join the EU or not. Firstly, the turnout at the referendum had to cover at least 50 % of the Polish population. 819

M. Baun, ‘EU Regional Policy and the Candidate States: Poland and the Czech Republic’, pp. 265-266. Ibid., p. 270. 821 M. Tatur ed., The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe, p. 65. 822 Ibid., p. 67. 823 Interview D8. 824 R. Markowski and J.A. Tucker, Pocketbooks, Politics, and Parties: The 2003 Polish Referendum on EU Membership (2003). Retrieved 6 July 2011 from https://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Markowski_Tucker_2003.pdf. p. 1. 820

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Secondly, more than 50 % of the turnout had to be in favour of the EU-accession. This led to a strategic dilemma for the opposition of EU-accession whether to vote against it or not to vote at all.825 Eventually, 58.85 % of the population attended the referendum. Of this percentage, 77.45 % voted in favour of the EU. 826 It is interesting to take a look at which factors played a role in the choices of the Polish people. A turnout of 58.85 % is remarkably low, but this was a surprisingly high number in comparison to previous elections in Poland. An analysis from the Institute of Political Studies states that political as well as economic factors contributed to the choice of the Polish people in voting in favour or against the EU-accession. 827 Considering political factors, probably party preference as well as support for the government, interests in politics and ideological self-placement contributed. Numbers show that 90 % of the supporters of the political parties in favour of EU-accession (Alliance of the Democratic Left, Civil Platform and the Freedom Union) voted in favour at the referendum as well. Furthermore, the then ruling pro-European government was leading the campaign that supported the accession to the EU. Therefore, it is most likely that support for the government and interests in the contemporary politics also played a role. 828 In addition, two important non-political factors played a role in the referendum. One important factor was the Church. The Polish Catholic Church in general, and Pope John Paul II in specific, supported EU-accession. Pope John Paul II encouraged the Polish people to attend the referendum and vote in favour of the EU. According to him, Europe needed Poland just as much as Poland needed the EU. 829 This argument could perhaps be based on the fact that more than 96 % of the Polish people identifies itself as Roman Catholic. 830 A second factor was the civil society in Poland. Organisations, foundations, associations, business centres and NGOs promoted the accession, mainly as a strategic, geopolitical, future-oriented choice. For them, the accession to the EU was seen as the final step in the transition process.831

4.5 Current Political Situation Political analysts in Poland predicted that the year 2011 would be a very challenging one for the Polish politicians in both domestic and foreign affairs.832 Not only would Poland hold the EU Presidency in the second half of 2011, but national elections would also be held during the same period. In the first few weeks of 2011, it was still unclear if the parliamentary elections would be held in the fall as usual, or at an earlier date. The fact that Poland's turn at the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU would begin on 1 July 2011 was the main reason for this unclarity. Many politicians, especially those from the governing Civic Platform party, believed that this event should not be disturbed by an election campaign. 833 As a result, both the governing coalition parties PO and the PSL as well as the opposition parties were 825

Ibid. Ibid., p. 2. 827 Ibid. 828 Ibid. 829 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 132. 830 U.S. Department of State. (2005). Poland: International Religious Freedom Report 2005. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51573.htm. 831 P.G. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldová eds., The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 133. 832 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; though year ahead’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 1 (2011), p. 7. 833 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; magic Word’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 3 (2011), p. 5. 826

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assumed of adjusting their actions for their own political benefits. Instead of taking some necessary measures, they avoided to make decisions that could have negative effects on the results of the parliamentary elections. According to political analyst Witlod Żygulski, this process commenced long before it became clear that the parliamentary elections would be held at the normal time, at the end of 2011. Because of that, he described this situation in January ‘as if the election campaign has already begun’.834 4.5.1 2011: The Year of the Parliamentary Elections Bearing in mind that the parliamentary elections might be held earlier than usual, in March 2011 it seemed as if avoiding unpopular decisions could have been one of the main reasons causing negative effects for the coalition parties in the polls. A survey done by the Homo Homini polling company showed that if parliamentary elections had been held on the first weekend of February, the PO would presumably have gained 34.1 % of the vote, PiS 27.7 %, the Democratic Left Alliance 15.3 %, and the Polish People’s Party 7.4 %.835 In an other survey, done by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) at the same time, 53 % of the respondents expressed their concern that the current government is unlikely to improve the economy, while 34 % of those surveyed expressed their approval of the government’s economic policies.836 According to The Warsaw Voice’s President and Editor-in-Chief Andrzej Jonas, the economic issue could indeed be regarded as one of the main causes of concerns for the senior governing party PO, as the parliamentary elections are getting closer.837 The main argument concerning the economic issue is often explained by the absence of long-awaited public finance reforms. By postponing this reform for a long time, the coalition parties became unpopular among the liberal economists in Poland that were pledging for reforms in the pensions system and public finance. 838 There is a public discussion going on the pensions system reform concerning the plan to reduce contributions to private Open Pension Funds (OFEs) in a move that would benefit the state’s Social Insurance Institutions (ZUS). 839 Critics explain this shift as an aim to temporarily improve the state budget at the expense of the painstakingly reformed pensions system.840 Michał Boni, the head of the prime minister’s team of strategic advisors, tried to limit the damage by explaining that the lack of changes in the pensions system should not be regarded as a part of the election campaign but more as a learning process.841 He noted that the political silence on this topic was not to be regarded as a lack of decisiveness in the coalition but rather a positive development. Boni suggested that the criticism on the government was in fact a disruption in the dialogue, noting that the strategic development perspectives are often being mixed with emotional, political and symbolic themes. According to Boni, it was indeed true that the governing politicians were not saying much about this topic, it were mainly the experts speaking. 842 834

W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; though year ahead’, p. 7. Polskie Radio. Homo Homini polling results. Retrieved 20 May 2011 from http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/308564,Tydzien-oddechu-od-polityki-krajowej-Zobacz-najnowszy-sondaz. 836 Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS). Publikacje; public opinion. Retrieved 23 May 2011 from http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2011/02_2011.pdf. p. 2. 837 A. Jonas, ‘Voice – From the editor’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 3 (2011), p. 3. 838 Ibid. 839 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; Government Losing Support as Election Looms’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 3 (2011), p. 8-9. 840 A. Jonas and W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; Young Potential Must Not Be Wasted, Interview with Michał Boni’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 3 (2011), pp. 6-7. 841 Ibid. 842 Ibid. 835

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The causes behind the declining support for the government could also be explained by three other key-factors. The first one is what the critics describe as ‘the inadequate reaction to a report by Russian aviation inspectors examining the causes of the April 10, 2010 crash of Poland’s presidential plane near Russia’s Smolensk airport’.843 Especially the opposition criticised the reaction of the Polish government to the Russian version of the events, noting that ‘the Russian one was widely reported internationally, while Poland’s version was not’. 844 The second factor could be found in the opposition’s push for the dismissal of Defence Minister Bogdan Klich as well as the Infrastructure Minister Cezary Grabarczyk. The first one was partially blamed for the Smolensk tragedy while the Minister of Infrastructure was held responsible for problems in the transportation sector that hit Poland in the winter period.845 The third important factor concerns the personal conflicts among the party’s highest ranks. These are being described by Andrzej Jonas as serious ‘cracks of dissent’ and thus regarded as signs of serious trouble. 846 In fact, the most current analysis of the situation within the largest coalition party is that ‘the biggest obstacles for the PO are the public expectations and the PO itself’.847 However, the results of the opinion polls were even more negative for the opposition party PiS. In the survey done by the Millward-Brown SMG/KRC polling centre, people were asked why they support the PO. The main reason of this support was reflected by the fear of the possibility that the PiS could return to power. 56 % of the respondents expressed this fear.848 Aware of the fact that the majority of the people surveyed regards PiS as in general a party that ‘is standing firmly by its policy of relentless confrontations’ 849, Żygulski concludes that ‘the respondents appear mainly motivated not by enthusiasm for the PO’s track record, but by the desire to ward off a repetition of the 2005-2007 scenario’. 850 Back then, Poland was governed by PiS in coalition with the radical Self-Defence (SRP) party, led by Andrzej Lepper, and the nationalist LPR led by Roman Giertych. 851 Żygulski commented on the current political division and the possible consequences of a new mandate for the PO already in January, stating that ‘if PiS suffers a painful defeat, which in the light of opinion polls is possible, the PO will essentially have a monopoly on power for the next four years’.852 This regarding the fact that the presidential as well as local elections were already won by the PO in 2010. 4.5.2 Divisions in Poland’s Political Landscape Interesting facts in some of the political analyses in Poland are often the comparisons between the present political situation in the country with similarities from the past. Although decades have passed since the period of the Partition, according to political analysts like Michał Szułdrzyński, the situation today is comparable with the one during this period. He refers to the fact that some voters support the PiS, considering it as ‘the only power that can re-arrange

843

W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; Government Losing Support as Election Looms’, pp. 8-9. Ibid. 845 Ibid. 846 A. Jonas, ‘Voice – From the editor’, p. 3. 847 Ibid. 848 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; Government Losing Support as Election Looms’, p. 8-9. 849 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; though year ahead’, p. 7. 850 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; Government Losing Support as Election Looms’, p. 8-9. 851 Ibid. 852 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; though year ahead’, p. 7. 844

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and move things in Poland to the right direction and take care of its interests’. 853 Also, he notes that ‘even if the PiS voters do not associate themselves fully with the programme and the reasoning of the party, they hide the fact and publicly praise Jarosław Kaczyński's wisdom’. 854 On the other hand, Szułdrzyński points to the fact that there are those that consider the rule of the PO as the only camp that can save the democracy in Poland. Although the PO voters may dislike Donald Tusk or Bronisław Komorowski and criticise them for their reluctance in modernising the country, nevertheless they are still convinced that only the PO can hinder the, as he describes it ‘growth of quasi-fascism represented by the PiS’. 855 The PO – PiS Conflict As discussed in section 4.5, the current political situation in which Poland finds itself, is mainly determined by the power struggle between the PO and PiS. Moreover, this conflict between the two major parties is often perceived as a ‘war’ instead of a political dispute. 856 Explaining the political division in Poland, Michał Szułdrzyński describes this conflict as a situation in which everything is about enemies and allies. 857 By suggesting that during the period of the Partition it was already notable that there were some parties that hoped to regain independence due to keeping friendly relations with the Prussian Empire, while the others tended to turn to Russia, the political situation now seems similar between the PO and PiS. 858 Contrary to economy, which is based on rivalry, he argues that the conflict between PO and PiS is indeed comparable to a ‘war’. ‘One of the camps must win and the victory must be total. Although the war has not moved to streets and made people fight with real weapons, it caused a real split in the public society; there are two Polands that live next to each other, and in political terms they turn against each other.’ Political Division of Poland: East West Although the most recent composition of the Polish parliament dates from the aftermath of the October elections in 2007, which resulted in a general victory for the PO, the idea of the two Polands based on the political division PO-PiS as Szułdrzyński noted is not a strange one. In fact, it is a very crucial one. If one examines the parliamentary election results from 2007 closely, one can clearly notice that PiS won a majority primary in the eastern part of Poland. 859 On the other hand, if one analyses the results in the western part of the country, it is obvious that PO is much more popular than PiS.860 This is illustrated by figures 5 and 6: in the former the regions where PiS is supported by more citizens are coloured darker blue, in the latter the regions where PO is the strongest are the darkest.

853

M. Szułdrzyński, Wojna postu z karnawałem (30 March 2011). Retrieved 23 May 2011 from http://www.rp.pl/artykul/634810.html. 854 Ibid. 855 Ibid. 856 Ibid. 857 Ibid. 858 Ibid. 859 National Electoral Commission. Election to the Sejm. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k4.htm. 860 Ibid.

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Figure 5 : Regional Division PiS.861

Source: http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k4.htm.

Figure 6: Regional Division PO.862

Source: http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/k5.htm.

861

Ibid.

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Political Division of Poland: City-Periphery However, this idea of a politically divided Poland along the ideological or rhetorical lines POPiS does not end in a general division of Poland by simply looking at the eastern part of the country or at the western part. If one examines more closely the political division in Poland, there is also a division notable in the electoral behaviour between the large cities and the periphery in general. Although the majority of the people resident in the western part of Poland, both in the large cities as well as in the periphery, voted for the PO in the last four years863, this trend deviated in the eastern part of Poland.864 In the latter, one can note a remarkable trend where the PO enjoys popularity in, next to the western part of the country in general, the majority of the large cities situated in the eastern part of Poland. Bearing this trend in mind, it can be concluded that the electoral support for the PiS ideology is mostly to be found among the rural population in the eastern part of Poland, while the PO finds its political support mainly in the western part op Poland as well as in the large urban areas across Poland in general. This trend was also confirmed in the aftermath of the presidential elections held in July 2010, when the PO’s presidential candidate, Bronisław Komorowski defeated PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński in the second round of the presidential elections. 865 The electoral trend described in the period of the parliamentary elections in 2007 was similar to the electoral behaviour during the presidential elections of 2010. 866 4.5.3 Local Elections in 2010 On 21 November and 5 December local government elections were held in Poland. Although the attendance was only 47,32 % during the first round,867 during the second round on 5 December, the general attendance was even substantially smaller; only 35,31 %. 868 During 862

Ibid. If one closely examines the election results in the western provinces of Poland, one can notice that the electoral behavior in general resulted in a PO victory on all levels. For example, if one zooms in on the voivodeship of Zielona Góra, http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/8.htm, it is notable that PO won by 47.06 % in this part of Poland. If one zooms in further on the powiet level of this, for example the powiet of StrzeleckoDrezdenecki , we notice a PO victory of 44.22 % against the 22.08 % of the votes that were accredited to PiS. Zooming in on the gmina level Dobiegniew, (which can be concerned as a distanced periphery in relation to the province capital Zielona Góra) PO achieved a victory of 38.78 % against the 21.17 % accredited to PiS. Zooming in on the voivodeship capital Zielona Góra itself, we see a PO victory of 51.90 %. Exploring the voting behavior on all levels in other western provinces as well, we see a comparable trend as in the example of Zielona Góra. As a result, we can conclude that in the western part of Poland, PO achieved a victory on all levels and in all regions. 864 In the eastern part of Poland, PiS achieved a victory as visualised in Figure 5: Regional division PiS’. However, the electoral trend in the eastern part of Poland deviated from the trend in the western part of the country. Where a general victory was achieved on all levels in the western part of Poland by the PO, the PiS was unable to achieve a victory in the large cities and voivodeship capitals situated in the eastern part of the country. For example, if one zooms in on the Lubelskie voivodeship, http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/6.htm, we note a PiS victory of 41.52 % against 29.47 % for the PO. Also, if one for example zooms in more closely on the regional level (concerning the parts of the province that can be regarded as periphery) it can be noticed that the PiS victory is being confirmed in parts as the Łukowski powiet with 43.89 % in favor of PiS against 22.28 % for the PO. This trend is similar in other powiets situatated in the eastern part of the country. However, there is one important deviation in this trend. Zooming in on the large cities in the east, especially the voivodeship capitals, one can see a PO victory in general. For example, if one zooms in on the city of Lublin, a PO victory of 41.22 % can be noted against the 36.59 % in favor of PiS. This trend is similar in other eastern provinces as well. For example, if one looks at the voivodeship of Rzeszów, http://www.wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/23.htm, a PiS victory of 48.43 % on voivodeship level can be seen. However, in the voivodeship capital of Rzeszów, one can note a PO victory of 41.35 % against the 35.43 % for PiS. In other eastern provinces of Poland, a similar trend can be noticed, e.g. in Lublin and Rzeszów. 865 National Electoral Commission. Presidential Election. Retrieved 23 May 2011 from http://prezydent2010.pkw.gov.pl/PZT1/EN/WYN/W/index.htm. 866 Ibid. 867 National Electoral Commission. Self-Government elections 2010. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.wybory2010.pkw.gov.pl/att/1/eng/000000.html#tabs-1. 868 Ibid. 863

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these two rounds, the governing party PO emerged as the winner while the opposition party PiS suffered a painful defeat.869 In the provincial assemblies, PO won the largest number of seats — 222, before PiS, which won only 141 seats. The junior coalition party PSL won 93 seats and became the third party in the local elections, while the opposition SLD won 85.870 The PO won in 12 of the 16 provincial assemblies. Bearing in mind the electoral trend described in section 4.5.2, it is not surprising that the PO also did well on the local level in western voivodeships such as Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Lubuskie, Śląskie, Wielkopolskie, Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie. In fact, PO also secured a majority in the central voivodeships Mazowieckie and Łódzkie as well as in the southern province of Małopolskie and the northern province of Warmińsko-Mazurskie. In the northeastern province of Podlaskie, PO and PiS gained the same number of seats. Also in line with the discussion in section 4.5.2, PiS ensured a majority in the eastern provinces of Lubelskie and Podkarpackie and PSL won a majority in the Świętokrzyski voivodeship with 32.91 %.871 In general, PO gained a victory of 39.13 % of the total assembly votes, PiS 25.13 %, PSL 16.58 % and SLD 15.15 %.872 4.5.4 European Parliament Elections in 2009 If we analyse the European Parliament elections that were held on 7 June 2009, we see an identical trend as analysed in the last parliamentary elections of 2007 and the local elections of 2010. Although in 2009 the definitive turnout of 24.53 % was much lower than the EU average of 43 % as shown in chart 1, it was slightly higher than the turnout of the European Parliament elections of 2004, when the definitive turnout was only 20.87 %.873 Chart 1: European Parliament Elections in Poland in 2004 and 2009874

Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html#ancre1. 869

Ibid. Ibid. 871 Ibid. 872 W. Żygulski, ‘Voice – Politics & Society; PO Wins Local Elections’, The Warsaw Voice, no. 1 (2011), pp. 810. 873 European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European Elections. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html#ancre1. 874 Ibid. 870

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The low turnout could be explained by the general lack of interest registered on the regional level. This assumption could be supported by the fact that the turnout of 38.92 % that was registered in the Warsaw region was in fact the only one that came close to the European average of 43 % as presented in figure 7.875 Figure 7: European Parliament Elections in Poland in 2009876

Source: http://pe2009.pkw.gov.pl/PUE/EN/WYN/F/index.htm. As has been noted, the results of the European Parliament elections in 2009 were fully in line with the electoral trend during the local elections that would follow in 2010 as well as the parliamentary elections held two years before, in 2007. The PO won in the western provinces, while PiS won primary in the eastern provinces.877 Also in line with the parliamentary elections of 2007 was the fact that the PO won a majority in the capitals of the eastern voivodeships as well. 878 As a matter of fact, in all voivodeship capitals a substantially higher turnout was registered compared to the periphery of the same voivodeships examined. 879 Bearing in mind the fact that the majority of the voters from the capitals supported PO and that the highest turnout was in fact in these capitals compared to the periphery, the logic consequence was a general PO victory of 44.34 % against the 27.40 % of the votes collected by PiS.880 The SLD ended third with 12.34 % of the votes and the PSL won 7.01 % of all votes.

875 National Electoral Commission. European Parliament Elections 2009. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://pe2009.pkw.gov.pl/PUE/EN/WYN/F/4.htm. 876 Ibid. 877 Ibid. 878 Ibid. 879 Ibid. 880 Ibid.

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The consequences for the European political groups as a result of the Polish elections in 2009 are visualised in table 5 and chart 2: Table 5: EP Elections in Poland in 2009 and the European Political Groups 881

Source:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html# ancre1.

881

European Parliament. Results of the 2009 European Elections. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html#ancre1.

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Chart 2: EP Elections in Poland in 2009 and the European Political Groups882

Source:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/poland_en.html# ancre1. 4.5.5 Conclusion Analysing the parliamentary elections of 2007, the local elections as well as presidential elections that were held in 2010 and the European Parliamentary elections held in 2009, one can notice a comparable electoral trend emerging. In the last four years, the PO was victorious on all administrative levels. Moreover, the PO was represented by a comparable victorious electoral trend. In a period of four years time, the PO won on all political administrative levels throughout the result of a large support in the western Polish voivodeships as well as throughout a large support in almost all province capitals throughout Poland. Having analysed this electoral trend and summed up the current political situation, the conclusion can be made that PO ensured an absolute grip on power throughout the last four years. Moreover, bearing this electoral trend of the last years in mind as well as the descriptions of the current political situation set out by most political analysts in Poland, a forecast could be made for the parliamentary elections that are to be held by the end of 2011. Moreover, supported by the polls discussed in section 4.5.1, the trend reflecting the PO domination in the Polish political world is presumable to carry on.

882

Ibid.

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4.6 Asylum and Migration Policy 4.6.1 The Development of the Polish Asylum and Migration Policy The year 1990 has been of great importance for the development of the asylum and migration policy in Poland. In this year, Poland has been confronted with serious issues concerning asylum. It was the case that Sweden has been a country which had been dealing with incoming asylum seekers from Poland for many years.883 However, after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, there was no more legal reason for Polish people to be granted political asylum in Sweden. Therefore, Sweden started to refuse asylum applications and many people were sent back to Poland at once. At that time, the Polish Asylum and Migration Policies were not sufficiently developed to respond in an appropriate way to these migration flows of returning Polish citizens. 884 Assisted by Western European countries, the Polish Red Cross, the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance and the United Nations started to develop new policies. Especially, the pressure coming from the UN and the western society was an accelerating factor for Poland’s path towards joining the Geneva Convention. 885 This convention, held in 1951, defines the rights of refugees on an international level. 886 In November 1990, a Governmental Commission for Refugees Affairs as well as a Plenipotentiary for Refugee Affairs within the Ministry of Interior was created. 887 In 1991, the Polish accession to the Geneva Convention took place. 888 This resulted in the foundation of the Polish refugees and migration laws. All agreements were determined in the Polish Act on Aliens and changes took place within the constitutional provisions on asylum. In February 1992, an United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Liaison Office was opened in Poland. When in 1993 Poland also entered the UN Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it completed its refugee protecting system as accepted by the western world. 889 In the years following the signing of the Geneva Convention, the Polish institutions concerning asylum and migration faced many changes of names and organisation structure. 890 An important renewal of the migration policy of Poland took place in 1997, when the new Act on Aliens was implemented. This act was again influenced by typical western values, but now also Polish interests were specifically taken into account. The new provisions stated in the Act on Aliens of 1997 mostly concerned residence, new conditions for admission and new criteria for the expulsion of foreigners.891 These changes resulted in the widening of the competences of the state authorities. The Polish authorities gained more control over the inflow of foreigners into Poland. New accession criteria were set out, like the obligation of having sufficient financial means for residence in Poland. All these new criteria were based on state security, public wealth and the threat of terrorism.892

883

A. Kicinger, Between Polish Interests and the EU Influence: Polish Migration Policy Development 1989-2004 (2005). Retrieved 19 May 2011 from http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2005-09.pdf. p. 6. 884 Ibid. 885 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 886 The UN Refugee Agency. (2010). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved 20 May 2011 from http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. pp. 1-3. 887 M. Wrzosek, Historique des structures et de la législation polonaises en matière de migration, given to the authors of this report by the Ministry of Interior and Administration, Migration Policy Department, 5 April 2011. 888 A. Kicinger, Between Polish Interests and the EU Influence (2005), p. 7. 889 Ibid. 890 M. Wrzosek, Historique des structures et de la législation polonaises en matière de migration. 891 Ibid. 892 A. Kicinger, Between Polish Interests and the EU Influence (2005), p. 12.

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Important changes were also made with regard to the rules concerning repatriation. Repatriation had always been a difficult issue within the Polish migration policy. Due to the new Act of 1997, the process of repatriation was made more clear and efficient. 893 In the meanwhile, Poland had applied for EU membership in 1994 and official negotiations started in 1998.894 The prospect of EU accession influenced the development of the Polish migration policy throughout the 1990s.895 Migration policy developed strongly during these years. However, the Polish migration policy still faced deficiencies in comparison to European law on migration. For example, in 1999 it turned out the new Act on Aliens was inconsistent with the European acquis communautaire.896 This was an impulse for amendments on the Polish policy, which took place in 2000/2001.897 4.6.2 Schengen With the EU accession in 2004, Poland also started its cooperation concerning the Schengen agreements.898 This offered Polish citizens the possibility to cross the internal borders of the EU as of 21 December 2007, when internal land and sea border checks on persons were eliminated (restrictions on air borders were lifted in 2008).899 This elimination asked for compensating measures regarding safety. Poland became the new external border of the EU. Especially for Poland, this was very important, since the Polish part of the EU-border is very excessive in length. The EU has high standards with regard to border protection. Poland would not be able to handle and pay for necessary improvements to its border protection system by itself. Therefore, assistance was provided by means of the Schengen Financial Instrument and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism. 900 Poland had to implement several new systems and instruments, like mobile border guard patrols, border check methods and new communication and information systems. 901 These measures all took place in phases, some of them prior to the accession to the Schengen zone. E.g., airports and seaports were already adjusted to EU conditions before 1 May 2004.902 4.6.3 Institutional Framework There are several Polish institutions playing a role with regard to asylum and migration policies in Poland. The first being the Ministry of Interior and Administration (MIA), which is responsible for the protection of state borders, the supervision of the border traffic and foreigners, the coordination of all activities related to the state migration policy and for issues of citizenship and issues of repatriation.903 893

Ibid. Ibid., p. 13. 895 Ibid. 896 M. Wrzosek, Historique des structures et de la législation polonaises en matière de migration. 897 A. Kicinger, Between Polish Interests and the EU Influence (2005), p. 13. 898 M. Kałużyńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., 5 years of Poland in the European Union (2009). Retrieved 21 May 2011 from http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/informacje_o_ue/Publikacje_o_UE/5_years_of_poland_in_the_european_union.pdf. p. 268. 899 European Parliament. J. Apap, Freedom of movement for persons (2008). Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/citizen/freedom/article_7175_en.htm. 900 M. Kałużyńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., 5 years of Poland in the European Union (2009), pp. 268269. 901 Ibid., p. 264. 902 Ibid., pp. 265-268. 903 Polish National Contact Point to the European Migration Network. (2009). Annual Policy Report 2009 for Poland. Retrieved 21 May 2011 from http://emn.intrasoftintl.com/Downloads/download.do;jsessionid...?fileID=968. p. 6. 894

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A second important institution is the Office for Foreigners (also called: The Head of Office for Foreigners), which has multiple competences on the central governmental level. 904 First of all, The Office coordinates the activities in the field of asylum and migration that are carried out by the voivodeships. Secondly, it has the power of granting the protection status of refugees and it manages the reception centres for asylum seekers. Thirdly, the Office manages the data concerning refugees, residence and return or expulsions proceedings. 905 Third, an important body is the Border Guard (BG), which has competences with regard to three topics: admission, residence and return. 906 Firstly, the BG determines whether an entry at the border is legal or not. This means the BG issues the length of the stay, visas, refusals and refugee status applications. Secondly, it controls the legality of foreigners in Poland and counteracts illegal migration. Thirdly, the BG is the institution initiating proceedings and enforcing decisions concerning the expulsion of foreigners, concluding obligations on foreigners to leave the Polish territory.907 4.6.4 Refugees in Poland When a refugee arrives in Poland, the application is received by the Border Guard. It is further handled by the Office of Foreigners. For the status of refugee, one has to apply at the Council for Refugees.908 However, only 1 % of the refugees coming into Poland are given the official refugee status.909 Their situations are being tested in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The majority of the asylum seekers who do not get the refugee status are given the so-called subsidiary status. This means they do not receive a Polish passport, but there are some supporting programs for them in Poland.910 The NGO Caritas mentions that, for Poland, a significant problem concerning refugees is that many refugees are deported back to Poland from Germany and other western countries. This is because refugees without an official refugee status are not allowed to travel freely within the Schengen zone. These refugees, mostly originating from Georgia and Chechnya, enter the Schengen zone in Poland. Poland is therefore also the country which they are deported back to. Many refugees are sheltered in Zgorzelec, a city at the Polish western border.911 More details about the living conditions and integration of refugees in Poland will be given in section 3.2.1 (Immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers). 4.6.5 The Polish Diaspora The biggest communities of Poles live in European countries such as the United Kingdom, Lithuania and Latvia, in the United States, Canada, South America, Australia and South Africa.912 In Lithuania and Latvia Polish minorities take up accordingly 7 % and 3 % of the entire population.913 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is their duty and right to take care of the Polish people living outside Poland.914 904

Ibid., p. 7. Ibid. 906 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 907 Ibid. 908 Interview D9. 909 Interview G1. 910 Ibid. 911 Ibid. 912 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Report on the situation of Poles and the Polish Diaspora abroad. Retrieved 14 May 2011 from http://www.msz.gov.pl/Report,on,the,situation,of,Poles,and,the,Polish,Diaspora,abroad,32373.html. 913 T. Edovald et al., World and its Peoples, Marshall Cavendish Reference 2010, p. 1054. 914 Interview D1. 905

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Three governmental goals can be appointed when it comes to dealing with the Polish Diaspora. First, Foreign Minister Sikorski stated in a speech on foreign policy in 2011 that ‘it is in the interest of Polish communities to support the Polish state, because its every success strengthens their position in their country of residence’. 915 Subsequently, the Polish communities living abroad could also dedicate to the enhancing of Poland’s image there. 916 Third, there is an active policy to get migrated Poles back to Poland. 917 According to the Polish Embassy in the Netherlands, it would be good for Poland if people who have obtained several skills abroad eventually return. 918 In order to achieve this, e.g. a programme called ‘the return with steps’ was established which makes it easier for emigrated Poles to return to Poland. 919

4.7 Foreign and Security Policy ‘Poland is not going left or right. If it were to go consequently in one or the other direction and reach the final limits, it would find itself either in the ditches of reactionism or in the puddles of anarchy. Poland advances, but straight, straight ahead…’ Ignacy Jan Paderewski 920 quoted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski in his speech on Polish foreign policy in 2011.921 In the description of Poland’s history (chapter 1), we have already seen that the Polish borders have changed tremendously throughout the years. If we look at its foreign policy since 1989, we see that this history of shifting borders has had major influence on its foreign and defence policy and nowadays still has. Although it is far from unusual for a country to have a closely intertwined foreign and defence policy, themes like safety and sovereignty seem to be more emphasised here than is the case in any of its EU neighbours. The latter explains why this chapter has chosen to discuss both Poland’s foreign policy and defence policy in one chapter. Bearing in mind its history of partition and occupation, a victimisation of Poland within history, is a topic that has marked its foreign and security behaviour for a long time. 922 However, more than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the latter seems to slowly show a tendency of disappearing from its policy. Poland wants to focus on the future instead of on what happened in the past. On the other hand, the Poles seem to have not forgotten their history by far.

915 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2011. Retrieved 27 May 2011 from http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20110316EXPOSE/expose_2011_en.pdf. p. 13. 916 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Report on the situation of Poles and the Polish Diaspora abroad. Retrieved 14 May 2011 from http://www.msz.gov.pl/Report,on,the,situation,of,Poles,and,the,Polish,Diaspora,abroad,32373.html. 917 Interview D5. 918 Ibid. 919 Ibid. 920 Ignacy Jan Paderewski was a famous campaigner for Poland’s independence during World War I and later during World War II. He represented the Polish National Committee in the United States (a country which he regarded his second homeland) and, in this job, had a severe influence on President Wilson who argued in favour of Polish independence in his ‘Fourteen Points’. After World War I, Paderewski became Prime Minister of the Second Republic of Poland. Source: First World War.Com. Who’s Who – Ignace Paderewski. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/paderewski.htm. 921 Ignacy Jan Paderewski quoted in: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2011, p. 15. 922 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika: Polens Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1989, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008, p. 151.

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In this section, the ambiguous relationship between past and present in Polish foreign and defence policy will be described. First, the section will provide a brief description of the course foreign policy in Poland has taken since 1989. Second, an explanation of the workings of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defence will be provided. Third, Poland’s foreign and security policy within the EU will be focussed upon. Finally, this section will look at Poland’s foreign and defence policy vis-à-vis other countries and organisations. 4.7.1 From 1989 until Today After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Poland, in line with other former communist countries, changed its political course tremendously. The aversion towards the own communist past resulted in a strong wish to, what was called, a ‘return to Europe’ and the West and move away from former oppressor Russia. In its attempt to seek close cooperation with the West, Poland approached both North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU wishing to become a member of these organisations. Becoming an EU member can be seen as a result of the wish to ‘return to Europe’. However, as will become clear later in this chapter, NATO membership highlights Poland’s call for safety and sovereignty. In its want to become a member of the EU and NATO, Poland managed to keep a continuous foreign policy strategy for approximately a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This seems obvious as we realise that foreign policy mainly consisted of working towards entering both the organisations, something which all political parties unanimously agreed upon.923 However, once the set goals had been reached, the safety of Poland’s borders were guaranteed by joining NATO (1999) and the country ‘returned to Europe’ by becoming a member of the EU in 2004, the initially unified vision to foreign policy started to become more fragmented as there was no longer a clear event to work towards. 924 Next to that, in 2001, parties with a eurosceptic vision had for the first time gained several votes in the Sejmelections, leading to more different standpoints on the direction Polish foreign and security policy should take within the government as well. 925 Although there was less consensus within Poland on foreign and security policy from 2001, one can still see a general shift in Poland’s foreign approach. Next to a strong focus on the EU (the people of Poland voted in favour of EU-accession in 2003), Poland’s foreign policy post-2001 can be defined as being even more strongly focussed on the United States. The latter is in line with the themes of safety and sovereignty that have marked Polish foreign policy as was already explained in the introduction. As said, regardless of NATO membership, Poland has usually been more focussed on securing its borders than for example other EU members. In order to make sure that the current Polish borders stay where they are, the Poles have found it necessary to seek close cooperation with the US, ultimately resulting in, for instance, a Polish participation in the war in Iraq from 2003. Within the EU, the latter has been controversial. Whilst in the middle of the EU-accession process, Poland decided to sign the ‘letter of eight’, with which it gave its support to the Iraq-war without informing its European partners before. This inspired France and Germany to give Poland the nickname of ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe. 926 The Poles, on the other hand, perceived there participation in Iraq as being none of the EU’s business.927 923

O. Osica, ‘In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations’, in: M. Zaborowski and D.H. Dunn eds., Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security, London: Frank Cass Publishers 2003, p. 27. 924 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 153. 925 Ibid, p. 153-154. 926 Ibid., p. 157. 927 Interview D1.

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In the aftermath of the Iraq-war, opinions of dissatisfaction with the EU were spotted on an international stage for the first time. With that, the positioning of Poland as a victim of history all of a sudden found its way into the EU during several occasions. For instance, during an interview with der Spiegel in 2007, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s uttered that the EU pushes every candidate country through the model of the German reunification. 928 Although Sikorski criticised the then ongoing eurosceptic feelings in Poland, he admits there is some cause for dissatisfaction by stating that he does not approve of the EU’s opinion that new Member States should adapt to the Western ‘old Member States’, and should not dwell on their historic grudges, in Poland’s case fifty years of oppression. 929 Another example dates also from 2007 when then Prime-Minister Jarosław Kaczyński raised awareness of the fact that had it not been for the Germans, Poland would have a much bigger population today and therefore a bigger vote within the EU.930 Both examples of a victimisation of the country are in line with the myth that gets linked often with Poland’s behaviour, as mentioned in section 2.1.3 on Polish myths, of being ‘the Christ of nations’. 931 The slightly pessimistic turn Poland’s foreign policy had taken since 2001 seemed to become more optimistic again once the more ‘Europe friendly’ PO got elected into the Parliament in 2007.932 Different in the policy of the new coalition of PO and PSL, was that Poland suddenly showed a much more friendly approach towards (former) arch enemies Russia and Germany.933 However, Donald Tusk (PO) becoming Prime-Minister did not fully change Poland’s foreign policy course immediately.934 The reason for this can be found in the influence that both the Polish Prime-Minister and President have in foreign policy (see section 4.7.2: Who does what in the makings of foreign policy?). It was only after April 2010, when President Lech Kaczyński passed away in the tragic plane crash at Smolensk, that Tusk’s policy approach was conducted in a broader way. 935 With that, Poland’s foreign and security policy seems to have taken a course that seems to be strongly focussed on ‘dialogue’ instead of the ‘confrontation’ that, according to Veronica Ziemer, used to mark Polish foreign policy and especially that of PiS. 936 With that, the foreign and security policy of Poland seems to have become more ‘down to earth’. 937 This seems not only to count for its approach towards (former) arch enemies Russia and Germany, but also towards the United States (see section 4.9.3) and the EU. In the words of journalist Timothy Garton Ash: ‘Poland […] [is] a country getting to grips with being normal at last’.938

928

Radosław Sikorski in an interview with ‘der Spiegel’. Ibid. 930 The Telegraph. G. Jones, Poland breaks EU taboo and mentions the war (22 June 2007). Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1555351/Poland-breaks-EU-taboo-and-mentions-thewar.html. 931 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 151. 932 Ibid., p. 161. 933 Ibid. 934 Ibid. 935 Interviews D2 and D6. 936 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 163. 937 Ibid. 938 The Guardian. T. Garton Ash, Poland: a country getting to grips with being normal at last (4 April 2011). Retrieved 27 May 2011 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/poland-new-europe?intcmp=239. 929

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4.7.2 The Workings of Foreign and Defence Policy in Poland Who does what in the Makings of Foreign Policy? As Nathaniel Copsey puts it in his Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the ‘New Europe’: A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine, it is rather difficult to point out who is exactly responsible for what when it comes to the planning of foreign policy in Poland. 939 The President is, according to Article 133 of the Polish Constitution, the official ´representative of the state in foreign affairs´. 940 However, his role and responsibilities are more limited than his official tasks imply. As a representative of the state, the President can ´appoint diplomats, receive foreign diplomats and ratify treaties and international agreements´. 941 Although the Minister of Foreign Affairs is expected to be the big decision maker in the field of foreign policy (which, in practice, also often is the case), he formally executes the foreign policy that the Council of Ministers decides on. 942 Given the fact that the PrimeMinister chairs the Council of Ministers, he, in that way, sets out Poland’s foreign policy. 943 Next to that, the Prime-Minister’s power in conducting foreign policy has its foundations in Polish law. According to Article 146, it is the Prime-Minister who is in charge when it comes to taking care of bilateral relations with other countries.944 Since both the President and the Prime-Minister have a significant saying in the makings of foreign policy, overlap and even rivalry between the different players often occurs.945 Several examples of this can be found, e.g. in 2007, when PO gained big results in the national elections. Donald Tusk was assigned Prime-Minister, which President Lech Kaczyński apparently did not utterly enjoy; Kaczyński refused to congratulate Tusk on his victory and waited with officially assigning Tusk his tasks for a full week. 946 In 2008, both Kaczyński, Tusk and Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski flew to Brussels for an EU summit. By the time all three arrived it was still unclear who would represent Poland in the several planned meetings. 947 Ministry of Foreign Affairs The hierarchy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows: beneath Minister Radosław Sikorski are his two Secretaries of State, respectively the Parliamentary Secretary (Jan Borkowski) and the Secretary for European Affairs (Mikołaj Dowgielewicz). 948 Beneath the Secretaries of State are five Undersecretaries of State. 949 Next to that, there are over thirty departments and sections within the Ministry that conduct Poland’s foreign policies. 950 Remarkable is that out all of those departments at least six are directly related to EU

939 N. Copsey, Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the ‘New Europe’: A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009, pp. 56-57. 940 Ibid., p. 57. 941 Ibid. 942 Ibid., p. 58. 943 Ibid., p. 57. 944 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 162. 945 N. Copsey, Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the ‘New Europe’, p. 57. 946 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, pp. 161-162. 947 EUobserver.com. Ph. Runner, Two-headed Poland in EU summit farce (14 October 2008). Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://euobserver.com/9/26926. 948 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister and the MFA Senior Officials. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.msz.gov.pl/Minister,and,the,MFA,Senior,Officials,13349.html. 949 Ibid.

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matters.951 Topics that the Foreign Ministry deals with are: ‘Poland’s relations with other states and international organisations, representation and protection of interests of the Republic of Poland and of Polish nationals and legal persons abroad, cooperation with Poles living abroad and promotion of the Republic of Poland abroad’.952 Ministry of National Defence: Facts and Figures As of 2007, the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) is led by Minister Bogdan Klich (PO). Secretary of State Czesław Piątas is assisted by two Undersecretaries of State. The main topics on the Polish security agenda have remained unchanged since 2009. These topics are the following: -

-

ensuring independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland, its integrality and inviolability of its bordes defence and protection of all the citizens of the Republic of Poland; creating conditions to ensure continuity of implementation of functions by public administration authorities and other entities competent in the area of national security, including entities responsible for running the economy and for other areas important for the life and security of its citizens; creating conditions for improvement of the state’s defence capabilities and ensuring defence readiness in the national and Allied structures; developing partnership military cooperation with other states, especially neighbouring ones; implementing commitments arising from Poland’s NATO and European Union’s membership; engagement in international crisis response operations led by NATO and the EU in the first place, as well as by the UN or as part of emergency coalitions.953

It is interesting to see how much the MoND emphasises national security. Not only are the first three priorities of the Ministry explicitly focussed on national security, but also including the word ‘national’ in the Ministry’s name highlights how important the protection of national sovereignty is to Poland. Explanations for this can easily be found. First, the need Poland feels to protect its sovereignty can be explained by the, many times mentioned before, several decades of Polish occupation and oppression. Second, Poland’s geographic location explains why the country is especially keen on securing its national borders. Not only is Poland the bordering country between the EU and Eastern countries such as unpredictable and (potentially) unstable countries such as Belarus and Russia, but NATO’s territory also ends with Poland. Its location therefore feeds the idea that ‘if something goes wrong [in the neighbourhood], Poland would be the first target’. 954 With that, Poland seems to give much attention to military threats with a nature of being pointed at one country. Economic, terrorist or regional threats, on the other hand, tend to be seemingly less relevant. The latter gets confirmed when the MoND is asked about its security priorities. According to the Ministry, most emphasis in Polish defence is put on the importance of ‘collective defence’ under the umbrella of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.955 950

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Ministry,of,Foreign,Affairs,32559.html?PHPSESSID=c22a6347afe1c8a19d2478182b4416 0f. 951 Ibid. 952 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Public Information Bulletin. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.msz.gov.pl/Public,Information,Bulletin,2153.html. 953 Ministry of National Defence. (2009). Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://www.wp. mil.pl/pliki/File/English/strategia_obronnosci_eng.pdf. pp. 7-8. 954 Interview D3. 955 Ibid.

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4.8 Poland within the EU Today 4.8.1 A Strong and Active Player? When asked about Poland’s role within the EU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states they see an increasing trend to be active on the European negotiation level. The Ministry claims to be active within the EU, but also to become more and more active bearing in mind that ‘they are still learning’. 956 Next to that, the government feels it should be an active European player given the size of the country.957 However, that does not imply that the government sees a future in what they call ‘big countries bullying around the smaller Member States of the EU’. 958 Enlarging the concept of the EU’s ‘big six’ with new member Poland therefore seems to form no part of the Polish EU strategy; in fact, Foreign Affairs states to be no fan of the concept to begin with.959 According to the government, what the EU needs right now is active European players that take their responsibilities.960 When asked about an example in which Poland recently showed its active and responsible role, the Ministry mentions its role in the Eastern Partnership Agreements (see section 4.8.5) and the ongoing negotiations about a pact to save the euro.961 In the original europact, dating from February 2011, Germany and France only included members of the euro area. After Poland, together with other Member States like Great-Britain, pushed for opening up the pact to Member States outside the euro area, euro outers became included in the negotiations as well. 962 Next to that, the Poles wish to promote stronger integration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The possibility of deepening European defence cooperation, which the Lisbon Treaty offers, is something that the Poles hope to strengthen during their Presidency of the EU. 963 Plans that the governments proposes are e.g. to give more attention to the further development of European battlegroups and open headquarters that ‘would give leadership’ to the CFSP.964 The Ministry stresses that it is their wish to make the plans for collective European defence operational. 965 However, it is not clear whether these plans will be actually fulfilled within the duration of the Polish Presidency. 966 Noteworthy here is that strengthening the CFSP does not mean the government perceives the CFSP a substitute for NATO.967 As the MoND puts it, it is still Article 5 of the NATO Treaty that provides its members with an already existing command structure and de facto defence plans and procedures when needed, something which Poland wants to hold on to and what they feel the CFSP lacks.968 Next to that, the MoND stresses that the situation in Libya has shown that a united, European opinion on defence and security matters still seems far away. 969 That all being said, opinions are also heard about the Poles not fully showing themselves on a European scale; something which could be much more possible given their 956

Interview D1. Ibid. 958 Ibid. 959 Ibid. 960 Ibid. 961 Ibid. 962 Ibid. 963 Ibid. 964 Ibid. 965 Ibid. 966 Ibid. 967 Interview D3. 968 Ibid. 969 Ibid. 957

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27 out of 321 seats in the European Council.970 An example of this occasional invisibility could be the initial inactive Polish response to the crisis in the Middle East and North Africa where countries like the UK and France quickly did bring out statements (for more on this see section 4.9.2). 4.8.2 Poland and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, July 2011 December 2011 In July 2011, Poland will be the first country holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the new Troika of Poland, Denmark and Cyprus. It will be the first time for Poland to chair the Council of the European Union since its accession in 2004, which has made the country keen on preparing thoroughly with the first planning starting already in 2009.971 Poland has stated it will have six so-called ‘general priority areas’ during its Presidency, namely: ‘the internal market, the Eastern Partnerships, energy security and developing an external energy policy, the CFSP, the EU’s financial perspectives and intellectual property’.972 According to Janusz Sznajder, advisor to minister Sikorski, 85 % of the Presidency’s agenda is set by ongoing issues within the EU and therefore directly influenced by Brussels. 973 10 % is left for so-called ‘crisis management’, which makes that 5 % of the agenda can be filled with issues that Poland considers of importance. 974 That being said, it is no wonder that ‘action assuring sustainable economic recovery and implementation of the post-crisis strategy will be the most current and leading theme of the Polish Presidency’ 975, as it is an issue directly influenced by Europe’s current euro crisis. Nevertheless, areas related to the strengthening of the Eastern Partnership Agreements, energy security and the CFSP seem more interesting for Poland itself. Several reasons for this can be appointed. First, Poland sees itself as one of the EU Member States that, due to its history and location, can easily deepen relations with the eastern neighbours, especially with Ukraine. 976 Poland’s focus on securing energy can be seen as closely related to the deepening of Eastern Policy. High priority on the European agenda has recently been given to energy security due to several gas crises between Russia and, mostly, eastern parts of the EU (2006 and 2009). 977 During these crises, Western Europe was hardly affected (see chapter 7 about energy). Therefore, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the securing of energy for the entire EU is not always as high up the agenda of western EU Member States as it should be. 978

970

Interview D6. Interview D7. 972 EurActiv.com. (15 September 2010). Hungary, Poland outline EU Presidency priorities. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/hungary-poland-outline-eu-presidency-priorities-news-497700. 973 Ibid. 974 Ibid. 975 UKIE. M. Kałużyńska, ‘Polish Presidency in the European Union – how to successfully pass a European maturity test?’, in: Polish Presidency in the EU – 2011, no. 22 (2009). Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://archiwumukie.polskawue.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/0/2ACB93B04657A47DC1257681003E73D1/$file/Analytical_Paper_Series_ 22_2009.pdf?Open. p. 7. 976 Ibid., p. 10. 977 UKIE. M. Pełka, ‘EU Energy Policy by 2011’, in: Polish Presidency in the EU – 2011, no. 22 (2009). Retrieved 13 March from http://archiwumukie.polskawue.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/0/2ACB93B04657A47DC1257681003E73D1/$file/Analytical_Paper_Series_ 22_2009.pdf?Open. p. 99. 978 Interview D1. 971

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As Michał Pełka states, the EU lacks a sufficient infrastructure that enables energy security for all the EU Member States.979 During its Presidency, Poland therefore wants to put special emphasis on the importance of developing such a European energy infrastructure and filling out the missing links in the already existing infrastructure. 980 An actual plan to achieve this could be e.g. the construction of so-called sleeping pipelines that could be used in times of crisis.981 In that way, when an energy crisis occurs, Member States that find themselves cut off from energy supply can still import their energy through different channels. Second, as already mentioned a few times before, Poland has always highlighted securing its national borders as one of its main priorities. This can be seen in both its relationship with the United States and NATO as in its putting the CFSP on the European agenda for July 2011. For the Poles, establishing one European defence identity is of great importance if the EU wants to be able to fight future crises in the European neighbourhood. 982 4.8.3 Challenges during the Presidency Despite thorough planning, Poland still faces some threats that are expected to pose a challenge on the upcoming Presidency. It has been said that these challenges are threefold. First, Poland will hold national parliamentary elections during autumn 2011 while the Presidency is still ongoing. This might cause difficulties during the Presidency. However, expectations are that the elections will not result in a large shift from political parties in power and will therefore have little influence on the Presidency.983 Second, negotiations on the earlier mentioned euro crisis will be more difficult to chair now Member States like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the so-called net payers, have stated several times that they want to cut back the EU-budget. 984 Third, most European attention at the moment goes to the events in North-Africa, also referred to as the Arab Spring. Although the Polish government supports the current NATO mission in e.g. Libya, there was an initial fear that all the attention given to North-Africa will undermine the Polish topic of the Eastern Partnerships.985 However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs understands that North-Africa has become a top priority for the EU and hopes that the Presidency can find a balance between Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood.986 4.8.4 Poland and its Approach towards EU Expansion When it comes to the expansion of the EU, Poland is usually in favour of this. The government’s general idea on expanding the EU is that having more countries on board of the EU increases the stability of the European region while the environment becomes more predictable. 987 Next to that, Poland seems to have not forgotten what EU-membership can mean for a country. Therefore, the country’s official stand towards Croatia, Turkey and, in the long-run, Ukraine is positive. 988 When it comes to Ukraine, the Poles see how the country is in a position that Poland used to be in not that long ago.989 979

UKIE. M. Pełka, ‘EU Energy Policy by 2011’, p. 100. Ibid. 981 Ibid., p. 101. 982 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 7. 983 Interview D4. 984 Ibid. 985 Interview D1. 986 Interview D7. 987 Interview D1. 988 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 10. 989 Interview D1. 980

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Despite this general positive stance on EU-enlargement, the case of Turkey is worth to be looked upon closer as there seem to be some contradictions in the matter. The current Pope Benedict XVI has, in the past, showed some hesitation in his opinion on Turkey entering the EU. 990 Although The Vatican later claimed to be neutral in the discussion on Turkey’s entry and supportive towards Turkey adopting the Copenhagen criteria, The Vatican’s true opinion remains ambiguous.991 Given the fact that almost 96 % of the Polish population sees itself as Catholic992, it would not be surprising if Poland would also not be truly enthusiastic about a Muslim country entering the EU. However, former Pope John Paul II did not show any hesitations towards Turkish membership.993 Next to that, the government’s opinion on Turkey’s accession seems to be remarkably positive. Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski has repeatedly spoken in favour of Turkish accession during several visits to Istanbul and Ankara, of which the last at the time of writing this report took place in October 2010.994 According to Sikorski, Poland will do its best to close the first chapter of negotiations between the EU and Turkey during its Presidency of the EU council. 995 Although, the Polish Embassy in the Netherlands states that Poland’s religious background does not influence Polish politics996, it remains unclear whether the Polish population will also strongly support Turkey entering the EU. 4.8.5 Poland and the Eastern Partnership Agreements The Eastern Partnership programmes (EaP) are agreements between the EU and six countries to create closer cooperation. Enrolled in the programme are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The programme was initiated by Poland, with the help of Sweden, to stimulate closer cooperation between the countries and the EU and, by doing so, create a safer environment on the EU’s periphery. For its upcoming EU Presidency, Poland has put the deepening of the Eastern Partnership agreements on the agenda as one of the top priorities. For the enrolled countries, the programme offers ‘prospects of free trade with the EU, financial aid, help with energy security and visa-free travel to the EU’. 997 The programme was created after the conflict between Russia and Georgia took place in 2008 and after the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis of 2009.998 The EaPs should add a more Eastern dimension to the EU’s policy regarding neighbouring countries as the crises of 2008 en 2009 showed that the European Neighbourhood Policy was not enough on its own and that the EU lacked a policy towards its eastern neighbours.999 According to the EU, the Eastern Partnerships contain five 990

Wikileaks. Vatican: encouragement, but no change on Turkey/EU policy (statement from the American Embassy in The Vatican). Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06VATICAN249.html. 991 Ibid. 992 U.S. Department of State. (2005). Poland - International Religious Freedom Report. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51573.htm. 993 Hürriyet. (13 December 2010). Cables show Vatican’s shifting stance on Turkey’s EU bid. Retrieved 5 June 2011 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=cables-show-vaticans-shift-in-stance-on-turkeys-eu-bid2010-12-13. 994 Warsaw Business Journal. A. Kureth, Poland to support Turkish EU bid during 2011 Presidency – Sikorski (7 October 2010). Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.wbj.pl/article-51482-poland-to-support-turkish-eu-bidduring-2011-presidency-sikorski.html. 995 Ibid. 996 Interview D5. 997 European Commission. (2009). Eastern relations. Retrieved 21 March 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/news/external_relations/090508_en.htm. 998 Ibid. 999 Ibid.

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points, namely border management, support for small businesses, connecting regional electricity grids, gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea to the EU and cooperation in case of any disasters.1000 The European Commission has recently decided to add another € 350 million to the already existing budget of € 250 million for the period 2010-2013.1001 Poland’s objective for initiating the Eastern Partnership agreements deserves further attention. As said, the EU lacked a neighbourhood policy towards the eastern neighbours. Although there is no doubt about the importance of a safe neighbourhood for any country, for Poland, which directly neighbours countries like Belarus and Russia (Kaliningrad), it seems even more important than to the EU members that are located more west. Again in line with the Polish history of Russian oppression and Polish foreign policy, a call for more cooperation with the eastern neighbours seems to make perfect sense. When asked why the EaPs are highly important to Poland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it has everything to do with security and is primarily based on the idea that if your neighbour is having problems, these will also become your problems. 1002 The latter clarifies why Poland, perhaps unusually, tries to maintain close bonds with Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, who is often referred to as the last dictator of Europe. The Polish government hopes to offer Belarus a clear choice with the EaPs. That is, they hope to show the Belarusian regime that many carrots lie in the EaPs, but that if the country decides to turn more towards Russia, cooperation with Europe will become remarkably tougher as sanctions from Europe will presumably follow.1003 In that way, the EaP with Belarus, but also with Ukraine, illustrates how the Partnership Agreements are designed to keep countries away from Russia, independent and, preferably, befriended with the West. 1004 In addition, it is not just the safety and stability of the Eastern European region Poland wants to develop with its EaPs. Part of the idea is that the EaPs could possibly open up the way to later NATO enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries and, especially in the case of Ukraine, in the future lead to EU enlargement. 1005 In that case, Poland would no longer be the bordering country of both NATO’s and the EU’s territory, but would be in the middle surrounded by a so-called ‘buffer zone’.1006 Although the government wisely does not speak of a ‘buffer zone’, it does confirm that it does not wish to be on the border of NATO and the EU. 1007 On the other hand, one should note that it is not just strategic interests that make Poland want Ukraine to become a member of the EU: it is also a matter of loyalty towards Ukraine based on their common history and a wish to let Ukraine experience developments that Poland has experienced. 1008 The Polish government, in this way, could lead the Ukrainians towards EU membership. Next to that, the Eastern Partnership Agreements are inspired by the Polish view on securing energy sources. As one can read in Maria Mälksoo’s The Politics of Becoming European, Poland is not always pleased with the roll it fulfils within the EU. The country often seems itself to be a less important actor in the European field than the old Member States are.1009 In the case of energy, the Polish fear is that the old EU Member States will sell 1000

Ibid. Ibid. 1002 Interview D1. 1003 Ibid. 1004 Interview D6. 1005 EurActiv.com. (20 January 2010). Poland vows support for Ukraine’s EU bid. Retrieved 21 May from http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/poland-vows-support-ukraine-eu-bid/article-189093. 1006 Interview D6. 1007 Interview D3. 1008 Interview D2. 1009 M. Mälksoo, The Politics of Becoming European, New York: Routledge 2010, p. 76. 1001

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out Poland to Russia if this is in their own interest. 1010 An important example of this can be found in the Polish opinion on the German-Russian gas pipeline (see chapter 7 for more on Polish energy policy). The pipeline, that provides Germany and other western EU-countries with Russian gas, is seen as an energy transit that leaves out Poland and only functions in the interest of the western EU members.1011 Therefore, the special interest Poland shows in the Eastern Partnership Agreements can presumably be seen as an attempt of the Polish government to make its own plans regardless of western interest-based plans. Especially the Partnership with Ukraine (as a transit country for energy) and Azerbaijan (as a gas-producing country) can provide future alternatives for the German-Russian pipeline. Poland’s energy policy will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 7. 4.8.6 The Visegrád Group The Visegrád Group (also VG or V4) is a form of regional cooperation between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which was established in 1991. 1012 In their process of the ‘return to Europe’, these countries decided to cooperate. The two most important goals were to turn away from the former Soviet regime and to turn to the EU. In order to face the tough transition period, they decided to link their accession processes and established the Visegrád Group.1013 With the accession of the Visegrád countries to the EU, the key objectives were achieved. However, this was not a reason to end the regional cooperation. As a response to their accession, a new declaration was signed in 2004.1014 The focus of the Visegrád countries turned to the strengthening of the identity of the Central European region. Within this context, the VG also set the goal of positively influencing the Eastern European region. As members of the EU, their objective became to support countries aspiring EU membership with their acquired knowledge and experience as they have also been through the process of transition from former communist state to a market economy. In this manner, the VG contributes to the enlargement process of the EU, by supporting the implementation of policies of the EU within the Eastern European countries. 1015 Poland within the Visegrád Group There were several moments when Poland took a different position within the VG than the other Visegrád countries.1016 E.g., with the prospect of the Copenhagen EU Summit of 2002 in sight, the Visegrád countries decided in advance what position all the four of them would take within the bargaining process. They would either unilaterally accept the EU conditions concerning agricultural compensation payments or gain more advantageous last-minute individual deals. However, Poland decided to shift away from this agreement right before the summit, and accepted other conditions instead of the ones the Visegrád countries agreed upon.

1010

Ibid. Ibid. 1012 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of the Visegrád Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 10 (2010), p. 1737. 1013 Ibid. 1014 Visegrad Group. (2004). Visegrad Declaration. Retrieved 23 March 2011 from http://visegradgroup. eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articlelist&iid=1. 1015 Ibid. 1016 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Visegrád Group in the expanded European Union: from Preaccession to Postaccession cooperation’, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 22, no. 3 (2008), pp. 647-649. 1011

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On top of that, in 2004 there was also tension between the four countries as a result of different opinions about the Nice Treaty. Poland very much defended the Nice provisions, which was not supported by the other Visegrád countries. This even led to the openly expression of the other Visegrád countries’ disapprobation of the Polish position within the VG. 1017 Many analyses state that the VG is disintegrating nowadays and that this is mostly due to the positions Poland is taking within the cooperation. According to Dangerfield (2008), Poland acts in a very cosmopolitan way. 1018 This means the Polish state acts open towards the larger EU policies like the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 1019 Besides, Poland acts out of a global perspective when it comes to security issues and seeks for cooperation with the US or the EU when it comes to national safety and security. 1020 The other countries within the VG are more defensive towards cooperation with others in their foreign policies. This is partly a result of eurosceptic, anti-immigration, rightwinged political parties playing a role in politics of these countries.1021

4.9 Foreign and Defence Policy vis-à-vis other Countries and Organisations 4.9.1 Defence against whom? As will be clear from the previous section on the history of Poland’s foreign politics, Poland finds a functioning defence system and security strategy highly important. However, the question remains whether this strong focus on securing Polish borders is still as relevant today as it has been in the past. Does Poland nowadays face serious threats from abroad? And from which countries do these threats come? When asked, the Polish MoND immediately makes clear that the threat of large-scale conflicts is much smaller than it used to be several decades ago and that Poland does not try to pursue a policy driven by the fears of its World War II and communist past.1022 Therefore, Poland sees no serious threat for its national security at the moment. 1023 However, this does not imply that a comprehensive defence strategy is not needed in case of a possible conflict in the future. Despite the country not naming itself a priority country for a terrorist attack, the MoND does state in its Defence Strategy of 2009, that threats for Poland at the moment lie in current global threats that most western countries deal with such as a threat of terrorism. 1024 When looking at the national security strategy of 2003, one can see that, in that way, not much has changed in the last eight years. In the 2003 strategy, terrorism is also mentioned as number one threat with the difference that in 2003 terrorism is directly linked by the government with a threat of weapons of mass destruction.1025 Interestingly, Business Monitor International (BMI), an organisation that offers country and industry analyses, states that Poland has little to fear when it comes to the threat of terrorism, a statement that the Dutch Embassy in Warsaw confirms. 1026 BMI states that, 1017

Ibid., pp. 647-648. Ibid., p. 649. 1019 Ibid. 1020 Interview D3. 1021 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Visegrád Group in the expanded European Union’, p. 649. 1022 The Ministry of National Defence. (2009). Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, p. 3. 1023 Ibid., p. 5. 1024 Ibid. 1025 Policy Documentation Center. (2003). The National Security Strategy of Poland. Retreived 6 July 2011 from http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002796/01/poland_foreign9_doc.pdf. p. 2. 1026 Interview D4. 1018

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given the fact that Poland is an EU-Member, a certain threat of terrorism needs to be taken into account, but that Poland’s ‘limited involvement in the global war on terrorism’, and Poland’s limited role on the international stage per se, make it a ‘low-risk country’. 1027 Bearing in mind that Poland contributed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has close connections with the United States, seems to make the latter a remarkable conclusion. However, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs does agree with BMI and considers Poland a low-risk country as well. 1028 If Poland indeed sees no serious threat for its national security, it remains interesting why Poland is widely defined as being more focussed on national security than some of its European neighbours. The main reason for this seems to be its relationship with Russia. Although the MoND declares, as mentioned before, that Polish defence policy is not driven by the past, one cannot deny that the Soviet Union has had a huge influence on Polish defence thinking today. Even though Prime-Minister Tusk’s government has continuously been seeking dialogue with Russia, one can still see a tendency amongst the Polish government of looking upon Russia with caution. Some nuance here is necessary though. It is not the case that the Polish government fears a possibility of renewed Russian intervention and suspects the country of making plans to take over Polish soil.1029 However, the lack of democracy, free media and civil society make Russia unpredictable and therefore deserving of close monitoring.1030 According to the MoND, the conflict in Georgia of 2008, in which Russia interfered in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, has proven Russia’s unpredictable character, thereby demonstrating that investments in Polish national defence are still needed. 1031Another country to watch is Belarus, which Poland considers to be undemocratic and therefore unpredictable as well.1032 As a neighbouring country, Poland follows the developments in Belarus with great interest. Once again, if something goes wrong on the borders of NATO territory, with which the MoND explicitly refers to Russia or Belarus, the Poles will be the first having to deal with this. 1033 4.9.2 Poland as an International Security Player Perhaps because of Poland’s strong focus on national security, less attention is often given to international security matters that do not directly involve or affect Poland. An example of this could be the current situation in Libya, in which Poland decided to support measures taken by NATO and the EU, yet not contribute actively.1034 The event is typical for classic Polish foreign defence behaviour that usually does not interfere in areas that form no priority for Poland. This can be seen for instance in the initial Polish response to the Arab spring. As mentioned in the section on the upcoming EU Presidency of this chapter, Poland had hoped that, during its Presidency to the European Council, it would get the EU to pay more attention to the eastern neighbourhood, several sources confirm that this hope has now been replaced by a slight fear that Europe will forget about the East with all the attention

1027

Fast Market Research. Business Monitor International. (25 February 2011). Poland Defence & Security Report Q2 2011. Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://www.fastmr.com/prod/127238_poland_defence_security_report_q2_2011.aspx. 1028 Interview D1. 1029 Interviews D1 and D3. 1030 Interview D3. 1031 The Ministry of National Defence. (2009). Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, p. 4. 1032 Interview D3. 1033 Ibid. 1034 Ibid.

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currently given to Libya: a country which is not of the biggest interest to the Poles. 1035 On the other hand, despite initial Polish silence about the Middle East and North-Africa, it became clear that the Poles are sending Lech Wałesa to Tunesia to help build up a democracy.1036 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement that by sending Wałesa, along with a group of Polish experts, they want to offer help to Arab countries, might imply that it will not only be Tunesia where the Poles will send advisors to.1037 Sikorski’s idea behind the mission is that, as Poland has gone through the process of democratisation itself, it is the perfect party to offer assistance. 1038 The latter seems to be part of a recent tendency in Polish foreign behaviour to get out of its comfort zone and start being visible on an international level. In a speech on foreign policy in 2011, minister Sikorski said to ‘reject the philosophy of ‘it’s not our business, we are too far away to get involved’.1039 By offering help to Tunisia, the government seems to underline Sikorski’s approach. Other international matters in which Poland has not been a marginal player are both its participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is said, for instance, that during the war in Iraq, a secret CIA detention facility for terrorists was based on Polish soil (see box 4). 1040 At the time of writing of this report, Poland still has 3000 troops involved in Afghanistan, leading several divisions.1041 From Iraq, the country has withdrawn. However, it is difficult to argue that the incentive for participation in both Iraq and Afghanistan came solely from the Polish wish to become more active in international security matters. It is more likely, that Poland’s participation in Iraq and Afghanistan can be explained by the fact that both wars were initiated by Poland’s most important defence partner, the US, a theory that is confirmed by the MoND.1042 Box 4: CIA Detention Facility

In 2006, Amnesty International published a report, stating that the USA ‘may have operated secret [CIA] detention facilities in European countries’, of which one being Poland. According to Amnesty, the facility might have been based on Polish soil from 2003 until 2005. Finding evidence for these statements remains difficult not to say impossible. Even though the existence of such facilities does not get confirmed by the MoND, it is, however, also not denied. When asked, an MoND official declares he assumes ‘there was something’, but does not know what this ‘something’ exactly was. In addition, he states that ‘those who could have been involved deny and say that they have no knowledge of it [the CIA detention facility] being there’. Sources: Amnesty International,’Partners in crime: Europe’s role in US renditions’; Interview D3.

1035

Ibid. M. Beunderman, ‘“Revolutionair” Walesa wijst Tunesiërs de weg’, in: NRC Handelsblad, 7 April 2011, p. 11. 1037 Ibid. 1038 Ibid. 1039 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 12 1040 Amnesty International. Partners in Crime: Europe’s Role in US Renditions. Retrieved 2 May from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/008/2006/en/e94ef88a-fa05-11dd-b1b0c961f7df9c35/eur010082006en.pdf. pp. 8-9. 1041 Interview D3. 1042 Ibid. 1036

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4.9.3 Poland, the United States and NATO Without any doubt, Olaf Osica states that the main reason for Poland to join NATO was to construct a direct security bond with the United States.1043 In the aftermath of Poland’s Soviet history, and only ten years after the zero-sum debate on the United States versus the Soviet Union reached its peak, its attitude towards the US and NATO can be seen as a pragmatic and ideological step towards the US and away from Russia. Therefore, the Polish government did everything in its power to achieve NATO-accession. Polish public opinion was united on this issue: all political parties agreed on the importance of Poland entering NATO and public opinion polls resulted in a 60 % of the Polish nation being in favour of NATO-accession. 1044 Although public opinion on the United States and NATO seem to have gone hand-in-hand for a long time, NATO and the United States are, of course, not the same institutions or organisations. Although often intertwined, this section will seek and try to separate both matters. The latter is especially of importance as the Polish debate on the United States and NATO seems to have changed since 1999 when Poland entered NATO. United States It is difficult to define a year in which the relationship between Poland and the United States was officially founded. However, if we look for an event that initiated the Polish-US relationship, it would probably be, as is also described in chapter 1, in 1918 when President Wilson of the United States presented his Fourteen Points Plan in which he called for an independent Poland and, in that, played a crucial role in the establishment of the Second Republic of Poland. Although the role of the United States in World War II remains ambiguous when it comes to whether or not President Roosevelt would have deliberately handed over Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Josef Stalin at the Jalta Conference of 1945 (see chapter 1), this debate does not seem to have affected the Polish positive view on the United States. Rather, does the Polish focus on the United States gets clarified by the idea that the Polish people still have not forgotten that both Britain and France were hesitant in relieving Poland in 1939 when Germany and Russia took over the entire Polish soil. 1045 Although one could argue that this no longer affects relations between Poland and the EU Member States, the MoND confirms that Britain’s and France’s past reluctance to help indeed still is a reason for the Poles to rely and trust more on the US for its security than on its EU fellow members.1046 Poland’s choice to seek more protection outside of the EU seems to them to make perfect pragmatic sense. What the Polish government nowadays finds in the United States and their security policy is something which, according to the Poles, is lacking in European security policy, namely a hard power approach, i.e., in the words of Olaf Osica, that security is ‘assured by force of arms and by the resolve to use it’. 1047 This approach differs strongly from the common European soft power security approach, which by some Poles, gets described as ‘a Western European disease called naïve pacifism’.1048 Poland’s general preference for hard power versus soft power explains why Poland gets linked with the United States so often. It is therefore no wonder that Poland, in its Defence Strategy report from the MoND, even

1043

O. Osica, ‘In Search of a New Role’, p. 22. Ibid., p. 27. 1045 Ibid., p. 23. 1046 Interview D3. 1047 O. Osica, ‘In Search of a New Role’, p. 23. 1048 Interview D1. 1044

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declares it has a special relationship with the United States when it comes to Poland’s military body.1049 This relationship has led to Poland being involved in quite a number of American events, examples of which, such as Poland’s participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have already been mentioned earlier in this section. About its contribution in the war in Iraq the MoND declares there was no doubt about whether Poland would join in, based on the idea that ‘America is just important to the Poles’.1050 However, the initial enthusiasm for, especially, the mission in Iraq began to quickly show a slight decrease. Two reasons for this can be posited. First, the United States did not let Poland contribute as much in the war in Iraq as it would have wanted. Assignments to do more than leading an international force of 2500 soldiers were not given by the US, which lead to disappointment from the Polish side combined with major costs that had resulted from the war.1051 Second, even though Poland had slight hopes for it, the country’s contribution to an American war did not lead to a relaxation of visa agreements for Polish people coming to the US. 1052 On the whole, today, this has lead to the Poles having a more down-to-earth approach when it comes to the United States. Where they, in the past, would have followed the United States blindly in its ideas, they now consider themselves to be more pragmatic. 1053 In other words, Poland nowadays first looks at ‘the other side of the deal to see if there are any benefits for Poland in it as well’. 1054 This is, however, not solely caused by the Polish contribution in Iraq. First, a tendency in Poland of a declining importance of the earlier mentioned zero-sum debate is visible. The world is no longer a bipolar world in which the United States defends Poland against the Russians, but rather something in between a unipolar and multipolar world.1055 Although Poland still finds itself vulnerable in its location on the periphery of NATO and EU territory, the US seems to have less interest in this matter than it once had when Russia perhaps still seemed a larger threat.1056 This has lead to a shift in the priorities of the United States away from Poland and the EU’s territory1057 (an example of this can be found in the initially American plans for a missile defence system on Polish soil that are now handed over to NATO, see box 5) and more towards the Middle East and e.g. Asia.1058 These days, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even openly questions whether the United States would be able to come to Polish aid ‘in every situation’.1059 Next to that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also links its change in behaviour towards the United States to a general tendency that Polish foreign policy is becoming more mature.1060 Result of this process is that foreign policy as a whole is no longer just focussed on security, and therefore the United States, but is becoming more diverse.1061

1049

The Ministry of National Defence. (2009). Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, p. 8. Interview D3. 1051 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 157. 1052 Interview D1. 1053 Ibid. 1054 Ibid. 1055 Interview D3. 1056 Ibid. 1057 Ibid. 1058 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 11. 1059 Ibid. 1060 Interview D1. 1061 Ibid. 1050

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Box 5: Missile Defence System In 2006, during the Bush administration, the United States initiated a plan to build a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. On Polish soil, the defence system should be able to destroy long-distance missiles aiming for the United States. The Czech Republic would facilitate a supporting radar system. The possible missiles were suspected to be coming from Iran. Although there was some resistance from the Polish people, the government in Poland was in favour of the plans for the controversial system. 2 When President Obama decided to hand the negotiations about the system over to NATO, which agreed on a missile defence system that would cover all NATO Member States, there were voices that said Poland felt some disappointment about its new marginalised role in the plans. 3 When asked, the MoND confirms this by saying this was indeed the case in the beginning after the negotiations between Poland and the US had taken so much time.4 Questions were therefore raised whether the US took the Poles seriously or not.5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adds that the timing of the Americans also literally was not great as they, out of the blue, called in the middle of the night to deliver the bad news.6 However, eventually, after became clear how the new missile defence system would look, the new plan was perceived by Poland as being better than the original plan. 7 This is first of all because the system now covers the entire NATO territory and second, because the new system is less controversial towards Russia and even includes Russia in negotiations about the plans. 8 Sources: 1.’Raketschild’. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from http://www.europanu.nl/id/vhk1mlek0wuz/raketschild, 21 May 2011., 2. Ibid, 3. Interview D2., 4. Interview D3., 5. Interview D3., 6. Interview D1., 7. Ibid., Interview D3., 8. Interview D1, Interview D3. NATO Resulting from the previous section, it is clear that NATO membership for Poland initially meant a step towards the United States for securing its borders. Next to that, as one of the countries that are ‘heavily attached to collective defence’1062, NATO membership does not only revolve around the United States, but is also about being a member of a collective defence organisation. According to Osica, NATO membership was for instance not sought by the Poles to make Poland become an important actor in the international security field. 1063 Rather, it sought membership so that it could make peace with its history of oppression. 1064 Apparently, peace has been made as the Minister of Foreign Affairs recently declared in a speech that ‘historical resentment is not worth pursuing’ and that ‘despite all the misfortunes that have befallen us [the Poles], we [the Polish people] now have a good basis from which to rebuild our position’.1065 By that, the Minister implicitly distanced himself from the ‘Christ of nation myth’ and argued that Poland is now looking at the future instead focussing on the past. However, regardless of whether the Poles are ready for a rebuilding their position, collective defence, NATO membership and, thus, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty still are the corner stones of Polish security policy today. 1066 When asked why the Polish government puts more emphasis on the importance of Article 5 than other NATO members seem to do, the MoND states that this is still driven by the Polish history in which security guarantees were not naturally given facts.1067 Next to that, the MoND emphasises, as mentioned before, 1062

Interview D3. O. Osica, ‘In Search of a New Role’, pp. 28-29. 1064 Ibid. 1065 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 3. 1066 Interview D1. 1067 Interview D3. 1063

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that Poland find itself located on the NATO periphery and therefore will be the first having to deal with possible problems in countries as Russia or Belarus.1068 The latter clarifies two things. First, it illustrates why the Poles are usually very keen on making sure that NATO has its equipment ready on a day to day basis so that everything is ready when its soil needs to be defended. 1069 Second, it explains why Poland mentions enlargement of NATO with more Central and Eastern European countries, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as its priority within the organisation nowadays. 1070 That is, when, for instance, Ukraine would enter NATO, Poland would find itself no longer on the border of its territory and therefore feel more secure. 4.9.4 Poland and Russia Almost twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Poland and Russia is still a large topic in the Polish public debate. However, as Ziemer puts it, with the appointment of Donald Tusk as prime-minister in 2007 the course the debate has taken has changed in that the debate has become more focussed on dialogue with Russia than before.1071 On the other hand, the Polish government states that this does not mean there are no longer ‘very rational worries’ when it comes to its relationship with Russia. 1072 These worries are generally not based on an idea that Russia would want to conquer back Polish soil, but rather on the idea that the Poles find Russia unpredictable in its actions for instance during the dispute about Georgia (2008) and the gas crises between Russia and Ukraine (2006 and 2009).1073 About the situation in Georgia, it has for instance been said it is not clear whether Russia respects internationally disputed borders since it also decided to interfere in Georgia.1074 Next to that, the Polish government is not too enthusiastic about the lack of democracy, free media and civil society it sees in Russia.1075 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland adds that they do see some modernisation of the political system in Russia, but that the Russian way of modernising ‘is a little bit different to ours’. 1076 How then, is the situation different to that of only a few years ago, which Veronica Ziemer described as being more based on confrontation than dialogue. 1077 First of all, the idea that the relationship between Poland and Russia is a zero-sum game seems to have diminished. As Sikorski puts it: ‘We have shunned the logic that states that anything that is bad for Russia must be good for Poland’.1078 He adds that, even though there are still some in Russia that ‘long for superpower glory’, they see a tendency of earlier mentioned modernisation that might in the future lead to some ‘broadly understood’ integration with the West. 1079 Although the Smolensk plane crash and following investigation have provided new difficulties in discussions between Poland and Russia (see box 6), Sikorski finds ‘the balance of the last three years of Polish-Russian relations […] positive’.1080 The reason that the Smolensk 1068

Ibid. Ibid. 1070 O. Osica, ‘In Search of a New Role’, p. 32. 1071 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 163. 1072 Interview D1. 1073 Interviews D1 and D3. 1074 Interview D2. 1075 Interview D3. 1076 Interview D1. 1077 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 163. 1078 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 9. 1079 Ibid. 1080 Ibid. 1069

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tragedy did not lead to a strong worsening of the Russian-Polish relationship might be that the Russian parliament passed a resolution in November 2010 which described the Katyń massacre of 1940, the commemoration of which the crashed plane initially headed for, as a crime of the Stalinist regime. 1081 Russian President Dimitry Medvedev also paid a two day visit to Warsaw on the 6th of December 2010; not long after the resolution on Katyń was passed and a month before the Interstate Aviation Committee would unveil the final report on its investigation into the Smolensk crash.1082 Apart from opposition party PiS, the visit by Medvedev was experienced as positive by most of the Polish politicians.1083 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adds that Russia and Poland may not always agree, but at least try to understand each other these days. 1084 In the meantime the government hopes to decrease Polish concerns about Russia by building a modern Poland, ‘which builds its strength on its economic potential, its ties with its allies and its international position. And, just in case, on a modern defence system’. 1085

Box 6: the Smolensk Plane Crash On April the 10th 2010, on its way to the Katyn commemoration, the plane of Poland’s president Lech Kaczyński crashed just outside of Smolensk. In the event, 96 people lost their lives, including the president and a significant number of Polish top armed force commanders. The following disputes over the crash’s nature, causes, consequences and who to blame have added new difficulties to the often already tense Russian-Polish relation. An important factor that feeds the dispute between Poland and Russia, are the conclusions of the report issued by the Interstate Aviation Committee, better known as the MAK-report.1 In the findings of this report, the detailed reconstruction of the last moments of Flight PLF 101 shows how the Polish side ignored the Russian advice to proceed to the alternative airport because the visibility at the Smolensk ‘Severny’ destination airdrome was too bad to land.2 General conclusion of the report is that the main ‘fault’ of the crash can be found on the Polish side and not the Russian. 3 However, according to the Poles, mistakes were also made by the Russians as the Russian airport staff and airport were considered to have been in a poor condition. 4 At the time of writing, quarrels are still ongoing on who is to blame for what, and several conspiracy theories have, in the meantime, been added to the debate. What really happened on that day in April might never become clear. Sources: 1. MAK is the abbreviation for The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC). The IAC was formed based on the intergovernmental Agreement on Civil Aviation and Air Space Use, signed on 30.12.91.The participants of the Agreement are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. 2. Mak report. Retrieved 21 June 2011 from 3 http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/files/tu154m_101/finalreport_eng.pdf. p 173-174. . Ibid., 4. Interview D1.

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W. Żygulski, ‘Thaw to the East’, The Warsaw Voice, no.1 (2011), p. 11. Ibid. 1083 Ibid. 1084 Interview D1. 1085 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 9. 1082

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4.9.5 Poland and its Special Connections with two EU Member States: Germany and Lithuania Germany Whereas the Kaczyński brothers and PiS are and were often noted for being critical towards the German vision on history, resulting e.g. in an interview with Der Spiegel in June 2010, in which an advisor to Jarosław Kaczyński stated that Kaczyński ‘is really not anti-German’ 1086 and the earlier mentioned example of Kaczyński who blamed the Germans for Poland having not the big vote within the EU Kaczyński wished for, the debate on the Polish-German relationship seems to have taken another course under the current PO government. The most firm critique on Germany today seems to be that the Polish government often finds Germany holding on too firmly to the concept of the ‘big six’ within the EU. 1087 According to some, this results in ‘bigger Member States bullying around the smaller Member States’, a situation that can have strong negative effects on a European cooperation level. 1088 Despite the road of more dialogue the current government seems to have chosen towards Germany1089, some references to World War II are still sometimes made. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently commented on Germany’s role within the EU in a speech that ‘Germany impacts Europe through the consultation mechanism, on which Member States – including Poland – have significant influence. The alternative, Germany’s leadership by ‘’traditional methods’’ […] would be worse’1090, the latter subtly referring to Germany’s history of oppressor. However, in the same speech, Sikorski points out the importance of Germany for Poland as the country is its biggest economic partner, essential in negotiations with Russia and a European partner per se. 1091 Its European partnership might have also influenced the initiative to send the High Representative of the EU, Catherine Ashton, a letter in December 2010 asking for deepening of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union.1092 The letter was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence from the Weimar Triangle: Germany, France and Poland.1093 Lithuania Although not mentioned that often in the current literature on Poland, Lithuania, finally, also deserves some special attention as it has a, mostly seen from the Lithuanian perspective, problematic history with Poland (see chapter 1). Less tension seems to be visible in the current relationship between the two countries. Foreign Minister Sikorski stated in his ideas on foreign policy for 2011 that Poland would like to ‘return to deeper cooperation’ with Lithuania, going further than the partnership NATO and the EU already offer. 1094 However, Sikorski hopes that the teaching of the Polish language in Lithuania will not be ‘further degraded’, referring to the Polish minority that lives there.1095 In addition, Sikorski supports the recent statement of the Lithuanian President that gives Poles an equal role as the 1086

Spiegel Online International. (29 June 2010). Pre-Polish election tension. Retrieved 22 May 2011 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,703245,00.html. 1087 Interview D1. 1088 Ibid. 1089 V. Ziemer, Zwischen Europa und Amerika, p. 161. 1090 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 8. 1091 Ibid. 1092 Letter to Catherine Ashton signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of France, Germany and Poland, given to the authors of this report by the Polish Ministry of National Defence, 7 April 2011. 1093 Ibid. 1094 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2011, p. 10. 1095 Ibid.

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Lithuanians in the country and hopes protection of minorities there will be developed more. 1096 On the whole, true tensions between Poland and Lithuania are hardly visible. When asked about Lithuania, the MoND states they ‘of course do not expect problems with Lithuania’.1097 Next to that, the Ministry argues that it is unthinkable these days that a Polish government would threaten Lithuania as, even if the government would consider to pose a threat, the media would be all over it.1098

4.10 Conclusion As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was Ignacy Jan Paderewski, Prime Minister during the Second Republic of Poland who noted that Poland is not going left or right and therefore, cannot be seen as being one or the other. Although it seems true that the days in which Poland was solely focussed on east/west divisions are long by, the Paderewski quote does show that Foreign Minister Sikorski subtly links his policy with the Western world (Europe and the US) and a transnational focus instead of nationalist views that, for instance, PiS often utters. Paderewski therefore seems to stand for the course the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to take, which is indeed not especially going left or right, although there is a strong preference for ‘Western-style’ policy. In the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland’s foreign and security behaviour was clear-cut and focussed on a ‘returning to Europe’, entering NATO and turning away from its communist past. Today, Poland has positioned itself successfully within these Western organisations. However, its foreign and defence policy today is not as black and white as it used to be and shows an ambiguity between past and present. This chapter has shown that Polish behaviour currently shows two tendencies that are typical for the country. First, since 1989, Polish foreign and security behaviour has been marked by securing its borders underneath the umbrella of bigger organisations. The membership of a transnational collective defence mechanism makes Poland feel safer in its environment. Therefore, it puts strong emphasis on its NATO membership and a strong connection with the United States. Also within the EU, Poland seems to be, in line with the US, one of the countries more in favour of a hard power approach than others, as it, for instance, highlights the importance of the Union’s CFSP and its possibilities for mutual defence within the EU. In addition, it is noteworthy that Poland only focuses on large organisations for its security and does not seek for defence cooperation with smaller groups of countries. Not only the United States and NATO are important, but within the EU Poland relies on the Weimar Triangle for defence matters. However, in the case of the United States, the more down to earth approach the Polish government has had since 2007 towards for instance Russia, but also Germany, seems to make the United States lose some of its role model status. Several factors seem to be influencing this process. On the one hand, the Tusk government seems to feel that the zero-sum game Russia and the United States used to play is no longer relevant. In addition, the priority of the United States lately has also shifted away from Europe and more towards, for instance, the Middle East. Next to that, the maturing of Polish foreign and security policy might lead to a making it less necessary to follow the United States regardless and becoming more of an international actor itself. 1096

Ibid. Interview D3. 1098 Ibid. 1097

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Second, the current government makes it very clear that Poland wants to focus on the future and not look back to the past. The government sees today’s threats for the country in issues that most western countries deal with such as terrorism and approaches countries it historically has difficult bonds with based on dialogue rather than seeking a defensive approach towards them. Especially the latter seems to be a very recent tendency that has started during the current Tusk government. For instance, it was only in 2007 that Jarosław Kaczyński used World War II to accuse Germany of Poland not having the strong voice within the EU it wanted to have. Now, the country shows that it is growing and maturing and becoming more independent on an international stage. Besides that, the Paderewski quote earlier in this chapter suggests that the current government wants to get rid of its image of solely focussing on national interests and fears. However, if we read between the lines, the past seems to be long but forgotten and remains very traceable in Polish foreign and security policy. It is true that former enemies do no longer get labelled as enemies of the state, but Russia keeps being monitored closely. Poland initiating international plans such as the EaPs and promoting enlargement of NATO and the EU with other Central and Eastern European countries therefore can be seen as influenced by its new approach of taking leadership, but also as still resulting from its past.

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5. CIVIL SOCIETY In this chapter the development of Polish civil society during the last three decades will be analysed. Before elaborating on the subject further, it is necessary to pay attention to several definitions that have been given to the concept civil society throughout the years, as many different views exist on what civil society actually is and what the main characteristics are of a good functioning civil society. This research will mainly focus on the definition adopted by the World Bank. The term civil society [is used] to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organisations: community groups, non-governmental organisations, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations.1099

However, it is important to note that some scientists explicitly add in their definition descriptions as ‘independent of the state’ and ‘for the common good’. 1100 In addition, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato note, next to the independence of the state, independence of the market as a precondition for a good functioning civil society, in which the citizens need to be protected from state and market influences to be able to form ‘independent judgements’. 1101 Others give a more implicit and extensive description of this disputed concept. Robert Putnam emphasises in his Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy that the development of a civil society, or in his words ‘civic community’, determines to what extent governments are able to function efficiently and effectively and are ascribed a legitimate status by citizens. 1102 In this way, a well developed civil society contributes to better functioning of the state. In this context, the existence of a ‘civic community’ can be defined by ‘the degree of civic engagement displayed by citizens’. 1103 Bearing in mind that this civic engagement is determined by e.g. the degree of voluntary work or interest in society in general, Putnam’s idea of a good functioning democracy, and thus government, has everything to do with the presence of the so-called ‘social capital’ in a society, which is characterised by public trust and shared norms and values that consequently establish social networks.1104 Herewith the clear distinction between state and civil society, as mentioned in the previous section, has been enriched with a more vague dimension. Furthermore, a fourth important description of civil society should be considered as well. The Italian writer and politician Antonio Gramsci gives a remarkably different view on the concept civil society. According to him, civil society is, next to political society, an important part of the state. 1105 As civil society and political society are both part of the state, the relationship between these two makes it possible that people get elected, and

1099

The World Bank. Defining Civil Society. Retrieved 21 May 2011 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pag ePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html. 1100 P.C. Schmitter and T. Karl, ‘What Democracy is… and is Not’, Journal of Democracy, no. 3 (1991), pp. 7980. 1101 M.W. Foley and V.A. Hodgkinson, ‘Introduction’, in: V.A. Hodgkinson and M.W. Foley eds., The Civil Society Reader, Hanover and London: University Press of New England 2003, p. xxii. 1102 Ibid., p. xxiii. 1103 Ibid. 1104 Ibid. 1105 J.A. Buttigieg, ‘Gramsci on Civil Society’, boundary 2, vol. 22, no. 3 (1995), p. 4.

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consequently, get power within a state and, moreover, get to keep this power. 1106 In this sense, it can be considered that there is no clear distinction between civil society and the state and, as civil society being a part of the state, that these two interact with each other. As some put it, ‘[c]ivil society, in Gramsci’s view, is the arena in which the struggle for hegemony unfolds’, which stimulates revolutionary actions.1107 Therefore, according to Gramsci, civil society and state are, unlike in the theories mentioned above, strongly intertwined. Gramsci’s ideas were of significant importance, especially for the development of Polish civil society during the last decade of the communist regime. His ideas had an important influence on actions performed by the famous Polish dissident Adam Michnik, who influenced Polish civil society significantly in the 1980s.1108 Bearing this theoretical framework in mind, Polish civil society will be examined step by step. In order to conduct good research on present-day Polish civil society, historical background is needed. Firstly, the civil society development during communist rule and the (early) years of transition will be described. Secondly, present-day civil society will be examined, with its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the role that the European Union has played and still plays nowadays in the development of Polish civil society will be taken into consideration.

5.1 Civil Society Development during Communist Rule and the (Early) Years of Transition 5.1.1 Communist Era: the General Picture During communist rule, civil society could not develop freely in Poland as there was an inhibitory legal basis regarding freedom to associate. The Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic of 1952 states in Article 84: 1). With the aim to develop political, social, economic and cultural activity of the urban and rural working masses, the Polish People’s Republic guarantees to its citizens the right of association. 2). Political organisations, trade unions, associations of working peasants, cooperative associations, youth-, women’s-, sports- and defense organisations, cultural, technological and scientific associations, as well as other social organisations of the working people, may organise citizens toward active participation in political, social, economic and cultural life. 3). It is prohibited to establish and participate in associations whose aims or activities threaten the political and social system or the legal order of Polish People's Republic.1109

Initially, Article 84 seems to guarantee the right and freedom to associate. However, if looked upon closer, one can see that this provision does not say anything about this ‘right of association’, mentioned in paragraph 1, in practice and how the implementation of this right is guaranteed by the Polish state. 1110 In addition, paragraph 3 of this article, partially because of its vagueness, made it difficult for the Polish people to actually act freely in associations and in establishing associations, as it provided the government the freedom to close organisations or block their actions when not in the government’s favour or not matching its positions or values. 1111 1106

Ibid. M.W. Foley and V.A. Hodgkinson, ‘Introduction’, p. xix. 1108 Ibid., p. xx. 1109 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland: An Analysis of the Laws Affecting Civic Organizations. Retrieved 22 May 2011 from http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/prawny/3.pdf. p. 4. 1110 Ibid. 1111 Ibid. 1107

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In other words, the constitution did not authorise organisations or citizens to influence public life the way they wanted to,1112 and ‘the sphere of social activity became subjected to a high degree of state control’.1113 As some put it, the mono-centric regime did not allow Polish citizens to act spontaneously. 1114 Civil initiatives did not match with the communist ideology, as this ideology was based on centralism. 1115 However, it was not totally impossible for Polish civil society to act, especially in the 1980s, which eventually caused that its influence did not disappear completely from Polish public life and that it even played a crucial role in the collapse of the communist regime in Poland in 1989.1116 There were two types of organisations that shaped Polish civil society in these years that were characterised by the totalitarian regime. The first type consisted of organisations which were formed or tolerated by the state.1117 However, these organisations could not develop or engage freely in public life as they worked under government’s supervision, which resulted in a situation in which the government’s goals were achieved instead of those of the organisation.1118 In addition, the communist government forced people to publically engage in a certain way to be able to legitimise their own policy, which did not motivate the Polish citizens much to initiate such civil society movements themselves. 1119 Moreover, this imposition resulted in and aversion against social organisations in general, as they were associated with the political regime of the communists.1120 The second type of organisations consisted of an underground social movement which was totally independent of the state, but at the same time had no legal status. The trade union Solidarity played the most important role in this underground civil society. 1121 As mentioned in section 4.1.1, Solidarity eventually contributed to a large extent during the Round Table negotiations that partially free elections were held in Poland on 4 June 1989. 1122 Furthermore, Solidarity also played an important role as the non-communist opposition on the political playing field during the 1980s.1123 5.1.2 Solidarity Because of the exceedingly important role Solidarity played during the final years of communist rule as well as during the period of transition, it would be interesting to elaborate on the movement a little further. The Solidarity movement came into existence because of a group of shipyard workers which went on strike in Gdańsk, in 1980. This strike formed part 1112

G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, in: J. Kucharczyk and J. Zbieranek eds., Democracy in Poland 1989-2009: Challenges for the future, Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych 2010, p. 116. 1113 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity: CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland (2006). Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Poland_Country_Report.pdf. p. 18. 1114 K. Dziubka, ‘Op Weg naar een Civil Society: Dilemma’s en Tegenstellingen bij de Transformatie van het Maatschappelijke Bewustzijn in Polen’, in: P. Dekker ed., Civil society: Verkenningen van een perspectief op vrijwilligerswerk, Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2001, p. 88. 1115 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006)http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Poland_Country_Report.pdf, p. 18. 1116 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 116. 1117 Ibid. 1118 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Poland_Country_Report.pdfp. 18. 1119 Ibid 1120 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 8. 1121 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 116. 1122 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland: Case study. Retrieved 28 May 2011 from http://www.cbos.pl/PL/wydarzenia/04_konferencja/Civil%20society%20in%20Poland.pdf. p. 2. 1123 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Poland_Country_Report.pdfp. 18.

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of a series of strikes being held for several weeks, by workers throughout the country protesting against the rising of prices and the lack of governmental representation. 1124 Lech Wałęsa, who was a recently fired electrician, became the spokesperson and the front-rank man of the shipyard workers’ strike. 1125 As sympathy strikes took place in several other parts of Poland, a trade union emerged in order to be able to arrange common and coordinated protest among the workers.1126 This trade union was called Solidarity. Solidarity, which had indeed started out as a local organisation, rapidly gained reputation throughout the country and beyond, and managed to attire around ten million people, which was almost half of the Polish working population, as a member to the trade union. 1127 While Solidarity started out as a trade union for workers, its reach broadened to a large part of the Polish society as it associated itself with intellectual circles involved in the same opposition against communism. 1128 This feature of opposition against communism could be one of the most important characteristics of the identity of Solidarity. It demonstrated quite clearly a division between government and society. In other words, the division between ‘we’, the people, and ‘they’, the state, might have been the core problem of the time. 1129 It can also be seen as the beginning of the development of a grass-root civil society in Poland, which would spread the way for other civil society movements, especially after the fall of communism. The common cause against the communist rule was the main reason that Solidarity gained as much influence as it did. The Communist Party had quite some trouble dealing with the Solidarity movement, as it consisted of workers instead of capitalists. Therefore, according to the theory of Marx, they fell within the ambit of the Party. In September 1981, the first Solidarity workers national congress took place. Ideas for a new economical and political plan were ventilated, and plans to overthrow the communist government took shape. 1130 In December 1981, the communist government imposed the Martial law. Moreover, the authorities had confirmed the illegality of the movement, therefore it had to perform its operations in an underground manner. Many Solidarity members were imprisoned, amongst which Lech Wałęsa. 1131 In 1983, during his imprisonment, the dissident Adam Michnik composed several ideas in the form of letters with regard to Solidarity’s opposition. He concluded that Solidarity had to continue its activities in an underground manner in order to create a civil society. 1132 However, in 1986, the communist leaders granted amnesty to Solidarity, allowing it to move above ground.1133 Solidarity was regionally organised instead of in a centralised manner, like the Communist Party was. The way in which the Solidarity movement operated was through the activity of a trade union, as well as through publications. The latter was very important, as it

1124 S.C. Pearce, ‘The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect: In Search of a Mnemonic Mirror’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 22, no. 2 (2009), p. 165. 1125 Ibid. 1126 Ibid. 1127 Ibid. 1128 J. Bielasiak, ‘The paradox of Solidarity’s legacy: contested values in Poland’s transitional politics’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 38, no. 1 (2010), p. 44. 1129 A. Mielczarek, ‘Lost Capital – The Intelligentsia Current of Underground Solidarity in Free Poland’, Polish Sociological Review, no. 3 (2008), pp. 229-244. 1130 P.K. Raina, Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal, London: George Allen & Unwin 1985, pp. 326-380. 1131 S.C. Pearce, ‘The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect’, p. 165. 1132 C. Miedema, ‘No title’. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/20070607-201107/Miedema%20C%20-%20masterthesis%2008-02-2007%20v2.pdf. p. 28. 1133 S.C. Pearce, ‘The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect’, p. 168.

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firmly rooted the survival and continuity of the resistance movement in spite of the initial severe persecutions by the authorities. 1134 Another important reason for the high amount of influence was the relationship between the Solidarity movement and the Roman Catholic Church, as they engaged in some sort of partnership in the resistance against communist rule.1135 The significant influence that Adam Michnik had on this relationship between civil society and cultural society must be taken into account. During the last years of communism, Michnik emphasised the possible significant role the Roman Catholic Church could play in Solidarity’s opposition against the communist regime as the church was an independent cultural movement that represented independent life and made this independent life possible within its walls as well. 1136 In this context, Michnik was significantly influenced by Gramsci’s ideas.1137 However, according to Michnik, the support from the church had to be strictly educational and not political. 1138 In his book The Church and the Left, which was published in Poland in 1981, he describes the logic behind this partnership. Next to the fact that the Roman Catholic Church was the place where independent life was possible, the Roman Catholic Church played a fairly large role during the partially free elections of 1989, as the Roman Catholic clergy had been involved in several campaign activities such as preparing the election activists, making their printing machines available, as well as organising special prayers in favour of the election of Solidarity.1139 In addition, Pope John Paul II offered Solidarity moral support already years before the elections of 1989, during the underground period, 1140 as well as during the last years of communism. 1141 Nevertheless, after the 1989 elections with which Solidarity gained 260 seats of the 261 seats put up for election, Solidarity began to splinter. It was as if the movement, once it was holding political power, was not able to retain the idea of a common cause and lost its unified form of an oppositional civic movement. 1142 Consequently, Solidarity split up in several different political parties in 1990. Likewise, during the decade after the election of Lech Wałęsa as president in 1990, some members of the movement were rather disappointed in the way in which politics and economics were organised. 1143 Nowadays, however, the legacy of Solidarity is still very much noticeable. Above all, its presence remains on the political level, as the two largest political parties are led by former Solidarity members.1144 Indeed, both the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO) ground the identity they disseminate on Solidarity rhetoric. PiS defines itself as ‘the embodiment of Solidaristic Poland’,1145 against the liberal individualism of the opposition. In turn, the PO bases its programme on the ‘struggle for freedom and liberal values’. 1146 This is rather striking, as both the political parties claim their very distinct programs based upon the 1134

A. Mielczarek, ‘Lost Capital – The Intelligentsia Current of Underground Solidarity in Free Poland’, p. 230. S.C. Pearce, ‘The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect, p. 170. 1136 M.W. Foley and V.A. Hodgkinson, ‘Introduction’, p. xx. 1137 Ibid. 1138 C. Miedema, ‘No Title’. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/20070607-201107/Miedema%20C%20-%20masterthesis%2008-02-2007%20v2.pdf. p. 28. 1139 K. Kosela, The Polish Catholic Church and the Elections of 1989. Retrieved 16 May 2011 from www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/rcl/18-2_124.pdf. pp. 129-130. 1140 J. Donovan, Poland: Solidarity – The Trade Union That Changed The World (24 August 2005). Retrieved 23 June 2011 from http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1060898.html. 1141 W. Roszkowski, Solidarity and the Influence of John Paul II (27 March 2006). Retrieved 28 June 2011 from http://www.wya.net/pdf/ISF2006/Roszkowski%20Speech%20JPII.pdf. p. 3. 1142 S.C. Pearce, ‘The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect, p. 168. 1143 Ibid., p. 170. 1144 Ibid., p. 171. 1145 J. Bielasiak, ‘The paradox of Solidarity’s legacy: contested values in Poland’s transitional politics’, p. 48. 1135

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same – although different interpretations of – legacy of Solidarity. Therefore, it can be stated that the legacy of the civil organisation of Solidarity is largely intertwined with politics nowadays. As the current (leading) political parties and their programmes as well as civil society in Poland derived from the same movement, it can be questioned to what extent current Polish civil society is able to act independently from politics. Having said that, the following section will proceed to outline the development of civil society in general after the collapse of the communist rule. This development, as will subsequently be explained in the following, has also been characterised by its political dimension. 5.1.3 The Early Years of Transition The foundation of the Civil Committees in the summer of 1989 was one of the most important happenings with regard to the development of Polish civil society in the early years of transition. 1147 The establishment of these political organisations made it possible for the noncommunist opposition Solidarity to get elected during the partially free elections in June 1989 and, moreover, to win the elections. The latter spread the way for the adoption of the new Associations Act by the newly elected parliament, in the same year.1148 The act preserved the name of the previous Law on Associations, which was in force during communist rule, but much more restrictive. 1149 The new Associations Act guaranteed the right to freedom of association and was possible to adopt as it was agreed upon during the Round Table talks. 1150 This act made organisations in general significantly independent from the state. 1151 Its adoption resulted in 23 000 associations that were officially registered by 1992. 1152 After its adoption in 1989, three amendments to the Act were made during the 1990s. The current Law on Associations ‘serves as the legal basis for Polish association creation and activities’. 1153 Another important year for civil society in Poland was 1997. As mentioned in section 3.1, the new constitution was adopted in that year. The adoption of this new constitution was important for the development of civil society as it introduced two new phenomena. Firstly, the constitution ‘ultimately guaranteed the freedom to form and to operate with respect to all civil organisations, thus empowering civil society’.1154 Secondly, by introducing the subsidiarity principle in its preamble, the constitution emphasised the important role of the individual in Polish society and, consequently, the supportive role which should be fulfilled by the Polish government.1155 During the early years of transition, in the beginning of the 1990s, activities in Polish civil society were mainly characterised by their political dimension, which meant that these activities were, in a certain way, similar to political activities.1156 The goals of the many civic activities which were held at that time were a mix of political and non-political ones. However, they had one thing in common, which was to try to erase the developments caused by the communist past and to stimulate new developments.1157 As mentioned above, the 1146

Ibid., p. 49. G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 116. 1148 Ibid. 1149 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 8. 1150 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 18. 1151 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 8. 1152 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 116. 1153 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 8. 1154 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 116. 1155 Ibid., pp. 116-117. 1156 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 18. 1157 Ibid. 1147

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number of NGOs in that period rose quickly. However, these NGOs faced several difficulties. The lack of financial resources was the main problem. 1158 The increase in the number of NGOs diminished from the mid-1990s as well as the development of NGOs in general. 1159 5.2 Present-Day Civil Society Grzegorz Makowski describes civil society in contemporary Poland as weak in his ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’.1160 A characteristic of this weak civil society is the fact that it is, as Makowski puts it, not able ‘to channel social interests, to make citizens active and to build local communities’.1161 The development of NGOs, which is ‘the institutionalised part of the civil society’, could be described as being weak as well. 1162 First of all, it is important to note that the term NGO is not defined clearly in Polish law. In addition, Polish people in general are not aware of the meaning of the term and do not use it much.1163 According to a consultant and former researcher of the KLON/JAWOR Association1164, about 100 000 NGOs were officially registered in Poland in 2011. 1165 However, ‘the reality is not as optimistic as [the] figures [are]’. 1166 In Poland, a NGO is not legally obligated to deregister when ending its activities as a NGO, which leads to the fact that the number of active NGOs is far from 100 000. ‘It is estimated that some 25 % of this number of NGOs registered, in fact, is dead.’1167 This means that Poland has about 75 000 active NGOs.1168 Moreover, the NGOs that actually are active experience financial problems.1169 5.2.1 The Weaknesses of Polish Civil Society According to Makowski, there is a connection between the condition of the NGO sector and ‘the general [weak] condition of civil society’ in Poland. 1170 The ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’ from 2006 concludes that one of the biggest weaknesses of Polish civil society is the low ‘engagement of citizens in public affairs’.1171 This engagement includes e.g. ‘involvement in non-partisan political actions’, ‘membership of organisations’ and ‘public spiritedness’ (the latter is characterised e.g. by a low level of trust in others). 1172 ‘Involvement in non-partisan political actions’ includes e.g. efforts to ‘stimulate voter participation’,1173 seeking contact with a national or local politician or civil servant, signing a petition, attending legal public demonstrations, or participating in illegal protests. 1174 A rather 1158

Ibid., p. 19. Ibid. 1160 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 117. 1161 Ibid. 1162 Ibid. Interview G2. 1163 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 8. 1164 KLON/JAWOR Association is a non-profit organisation which deals mostly with doing research and providing information to other organisations on how to perform actions, how to meet different legal obligations and how to search for funding. 1165 Interview G2. 1166 Ibid. 1167 Ibid. 1168 This number is based on the situation in April 2011. 1169 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. Interview G2. 1170 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. 1171 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 74. 1172 Ibid., p. 8. 1173 Ibid. 1174 Ibid., p. 25. 1159

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low percentage of Poles is involved in non-partisan actions or is member of a CSO. 1175 In 2004/2005, between 12.3 % and 20.3 % of the Polish adults was a member of a CSO, depending on the research and the sort of questions asked. 1176 According to the survey conducted by Diagnoza Spoleczna in 2007, 15 % of the Polish adults was a member of a CSO.1177 However, a research done by Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) in 2008 showed that approximately 20 % of the Polish adult population seemed to be active within a CSO somehow, 1178 while another research, conducted by Diagnoza 2009, showed that this number was 13 %. 1179 In some scholars’ view this difference in numbers can be explained by the fact that different surveys have different questionnaires, with one having more detailed questions regarding the naming of specific organisations while others keep the questions more general.1180 Without concluding which number is fully correct, when comparing these different results with the results of civic engagement in West European countries, e.g. Austria and Norway, one can conclude that the level of participation of Polish citizens is extremely low.1181 According to the CBOS research from 2008, Polish citizens seem to be most active in, successively, educational/school foundations, trade unions, church and religious organisations, and sports clubs.1182 It is important to note that, in spite of being in the top three of types of organisations in which the citizens are most active, the activeness in trade unions has decreased strikingly over the last twenty years, as it dwindled from 22 % of all Polish adults in 1989 to 6 % in 2008.1183 According to KLON/JAWOR, in 2010, between 12 % and 13 % of the Polish adults was engaged somehow in the Polish non-governmental sector within the last year, either by spending their time doing certain activities voluntarily organised by a NGO or by being an official member.1184 Remarkable is that a lot of Polish people who were questioned did not know what was meant by the question if they were engaged in some kind of NGO-activity. Many Poles do not know exactly what the third sector means and therefore specific organisations need to be named in the questions in order to get the right data when such research is conducted.1185 However, the research of KLON/JAWOR from 2009 shows that the number of Polish adults contributing financially or materially to organisations or the community in general is significantly higher, namely about 50 % of adults living in Poland. 1186 It needs to be noted that this percentage owes its high number to the fact that donations given to the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity, a public charity collection which is organised ones a year, were included. Otherwise, without these donations, the number concerning philanthropic conduct would only be 19 %. 1187 According to Putnam, trust is a significant condition for a strong civil society. Bearing this in mind, the low engagement of the Polish citizens can be subscribed to the low level of trust in the NGO sector. In 2006, according to a research done by CBOS, a netto 1175

Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 26. 1177 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland, p. 22. 1178 Ibid., p. 23. 1179 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. 1180 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland, p. 23. 1181 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. 1182 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland, p. 24. 1183 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 1184 Interview G2. 1185 Ibid. 1186 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 119. 1187 Ibid. 1176

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number of 7 % of the Polish population declared to have trust in NGOs. 1188 In general, Polish people do not believe that NGOs are able to solve the problems that Poland is dealing with. 1189 In addition, NGOs are often associated with state institutions by Polish citizens. 1190 As the trust in state institutions is rather low,1191 the low level of trust in Polish NGOs can be explained through this association with state institutions. This association is not strange as NGOs are often connected with the government, which will be elaborated on below. In addition, particularly in small communities, local NGOs occasionally establish a political committee in order to get elected. 1192 However, in 2004, a research done by the same organisation showed that the low level of trust does not apply for charity organisations.1193 The level of trust in charity organisations such as Caritas (84 %), Polish Red Cross (82 %) and the Great Orchestra of the Christmas Charity (86 %) is rather high compared to the level of trust in other institutions, including public institutions as the government (21 %) and local authorities (53 %).1194 In addition, when looking at the level of trust in general one can see that Poland is ranked among the countries where there is remarkably low general trust in people. 1195 There is a significant difference between the level of trust in close family-members, which is rather high, and the level of trust in people outside family circles, which is significantly lower. 1196 These results can also be appointed as one of the reasons for the low civic engagement as trust is needed in order to initiate cooperation between citizens for the common good. 1197 This vision is shared by several scientists who emphasise that ‘the dominant role of family’ in combination with the ‘low level of social trust’ plays an important role in the lack of development of Polish civil society.1198 Furthermore, the ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’ from 2006 identified a second important weakness; the lack of engagement of CSOs members. 1199 This weakness is especially affecting organisations as there is ‘a lack of people willing to selflessly support their activities’.1200 This problem could be tackled by the organisations themselves by putting more effort in engaging their members and involving the local communities more in their activities.1201 Finally, by the same report it is indicated that the cooperation between the public administration and the CSOs is having some problems as well. 1202 According to Makowski, the bad financial condition of most NGOs and the fact that the biggest source for funding lies in the governmental sector, in combination with this lack of cooperation between the two,

1188

Ibid., p. 118. Centrum Bandania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS). (2006). Zaufanie do Rządu, Przedsiębiorstw, ONZ i Organizacji Pozarządowych w 20 Krajach Świata. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2006/K_004_06.PDF. p. 6. 1189 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. 1190 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland, p. 30. 1191 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 68. 1192 Interview G2. 1193 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 67. 1194 Ibid., p. 68. 1195 M. Wenzel and J. Kubik, Civil Society in Poland, p. 27. 1196 Ibid., p. 28. 1197 Ibid., p. 27. 1198 A. Pacześniak, ‘The influence of the European Union on the NGO sector in Poland – a benefit or an obstacle?’, in: S. Devaux and I. Sudbery eds., Europeanisation: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27, Prague: Centre français de reherche en sciences sociales 2009, p. 165. 1199 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), pp. 8 and 75. 1200 Ibid., p. 75. 1201 Ibid., pp. 8-9 and 75. 1202 Ibid., p. 9.

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leads to a tendency which is characterised by CSOs ‘implementing public tasks, thus losing their civic character’.1203 Despite this trend indicated in 2006 and 2009, one can say that in the last two or three years some positive changes have occurred. According to KLON/JAWOR, Polish civil society is more visible nowadays as it has more impact on the state in terms of policies that are implemented and the activities done by the state,1204 even though this impact was described as rather weak in 2006 by the ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’.1205 According to Makowski, a long-term policy prepared by the Polish government is needed in order to stimulate further development of Polish civil society and, consequently, democracy.1206 This long-term policy would have to tackle the problems that current Polish civil society is facing. 1207 In order to prevent that the current situation of the civil society in Poland will stagnate or get worse, the government needs to develop and implement a policy which includes ‘long-term action to support civic education and the development of the nongovernmental organisations sector’.1208 The policy should also include ‘practical implementation of the social dialogue idea’, through the concept of civil dialogue, in order to stimulate cooperation between the government and CSOs in public policy making. 1209 During the PO-PSL government, the Strategy for Supporting the Development of Civil Society and the report Poland 2030: Developmental Challenges were adopted. Both documents point out the problems with regard to Polish civil society development, however they do not provide a concrete strategy on how these problems should be tackled. Furthermore, these documents are not of obligatory nature and therefore are not powerful enough.1210 5.2.2 The Strengths of Polish Civil Society One of the strengths characterising Polish civil society is the fact that since the new Constitution of 1997 the official establishment and registration of NGOs is not a state competence anymore. This means that according to the current constitution, NGOs have to be registered by a judicial authority, which makes NGO registration independent from the state.1211 Furthermore, the year 2003 has been an important year for Polish civil society concerning its legal framework, as the adoption of the Act on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work improved its position and possibilities for development.1212 This act ‘defines the rules of cooperation with the public administration’ and created the Public Benefit Works Council,1213 which is: [A]n advisory and supportive body to the Ministry of Social Policy. Its tasks include…, among other things, to: express opinions on issues concerning the application of the Public Benefit and Volunteer Work Act; express opinions about government draft legal acts concerning public benefit activity and volunteering; provide support and express opinions in cases of disputes between institutions of public administration and public benefit organisations; and, in cooperation with NGOs, create mechanisms for

1203

G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. Interview G2. 1205 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 7. 1206 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, pp. 119-120. 1207 Ibid., p. 119. 1208 Ibid., p. 120. 1209 Ibid., p. 123. 1210 Ibid., p. 121. 1211 Z. Lasocik, Freedom of Association in Poland, p. 5. 1212 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 117. 1213 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 8. 1204

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informing about the standards for conducting public benefit activity and about cases of breaches of these standards.1214

According to the ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’ this legal framework can be considered as a significant strength in Polish civil society as it creates an ‘improving legal environment’.1215 However, at the time of the writing of the ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’ (2006), though the existence of the act was seen as a positive thing, amendments to the act were recommended by the same report.1216 In the meantime, in 2010 to be exact, the Public Benefit Act was amended. Nowadays, among other things, it provides Polish NGOs the opportunity to register as a Public Benefit Organisation (PBO). Public Benefit Organisations are exempt from paying corporate tax on income devoted to their statutory goals… Currently [in June 2011], over 8,300 organisations have PBO status. In order to qualify for PBO status, a non-governmental organisation (such as a foundation or association, but also commercial company and sports club, i.e. not an NGO under the Act's definition) must satisfy a number of requirements specified in the PBA…To apply for PBO status, an organisation must submit an application form, a financial report, and its organisational statute to the State Court Register…In general, PBO status qualifies an organisation to receive certain benefits defined in the law, provided that it meets accountability requirements.1217

Another benefit PBOs enjoy in Poland, next to the exemption ‘from paying corporate tax on income devoted to their statutory goals’,1218 is the fact that Polish citizens can donate 1 % of their income tax to a PBO of their own choice. 1219 However, the extra requirements it needs to meet in order to receive these extra benefits are perceived by some NGOs as too much effort for the small amount of money it gets in return. 1220 Among these requirements are many obligations with regard to accountancy and reporting.1221 Nevertheless, with the benefits provided by the Public Benefit Act, Polish NGOs are able to perform their activities more effectively as there is more money left. Moreover, according to the ‘CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Poland’, with this law the Polish population is stimulated to volunteer more and to contribute to charity. 1222 Furthermore, this law stimulates cooperation between the public administration and NGOs.1223 However, another important factor in the improvement of cooperation between NGOs and the government has been the fact that NGOs are increasingly represented in bodies which contribute to social dialogue in Polish society. 1224 The influence of the EU in this matter will be discussed in the next section. One of the biggest strengths of Polish civil society are the positive values which are represented and defended by NGOs. Values ‘such as such as democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-violence, gender equity and poverty eradication’ are promoted, which are crucial for the development of a strong civil society.1225 Finally, other strengths that are

1214

Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 8. 1216 Ibid. 1217 United States International Grantmaking: Council on Foundations. (2011). Country Information Poland. Retrieved 18 June 2011 from http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/poland.asp. 1218 Ibid. 1219 I. Goliński, How Percentage Laws Work in Practice: Poland’s 1% system (2003). Retrieved 6 July 2011 from http://www.onepercent.hu/Dokumentumok/Chapter_4_Golinski_Pl.pdf. p. 1. Interviews B1, G1 and H2. 1220 Interview B1. 1221 Ibid. 1222 M. Gumkowska et al., The Challenge of Solidarity (2006), p. 74. 1223 Ibid. 1224 Ibid. 1225 Ibid., pp. 74 and 82. 1215

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represented in the Polish NGO sector regard its diverse climate and good network organisation.1226

5.3 EU Influence on Polish Civil Society EU influence on Polish civil society is two-sided. EU accession brought positive as well as negative effects. According to KLON/JAWOR, the influence of the EU was significant, however not always positive. 1227 In this section, the positive as well as the negative effects on Polish civil society caused by EU accession will be examined. 5.3.1 The Positive Effects European regulations could be considered the prominent positive influence on Polish civil society, as Poland’s EU accession meant that Poland needed to adapt its regulation to EU regulation. With the adoption of the legal framework on public consultations and establishment of monitoring committees, Poland had taken a significant step forward in developing a stronger civil society. 1228 The EU intends to promote active citizenship, or ‘active participation in public life’, in Polish society as well as on the supranational EU level.1229 This promotion means that the EU does not influence Polish civil society solely through ‘forcing’ implementation of civil society friendly regulations in Poland since Poland’s EU accession, but also through regulations stimulating more active citizenship and development of European civil society in general on the EU level. The promotion of active citizenship can be found in several EU treaties and documents, the establishment of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the stimulation of cooperation between the public sector and the civil society. 1230 Firstly, active citizenship is promoted in several EU treaties and documents. The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) stimulates social dialogue, 1231 while the Lisbon Treaty ‘provides […] that citizens are directly represented in the European Parliament, shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union and to an open and transparent dialogue with the institutions of the Community’. 1232 Important documents with regard to development of NGO-activity are Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in Europe and The Commission and Non-governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership.1233 Furthermore, the TEC established the EESC. This committee ‘consists of representatives of various economic and social groups of organised civil society’.1234 Finally, the EU actively stimulates partnership between the public sector and the civil society. The partnership has been strengthened due to the EU programme (2007-2013) on the management of structural funds and the cohesion fund. 1235 In this EU programme, civil society organisations are able to take part in the negotiations about the preparation as well as 1226

Ibid., p. 74. Interview G2 1228 Ibid. 1229 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 120. 1230 A. Pacześniak, ‘The influence of the European Union on the NGO sector in Poland – a benefit or an obstacle?’, p. 176. 1231 Ibid. 1232 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 120. 1233 A. Pacześniak, ‘The influence of the European Union on the NGO sector in Poland – a benefit or an obstacle?’, p. 176. 1234 Ibid. 1235 Ibid., p. 177. 1227

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implementation of the EU programmes. 1236 In order to strengthen this inclusion of Polish civil society in these negotiations, the so-called monitoring committees were established. Within these monitoring committees, the state, market and civil society are represented through its own representatives. 1237 These committees have been established in order to implement and manage EU structural funds in line with EU regulation.1238 With the monitoring committees Poland stimulates the public decision-making process more in a EU model direction as social partners are also included in this process. 1239 The committees are independent and represented at different administrative levels, including the national level. Furthermore, they have a consultative function and they can give their opinion to different governmental institutions, but their recommendations are not legally binding for the institutions. 1240 As Anna GasiorNiemiec and Piotr Gliński put it in their ‘Europeanisation of civil society in Poland’, ‘[t]heir task is to monitor, evaluate and recommend changes and modifications of objectives and modes of management and implementation of a given programme and related fund, both in terms of policy goals, policy instruments, financial instruments, the access and allocation strategies’. 1241 The stronger cooperation between civil society and the public sector is supposed to stimulate civic activity.1242 In sum, looking at the cooperation between civil society and the public sector, positive changes can be seen. Some subscribe these positive changes to EU rules. 1243 Nevertheless, the question remains if these changes can be subscribed to the influence of Polish EU membership or to the influence of other international organisations, networks or NGOs.1244 5.3.2 The Negative Effects The biggest negative effect which EU accession brought for Polish civil society is that it stimulated, and still stimulates, stratification in the NGO sector. According to KLON/JAWOR, Poland expected that after EU accession its civil society would be strengthened because there would be more funds coming from the EU.1245 However, these expectations eventually lead to a disappointment, as EU funds were only available and accessible for bigger NGOs which were in possession of enough financial means and professionals. Only these NGOs were able to apply successfully for EU funds as they could meet the obligations required for the funds, while the other, smaller, NGOs could not.1246 In addition, the Polish government developed extra regulations on top of the already existing regulations imposed by the EU, because it distrusted the NGO sector in terms of that it was able to control the way in which the EU funds would be spent without money disappearing. Therewith, application rules became stricter and the Polish government installed a controlling mechanism on how EU funds were spent.1247 This caused that in the years right after accession only about 10 % of all NGOs in Poland could apply for EU funds as only they 1236

Ibid. A. Gąsior-Niemiec and P. Gliński, ‘Europeanization of civil society in Poland’, Revija Za Socijalnu Politiku, vol. 14, no. 1 (2007), p. 38. 1238 Ibid. 1239 Ibid. 1240 Ibid. 1241 Ibid. 1242 A. Pacześniak, ‘The influence of the European Union on the NGO sector in Poland – a benefit or an obstacle?’, p. 177. 1243 Ibid. 1244 Ibid., p. 178. 1245 Interview G2. 1246 Ibid. 1247 Ibid. 1237

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met the criteria for application. Moreover, the number of NGOs that actually received EU funding was rather small as well.1248 The small number of organisations that was able to attract EU funds, was also able to develop more successfully and to use its gained assets in order to attract more EU funds. These organisations had the knowledge, skills, and, more importantly, enough money to apply for EU funds successfully. Therefore, these organisations grew significantly and, as they got bigger and bigger in the meantime, nowadays, have an even better chance to grow even more. 1249 On the contrary, the large majority of Polish NGOs was small and not able to attract EU funding. Therefore, these NGOs stayed small while the bigger NGOs were growing. Nowadays, they are staying small, as they do not receive the EU funding that bigger NGOs receive and are not even able to apply because they do not meet the criteria or for other reasons, e.g. not having enough workers. Majority of the Polish NGOs does not have any financial means. This entails that they cannot apply for EU funds as certain capital is needed before you can apply.1250 This majority of the Polish NGOs is primarily dependent on funding from the Polish government. A good relationship with the government is therefore crucial for these NGOs in order to survive, as there are almost no other funding sources for the Polish NGOs.1251 As mentioned above, the dependency on government’s funding causes that Polish NGOs are performing public instead of civic tasks.1252 This development within the Polish NGO sector, which is stimulated through EU funding, has caused an unequal structure within the sector.1253 In other words, the Polish NGO sector is characterised by a great extent of stratification. This stratification is getting bigger and ‘more stretched’ as big NGOs are getting bigger and the small NGOs are getting smaller.1254

5.4 Conclusion Contemporary Polish civil society has several weaknesses. The most prominent weakness is the lack of civic engagement. In 2010, about 13 % of the Polish adults was engaged somehow in the Polish non-governmental sector, which indicates, especially when compared to the civic engagement in countries in West Europe, low civic participation in Poland’s civil society. Moreover, the unawareness of what the terms NGO and NGO-activity mean, illustrates this low civic engagement even more. According to Putnam, trust is a significant condition for a strong civil society. Bearing this in mind, the low engagement of the Polish citizens can be subscribed to the low level of trust in the NGO sector and in people in general that characterises Polish society. Several scientists emphasise that the low level of public trust plays an important role in the lack of development of the civil society in Poland, as trust is needed in order to initiate cooperation between citizens for the common good. Another fact that can serve to explain the low civic engagement in Poland is the imposed civic engagement by the government during the communist days. Due to this imposition, hostility developed towards social organisations in general, as they were associated with the political regime of the communists.

1248

Ibid. Ibid. 1250 Ibid. 1251 Ibid. 1252 G. Makowski, ‘Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects’, p. 118. 1253 Interview G2. 1254 Ibid. 1249

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Furthermore, the rather laborious cooperation between the public administrations and the CSOs and the bad financial condition of many organisations are indicated as weaknesses of Polish civil society. Bearing this bad financial condition in mind, the fact that the biggest source for funding lies in the governmental sector, in combination with this lack of cooperation between the two, leads to a tendency which is characterised by CSOs implementing public tasks instead of civic tasks. However, in the last two years, Polish civil society has become more visible in terms of that it has more impact on the state with regard to policies that are implemented and activities performed by the state. In order to stimulate further development of Polish civil society a long-term policy prepared by the Polish government is needed. The PO-PSL government has already adopted two strategies. Both documents point out the problems with regard to Polish civil society development, however they do not provide a concrete strategy on how these problems should be tackled. Furthermore, these documents are not of obligatory nature and therefore are not powerful enough. Nevertheless, the Polish civil society has proved to have several strengths as well. The Act on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work is one of the important laws which strengthened the position and possibilities for development of the Polish civil society. This legal framework offers NGOs the possibility to register as a PBO, if it fulfills certain conditions, and to enjoy certain financial benefits, which enable Polish NGOs with a PBO status to perform their activities more effectively as there is more money left. Furthermore, the Polish population is stimulated to volunteer more and to contribute to charity. Considering the influence the EU has had on the development of Polish civil society, the conclusion is two-sided. Poland’s EU accession brought positive as well as negative effects for the development of its civil society. On the one hand, EU accession meant that Poland needed to adapt its regulation to EU regulation. With the adoption of the legal framework on public consultations and establishment of monitoring committees, Poland had taken a significant step forward in developing a stronger civil society. With the establishment of the monitoring committees, cooperation between Polish civil society and the government is stimulated. Furthermore, as the EU intends to promote active citizenship on national as well as on supranational level, Poland’s civil society development has also been stimulated through several EU initiatives on the supranational level, e.g. the establishment of the EESC and several treaties. However, on the other hand, EU accession also brought a significant negative effect for the Polish civil society, as EU funding only stimulated the growth of the bigger NGOs. In this way, the gap between the small and big NGOs has been growing over the last few years, causing stratification of the NGO sector. When considering the fact that Polish civil society has been able to develop freely only since 1989, it can be concluded that the country is on the right track. However, the Polish civil society still faces many problems, of which the problem of low civic engagement seems to be the biggest one. This low civic engagement is fuelled by the low level of public trust. This problem indicates that Poland, in terms of Putnam’s idea of a well functioning ‘civic community’, still has a weak civil society. However, in terms of the more liberal ideas of Arato and Cohen, Poland’s civil society has known a good development, especially during communist rule, when Solidarity set the stage for the development of a grass-root civil society that distinguishes oneself clearly from the communist state. However, Solidarity’s turning point to the political opposition of the communist government politicised Poland’s civil society, a characteristic which is still noticeable in present-day civil society. The low level of trust in NGOs can partially be explained from the point of view that NGOs are often associated with the government by Polish citizens, which is not strange as NGOs often 183

perform public tasks. Empowerment of Polish civil society’s civic tasks is therefore needed in order to strengthen public trust in NGOs and therewith civic engagement and civil society development.

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PART III: ECONOMY, INFRASTRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY 6. THE ECONOMY In this chapter, the Polish economic development since its transition period from demand economy to market economy will be analysed. The reform has been widely experienced as harsh and its completion may still not be entirely finished. Considering the economic disarray in 1989, the Polish economy has greatly improved since then and continues to grow at considerable speed. However, despite high growth rates and a quick recovery from the economic crisis in 2008, Poland still belongs to the poorest countries in the European Union (EU) in 2011. Despite impressive growth numbers, increased stabilisation and other achievements in the last two decades, Poland has a large catching-up process ahead of itself. The challenges the Polish economy will face in the coming years are manifold: a sustainable increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a larger Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) influx, a more entrepreneur-friendly business climate, monetary stability and convergence to the EMUcriteria, a solid and transparent fiscal policy, a positive trade balance in most sectors and decreasing regional disparities with regard to economic development, all rightfully belong on the agenda of economic and financial policy. In the first section of this chapter, the transition period will be described; the second section deals with the current fiscal policy, followed by the third section, regarding monetary policy. The performances of important economic sectors has been analysed in the fourth section. The fifth section deals with the Polish business climate, the sixth section draws the position of Poland in international trade, whereas the seventh and final section discusses the differences in the level of development between the different regions in Poland. The conclusion gives a verdict on the path to a market economy and the current state of the Polish economy.

6.1 Shock Therapy Elaborating on chapter 4 on Polish Politics, this section describes the first years of Poland in transition from a planned to a free market economy. In order to reform the economy, Poland adopted ‘shock therapy’ as a way of reforming. Shock therapy was previously executed in Latin America under the supervision of neoliberal economists. In the case of Poland, all economic authority was handed to a single person, Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Balcerowicz had unlimited freedom in reforming the Polish economy to his liking and he chose shock therapy as the preferred method. A few years on this rocky road, his successor Grzegorz Kołodko, a former communist economist, slowed down the fast pace of reforms and made a successful attempt for stabilising prices and markets. A decade after the start of shock therapy, the Polish economy was steadily on its way of becoming a western market economy. Scientists disagree about the success and necessity of shock therapy as the best solution for Poland to reform. Consequently, the debate about the success of shock therapy – an unstable disaster or the least of all evils – still continues. 185

6.1.1 Shock Therapy: The Beginning In September 1989, when Solidarity leader and soon-to-be-president Lech Wałęsa appointed the scholar Leszek Balcerowicz, one of the famous capitalist economists of Poland, as the minister of finance, it was clear from the outset that Poland was waiting massive reforms of an unprecedented scale. Balcerowicz, who studied economics in the United States and made his acquaintance with the capitalist way of running an economy, had made his intentions of large and sudden reforms clear in the years preceding the actual collapse of Eastern European communism. 1255 Balcerowicz received attention in the 1980s by forming the Balcerowicz Group, a controversial group of scholars, advocating a free market system for communist Poland. Before the overturn of communism, the group had already designed a reform strategy, consisting of radical reforms, which would be irreversible by nature and lead to a Western capitalist system. When the communist nomenklatura would face such a fait accompli, the irreversible nature of the plan would render the reforms sustainable. In short, the aim of the strategy was that there would be no possibility of a return to communism. Furthermore, the Balcerowicz group reasoned that by reforming swiftly and radically, the 'critical mass', necessary to execute and preserve the reforms, would be amounted. 1256 Balcerowicz explained the radical reform by a psychological effect: people will change their behaviour and habits quicker when they realise there is no way back. In case of gradual reform, people could blockade every single step of reforming.1257 In the late 1980s, no-one could yet envision such a smooth and quick collapse of the communist power. The fear that communism might return gave large popular support for radical plans, abandoning communist rule once and for all. During the Round Table Talks, as mentioned in section 4.1.1, Balcerowicz envisaged a reform plan which was widely accepted by the leaders of Solidarity. Besides Balcerowicz as minister of finance, several other members of the Balcerowicz Group were appointed to senior positions in the newly established Polish economic institutions. 1258 6.1.2 The Challenges of Shock Therapy Balcerowicz chose a free market policy for pursuing his reforms. By focusing on rapid privatisations, a strict fiscal policy and a floating currency, the free market would, supported by institutions, develop swiftly and effectively.1259 The psychological shock such a free market existence would produce, realising that a free market system is a diametrically opposed to the previously experienced state-led communist rule, cannot be underestimated. Not a single Pole had ever experienced free market capitalism in his own country. The advantages of a state-led economy, such as job security, price stability, comparative equality and extensive social support would evaporate overnight. Instead, in the new economy, Poles would have to start thinking as entrepreneurs, by making profit, handling floating prices and coping with economic scarcity. The change to capitalism, while perceived as an utterly necessary step for Poland, would by any means demand a tremendous amount of flexibility in the Polish minds. Furthermore, the core 1255

L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, capitalism, transformation, Budapest: Central European University Press 1995, pp. 306-315. 1256 Ibid., pp. 318-320. Balcerowicz defends in this manuscript the necessity to reform by radical speed in an economic sense as well by stating ‘Trying to stop inflation slowly was perceived as a hopeless task’. 1257 Balcerowicz explains this assumption as a part of Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance as first explained in When prophecy fails by L. Festinger, University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Source: L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, capitalism, transformation, p. 342. 1258 Ibid., pp. 340-343. 1259 Ibid., p. 304.

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elements of most Western capitalist systems, crystallised into a complicated set of rules, legal framework, controlled by institutions, took many decades to shape itself. Shock therapy did not allow Poland to have a fraction of this time; the essential reforms of institutionalising a free market would take a maximum of a few months. Considering the challenges Poland would face by adopting shock therapy, it should be noted that little alternative was visible at the time. Since Eastern European communism had failed to produce any meaningful growth or modernisation of the economies, the shift to some sort of capitalist system seemed to be the only way out. Only the speed of the implementation was the source of debate in countries facing transition to a market economy. Czechoslovakia was a proponent of a more gradual approach of transition. Grzegorz Kołodko, Minister of Finance who succeeded Balcerowicz, argued during numerous speeches and political debates in the mid-1990s that a gradual economic reform would have been a better solution for Poland. 1260 For Poland, in a desperate desire to govern independently, shock therapy seemed at the time to be the most radical way to break with the imposed communist system. The Polish situation was incomparable to its neighbouring countries in the late 1980s. Czechoslovakia, advocate of the gradual reforms, had, prior to the reforms, a much more prosperous economy, with considerably lower debts. Furthermore, contemporary scholars have still not reached an unanimous conclusion which system of reforming has proved to deliver the best results. Depending on the elements one qualifies as more important (GDP growth over equality or the other way around), the gradual and the shock approach of reforming both have its strong points and its flaws. Considering the Polish situation, it is hard to condemn the Polish choice in choosing for shock therapy. The people gave Balcerowicz and Solidarity a staggeringly strong mandate: Solidarity gained 90 % of the votes in the first free elections and just a mere 3 % opposed Balcerowicz' reform plans. As Balcerowicz stated, the time was ripe for ‘extraordinary politics’.1261 6.1.3 The First Results of Shock Therapy The Balcerowicz plan was built on three pillars: stabilisation, liberalisation and institutionalisation. An important feature of the plan was its different approach to social policy. Whilst extremely large in a communist state, social policy would heavily shrink by executing the Balcerowicz plan. The state would guarantee some minimum standards, as anything more would make the already expensive process of reform an even larger explosion of costs.1262 The abandoning of the previous and extensive social policy system has been formulated concisely by scholar Anders Aslund: ‘Any social engineering was out of the question’.1263 The Balcerowicz plan faced many challenges to cope with on an immediate basis. Huge deficits and the threat of hyper inflation forced the government to take measurements, designed to stabilise any form of a market economy, with no delay. According to the Balcerowicz plan, these measurements would be costly but were supposed to be unavoidable.

1260

Ed., 'The Warsaw Voice, On the way to the Market', The Warsaw Voice 1995 Business and Economy Yearbook (1995), p. 5. 1261 L. Balcerowicz, ‘Understanding Postcommunist Transitions’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 4 (1994), p. 87. 1262 L.J. Cook, M.A. Orenstein and M. Rueschemeyer eds., Left Parties and Social Policy in Postcommunist Europe, Oxford: Westview Press 1999, p. 80. 1263 A. Aslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, p. 33.

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In 1990, Balcerowicz introduced a new tax system and slowed inflation down from 600 % to a high but acceptable 70 %. Simultaneously, the Polish economy shrunk by 12 %. Balcerowicz had only expected a minor shrinking. Consequently, the public deficit rose further and the funds, designed to bear the costs of transition, were depleting. Furthermore, for the first time since the instalment of communism, 45 years before, Poland faced mass unemployment. Over 12 % of the Polish workforce lost his job and, consequently, lost confidence in the righteousness of the reforms. Others, previously relying on social aid, also felt the consequences of transition. As a consequence, large groups, supporting Solidarity found themselves betrayed by the harsh results of shock therapy. The support for the Balcerowicz plan plummeted and the strong mandate Solidarity and Balcerowicz received just a year before disappeared within weeks. In the summer of 1990, less than a year after the collapse of communism, only half of the population supported Solidarity. A political crisis appeared, with Solidarity leaders Wałęsa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki were splitting up the previous 'movement of unity'. In December 1990, Wałęsa barely won the presidential elections against the complete outsider Stanisław Tymiński. With Solidarity losing its power base, the Balcerowicz plan found more opposition to execute its, suddenly controversial, package of reforms. 1264 Ironically, the abundance of social aid would lead to the political downfall of the Balcerowicz plan. Influenced by the people's call of the continuation of communist social aid, the Balcerowicz plan left the communist pension system largely untouched. In the turmoil of events, it appeared that elderly could receive a pension and a salary for their working efforts at the same time. These pension costs and the new costs of unemployment proved to be too high a burden for the depleted Polish treasury. In the mid-1990s, Polish government’s expenses were an approximate 50 % of its GDP. Only social democratic Sweden spent a higher GDP percentage in Europe. Over 17 % of Polish spendings went to the inherited pension system. It is worthwhile noting that a neo-liberal plan, questioned for its lack of social spending and 'anti-social' consequences, fails on too much spending on social costs. Dissatisfied with the deficits and instability, the Polish voters switched entirely. In 1993, they elected the post-communist party SLD in power. The Communist Party, unpopular for many years, had quickly transformed itself and seemed, only four years after the longawaited collapse of communism, an acceptable alternative for the Solidarity governments. Grzegorz Kołodko, a professor of economics during the communist era, succeed Balcerowicz. His first task was to bring stability.

6.2 Fiscal Policy In this section, Poland’s fiscal policy will be described. This is crucial for understanding the economic behaviour of Poland. Fiscal discipline is also very important in relation to the EU and the adoption of the euro in the near future. Firstly, Poland’s fiscal policy during the transition period will be discussed. Secondly, fiscal transparency and fiscal policy rules will be dealt with. Thirdly and finally an overview of Poland’s fiscal policy will be given, as well as some expectation for 2011. Poland’s rapid and constant economic growth during the early years of transition contributed to a balanced budget, and a declining state deficit: from 6.5 % in 1991-1992 to 3 % between 1993 and 1996. Public debt was also reduced, mainly because of the writing off

1264

Chapter 4 elaborates further on this subject.

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of foreign debt. This resulted in Poland’s renewed credit capacity, and thereby the ability to receive loans, which had been lost during communist rule.1265 Poland’s good fiscal position started to crumble after 1999. This was mainly caused by delayed costs from earlier reforms in the healthcare service, education, the pension system and local administration. Poor economic growth, popular promises to the electorate and relaxation of fiscal policy rules made Poland’s fiscal position even worse. 1266 When Poland joined the EU, it did not fulfil the convergence criteria and the EU started the excessive deficit procedure.1267 However, even after EU accession, Poland was unable to strengthen its fiscal policy rules. The reforms needed for EU membership, including the commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), could not make Poland perform better. This inert performance can be explained by the high costs of transition and of EU accession, the lack of effective sanctioning by the EU and the fact that other EU Member States were performing badly as well, which was considered to be an excuse. 1268 More important, however, is of course Poland’s current fiscal policy. In its 2010 report on Poland, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warns that if no fiscal policy reforms are taken, public deficit will rise to over 7 % of GDP in the upcoming years and public debt will pass ‘the 60 % of GDP limit’ in 2011. Therefore, the OECD strongly advises the Polish government to strengthen its fiscal position by the following measures: strengthening its fiscal institutions; completing the pension reform; broadening tax bases; and generating substantial privatisation revenues. 1269 The Ministry of Finance is working on reforms that will prevent public debt from rising above 60 % of GDP. However, considering the upcoming parliamentary elections it is difficult to predict which reforms eventually will be taken.1270 6.2.1 Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules As stated by Rafal Benecki, fiscal transparency and policy rules contribute to credible policies, a more certain policy environment, earlier response when an economic problem occurs and thus improve economic performance in general. 1271 In this section it is described how Poland is performing on these points. Firstly, Poland’s fiscal transparency will be looked at, secondly, the policy rules Poland imposes on itself will be examined. Fiscal Transparency In the first years after the fall of communism in Poland, its fiscal transparency lay behind that of other countries in the region. The first important step towards better fiscal transparency was the Act on Public Finances, adopted in 1998. According to this act, Poland should have a more codified budget and more stringent reports. It includes rules on how to use budgetary reserves and there is also a sanctioning mechanism if these rules are not followed. 1272

1265

R. Benecki et al., ‘Fiscal transparency and Policy rules in Poland’, in: P. Jaworski and T. Mickiewicz eds., Polish EU Accession in a Comparative Perspective: Macroeconomics, Finance and the Government, London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies 2006, p. 13. 1266 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 1267 Interview E4. 1268 R. Benecki et al., ‘Fiscal transparency and Policy rules in Poland’, p. 15. 1269 OECD. (2010). Economic Survey of Poland, 2010. Retrieved 21 February 2011 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/28/44904949.pdf. p. 4. 1270 Interview E4. 1271 R. Benecki et al., ‘Fiscal transparency and Policy rules in Poland’, p. 4. 1272 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

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With regard to the monitoring of transparency, Poland still has some problems with its budgetary process. Although the International Monetairy Fund (IMF) recommended a medium-term framework, Poland provides only a one-year budget framework that plans its annual budgetary expenses. This makes it almost impossible to connect the budget planning to medium term macro-economic developments. Because of this, it is more likely that the Polish budgeting process is affected by short-term policy aims instead of medium or long-term goals.1273 However, this situation is improving now, since Poland is working on multi-annual budgetary planning. According to the Ministry of Finance this is not caused by any pressure from the EU or the OECD. It is just ‘common sense’ to publish budgetary planning in such a way; to improve this, is therefore a logical step in a process of transition. 1274 On other areas of fiscal transparency Poland is also making rapid improvements. For example, effective accounting and reporting has been improving; there is compliance with international financial institutions; and most non-budgetary activities are covered by the Ministry of Finance. According to Benecki, it is also very important, that the Polish Supreme Audit Office (NIK), which is responsible for the audit functions, works independently from the Ministry of Finance. This increases the credibility as well as the effectiveness of the NIK. 1275 Because it is importance for fiscal transparency and a credible fiscal policy, the next section discusses the NIK. Supreme Audit Office The NIK is one of the oldest state institutions in Poland. It was introduced in February 1919; three months after Poland re-emerged on the European map. The NIK functions according chapter nine of the constitution and the Act on the NIK of 23 December 1994. This supervisory body controls the revenue and expenditure of the state and all institutions and corporations (including the National Bank of Poland) which make use of public funds. The NIK audits all government institutions, at both the central and regional level. Its chairman is appointed by the Sejm every six years. However, the NIK is politically independent because the appointment of its chairman does not coincide with parliamentary elections. The NIK can control proceedings at its own initiative, at the request of the Sejm, the president of the Republic or the Prime Minister. Every voivodeship has its own NIK office, which controls the budget and expenditures of that region. 1276 Although the advice given by the NIK is not binding and therefore not able to affect policies or spending directly, this advice is generally taken seriously by the audited body (for example: the government, a semi-governmental institute or a (state) company). For example, the outcome of the audit can be given to one of the partners of the audited body if this body does not follow the advice of the NIK. This obviously could have negative effects for the audited body.1277 In every audit the NIK follows three controlling priorities: first and foremost the check whether there is a risk of corruption within a state or regional policy; secondly, it is checked whether the institutions function effectively; and thirdly it is checked whether a certain policy is in line with EU rights and obligations. 1278

1273

Ibid., p. 16. Interview E4. 1275 R. Benecki et al., ‘Fiscal transparency and Policy rules in Poland’, p. 17. 1276 NIK. (2011). About the Supreme Audit Office. Retrieved 9 May 2011 from http://www.nik.gov.pl/en/about-us/. 1277 Interview E5. 1278 NIK. (2011). Three indispensable elements of NIK audits. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/three-indispensable-elements-of-nik-audits.html. 1274

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Auditing is generally believed to be necessary, but a common complaint of businesses is that the procedures are very bureaucratic and take a lot of time. 1279 Especially in rural areas where entrepreneurs may receive EU or state funding, and therefore need to undergo the NIK controls, this seems to be a problem. Instead of making policy or business practices more effective, the NIK controls are considered to be just another obstacle for entrepreneurs. 1280 However, it is difficult to change these practices, since according to the NIK this problem exists in almost every other country; the NIK is doing what is described in the Constitution and the Act on the NIK of 23 December 1994. Because there are differences in auditing practices between different countries, it is very hard to compare them and to learn from each other by best-practice. This is, however, tried by EUROSAI (European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions), an organisation for cooperation between auditing bodies of European countries. 1281 Besides within the EUROSAI, Poland also cooperates on a bilateral basis with comparable institution in neighbouring countries, the European Court of Auditors and the International Board of Auditors for NATO.1282 Fiscal Policy Rules With regard to fiscal rules in Poland, the Constitution and the Act on Public Finances are the most important. Furthermore, Poland has to adhere to international rules, such as those imposed by the EU. Quite contradictory to what the 2010 OECD report describes about the problems concerning Poland’s fiscal policy rules –that these rules have to be stricter– is the fact that these rules are actually very strict in Poland. The Constitution provides for a mechanism which has to prohibit public debt from reaching the 60 % of GDP line. This mechanism obliges the national government to maintain the public deficit-to-revenue ratio the same as the year public debt first exceeds 50 % of GDP. When this mechanism becomes effective, the government has to present a fiscal consolidation programme to the Sejm, in which is outlined how to decrease the public debt-toGDP ratio. The question why Poland has problems to keep public debt below 60 % of GDP, could be explained by the two year delay between the date on which the debt limit is reached and the date of implementing a possible remedy. Another factor which could influence fiscal discipline in a negative way is the not very high degree of fiscal transparency. 1283 However, the main reason for not sticking to the rules set by the Constitution, the Act of Public Finances, and the EU has been the economic slowdown in 2008 and 2009. Because of the global financial and economic crisis, unemployment increased and thereby government expenses. Furthermore, there are problems with the pension scheme which is currently being reformed.1284 6.2.2 Fiscal Overview and Fiscal Expectations for 2011 Poland managed the economic and financial crisis relatively well. However, the public deficit rose in 2009 partly because of this crisis, as can be seen in chart 3. Therefore, the European Commission started the excessive deficit procedure against Poland. According to the 1279

Interviews E3, E4 and E5. Interview E3. 1281 Eurosai. Retrieved 9 May 2011 from http://www.eurosai.org/eng/. Interview E5. 1282 Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland. The Supreme Chamber of Control. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/The,Supreme,Chamber,of,Control,398.html. 1283 R. Benecki et al., ‘Fiscal transparency and Policy rules in Poland’, p. 18. 1284 Interview E6. 1280

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Commission, public debt will also rise, up to 59.3 % of GDP, which is still under the 60 % of GDP Maastricht criterion. 1285 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance does not agree with the Commission on this point and expects public debt to stay below 55 % of GDP. This difference in expectations can be explained by the way of calculating this number. In Poland the National Road Funds are included, which makes public debt seem lower. 1286 Chart 3: Budget Deficit and Public Finance Sector Deficit.1287

Source: Poland 2010 report Economy, Ministry of Economy. Compared to other EU countries and the EU as a whole, Poland’s GDP grew instead of declined as was the case in other European countries. However, as has been explained above, its public debt and public deficit are relatively high. This is illustrated in table 6. Table 6: Public Finances compared with other Countries (2010).1288 Poland Czech R. NL EU 27 GDP per capita 62 80 131 100 Real GDP growth 3,8 -4,1(2009) 1,8 1,8 Public Balance (% of -7,9 -4,7 -5,4 -6,4 GDP) Public dept (% of GDP) 55 38,5 62,7 80 Source: Eurostat, 2011

EU 15 110 1,8 -

1285

Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, given to the authors of this report by the Polish Ministry of Economy, 7 April 2011, p. 124. 1286 Interview E6. 1287 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 122. 1288 Eurostat. Country Profiles. Retrieved 22 June 2011 from http://epp. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/guip/themeAction.do.

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As has become clear in the above, public finance management is a great challenge for Poland; public debt and –deficit are rising. To improve the situation with regard to its public finance management Poland should cut expenditures and raise its income. To get its fiscal situation on track again, Poland plans to take the following measures during the years 2011 and 2012: freeze of nominal wages, reduction in funeral benefits, lower spending on active labour market policy and abolition of reduced excise duty on bio-fuels. The most important changes have to be made in the currently reformed pension scheme. This will improve not only the short-term fiscal situation, but also its sustainability. Another important development has to be made on a local scale; local governments have to have balanced current budgets from 2011 onwards and in 2014 individual debt limits will become binding. Hereby, the government wants to have more control on the expenditures made by the local governments. 1289 The Ministry of Finance expects public deficit to rise in 2011 because of a peak in public investment. However, the deficit is expected to decline to 3 % in 2012 as a result of the above mentioned measures.1290

6.3 Monetary Policy of the Polish National Bank This section will provide a brief description of the main objectives of the Polish National Bank (NBP) and the current internal and external developments that may have an influence on monetary policy of the NBP in 2011. After this Poland's preparation for euro adoption will be analysed and the difficulties in fulfilling the roadmap to euro-adoption highlighted. 6.3.1 Policy Objectives The main objective of the Polish National Bank is to maintain price stability. Therefore, the NBP bases its monetary policy on inflation targeting. Since the accession to the EU in 2004, the NBP adopted a permanent inflation target under a floating exchange rate regime of 2.5 %, with a symmetrical tolerance band for deviations of ± 1 percentage point. 1291 In 2010, the annual growth of prices of consumer goods and services in Poland amounted to 2.6 %, close to the NBP inflation target of 2.5 %. However, in recent month’s inflation rose markedly above 2.5 % up to 3.1 % in December 2010 and 4.5 % in May 2011. This increase was mainly driven by the sudden rise of the energy, gas and fuel prices on the world market. As a response to this price increase, the NBP raised its interest rate from 3.5 % in January to 4.5 % in June 2011.1292 Another objective of the NBP is the preparation for participation in the euro area. 1293 Poland, like all other new EU member states, has committed itself to adopting the euro and to accept the common EU monetary policy that comes with it.1294 The exact date for the adoption of the euro has not yet been set. This date depends on the capacity of Poland for fulfilling a number of conditions of monetary union participation, as set in the Maastricht criteria.

1289

M. Rozkrut, Presentation on the Macroeconomic performance and fiscal consolidation in Poland (March 2011), given to the authors of this report by the Ministry of Finance, 7 April 2011. 1290 Ibid. 1291 Narodowy Bank Polski. Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2011. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.nbp. pl/homen.aspxf=/en/publikacje/o_polityce_pienieznej/zalozenia.html. p. 4. 1292 Narodowy Bank Polski. (2011). Information from the Meeting of the Monetary Policy Council. Retrieved 20 May 2011 from http://www.nbp. pl/homen.aspx?c=/ascx/subgen.ascx&navid=5034. p.1. 1293 Narodowy Bank Polski. Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2011, p. 6. 1294 Narodowy Bank Polski. (2004). A Report on the Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Adoption of the Euro. Retrieved 11 March 2011 from http://www.nbp. pl/homen.aspx?f=en/publikacje/e_a/e_a.html. p. 5.

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Aside from meeting the criteria, there must be the political will to adopt the euro. 1295 In order to start working on the conditions set by the EU, the NBP is dependent on cooperation with the Polish government. However, it seems like preparations for adopting the euro are not the most important priority of the Polish government at this moment. 1296 There might be several explanations for this, which will be described at the end of this section. Regardless of the reluctant position of the Polish government, the Council of the NBP maintains its view that Poland should join the Exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) at the earliest possible date, after meeting the necessary legal, economic and organisational conditions.1297 The plenipotentiary of the NBP's management board is trying to take all steps that are feasible without having an official target date. According to the NBP the most important step that they could take is convergence of the Polish interest rate with the European Central Bank (ECB) rate. However, macroeconomic stability is needed for this convergence, and the situation of public finances in Poland is still causing a lot of instability at this moment of time. 1298 6.3.2 Monetary Policy: Internal Developments In terms of economic growth, Poland continues to outperform within the Central and East European region. Growth accelerated in last months of 2010 and is expected to reach 4.1 % in 2011. This growth will be mainly supported by domestic demand, driven by growth of public and private (infrastructure) investments and the use of EU funds. However, according to the emerging markets research of the ABN AMRO Bank of April 2011 there are some clouds on the horizon: due to rising inflation and unhealthy levels of public finance indicators, it is expected that monetary and fiscal policies will be further tightened in 2011.1299 As described in the previous section, a first important factor affecting the monetary policy of the NBP is the Polish inflation rate. Inflation has been moving upwards since 2010; higher global commodity prices and the increased Value Added Tax (VAT) rates drove the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 4.5 % in April 2011. ABN AMRO expects the CPI to level off somewhat in late 2011 to 3.6 %, however this is still above the upper limit (3.5 %) of the central bank's inflation target.1300 As a reaction to rising inflation, the NBP raised its monetary policy interest rate from 4.25 % to 4.50 % in June 2011. In the opinion of the Council, the elevated level of current inflation and inflation expectations, as well as the risk of rising wage pressure amidst a considerable growth in employment, justify an increase of the NBP interest rate.1301 A second important factor affecting the monetary policy of the NBP is the situation of public finances. In order to maintain macroeconomic stability, and to comply with the euro adoption criteria, decisive measures need to be implemented. However, the state budget deficit remains at a growing level. The government recently adopted a new medium-term 1295

J. Carrol, Slovakia and the Euro: How Slovakia has out-paced its Visegrad neighbours on the path to Economic and Monetary union (2011). Retrieved 20 May 2011 from http://www.mjpa.umich.edu/uploads/2/9/3/2/2932559/05-carroll-slovakia.pdf. p. 65. 1296 Interview E7. 1297 The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) was set up on 1 January 1999 as a successor to ERM to ensure that exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies do not disrupt economic stability within the single market, and to help non euro-area countries prepare themselves for participation in the euro area. The convergence criterion on exchange rate stability requires participation in ERM II. 1298 Interview E7. 1299 ABN AMRO. A. van Dijkhuizen and H. van Cleef, Country Update Poland: Some Clouds on the Horizon. Retrieved 5 May 2011 from http://www.abnamro.nl/.../Emerging_Markets_-_02_van_10_-_20_apr.pdf. p. 2. 1300 Ibid. 1301 Narodowy Bank Polski. Press release from the meeting of the Monetary Policy Council held on 7-8 June 2011. Retrieved 10 June 2011 from http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/aktualnosci/2011/mpc_2011_06_08.html.

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fiscal plan that aims to reduce the budget deficit to the Stability and Growth Pact target of 3 % GDP in 2012 (see for more information the section on fiscal policy). According to ABN AMRO 'effective implementation of these plans will be a tough challenge, as the budget plan is based on rather optimistic assumptions and places the bulk of the adjustment burden on local governments as well as social security funds, including the pension system. Moreover, budgetary consolidation is hindered by the fact that 2011 is an election year and that almost three-quarters of government spending is mandatory’. 1302 6.3.3 Monetary Policy: External Developments When in 2009 the global economic crisis and disturbances on the financial markets caused an economic recession in almost every country of the EU, Poland experienced an exceptionally positive growth of 1.7 %. This positive growth can be explained by several factors: Poland has (compared to other EU countries) a smaller share of exports in GDP, a floating exchange rate and a relatively small dependence on credit. Nevertheless did the financial crisis still affect the economic situation in Poland. Economic activity declined considerably in 2009 and therefore Poland experienced an economic slowdown, the annual GDP growth fell from 5.0 % in 2008 to 1.7 % in 2009.1303 The monetary policy guidelines of the NBP for 2011 are strongly affected by the global economic situation and the disturbances on the financial markets. Although in 2010 the global economic activity has markedly improved, there are also still uncertainties related to the global economic recovery. The first half of 2010 brought renewed turmoil on the financial markets, such as the crisis in Greece, and increased European financial uncertainty. This might influence the economic situation in Poland because a lower than expected global growth number may hinder the planned reduction in public finance deficits in Poland. This delay in improvement of public finance could lead to an increase in long-term interest rates and higher volatility of financial instruments, which would additionally contribute to lower economic growth and even more difficulties in meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria.1304 6.3.4 Poland’s Accession to the Euro-Zone Accession to the EU in 2004 opened the way for Poland to start preparations for participation in the euro area, this being the next stage of economic integration. After all, all new Member States are obligated to eventually replace their national currencies with the euro. The exact moment of accession depends firstly on fulfilling a number of conditions for monetary union participation, written in the so called Maastricht convergence criteria. The Maastricht convergence criteria include fiscal criteria referring to the general government deficit and public debt as well as monetary criteria, related to price stability, the level of longterm interest rates and exchange rate stability. 1305 Secondly, the accession depends on the political will to support the reforms that are needed in order to join the ERM II and shift the monetary policy to the ECB. This section will give a brief description of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the road map that is set out for fulfilling these criteria. After this, the political situation with regard to the adoption of the euro will be explained. 1302

ABN AMRO. A. van Dijkhuizen and H. van Cleef, Country Update Poland, p. 3. Narodowy Bank Polski. (2011). Inflation Report. Retrieved 30 March 2011 from http://www.nbp. pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/raport_inflacja/raport_inflacja.html. p. 3. 1304 Narodowy Bank Polski. (2004). A Report on the Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Adoption of the Euro, p. 6. 1305 Ibid., p. 5.

1303

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6.3.5 The Maastricht Convergence Criteria The adoption of the euro and the monetary policy that comes with it are related to a legal and economic procedure outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht. The procedure provides a framework for macroeconomic criteria and harmonisation of legal regulations concerning monetary authorities. There are four conditions that Member States of the EU must fulfil in order to join in the economic and monetary union and use the euro.1306 First, there is the condition of price stability: Member States should have a price performance that is sustainable and an average inflation rate that does not exceed that of the three best-performing Member States by more than 1.5 percentage point for a period of one year. Second, Member States must avoid situations of excessive government deficits; that is actual government deficit should be no more than 3 % of GDP and government debt should be no more than 60 % of GDP. Third, Member States should have respected the normal fluctuation margins of the exchange rate mechanism without severe tensions for at least two years. Fourth, Member States should have had an average nominal long-term interest rate over a period of one year that does not exceed that of the three best-performing Member States by more than 2 percentage points. 6.3.6 The Roadmap to Euro-Adoption The official target date of the adoption of the euro in Poland was initially set at 2012. Setting a date marked a clear break with the past government which never formally committed to a specific date. In 2008, the current government developed a roadmap for the adoption of the euro, with an outline of the major actions to be undertaken before effective membership, such as conditions for the ERM II entry. However, the deepening of the global financial and economic crisis in 2009 caused some difficulties with fulfilling this roadmap. First of all, the volatility of the exchange rate increased, and this caused fear that rendering the zloty to the ERM II would be too risky. As a consequence, a lack of political consensus prevented the fulfilment of the legal aspects, related to the amendment of the Polish Constitution, for ERM II entry. Second of all, due to inflationary pressures in Poland some questions arose whether Poland was and is actually able to meet the inflation criteria in the near term. Finally, the financial crisis contributed to a sharp fiscal deterioration in Poland, which caused the opening of an Excessive Deficit Procedure by the European Commission in 2009.1307 Due to these circumstances, the Polish government officially postponed the timetable for joining the currency union in July 2009 and the OECD recommended not to set another adoption date, as setting another date and not fulfilling it on time could damage the authorities reputation.1308 6.3.7 The Need for Structural Reforms According to the OECD rapport of April 2010, based on a purely indicative assessment at a single point in time, Poland does not satisfy three out of the four Maastricht convergence criteria, namely those with regard to price stability, the government financial position and exchange-rate stability. 1309 Therefore the report suggests that there are several issues that need

1306

Eurostat. Glossary: Convergence Criteria. Retrieved 9 March 2011 from http://epp. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Maastricht_criteria. 1307 OECD. (2010). Economic Survey of Poland, 2010, p. 14. 1308 Ibid. 1309 Ibid., p. 60.

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to be tackled before the euro can be implemented. The most important one is that Poland should implement a credible fiscal consolidation in order to meet the fiscal criterion. 1310 6.3.8 Restoring Fiscal Discipline The development of a sound fiscal policy is the most important pre-requisite for fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. Restoring fiscal discipline and improving the efficiency of the fiscal institutions will lower inflation pressure, reduce the volatility of the currency and favour the convergence of the interests rates. The general government deficit had systematically exceeded 3 % of GDP and the government debt is projected to expand towards the 60 % Maastricht ceiling. 1311 In section 6.2 more detailed information about the fiscal situation in Poland is given. 6.3.9 Political Situation with Regard to Euro-Edoption According to an article of J. Carrol, the most important determining factor in any country’s decision to adopt the euro is the political will to meet the Maastricht criteria and join ERM II.1312 Governments are expected to actively pursue euro-zone accession and there is no authority to compel a country to enter ERM II. Therefore, an unwilling government can certainly impede euro adoption.1313 As has been discussed earlier, the Polish government is unwilling to adopt the euro at this moment of time for four reasons. First of all, where there are large fiscal problems as in the case of Poland, political elites worry that cuts in social spending will give too much negative public reactions. In addition, the upcoming elections in 2011 make politicians unwilling to implement the unpopular structural reforms this year. Second of all, the rigidity of ERM II entails potentially high risks for Poland because they do not already maintain exchange rate parity with the euro through soft pegs or currency boards.1314 Without these soft pegs or currency boards compliance with ERM II is more complicated and therefore requires a fundamental shift in the Polish currency regime. Poland uses a combination of direct inflation targeting and managed floats, which means that complying with ERM II is very difficult. Moreover, ERM II entails higher risks for Poland than for any of the other new member states because the Polish zloty is a volatile currency that offers sizeable scope for speculators to bet against.1315 Third of all, Poland is in the unique position of having to overcome legal hurdles before being able to adopt the euro. The country’s constitution states that the zloty is the national currency and that only Poland’s national central bank has the right to set monetary policy. Euro adoption would entail shifting monetary policy to the ECB which would require a constitutional change before Poland can enter the euro-zone. However, political cooperation between the PO and PiS is needed for this constitutional reform. Currently, the PO lacks the two-thirds parliamentary majority it would need to pass the constitutional amendments and will need the cooperation of the PiS since a qualified majority cannot be reached without their support. The eurosceptic PiS, however, is opposed to euro adoption and has stated that Poland should not adopt the euro until its economy is more developed and economically comparable to that of the largest member states.1316 1310

Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 73. 1312 J. Carrol, Slovakia and the Euro (2011), p. 69. 1313 Ibid., p. 69. 1314 Ibid., p. 67. 1315 OECD. (2010). Economic Survey of Poland, 2010, p. 73. 1316 J. Carrol, Slovakia and the Euro (2011), p. 63. 1311

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Lastly, the uncertainties about the economic recovery of other EU countries could make the Polish government act more careful in setting a new official implementation date.

6.4 Economic Sectors 6.4.1 Agricultural Sector in Poland One of the common features of communism was the agricultural policy of establishing collective farms. The legacy from 45 years of this communist agricultural policy differs among the Central and Eastern European Countries. In Poland, this process of collectivisation never fully succeeded, mainly due to protest by farmers in the southern and eastern parts of Poland. Therefore, small scale farms could maintain their existence in these regions. 1317 During the transition of a planned economy to a free market economy, the number of small scale farms even grew. This was caused by the growing unemployment as a result of the transition; many labourers had to find other ways of earning a living and ‘returned to their two hectares of land’. 1318 According to Hannah Chaplin, agriculture offered many Polish people a minimum degree of welfare in this period where social security was absent. 1319 Although employment in agriculture has declined after the first years of transition to 13.3 % of the working population in 2009, it is still the main economic activity in most rural areas and especially in those areas where farms are relatively small. 1320 The continuing existence of these non-profitable small scale farms is not contributing to the economic development of these regions. However, it is very hard to change the structure of the economy because of two problems: One concerning liberalisation and the other concerning the division of the land; inheritance law and its consequences for the cadastre. 1321 Both will be explained below. Firstly, even after 1989 the agricultural market remained largely under state control; the market continued to be protected from foreign agricultural goods by the use of tariffs and other trade measures. In addition, farmers producing milk, cereals and meat received extra income support by the state. Liberalisation was even further impeded by EU accession, for which Poland had to adopt policies in line with the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Currently farmers receive both national and European income support, which does not make farmers more innovative and certainly does not make them change to other jobs, which is needed to improve efficiency.1322 According to the Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA), which prepared Polish farmers to the introduction of the CAP, Poland actually was on the way of establishing a more liberal market for agricultural products. However, when it became clear that Poland would join the EU, there was no other choice than to adopt the CAP policy, ‘which cannot be considered very liberal’. 1323 There will be elaborated further on the consequences of the CAP on the Polish agricultural sector in the next section.

1317

Interview E1 Ibid. 1319 H. Chaplin et al., ‘Impediments to the Diversification of Rural Economies in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from Small-scale Farms in Poland’, Regional Studies, vol. 41, no 3 (2007), pp. 362-363 1320 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 87. 1321 Interview E1. 1322 H. Chaplin et al., ‘Impediments to the Diversification of Rural Economies in Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 363. 1323 Interview E1. 1318

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Secondly, there is the problem of the division of agricultural land in Poland. This problem can be explained by the Polish partition,1324 which has been dealt with in section 1.5. In the western part of Poland, which was occupied by Prussia, property and land were inherited by the eldest son. Thereby, the size of farms did not change much; even today, farms are quite large in this region, which makes them far more productive than small farms in other regions.1325 In the southern part, which was occupied by Austria, property and land were divided among all sons when the father died. Consequently, land in this region ended up divided among too many people, who could not produce very effectively on such a small scale. The effects of this inheritance law are still visible in the southern region. Because the land is divided between so many people, it is hard to define who owns what and thereby, the cadastre is not fully developed. This has also negative consequences with regard to the privatisation of the land.1326 In the eastern part of the country, occupied by Russia, there were not much problems with the inheritance law, most of the farms are middle sized. However, according to FAPA the situation considering agriculture is poor in this area as well. People are leaving these areas because of the underdevelopment of the region; ‘the East is deserting’1327. According to the Analyses and Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Regional Development this is mainly caused by the unproductive agricultural sector. 1328 It is essential to the further liberalisation and economic development and growth that Poland’s rural economy (especially in the southern and eastern regions) diversifies. Right now, there are still too many people trying to make a living on small and inefficient farms, which hampers Poland’s rural economic development.1329 However this is not as easy as it seems since there are not many jobs outside of the agricultural sector in the rural areas. Consequences of EU Accession for the Agricultural Sector in Poland According to FAPA, the main consequence of EU accession was the accession to the single market, which offered lots of export possibilities. Other positive changes were the introduction of fixed high prices for agricultural products and the increase in productiveness by intensification of the production process. Negative consequences of EU accession are the restrictive quotas, which made a lot of dairy and sugar farmers quit, and the many product rules, which asked for a lot of modernisations that were too costly for many farmers. In order to adapt to EU standards FAPA helped Polish farmers modernising their farms by organising learning programmes. These programmes were part of and paid for by the PHARE programme of the EU, which was introduced to make Poland and Hungary ready for membership (see also section 7.2 on Infrastructure).1330 The adaption to the product rules is also considered to be a positive development since it improved the production process and the quality of the products. In addition, those farmers who ‘survived’ the consequences of the CAP and the internal market were only the most efficient ones; ‘many inefficient farms quit’.1331

1324

Ibid. Ibid. 1326 Ibid. 1327 Ibid. 1328 Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.mrr.gov.pl/rozwoj_regionalny/Ewaluacja_i_analizy/Raporty_o_rozwoju/Raporty_krajowe/Documents/ obszary_problemowe_ang_rpw_2405.pdf. p. 66. 1329 H. Chaplin et al., ‘Impediments to the Diversification of Rural Economies in Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 363. 1330 Interview E1. 1331 Ibid. 1325

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As has been explained in the previous section, accession to the EU also included adoption of the CAP. This has been subject to discussion in Poland but also in other EU countries since Poland would absorb a lot of CAP money when it would become an EU member. In Poland there was some hesitation with regard to the CAP since it was already clear that this policy should be reformed. The CAP reforms include also the liberalisation of prices, which will make them go down, which has negative consequences for Polish farmers, while direct payments to Western European farmers would continue to exist. This scenario would have been bad for the competitiveness of the Polish agricultural sector. Therefore a compromise was negotiated: Polish farmers were to receive 25 % of the direct payments, rising to the same level of that of farmers in the old Member States within ten years, and direct payments to farmers in all EU Member States would slowly decrease. 1332 Another issue, according to FAPA, was the fact that the CAP provides the incentive to intensify production, which is not very sustainable for the environment, as is becoming clear more and more. With the CAP, Poland is giving away its small scale, nature friendly, though not so productive way of farming. There were also hesitations among Polish farmers about accession to the EU and the adoption of the CAP. They were afraid the EU would dominate the sector and they perceived it as a ‘protectionist block’. However, after 2004 their opinion changed as they received a lot of EU money (both via the CAP and different development funds) and because they profited from the high prices on the internal market.1333 Trade in Agricultural Products Although the many small scale farms are not producing very efficiently, Poland is responsible for a large share in world agriculture production. The share of agricultural production in the world of course differs per product, illustrated by table 7. This considerable share in the world food/agricultural production also has its effects on Poland’s import and export of agricultural products. Poland is a net exporter of agricultural goods and these goods constitute an important part of total export, as is illustrated in table 8. Both import and export of agricultural goods increased after EU accession in 2004, and trade dynamics accelerated even further because of the opening up of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) markets in the East in 2008.1334 The largest share of agricultural exports is directed to Germany (24.1 %) but Russia and the other CIS countries are becoming more and more important as markets for Polish agri-food products. Considering the import of agricultural products, the EU-15 is the largest supplier, followed by the developing countries.1335

1332

Ibid. Ibid. 1334 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. (2009). Agriculture and Food Economy in Poland. Retrieved 25 June 2011 from http://www.minrol.gov.pl/eng/content/view/full/18560. p. 49. 1335 Ibid., p. 51. 1333

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Table 7: Agriculture in Poland compared in a Global Perspective 1336 Specification Share of Poland in the world Place of Poland in the world 2007 2007 Total area 0,2 68 Of which land Population

agricultural 0,3

53

0,6

33

0,2

50

Wheat

1,4

16

Rye

21,2

2

Barley

3

11

Oats

5,9

3

Potatoes

3,8

6

Sugar beets

5,1

6

Apples

1,6

13

Meat

1,3

14

Cows’ milk

2,1

10

Of which in agriculture Agricultural goods

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 2009. Although both import and export of agricultural products increased in recent years, the trade surplus declined by 0.5 billion from 2007 to 2008. This was mainly caused by the worldwide economic downturn, and because of a decline in demand. Furthermore, Polish products were relatively expensive, which made Polish demand for foreign products increase. 1337

1336

Central Statistical Office (GUS). (2011). Statistical yearbook of Agriculture 2009. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_4127_ENG_HTML.htm. 1337 Ibid., p. 52.

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Table 8: Share of Agri-Food Products in % of Total Foreign Trade 1338 Share of agri-food products in 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007

2008

Total export

8,4

8,8

10,0

9,8

9,8

9,9

Total import

5,9

6,2

6,8

6,4

6,4

7,0

Source: Agriculture and Food Economy in Poland 2009. Regional Production Agricultural production differs per region because of differences in soil quality, possibilities to sell products, size of the holdings and traditions. Most productive in agricultural productions are the regions in the western and northern voivodeships of the country; companies are larger there and fertilisation is more intensive. 1339 Besides differences of scale, which have been discussed in section 6.4.1, there are also differences in types of crops. For example, the voivodeships Dolnośląskie and Lubelskie produce the largest amount of buckwheat; Dolnośląskie, Wielkopolskie and Opolskie are responsible for the largest share of grain maze production; and strawberries and other ‘soft fruits’ are grown mostly in Mazowieckie and Lubelskie. Concerning cattle production Mazowieckie, Podlaskie, Wielkopolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie are the most productive regions. 1340 6.4.2 Industry Sector of Poland During the last 15 years the industrial output in Poland has been growing rapidly. This growth is attributable to the growing activity of private sector companies. Privatisation and restructuring processes of Polish state-owned enterprises, which began in the 1990s, led to changes in the ownership structure of industry. 1341 The Polish industry sector is systematically being modernised and is now able to offer products on competitive EU markets. 1342 However, signs of low competitiveness in the industry sector and growing regional disparities could be a source of future problems. This section will give a brief description of the structure of the Polish industry sector. After this, the structural problems that the Polish industry sector is still facing will be analysed. Structure of the Polish Industry Sector The industry sector in Poland contributes for a total amount of 31.8 % to Poland’s GDP, which is approximately €108 billion per year. Furthermore, 29.2 % of the Polish labour force works in the industry sector.1343 In the industry sector 83 % of the total sold production is generated in the manufacturing sector, 9.5 % in the electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply sector, 5.3 % in the mining and quarrying sector and 2.2 % in the water supply, sewerage sector, waste management and remediation activities sector. In January and

1338

Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 32. 1340 Ibid., p. 33. 1341 Polish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour. Poland 2005 Report Industry. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/B35213CC-3857-4AEE-98E300078BA7753D/15232/Reportindustry_2005.pdf. p 11. 1342 Ibid. 1339

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February 2011, the industrial production increased by 10.1 % compared to 2010, and prices of sold production increased by 6.7 %. The Manufacturing Sector The manufacturing sector accounts for 83 % of the total sold production in the Polish industry.1344 The divisions that recorded most output growth in 2009 and 2010 are the divisions that belong to the high-technology sectors. The highest growth rate was observed in the manufacturing of computers, electronic and optic products (10.6 %), and in pharmaceutical products (7.3 %). Global Crisis In 2009, the industrial output within the EU decreased rapidly due to the financial crisis. Demand for industrial production hampered in all EU economies, and as a result the total industrial output decreased in size by 14 % on a yearly basis. In contrast to the rest of the EU, the decline in industrial output in Poland in 2009 was much slower (a 3.5 % fall on a yearly basis). This slower decrease, compared to other EU countries, can be explained by the relatively large industrial internal market in Poland and the fact that the decrease of export was slowed down by the depreciation of the Polish zloty.1345 Problems in the Industry Sector Growing competitiveness in the global industry sector causes a serious debate about the future directions of Polish enterprises in the industry sector, since innovativeness of the Polish industry, compared to other EU countries, is low. Signs of low competitiveness can been found in the fact that added value to the GDP by the industry sector is decreasing; which is the result of increasing labour costs and diminishing access to cheap raw materials forces. 1346 The decreasing competitiveness of the Polish industry sector has been confirmed by various researches and reports, with the report of the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) being the most important.1347 As the Poland 2010 Report Economy states: ‘Innovation leading to modernisation will be of key importance in this regards.’1348 According to the EIS, innovation could be encouraged by greater involvement in seeking new products, implementation of innovative technologies and improving the quality of human capital. 1349 Another problem of the Polish industry sector is the widening of regional disparities, which is mainly caused by the decline in socialist-style heavy industry. Economic performance and catch-up growth of the Polish regions diverge; the western and southwestern regions along with the capital region have shown the fastest pace of transformation and economic growth in comparison to other regions. However, some regions are not able to fully restructure the traditional industry branches. For example, the share of people employed in heavy industry in Katowice still amounts to 25 %, which makes the economic situation in these regions strongly dependent on unstable raw material markets.1350

1343

According to the statistics of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook Poland’s GDP in 2010 was USD 470 billion, this is approximately EUR 339 billion. Currency converted on 1 June 2011. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 1344 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 127. 1345 Ibid., p. 40. 1346 Ibid. 1347 Ibid., p. 211. 1348 Ibid., p. 134. 1349 Ibid. 1350 Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 63.

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Currently, the greatest development challenges for Poland are related to the development problems of peripheral regions. This has resulted in the development of various strategies on regional development. One of the main priorities of these strategies is to create functional links between regions that are developing at a slower rate with the growth leaders. More information about regional disparities can be found in section 6.8 about regional development. 6.4.3 The Polish Service Sector The service sector plays a dominant role in Western developed economies, also in Poland. During the economic transition the role of the service sector changed significantly; from a neglected one during Soviet times, to a leading role in the newly established market economy. Nowadays the service sector is a core sector in Poland, and the most important stimulator for Poland’s economic growth. 1351 Table 9: Polish Services Sector, Economic Entities by Ownership1352

Source: Poland 2010 report Economy, Ministry of Economy. Structure of the Polish Services Sector The services sector in Poland has the largest share in generating gross added value to GDP. It contributes a total of 63.0 % to Poland’s GDP, which is approximately €205 billion per year, according to statistics of 2010. Furthermore, Poland’s services sector employs more than half of the total working population, which is nearly eight million people. 1353 In 2009, according to the REGON list of companies by type (the system also used in the Poland 2010 report economy), the percentage of enterprises operating in the service sector was 76 %. Out of these, 95.9 % are private companies, mostly operating in trade and repair (nearly 1.1 million enterprises).1354 The sector is dominated by micro-enterprises employing up to 9 workers, which constitute 95.5 % of the sector. 3.7 % of enterprises operating in the sector employ between 10 and 49 workers; larger enterprises amount to nearly 1 %.1355

1351

J. Stefaniak, Service sector in transitional economies. Case of Poland. Retrieved 22 April 2011 from http://www.reser.net/file/75411/. p. 1. 1352 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 61. 1353 According to the statistics of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook Poland’s GDP in 2010 was USD 470 billion, this is approximately EUR 339 billion. Currency converted on 1 June 2011. 1354 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 169. 1355 Ibid.

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When it comes to the number of entities, employment and value added to GDP, the trade and repair section is the largest subdivision of the service sector in Poland. Other important sectors are hotels and restaurants, transport, warehousing and communication and property management. In this chapter, the sectors trade and repair and transport, warehousing and communication will be further analysed. Trade and Repair As already mentioned, the trade and repair sector is the most important section of the Polish service sector when it comes to the share in value added to GDP in the service sector. It contributes 35 % of added value generated by the private market services sector. 1356 The process of economic transformation in Poland changed the structure of the domestic trade market; the biggest change took place in the wholesale and the retail trade. In the 1990s, the number of shops more than doubled. At the end of 2006, the total number of retail outlets was estimated at approximately 400 000, including 394 000 shops and 10 200 filling stations. The development of private enterprises combined with privatisation of state-owned companies is one of the foundations supporting the development of the trading infrastructure in Poland. 1357 Electronic trade is a small segment of the retail and wholesale market, but the sector is growing fast and undergoing intense development.1358 In 2008, the net value of sales revenues, made on-line or through automatic data exchange, amounted to 48 billion euro, which constituted 7.1 % of sales revenues. However, many enterprises in Poland still lack awareness of how to make effective use of computer networks for electronic trade. Only around 57.4 % of enterprises have their own website; only one in five companies offers the possibility to place on-line orders; and only 1.4 % of analysed entities accept on-line payments. This might be the main reason for an exceptionally low share (2.1 %) of internet sales revenues of companies. 1359 Transport, Warehousing & Communication In 2009 the transport, storage and communication section generated 14.4 % of the gross value added in the market services sector and 7.5 % in the entire economy. 1360 The main activities related to transport and communication are land transport via pipelines, water transport, air transport and transport supporting activities. In 2009 average employment in this section amounted to 463 000 persons; the size of entities operating in transport, storage and communication is similar to the one in trade and repair. Furthermore, micro-enterprises dominate the sector.1361 Problems in the Services Sector A growing problem in Poland is the lack of innovativeness in the services sector compared to other EU countries and even to the Polish industry sector. A knowledge-based economy 1356

Trade and repair constitutes of: wholesale and retail trade, repairs of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household appliances. According to the statistics of the CIA the trade and repair sector generates approximately EUR 72 billion to GDP. CIA factbook. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 1357 Official Promotional Website of the Republic of Poland, The Economy. Retrieved 6 May 2011 from http://en.poland.gov.pl/The,Economy,,7313.html. 1358 Electronic sale and transactions. 1359 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 169. 1360 According to the statistics of the CIA the transport, warehousing and communication sector generates EUR 30 billion to GDP. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pl.html. 1361 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 174.

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requires a competitive services sector and therefore it is important that more expenditure on innovative activities in the service sector is stimulated.1362 There are several Polish innovation strategies in which action plans are defined to improve innovative activities. 1363 There are five priority axes on which these strategies mainly focus on: human resources, research, intellectual property rights, innovation-related capital and infrastructure. €9.7 billion is allocated to these programmes, the EU contribution amounting to €8.3 billion. The use of EU funds seems to be an important opportunity to boost Polish capacity for research and innovation. Another problem in the Polish services sector is that the development of Polish Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is hindered by structural weaknesses. These structural weaknesses are related to bureaucracy, poor infrastructure, complex legal and tax regulations, low innovation capacity and insufficient availability of skilled labor.1364 Public policies can play an important role in overcoming these obstacles. There are several policies related to the development of SMEs , but these are dispersed among different authorities. The Ministries of Economy, Regional Development, Education, and Labor, plus several regional institutions are working on policies related to the development of SMEs. Although policy-makers have recognised that a long-term strategy for improving innovativeness and eliminating the structural weaknesses with regards to SMEs, requires coordinated actions across this wide range of policy domains, in practice there appears to be limited co-ordination among the numerous activities. The 2003-2006 SME policies were not renewed, and therefore the authorities asked for the OECD’s expertise for the development of a new strategy on SME and entrepreneurship policies. The OECD advised to reduce the number of policies related to development policies from 49 to 9. Furthermore, as advised by the OECD, the strategies should be aimed at creating a better legal and institutional system, more investments in infrastructure and support for the development of human resources and the R&D sector.1365

6.5 The Financial System This section will give a brief overview of the recent changes and developments of the banking, insurance and pension sector, as well as the capital market in Poland. 1366 When looking at these developments and changes it becomes clear that the Polish financial system is still underdeveloped compared to the other Member States of the EU (EU27) and the euro countries (MU15) in 2010.1367 Paradoxically, this low level of development is considered to be one of the reasons why Poland managed to avoid a major financial crisis in 2009. However, the global economy is recovering and therefore the underdevelopment of the Polish financial system could have a negative effect on Poland's economic growth in the future.

1362

Interview E6. For example the Strategy for increasing the innovativeness of the economy for the years 2007-13. Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 174. 1364 OECD. (2010). Economic Survey of Poland, 2010, p. 136. 1365 Ibid. 1366 O. Kowalewski, Poland's Financial System Development (2010). Retrieved 8 March 2011 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616727. p. 2. 1367 Ibid., p. 3. 1363

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6.5.1 Structure of the Polish Financial System In 2009 the banking sector's total assets declined by 3.7 % but still accounted for approximately 80 % of the country's GDP (see chart 4 below). Lending institutions dominate the financial market, but at the same time the role of other financial intermediaries, such as insurance companies, pension- and investment funds, has increased in the last couple of years.1368 Chart 4: Assets of Financial Intermediaries as a Percentage of GDP in 2009

Source: National Bank of Poland, Polish Financial Supervisory Authority. 6.5.2 Banking Sector According to data of the Polish Central Bank of 2009, the banking sector in Poland consists of 643 credit institutions of which 49 are commercial banks.1369 The Polish banking sector can be considered to be the largest in Central and Eastern Europe; the commercial banks are the largest in the whole region and account for 28 % of total bank assets in the Central and East European countries.1370 Despite this large share of total bank assets, the Polish banking sector still remains underdeveloped in comparison to the average values of the EU27 and MU15 countries. 1371 When looking at data from 2008 on the development of credit institution assets as a percentage of GDP in Poland, it can be noticed that this percentage is only one-third of the average level of the EU27 and MU15 countries.1372 See chart 5 below.

1368

Ibid., p. 2. Narodowy Bank Polski. Financial Stability Report – December 2009. Retrieved 2 May 2011 from http://www.nbp. pl/homen.aspx?f=en/systemfinansowy/stabilnosc.html. p. 32. 1370 O. Kowalewski, Poland's Financial System Development (2010), p. 2. 1371 Ibid. 1372 It has to be mentioned that this conclusion is drawn from data of 2008. 1369

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Chart 5: Total Assets of Credit Institutions as a Percentage of GDP 2001-2008

Source: European Central Bank In 2009 foreign controlled credit institutions accounted for almost 63 % of the total banking assets.1373 The owners of the foreign banks in Poland are mainly European credit institutions, with the exception of U.S. Banks GE Capital and Citigroup. The largest foreign owned bank is Bank Pekao SA, which is controlled by an Italian financial group called UniCredito Italiano.1374 Foreign bank presence in Poland is considerably higher when compared to the average level of EU27 and MU15. Although the domination of foreign banks in the banking sector contributed to the modernisation of Poland's financial system, especially to the enhancement of efficiency in the banking sector, there are also risks that stem from this heavy reliance on foreign banks. 1375 During the financial crisis a lot of parent banks were affected and had to fall back on government support in there home countries. The turbulence on the global market caused a major fall in mutual confidence on the interbank credit market. As a result, the Polish banking sector became less liquid, banks became more cautious about lending and banks offered higher interest rates.1376 Furthermore, concerns have been expressed recently about the growth of nonperforming loans in the banking sector, which rose to 11.9 % in September 2010.1377 This is mainly attributable to the increase of mortgage loans that are for a large part (60 %) denominated in foreign currencies, mainly Swiss francs.1378 Due to the dominant position of the banking sector in Poland, this could be an important source of causing future instability in the financial system since this lending expansion is not expected to be justified with increased customer purchasing power.1379

1373

O. Kowalewski, Poland's Financial System Development (2010), p. 5. ABN AMRO. A. van Dijkhuizen and H. van Cleef, Country Update Poland, p. 3. 1375 O. Havrylchyk, ‘Efficiency of the Polish banking industry: Foreign versus domestic banks’, Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 30, no. 7 (2006), p.1. 1376 O. Kowalewski, Poland's Financial System Development (2010), p. 10. 1377 ABN AMRO. A. van Dijkhuizen and H. van Cleef, Country Update Poland, p. 3 1378 Ibid. 1379 Interview E7. 1374

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Although there are concerns about the domination of foreign-owned banks and the increase of non-performing loans, the Polish banking sector is considered to be highly profitable. 1380 6.5.3 Capital Market Improving economic prospects on the global market caused an increase in demand for financial assets in Poland. According to data from 2009, the stock prices of the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index (WIG) had increased with 46.9 % compared to 2008.1381 A total of 379 companies, including 24 foreign-owned companies, were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in 2009.1382 The WSE is the largest stock exchange in Central and Eastern Europe, with a very high market activity. This high activity can be explained by the fact that state-owned companies are still being privatised. The total value of shares that was sold by the Treasury amounted to approximately €9 billion in 2009 and €6 billion in 2010. The Treasury, which held 98.8 % of the WSE before the privatisation process started, plans to float about 63.82 % of the stock market in the upcoming years. 1383 6.5.4 Insurance Sector The Polish insurance sector is in terms of assets also the largest in Central and Eastern Europe. Until 2010 the insurance sector was dominated by the state-owned insurance group PZU SA, which had a 40 % market share. In 2010, the Treasury started to privatise the PZU and its shares were traded on the WSE.1384 At the end of 2009 there were 30 life insurance and 35 non-life insurance companies operating. Almost all insurance companies are foreign owned. The only exception is the PZU which controls 32.5 % of the life insurance market and 38.5 % of the non-life business. 1385 The Polish insurance sector remains underdeveloped compared to other EU countries. Insurance penetration, in the form of premiums as a percentage of GDP, is still considerably lower compared to the levels of the EU27 and MU15.1386 6.5.5 Investment Funds During the financial crisis the value of managed assets dropped dramatically. In 2009 investment fund assets began to grow again from approximately €5 billion to €24 billion, but the investment funds have not yet rebuilt their position and it will probably take some time before the level of assets return back up to the levels of before the financial crisis. Despite of the strong revival of the Polish national fund market after the financial crisis, the sector still remains strongly underdeveloped in terms of total assets as a percentage of GDP, when compared with EU27 and MU15 levels. See chart 6 below.

1380

O. Kowalewski, Poland's Financial System Development (2010), p. 10. Ibid. 1382 Ibid. 1383 Ibid. 1384 Ibid., p. 13. 1385 Ibid., p. 10. 1386 Ibid., p. 14. 1381

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Chart 6: Total Assets of Investment Funds as a Percentage of GDP

Source: European Central Bank 6.5.6 Pension Funds In 2009, the pension fund assets rose by 29.2 % compared to 2008. 1387 This growth is mainly the result of capital inflows from the privately managed open pension funds (OFEs). However, the pension reforms which are designed by the Polish government with the aim to prevent the public debt rising to worrying measures are cutting the transfers to privately managed pension funds from 7.3 % of workers salaries to 2.3 %. The difference will flow into the public pension system, of which the public debts can be financed. 1388 The pension reform could have a negative effect on the financial market. The OFEs will have less money at their disposal and according to the opponents of the pension reform this means that companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange will lose a large quantity of investment capital. In the long run, this could stagnate economic growth in Poland. 1389 6.5.7 Financial System Development The financial system in Poland has already been modernised significantly, in part due to the increasing role of foreign banks. At the same time margins remain large, suggesting that competition is insufficient. Banking infrastructure is underdeveloped, especially in rural areas and insurance penetration, in the form of premiums as a percentage of GDP, is still considerable lower than in developed countries. Furthermore, the investment fund sector still remains strongly underdeveloped in terms of total assets as a percentage of GDP. Much remains to be done, but the scope for financial development in Poland is expected to be huge; the privatisation of the WSE already improved the situation because it brought international linkages to the Polish capital market. This can be an incentive for further financial system development.

1387

Ibid., p. 15. Interview E8. 1389 The most prominent opponent of the pension reform is Leszek Balcerowicz, one of the architects of Poland's market reform. 1388

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6.6 The Polish Business Climate 6.6.1 Legal Framework Poland has, besides the supranational framework envisaged by the European institutions, its own national frameworks to assist a well-functioning market economy. The most important of these institutions is the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK in Polish). The Polish competition regulator is, like most European counterparts, member of international regulatory alliances such as the European Competition Authorities (ECA), the International Competition Network (ICN), and OECD. An obvious and notable difference of the UOKiK is the institutional merger of competition and consumer protection. The combining of these two policy areas in one institution is unique in the EU. Apart from the unique institutional set-up, the goals of UOKiK are closely connected with regulatory bodies of other EU-member states. To compare the goals of the UOKiK with other European regulatory bodies, the regulatory counterparts of EU-member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands have been chosen. These countries are known to have strong and well-established antitrust tradition, which proved to be the basis for EU institutions, involved with competition. Hence, the German and Dutch regulatory bodies can serve as a benchmark for the relatively young UOKiK. The UOKiK explicitly mentions the subordination to the DGs of the European Commission, whereas the German and Dutch bodies mention their national obligations. Furthermore, UOKiK formulates its goals slightly different than the German and Dutch institutions. The Polish antitrust policy consists of the prevention of ‘competition restricting practices’ as well as ‘the controlling of mergers and state aid schemes’. The German Bundeskartellamt focuses primarily on preventing cartels and protecting competition, whereas the Dutch Competition Authority extends these general cartel-fighting goals, mentioning the energy and transport sector in particular.1390 It has been noted that the Polish antitrust regulatory framework is, compared with other EU-member states, has a lengthier competition policy and a different political background, keen on protecting consumer rights and, by mentioning state aid, averse to state influence in business. Both features may well be a counter reaction to a state-dominated communist past. 6.6.2 Bureaucratic Efforts for Entrepreneurs In 2011, Poland is ranked 70th out of 183 countries on the scale 'easiest to do business in', based on an extensive country-scale Doing Business report. 1391 Compared to 2010, Poland gained three places. However, Poland is still well behind most of the OECD members. 1392 Major challenges for entrepreneurs in Poland seem to be the sluggish taxation system and the endless procedures an entrepreneur has to undergo before receiving a final construction 1390

Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit. Over de NMa. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from http://www.nmanet.nl/engels/home/Index.asp. UOKiK. What we do. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from http://www.uokik.gov.pl/what_we_do.php. Bundeskartellamt. About the Bundeskartellamt. Retrieved 6 March 2011 from http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/GeneralInformation/GeneralInformation.php. 1391 The World Bank. (2011). Ease of Doing Business in Poland. Retrieved 20 March 2011 from http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/poland#starting-a-business. 1392 The comparatively low position of Poland in the Doing Business rankings is well known in the Polish entrepreneurial environment. Some blame the reporters of using a standard, small-size ‘flower pot company’ as their test case to find out about the business ease in a country. When larger enterprises were taken into account, Poland would probably score much higher, businessmen argue. Interview E11.

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permit. The relative ease, compared to OECD countries, of receiving credit in Poland is a positive feature of the Polish system. Taxation According to a 2010 report of Doing Business, Poland was ranked on the 148th place of the World ranking, considering the time and costs of paying business taxes. 1393 This places Poland between Dem. Rep. Congo and Lesotho, countries with a rather weak administrative system. The number of payments and the average time of filling in a tax form are twice as high, compared to other OECD members. It seems that Poland, with a 120th place in 2011, is rapidly improving its bureaucratic way of company taxation. The latest years, it has been possible to fill in and submit the taxation forms by internet. Still, entrepreneurs complain about the large workload, therefore it has been advised to Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) to outsource your taxation issues to a specialised company. Construction While the taxation burden for undertaking business in Poland is comparatively high, Poland scores even worse in dealing with construction permits. Out of the 184 countries participating in the survey, Poland occupies the 164th place for 'construction permit friendliness'. In 2011, just eight countries worldwide require a larger number of legal procedures in Poland, before a company is entitled to build – on average, an entrepreneur in Poland needs to go through 32 procedures, double the OECD average. The Polish entrepreneur spends twice as much time and money on gathering the necessary permit.1394 Notwithstanding the rather horrendous score on the world list, it is important to realise that Poland had to go a long way of reaching the number of ‘just’ 32 procedures. To compare, a decade ago, the procedures to acquire land were much more laborious. In 1995, when the prices of land were at a very low rate for Western standards, a mere 1932 ha of land was bought by foreign investors.1395 On top of that, just 10 % of this land was bought in the vast countryside, where the prices of land were much lower than in the industrial areas. Obviously, the price of the lands was not the main obstacle for foreign investors, who were willing to build real estate, farms or plants on their new-to-be-acquired land. Old-fashioned bureaucracy, a relic from the communist era, imposed such severe regulations – for instance, the purchase1396 of land larger than 1 ha, an investor had to get permission from three different ministries – that investors got discouraged. However, looking at the past, the Polish system of acquiring permits has been drastically improved already.

1393

The World Bank. (2009). Paying Taxes. Retrieved 20 March 2011 from http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/paying-taxes. 1394 The World Bank. (2010). Dealing with Construction Permits. Retrieved 20 March 2011 from http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/dealing-with-licenses. 1395 Ed., ‘Fine-Tuning the Market Economy’, The Warsaw Voice 1996 Business and Economy Yearbook (1996), p. 12. It has to be taken into account that in 1995 different legislation existed for foreign investors to acquire land. The current situation (2011) is described in par. .3.3.2 regarding land property and registry. 1396 By purchase it is meant the legal transaction of buying land, disregarding the intention to build something on this land, which used to be an even lengthier procedure.

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6.6.3 Reasons to invest in Poland Despite the low ranking on the 'Easy Doing Business' index, Poland has attracted substantial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in the years prior to the economic crisis of 2008. The attractive features of the Polish economy could compensate for sluggish bureaucracy or lower labour productivity. The majority of FDI hails from other EU-member states, as the European internal market makes profitable investing significantly easier to realise. 1397 The interest of European investors in Poland is based on four key features. Firstly, Poland has a strategic geographical position, with a proximity to large European industrial centres such as the Ruhr area. The Poland infrastructure is rapidly improving1398 and there are many easily accessible ways of transportation (rail, road, Baltic Sea) heading for the EU member states westwards. The upcoming EURO 2012 1399 boasts the infrastructure, mainly in the Championship host cities.1400 Since Germany and Poland both lie on the same North European low land, Polish transport does not have many geographical obstacles going west and is strategically well-placed for mass trade with its western neighbours. The number of straightforward roads, not hindered by mountains, wet lands or other geographical obstacles, speeds up the wheels of transportation. 1401 Secondly, the lower wages made Poland a low-cost opportunity to invest in. Due to the relatively small economic strength, arguably caused by the economic failure of the communist system and the subsequent costly transition period, the wages for workers were in the 1990s many times lower than its West European counterparts. In 1995, a worker in former West-Germany earned a tenfold compared with its Polish colleague. 1402 By 2008, the Polish worker has decreased this gap to earning a fourth of the salary of its German counterpart. 1403 Low salary costs, or low costs in general, are as a rule an attractive feature for investors. A low wage-country makes investing particularly interesting for labour-intensive investments, as investing in cheap man power can maximise the profit. As a low-wage country, Poland has to compete with the Asian markets, were the wages are even lower in many cases. Thirdly, the Polish working class has been well-educated. In 2005, 91.1 % of the Polish working population has finished at least secondary school, much higher than the EUaverage of 77.4 %. 1404 Poles receive in schools a little more education in foreign languages (avg. 1.5 foreign languages per capita), compared to the EU school average of 1.4 foreign languages per capita.1405 Additionally, the older generation of Poles learnt Russian at school, which may be counted as an additional plus in the European business environment.

1397

Alongside harmonised regulations, the plain lack of tariffs, quotas and other barriers, combined with the Schengen agreement makes investing within the EU far more attractive than outside EU territory. 1398 Par. 7. 2 provides detailed information regarding the infrastructure developments. 1399 EURO 2012 is the common name for the upcoming UEFA European Football Championship, to be held in Poland and Ukraine in June 2012. 1400 These four cities are Warsaw, Gdańsk, Poznań and Wrocław. Incidentally, these cities and their urban area have been mentioned as the future four Polish growth poles. 1401 The lack of a significant geographical frontier has been a disadvantage r for Poland in the past, experiencing problems since those borders could not be used as natural frontier lines to defend against foreign military attacks However, in the current times of European peace and heavy trade, Poland is able to reap the benefits of its easily accessible flatlands. 1402 Ed., ‘Finding Its Own Road’, The Warsaw Voice 1997 Business and Economy Yearbook (1997), p. 13. 1403 Eurostat. (2010). Wages and labour costs. Retrieved 25 June 2011 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Wages_and_labour_costs. 1404 European Commission. (2007). Belangrijke feiten en cijfers over Europa en de Europeanen. Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/51/nl.pdf. pp. 29-30. 1405 Eurostat. (2010). L. Mejer et al., More students study foreign languages in Europe but perceptions of skill levels differ significantly. Retrieved 30 May 2011 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KSSF-10-049/EN/KS-SF-10-049-EN.PDF. p. 6.

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Fourthly, Poland consists of a rather big internal market by itself. Apart from Russia, Poland is by far the most important economic power of the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect, goods produced in Poland can also be sold at large in Poland. Furthermore, companies can derive personnel from a large pool of Polish workers, unhindered by a range of national, ethnic or language boundaries. Fifthly, Polish culture has been perceived as more familiar with Western nations compared to other Eastern European states. Poland uses the Latin alphabet, hereby creating a higher level of transparency for Western investors. The dominant religion in Poland is Roman Catholicism, contrasting the nations in Eastern Europe, which share an orthodox or Islamic tradition. Poland, particularly the Western provinces, has been heavily influenced by the German mentality of living. The Polish political system has been stabilised into a modern democracy. These cultural aspects make Poland an easier place for many Western investors to do business than other large Eastern European nations, such as Ukraine of Russia. Consequently, Poland is considered to have the advantages of a post communist economy, without the widespread deficits.1406 In sum, compared to low-wage countries in Asia, where the average salary in certain cases lays many-fold lower, Poland has some clear advantages. The goods produced in Poland will arrive faster and less costly in Western Europe. A large chunk of the work force is welleducated and able to communicate in another European language. As an EU member, the barriers of investing have been minimised. These features may explain the large growth of FDI influx to Poland in recent years. 6.6.4 The Influx of FDI to Poland The attraction of FDI to Poland was formulated as one of the main objectives by the executors of shock therapy. In the first years of transition, FDI barely entered Poland. Political and institutional instability created a daunting business climate for foreign investors. Rapid political changes and parties, giving statements contrary to market liberalisation and FDI, led to a wait-and-see tactic by major foreign players, since a well-functioning market economy and a profitable FDI go hand in hand. 1407 Investing in Poland was attractive only for the most adventurous. Since 1995, FDI slowly started to become a factor in the Polish economy. In the new millennium, Poland has been praised in reports for its renewed capacity of attracting FDI. In 2008, in the wake of the financial crisis, a FDI-report on EU-member states valued Poland for attracting FDI as fifth best in number of companies (176 projects). More impressive, FDI in Poland delivered the second-most jobs from all EU-member states. An estimated 15 000 jobs were created in Poland by this influx of FDI.1408

1406

Ed., ‘Fine-Tuning the Market Economy’, The Warsaw Voice 1996 Business and Economy Yearbook (1996), pp. 7-14. 1407 Political parties which were opposed to shock therapy embraced the infant industry argument. This argument, first raised by Friedrich List in Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie, 1841 and rejuvenated by Chang in Kicking away the Ladder, 2002, questions whether it is profitable for a developing economy to open all its gates for foreign influences. The argument supports an initial protectionist policy, to allow the domestic infant industries to grow without competing with foreign companies. In the end, Poland did not adopt a protective infant industry policy. 1408 The presented data have been gathered from European attractiveness survey (2010), the yearly business survey of accountancy firm Ernst & Young. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Attractiveness_survey_2010_EU/$FILE/Attractiveness_survey_2010 _EU.pdf. pp. 17-31

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The financial crisis caused a dramatic downfall in the number of FDIs going to former communist states, as investors became more risk-averse. However, Ernst & Young labelled Poland as most resistant of all against these unprecedented events. 1409 Despite these positive notices of Poland and FDI, we decide to simply calculate the FDI per capita and the percentage of FDI of total GDP. By comparing these data with other European nations, we aim to place the proclaimed 'Polish FDI success' in a more realistic perspective. Table 10: FDI Data of Poland, The Czech Republic and The Netherlands 1410

Poland Czech Republic Netherlands

2010 Figures & Data

Currency: USD

FDI (in billion)

GDP (in bill.) Inhabitants (in mill.) FDI per capita FDI as % of GDP 721,7 38,2 5205 27,5% 261,5 10,7 11869 48,5% 680,4 16,6 41496 101,1%

198,8 126,7 687,8

Source: FDI FACTSHEET, 2010 Graphically, these data are presented in figure 8. It is clear that Poland, by no means, is on the same level of attracting FDI as its neighbouring Czech Republic, which is a slightly less-thanaverage EU-member state, regarding FDI. The Netherlands, as a champion of attracting FDI, fall in an entirely different league. While reports have shown the progress of Poland, Poland still has a long way to go to reach a the next level of attracting FDI. 1411 On the bright side, these data seem to indicate plenty of places for foreign investment in the Polish economy, which may help Poland to grow further.

1409

As Ernst & Young states: ‘Of the entire region Polish came off best’. Source: Ernst & Young (2010). Investment projects down in Europe last year. Central and Eastern Europe hit hardest. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.ey.com/CZ/en/Newsroom/News-releases/2010_Investmentprojects. 1410 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 1411 Interview E7.

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Figure 8: FDI per Capita1412

Pola nd C z e c h R epu blic N eth erla nds

Source: FDI FACTSHEET, 2011 6.6.5 SMEs in Poland Notwithstanding the psychological challenges which had to be overcome, many Poles managed to develop an entrepreneurial spirit after years of communist rule, at a time in it was hardly possible to undertake business activities. It may have been the most positive surprise of the entire reform period to experience the revival of the SME in Poland. Within a few years, Poland had arguably the largest amount of shops in Europe, 1413 mainly due to the flourishing of tiny retail shops. While SMEs in Poland and other post-communist states were much smaller than its Western European counterpart, they proved to be the most ‘dynamic … [and] the healthiest segment’ of the newly created free market. 1414 Whereas in Western Europe, the existence of one retail shop per 1 000 inhabitants is the average, in Poland, one shop per 100 citizens became the standard at the end of the 20th century.1415 The move of the largely unemployed countryside to small business retail developed itself as a success story of the Balcerowicz plan. The SME sector became the ‘engine’ 1416 of the Polish economy, hereby replacing many inefficient state-led companies. The new ‘engine’ of Poland also suffered from serious defects, such as a lack of innovation and the large fragmentation of SMEs in Poland. Many SMEs were too small to get listed in official date. The World Bank used records from databases, finding just 10 000 companies in Poland in 1999, three times less than in Estonia and 25 times less than in

1412

Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 1413 Romania and Poland reportedly had roughly the same amount of companies, being on top in Europe in this respect. Source: L. Klapper et al., ‘Small- and Medium-Size Enterprise Financing in Eastern Europe’, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2933 from The World Bank Development Research Group Finance (2002), p. 34. 1414 Ibid., p. 25. 1415 UNU/Wider, no. 216 2000, pp. II-III and pp. 1-2. 1416 Ibid., p. 3.

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Belgium, two countries with a considerably smaller population. 1417 An estimated 97 % of the companies in Poland were too small to get a listing. In the 21st century, the specific features of the Polish SME move towards the European average. However, the lack of innovation and the large fragmentation of SMEs in Poland is still detectable nowadays. 1418 Nevertheless, SMEs are still considered to be one of the most successful elements of the present-day Polish market economy. 1419

6.7 International Trade This section deals with Poland’s international trade. Firstly, we would like to describe the current situation concerning foreign trade, taking the effects of the economic and financial crisis into account. Secondly, the focus will be on the import and export of Poland and its main trading partners. Thirdly, the effects of the EU internal market, of which Poland is part of since 2004, on Poland’s foreign trading activity will be explored. 6.7.1 Current Situation Poland's trade volume has been, like most countries’ trade activity, negatively influenced by the global economic and financial crisis. During the beginning of the crisis in 2008, trade slowdown was primarily reflected in export numbers, as a result of the rapidly decreasing import demand of Poland’s main trading partners. From 2009 onwards, the reverse happened; import demand in Poland decreased more rapidly than that of its trading partners, causing a large export slowdown. In the first half of 2009, export (-15.5 %, compared to the same period one year earlier) declined less rapidly than import (-24.5 %), see chart 7. This large import decline was partly caused by the depreciation of the zloty; the depreciation made Polish products more competitive on the world market, but importing foreign goods much more costly. Consequently, Poland’s negative trade balance declined. 1420 Chart 7: Monthly Commodity Trade Balance from January 2009 to June 20101421

Source: Analyses and Forecasting department, Ministry of Economy.

1417 The World Bank. (2004). L. Klapper et al., Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data. Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/4754591107891190953/661910-1108584820141/Entry_KLR.pdf. p. 40. 1418 For a more detailed explanation, see par. 6.4.3 on the Polish service sector. 1419 Interview E9. 1420 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, pp. 97-98. 1421 Ibid., p. 98.

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The beginning of the year 2010 showed that the trade volume is recovering, with export growing by 19.2 % and import growing by 17.6 %. By reaching this high growth rates, Poland import and export regained the territory lost in the first crisis period. Due to the relatively cheap zloty and growing Polish competitiveness, Polish export increased, compared to the year prior to the crisis, while the import number slightly decreased overall. 1422 6.7.2 Polish Import and Export The main part of Polish export (79.9 % in 2009) goes to EU countries and this EU-export share is still increasing (by 1.9 % in 2009). The share of export to euro countries is particularly significant; the euro countries were responsible for more than half of the total export from Poland. Germany, as the largest economy in the eurozone, stands out as Poland's main trade partner, since Germany accounts for 26 % of Poland's export. The CIS countries (mainly Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) also constitute for a considerable share of Polish export (7.6 % in 2010).1423 See figure 9. Figure 9: Share of Individual Market Groups in Polish Exports 1424

Source: Analyses and Forecasting department, Ministry of Economy. Poland’s main export commodities are electric machinery products (44.8 %), chemical industry products (12.1 %) and agri-food products (close to 10 %). 1425 See chart 8. During the economic crisis, the rate of export decline of technically high advanced products was much lower than the decline in export of low processed products. This difference shows the growing importance of Poland's industry of advanced products, which seems to be a booming market. In 2011, Poland is a net importer of advanced industrial goods and a net exporter of low processed goods. For most EU 15 member states, this is the other way around. It seems that Poland is catching up in this respect; it takes time to develop an advanced industry. 1426

1422

Ibid. Ibid., p. 100. 1424 Ibid., p. 101. 1425 Ibid., p. 103. 1426 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009). Retrieved 25 June 2011 from http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/informacje_o_ue/Publikacje_o_UE/5_years_of_poland_in_the_european_union.pdf. p. 47. 1423

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Chart 8: Commodity Structure of Polish Exports in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008.1427

Source: Analyses and Forecasting department, Ministry of Economy. Poland’s main import partner is Germany (28.1 %), followed by Russia (8.7 %), Italy (6.5 %), the Netherlands (5.6 %) and China (5.3 %). As with export, the largest part of the imported goods consists of machinery and transport equipment (38 %), followed by intermediate manufactured goods (21 %) and chemicals (15 %). Considering the Polish import data, it is notable that Russia is much more an import partner than an export partner, due to the large import of Russian natural gas and other commodities as a source of energy. Furthermore, Poland is a net importer of energy related goods such as fuels, minerals and other lubricates. 1428 Chart 9: Commodity Structure of Polish Imports in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008.1429

Source: Analyses and Forecasting department, Ministry of Economy.

1427

Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 105. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Poland. Retrieved 20 March 2011from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. 1429 Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 105. 1428

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Poland has experienced a negative trade balance1430 since the fall of communism. Since the economic crisis started in 2008, the trade deficit declined with 200 %, but is still significant. Large sectoral differences occur within the national trade balance. Poland has a large surplus of agricultural products, while it mostly imports natural resources and chemical products. In total, the negative trade balance consists of -9.3 bln. euro in 2010, three times lower than in 2008.1431 Chart 10: Commodity Structure of Foreign Exchange Balance in 2009, compared to 2004 and 2008.1432

Source: Analyses and Forecasting department, Ministry of Economy. 6.7.3 Internal Market: Intra-EU Trade The developments of other national EU markets, most notably the German market, are of the highest importance for Poland; almost 80 % of total export is directed to fellow EU member states. The NBP stated that Polish economic growth or decline is for 50 % dependent on the economic developments in neighbouring Germany. Other European countries, such as Slovakia and Lithuania, are largely dependent on the performance of the Polish economy. 1433 This interdependence is to a large extent a consequence of Poland entering the EU and, logically, close the ties with its bordering EU member states. Firstly, as far as EU accession goes, it is important to note that, by entering the EU, Poland strengthened its position on the global stage; Poland's economy became more reliable, accessible, competitive and stable. Because of this increased reliability and accessibility, the influx of FDI to Poland rapidly increased. With their increased competitiveness, Polish firms were able to acquire more space for operating on a global stage. Secondly, foreign trade activity increased manifold. By adjusting to the acquis communautaire and the requirements for joining the European internal market, the Polish market space improved in many areas. The increased concern for the environment, for the health and labour standards as well as the instalment of the European common trade policy, bringing favourable export subsidies, all contributed to a better climate for intra-European trade with a well functioning Polish market economy as a key player.1434

1430

A negative trade balance or a trade deficit occurs when the country’s imports exceeds its exports. Ministry of Economy. (2010). Poland 2010 Report on Economy, p. 105. 1432 Ibid., p. 106. 1433 Interview E10. 1434 Ibid. 1431

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However, Poland did not maximise the positive trade effects of EU accession, as it gave insufficient attention to trade activity with foreign partners. Poland could have focused more on developing modernised infrastructure, beneficial for mass transportation, 1435 and on creating a more business friendly environment. 1436,1437 Besides the effect of the trade creation, EU accession also had the effect of trade diversion. Poland experienced, as a result of the EU accession, increasing trade relations with other EU member states and with countries that have preferential trade relations with the EU. 1438 Conversely, trade with countries outside the EU with no preferential EU trade relations, decreased. It has been calculated that the effect of trade creation was much stronger than the trade diversion effect, both for Poland and the EU. 1439

6.8 Regional Development As has been mentioned in section 4.3 on local politics in Poland, there are huge differences in the level of development between the largest cities and the country side, especially in the eastern part of Poland. It has been discussed how the EU affected the development of regional policies in the first years after 1989 and what kind of divisions have been made in the preaccession period. In this section there will be looked more closely at the economic development of the different regions; why are some of the voivodeships, especially in eastern Poland, less developed, what are the main challenges in these regions and how could the economic situation be improved. When travelling trough Poland by train, it is very easy to notice the difference in the level of development between cities and rural areas. Nevertheless, official government reports on the development problems in different rural areas are less explicit when it comes to disparities. Although the National Development Strategy (NDS) mentions that the five eastern voivodeships have a lower GDP and are poorer than the poorest regions of Greece, Portugal and Spain at the time of their accession, it does not include specific solutions to specific problems or needs. 1440 The only specific statements on these regions of the report, say that development is depending on cross-border cooperation and community (EU) funding. 1441 This basically shifts the responsibility away from the national government. Another problem is that the NDS uses the voivodeships as a unit to measure GDP and unemployment (see figure 10).1442 However, this does not show the real picture, since income is about 40 % higher in the big cities compared to rural areas.1443 Most voivodeships have well-developed capital cities, which make the voivodeship look very developed, even though the rural areas can be very poor.

1435

Par. 7.2 deals with an extensive overview of the Polish achievements in infrastructure. Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 42. 1437 See par. 6.6 for a detailed explanation of the Polish business climate. 1438 Such as, agreements on trade with the Least Developed Countries in the Everything but Arms Programme, with EFTA countries, with Turkey and other countries in the Mediterranean. 1439 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 44. 1440 Ministry of Regional Development. (2006). National Development Strategy 2007-2015. Retrieved 25 June 2011 from http://www.mrr.gov.pl/english/Strategies/srk/Strony/srk.aspx. p. 10. 1441 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 1442 Ibid., pp. 10-12. 1443 Interview E1. 1436

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Figure 10: GDP at Purchasing Power Parity in Voivodeships per Capita.

Source: National Development Strategy 2007-2015. The report, written by the Institute for Structural Research and the Ministry of Regional Development in 2009, gives a better view of the regional disparities in Poland. 1444 Therefore in this section, this report will be followed and tested by the different interviews that where conducted in Poland. In Poland, experts from ministries and universities pointed at the low level of development of the rural areas and the problems that arise from this. There is a division being made between Poland A and B, and sometimes even Poland C. In this division, Poland A consists of Warsaw and the other so called ‘growth poles’, Poland B consists of areas surrounding the big cities and Poland C would be the (eastern) rural areas.1445 The main development problems in Poland B and C, can be found in poor infrastructure, high employment in the agricultural sector, the low level of FDI influx and the shortage of jobs. 1446 Because of these problems another one is arising; people are leaving and especially the eastern regions are becoming empty.1447 Furthermore, it is perceived that the government is making all its efforts in favour of development of the cities and is forgetting about the rural areas.1448 The explanation for this is that the Ministry of Regional Development follows the polarisation-diffusion model. According to this model, development funds will be spent best, when directed to the capital cities of the voivodeships.1449 This sounds very acceptable; capital cities have more and better means to spend the money. But reality shows that development is not being spread to the

1444

Ministry of Regional Development. (2006). National Development Strategy 2007-2015. Interviews E2 and E3. 1446 Interviews E1 and E2. 1447 Ibid. 1448 Interviews H1, E1, E2, E3 and E6. 1449 Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 5. 1445

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periphery, it stays in the centres. 1450 The above mentioned issues can also be found in and are explained by the 2009 Report on Regional Disparities. The report studies different sub-regions (not on voivodeship level) on six indicators: economic structure, innovativeness, environment, social problems, human capital and accessibility. After applying these indicators on all the sub-regions, Poland can be divided into eight groups of more or less identical sub-regions (See figure 11 and 12). In which Poland A (groups 1, 2, and 3), Poland B (groups 4, 5, 7 and 8) and even C (group 6) can be recognised. 1451 Figure 11: Typology of Polish Sub-Regions. 1452

Source: Report on Regional Disparities in Poland.

1450

Interview E1. Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 50. 1452 Ibid.

1451

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Figure 12: Typology of Polish Sub-Regions. 1453

Source: Report on Regional Disparities. 6.8.1 Warsaw (Group 1) Warsaw is the only true metropolitan city in Poland, comparable to capital cities of other OECD countries. It even knows one of the highest levels of economic growth within this group of countries. On five out of the six criteria, Warsaw features a high score. However, this does not mean that there are no development obstacles. 1454 The social-economic situation is exceptionally good in Warsaw. The same counts for productivity, which is very high, and the situation of the labour market, which is relatively favourable. In addition, the level of innovativeness is by far the highest of the country. These circumstances positively affect the attractiveness for FDI to Warsaw.1455 Nevertheless, there are some negative (side) effects of this high level of development. The environment is badly affected by air pollution and waste accumulation, the process of urbanisation is chaotic (because of fast growth), and criminality is relatively high. Even though the situation is much better when compared to other parts of Poland, a possible obstacle to further economic growth is the still badly developed transport infrastructure.1456 6.8.2 Growth Poles (Group 2) This group consists of the big cities of Poznań, Wrocław, Kraków, Tricity (Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot), Łódź and Szczecin. The national development strategy focuses on these cities, next to Warsaw, as is logical following the polarisation-diffusion model as described

1453

Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 52. 1455 Ibid. 1456 Ibid., p. 54. 1454

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above. 1457 Although there are major differences between the six cities, they all have a high level of economic development. This was partly achieved by the ability of these cities to adjust to the new economic system and globalisation. Also for these cities, economic growth influences the environment negatively. 1458 6.8.3 Strong Supra-Local Centres (Group 3) These areas are relatively well developed because of their proximity to Warsaw or one of the other ‘growth poles’. Regions that belong to this group are sub-regions of western and eastern Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań, Wrocław and Gdańsk. These sub-regions profit from the economic activity of the ‘growth poles’ but do not experience the negative consequences, such as pollution and crime on the same scale. This makes them a good place to live, and therefore regions in this group know the highest population growth rate. However, transport and information communication to Warsaw and the other growth poles could be improved. 1459 6.8.4 Silesia (Group 4) The urban areas within this region (besides Wrocław, mainly Katowice and Opolskie) can be qualified as sub-regions which are potential ‘growth engines’. They are very attractive to investors because of the location of the industrial companies in the area. 1460 This is probably closely related to the well-developed transport infrastructure in Silesia, which is the best in the whole country. 1461 The main problem in the area is the process of restructuring the economy; industry is still a very important sector in this region and the services sector develops only slowly. This situation has negative consequences for the labour market as well; the quality of human capital is relatively low and structural unemployment numbers are among the highest in the country. Another problem in this region, because of the huge industrial activity, is, water and air pollution.1462 6.8.5 Centres of Masovia and Eastern Poland (Group 5) This group includes sub-regions which are situated around a relatively strong city (Białystok, Płock, Lublin and Rzeszów). It features low economic development compared to the country average. This is mainly caused by structural problems in the agricultural sector, which are historically determined, and the low level of innovativeness in these sub-regions. 1463 Although the consequence is a good condition of the natural environment, in these regions it is not so much a development potential since tourist management is weak. 1464 In relation to the neighbouring sub-regions in the east and the south, the situation on the labour market is quite favourable. However, this could not prevent young people from moving to better developed regions in Poland or Europe. Depopulation of the sub-regions of group 5 (excluding the ones in the Mazowiekie voivodeship) the report considers to be a real treat.1465

1457

Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 1459 Ibid., p. 60. 1460 Ibid., p. 63. 1461 Ibid., p. 64. 1462 Ibid., p. 63. 1463 Ibid., p. 65. 1464 Ibid., p. 66. 1465 Ibid. 1458

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6.8.6 Peripheries of Eastern and South-Eastern Poland (Group 6) The sub-regions of southern and south-eastern Poland are considered to be the poorest of the country; GDP per capita does not exceed 50-60 % of the national average. According to the 2009 Report on Regional Disparities, this is mainly caused by these sub-regions’ location. 1466 They border Belarus and Ukraine and cross-border cooperation, which should be improved according to the NDS, is not very high on the agenda in these countries. 1467 This makes it less likely that cooperation with these countries will improve in the near future. Another main problem these sub-regions cope with can be found in the agricultural sector. Agriculture is very inefficient because of too many small scale farms, on which work too many people; this is called ‘agricultural overpopulation’.1468 This situation makes it look like employment is around the national average, while in reality unemployment is much higher according to M. Buwkowski.1469 The above mentioned problems, poor infrastructure and low innovativeness make it also harder to attract FDI. Even the development of tourism, which has some potential in these sub-regions because of the clean and in some areas protected nature, is problematic. Very poor transport and information infrastructure is the main reason for this. 1470 The different regions and capitals in this area are trying to become more competitive, build roads and attract FDI, but it remains difficult to make progress since the focus of the Ministry of Regional Development is directed to better performing areas. This will be illustrated in box 7, in which the situation and strategy of the city of Lublin and its surrounding region will be dealt with. 6.8.7 Peripheries of Central and South-Western Poland (Group 7) Sub-regions in this group are closely situated to the strong growth centres; therefore they have a higher level of development than other peripheral areas. GDP almost reaches the national average and population is relatively dense. Local government investments and a relatively good infrastructure were main contributions to this positive economic situation. However, this could not improve the innovativeness of these regions, which is still very low. Another obstacle for further development is the natural environment; in some areas water and air are seriously polluted. 1471 6.8.8 Peripheries of Northern and North-Western (Poland group 8) The peripheral sub-regions in northern and north-western Poland are characterised by their specific agricultural situation and low level of urbanisation. 1472 The level of development and the economic situation differs within this group. A region like Warmińsko-Mazurskie, is highly developed, mainly because its well functioning agricultural sector, while regions as Słupski and Stargardzki are much poorer. Because of its clean environment, location (close to the sea side) and good tourism infrastructure, tourism has great potential in these subregions.1473

1466

Ministry of Regional Development. (2006). National Development Strategy 2007-2015, p. 18. Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 68. 1468 Ibid., p. 69. 1469 Ibid. 1470 Ibid., p. 70. 1471 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 1472 Ibid., p. 74. 1473 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

1467

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Box 7: Case Study on the Lublin Region: Powiats in Lubelskie1474

Source: Official website of the Lubelskie voivodeship. Lubelskie is a voivodeship in the eastern part of Poland, bordering both Ukraine and Belarus. According to the Ministry of Regional Development it is one of the poorest regions of Poland1475 and according to the Investment Promotion Office in Lublin even one of the poorest in the EU.1476 As its peripheries belong to group 6 and the Lublin powiat to group 5 (as is illustrated by figure 12), it is clear that the centre (Lublin) is best developed and that development of the periphery is most problematic. However, according to the polarisationdiffusion model this development difference should become smaller in the near future. And even though there are people who say this model is not working, 1477 officials in Lublin believe that it is best to direct to the main cities, as they know their region and thereby where to spend the money. 1478 The situation of the agricultural sector, as is explained before in section 6.4.1, is most problematic. However, in the case of cities like Lublin this is not the main issue. According to the Investment Promotion Office of the city, the lack of investments in the region is one of the biggest problems. Investments create jobs, which is needed, mainly for the ability to give local graduates better job opportunities and thereby stopping the negative demographic development.1479 In addition, it could help to get people out of the agri-business, which is hardly profitable for most farmers. To attract both Polish and international investors, Lublin is developing all kinds of preferential circumstances, such as the Lublin sub-zone. This is a special economic zone, where investors enjoy income tax-preferences (a measure by the national government) and exemption from property tax (a regional measure) if they employ a certain amount of people for three or five years minimum (depending on the size of the firm). 1480

1474 Official website of the Lubelskie voivodeship. (9 August 2011). Retrieved 24 April 2011 from http://www.lubelskie.pl/img/userfiles/files/PDF/angielska_wersja/mapa2011-ang.pdf. 1475 Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 68. 1476 Interview E2. 1477 Interview E1. 1478 Interview E2. 1479 Ibid. 1480 Lublin Economic Guide, given to the authors of this report by Investment Promotion Office Lublin, 6 April 2011, p. 14.

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The Lublin Sub-Zone1481

Source: Official web site of Lublin. Besides the creation of the Lublin sub-zone,1482 the MO, the Lublin Business Club Association and the city of Lublin, also organise special economic forums to attract the attention of possible investors.1483 Other important institutions, especially in assisting new investors, are e.g: the Foundation for Lubelskie Development, the Crafts and Small Business Centre in Lublin, the Lublin Development Foundation, Regional Chambers of Commerce and the Enterprise Council of the Lublin Region. 1484 As has been mentioned in section 7.2, infrastructure is a major problem in the region; both in Lublin and in the periphery. Since this hampers investment, and economic activity, it gets a lot of attention by the city. Infrastructure projects in the region of Lublin are partly funded by EU money, as is the case with a newly build Airport near Lublin, but is neglected by the national government. 1485 Concerning the airport, which effectiveness is rather doubtful, different experts from the region as well as government officials claim that it is just a prestige project and that Lublin does not need an airport; it needs rail- and motorways (see also section 7.2 on infrastructure). 1486 The EU pays a lot of attention to regions and thereby the region of Lublin and its problems got more attention after Polish EU accession in 2004. 1487 There is more money for infrastructure and other development programmes now and jobless people can look for a job in other parts of Europe. 1488 The latter can be seen as both a positive and a negative development, since it solves unemployment, but worsens the demographic situation in the region. Another consequence of EU accession in the Lublin region has been the restructuring of the agricultural sector. After Poland was a member of the EU, farmers (mainly sugar producing ones in this case) were restricted by al kind of product rules and also had to deal with production quotas. This development made many farmers quit and thereby unemployment increased in Lubelskie. However, on the whole accession to the EU was good for the economic development of the region. 1489

1481

Official Website of Lublin. Special Economic Zone. Retrieved 2 June 2011 from http://www.lublin.eu/Special_Economic_Zone-1-509-12-494.html. 1482 Interview E2. 1483 Lublin Economic Guide, p. 18. 1484 Ibid., p. 19. 1485 Interviews E2 and H1. 1486 Interviews E2, E3 and H1. 1487 Interview E2. 1488 Ibid. 1489 Ibid.

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7. ENERGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT Three policy areas that cannot be let out of sight when examining Poland within a political and economic framework, are those of energy, infrastructure and environment. Within these sectors, Poland is facing several difficulties. These problems are related to important aspects such as foreign policy, the relationship of Poland with the European Union, the Polish economy and the regional disparities that exist with regard to economic development. First, Poland's energy policy will be described, which is occupying an important place within Poland's foreign policy. Important are the priorities of energy efficiency and energy security. Second, the infrastructural sector and its development and deficiencies will be illustrated. Third, Poland's environmental policies and the accompanying difficulties will be analysed. Finally, a further explanation of how the infrastructure and environment are intertwined will be given.

7.1 Energy Poland’s current energy strategy is outlined in ‘Energy Policy of Poland until 2030’, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers on the 10th of November 2009. It deals with the problems of growing demand for energy, developing new energy infrastructure, dependency on foreign suppliers and environmental implications. 1490 The issue of energy efficiency is prioritised within the strategy. The Polish government is aiming at zero-energy economic growth and wants to decrease energy consumption to the EU15 level. It is trying to reach this by investing in research and development of sustainable use and production of energy; information and education campaigns; and financial and fiscal benefits for companies that produce energy efficiently. 1491 The National Energy Conservation Agency (KAPE), a research institute funded by de government and the EU, is very active in promoting efficient use of energy. In its promotion campaigns, among other things KAPE stimulates better isolation of houses, the use of energyefficient lamps and education on how to save energy. It seems that this policy is successful, since Poland is catching up with EU-15 standards as regards the efficient use and level of consumption of energy.1492 Then there is the issue of energy security, which is interrelated with all the other goals of the strategy. Most important is that Poland wants to become less dependent on foreign suppliers of energy resources; especially oil and gas from Russia. To this end, Poland is promoting the extended use of hard coal and lignite; developing new forms of energy production (e.g. using bio mass); the introduction of nuclear energy; and diversifying the import.1493 The problem of energy security will be elaborated further in the next section. The introduction of nuclear energy is also an important priority of the Polish government. It is both part of its ‘green’ strategy and a means of becoming less reliant on foreign suppliers. Currently the legal and infrastructural frameworks are being developed to make the installation of nuclear power plants possible.1494 However, plans may change after 1490

Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030. Retrieved 20 March 2011 from http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/8134/Polityka%20energetyczna%20ost_en.pdf. 1491 Ibid. 1492 Interview Z1. 1493 Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030. 1494 Ibid.

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the nuclear disaster in Japan as a result of the earthquake on the 11March 2011. Since this accident, there is a discussion going on in Poland on the risks of nuclear energy, as is the case in other European countries. A referendum on the nuclear energy plant would be possible according to KAPE.1495 Concerning renewable energy sources (RES), Poland has included concrete goals in its energy strategy. By 2020 the RES share of final energy consumption has to be 15 % and the share of biofuels used by the transport sector has to reach 10 %. In addition, agricultural biogas installations and ‘wind farms’ are promoted by the government. For investments in these kinds of RES it is possible to use national and EU funds. 1496 How this is put into practice is not explained further in the strategy, which makes it a bit unclear how the green energy projects will be funded. As another ‘green’ initiative, Poland is limiting the impact of the use of energy on the environment by the reduction of CO2 emissions; this is part of Poland’s international obligations (mainly constraints posted EU). Furthermore, Poland is developing a management system for a national emission ceiling and indicators to measure emission of CO2, for instance the development of carbon dioxide storage.1497 According to KAPE, the influence of the EU with respect to RES and the reduction of CO2 emissions is quite important, since Poland itself (both the government and the people) would probably not have paid this much attention to environmental problems. Economic development is generally believed to be more important, and if Poland is interested in ‘green’ technologies, it is mainly because it is a way of becoming less dependent on Russian energy resources.1498 With respect to the economic side of energy production and supply, Poland is trying to increase competition in the sector. Competition in the energy sector (most notably in the electric energy sector) is seen as a means to counteract excessive price increases. One of the solutions to reach this goal will be to make it easier to change suppliers. 1499 However, there is also a negative side to the liberalisation that took place in the energy sector. The main problem here is the condition of the electricity infrastructure, which was inherited from the communist era. The condition of this infrastructure is very poor and should be renewed. This would be a very costly project and therefore private owners of the energy industry are not eager to invest in a better electricity infrastructure. According to some people in semigovernmental and non-governmental organisations, current thinking is that a state policy should be adopted to avoid large power outages. 1500 7.1.1 Energy Security Energy is becoming more and more important within international relations, because of the growing dependence of the energy importing countries on the energy exporting countries. When looking at Europe, where fossil fuel production is declining, it is becoming clear that the EU will become even more dependent on Russian supply of oil and gas, than it already is. Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas is expected to increase from 50 % now, to 65 % in 2030.1501 1495

Interview Z1. Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030. 1497 Ibid. 1498 Interview Z1. 1499 Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030. 1500 Interviews H2 and Z1. 1501 P. Naimski, Energy diversification strategy for Poland (2007). Retrieved 22 March 2011 from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/academics/regional/conf/Piotr_Naimski_at_Columbia%20University070917_.pdf . p. 3. 1496

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The situation for Poland is even less comfortable; it is very dependent on Russia for its energy: Russia supplies two thirds of Poland’s gas and 96 % of its oil. 1502 What is striking is that Russia is not mentioned at all in the chapter on energy security in the ‘Energy Policy of Poland until 2030’, since it is exactly because of the dependence on Russian oil and gas and because of the sensitive relation with this country, that energy security is very high on the agenda in Polish politics. For Poland, energy is also high on the agenda within the context of the EU, as is explained in section 7.1. In the next section will be looked at the gas and oil supply to Poland, after which, will be dealt with Poland’s energy security in an EU context. Gas Firstly, the problem of dependency on Russian gas has to do with soviet infrastructure (the Yamal pipeline in the case of Poland) which is still being used (see figure 13). Secondly, Poland’s own energy production comes mainly from coal production, which covers up to 60 % of total energy consumption and according to KAPE, could even cover up to 90 % in the future. This is however problematic, since the EU wants to reduce emissions from coal production. Because of these two problems, according to Piotr Naimski, the best strategy for Poland on the short run is to diversify its energy import by creating gas pipelines in a northsouth direction. On the long run, solutions must be sought in nuclear energy, new coal technologies, and other ‘green’ energy production. 1503 With regard to the short term solutions, Poland is diversifying its natural gas import by the Baltic Pipe and a LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) terminal. The former will transport gas from Norway, trough Denmark and the Baltic Sea, the latter will provide Poland with liquidised natural gas via a terminal in the north-west of Poland. When both projects are fully implemented, Polish energy supply will be divided as follows: one third is produced within Poland, one third will be imported via the new routes and one third will still be provided by Russia via the Yamal pipeline. 1504 Figure 13: Gas Pipelines in Europe

Source: P. Naimski, Energy diversification strategy for Poland (2007). 1502

Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 4. Interview Z1. 1504 P. Naimski, Energy diversification strategy for Poland (2007), p. 5. 1503

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Crude Oil Due to still existing soviet infrastructure, Poland imports 96 % of its total oil consumption from Russia. There is however a possibility to get round the Russian Druzhba pipeline by the existing oil terminal ‘Naftoport’ in Gdańsk in case of disruption of supply from Russia. With regard to the high dependence on Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline, it is very important for Poland to look for other suppliers and transport routes. Especially since Russia openly stated that it considers shutting down the Druzhba pipeline.1505 As an alternative transport route Poland was very interested in the Odesa-Brody-Plock pipeline (OBP pipeline) which could transport Caspian oil via Ukraine. By this route, it would also become possible to export Caspian oil, avoiding Russia, to other European countries trough Naftoport in Gdańsk (see figure 14). Right now the terminal in Gdańsk is already used to export Kazakh oil, transported via the Russian oil company Transnieft, to the US.1506 However, four years after May 2007, when the project of the OBP pipeline was launched, it has still not been realised. This delay is mainly caused by difficulties in the negotiation processes with the governments of the countries through which the pipeline has to be going. 1507 Figure 14: The Caspian Crude Oil Corridor to Europe

Source: Centre for Eastern European Studies.

1505

Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 1507 Interview Z1. 1506

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Energy as a Foreign Policy Instrument Poland feels threatened by the Russian plans of decreasing oil and gas deliveries trough the Yamal and Druzhba pipelines. This feeling has increased because of the construction of the North Stream, which will transport Russian gas to Western Europe directly; not going through Poland or other Central and Eastern European countries. Together with the fact that Russian oil and gas companies are state owned, the above mentioned developments could mean that Russia can use its natural resources as a foreign policy instrument; to put pressure on its former colonies in Eastern Europe. This was best shown by the recent gas conflicts (2006 and 2009) between Russia and Ukraine, which resulted in shortages in several Eastern European countries. Because of this, Poland hopes to finish the above mentioned projects (the LNG terminal and the Baltic Pipe) before 2012.1508,1509 Storage of supplies, improvement of internal energy infrastructure and pipeline connections to other European countries are also part of the strategy to become less dependent on Russian oil and gas.1510 To secure its energy supply Poland is actively lobbying within the EU. Logically it will be also one of the priorities during the Polish EU presidency. 1511 Besides that, the ‘Energy Strategy until 2030’ outlines how Poland will try to improve its energy security via the EU.1512 The Minister of Economy as well as his representatives at the EU are actively working to get attention for the issue of energy security. A few important goals regarding this topic are: getting the Odesa-Brody-Plock pipeline project going on; blocking initiatives that threaten Poland’s energy security; connect Poland to other EU countries’ energy infrastructure and also establish the financial means for this goal; and building a multilateral EU policy framework for energy security issues. 1513

7.2 Infrastructure The infrastructural sector in Poland is facing a lot of difficulties. 1514 It still remains underdeveloped compared to other EU members.1515 The infrastructure that was created during the communist period, is too old too function properly nowadays. After the fall of communism, initiatives for rebuilding programmes in order to develop the Polish infrastructure lacked in Poland. 1516 Even during the nineties, little attention was being paid to Polish infrastructure. No investments were made and there was no money available. However, in the early 21st century, the problem seemed to be recognised by the Polish government, as it would be impossible to reach modern economic growth without a well developed infrastructure.1517

1508

P. Naimski, Energy diversification strategy for Poland (2007), pp. 4-6. Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030, p. 11. 1510 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 1511 Website Polish EU presidency. Retrieved 18 May from http://prezydencjaue.gov.pl/en/what-is-thepresidency/421-mikolaj-dowgielewicz-we-must-save-schengen. 1512 Ministry of Economy. (2009). Energy Policy of Poland until 2030, pp. 23-24. 1513 Ibid. 1514 Within this section, the following definition of ‘infrastructure’ will be used: the basic systems and structures that a country or organisation needs in order to work properly, for example roads, railways, banks etc. (Longman Dictionary for Contemporary English) and all the issues related to construction, spatial order and housing, maritime, economy, communications and transport (Polish Ministry of Infrastructure). 1515 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 100. 1516 Interview H1. 1517 Ibid. 1509

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Infrastructure influences the development of a country when it is inhibiting investors and diminishing the country’s competitiveness.1518 Furthermore, an underdeveloped infrastructural system has a negative influence on the regional cohesion as well. 1519 The urgency to improve the infrastructure became clear, but in order to do so, Poland needed financial assistance. In the pre-accession period, this assistance used to come from the PHARE programme, 1520 the main financial instrument provided by the EU to the Central and Eastern European Countries.1521 After accession, the EU influence on the development of the Polish infrastructure remained. Not only in the form of financial assistance, but also in the fact that the EU obligated Poland to set up long term objectives and programmes. 1522 Poland started off as a EU Member State with great arrears in the infrastructural sector. Since 2004 the influence of the EU on the Polish infrastructure has been quite beneficial. However, as Poland’s infrastructure was at a low level when it entered the EU, its infrastructure still remains underdeveloped in comparison to other Member States. 1523 A means that is contributing the most to the solution of the problem of the infrastructure nowadays is the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (OPI&E).1524 This is a programme approved by the European Commission in 2007. Most of its funding is coming from the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. 1525 The European Investment Bank is also providing finances for the infrastructure. These finances are loans provided to the regions, which they are able to pay back later by means of the funds they receive. 1526 The OPI&E is carried out by an intermediate body of the Ministry of Infrastructure.1527 It is the largest investment programme ever implemented in Poland and contains projects such as water and sewage management, energy security and transport matters.1528 The contribution of this programme to the Polish environment will be further elaborated on in section 7.3. In the area of infrastructure the main goals are the creation of a basic motorway and expressway network, modernisation of railway lines and stations and the development of Polish airports, the seaport infrastructure and a sustainable urban transport system. 1529 The Ministry of Infrastructure holds the opinion that improvements coming from the OPI&E can not yet be seen as the programme is currently still in process. The Ministry expects the earliest results in 2013, when the investments will be completed. 1530

1518

European Commission. (2007). Operational Programme 'Infrastructure and Environment'. Retrieved 18 May 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=PL&gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=1212 &gv_defL=7&LAN=7. 1519 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 100. 1520 Interview H1. 1521 D. Bailey and L. De Propris, ‘A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity-Building in the Candidate Countries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2004), p. 77. 1522 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 20. 1523 Ibid., p. 101. 1524 European Commission. (2007). Operational Programme 'Infrastructure and Environment'. Interview H1. 1525 European Commission. (2007). Operational Programme 'Infrastructure and Environment'. 1526 Interview H1. 1527 Ibid. 1528 Infrastructure Investments in Poland co-financed from European Union Funds, given to the authors of this report by the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure, department of EU Funds, 20 April 2011. 1529 Ibid. 1530 Interview H1.

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7.2.1 The Problem of the Railways According to the Ministry of Infrastructure, out of all the sectors, the railway sector is the most underdeveloped. 1531 Firstly, this is due to the fact that the largest part of the infrastructure is created during the communist era and therefore very old. Secondly, the role that the companies play in the infrastructural sector is holding back the development of it. The problem can mainly be found in the management. The company that is responsible for this, is difficult to influence for the Ministry of Infrastructure. It has a very strong labour organisation and Polish politicians are likely to listen to the demands of this organisation instead of taking decisions that are the most beneficiary for the whole infrastructural sector. On top of that, different companies are responsible for different sections, which is slowing down the development process as well.1532 Thirdly, the roads are currently getting more attention, at the expense of the railways. This is caused by the fact that politicians listen to what is ‘popular’ among the Polish people and to the requests of labour organisations, especially with upcoming elections in mind. 1533 According to the Ministry of Infrastructure, total privatisation would be more beneficial to the Polish infrastructure.1534 At this moment, the transformation of Polish railway companies into free market companies is halfway through. Intercities, for example, are delivered by a private company, but its shares are fully owned by the state. This company will however soon be liberalised and on the stock market. The main company, the Polish Railway Company, is also undergoing the process of being put on the stock market. 1535 7.2.2 Infrastructure and Regions As stated in section 3.1.2, a problem that the Polish regions are facing is the lack of cohesion. This is also a problem within the infrastructural sector. When each region is acting in its own interests, this has a bad influence on cross-regional projects like the construction and maintenance of roads and railways. This problem demonstrates itself in for example the delay of the construction of a road from one regional capital to another, because two voivodeships disagree about it.1536 According to an expert at the Marshal Office Lubelski, such decisions have to be taken as a nation, to improve the entire Polish infrastructure, but as explained in section 3.1.2, the Polish regional authorities are not acting in this way. 1537 The fact that a Marshal has so much decisional power (see again sectionh 3.1.2), can also lead to ‘prestige projects’. For instance, the city of Lublin started the project of building an airport, which was made possible by money received from the municipality and companies. 1538 However, the Ministry of Infrastructure believes that effort and money should be spent on road- or railway projects, which is beneficiary for the whole Polish infrastructure. 1539

1531

Ibid. Interview D8. 1533 Interview H1. 1534 Ibid. 1535 Ibid. 1536 Interview D8. 1537 Ibid. 1538 Ibid. 1539 Interview H1. 1532

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7.2.3 Telecommunications An infrastructural branch that has to be taken into account, is that of telecommunications. 1540 According to A. Ciéslik et al. (2010), a well-developed infrastructure of telecommunications can contribute to economic development and diminish economical differences between regions.1541 The latter can occur as a result of product homogeneity, diminishing transaction costs and increasing flows of capital, goods and production factors. 1542 The level of development in telecommunications is also used in analyses concerning the economic development of the different Polish regions. A report written by the Institute for Structural Research and the Ministry of Regional Development states that the development of modern telecommunication techniques is one of the factors that can contribute to the economic development of a region. 1543 The EU also holds the opinion that a well-developed infrastructure of telecommunications can positively influence the economy. 1544 Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EC initiated programs concerning the development of telecommunication systems in its Member States. On top of that, the EP passed a directive that insisted on a more universal telecommunication system within the EU. With the prospect of its EU accession in mind at that moment, Poland had to adjust to these regulations as well. 1545

7.3 Environmental Policy Poland’s current regulations with regard to the environment are set out in ‘The National Environment Policy for 2009-2012 and its 2016 Outlook’. 1546 In the 2001 Act on Environmental Protection Law, it was decided that the national environment policies would be set out in such a policy document every four years.1547 7.3.1 Environmental Policy in Communist Times In the early communist years, there was almost no attention for the environment in Poland. Policies regarding the environment did not exist, while industrialisation and urban development led to extreme pollution.1548 From 1972 on, as a result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, more attention was being paid to the environment. With an eye on this upcoming conference, Poland started developing its domestic environmental protection policies. In that year, the Ministry of Territorial Administration was reorganised and the issue of environmental protection was included in

1540

The concept of telecommunications is defined by M. I. Nadiri and B. Nandi, Telecommunications infrastructure and economic development (2003), as ‘the transmission media, which includes wired and wireless networks, satellites and antennas, together with routers and other devices that control the transmission path of information.’ Source: A. Cieślik and M. Kaniewska, ‘Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regional Economic Development: The Case of Poland’, Regional Studies, vol. 38, no. 6 (2004). 1541 Ibid., pp. 713-714. 1542 Ibid., p. 714. 1543 Ministry of Regional Development. (2009). Regional Disparities in Poland, p. 47. 1544 A. Cieślik and M. Kaniewska, ‘Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regional Economic Development’, p. 722. 1545 Ibid. 1546 Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland. (2008). The National Environment Policy for 2009-2012 and its 2016 Outlook. Retrieved 21 March 2011 from http://www.mos.gov.pl/g2/big/2009_07/2826c539c3015384e50adac8fe920b0b.pdf. 1547 Ibid., p. 3. 1548 Ibid.

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this ministry’s responsibilities. In 1973, the Institute for Environmental Protection was established. 1549 During the years after the end of communism, more initiatives occurred in the field of the protection of the environment. As a result of Gorbachev’s glasnost policies, environmental groups became able to play a more substantial role in the area of environment. Among them were groups who could not operate during the martial law, such as the League for the Protection of Nature and the Polish Ecological Club. In addition, the influence of the Solidarity movement opened up a sphere of activism. In 1985, the Ministry of Environment was created.1550 The awareness of environmental problems among the people grew even more after the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. As a result of all these developments, environmental issues were taken into account during the Round Table Accords of 1989. 1551,1552 7.3.2 Environmental Policy after 1989 Obviously, many doors were opened after the fall of the communism. Environmental organisations were able to put more actions into practice and the leaders of these movements gained important functions in the Polish politic institutions, such as the parliament and the ministries. Significant steps were taken in 1991, with the Act on Environmental Protection Inspectorate, which introduced a unified system with legal agreements on the environment. Efforts were also made to create a effective network of NGOs. In the same year, the first ‘National Environment Policy’ was established. The establishment of environmental policies also demanded a financial system in order to reach the aims regarding the environment, since there were no means for this at all until 1991. Therefore, both a National and a Provincial system for Environmental Funds were founded in 1992. 1553 In the meantime, there were also intergovernmental financial funds coming from the World Bank, PHARE and the Environmental Partnership for Central and Eastern Europe. 1554 One of the most important financial instruments for the development of environmental protection in Poland was created on a cross-border level. In 1992, the Polish government started a project of debt-for-environment-swaps, in order to solve economical as well as environmental problems at the same time. Within such a debt-swap, part of the debts owed by Poland to creditor states were being relieved and turned into beneficiary investments for the environment. The Minister of Environment created the EcoFund to manage this debtswap. In the official document however, the EcoFund was called a non-governmental organisation, founded under the Polish law.1555 The EcoFund was the responsibility of the Interim Interministerial Committee, chaired by a Deputy Minister of Finance. 1556

1549

J. Carmin and B. Hicks, ‘International Triggering Events, Transnational Networks, and the Development of Czech and Polish Environmental Movements’, Mobilization: An International Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 3 (2002), p. 310. 1550 Ibid., p. 320. 1551 Ibid., pp. 311-314. 1552 The content of the Round Table Accords is explained in section 4.1.1. 1553 Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland. (2008). The National Environment Policy for 2009-2012 and its 2016 Outlook, p. 4. 1554 J. Carmin and B. Hicks, ‘International Triggering Events, Transnational Networks, and the Development of Czech and Polish Environmental Movements’, p. 315. 1555 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. T. Zylicz, Debt-for-Environment Swap as a Game: The Case of the Polish Ecofund (1998). Retrieved 7 May 2011 from http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL1998/NDL1998069.pdf. p. 3. 1556 Ibid., p. 8.

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7.3.3 Environmental Policy and the European Union During the 1990s, the environmental policies lost much of the attention that rose directly after the SU collapsed. However, it was given a new impulse when EU-accession came to the scene. 1557 As Poland is a Member State of the EU, it is obligated to meet EU requirements regarding the environment and it has to introduce EU law and Directives into its national policies. These laws and directives concern issues like pollution emission, sewage treatment or waste management. 1558 Since these investment projects ask for a lot of financial support, EU funds are very important in this area. These funds are provided by means of the OPI&E, as explained in section 7.2.1559 There are two EU funds that contribute financially to this environmental programme. The first one is the Cohesion Fund. This fund is developed for economic and social development within the EU with an eye on sustainability and the environment. The Cohesion Fund is meant for stimulating the development of the new Member States in several areas. 1560 Secondly, financial assistance comes from the European Regional Development Fund. This fund is intended to stimulate the development of the many regions within the EU and reduce the development gap between them. 1561 Other financial contributions to the environment come from the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism. 1562 7.3.4 The Problem of Waste Management Currently, an environmental problem that Poland is facing, is that of waste management. 1563 Despite the EU legislation it is tied to, Poland still misses an accurate waste management system. Hence, a huge part of the total waste is being disposed in landfills and recycling is hardly taking place. 1564 In 2006, the National Waste Management Plan 2010 was developed. 1565 Top priorities in this plan are reducing the quantity of waste and encourage the reusing of it. These goals have to be reached by means of, for instance, closing domestic landfills that are not in accordance with legal conditions, and eliminating the illegal waste deposition practices. Following these priorities will also contribute to the climate change problem. 1566 However, in 2008, 97 % of the total waste in Poland was still being stored in landfills, without any pre-sorting. At that time, only 30 % of the waste storage facilities was in accordance with the EU law.1567 The main factor contributing to the problem is the fact that waste transport is arranged on a local scale, so the National Waste Management Plan does not

1557

Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland. (2008). The National Environment Policy for 2009-2012 and its 2016 Outlook, p. 4. 1558 Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved 15 March 2011 from http://www.mos.gov.pl/kategoria/2183_general_information/. 1559 Ibid. 1560 European Commission. (2007). Het Cohesiebeleid 2007-2013. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/2007/publications/guide2007_nl.pdf. p. 120. 1561 European Commission. (2007). European Regional Development Fund. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/2007/feder/ce_1080(2006)_en.pdf. p. 1. 1562 Council of Ministers, Republic of Poland. (2008). The National Environment Policy for 2009-2012 and its 2016 Outlook, p. 5. 1563 Interviews H2 and D10. 1564 Ibid. 1565 Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Poland. (2006). The 2010 National Waste Management Plan. Retrieved 22 May 2011 from http://www.mos.gov.pl/g2/big/2009_06/e97e2a07ce29b48c19f462f83a6bf1a9.pdf. p. 1. 1566 Ibid., p. 79. 1567 Interview H2.

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have much influence. Decision-making is too much divided between different administrative levels.1568

7.4 Infrastructure and Environment The policy areas of infrastructure and environment can collide on different levels. E.g., one of the challenges the infrastructural sector had to face after EU-accession was that of the implementation of EU directives regarding the environment. All of these directives are met since 2008. Up until that moment, Poland had not fully implemented the Habitat Directive and the Bird Directive. However, there still remain problems related to the implementation of EU directives on environmental issues. Some of the infrastructural projects were initiated before the directives were implemented. Therefore, these ongoing projects are still lacking in the field of EU conditions with regard to the environment. Poland is currently trying to come to a compromise with the EU on this matter.1569 Another example of infrastructural policy clashing with environmental policy was visible in 2007, when Poland ended up in a conflict with the EU about the plans for a road project in the Rospuda valley. 1570 Poland was of the opinion that the region in which the Rospuda valley is situated definitely needed the construction of a new road, but this would automatically lead to environmental consequences. That is, the Rospuda valley is part of a European list of special protected areas, the so-called ‘Natura 2000’.1571 Despite the objections coming from the EU and the official charges of the European Court, the Polish government still decided to start the road project. When the Polish government announced that the start date of the project would be 1 August 2007, the EC demanded the European Court to take urgent legal proceedings towards the Polish government. 1572 The main argument coming from the Polish authorities to defend their position, was that the decision about the location of the road was already taken before EU accession. However, Poland gave in to the objections coming from the EU and no further steps were taken until the Court would give its final judgment about the project. 1573 In 2009, the Polish authorities came up with an alternative, e.g. a new route which in addition would be less expensive.1574 This proposal led to the EU lifting the injunction that was still inhibiting the start of the road project in the Rospuda valley. If this alternative proposal would not have taken place, the Polish government would have faced profound fines, ordered by the EU. 1575

1568 Environmental Expert.com. European Environmental Press. (14 March 2008). Systematic waste management systems lacking in Poland says EU. Retrieved 27 May 2011 from http://www.environmentalexpert.com/news/systematic-waste-management-systems-lacking-in-poland-says-eu-28996. 1569 Interview H1. 1570 NRC Handelsblad. S. Alonso and J. van der Kris, Poolse regering wil stukje uniek natuurgebied opofferen voor aanleg van belangrijke weg (7 March 2007). Retrieved 3 June 2011 from http://archief.nrc.nl/index.php/2007/Maart/7/Buitenland/04/EU+en+Polen+botsen+in+het+++Rospudadal/check=Y. 1571 NRC Handelsblad. S. Alonso and J. van der Kris, Poolse regering wil stukje uniek natuurgebied opofferen voor aanleg van belangrijke weg (7 March 2007). 1572 NRC Handelsblad. (2007). Spoedproces tegen Polen over snelweg. Retrieved 5 June 2011 from http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l&text=spoedproces+tegen+polen+over+snelweg&hit=1&set=1&identify=Y. 1573 Ibid. 1574 BBC News. (25 March 2009). Poland reverses to spare wetland. Retrieved 5 June 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7962918.stm. 1575 Ibid.

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These examples not only show how infrastructure and environment can collide, but also how EU accession brought some difficulties to the surface within these areas.

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PART IV: WELFARE STATE 8. WELFARE STATE Cultural-historical, political-economic and juridicial elements of the society are subsequently set out in previous chapters. This chapter adds to this a description of the main characteristics and developmental phases of the Polish welfare state. The welfare state is a state in which the government balances market forces with some additional welfare provisions. Welfare is mostly profited by the combination of income from work and, if necessary, income from social benefits. 1576 The main function of a welfare state is to secure its people with the basic means of existence and to provide them with a general sense of security. Collectivist regimes, like the communist regime, are not characterised as welfare states. In a communist state, other than what is the case in a welfare state, the government namely tries to fully control market forces, production and distribution of resources in society.1577 There are different types of welfare states in Europe. In order to explain the Polish welfare state, it is deemed useful to refer to some welfare state typologies. These typologies are based on ideal types in present day literature. Special emphasis is placed on the transition from a centrally planned economy with a Collectivist Social system to a welfare state system with a market economy. Labour and Social affairs are discussed and linked back to the main developmental patterns of welfare state typologies in the subsequent sections. Firstly, a general overview is presented of the three main European welfare state typologies. Secondly, a characterisation is given of the welfare state as it has been shaped through time. Thirdly, the labour market is described. With regard to the labour market, emphasis is placed on the European dimension, labour participation, skill mismatch and flexible labour market policies. In relation to labour affairs, migration and demographic patterns are shortly described. Finally, the main social provisions are set out to present a general overview of the social policies in place.

8.1 European Welfare State Typologies The typology of welfare states in Europe is based on the development of social provisions dating back to the interwar period. The field of welfare typology studies developed strongly during the eighties. The most famous publication on the typologies of the European welfare states is Three Worlds of Capitalism (1990) by Esping-Andersen.1578 The first type of welfare state is the Liberal welfare state. In the Liberal welfare state, universal coverage is provided at the minimum level of existence. Welfare provisions merely provide the minimum means necessary for survival. Besides this, the social security can be

1576

M. Cousins, European welfare states: Comparative Perspectives, London: Sage 2005, p. 107. N. Barr, Economics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, pp. 53-55. 1578 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Oxford: Polity Press 1990. Referred to in: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research. J. Staręga-Piasek and P. Matela, Rescaling Social Welfare Policies in Poland (2006). Retrieved 9 July 2011 from http://www.euro.centre.org/rescalingDocuments/files/Poland.pdf. pp. 8-9. 1577

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upgraded through additional private social insurance arrangements. 1579 Fighting income differentials and inequality in society are no main goals within the Liberal model. 1580 A low level of benefits reinforces the fluidity of the labour market and safeguards the incentive to work. 1581 The country which is traditionally known as the schoolbook case of the Liberal welfare state is the United Kingdom. 1582 The second type of welfare state is the cristian democratic or corporatist welfare state. This type does not aim at lifting income or status differentials. Labour and employment protection are traditionally high and the negotiation position of the trade unions in social dialogue strong. The social insurance system is linked to personal contributions and in this way preserves status differentials.1583 The family unit is the main point of reference of labour and social policies.1584 An important aspect is the role of traditional Christian values. 1585 In cristian democratic welfare states, there tends to be more investment in specific skills and in company training. This is related to a high level of employment protection and a rigid labour market. Employees mostly stay with one company for most of their lives and are contracted on long term contracts.1586 The family is the corner stone of the cristian democratic model. 1587 Women are often highly dependent on the man. This is both the case for initial income generation from paid labour as also for social provisions. The social provisions depend on contributions which are build up through paid labour.1588 Austria and Germany are traditionally good examples of cristian democratic welfare states.1589 The third type of welfare state is the social democratic welfare state. This type is based on the principle of universalism. Citizens should be able to live relatively independent from high market pressures. This welfare state provides a broad coverage and high benefit level for the middle-class. There is a high degree of equality both between social classes as also between man and women. 1590 European welfare states which are traditionally characterised as social democratic are Sweden and Denmark. 1591 Three types of European welfare states have been identified, the Liberal, the cristian democratic and the social democratic. In the next section, a short characterisation will be presented of the Polish welfare state and its backgrounds.

1579

G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, p. 26 N. Barr, Economics of the Welfare State, pp. 45-48. 1581 P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in: P.A. Hall and D. Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 50-51. 1582 M. Daly, The Gender Division of Welfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 54-55. 1583 C. Aspalter, K. Jinsoo and P. Sojeung,‘Analysing the Welfare State in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia: An Ideal-Typical Perspective’, Social Policy and Administration, vol. 43, no. 2 (2009), pp. 176-178. 1584 Ibid., pp. 172-174. 1585 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland: Policy Developments and Practice in a New EU Member’, Social Policy and Administration, vol. 43, no. 2 (2009), p. 138. 1586 P.A. Hall and D. Soskice eds., ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, pp. 50-51. 1587 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare state, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 138-140. 1588 C. Aspalter, K. Jinsoo and P. Sojeung, ‘Analysing the Welfare State in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia’, pp. 176-178. 1589 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, pp. 27-28. 1590 M. Daly, The Gender Division of Welfare, pp. 54-55. 1591 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, pp. 27-28. 1580

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8.2 The Welfare State of Poland In this section, an analysis is given of the Polish welfare state. In order to discover specific patterns in society, current labour and social policies are set against the historical background. 1592 8.2.1 History of the Welfare State in Poland The construction of the Polish welfare state can be traced back to the end of the 19th and early 20th century. At this time, large parts of Poland were still part of the Prussian and AustroHungarian Empire. The Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Empire had developed their welfare states along the lines of the cristian democratic type. 1593 During the interwar period, between World War I and World War II, Christian parties played a dominant role in Polish politics. Subsequently, the cristian democratic welfare state got strengthened. The system of welfare benefits was relatively generous in its coverage and benefit levels in order to increase the social integration of the working class.1594 The Catholic Church played an important role in the development of the welfare debate in politics. 1595 After World War II, the Communist Party of Poland (PUWP) introduced socialist policies in order to realise full-employment and egalitarianism. 1596 During the Socialist regime, there was a system of widespread distributions of social benefits supporting people through all phases of life. The society, and by that the state, was supposed to take care of all its members based on the ideology of Social Collectivism. Equality and universalism were the leading principles of this society model. The most important idea was that citizens are cared for by each other and by the state from cradle to grave. One of the socialist reforms was the introduction of a universal social security system for all. Previously there was a conservative social insurance system in place, which was based on individual contributions. Social benefits were linked directly to employment. This was in line with the communist full-employment model. 1597 For the elderly and disabled there were no social security benefits but there were welfare benefits. This was a separate system which was not linked to employment.1598 Healthcare, education as also public transportation and libraries were free. 1599 Within the cristian democratic welfare state the Catholic Church played an important role with regard to the provision of welfare. This, however, changed after World War II. In those days, the Catholic Church lost much of its formal role in the Polish society (see section 2.2 for more information on the role of the Catholic Church), as the Communist Party was in favour of a secular society.1600 Until 1989, state-owned enterprises took care of most welfare provisions. Trade unions and NGOs had marginal political power. There was, however, close cooperation 1592

J. Garcés, F. Ródenas and S. Carretero, ‘Observations on the Progress of Welfare-State Construction in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.19, no. 4 (2003), pp. 338-343. 1593 Ibid., pp. 354-356. 1594 Ibid., p. 49. 1595 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). A. Cerami, New Social Policy Ideas in the Making: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe (2006). Retrieved 9 July 2011 from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8482/1/MPRA_paper_8482.pdf. pp. 46-48. 1596 European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research. J. Staręga-Piasek and P. Matela, Rescaling Social Welfare Policies in Poland (2006), pp. 8-9. 1597 N. Barr ed., Labour Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Accession and Beyond, Washington DC: The World Bank 2005, p. 3. 1598 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 1599 Ibid., pp. 3-6. 1600 European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research. J. Staręga-Piasek and P. Matela, Rescaling Social Welfare Policies in Poland (2006). pp. 5-7.

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between enterprises and the trade unions with regard to the implementation and practical execution of social provisions.1601 8.2.2 Welfare State in Transition After 1989, the socialist system of a full-fledged universal flat rate system was replaced by an insurance and contribution based system. Political and economic changes dominated the development of the welfare state during this transition. The modernisation of the socialist system was not always high on the political agenda. 1602 As a result, some remnants of the system are still in place. Such remnants are for example the universal benefit programs or the first pillar of the pension system. The limited reforms also led to a situation in which certain welfare provisions remained underdeveloped or are only provided by NGOs. Many new policies to reform the social benefit system are not yet fully implemented. Besides, there are still some regional differentiations. From 1994 to 1997, the economy developed at a fast pace. Liberal reforms were designed in order to adapt the social security institutions to a market economy. 1603 Social policy concentrated mainly on building a minimum social safety net. This was aimed specifically at the social groups which were most affected by the transition process. 1604 During the nineties, related to high transitional unemployment and early retirement schemes, the public welfare expenses were very high. High welfare spending led to a high public debt. Paradoxically, even at that moment, the state social welfare schemes remained unable to provide the people with sufiwwcient social security.1605 8.2.3 Reform of the Welfare State and the EU After the collapse of the socialist government in 1989, unemployment and poverty levels were high. Structural cooperation between European Union member states, which aimed to improving social provisions, increased steadily after 1989. In 1990, the Operation PHAREcoordination was introduced to assist with the restructuring of the economy. 1606 Food aid was made available as an element of PHARE. Operation PHARE in this way marks the severity of the social situation and puts into perspective the importance of the European aid and restructuring programs for Poland at that time. In 1997, the European Commission published a report in responds to the Polish application to membership. In this report the Commission emphasised on the necessity of the

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The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter I, Article 12. For more information on the political system in Poland see Chapter 4. 1603 Eur-Lex. Additional Protocol to the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, and to the Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part. Retrieved 13 April 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21994A0129(01):EN:HTML. 1604 International Labour Organization (ILO). S. Golinowska et al., Decent Work Country Report – Poland (2008). Retrieved 15 March 2011 from http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/geneva/download/events/lisbon2009/dwreports/dw_poland.pdf. pp. 5-7. 1605 J. Garcés, F. Ródenas and S. Carretero, ‘Observations on the Progress of Welfare-State Construction in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic’, pp. 354-356. 1606 Europa – Press releases RAPID. (11 January 1990). Operation Phare – Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Economic Restructuring. Retrieved 14 April 2011 from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/90/3&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN& guiLanguage=en. 1602

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Polish economy to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. 1607 This placed extra pressure on the harmonisation and flexibilisation of the Polish social and labour policies with those in other EU member states. The Polish government responded to this pressure by ratifying the European Social Charter in June 1997.1608 Implementation has not yet been completed as already a revised version of the Social Charter was introduced. The revised Social Charter has not yet been ratified by the parliament.1609 This has to do with the current budget deficit and political priorities. 1610 In preparation of EU accession, the welfare state already started to show some characteristics of the Liberal welfare state typology. This can be seen in the fact that social insurance, healthcare and education were partially privatised, benefits became income related, the labour market was made more fluid, and education started to aim more at general skills and knowledge. 1611 Around the time of the accession to the EU, many of the characteristics related to a conservative welfare state, as was dominant before World War II, had been restored. This restoration was especially clear with regard to labour policies. These were namely aimed at long term employment, offered a high degree of employment protection and increasing the negotiation position of trade unions. Besides rigid labour market policies also the conservative social and family policies characterised the return of the cristian democratic welfare state typology. 1612 Education, healthcare and social policy are officially not policy domains of EU legislation. Community competences, however, increased since the Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties. The EU institutions support and supplement the European welfare states.1613 There are then also the social-acquis, the European social objectives 1614 and the European Social Agenda.1615 Furthermore, through the Open Method of Coordination, member states shared even more expertise and best practices on the workings of the welfare state.1616 The Polish government gradually improved the overall level of social security. The government was assisted by the European Structural Funds, such as the European Social Fund

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European Commission. (1997). Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union. Retrieved 28 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op_en.pdf. 1608 Eur-Lex. (2005). PROTOCOL. Retrieved 28 June 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:026:0222:0322:EN:PDF. 1609 Council of Europe. (2011). Poland and the European Social Charter. Retrieved 5 May 2011 from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/CountryFactsheets/Poland_en.pdf. 1610 Interview F4. 1611 J. Garcés, F. Ródenas and S. Carretero, ‘Observations on the Progress of Welfare-State Construction in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic’, pp. 355-356. 1612 C. Aspalter, K. Jinsoo and P. Sojeung, ‘Analysing the Welfare State in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia’, pp. 182–184. 1613 A. Stuchlík and C. Kellermann, Europe on the Way to a Social Union? The EU Social Agenda in the Context of European Welfarism (January 2009). Retrieved 15 May 2011 from http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/id/ipa/06013.pdf. pp. 3-5. 1614 Eurofound. (30 November 2010). Social acquis. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/socialacquis.htm. Europa. Priorities and objectives: the social agenda. Retrieved 14 March 2011 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_agenda/index_en.htm. 1615 Europa. (2 October 2005). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region. Retrieved 9 July 2011 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_agenda/c10115_en.htm. 1616 J. Garcés, F. Ródenas and S. Carretero, ‘Observations on the Progress of Welfare-State Construction in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic’, pp. 355-356.

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(ESF), and through the expertise and assistance of other EU member states. 1617 In line with increasing European cooperation, Poland is represented and actively involved in the European Open Social Insurance Platform (ESIP).1618 The current agenda would, mainly, be set by European and international regulations. The adjustment of national social and labour policies to internal market and competition legislation is the main driver of development. 1619 The European Committee of Social Rights conducts a yearly assessment of the implementation of the Social Charter, and of the 2005 revision thereof, in national law and practice. 1620 According to the European Social Survey, the Polish government is most reluctant towards increasing EU powers on the social policy area.1621 European social and labour strategies and goals did, however, speed up the Polish decision-making and social policy development according to interview material gathered. 1622

8.3 Labour Market This section assesses different aspects of the labour market. In general, the labour market is characterised by high unemployment levels and rigid labour legislation. To tackle these issues the government has introduced flexibilisation policies.1623 There is already a positive trend to be seen with regard to supply and demand in the labour market. In the future the labour market, however, still faces some unresolved issues which are mainly related to demographic and migration patterns.1624 8.3.1 Transition and EU Accession Before 1989, labour market forces of demand and supply were controlled by the central government. After 1989, a there was no official unemployment before, labour legislation needed to be built up. Activation policies, subsidised employment and retraining schemes were also introduced. 1625 These policies were especially needed as the transition caused several industries and with that the supply of specific occupations on the labour market to decline. 1626 The European Community offered vocational training and investment in active labour market policies as an element of PHARE.1627 Vocational trainings programs were, however,

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International Labour Organization (ILO). S. Golinowska et al., Decent Work Country Report – Poland (2008), pp. 5-7. 1618 European Social Insurance Platform. Retrieved 14 April 2011 from http://www.esip.org/. 1619 Ibid. 1620 Council of Europe. (2011). Poland and the European Social Charter. 1621 A. Stuchlík and C. Kellermann, Europe on the Way to a Social Union? (January 2009), p. 5. 1622 Interview F2. 1623 A. Lamo, J. Messina and E. Wasmer, ‘Are Specific Skills an Obstacle to Labor Market Adjustment?’, Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 240-242. 1624 Ibid. 1625 C. Aspalter, K. Jinsoo and P. Sojeung, ‘Analysing the Welfare State in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia’, pp. 170-185. 1626 M.W. Socha and U. Sztanderska, Employment and Labour Market Policies in Poland. Retrieved 14 April 2011 from http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/archive/lang--en/index.htm. p. 7. 1627 Europa – Press releases RAPID. (11 January 1990). Operation Phare – Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Economic Restructuring.

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too narrow in scope. 1628 The programs were mainly aimed at education and training in the banking and finance sector.1629 The European Employment Strategy (EES) is adopted as part of the Amsterdam treaty and offers a soft law mechanism to coordinate employment policies in the EU. 1630 The main aims of the strategy are employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability of employers and employees and equal opportunities, access to work. The main goals have been set at improving quality and productivity at work, strengthening social cohesion, inclusion and full employment. 1631 In 2003, the EES got amended. 1632 The means by which the EES aims are to be met are mostly through flexible labour market and activation policies. These policies translate in practices such as the introduction of employment offices, combating social exclusion, increasing gender equality but also through life-long learning and vocational training. An important aim of the strategy is to strengthen labour incentives. 1633 Social security should thus be minimal as to not diminish the incentive to work. In practice, people live with a relatively high market pressure. Finally, the labour policy aims to lead people from undeclared work into regular employment, also asylum seekers need to be better integrated and employment opportunities should be divided more equally over the regions. 1634 The Polish National Reform Program (NRP) 2005-20081635 was developed for the implementation of the EES.1636 Emphasis was placed on the reduction of unemployment through the creation of new jobs and through increasing adaptability of employers and employees. Also part of the NRP was the aim to boost human capital, to increase adaptability of employees and to include underprivileged groups into the labour market. The aims were to be supported by policies improving the balance between professional and family life, increasing quality and mobility of human capital.1637 The Polish government was assisted by the European Commission into adapting its policies and practices to the EES with structural funds such as the European Social Fund. 1638 As real growth and investment increased and unemployment decreased, the government is generally positive about the results of the 2005-2008 NRP. Especially the investments in infrastructure and innovation are linked to this success.1639 In 2008, a new Polish NRP has

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A. Lamo, J. Messina and E. Wasmer, ‘Are Specific Skills an Obstacle to Labor Market Adjustment?’, pp. 240241. 1629 Europa – Press releases RAPID. (11 January 1990). Operation Phare – Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Economic Restructuring. 1630 European Employment Observatory. European Employment Strategy (EES). Retrieved 16 March 2011 from http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/en/ees/. 1631 Eurofound. (2010). Treaty of Amsterdam. Retrieved 6 May 2011 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/treatyofamsterdam.htm. 1632 Eur-Lex. (5 August 2003). Council Decision of 22 July 2003 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States. Retrieved 7 May 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003D0578:EN:HTML. 1633 E. Mazur-Wierzbicka, European Employment Strategy: A New Direction for the Polish Employment Policy (2009). Retrieved 17 April 2011 from http://mikro.univ.szczecin.pl/bp/pdf/71/7.pdf. pp. 91-93. 1634 Ibid. 1635 National Reform Programme for 2005-2008 to implement the Lisbon Strategy (28 December 2005). Retrieved 17 March 2011 from http://www.fub.it/files/Polonia.pdf. pp.1-3 1636 E. Mazur-Wierzbicka, European Employment Strategy (2009). pp. 94-96. 1637 National Reform Programme for 2005-2008 to implement the Lisbon Strategy (28 December 2005). Retrieved 17 March 2011 from http://www.fub.it/files/Polonia.pdf. p. 5. 1638 European Commission. European Social Fund. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp?langId=en. 1639 Ministry of Economy. (2008). National Reform Programme for 2008-2011 to implement the Lisbon Strategy. Retrieved 17 April 2011 from http://www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/ED3609C2-1747-4125-98B1C23D09115D94/50245/NRP20082013.pdf. pp. 8-10.

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been adopted for the period of 2008-2011. The main aims are now to promote an active society, efficient institutions and innovation in the economy. 1640 8.3.2 Labour Participation Labour participation has remained relatively low over the past twenty years. This is surprising as wages and the demand for labour have been rising. The main explanations of low participation rates are a skill and generational mismatch caused by the transition process. Against this background it is of great importance to have a high labour participation. There is, however, a relatively low participation of women, young graduates and people above the age of 50.1641 During the nineties, low participation rates were related to the fact that the social security was too broad and to easily accessible. In responds to low participation, there was increasing attention for employment creation programs such as public works during the nineties.1642 Since 2006, Polish labour participation rates dropped. The most particular feature of this decrease of labour participation is the drop in labour participation of prime age individuals. In some regions youth unemployment is as high as 25 to 40 %.1643 This is both the case for man as also for women. 1644 Youth unemployment in the range of 19-25 is an immense problem as these people do not get the chance to develop working experience. This is even more problematic for young women. In 2006, only 62.8 % of the labour force in the age group of 15 to 64 was active.1645 Participation rates amongst the older generation, above the age of 50, are the lowest in Europe. Poland has had an unemployment rate of close to 20 % in the early 2000s. In order to create more chances on the labour market for young people and to give companies the opportunity to modernise more efficiently, early retirement got introduced. 1646 This only led to social exclusion of elderly and is currently a large burden on the current pension system. 1647 Unemployment rates are higher under the generation between 50 and 64. Only little jobs are provided to this generation which is, in many cases, discriminated on the labour market. This can demotivate people to take on courses to re-skill themselves for a better position on the labour market.1648 The gap between the participation of women and men declined as more women took on paid jobs. This increase of woman activation is most probably related to growth of the services sector. With regard to the European average, labour participation and especially women participation and participation amongst disabled is, however, still low. 1649 There are 1640

Ibid. Ibid. 1642 International Labour Organization (ILO). E. Kwiatkowski et al., Labour Market Flexibility and Employment Security: Poland (2001). Retrieved 15 April 2011 from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--d_emp/documents/publication/wcms_142350.pdf. 1643 NRC Handelsblad. S. Alonso en L. Starink, Polen lijdt onder sociale welvaart (24 November 2005). Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://vorige.nrc.nl/europa/article1668214.ece/Polen_lijdt_onder_sociale_welvaart. 1644 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Bukowski et al., Employment in Poland 2007: Security on flexible labour market (March 2008). Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/14284/1/MPRA_paper_14284.pdf. 1645 BAEL. (2006). Central Statistical Office (GUS), ‘Monthly economic activity reports’. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from http://www.stat.gov.pl. pp. 8-10. 1646 Interview F5. 1647 International Labour Organization (ILO). E. Kwiatkowski et al., Labour Market Flexibility and Employment Security: Poland (2001), p. 61. 1648 Interview F5. 1649 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Rogaczewska and J. Tyrowicz, Active Labour Market Services Privided by NGOS - The Potential for Social Capital Building In Poland (2007). Retrieved 15 April 2011 from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15042/1/MPRA_paper_15042.pdf. pp. 7-11. 1641

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programs of subsidised employment for disabled people but nothing in place for older workers.1650 8.3.3 Skill Mismatch The most important reason for the high and long term unemployment in Poland can be explained by sectorial restructuring. This required a reallocation of workers into new sectors. There were also technological changes which changed the working processes and the labour demands of firms.1651 As whole industries and production lines closed down, large groups of highly specialised workers could no longer use their experience and skills. For example there might be polish coal miners which are either unable or not willing to work in the tourist or service sector. This is also called a skill mismatch.1652 Worker skills, especially in case of people in the age range of 50-64, do not easily adapt to the modernised economic environment. Overspecialisation of the labour force led to relatively high and persistent unemployment. Retraining is costly and time consuming. 1653 At the moment the adjustment of the labour market to the modernised economy is therefore largely set by demographic turnover. People in the age group of 50-64 gradually leave the labour market relatively young. This is, however, a slow process and may prove too big of a burden on the pension system. 1654 There is also a skill mismatch for young people, aged 15-24, lacking the necessary working experience and expertise to gain foothold on the labour market.1655 Throughout the nineties, a large part of the education system got privatised and reformed in order to increase the link of the education with the demand on the labour market. Still, however, there is high youth unemployment. 8.3.4 Demographic Changes This section elaborates on the demographic changes. This has had an important impact on the labour market. Overall, there is a negative population growth rate due to the two factors of natural decline and emigration (see also section 2.1.1. The People, Culture). The total Polish labour supply is expected to decline from 17.2 million in 2004 to 12.8 by the year 2054. 1656 This is due to a negative population growth and migration patterns. During the past twenty years, fertility rates have dropped as mortality rates declined. This development can be traced back to the early nineties and is also called the second demographic transition. The first demographic transition is used to describe the so called baby boom generation which was born shortly after World War II. Popular aging and the subsequent smaller labour force has a negative effect on the tax base of the country. As less people work, less people pay tax. As less people pay tax, the 1650

Council of Europe. (November 2008). European Social Charter: European Committee of Social Rights: Conclusions XIX – 1 (POLAND), Articles 1, 9, 10, 15 and 18 of the Charter. Retrieved 18 April 2011 from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/State/PolandXIX1_en.pdf. p.14 1651 A. Lamo, J. Messina and E. Wasmer, ‘Are Specific Skills an Obstacle to Labor Market Adjustment?’, pp. 240256. 1652 Ibid., pp. 253-254. 1653 Ibid., pp. 252-253. 1654 Ministry of Economy. (2008). National Reform Programme for 2008-2011 to implement the Lisbon Strategy, p. 10. 1655 Interview F1. 1656 Central European Forum For Migration and Population Research. M. Kupiszewski ed., Demographic Developments, Labour Markets and International Migration in Poland - Policy Challenges (2007). Retrieved 4 May 2011 from http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2007-03.pdf. pp. 3-4.

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government has fewer budgets to spend. This will most probably lead to shortages of public finances and a decrease of social security. In responds to popular aging, labour participation needs to increase and fertility levels need to be maximised. 1657 In order to place the situation on the labour market in a European perspective, it is important to make note of the fact that the Polish labour force is relatively young in comparison to other EU member states. This is related to a second demographic transition, which is also called the ‘baby boom aftershock’ which took place during the 1980s. 1658 This second demographic transition can be explained by changes in the socioeconomic situation. The transition from a centrally planned to a free market economy brought about change in the norms in society related to family planning. 1659 8.3.5 Migration Patterns Poland has been and still can be characterized as an emigration country. Many Polish have moved to other countries in the EU. This outflow of people has a large impact on demographic patterns, social processes and the economy. 1660 During socialist rule migration was largely constrained. There was some emigration from Poland to the west of Europe. This increased gradually in the 1970s and the 1980s as border restrictions were lowered and the relation between Poland and Germany improved. Around 1986, 25 000 Poles with a Jewish background, left the country. 1661 In total, 3 % of the Polish population, more than a million people, emigrated before 1989. 1662 It is difficult to get a good oversight of the scope of recent migration patterns. The main source of information is the central population register.1663 The data provided is not always accurate as many people which are registered as permanent residents in practice do not live and work in Poland. Only by cancelling the residence registration can people be removed from the data. Many people living and working abroad on a temporary or permanent basis will remain permanently registered in Poland as they do not deregister.1664 The Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS)1665 has been instrumental for the collection of data on temporary migration (more than two months abroad) since 1994. In 2007 the data system on migration has been upgraded on quality and scope.1666 This was in response to European regulation. 1667 The Commission requires yearly statistics on migration and foreign workers. 1668

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Central European Forum For Migration and Population Research. M. Kupiszewski ed., Demographic Developments, Labour Markets and International Migration in Poland - Policy Challenges (2007), pp. 11-14. 1658 NRC Handelsblad. S. Alonso en L. Starink, Polen lijdt onder sociale welvaart (24 November 2005). 1659 Central European Forum For Migration and Population Research. M. Kupiszewski ed., Demographic Developments, Labour Markets and International Migration in Poland - Policy Challenges (2007), http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2007-03.pdfpp. 5-6. 1660 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Bukowski et al., Employment in Poland 2007 (March 2008), pp. 24-26. 1661 Focus Migration. S. Alscher, Poland (January 2008). Retrieved 5 May 2011 from http://focusmigration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP03_Poland_Update. pdf. p. 1. 1662 P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘From Net Emigration to Net Immigration. Socio-economic Aspects of International Population Movements in Poland’, in: R. Rotte and P. Stein eds., Migration Policy and the Economy: International Experiences, Munich: Ars et unitas 2002, p. 600. 1663 Central Statistical Office (GUS). (2009). Labour force survey in Poland in the years 2003 – 2007. Retrieved 7 May 2011 from http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/index_ENG_HTML.htm. 1664 P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘From Net Emigration to Net Immigration. Socio-economic Aspects of International Population Movements in Poland’, p. 588. 1665 Central Statistical Office (GUS). (2009). Labour force survey in Poland in the years 2003 – 2007. 1666 European Migration Network (EMN). Polish National Contact Point to the European Migration Network. (2009). Annual Report on Asylum and Migration Statistics for Poland. Retrieved 1 April 2011 from http://emn.intrasoft-

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Since 2004, migration has been largely characterized by a brain drain, the outflow of young and highly educated workers, from more economically backward areas. In some regions youth unemployment is as high as 19.5 %.1669 Due to the high youth unemployment in rural areas, young people are forced to move to the economic centres of Poland, or even of the EU, where the prospect of finding employment is more promising.1670 The outflow of workers has increased since EU accession. If this pattern continues, it will lead to a crowding out effect on the labour market on the long term. The most important receiving countries, since 2004, have been the UK, Ireland and Germany. 1671 Migration to other EU countries is often seen as the option of last resort for many young and highly educated. In clear terms, a ticket to the UK is the most important social security for many. 1672 People who are pushed out of the Polish labour market often find themselves left with no other choice than to look for a job elsewhere in the EU. For many people it is very difficult to compete on the European labour market. 1673 They often lack the specific knowledge and language skills which they need to compete. This is especially the case for people above the age of 45. Their position on the labour market is often weak. This is in part also related to a lack of information and knowledge about social and employment rights in receiving countries. Polish emigrants do not always enjoy the same working conditions or social security provisions as third country nationals. There are many cases where employees have been denied their labour right.1674 A related issue is the impact of emigration on family structures. This is the case for example with so called Euro-orphans. These are the children who are left behind as their parents leave to other European countries for work. 1675 As disintegration of family bonds and communities are directly linked to migration patterns, social cohesion and trust are increasingly put under pressure.1676 Around 2006, the emigration from Poland was a major cause of concern for the Polish right-wing national government.1677 Since this time, many public and private initiatives have made efforts to keep people from leaving Poland. These seem to have been successful as emigration slowed down by 24 % in 2007 and by another 15 % in 2008. 1678 Short term migration was highest in 2007 but decreased with 48 % by 2009. Not all migration is within the EU; according to 2010 data, half of all emigrants under the age of 30 migrate to the United States. Emigration levels will most probably decrease. 1679 intl.com/Downloads/prepareShowFiles.do;jsessionid=C8F9DBF3596192943B509699023CB588?entryTitle=02.% 20Annual%20Policy%20Report%202009. 1667

Eur-Lex. (11 July 2007). Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers. Retrieved 7 May 2011 from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023:0029:EN:PDF. 1668 Ibid. 1669 Interview F4. 1670 Interview F3. 1671 P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘From Net Emigration to Net Immigration. Socio-economic Aspects of International Population Movements in Poland’, p. 598. 1672 Interview F1. 1673 Interview F5. 1674 Ibid. 1675 Interview F1. 1676 Interview F5. 1677 BBC. T. Whewell, Can Poland woo back its emigrants?(6 July 2006). Retrieved 19 May 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5154002.stm. 1678 OECD. (2010). Recent changes in migration movements and policies (country notes): Poland. Retrieved 16 March 2011 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/15/45629509.pdf. pp. 232-233. 1679 P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘Demographic and labour-market impacts of migration on Poland’, p. 600.

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There is only small scale immigration. In 2008, there were 0.2 % immigrants on the total population.1680 Recently, however, gaps in the labour market are increasingly filled by immigrant workers.1681 Most of these immigrants come from neighbouring countries like Ukraine or Belarus. These people are often active in temporary seasonal work. Especially seasonal workers are not always properly registered and sometimes become the victim of illegal labour activities, lower labour protection and bad working conditions. 1682 The demographic structure, as well as the education and skills, supplied by the work force, does not optimally meet the needs of the Polish labour market. Immigration increasingly fills the gaps in the demand for specialised labour. Immigration, however, does not offer a realistic solution to solve declining demographics on the long term. In order to even out the demographic decline, 26.3 million immigrants would be needed. 1683 This large scale immigration would affect many factors in society among which human and social capital. The labour participation is relatively low. Popular aging and emigration, poses an additional threat to the labour market and financial base of the social security system. Consequently, wages are expected to rise and create a pulling effect on economic immigrants and return migration.1684 8.3.6 The Labour Inspectorate The labour law and the labour inspection services became stricter since 2007. The Polish Labour Inspectorate is based on this 2007 working conditions inspection act. 1685 Following the 2007 law on labour inspection, many training programs and media campaigns have been set up. The EU also invests in public awareness. An example is the 2008-2009 European campaign on occupational risk. 1686 By 2007, the number of accidents at work had been increasing for some years and found itself at a high point. The rise was the strongest in the sectors of industrial processing, agriculture, hunting, forestry and construction. 1687 The main labour rights which are being violated, in relation to Polish labour law, are the rights to rest, to payment for work and to safety at work. 1688 The number of complaints from employees has been rising over the past years. They were mainly about salaries which were not paid or about working conditions being below standard. 1689 The number of employee complaints regarding non-compliance with the labour law by employers has increased especially related to salaries not being paid and black work. Over 30 % of the companies that were inspected by the Polish Labour Inspectorate were found to

1680

OECD. (2010). Recent changes in migration movements and policies country notes: Poland, pp. 232-233. Interview F4. 1682 Interview F1. 1683 Central European Forum For Migration and Population Research. M. Kupiszewski ed., Demographic Developments, Labour Markets and International Migration in Poland - Policy Challenges (2007), pp. 11-12. 1684 Central European Forum For Migration and Population Research. M. Kupiszewski ed., Demographic Developments, Labour Markets and International Migration in Poland - Policy Challenges (2007), pp. 11-14. 1685 Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy. Act on National Labour Inspectorate of 13 April 2007. Retrieved 7 March 2011 from http://www.pip. gov.pl/html/en/doc/act_nlis.pdf. 1686 Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy. National Labour Inspectorate’s Programme of Activity for 2009. Retrieved 2 May 2011 from http://www.pip. gov.pl/html/en/doc/program_2009_eng.pdf. pp. 13-15. 1687 Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy. Executive Summary of the Chief Labour Inspector’s Report on the National Labour Inspectorate’s activity in 2007. Retrieved 14 May 2011 from http://www.pip. gov.pl/html/en/doc/01050701.pdf. 1688 European Working Conditions Observatory. E. Kuźmicz, Increasing numbers of employers break wages law (2011). Retrieved 29 May 2011 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2010/10/PL1010019I.htm. 1689 Ibid. 1681

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evade tax through the use of black work in a lesser or more severe degree. According to the statistics, the number of people working black has increased in the period from 2008-2011. According to the statistics, working conditions are rapidly improving since 2007. 1690 Therefore, there seems to be an overall positive trend in the practical implementation and inspection of the labour law since 2007. The number of accidents has decreased strongly. In 2010, the number of fatal accidents decreased by 13 %. The number of severe injuries at work has decreased by 30 % in comparison to 2009. There have been 424 fatal accidents and 600 severe accidents at work in 2010.1691 Nevertheless, inspection services are also criticized for acting too strict. It would be hard to comply with the regulations. Inspections pose a large administrative and financial burden on companies. This is especially the case for small and medium enterprises. There would always be something which needs improvement and for which businesses would be fined. Some foreign business man, working in Poland, raised the issue of unfair strictness towards foreign companies. 1692 The labour inspectorate works closely together with labour inspectorates in most of the other Member States. Due to this cooperation, the Polish government is able to monitor, inform and practically assist also, to some degree, those working abroad. The cooperating national inspection services share database information and best practices. 1693 8.3.7 Flexible Labour The European Commission actively promotes a more flexible labour market. 1694 In a more flexible labour market, employment protection is lower. It is than easier for employers to fire and hire labour. Also, it will be easier for companies to adapt their production processes to consumer demand.1695 In 2002, labour market flexibility was strengthened through an increase of temporary employment. Young and low skilled job seekers were positively affected by these policies for as far as youth unemployment decreased. 1696 From 2004 onwards, the government shifted its attention from passive to active labour market policies. Active labour market policies are programs which, for example, are aimed at the development of human resources and at increasing mobility on the labour market. 1697 The labour legislation is made more flexible, especially regarding temporary works (see also chart 11).1698 The percentage of the labour force taking part in untraditional

1690

Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy. Inspection and supervisory activities. Retrieved 29 March 2011 from http://www.pip.gov.pl/html/en/html/00000005.htm. 1691 Ibid. 1692 Ibid. 1693 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. W. Cockburn ed., Labour inspectorates’ strategic planning on safety and health at work: Results of a questionnaire survey to EU-OSHA’s focal points (2009). Retrieved 28 April 2011 from http://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/reports/TE-80-09-641-EN-N_labour_inspectorates. 1694 European Commission. (2010). Europe 2020: A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Retrieved 17 April 2011 from http://europa.eu/press_room/pdf/complet_en_barroso___007__europe_2020_-_en_version.pdf. 1695 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Bukowski et al., Employment in Poland 2007, p. 27. 1696 European Commission. A. Arpaia et al., Short time working arrangements as response to cyclical fluctuations (June 2010). Retrieved 17 April 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp64_en.pdf. pp. 6-8. 1697 Act of 20 April 2004 on Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions. Retrieved 8 April 2011 from http://www.polishlaw.com.pl/pct/fileakty_prawne41_0.pdf. 1698 E. Karwowski, Halving unemployment: Poland in the 2000s. Retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://www.econrsa.org/wkshops/publiceconomics/2010/halving-unemployment-poland.pdf. p. 3.

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unemployment schemes like part-time of shared work remains persistently low (see chart 12). However, at more than 20 %, temporary employment is rather high (see chart 11).1699 The Case of Mothers on the Labour Market In general, it is difficult for child rearing women to find sufficient job stability. This is especially difficult when working in the private sector. As long term standard contracts become less common employment protection decreases.1700 Women officially have the right to return to the job which they left before childbirth up until two years of maternity leave. In practice, however, these women often have great difficulty to follow a steady career path.1701 There are almost no part-time jobs available which makes it harder to combine child rising with income from work. And, even though it is officially possible, it is not common for employees to work at home. The percentage of non-standard contracts did increase strongly since 2003. This is especially difficult for child raising women and puts a strong pressure on the work-life balance and family life. 1702 Chart 11: Temporary Employment: Developments since onset of Lisbon Strategy and Impacts of the Crisis 2009

Source: European Labour Force Survey, online database (Eurostat 2010a) Note: Figures are for age 15–64

1699

European Commission. A. Arpaia et al., Short time working arrangements as response to cyclical fluctuations (2010), pp. 6-8. 1700 Ibid. 1701 Interview F5. 1702 Ibid.

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Chart 12: Share of Employees taking Part in Short-Time and Partial Unemployment Schemes 2009

Source: European Labour Force Survey, online database (Eurostat 2010a) Note: Figures are for age 15–64 Labour mobility and flexibility are being promoted. This is done in responds to high unemployment, rigidity and a lack of efficiency on the labour market. These policies have already led to a decrease of employment security and also increased emigrational patterns to other EU countries. 1703 The main issue, with regard to flexibility policies, is the high administrative and bureaucratic burden imposed on employers.1704 In order to maintain a good quality of life, in an increasingly competitive and flexible labour market, it is important to promote equal opportunities and provide a sufficient level of social security. 1705 There is a trend of vulnerable groups, being pushed into non-typical and temporary work. This is increasingly the case in typically female jobs as for example nursing, telemarketing and administrative work.1706 Many people aged 50-64, which have developed their careers before 1989, find themselves in the situation in which they had insufficient marketable skills to meet up to the demands of the labour market. 1707 These people mostly lack the necessary English language and IT skills.

1703

P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘Demographic and labour-market impacts of migration on Poland’, pp. 621624. 1704 E. Mazur-Wierzbicka, European Employment Strategy: A New Direction for the Polish Employment Policy (2009), pp. 91-93. 1705 International Labour Organization (ILO). S. Cazes and A. Nesporova eds., Flexicurity: A relevant approach in Central and Eastern Europe (2007). Retrieved 7 March 2011 from http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ilobookstore/order-online/books/WCMS_091425/lang--en/index.htm. pp. 13-17. 1706 Interview F3. 1707 Interview F5.

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Chart 13: Part-Time Employment: Developments since onset of Lisbon Strategy and Impacts of the Crisis

Source: European Labour Force Survey, online database (Eurostat 2010a) Note: Figures are for age 15–64 8.3.8 Active Labour Market Policies This section describes Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). These sorts of policies are aimed at creating an optimal link between the demand and the supply of labour. At this moment, these policies are much needed as the access to the labour market is low. The position of vulnerable groups in the Polish society is worrying. Young graduates, women and people of the older generation are increasingly employed based on non-typical contracts. These non-typical contracts offer low social security provisions and low employment protection.1708 ALMPs can include government subsidies in support of medium and small enterprises, life-long learning schemes, vocational labour institutions and public employment services. Not only is the work of job agencies and employment services important in this regard. Perhaps even more important are the policies in support of education and skills of the labour force.1709 The main action which has been undertaken by the Polish government regarding ALMPs is the creation of regional labour offices. These labour offices offer long term unemployed person’s vocational training, computer courses, job advice, psychological tests, assistance finding a matching job and language courses.1710 The main source of lobby pressure on the government comes from large private companies. These companies steer employment policies into dominantly increasing the link between demand and supply on the labour market. In this way ALMPs function as a public 1708

Council of Europe. (November 2008). European Social Charter: European Committee of Social Rights: Conclusions XIX – 1 (POLAND), Articles 1, 9, 10, 15 and 18 of the Charter. 1709 European Lifelong Learning Indicators (ELLI). B. Hoskins, F. Cartwright and U. Schoof, Making Lifelong learning tangible! (2010). Retrieved 7 March 2011 from http://www.elli.org/fileadmin/user_upload/About_ELLI/Documents/ELLI_EU_eng_final.pdf. pp. 6-9. 1710 Ministry of Economy. (2008). National Reform Programme for 2008-2011 to implement the Lisbon Strategy. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.mg.gov.pl/node/8411?font-size=1. pp. 14-15.

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job agency, simplifying recruitment efforts for companies. Policies aimed at training programs for young people and at optimizing the work of labour offices, are positive for company recruitment in the private sector. Social inclusion, of less productive or more sensitive groups on the labour market, does not always receive sufficient attention with regard to employment policies. 1711 ALMPs are being stimulated by the EU. There are, for instance, some European youth employment projects in order to promote European labour mobility. Youth on the Move is one of these programs. Due to the lack of financial means and national political will, however, this program was not implemented in 2010. Furthermore, there is the Eurodesk program which assists young people to find a volunteering job or placement within the EU. These EU labour flexibility schemes do not have a wide reach, but nonetheless are positively received. 1712 In the EU report on the progress and implementation of the European Social Charter, Poland is criticized for having insufficiently developed its employment services. 1713 There are some government programs which give out subventions to assist employers hiring students or young graduates. Furthermore, there are programs aimed at assisting disabled people into work. There are, however, no programs to support employers taking on long term unemployed in the age group between 50 and 64 or even above the age of 60. 1714 ALMPs are insufficiently profited as the government aims mostly at passive labour policies. With regard to the ALMP’s in place there is often a lack of money and means for the implementation thereof. Insufficient financial resources are made available to the public labour offices which are in charge of implementing ALMPs (see also chart 14). This year the national budget for vocational training has been cut for 75 %. This is a large budget cut and will have a large impact on the effectiveness of ALMPs. The political reasoning behind the ALMP budget cut is that the duration of an unemployed person to find a job is almost the same with or without being the beneficial of ALMPs. Training the long term unemployed increases their value for the labour market, have a better negotiating position towards employers and find a job which makes optimal use of their professional profile, knowledge and expertise. 1715 For most unemployed people, especially people of an older generation, it is hard to learn new skills. It is furthermore a concern that the training programs do not always have a strong connection to the demand on the labour market. 1716 Without training, however, many people are pushed into low end jobs.

1711

Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Rogaczewska and J. Tyrowicz, Active Labour Market Services Privided by NGOS, pp. 235-241. 1712 Interview F5. 1713 Council of Europe. (November 2008). European Social Charter: European Committee of Social Rights: Conclusions XIX – 1 (POLAND), Articles 1, 9, 10, 15 and 18 of the Charter. 1714 Interview F5. 1715 Ibid. 1716 Ibid.

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Chart 14: Expenditure on Active and Passive Labour Market Policies as Percentage of the GDP, 2008

Source: European Labour Force Survey, online database (Eurostat 2010a) Note: Figures are for age 15–64 8.3.9 Labour NGOs NGOs are allowed, as relatively independent actors, to promote employment and professional activities aimed at the unemployed. Trade Unions and employer associations are excluded from this provision.1717 Labour NGOs can, for example, be involved in projects such as a restaurant where people with a certain disability can volunteer and are in this way more integrated within the labour market and society. 1718 Social capital plays an important role in societies to match labour demand and 1719 supply. Social capital is another name for the social networks, trust and bands between people in society. There is a relatively low level of social capital. This makes the need for NGO programs which support social inclusion ever the more important. Cooperation with NGOs is sometimes seen, by the government, as nothing more but an increase of the competition for European funds. 1720 Because of this competition over European funds, and due to extended bureaucratic procedures, public employment services and local authorities insufficiently cooperate with NGOs available.1721

8.4 Conclusion Labour Market Since 1989, the labour market has been characterised by its high unemployment and high employment protection. During the nineties it was relatively easy to apply for welfare provisions such as unemployment benefits. This had a negative effect on labour incentives 1717 Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Act of law of April 24th 2003 on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work. Retrieved 4 March 2011 from http://www.pozytek.gov.pl/files/Biblioteka/Nowela%20ang.pdf. 1718 Interview F1. 1719 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Rogaczewska and J. Tyrowicz, Active Labour Market Services Privided by NGOS, pp. 235-241. 1720 Ibid., pp. 239-243. 1721 Interview F1.

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and subsequently on public finances. At the moment, social benefits, as well as employment protection, are low and access to social welfare provisions is made stricter. Unemployment remains relatively high and the adjustment of the labour market to the modernised economy is largely set by a demographic turnover. There are issues of low human capital, skill mismatch, emigration, aging and low innovation levels in the economy. Related to these issues is the fact that there is too little national and EU funding for ALMPs. As a consequence, many young graduates and unemployed move elsewhere in the EU for work. There is too little attention for social inclusion and re-training programs which is mainly problematic for people in the age range of 50-64. Improvement of the cooperation between the government, regional labour offices and labour NGOs would probably be the most effective and cost efficient approach in order to implement ALMPs.1722

8.5 Social Security Since 2004, Poland is known as a country with a high level of social services. The idea of social security, against certain basic social contingencies, is an integral part of its society. The Social security is even named in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 1723 The Polish welfare state provides almost the same degree of social security coverage as most Western European countries.1724 The social security is composed of social insurance, unemployment, incapacity to work and family benefits (family benefits are discussed in more detail in section 8.6.) 8.5.1 Social Insurance The Social Insurance System has been created by the Act of 28 March 1933. This act is also called the Ambulation Act and was amended on 24 October 1934.1725 After World War II, the finances of the Social Insurance were depleted. In 1950-1951, the Social Insurance Institution ZUS was largely disintegrated under socialist rule. In 1955 a new insurance system was set up which was made up of two parts. The first part was for short term benefits and the second part for long term benefits. The short term benefits were taken care off by centrally coordinated trade unions. These are for example sickness and childcare benefits. The long term benefits, like old-age pensions, were taken care off by the Ministry of Labour and Social Care. 1726 In 1974, the original Social Insurance structure got restored and an obligatory social insurance was introduced. 1727 With the Act on the organization and financing of the Social Insurance System of November 25th 1986, the Social Insurance Fund (FUS) was created. As a fund administrator, the Social Insurance Institution ZUS got restored. 1728

1722

Interview F5. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chapter I, Article 12. 1724 Interview F2. 1725 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2011). Retrieved 15 April 2011 from http://www.zus.pl/pliki/ulotki/Ubezpieczenia%20spoleczne%20informacje%20fakty%20wer%20angielska.pdf. p.15 1726 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). (2011). Compendium. Retrieved 18 April 2011 from http://www.zus.pl/pliki/ulotki/Informator%20Compendium.pdf. pp. 7-10. 1727 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). (2011). Compendium. Retrieved 18 April 2011 from http://www.zus.pl/pliki/ulotki/Informator%20Compendium.pdf. p. 8. 1728 Social Insurance System ACT of October 13th 1998. Retrieved 18 April 2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPENSIONS/Resources/3954431122047906143/PenLegPolandSocIns1998.pdf. 1723

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After the 1989 collapse of the communist system, abuse of social insurance benefits was a major issue.1729 People with an unemployment registration card receive some additional social benefits such as free health insurance. Especially during the nineties, this has proven to be an important incentive for people to get themselves registered as being unemployed. 1730 People would combine social benefits with income from unregistered employment. This posed additional pressure on the costs of social security.1731 In 1999, the reforms of the Social Insurance System started with a special focus on the pension system. The main focus was on the elimination of the socialist universal state system of social insurance.1732 ZUS went through profound changes but these were mainly technological and IT related.1733 The EU accession has increased the coordination of the social security system with that of other member states.1734 The Polish prime minister appoints the ZUS president as well as the supervisory board. The members, of this supervisory board, are delegated by the social partners from the Tripartite Committee for Social and Economic Affairs.1735 The Social Insurance Fund is typically used as a characteristic for the cristian democratic welfare state type. The pension system is, however, not yet fully based on social insurance. There is still the first pillar PAYG system (pay as you go system) providing a minimum flat rate coverage. This can be marked as a remnant of the socialist system. 1736 Benefits are distributed by ZUS. There is an individual social insurance company for farmers and their families. This social insurance fund is called KRUS. 1737 In 2009, ZUS had a budget of PLN 138.305.1 million. There is, however, a yearly returning budget deficit. 1738 Minimum guaranteed benefits are calculated based on an annual index of consumer goods and services in the preceding year. In 2010, the minimum guaranteed benefits were set at a monthly rate of PLN 706.29.1739 For labour insurance at a minimum level of existence, private entrepreneurs pay 13 % whereas employees share this insurance payment with their employer. 1740 8.5.2 Old Age Pensions Background During the transition period of the 1990s, there was a weak correlation between pension benefits and the length of employment. Everybody would receive a flat rate pension independent of their contributions. The contributions made by the working population were

1729

Interview F6. NRC Handelsblad. S. Alonso en L. Starink, Polen lijdt onder sociale welvaart (24 November 2005). 1731 P.A. Hall and D. Soskice eds., ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, p. 51. 1732 K. Nelson, ‘Social assistance and minimum income benefits in old and new EU democracies’, International Journal of Social Welfare, vol. 19, no. 4 (2010), pp. 367-378. 1733 Interview F6. 1734 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). (2011). Compendium. Retrieved 18 April 2011 from http://www.zus.pl/pliki/ulotki/Informator%20Compendium.pdf. p. 9. 1735 Ibid., http://www.zus.pl/pliki/ulotki/Informator Compendium.pdfp. 13. 1736 Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). M. Bukowski et al., Employment in Poland 2007 (March 2008), p. 5. 1737 Agricultural Social Insurance Fund. (2009). Agricultural Social Insurance Fund Basic Information. Retrieved 7 March 2011 from http://www.krus.gov.pl/fileadmin/moje_dokumenty/obrazki/KRUS-broszura_EN.pdf. 1738 Interview F4. 1739 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2011), p. 39. 1740 Interview F2. 1730

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insufficient to support the pension system due to demographic developments. The pension system was one of the most expensive systems in the whole of Europe. 1741 Before 1999, there was one old age pension system for all in the form of a collective pyramid or pay as you go system (PAYG). Only the mining, agriculture and the uniformed sector were excluded from this system. The basic idea of this system is that the active population pays for the pensions of the retired workers.1742 The difficulty of this pension system is that is does not give enough consideration for the base of the pension contributions. Demographic changes like falling population numbers but also early retirement and work in the shadow economy made that the contribution base of the pension system was relatively small. As a consequence, the PAYG system could no longer provide sufficient levels of social security to the retired. 1743 The current old age pension system is based mainly on a large reform of the pension system in 1999. Old Age Pension System The retirement age in Poland is currently 65 for men and 60 for women. Early retirement has been abolished with the 1999 pension reforms. However, as a transitional arrangement, there are still some people with the right to use early retirement. Women can obtain an early retirement pension if they have contributed for more than 30 years and are above the age of 55. For man the age limit has been set at 60 years and the minimum contributory years need to amount to a 25 years.1744 In 1999, in addition to the PAYG, firstly, a second pillar got introduced based on individual savings accounts. This pillar is build up of private or Open Pension schemes (OPFs). The PAYG system still applies to people older than 50, born before the first of January 1949, on the date of entry into force of the reform. Women retiring during 2009-2013, who did not yet join private schemes, have been offered a transitional scheme. This consists of a mixed oldage pension partly under old and partly under new rules.1745 This is only guaranteed for the minimum old-age pension.1746 Pension funds started paying out pensions starting from January 2009.1747 Secondly, a third pillar was introduced in the form of additional private savings. 1748 The main reason for the reform was that this is generally less sensitive to demographic changes and in this way pension savings are more resilient to financial fluctuations. 1749 This

1741

M. Góra, The New Polish Pension System: An Example of a Non-orthodox Approach to Pension Reform (2003). Retrieved 17 March 2011 from http://www.ier.hitu.ac.jp/pie/Japanese/discussionpaper/dp2003/dp168/text.pdf. pp. 4-5. 1742 Pensions Institute. D. Stańko, Polish Pension Funds, Does The System Work? Cost, Efficiency and Performance Measurement Issues (January 2003). Retrieved 17 March 2011 from http://www.pensionsinstitute.org/workingpapers/wp0302.pdf. 1743 M. Góra, The New Polish Pension System, pp. 4-5. 1744 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), given to the authors of this report by the Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), 7 April 2011, p. 27. 1745 Ibid. 1746 Pensions Institute. D. Stańko, Polish Pension Funds, Does The System Work? Cost, Efficiency and Performance Measurement Issues (January 2003), p. 8. 1747 Interview F6. 1748 Interview F2. 1749 The Financial. (16 February 2011). Moody's: Pension reforms in Hungary and Poland have mixed rating implications. Retrieved 17 March 2011 from http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Business/81055_Moody's:_Pension_reforms_in_Hungary_and_Poland_h ave_mixed_rating_implications/.

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system is based on the so called ‘Security through Diversity’ principle. 1750 People save for their own pensions and not for those of the previous generation. 1751 Contributions The first and second pillars are financed through individual contributions, 19.52 % of Gross Wages, which are shared between the employer and employee, both contribute 9.76 %. Private entrepreneurs pay their pensions themselves. Participation in the second, funded tier means that of the employee’s contribution, 7.30 % is diverted to the OPFs. 1752 The contribution to the third pillar is optional. Under the old PAYG system, the ceiling to contributions and pensionable earnings is set at 2.5 times average earnings. Level of Benefits In March 2010, minimum guaranteed pension benefits were set at PLN 675.10. The average pension in 2009 was PLN 1596.46. In total 7.9 % of all pensioners received the minimum pension.1753 The maximum pension under the old scheme is set at 250 % of the base amount. This comes down to a monthly payment PLN 2716.71 in 2010.1754 Indexation The calculation of the pension indexation is based on the index of consumer goods and services in the year before taking into account real growth and the average monthly earnings. The indexation is negotiated on by the Committee of Social and Economic Affairs. If no consensus is reached in the Committee, the Council of Ministers sets the guaranteed minimum pension level. 1755 It is possible to combine old age pension benefits with income from work. Pensioners older than 65 for man and 60 for women are allowed to combine their pensions with work without restrictions. When income from work does not exceed 70 % of the average monthly earnings, the pension is paid fully. There are only restrictions set for people which make use of early retirement schemes. The provision to combine income from work with that from pensions has been heavily criticised. It would make the pension system unnecessarily expensive. Able bodied persons should not receive income from pensions. 1756 Review of the Old Age Pension System In order to finance the first pillar (old PAYG system), ZUS has a deficit close to 90 million. There is no other option than to pay out the minimum pensions to the people which were not in the position to build up a personal pension before 1989. The liability of the old system will maintain to be a problem for the next 30 years to come as this is the maximum time-period to be expected for generational replacement.1757 The ‘Security through Diversity’ system has got three important weaknesses. In the first place is it the case that this pension scheme reinforced the role of the male breadwinner. 1750

A. Chlon, M. Gora, and M. Rutkowski, ‘Shaping Pension Reform in Poland: Security through Diversity’, Social Protection Discussion Paper, no. 9923 (1999), Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp.13-15. 1751 Interview F4. 1752 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), p. 23. 1753 Interview F4. 1754 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), p. 40. 1755 Ibid., p. 37. 1756 Interview F4. 1757 Interview F1.

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The main reason for this is that it is very difficult to build up a sufficient pension in combination with part-time work and other forms of flexible labour. Under the current system, only stable, long-term contractual work is able to secure a good coverage. This enforces the male breadwinner family model. 1758 As a result, unmarried women often build up insufficiently pension benefits. Women are expected to stay home as the men earn income and build up social insurance benefits for the family. This characterises the cristian democratic welfare state.1759 The second weakness is that the system makes the labour market less flexible. The pension system is mandatory. Besides this the system is based on cooperation between employer and employee which supports long-term employment. Thirdly, it is a problem that the third pillar of supplementary insurance is not yet sufficiently used.1760 This situation is expected to improve as the younger generation is increasingly inclined to save. This would have to do with a general shift in the attitude towards more active citizenship and personal responsibility. 1761 Opinions on whether the 1999 pension scheme reforms have been positive differ. The reforms had a high social cost on the short term. Poverty levels among elderly increased. At the moment pensions are relatively low and there is a large yearly deficit in ZUS. 1762 According to the 2010 European Social Observatory review of the Polish Pension system, the current three pillar pension system should be sufficiently healthy, on the long term, from a fiscal point of view. 1763 However, it will be necessary to change some elements of the system. In the first place the retirement ages should be increased and should also be made equal for man and woman. In the second place, work after 65 of age should be promoted. In the third place, it should no longer be possible to combine income from pensions with income from work. Finally, it is important to make sure that the private pension funds invest in a sustainable way and spread the financial risks.1764 Independent from the discussion about which pension system is the right one for Poland, it is to be taken into account that there are currently four people working to sustain one retired person. Due to demographic change, this will increase to 2.2 active workers paying for one retired person within 25 years.1765 Recent Developments On 30 December 2010, government contributions to the OPFs have been cut by 5 % in relation to the national budget deficit. The contribution is taken down from 7.3 % to 2.3 %. By 2013, the contribution of the government to the OPFs will be raised again to 5.3 %. 1766 For the moment the difference of 5 % is being transferred to ZUS, into a fund based on separate

1758

Observatoire social européen (OSE). I. Guardiancich, Country Report Poland. Current pension system: first assessment of reform outcomes and output (May 2010). Retrieved 9 May 2011 from http://www.ose.be/files/publication/2010/country_reports_pension/OSE_2010_CRpension_Poland.pdf. p. 3. 1759 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 132. 1760 Observatoire social européen (OSE). I. Guardiancich, Country Report Poland, pp. 23-27. 1761 Interview E6. 1762 Interview F4. 1763 European Commission. (2011). Summary of Consultation Responses to the Green Paper: "Towards Adequate, Sustainable And Safe European Pension Systems". Retrieved 6 June 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6624&langId=en. 1764 Interview F4. 1765 Ibid. 1766 The Financial. (16 February 2011). Moody's: Pension reforms in Hungary and Poland have mixed rating implications.

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individual savings. This is again a notional system in which pension is calculated based on contribution made per person. 1767 Since 2009 there is an official social dialogue in place between pension funds and the government. However, there have been multiple indications of social partners being marginalised in decision making procedures.1768 According to interview material, the decrease of government contributions to the OPFs has only been discussed once and the advice profited by private banking sector would not have been taken serious. 1769 The decision to decrease the government contributions was a said to be a highly political. It has been portrayed by the OPFs as the fruit of a rather short term political vision.1770 The main complaint against this reform, which has been communicated by the private banking sector, is that the government in this way again increases the risks for the next generations. This would be the case as OPFs will than lack behind in the growth necessary to deal with the expected aging of the Polish society.1771 On 7 January 2010 the Polish Finance Minister Rostowski presented a fiscal consolidation plan for 2010-2012. The main measures announced included a gradual increase and equalisation of the retirement age for men and women at 67 years and also additional privatisations.1772 8.5.3 Care Allowances Care allowances are granted to people taking care of a sick family member or someone living in the same household with an insured person during the period of care. Care allowances are also available for parents or carers taking care of sick or handicapped children. The amount of the allowance ranges from 153 to 520 zloty monthly.1773 Care allowances are aimed to support the care function within families. This policy strengthens family bonds and is in this way characteristic of the cristian democratic welfare state.1774 8.5.4 Unemployment Benefits Unemployment benefits were tightened in the mid-90s in order to reduce reservation wages and to increase labour supply. At the moment Polish unemployment benefits are by far not sufficient to maintain a normal standard of living. 350 to 500 zloty is the unemployment benefit level. The level of benefits is especially problematic for families with children. Due to this, many unemployed people are often highly dependent on family. 1775 The level of dependency on family and the personal social network in addition to social security is indicated by the so called degree of familialisation. As familialisation levels are higher and de-commodification levels are lower the incentive for unemployed to find a new job as soon as possible increased.1776 Before 1989, there was a law which prohibited an 1767

Interview F4. Eurofound, EIRO. (2009). Social partners uneasy about government proposal to change pension system. Retrieved 14 April 2011 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/12/articles/pl0912019i.htm. 1769 Interview F4. 1770 Ibid. 1771 Observatoire social européen (OSE). I. Guardiancich, Country Report Poland. Current pension system: first assessment of reform outcomes and output (2010), pp. 36-38. 1772 European Commission. (2011). Summary of Consultation Responses to the Green Paper: "Towards Adequate, Sustainable And Safe European Pension Systems". 1773 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2011), pp. 67-68. 1774 C. Aspalter, K. Jinsoo and P. Sojeung, ‘Analysing the Welfare State in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia’, pp. 170-172. 1775 Interview F5. 1776 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 136-151. 1768

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employer to fire the head of an household if this person was the only person involved in paidlabour of the family. There is a high dependency of workers on labour market forces. This is characteristic for Liberal welfare states. This dependency creates a situation in which companies can offer relatively weak job protection and a lesser quality of employment conditions. 1777 Against the historical background of high social and employment security, the current state of affairs with relatively low levels of social security has been a large change for the society. Temporary Incapacity to Work During the early nineties, the Polish government wanted to create more space on the labour market for young and healthy workers. As a result, more people than necessary were listed as disabled to work and there were problems with abuse. In order to strengthen the control of sickness benefit claims and medical certificates, ZUS evaluating doctors check up on reports of temporary incapacity to work. 2875 of such inspections have been conducted in 2009 and 12.2 % turned out to be false reports by people considered fully capable of work. 95 700 people were found to take advantage of medical certificates in some way. Of these people, 3402 people were denied further benefits and had to pay back received benefits. Conclusion Social Security Ever since 1989, the social security has been characterised by high levels of familialisation and low levels of de-commodification. As the benefit level is low there is a high dependency on family support as also a strong incentive to work. As the social security system is based on contribution, it is hard for part-time or flexible workers to build up sufficient social benefits. This is especially the case for women and young people. Even if benefits are relatively low, it has long been relatively easy to apply for a wide range of social security benefits. High social assistance costs related to economic transition, such as early pensions and high unemployment are a burden on the Polish public finances. High social insurance expenditures are also due to fraud cases and expenses on invalidity and sickness benefits. Recently, the access to welfare provisions has been tightened and the effectiveness of inspection services improved.1778 As aging of the population becomes more and more of a problem, it is to be expected that in 25 years the Polish government will have great difficulty to sustain the welfare state. This is especially the case with regard to the old age pension system. 1779

8.6 Family Affairs This section deals with family affairs and fits them into more general patterns of the welfare state. Firstly, a description is given of family patterns in the fame work of different family models. Secondly, the main family benefits in Poland are presented and shortly analysed. These family benefits consist of child birth grants, care benefits and family allowances.

1777

P. Kaczmarczyk and M. Okólski, ‘Demographic and labour-market impacts of migration on Poland’, pp. 599624. 1778 European Commission. (2011). Summary of Consultation Responses to the Green Paper: "Towards Adequate, Sustainable And Safe European Pension Systems". 1779 Interview F4.

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8.6.1 Family Model Throughout the initial development of the Polish welfare state and especially after World War I, conservative cristian democratic forces were most influential. Compared with Western Europe, the social policies have relatively strong maternal characteristics. 1780 A wide variety of family and child benefits were put in place. Family policies developed from the point of view of the male breadwinner model. 1781 During the era of state socialism, government perspectives changed. Women and men were increasingly seen as equals. The dual earner model was strengthened. Both men and women were expected to work as the state provided child and family care for everybody. The Polish society, however, never knew a true dual earner model. This is related to the fact that state-socialist support of dual employment as also the public provision of childcare has never offered sufficient support to working mothers in Poland. Also it is related to the strong position of the Catholic Church and the Christian values in society. More often than in an ideal typical dual-earner model, women stayed at home and took care of the children. 1782 After 1989, the coverage of family and child benefits provided gradually improved. Family policies were restored in support of the male breadwinner model. Strong family bonds were increasingly important also as the state system for childcare had collapsed. 1783 42 % of the people are in favour of a traditional male breadwinner model based on the mother staying home at least until the child is three years. Within this model, fathers play a rather marginal role in child care. Only 38 % of the people support the development of the dual earner model. 1784 The current Polish family model shows characteristics of both the dual earner model as also of the male breadwinner model. The male breadwinner model is based on the idea that the man goes out of the house and does paid labour. The woman does unpaid labour such as taking care of the children and the household. This model fits in the cristian democratic welfare state type. 1785 The division of paid and non-paid labour between men and women is not equally divided. Often a woman will be in charge of the house work. This is the traditional division of work. 1786 The past ten years, the traditional gendered division of work is slowly becoming more equal.1787 Within the dual earner model, paid and unpaid labour are shared between men and women. 1788 This model fits within the Socialist system but also within the Liberal and social democratic welfare state. The division of unpaid work between men and women is still largely unbalanced. Little attention is given to the role of the father as a care-giver and there is additional support is provided to stay at home parents. Young parents decide to work and bring their children to a day-care loose the right to family benefits and are confronted with low standard and expensive child care services. As a result mothers rather choose to stay home to take care of the children at least for some years after child birth.1789 These are typical characteristic of the cristian democratic welfare state, and the male breadwinner model. 1780

A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 149. J. Garcés, F. Ródenas and S. Carretero, ‘Observations on the Progress of Welfare-State Construction in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic’, p. 338. 1782 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 137. 1783 Observatoire social européen (OSE). I. Guardiancich, Country Report Poland, p. 39. 1784 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 146-147. 1785 Ibid., p. 127. 1786 Interview F1. 1787 Interview F5. 1788 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 137-138. 1789 Ibid., pp. 136-151. 1781

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However, with family and child benefit levels being low and means tested, nowadays more parents are dependent on a dual income in order to provide for their family. There are other issues which are closely linked to the development towards a dual earner model. Low employment security offered to young people and especially women have a weak position on the labour market. The birth-rate is already relatively low and it is certainly too low to secure a healthy generational balance of the population. It is to be expected that the birth rate will remain low for the years to come if the labour market and social security system proof unable to provide sufficient income from paid or unpaid work based on which young families can sustain themselves. 1790 8.6.2 Family Benefits All figures used in this section are as they were according to ZUS official year overview of the year 2010. After 1989, the main aims of the family benefits were to diminish child poverty, and increase fertility rates (see also section 2.1.1. The People). At this moment, there are three types of family benefits. These are child birth grants, care benefits and family allowances.1791 The family benefits are means-tested. 1792 This means the benefits are only granted to families or legal guardians with an income below a certain threshold. These benefits are not sufficient to take care of the basic needs of children. This is even more problematic in the economic centres, where the cost of living is increasingly high.1793 Even with the additional support for large families or for one parent households the family benefits are by far not sufficient. 1794 An increasing number of parents no longer find themselves even in the position where they can choose to stay at home to take care of the children. Even if they receive maximum family and child care benefits it is financially difficult to be a full time home carer.1795 Also, against this background, child poverty remains an important issue in society. 1796 8.6.3 Child Birth Grant The child birth grant is a lump sum which is set at 1000 zloty for every child born alive in 2010. In case of a single parent household this lump sum paid is 1170 zloty.1797 The child birth grant is originally initiated as an additional motivation in order to increase the fertility. Up until now, the child birth grant did, however, not have a positive effect on the fertility rates.1798 It is argued that the lump sum provided is too low and so ineffective. It does not offer a young family with sufficient means to cover the basic extra costs of a new born. 1799

1790

Interview F3. Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Family benefits. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://www.mpips.gov.pl/en/social-security-system-cooperation/family-benefits/. 1792 OECD. Social Policy Division. Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. (2011). Key characteristics of parental leave systems. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/26/37864482.pdf. p.14 1793 Interview F1. 1794 Ibid. 1795 Interview F3. 1796 Interview F2. 1797 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), p. 64. 1798 Interview F6. 1799 Interview F2. 1791

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8.6.4 Care Benefits For children with special medical or care needs, the family receives special care benefits. This ranges from 153 to 520 zloty monthly. 1800 The amount of the care benefits provided is also dependent on whether a parent or carer needs to give up paid labour in order to take care of the child. 1801 The benefits are, however, often insufficient to cover the expensive additional needs of a handicapped child.1802 8.6.5 Family Allowances Family allowances are relatively low in Poland. The maximum amount a family can receive in benefits is 583 zloty per month. 1803 The state provides additional allowances to large families. This is to promote large families. This promotion is characteristic for the cristian democratic welfare state. 1804 Parents receive 43 zloty per month when they have up to three children. In the case that parents have three or more children, the parents receive 66 zloty per month for every subsequent child after the third. For each family with three or more children the additional multiple family allowances are maximum 80 zloty.1805 Each year, at the beginning of the academic year, 100 zloty is paid to support parents with additional education related costs. In the case that children are educated outside their hometown or village the family receives 90 zloty on a monthly basis per child.1806 Family allowances are paid until a child reaches the age of 18. For students this age is set at 21 and for disabled students this age is set at 24. 8.6.6 Parental Leave Paid maternity leave is made available for between 20 and 37 weeks depending on how many babies are born. Mothers have the right to take unpaid maternity leave up to period of two years.1807 Both paid and unpaid maternity leave are provided with. Paid maternity leave is relatively short but the unpaid maternity leave is rather long in comparison with other EU countries.1808 Two weeks of fatherhood leave, after childbirth, are provided by law. 1809 In the case that a child, however, stays in external care for five days per week, both parents loose the right to take parental leave or maternity allowances. 1810 This is a disincentive for the parents to combine childcare with paid labour. In all, motherhood and parental leave are implemented but remain of a lesser quality than is the case in other EU member states. The benefits are low, they, however, still tend to limit the labour market potential of women. 1811

1800

Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), p. 63. 1801 Interview F1. 1802 Interview F6. 1803 Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Family benefits. Retrieved 16 April 2011 from http://www.mpips.gov.pl/en/social-security-system-cooperation/family-benefits/. 1804 M. Cousins, European welfare states: Comparative Perspectives, p. 36. 1805 Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). A. Siporska ed., Social Insurance in Poland: information, facts (2009), p. 63. 1806 Ibid., p. 62. 1807 Interview F5. 1808 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 150. 1809 The Guardian. A. Graff, Polish feminism is no longer ridiculed (9 April 2011). Retrieved 5 May 2011 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/09/polish-feminism-gender-equality. 1810 O. Thévenon, ‘Family policies in Europe: available databases and initial comparisons’, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, (2008), pp. 165-170. 1811 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 150.

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8.6.7 Family-Work Balance There is a lack of attention for the family-work balance of parents. Labour and family policies are not optimally adjusted. 1812 This mainly has to do with the flexible labour market. On one side people are expected to be more flexible with regard to working hours, working days, locations. This makes it increasingly difficult for parents to adapt their schedules to time tables at school or day-care facilities. A high number of Polish workers left the country in order to work in other EU countries. Related to this is the issue of the so called Euro-orphans. These are children who are left to live with grandparents and family as parents left to work abroad.1813 Women are entitled to relatively long maternity leave but the financial and long term career costs for this are high. 1814 Different from other Central European countries, the costs of maternity leave are covered not only by the social insurance company but also by the employer. 1815 In this way the interests of the employer are linked to the family planning of their employees. It is difficult for women to develop a career that offers them enough work satisfaction, stability and growth opportunities. 1816 In many families grandparents and other family members take care of the children while parents are out to work.1817 8.6.8 Childcare Services For maternal employment it is most important to have good quality and affordable external child care services. Increasing state support to childcare is a way in which the state can increase the activity rate of women. Even during state socialism, which generally promoted a dual earner model, the percentage of children taken care of outside the house did not rise to more than 50 %. This number is based on children between three and six years of age. State-socialist support of dual-employment and the public provision of childcare did not offer sufficient support to working mothers.1818 After 1989, the childcare provisions deteriorated strongly as state and trade union organised childcare services largely disappeared. 1819 Due to the transitional collapse of the child care provisions, for a long time it has not been common for Polish parents to send their children to pre-school. Over the last ten years, it has been the case that childcare services were relatively expensive. The coverage and quality of public childcare was highly insufficient. This is increasingly a problem for families with a low income, or multiple children as these families often also did not have the means to use expensive private child care. In some regions, childcare services received subsidies. These services offered childcare at a reduced rate for low-income families.1820 Since a few years, parents are entitled to, voluntary and free of charge, pre-primary education for children between the age of three and six years. For a long time this was not 1812

Ibid., pp. 136-151. Interview F1. 1814 C. Glass and E. Fodor, ‘From Public to Private Maternalism? Gender and Welfare in Poland and Hungary after 1989’, Social Politics, vol. 14, no. 3 (2007), pp. 324-327. 1815 OECD. Social Policy Division. Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. (2011). Key characteristics of parental leave systems, p. 6. 1816 Interview F5. 1817 Ibid. 1818 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 136-151. 1819 Interview F9. 1820 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, pp. 143-145. 1813

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often used. There would have been a lack of awareness and an insufficient coverage of childcare facilities. A lack of childcare facilities is still is a problem, especially in rural areas with lower population density. The number of children attending pre-school has been steadily increasing. 1821 In the year of 2008/2009, 63 % of children between the age of three and six attended pre-school. 1822 At the moment, the Ministry of Education aims to provide pre-school for at least 90 % of the children above the age of four.1823 A positive development can be seen as in the 2011 childcare regulation reforms. Before 2011, the organisation of childcare knew extensive legal regulations. This limited the development of private or small-scale childcare provisions.1824 The reforms make it easier for private and semi-public bodies like also NGOs to offer childcare services. It is expected that more small-scale childcare will be offered. This would answer to the growing demand amongst the population for affordable and high quality childcare.1825 The role of employers in providing formal childcare is very small. 1826 There is a lack of support by employers. This, in combination with insufficient investment in pre-school childcare, provided by the government, makes it harder for women to take part in active life. Due to the lack of childcare provisions, mothers often find themselves in the position where they are left with the choice to either work or raise children. 1827 Women participation rates are still among the lowest in Europe. The 2011 reforms are a step in the right direction towards better quality, promotion and provision of early childcare. In order to increase women participation rates, it will, however, be necessary to further increase public investment with the aim to offer affordable and good quality childcare in all regions. On a short term, cooperation with NGO initiatives might be a good way to increase the coverage.1828

8.7 Education 8.7.1 Preparations for Accession to the EU In the end of the nineties, the education system was reformed. The reforms started with decentralisation and privatisation. In order to enter the EU, it was necessary to modernise the educational system and thus modernisations were introduced. Even though educational competencies remain at the national member state level, the EU made structural funds available for educational reforms in Poland. 1829 Preparations for accession to the EU started in 1999 and included decentralisation, prolongation of general compulsory education (see also

1821

Euraxess. Poland. (13 December 2010). Childcare/Education. Retrieved 17 May 2011 from http://www.euraxess.pl/index.php/services/incoming/childcareeducation?start=1. 1822 Interview F10. 1823 Ibid. 1824 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 143. 1825 Interview F10. 1826 A. Plomien, ‘Welfare State, Gender, and Reconciliation of Work and Family in Poland’, p. 145. 1827 Ibid., pp. 138-140. 1828 Interview F1. 1829 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009). Retrieved 25 June 2011 from http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/informacje_o_ue/Publikacje_o_UE/5_years_of_poland_in_the_european_union.pdf. pp. 268-269.

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figure 15), reorganisations of school networks, modernisation of school curricula and equipment and the promotion of teacher skills.1830 Figure 15: Changes introduced since 1999: Introduction of the New School Type ISCED 2 and Extension of General (Comprehensive) Education by one Year (related to 15-Year-Olds) Previous structure of school system: ISCED 0 3

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Source: Polish Ministry of National Education and Sport (2011) Looking back at the subscribed objectives, it can be concluded that not every objective has been realised. 1831 For most part, this is related to the fact that a new government was elected in 2001, which changed the educational priorities. At the upper secondary level of education objectives have not been met. The adjustments of the gimnazjum curricula were also not adequately implemented. This caused a gap between the curriculum which was used at the

1830 Eurydice. EACEA. (2009/2010). Organisation of the education system in Poland. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/eurybase/eurybase_full_reports/PL_EN.pdf. pp. 1920. 1831 Ibid., p. 19.

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gimnazjum level and the one used at the postgimnazjum level. Through the implementation of curricular reforms in 2009, the Polish government tried to tackle this problem. 1832 In 2004, educational reforms were again introduced. The main changes were the obligatory pre-school preparation. This is a one year preparation which is obligatory for all children from the age of six. Another main change was the introduction of special schools and similar pre-preparation classes for mentally handicapped children. Also, a zawodowy exam, a professional exam, and a maturalny exam, a matriculation exam, were introduced.1833 Besides these changes, additional attention has been given to higher education. This was connected to the fact that pupils increasingly wanted to enter into higher education institutions. Finally, more vocational and higher education institutions were established. These reforms have been made in line with the process of privatisation of the educational system. 1834 When taking a look at the PISA research, the educational reforms seem to have been successful with regard to higher and formal education.1835 Because of the establishment of more higher education institutions (from 112 to 456 in 1990-2008), the amount of students in higher education increased a fivefold between 1990 and 2005. The number of students rose from 400 000 students to nearly two million. The rise of students in higher education resulted in the position of Poland being one of the EU’s leaders in the promotion of higher education and one of the countries with a high level of growth in its number of students in higher education. 1836 8.7.2 Polish Education within the EU Poland is participating actively on the realisation of a common EU educational policy. Consequently, Poland is strongly committed to the EU education programme of Lifelong learning (LLL). 1837 Poland already joins the LLL-programmes, looking at the Comenius (preschool and school education), the Erasmus (higher education), Leonardo da Vinci (vocational education), Gruntvig (adult education) and the Jean Monnet programme (social integration in the context of migration). However, more work is in progress concerning the LLL strategy (read more about the Polish LLL strategy under section 8.7.8: current priorities and actions). 1838 Since Poland holds membership of the EU, there are several educational improvements concerning Poland and the EU. Firstly, the mobility of Polish university students has been improved, due to the Erasmus programme. Secondly, the European cultural and social identity has been increased, as European projects were introduced at schools and universities. An example is the introduction of European Studies at Polish universities. In addition, foreign languages gained importance in educational programmes. 1839 8.7.3 Education System The current organisation of the Polish education system is described below (see also figure 16). Please refer to the subdivisions for information about the Polish education system and the related problems.

1832

Ibid. Ibid. 1834 Ibid., p. 20. 1835 Current priorities and actions 2010, given to the authors of this report by the Ministry of National Education, 7 April 2011. 1836 Eurydice. EACEA. (2009/2010). Organisation of the education system in Poland, p. 20. 1837 Ibid., p. 258. 1838 Ibid. 1833

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Figure 16: Organisation of the Education System in Poland, 2009/2010

Source: Eurydice (2009-2010) Pre-Primary Education Pre-primary education can be received by children aged three to five at a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, all six year old children must attend kindergartens (predszkola) or pre-primary classes at a primary school (oddziały przedszkolne). The Ministry of National Education and Sport introduced one year of obligatory pre-school education, which started in the years 20042005. Therefore, the age of starting compulsory education has been lowered from seven to six. From 1 September 2009, all five year old children have the right to attain pre-primary education, which can be either in a kindergarten or another pre-school institution. Starting from 1 September 2011, this right will become an obligation.1840 Even though traditional Polish families are not used to bring their children to preschools, there is an increase in the number of children attending pre-primary schools. 1841 In the year 2008/2009 around 63 % of the children in the age range of three to six years attended pre-school institutions.1842 Nevertheless, the Lisbon strategy states that by 2011, 90 % of the children must attend pre-school education.1843 The Ministry of National Education and Sport now has set a new target of 95 % of children to attend pre-school institutions, from the age of four.1844 Therefore, pre-school education is one of the main priorities of the Ministry of National Education and Sport.1845

1839 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 288. 1840 Polish Eurydice Unit. (2010). The System of Education in Poland. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.eurydice.org.pl/sites/eurydice.org.pl/files/the_system_2010.pdf. pp. 22-27. 1841 Interview F9. 1842 Eurydice. EACEA. (2009/2010). Organisation of the education system in Poland, p. 51. 1843 Interview F9. 1844 Ibid. 1845 Ibid.

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The main activity of the Ministry is to support the network of pre-school institutions, including pedagogical and physiological support for parents. 1846 The Ministry tries to change the mentality by promoting pre-school education. This includes for example the promotion of pre-school education in a Polish soap opera. The government also makes it more accessible through the creation of additional pre-school institutions. 1847 This is done through the financing of private alternatives to public pre-schools. Especially in rural areas the financing of private alternatives is necessary. In line with the 2011 law on childcare, any sufficiently qualified person could run a pre-school institution. 1848 Primary Education All children between the age of seven and 13 must attend primary education. Since September 2004, one year of compulsory per-school preparation has been introduced as part of the educational reforms. In 2012, all six year olds are obliged to attain primary education. 1849 The primary education system can be divided into two stages:1850  Stage one: this stage covers the first, second and third year. The teaching method is called integrated teaching and is designed to smoothly convert from pre-primary school to primary school. Pupils have one teacher for all three years.  Stage two: covers the fourth, fifth and sixth year. The objective is to teach pupils to learn systematically. Different classes are given, including Polish language, social and natural science, mathematics, technology, art and music, religion, ethics and physical education. For every class there is a different specialised teacher. The school head is responsible for the curriculum used in class by the teacher. Secondary Education Along with the 1999 reforms, a three-year gimnazjum has been introduced as a lower level of secondary education. Since 2002, an upper secondary education has also been established:  Lower secondary education. This education level offers a three year full-time educational program after primary school. This is obligatory for all pupils, between the age of 13 and 16 years. This program is the last stage of obligatory education and provides a variety of subjects at a basic level. After this stage pupils can choose a further educational route.  Upper secondary education or post-gimnazjum school. The age of pupils is between 16 and 18/19 or 20 years. In the end, pupils will have a vocational qualification or they take the Matura exam. There are different upper secondary educational institutions: - Liceum ogólnokształcące (three-year general secondary school - Liceum profilowane (three-year specialised secondary school) - Technikum (four-year technical secondary school) - Zasadnicza szkoła zawodowa (two to three-year basic vocational school) A problem that arises with the upper secondary level education is the difference of school quality. Even though this difference in school quality has not formally been recognised, there

1846

Ibid. Ibid. 1848 Ibid. 1849 Ibid. 1850 Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London. Education System in Poland. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.london.polemb.net/index.php?document=57. 1847

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are some unofficial rankings made by newspapers every year which include the differences between the qualities within schools.1851 Post-Secondary Education / Non-Tertiary Education Post-secondary education admits graduates on the basis of the secondary education certificate. The age of pupils entering post-secondary education is between 19 and 21 years. Postsecondary education provides a variety of branches and has a duration of two to two and a half years. Tertiary Education The main educational reforms took place in the higher education system in Poland. Since 1990, a new law has been adopted which gave higher educational institutions more freedom of self-governance. Also private higher education systems were established. However, with some exceptions, the quality of the private higher education is considered weak. 1852 Since 5 May 2006, higher education has been supervised by a separate ministry: the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.1853 The process of division had to provide more and better quality for higher education. 1854 However, this division caused some problems with cooperation between both ministries concerning education. To be able to enter higher education, a Matura certificate is necessary. Generally, also an entrance examination is done or a qualifying interview. Examination fees are defined by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Higher education is targeted at teaching students to prepare for their future professions and offers students a Master degree, a higher vocational degree or a supplementary Master degree. It can furthermore offer a postgraduate course (PhD). 1855 Student attending higher education are able to receive financial support from the state budget. University student support funds include social allowances, special grants for disabled students, scientific achievements grants and housing and meal allowances.1856 Adult Education Adult education is dealt with in Article 68 of the Education Act (1991). Since the Education Act, adult education has been established and has developed quickly, mostly in the area of out-of-school education. Adult education is offered by both public and non-public educational institutions. Adult education is financed by the state budget, by employers, own income of students and additionally by European funds. The objective of adult education is mostly to obtain the Matura exam or another certificate. However, according to the Ministry of National Education and Sport, Poland received low achievements concerning adults learning. 1857 One of the priorities of the Ministry of National Education and Sport as well as the EU is to improve education beyond the traditional period of school education. 1858

1851

Interview F10. Ibid. 1853 Eurydice. (2010). National system overview on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms. Retrieved 23 May 2011 from http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/eurybase/national_summary_sheets/047_PL_EN.pdf. p. 7. 1854 Interview F10. 1855 Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 7. 1856 Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London. Education system in Poland. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from http://www.london.polemb.net/index.php?document=57. 1857 Interview F10. 1858 Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 21. 1852

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Vocational Education The Ministry of National Education and Sport is working on a plan concerning vocational education. The fundamental purpose of the plan is ‘to gradually disseminate vocational qualifications requirements through flexible courses instead of different types of schools’. 1859 Changes in vocational education are aimed at making the training more current and practical in cooperation with the employers in order to match the labour market needs. However, the training on the job is a matter of the Ministry of Labour.1860 Special Education Special education in an integral part of the Polish education system. This can be seen in the legislation that has been made for special education, which is common to mainstream as well as special education. 1861 In 1993 the first legislation on education for children with special needs was introduced. 1862 Legislation for children without necessary care from their parents was included in the Polish constitution in 1921. Article 103 of the Polish constitution of 1921 states that ‘children without necessary care from their parents have the right to receive care and help from the government’. 1863 8.7.4 Financing Education in Poland is financed by a general subsidy from the state budget. Due to the educational reforms of 1999, the amount of money a school receives is based on the number of pupils. Schools located in rural areas are able to receive extra money, because of a special subsidy made available for rural students.1864 Every December, the division of the general subsidy for territorial self-governments is announced by the Minister of National Education and Sport. Territorial self-government units are responsible for the further division in its area. Private schools are financed by parents, private enterprises and foundations. 1865 The EU has made funds available for the development of education in Poland. Poland receives a total amount of 4.2 billion euro during the years 2007-2013 from the EU. Of this amount, 2.7 billion euro has to direct towards the development of school education systems and 1.5 billion euro for the development of higher education. Additional funds can be made available by the EU with the development of research and science, which can be 2.6 billion euro. 1866 8.7.5 Distribution of Responsibility The responsibility of the educational sector is mainly in hands of the Ministry of National Education and Sport. Higher education however, is regulated by the Minister of Science and Higher Education. Exceptions can be seen in artistic schools that are under supervision of the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Justice. Because of the educational reforms, a decentralisation of education took place. Now the responsibility of pre-schooling, primary schools and gimnazjum is under supervision of the 2479 gminas. Secondary schools, lyzeums, artistic schools, vocational education and special need education are administered by the 379

1859

Interview F10. Ibid. 1861 Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 7. 1862 Ibid. 1863 K. Nowak-Fabrykowski, ‘The Care and Education of Orphaned Polish Children: A Success Story’, Childhood Education, vol. 80, no. 6 (2004), pp. 2-3. 1864 Interview F9. 1865 Polish Eurydice Unit. (2010). The System of Education in Poland, pp. 10-17. 1866 Ibid. 1860

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powiats.1867 Policy that has to be implemented by the Ministry of National Education and Sport and the implementation of pedagogical objectives are supervised by the 16 województwa. On a local level, school councils have to be established as to advise the Minister of Education. The establishment of a National Education Council has been envisaged by the School Education Act of 1991. A school council has to be a social opinion making body and should exist of representatives of regional education. However, until now, no such council has been established. 1868 Box 8: The Case of the Pogotowie Opiekuncze in Lublin1869 The Pogotowie Opiekuncze (PO, emergency shelter) in Lublin is a children’s home for children facing social problems. The PO provides shelter, food and education to children for a maximum of two years. The PO supports children, from the age of six to 18, who often face family problems and/or problems with legal authorities. Most children living in the PO have parents that are unable to raise them. Difficulties for parents raising their children mainly arise due to unemployment and alcohol problems, but also because the child for example suffers an attention deficit disorder. These problems negatively affect children, which result in poor school performances or problems with the police. Within the PO there are four groups; each group exists of eight children, divided by age and sex. The PO shelters children who reside in the PO permanently, and children who only reside there during the day. The return of the child to its parents is promoted. This is also guided by the PO’s pedagogue and psychologist. However, if there is no prospect of the child returning to its parents, the PO also looks for adoption possibilities. Firstly, adoption possibilities are looked at within the family; by grandparents, uncles or aunts. If this is not possible, the PO looks for adoption parents elsewhere in Poland. If the child cannot be placed in an adoption family, or if the adoption itself causes further trouble, the child is sent to another children’s home where it can reside permanently. The PO is almost completely financed by subsidies from the state. According to the PO in Lublin, problems arise with finances, as costs increase but the amount of subsidies remains the same. On the one hand, the PO considers Polish accession to the EU as being positive because more money is made available by the EU for POs. Also, the EU demanded for smaller groups of children, which the PO considers to be a positive development in childcare. On the other hand, bureaucracy has increased and the new administrative duties which stem from this take a lot of time. Furthermore, the labour migration of Poles to Western Europe since the accession had the effect of broken families. Currently, the PO also shelters children from these families and for whom other family members could not care properly. 8.7.6 Education and Migrants Regulation concerning education and migrants in Poland has been adapted. Foreigners under the age of 18 have the same rights as Polish citizens concerning their studies. Furthermore, they have the right to be taught in the Polish language and the possibility to attend classes concerning their national language, history and culture. If there are plenty of students that acquire these classes, schools can choose to become bilingual. 1870

1867

Interview F9. Polish Eurydice Unit. (2010). The System of Education in Poland, pp. 10-17. 1869 Interview F11. 1870 Interview F12. 1868

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Box 9: The Case of the Roma children1871 The Ministry of National Education and Sport deals with the educational part of the Roma children. Extra tuition is given in order to provide extra classes to Roma children with learning difficulties. The school can either employ a teacher or an assistant, who is also a member of the Roma community. Such a system connects the school and the Roma community. A similar system is already introduced in Slovakia and Hungary. Moreover, Poland has a wide holistic program for Romanian ethnical minorities. This program does not only concern educational needs, but also safety, health care and other parts of social life. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Safety is responsible for this and takes full responsibility for this program. 8.7.7 Education in Rural Areas The Council of Europe urges the need for the provision of quality education in rural areas in Poland. In a report of the Council of Europe,1872 Polish authorities were urged to ensure this quality education. In 2006, a Polish state programme was introduced, to close the educational gap among students from rural and urban areas. Two programmes are the ‘Grants for schools for development projects’ and the ‘Distance learning centres in rural areas’. In the former project, projects were selected to provide technical and organisational assistance to schools in rural areas. In the latter project, centres were created from 2005-2008 with trained staff and hardware and software for children in rural areas.1873 In order to bridge the gap between urban and rural areas, European Social Funds have been earmarked for grants and scholarships for upper secondary- and university students in rural areas. In addition, the Strategy for the Development of Education in Rural Areas (20072013) was accepted. Also, specific aid is given by the EU to ensure equal educational opportunities for pupils and students coming from low-income and problem families. 1874 8.7.8 Current Priorities and Actions There are several priorities and actions that are currently worked on by the Ministry of National Education and Sport. The main priorities will be described. First of all, former reforms of the education system are continuing. Secondly, the LLL strategy will further be designed, including the promotion of ‘new skills for new jobs’. Thirdly, there is an on-going modernisation of educational statistics and research. Finally, a reform of teachers’ employment and remuneration system is worked on. 1875 Continuation of the Education System Reform One of the priorities of the Ministry of National Education and Sport is the continuation of reforms in the education system. The reform can be mainly seen in the implementation of the new curricula in the years 2009-2016. Between 1999 and 2009 the developed curriculum at the school level had to be approved by the Ministry of National Education and Sport. Since the 2009 reforms it has been changed. The Ministry is still dealing with the competences a student should obtain. The core curriculum is, however, developed and approved at the school level. This system is not yet fully implemented. (see table 11). 1876 1871

Ibid. Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government. Retrieved 12 March 2011 from https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155005&Site=COE. p. 287. 1873 Office of the Committee for European Integration. M. Kałuźikńska, K. Smyk and J. Wiśniewski eds., Five years of Poland in the EU (2009), p. 287. 1874 Council of Europe. (2007). Memorandum to the Polish Government, p. 287. 1875 Interview F10. 1876 Ibid. 1872

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In May 2011 the first examination based on the core curriculum will be held in the lower secondary classes. The results of these exams will serve as feedback for the Ministry of National Education and Sport. In 2015, the results of the first final exams at the primary schools and the upper secondary schools will be known (see table 11 about the schedule of implementation of the school curriculum).1877 Table 11: Agenda of Implementation of the New Curricula 2009-2016 School year

Reformed teaching in classrooms

2009/2010

I PS

I LOWER SECONDARY

2010/2011

II PS

II LOWER SECONDARY

2011/2012

III PS

III LOWER SECONDARY examination adapted to the new core curriculum

2012/2013

IV PS

IL

IT

I ZSZ

2013/2014

V PS

II L

II T

II ZSZ

2014/2015

III L VI PS secondary school final test adapted certificate adapted III T to the new core to the new core curriculum curriculum

2015/2016

IV T

III ZSZ

PS – primary school, L – upper secondary general, T – upper secondary vocational, ZSZ – basic vocational school Source: Polish Ministry of National Education and Sport (2011) Designing the Lifelong Learning (LLL) strategy Based on the documents of the EU about LLL, the Ministry of National Education and Sport is designing their LLL strategy. 1878 Currently, nine sectors are cooperating together to design the LLL strategy. In every of these nine sectors, a part of education and the development of competences is included. There are some priorities within the nine sectors which have the most advanced parts concerning education. These are human capital, which is coordinated by the office of the Prime Minister and social capital, which is coordinated by the Minstry of Culture and National Heritage. Social capital is build up mostly through artistic and cultural education and the usage of the media in education. 1879 The LLL strategy is almost ready. However, difficulties arise with the implementation of the LLL strategy. By implementing the LLL strategy, close cooperation between the seven different ministries is required and this cooperation causes difficulties. According to the Ministry of National Education and Sport the process of cooperation system is inefficient and thus could be made more coherent.1880

1877

Ibid. Ibid. 1879 Ibid. 1880 Ibid. 1878

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Another difficulty arises with the promotion of the LLL strategy among the public. According to the Ministry of National Education and Sport, the general idea of the LLL is well known among the decision makers, but not among the public. The public mostly think that the LLL strategy is focused only on adults who need to improve education to obtain a qualification. The Ministry of National Education and Sport is therefore trying to promote the LLL idea as an continuous process of learning, where the learning person should be in the centre of attention. Promotion is being done through institutes of educational research, as the Ministery of Education and Sport has limited resources to promote the idea of LLL. 1881 ‘New Skills for New Jobs' 1882 The Ministry of National Education and Sport currently deals with a project for changes in vocational education and changes in special needs education. Changes in vocational education are aimed at making the training more current and practical in cooperation with the employers in order to match the labour market needs. Also training on the job itself will be promoted in order to develop the skills of their employees. Nevertheless, the training on the job is a matter of the Ministry of Labour.1883 Special needs education is being promoted in order to entail special individualised provision at school for students with special needs, concerning students with learning difficulties, but also particularly gifted students.1884 Reform of the Teachers’ Employment and Remuneration System Reforms are dealt with concerning the teachers’ employment and remuneration system. In Poland a teacher has three stages in his carreer. Currently, 50 % of the Polish teachers are at the highest level of their carreer. As their carreer development is no longer an incentive, an extra motivation for teachers is needed. Work is in progresss by the Ministry of National Education and Sport to offer teachers an additional stage in their carreer. 1885 Furthermore, the Minister of National Education and Sport appointed a committee for professional status of teachers. This body will need to create objectives for a new law, substituting the Teachers Charter of 1982.1886 Modernisation of Educational Statistics and Research One of the main priorities of the Ministry of National Education and Sport is the modernisation of educational statistics and research. Reforms in educational research and statistics have started in 2010. All reforms aim to improve efficiency and provide qualityoriented financing of educational research.1887 Nevertheless, problems arise with the quality of the translation of educational strategies. The regulations of the state claims that the price of translation is more important than the quality, because the Ministry of National Education and Sport is dealing with public money. As a consequence, the quality of translation of educational research is considered weak. 1888

1881

Ibid. Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 9. 1883 Interview F10. 1884 Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 9. 1885 Interview F10. 1886 Eurydice. (2010). National system overviews on education systems in Europe and ongoing reforms, p. 9. 1887 Ibid. 1888 Interview F10. 1882

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8.8 Health Care 8.8.1 Health Care System The current Polish health care system is based on a corporatist insurance system. It consists of a system of public and private social care and supplementary private health care. The current organisational structure of the health care system will be described below (see also figure 17). Please refer to the subdivisions for information about the Polish health care system. 1889 Figure 17: Organisational Chart of the Polish Health Care System1890

Source: European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health Care Systems in Transition: Poland, 1999. Ministry of National Health and Social Welfare The main responsibility of the Ministry of National Health and Social Welfare is national health policy. It is mostly responsible for those health care institutions which it finances directly. These institutions include national postgraduate education centres and national centres for child health, maternal health, plastic surgery and cardiology. Furthermore, there are several semi-autonomous institutions that are ultimately also the responsibility of the Ministry of National Health and Social Welfare, including medical academies, university hospitals and research institutions. The Ministry of National Health and Social Welfare is responsible as well for the implementation of health programmes, the funding of medical equipment and for setting and monitoring health care standards. 1891 Health Insurance Funds In January 1999, the Health Insurance Act was introduced. This Act provided for funding to cover the health services, including 16 regional funds and a seventeenth branch. This seventeenth branch is the National Health Fund, which is, along with regional branches,

1889

European Observatory on Health Care Systems. (1999). Health Care Systems in Transition: Poland. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.saglik.gov.tr/EN/dosya/2-985/h/poland.pdf. p. 8. 1890 Ibid. 1891 Ibid.

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responsible for health services. Furthermore, every private provider of health care must be registered by the National Health Fund.1892 It is expected that government funds will be scaled back, as insurance coverage in Poland is expanding. Also, the governments’ administration will be phased out as providers deal directly with the insurance funds. Nevertheless, some specialised services, including organ transplants and public health programmes, will remain to be financed by the state budget.1893 ZOZ The ZOZ (health care management units) provide primary and secondary care by offering a range of services. The ZOZs manage health and social services. These services include hospitals and community-based facilities, such as polyclinics, small outpatient centres, specialised services and social services. The ZOZs receive their funds from the voivodeships to which they fall within the ambit of. Each ZOZ covers a varying amount of people, with an average of 100 000 persons.1894 Management of the Health Care System There does not exist one single health sector body that has full authority over the management of the health care system. The main objective during the transition period was to dismantle much of the centralised ‘bureaucratic socialism’. 1895 Currently, health services’ owners, such as voivodeships, powiat and gminas have more autonomy in planning, regulation and management. In this manner, Poland has shifted from a highly centralised system of health care to a decentralisation of responsibilities for health care. The role of the voivodeships in health care administration has increased and as a consequence management responsibilities of the ZOZ did as well. Health care institutions are now autonomous registered organisations that are responsible for their own budgets and service decisions.1896 Family doctors are the ‘gatekeepers’ for hospitals, as they send out patient services to specialist health care. Patients themselves can choose between a public and a private provider of health care. Private health care has been increasing in Poland, mostly covering pharmacies, dental practices and private medical practices.1897 8.8.2 Life Expectancy Life expectancy has improved steadily since 1990. In 2009, the average life expectancy was at birth an estimated 76 years in 2009. Compared to Western European countries this is low, as life expectancy is around 80 years there. Nevertheless, the Polish life expectancy is similar to that of the global life expectancy and to that of Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Russia (see also chart 15).1898

1892 World Health Organization. (2011). Country Cooperation Strategy at a glance: Poland. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_pol_en.pdf. p. 1. 1893 European Observatory on Health Care Systems. (1999). Health Care Systems in Transition: Poland, p. 9. 1894 Ibid., p. 10. 1895 Ibid. 1896 Ibid. 1897 Ibid., p. 11. 1898 Health of Nations. Poland: Diseases overview. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.healthofnations.com/countries/profile/poland#spending-overview.

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Chart 15: Life Expectancy at Age 601899

Source: Health of Nations. Poland. The Polish adult mortality rate per 100 000 people between the age of 15 and 60 is relatively high compared to the European average, and it is even higher than the global average (see also chart 16). Chart 16: Adult Mortality Rate (per 100 000 age 15-60)1900

Source: Health of Nations. Poland. The main causes of death after aging are circulatory diseases (responsible for 46 % of deaths in 2005) and cancers (responsible for 25 % of deaths in 2005). Looking at the cancer mortality rate, this rate is high in comparison to the European and the global average (see chart 17).1901

1899 Health of Nations. Poland: spending overview. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.healthofnations.com/countries/profile/poland#spending-overview. 1900 Ibid. 1901 Ibid.

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Chart 17: Cancer Mortality Rate (per 100 000 all ages)1902

Source: Health of Nations. Poland. Furthermore, Poland has one of the highest amounts of deaths due to road accidents in Europe. Other main contributions of lower life expectancy in Poland are found in smoking, unhealthy diets and physical inactivity. 1903 8.8.3 Financing Public health services are state-financed by the National Health Funds (NFZ) through an earmarked income tax. Every worker in Poland is required to contribute to the NFZ, as employee-contributions are deducted from the salary. Self-employed workers have to make their own contributions directly to the NFZ. Citizens ensured by the NFZ are entitled to free health care, rehabilitation and maternity benefits.1904 Despite the fact that health care is theoretically free to use in Poland, under-the-counter-payments to doctors or other healthcare workers still occur in order to obtain better or faster care. 1905 In 2008, Poland spent an estimated 7.0 % of the GDP on health care (see also chart 18). In 2009, this amount decreased to an estimated 6.8 % of the GDP. This is rather low for an OECD country, and it is lower than in Hungary, the Czech Republic or Slovakia. Nevertheless, one can see an increase in the quality of health care since 1990. This trend of improving health care is expected to continue during the coming years. 1906 Since 2005, the financial problems have eased, as a result of the economic growth and rising employment. As a consequence, the NFZ had an increased income due to increasing tax incomes. Nevertheless, some hospitals stayed indebted and the health care system’s financial situation remained vulnerable. When looking at the current economic slowdown, the government indicated that there could be a further rise in the health tax, to 10 % of earnings. 1907

1902

Ibid. World Health Organization. (2011). Country Cooperation Strategy at a glance: Poland, p. 1. 1904 Ministry of Health. The Polish Health Care System: in historical prospective and today. Retrieved 13 March 2011 from http://www.mz.gov.pl/wwwmzold/index?mr=m0&ms=&ml=en&mi=535&mx=0&mt=&my=464&ma=5166. 1905 Health of Nations. (2011). Poland: Spending overview. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.healthofnations.com/countries/profile/poland#spending-overview. 1906 Ibid. 1907 Ibid. 1903

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Chart 18: Health Expenditure as a Share of GDP, OECD Countries, 2008

8.8.4 Polish Health Care and the EU Funds Poland received several EU funds in order to modernise the Polish health care system and to equalise healthcare to the EU average. These funds were available as early as the preaccession period. After the EU accession, these funds increased. In 1989, the EU started with the PHARE programme. With the funding of the PHARE programme, health care reforms were initiated in Poland, dealing for instance with the management of health care, the developing of primary care, the establishment of information systems and the funding of research. The World Bank financially supported Poland as well, in order to strengthen institutional capacity. During the years between 2007-2013, the financing of the development of the health care system is based on two programmes: The Regional Operational Programmes (ROP) and the Operational Programmes (OP) for infrastructure and environment. The amount of money spent on these programmes is almost 700 million euro. Most of the amount has already been spent on the health care infrastructure in Poland and the improvement of medical service and equipment. 1908 8.8.5 Challenges Main challenges in Polish health care can be seen in incomplete reforms, a deficient of financial support for the health care sector, the migration of health professionals and the inadequate capacities of the public health system. 1909 There can be seen a low amount of public expenditure on health care, which has put pressure on health services. This insufficient expenditure resulted in dissatisfaction of health care services due to waiting lists, elements of corruption and indebtedness of hospitals. The problem of long waiting lists and widespread corruption is not likely to disappear in the

1908

World Health Organization. (2011). Country Cooperation Strategy at a glance: Poland, p. 1. Health of Nations. (2011). Poland: Policy overview. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.healthofnations.com/countries/profile/poland#spending-overview. 1909

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coming years. Also, there is a dissatisfaction of the health care personnel due to low wages, poor working conditions and a lack of career possibilities. As a result of the lack of financial support for the health care sector, the problem emerged of migration of health professionals towards other EU countries, but also migration from rural to urban areas.1910 The Polish health care system is particularly weak and it is not expected to improve significantly over the coming years. Dissatisfaction among the Polish population about the operation of the public health system will remain high. In addition, there can be seen an increasing widening of the gap between public and private health care. 1911 The dissatisfaction of the Polish population about public health care may encourage the further development of private health care institutions.1912 8.8.6 Opportunities Some opportunities concerning Polish health care can be noted. Firstly, Poland is currently in a good economic situation and therefore more money can be spent on health care. Secondly, Poland will lead the Presidency in the EU in the second half of 2011. It could be that this Presidency will create new opportunities for health care financing and access to technologies and know-how. There can be more access to good quality data on health and the health care sector. Finally, the health sector reform is one of the priorities of the current government, which has been introducing several proposals concerning the health care system, such as the shifting of public hospitals from their current non-commercial status in order to improve their financial control. From 2009 on, the government financed local authorities for over two years, in order to turn the local authorities that are now under their control, into commercial entities. 1913

8.9 Conclusion The socialist system, wherein the state takes care of every individual from cradle to grave, has been replaced for the most part. The full-fledged universal flat rate system got replaced by an insurance and contribution based system. To this day, some remnants of the socialist system like universal public benefit programs are, however, still in place. This is for example the case with regard to the first pillar of the pension system. Most post 1989 welfare state reforms were in line with cristian democratic values. In line with the cristian democratic welfare typology, there is a health insurance system as well as extra support to the family in the form of maternity and care benefits and additional support for large families. A public health insurance system as well as extra maternity and care benefits and additional support for large families are the main characteristics. The benefits are, however, very low and only made available to people with the lowest incomes. Generally people are assumed to take care of themselves and their families actively before depending on the state. This is completely different from the socialist idea of the state taking care of every individual from cradle to grave and is based more on active citizenship

1910

World Health Organization. (2011). Country Cooperation Strategy at a glance: Poland, p. 1. Ibid. 1912 Health of Nations. (2011). Poland: Policy overview. Retrieved 4 June 2011 from http://www.healthofnations.com/countries/profile/poland#spending-overview. 1913 Ibid. 1911

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Alongside the cristian democratic patterns, there is the movement towards a Liberal welfare state. Low levels of decommodification, increasing privatisations of social services and a dual earner family model characterise this development. During the transition process, liberal reforms were designed in order to adapt the social security institutions to the market economy. Social policies concentrated mainly on building a minimum social safety net. This was aimed specifically at the social groups most touched by the transition process. Welfare spending, related to high transitional unemployment and early retirement schemes, has led to an increase in the public debt during the nineties. Paradoxically, the state social welfare schemes remained insufficient to provide the people with social security for the past twenty years. Alongside the cristian democratic patterns, there is the movement towards a Liberal welfare state. Low levels of decommodification, increasing privatisations of social services and a dual earner family model characterise this development. Social policies concentrated mainly on the provision of a minimum social safety net. This was aimed specifically at the social groups most touched by the transition process. With regard to the economic-political theory, the Polish welfare state has re-joined the cristian democratic group of welfare states in the EU. In practice, however, liberal influences also strongly increased. Before 2007, most emphasis was placed on employment creation through entrepreneurship, infrastructural development and flexibilisation of the labour market. Since 2007, more emphasis has again been put on social policy. This is especially true with regard to labour market related social policy such as childcare, gender equality and life-long learning. Benefit levels are very low and only made available to people with the lowest incomes. People are assumed to take care of themselves and their families before they can dependent on the minimal benefits offered by the state.1914 Certain welfare provisions are still underdeveloped or only provided by NGOs. Food, shelter and clothing programs but also social inclusion, child-care and employment programs are provided with by NGOs. In practice, not all European initiatives function as they should. The most important is the driving force which is profited by Brussels in the form of agenda setting, legitimisation of Polish National regulations and money transfers in the form of subsidies and structural funds. With regard to the implementation of both labour and social policies there is still work to be done both in terms of public awareness and opinion as in terms of financial and practical resources.

1914

K. Nelson, ‘Social assistance and minimum income benefits in old and new EU democracies’, pp. 367-378.

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FINAL CONCLUSION During the writing of this report, we have attempted to approach this research without any prejudices towards Poland in order to give a solid status quo of Poland as a country in many of its aspects. It is for this reason we have not worked with one main question while writing this report. While researching Poland, it became clear that a thorough report on Poland should include several themes that seem to mark or have marked Poland and Polish behaviour for a long time. As a result, we have decided to work with different frameworks throughout the report. The frameworks we have used during this research project are the following: first, we have attempted to answer whether we can legitimately speak of the existence of differences within areas in Poland, called Poland A, B and C. Second, we have examined what difficulties and opportunities different generations within Poland face. Third, we have looked at the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Polish society. Fourth, we have investigated the myth of Poland being ‘the Christ of nations’ to see whether we think it is legitimate that this myth is so often mentioned as typical for Polish behaviour. Fifth and finally, being Master students of European Policy, we have sought to answer the question in which areas Poland’s EU membership has formed a solution to existing problems or, on the contrary, has caused problems that did not exist before. We have found that in some topics discussed in this report several frameworks are closely intertwined, whereas in other chapters certain frameworks do not seem to have had any influence on the topics that are being discussed. In this conclusion we will structurally examine our frameworks one by one and answer the questions raised in those frameworks. Where frameworks are closely related, this will be made clear as well. Poland A, B and C When first hearing about the possible existence of differences between areas in Poland, called Poland A, B and C we were reluctant with using this terminology ourselves. However, during the writing of this report, it has become clear that a strong difference between the so-called Poland A, B and C definitely exists. As is the case in many countries, a difference in wealth and development between cities and rural areas can be seen in Poland. However, such a clear distinction between metropolitan Warsaw and rural areas in the east of Poland deserves more attention than solely concluding that city life is further developed than rural life. For this report, we have adopted the definition of Poland A being Warsaw and other rapidly growing bigger cities (the so-called ‘growth poles’), of which the latter can be less developed than Warsaw, and the areas that surround the large Polish cities. Poland B is formed by urban areas in the east of Poland, Masovia and the peripheries in central, southwestern, northern and north-western Poland. Poland C is formed by the rural areas and then especially rural areas in eastern and south-eastern Poland. This report has concluded that the polarisation-diffusion approach the Polish Ministry of Regional Development uses to develop the periphery of capital cities and rural areas is not successful. Because this approach puts more focus on the cities, only Poland A develops further whilst leaving the periphery behind. With this, the gap between Poland A and Poland B and C increases. The lack of development in Poland B and especially C is manifold. Poland B and C know poor infrastructure within its own areas, but when it comes to connections between Poland A and Poland B and C, infrastructure is also far from sufficient. Many inhabitants of 289

Poland B and C work in agriculture, with farms in the southern part of Poland often being small-scaled and inefficient, while farms in eastern Poland face difficulties with the underdeveloped state of their region. The latter leads to a ‘deserting of the east’: a source for many other problems. Because of the underdevelopment of the regions B and C and the little possibilities for work outside agriculture, many young people leave for Poland A. Even when Poland B and C provide sufficient education possibilities for their youngsters, there is often a limited future for well-educated people on the labour markets of Poland B and C. Next to that, the level of foreign direct investments in Poland B and C is low which leads to little opportunities for developing the labour market Remarkable for Poland A, B and C is that people’s behaviour in elections can also roughly be divided by whether they live in Poland A, B or C. Both in the national elections of 2007 and the presidential elections in 2010, it was Poland A that voted for the PO along with the rural areas of western Poland and Poland B while the rural areas of the eastern part of Poland (Poland C) voted in majority for the PiS. Historical events have had some influence on the division of Poland in the A-B-C partition as well. When analysing welfare, economic development and political preferences, similarities occur when the level of regional development is compared with the historical divisions, dating back to the late 18th century. Whereas the territory of the Prussian-occupied part of Poland largely reflects the higher developed status of Poland A, eastern Poland, back then occupied by the Russian Empire, belongs to Poland B or C (with the exception of Warsaw). However, as Poland B areas can also be found in western Poland, it is impossible to argue that differences in development between Poland A, B and C are mainly caused by its past foreign occupiers. Rather, we still see the influence of these former occupiers in the way infrastructure and cadastres are organised within different parts of Poland. These differences in organisational structures have caused some regions that are better organised due to their past conquerors, to develop more than others. Different Generations As in all countries, different generations face other challenges than the generations before or after them. However, for a former communist country as Poland, the natural difference that usually already exists between generations is even larger due to the past two decades in which Poland rapidly changed from a soviet country with communist rules to a liberal democracy. Subsequently, the differences between the generations that experienced living under communist rule and the new generation that has no experience whatsoever with living in a communist country are multifarious, leading to problems for especially those who experienced communism and now live in a liberal society. The transition from a communist system towards a model of a free market economy, has made the position on the labour market of people aged 50-64 difficult. First, during the transition, many of these people were fired from their jobs in the public sector and were forced to adapt to the new model of a free market economy. Because of their working experience in the inefficient former communist system, these people faced difficulties with finding a new job as many companies preferred to hire newly graduates. During the nineties, the government tried to partially solve this by giving these people easy access to pre-pensions or incapacity to work benefits to make space on the labour market for the younger generation. In the meantime, the government did not, and still does not, provide tailor made solutions for the older generation to fit them into the labour market again. Second, people aged 50-64 enjoy relatively low social security. This has resulted from the remnants of the communist system 290

on which these people are still partially dependent when it comes to, for instance, their pensions. The new generation also faces their own difficulties on the labour market. Although people belonging to this new and young generation are often higher educated than their parents, and have better knowledge of foreign languages such as English, it is often difficult for them to find a job. Job opportunities in especially Poland B and C are low for both (young) graduates and lower educated people, and do not match their skills. This causes a large shift from young people moving away to Poland A or even abroad where wages are usually higher, leaving grandparents and children behind in Poland B and C. Those who arrive in Poland A, do not automatically find a job though as companies often prefer to hire cheap, highly adaptable and flexible workers. Obtaining a long-term contract can therefore be difficult. Roman Catholicism Poland has a long Christian tradition that goes back all the way to the year 966 AD when monarch Mieszko I converted to Christianity. In addition, when King John Casimir crowned Saint Mary queen of Poland in 1656, Roman Catholicism became a fundamental part of the Polish national identity. In the meantime, many wars have been fought, Poland has disappeared from the world map for a period of 123 years and many foreign invaders have temporarily ruled over Polish soil. However, Roman Catholicism has remained the country’s number one religion for all these years. Obviously, this long tradition is still visible in Polish daily life. Especially during the time of the Soviet Union, the Roman Catholic Church often offered a substitute for the communist rule and was, for instance during the time of the Solidarity movement, even directly involved in politics. As the Roman Catholic Church played a significant role in counterweighing the communist regime, it contributed strongly to the reinforcement of the connection between Polish national identity and Roman Catholicism. Nowadays, national holidays are often inspired by religious events, the labour market is, in essence, based on the Christian idea of a male breadwinner model and in 2002, 75 % of the Polish population claimed to be practicing Roman Catholics. However, the large role the Church used to play in public life seems to have decreased. Roman Catholicism remains bigger in Poland than it seems to be in most of its EU neighbours (with the exception of Italy and Spain), but researches have shown that the importance of religion and the number of Roman Catholics is decreasing gradually, with the highest number of secularisation and nonpractising Roman Catholics in the northern, western and metropolitan parts of Poland. In these regions, religion has become something to practice at home, but which does not influence public life. Next to that, the younger generation of Poles seems to be less religious than their parents or grandparents. However, one cannot deny that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland still can have a great influence on public events. While the Warsaw-based government states that politics and religion are two separate entities, secularisation seems not entirely strict throughout the entire country. Pope John Paul II has had a considerable influence on the building of a positive opinion on EU membership in especially the more religious and eurosceptic parts of Poland in the south and east of the country. However, after his death, the number of Roman Catholic Poles decreased again, leaving the question whether it is the Church that remains a great influence in Poland or whether the Church’s influence had more to do with the popular former Pope than with Roman Catholicism per se.

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‘The Christ of Nations’ Adam Mickiewicz’ story dating from 1831, in which he described Poland as the country being ‘the Christ of nations’ has considerably influenced the general opinion on how Poland has presented itself in the world. Mickiewicz’ description of ‘the Christ of nations’ is twofold. Not only is Poland the country always having to suffer from defeat and pain, but also would this suffering serve a greater cause, namely the relief of the rest of the world. Although much foreign literature about Poland refers to this myth, we feel the use of this myth in relation to Polish self-representation deserves some nuance. Indeed, we have found that the myth is still relevant for Polish international politics, but only partially and in a decreasing amount. However, it is the role of Poland having to have suffered throughout history that Polish politicians occasionally use on an international stage to try and get things done. One should note, though, that the events in which the strategy of presenting oneself as a sufferer was used seem to mostly date back to the previous government in which both PiS and PO were represented. In the current homogenous PO government, an approach of not often referring back to the Polish past of partition and being occupied in international politics seems to be more common. In addition, the aspect of the ‘Christ of nations’ myth which states that Poland’s suffering will save the rest of the world has proved to not be visible at all in Polish political behaviour. Referring to Poland as ‘the Christ of nations’ therefore seems to be wrong. Rather could one speak of a Polish victimisation within history. That way, one does justice to Poland giving itself the role of a victim of history in past events, but leaves out the aspect of this suffering being necessary in order to save the rest of the world. The European Union: Solution or New Problem? The process of entering the EU has changed Poland in many ways. This report has sought those changes in different aspects of Polish society and has answered the question for each of those aspects whether membership of the EU has improved Poland’s situation or worsened it. For the development of the legal system of Poland, entering the EU has had a positive influence. By becoming a member of the EU, Poland had to adapt to European standards and implement the acquis communautaire. Although the Polish legal system has made improvements, many problems have not been solved by entering the EU. Current problems in Poland regard the weak enforcement of law and the protection of (human) rights. Next to that, the organisation of the judiciary is inefficient, access to legal aid is difficult for many, corruption remains a problem and Polish legislation has still not been fully aligned to EU legal standards. Poland’s financial system has been modernised significantly since Poland joined the EU in 2004. We mainly attribute this modernisation to the dominant role of foreign banks in the banking sector. However, the financial system is still underdeveloped compared to the average of the EU27 and the Monetary Union when we look at Poland’s banking infrastructure, insurance penetration and the development of investment funds. Furthermore, developments that will lead to Poland eventually joining the eurozone have been postponed with no exact date of when the euro will be adopted by the Poles. At this moment, Poland does not fulfil three out of four criteria of the Maastricht criteria and is therefore not ready to adopt the euro. Poland should restore its fiscal discipline if it wants to join the eurozone in short notice. Besides from not meeting the Maastricht criteria, it seems that both Poland and the EU do not want to consider expanding the eurozone on a short term, since the euro faces a crisis and the monetary system is under heavy scrutiny. 292

In agriculture, the EU has led to both problems and improvements. The strict regulations of the EU have caused a problem for farmers that cannot live up to those standards. These farmers have had to stop their businesses as a result of the EU. Nevertheless, the fact that many farmers had to stop their businesses is not necessarily bad for the EU and Poland. In this way, only the more efficient farms have remained. Next to that, the underdeveloped rural areas, that the Polish government does not always pay as much attention to as it could, do get attention from the EU, which stimulates regionalism. This stimulating the regions to develop by providing them with structural funds is something Poland did not know before entering the EU. However, we should note that the development of the regions does not always lead to positive and efficient changes. For instance, Poland has too many gminas, which are relatively powerful when it comes to decision making, but do not coordinate their work with the central government. Next to that, the regions often have too many courts that are not regularly used. The developments of the regions should therefore become more efficient. On the whole, Poland has developed itself fast in the last two decades and with success. The country has managed to build a stable economy, to become a member of NATO and the EU and to move away from its communist past. Nevertheless, Poland still faces difficulties and many reasons for concern can be seen. Regional inequalities are big and do not seem to become any smaller in the nearby future. When attempts are made by the EU to develop the regions, these are often not efficient. Attempts by the Polish government to stimulate the development of the regions seem to hardly be made at all. Older generations often have difficulties with fitting into the new society that has emerged from 1989 on, but the young generation does also not face guaranteed jobs as soon as it leaves school either. Furthermore, the situation of human rights remains difficult and the process of implementing EU legislation is in many cases either slow or done too fast and therefore not sufficient.

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