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The development of Chinese education in Malaysia, 1952–1975: political collaboration between the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Chinese educationists a
b
Yao Sua Tan & Hooi See Teoh a
Centre for Policy Research and International Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia b
Department of Chinese Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Published online: 01 Oct 2014.
To cite this article: Yao Sua Tan & Hooi See Teoh (2014): The development of Chinese education in Malaysia, 1952–1975: political collaboration between the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Chinese educationists, History of Education: Journal of the History of Education Society, DOI: 10.1080/0046760X.2014.959073 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0046760X.2014.959073
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History of Education, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0046760X.2014.959073
The development of Chinese education in Malaysia, 1952–1975: political collaboration between the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Chinese educationists Yao Sua Tana* and Hooi See Teohb
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a
Centre for Policy Research and International Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia; bDepartment of Chinese Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Received 13 February 2014; accepted 24 August 2014) This paper examines the development of Chinese education in Malaysia from 1952 to 1975, focusing on the political collaboration between the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Chinese educationists to advance the cause of Chinese education instead of the usual macro policy analysis. This collaboration was compounded by the different stand adopted by the MCA and the Chinese educationists on issues relating to Chinese education. This different stand reflected the MCA’s political limitations to advance the cause of Chinese education. The MCA had to abide by the elite accommodation model adopted by the coalition government since it was a partner of this coalition. Such an accommodative approach could not meet the assertive demand of the Chinese educationists on issues relating to Chinese education. Meanwhile, the political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists was also constrained by internal conflict within the MCA that compromised the interests of Chinese education. Keywords: Chinese education; Malaysian Chinese Association; Chinese educationists; political collaboration; elite accommodation model
The development of Chinese education in Malaysia (Malaya before 1963) has come a long way since the large-scale immigration of the Chinese beginning in the nineteenth century. This development was spearheaded by the Chinese educationists affiliated to the United Chinese School Committees’ Association (UCSCA or Dong Zong) and the United Chinese School Teachers’ Association (UCSTA or Jiao Zong).1 The Chinese educationists affiliated to these two associations play the role of a pressure group in safeguarding the development of Chinese education in Malaysia. As a pressure group, their modus operandi is to lobby for support from the Chinese community in general and the Chinese-based political parties in particular to advance the cause of Chinese education in the country. As far as the Chinesebased political parties are concerned, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), formed in 1949, is their prime target of political collaboration given its strategic *Corresponding author. Email:
[email protected] 1 For a detailed understanding of the role of the Chinese educationists in safeguarding Chinese education in Malaysia, see Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaysia, 1945-1961 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997). © 2014 Taylor & Francis
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position as a key component political party in the Malaysian coalition government, initially the Alliance government and subsequently the National Front government. The Alliance was formed in the mid-1950s and comprised three ethnic-based component political parties, namely the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). These three component political parties represented the respective interests of the three main ethnic groups in Malaysia, namely Malays, Chinese and Indians (like the Chinese, the Indians were also originally immigrants who came to Malaya in large numbers beginning in the nineteenth century). The Alliance managed to form an interim local government when it won the 1955 Federal Legislative Election, the first ever Federal Legislative Election held by the British colonial government to elect a transitional government to work towards the independence of Malaya. In the early 1970s, the Alliance government was expanded and transformed into the National Front government following emerging political challenges in the aftermath of the 1969 General Election.2 Despite the inclusion of new Chinese-based political parties, the MCA remained a key component political party in this coalition. This paper examines the political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists to advance the cause of Chinese education in Malaysia from 1952 to 1975. The Chinese educationists hoped that through this collaboration the MCA could help to influence the formulation and implementation of educational policy in favour of the development of Chinese education from within the coalition government. Unfortunately, this was not the case as the role of the MCA was largely circumscribed by the politics of accommodation adopted by the coalition government, though it had collaborated freely with the Chinese educationists in the early 1950s prior to becoming a partner in the Alliance government. This politics of accommodation was guided by ‘an elite accommodation model’.3 Among other things, this model hoped to ensure that public mobilisation on ethnically sensitive issues was kept to the minimum to enable the political elites to deal with these issues in a bargaining mode.4 More specifically, such a model was based on limiting and controlling ethnic hostility, depoliticising tense ethnic issues and compromising at the elite level; it required considerable pragmatism and moderation, ambiguity, gradualism combined occasionally with the technique of fait accompli, and a carefully controlled feedback system so that the elites did not find themselves estranged from the masses.5 Arend Lijphart associates this model (as observed during the Alliance era) with ‘consociational democracy’,6 which entails conscious cooperation among the elites from different communities to control the destabilising effect of open, ethnic competition.7 But such an accommodative approach was strongly contested by the Chinese educationists, who adopted a non-compromising stand on issues relating to Chinese education in line with their role as a pressure group. Thus, by subscribing to the elite accommodation model, the 2
See Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1983). 3 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), 2. 4 Ibid. 5 Mauzy, Barisan Nasional, 23. 6 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 150–3. 7 Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (New York: Pearson Education, 2009), 19.
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MCA was seen by the Chinese educationists as not possessing enough political will to safeguard the development of Chinese education in the country. It appears that the Chinese educationists were not aware of the difficulty confronted by the MCA in negotiating ethnic issues within a plural society. The period in the late 1950s, when the MCA was controlled by radical young turks who forged a close working relationship with the Chinese educationists, was perhaps the only notable exception. But this close working relationship was abandoned when the MCA succumbed to political pressure from the UMNO, the dominant component political party within the Alliance government, to comply with the elite accommodation model. The changing political scenario in the aftermath of the 1969 General Election led to a brief period of political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists; this political collaboration did not incur the wrath of the UMNO as, by then, the UMNO no longer subscribed to the true spirit of the elite accommodation model. The 1969 General Election was, in many ways, a wake-up call to the MCA; it suffered a major loss of political support among the Chinese electorate for its refusal to uphold the cause of Chinese education and this setback put the party in a political predicament. This hotly contested general election witnessed the emergence of Chinese oppositional politics in urban areas as illustrated by the huge electoral support given to the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a predominantly Chinese-based political party that subscribed to the ideology of cultural democracy as the main thrust of its political agenda.8 The political predicament of the MCA was also compounded by the changing political orientation of the UMNO that stemmed from its commitment to redress Malay grievances over the lack of socioeconomic mobility. These grievances were largely the result of the divide-and-rule policy adopted by the British. This policy not only entrapped the Malays in the rural peasant economy which had little economic advancement but also deprived them of educational mobility through the provision of a terminal primary education. On the other hand, the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, were encouraged by the British to engage in the modern cash economy, especially the tin-mining industry. The financial gains accrued from this economic engagement enabled the Chinese to finance the expansion of the Chinese school system. All this led to better socioeconomic mobility among the Chinese. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic mobility of the Chinese was further enhanced by the opportunities to attend urban-based English schools established by the British and the Christian missionaries – the English schools were then the best means of socioeconomic mobility via educational pathways. Unfortunately, this disparity in socioeconomic mobility was not duly redressed by the UMNO during the early decades of independence despite its political dominance within the Alliance government. The grievances of the Malays were one of the key reasons that sparked the 13 May racial riots in the aftermath of the hotly contested 1969 General Election.9 Immediately after the racial riots the UMNO began to assert its political dominance within the coalition government to safeguard the interests of the Malays. This asserting of political dominance was at the expense of the elite accommodation model 8 R. K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), 30–1. 9 For a detailed account of the racial riots, see National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report of the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1969); Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, May 13: Before and After (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1969); Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino–Malay Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1986).
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and was viewed with much distrust by the non-Malays, who feared for the disappearance of inter-ethnic bargaining and accommodation.10 The implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which aimed at redressing economic disparity in the country through affirmative measures that favoured the Malays and a new educational policy that enforced Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system through the conversion of the English-medium schools to Malay-medium schools, was a clear indicator of the assertive political leadership imposed by the UMNO on the coalition government beginning in the early 1970s.11 As such, the position of the MCA within the coalition government was marginalised, further limiting its political leverage on the development of Chinese education. Although the MCA attempted to arrest its political decline through a reformist movement in the early 1970s, this reformist movement was short-lived as a result of the MCA’s internal conflict. The demise of the reformist movement had also brought to an end a brief period of collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists. The collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists was finally terminated in the mid-1970s due to irreconcilable differences in safeguarding the interests of Chinese education. This paper illustrates the different stand adopted by the MCA and the Chinese educationists on issues relating to Chinese education and the political limitations of the MCA to advance the cause of Chinese education. This will provide new insights on the predicament faced by the development of Chinese education in Malaysia in contrast to many existing studies that look at this predicament from a macro policy perspective.12 This paper begins by tracing the genesis of the political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists during the British colonial era. It then discusses initial constraint in this collaboration when the MCA became a partner in the Alliance government. It goes on to examine the MCA’s political crisis arising from its collaboration with the Chinese educationists that went against the elite accommodation model and the deadlock in subsequent collaboration following the crisis. Finally, it focuses on the brief renewal of the MCA’s political collaboration with the Chinese educationists and the termination of this political collaboration in 1975. Political collaboration during the British colonial period The enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance by the British was a critical moment in the development of Chinese education in Malaya. This was because the ordinance incorporated the recommendation of the Barnes Report to establish English–Malay bilingual primary schools (commonly known as national schools) to replace the vernacular school system in preparation for the decolonisation of Malaya.13 The national schools were to serve as a platform to unify students of all races. Prior to this, the British had allowed the vernacular school system, especially the Chinese and Tamil school systems, to flourish in fulfilment of the educational 10
Mean, Malaysian Politics, 22. Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 254. 12 See, for example, Haris bin Md. Jadi, ‘Ethnicity, Politics and Education: A Study in the Development of Malayan Education and Its Policy Implementation Process 1955–1970’ (PhD diss., University of Keele, 1983). 13 See Federation of Malaya, The Education Ordinance, 1952 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952); Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951). 11
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needs of the Chinese and Indians, though there was an attempt to control the Chinese school system in the 1920s arising from the involvement of the Chinese school teachers and students in anti-British subversive activities. However, following decolonisation after the Second World War, the British began to construe the vernacular school system as dysfunctional and malintegrative and, as such, efforts were put in place to reorganise the educational system, culminating in the enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance, which incorporated the establishment of national schools as recommended by the Barnes Report. It was at this critical moment that the MCA began to collaborate with the Chinese educationists to safeguard the Chinese school system. The political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists was largely driven by the then MCA President, Tan Cheng Lock, who was a staunch supporter of mother-tongue education despite being educated in English. In a meeting with the Chinese educationists in November 1952, he maintained that the Chinese in Malaya must be allowed to go through Chinese education to preserve their culture and tradition. He associated the mother tongue with an inseparable shadow that one must invariably live with. He even looked down on those who did not know their mother tongues.14 Politically, he favoured the unification of the three main ethnic groups in Malaya but culturally he called for the preservation of their respective cultures.15 He subsequently established the MCA Chinese Education Central Committee (MCACECC) in April 1953 to serve as the collaborative platform between the party and the Chinese educationists. One of the main tasks of the MCACECC was to demand for a fair and equitable treatment of Chinese education.16 The Chinese educationists responded positively to the establishment of the MCACECC and agreed that it should come under the political patronage of the MCA following the assurance by Tan Cheng Lock that the MCA was fully committed to the safeguarding of the interests of Chinese education.17 Tan took the responsibility to head the MCACECC. He was assisted by representatives from the UCSCA and the UCSTA. The establishment of the MCACECC provided the extra impetus to both the MCA and the Chinese educationists to safeguard the position of Chinese education in Malaya. In May 1953, Tan Cheng Lock began to adopt a strong stand against the British educational policy by questioning the establishment of the national schools by the 1952 Education Ordinance. He demanded that the British High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer, amend the ordinance to safeguard the rights of the Chinese to maintain the vernacular school system. Unfortunately this demand was not heeded by the British High Commissioner, forcing the MCACECC to submit a memorandum to the British High Commissioner. Among other things, this memorandum upheld the concept of coexistence and co-prosperity of all races in Malaya.18 This concept was popularly accepted by the Chinese educationists in their demand for a fair and equitable treatment of Chinese education. But things changed when the MCA joined the Alliance to contest the 1955 Federal Legislative Election. 14
Dong Zong Chubanzu [Publication Unit of the UCSCA], ed., Dong Zong Sanian [Thirty Years of the UCSCA], Vol. III (Kuala Lumpur: UCSCA, 1988), 573. 15 Ibid., 577. 16 Ibid., 584. 17 Ibid., 577. 18 Jiao Zong 33nian Bianjishi [Editorial Board of the Special Publication to Commemorate the 33rd Anniversary of the UCSTA], ed., Jiao Zong 33nian [33 Years of the UCSTA] (Kuala Lumpur: UCSTA, 1987), 336–7, 340–7.
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Despite strong challenges from the Party Negara and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the Alliance managed to secure a resounding victory in this election, i.e. by winning 51 seats out of a total of 52 contested seats, to form the interim local government.19 The President of the UMNO, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was appointed Chief Minister. A cabinet comprising members of the Alliance was also formed. Tunku subsequently managed to negotiate with the British for the independence of Malaya, which was agreed upon by the British in 1957. Initial constraint in political collaboration The winning of the Federal Legislative Election by the Alliance in July 1955 could also be attributed to the decision by the Chinese educationists to temporarily drop their demands to safeguard the development of Chinese education, among which was their demand to recognise Chinese as an official language of Malaya in order to legitimise the position of Chinese education, which was threatened by the enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance. This decision was instrumental to the Alliance as the demand was regarded as contentious by the Malay nationalists affiliated to the Party Negara. Also, the Alliance was accused by the Party Negara of colluding with the Chinese educationists on this demand due to the MCA’s close political collaboration with the Chinese educationists. The official language issue was then a prime concern to the Malays who demanded a more assertive role for the Malay language to redress their lack of educational mobility as well as to uphold the supremacy of the Malay language as the integrative language of the country, especially among the non-Malays. Although the Malay language was made an official language alongside English under the Federation of Malaya Agreement signed in 1948, its role was largely circumscribed by English, even within the English–Malay bilingual primary school system recommended by the Barnes Report and subsequently incorporated by the 1952 Education Ordinance. As far as educational mobility was concerned, the establishment of the English–Malay bilingual primary schools as recommended by the Barnes Report was meant to facilitate the movement of students into an English-medium post-primary education and not a Malay-medium post-primary education.20 Thus, the instrumental value of the Malay language was confined to the primary level of education. But it was precisely at the post-primary levels that the Malays felt that their educational mobility was most wanting and a more assertive role for the Malay language would help to advance their educational mobility beyond the rudimentary primary level. Therefore, the exploiting of the official language issue by the Party Negara certainly had the potential to woo the support of the Malay electorate in the forthcoming Federal Legislative Election. It was for this reason that the Alliance hoped that the Chinese educationists could drop their demand to recognise Chinese as an official language to avoid further exploitation of the official language issue by the Party Negara. Much to the relief of the Alliance, the Chinese educationists agreed to drop the demand at a round-table meeting held in Malacca on 12 January 1955. In return, the Alliance promised the Chinese educationists that it would safeguard the development of Chinese education if it managed to win the forthcoming Federal Legislative Election.21 19
See K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1965). 20 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education, 75. 21 Heng, Chinese Politics in Malaysia, 203.
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Since becoming a partner in the interim local government, the MCA had begun to adopt a cautious stand on issues relating to Chinese education in line with the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government. This change of stand was most evident during the MCACECC meeting on 15 October 1955. In the meeting, Tan Cheng Lock advised the Chinese educationists not to be overly assertive in pursuing the cause of Chinese education in response to their demand that the Alliance government should immediately honour its pre-election promises. He also reminded the Chinese educationists that the MCA had to strike a delicate balance between the interests of the Chinese and the interests of the Malays in addressing issues with contrasting ethnic overtones.22 Clearly, the MCA could no longer act unilaterally to support the cause of Chinese education. In the same meeting, the newly appointed Deputy Minister of Education from the MCA, Too Joon Hing, also called on the Chinese educationists to give adequate time to the Alliance government to honour its pre-election promises.23 All in all, there was a marked change in the stand of the MCA vis-à-vis issues raised by the Chinese educationists. The MCA’s sudden change of stance was not well received by the Chinese educationists, who were not willing to compromise the interests of Chinese education. Much to the despair of the MCA, the Chinese educationists decided to revive the official language issue that was dropped by them prior to the 1955 Federal Legislative Election, forcing the MCACECC to convene a special meeting to deliberate on the issue. The issue was hotly debated in this special meeting and with the intervention of Tan Cheng Lock the meeting finally decided to put the issue on hold until further notice.24 Clearly, such a decision was an attempt by the MCA to delay any deliberation on the issue. Meanwhile, the Chinese educationists began to doubt the MCA’s political leverage within the Alliance government to safeguard the interests of Chinese education. Such a doubt was not unfounded. Despite winning all 15 seats contested by the party in the 1955 Federal Legislative Election, the MCA was actually under the political patronage of the UMNO. This was because most of the seats secured by the party were the result of political support extended by the UMNO,25 indicating the dominant role played by the UMNO within the Alliance. The dominant position of the UMNO was also illustrated by the fact that it managed to secure 34 of the 35 seats contested by the party. The MCA, too, realised its lack of political leverage to safeguard the interests of Chinese education. It was for this reason that it had extended its invitation to the Chinese educationists to join the party to strengthen its political leverage in pursuing the cause of Chinese education. But this invitation was rejected by the Chinese educationists, who preferred to remain as a pressure group.26 This was in line with the principle of transcending party politics upheld by the Chinese educationists. Admittedly, the MCA’s lack of political leverage had constrained its capacity to negotiate a more rigorous development of Chinese education from within the Alliance government. For instance, the Razak Report promulgated by the Alliance government in 1956 as a fulfilment of promises made prior to the 1955 Federal 22
Dong Zong Chubanzu, ed., Dong Zong Sanian, 579–80. Ibid. 24 Tay Lian Soo, Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhanshi [The Historical Development of Chinese Education in Malaysia] (Skudai: Southern College Press, 2005), 128. 25 Ibid. 26 Dong Zong Chubanzu, ed., Dong Zong Sanian, 580. 23
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Legislative Election was only partly in favour of the development of Chinese education, i.e. it accepted only the Chinese primary schools as an integral part of the national educational system but not the Chinese secondary schools.27 As we shall see, the Chinese secondary schools were required to comply with its ultimate objective to elevate Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system by switching to the national medium in support of the integrative role of the Malay language. This was primarily because the promulgation of the Razak Report was guided by the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government, which tried to accommodate the contrasting educational needs of the Malays and the non-Malays. Thus, the acceptance of the Chinese primary schools as an integral part of the national educational system was meant to accommodate the assertion of the Chinese for mother-tongue education. On the other hand, the ultimate objective to elevate Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system was to enhance the educational mobility of the Malays, though the strengthening of the integrative role of the Malay language among the non-Malays was also a major concern. Emerging crisis in political collaboration The political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists took a different trajectory with the emergence of radical young turks in the party. These radical young turks were led by Lim Chong Eu. Lim joined the MCA in 1954 and consolidated his position within the MCA by early 1958. He went on to challenge the MCA top leadership during the party election on 23 Mac 1958. He managed to defeat the incumbent President, Tan Cheng Lock, by a small majority of 22 votes, i.e. 89 votes against 67 votes. Meanwhile, several of his staunch supporters were also elected to the party’s top positions. For instance, Too Joon Hing was elected as the Secretary General of the MCA. This victory incurred the wrath of the old guard, who were loyal supporters of Tan Cheng Lock. However, Lim’s position within the MCA was not as strong as one would expect. Despite controlling several top positions Lim was unable to control the MCA state divisions, which remained under the influence of the old guard. Lim decided to forge a closer working relationship with the Chinese educationists soon after assuming the leadership of the MCA to boost his political repute and standing among the Chinese community. While addressing a convention hosted by the Chinese associations in Johor on 27 May 1958, he openly voiced his support for the development of Chinese education in the country.28 He subsequently revamped the MCACECC to ensure that the MCACECC could play an effective role to facilitate the MCA’s collaboration with the Chinese educationists. The new MCACECC decided to host a National Convention on Chinese Education in Ipoh on 20 September 1958. In the convention, Lim reiterated his support for the development of Chinese education by asserting the need to have an educational system that could allow the mother-tongue education of all races to flourish.29 The 27
Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee 1956 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956), 9. 28 Cheah See Kian, Lin Cang You Pingzhuan [A Critical Biography of Lim Chong Eu] (Penang: Island Publication, 1988), 99. 29 Dong Zong Chubanzu, ed., Dong Zong Sanian, 601.
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development of Chinese education was then confronted by the problem of the conversion of the Chinese secondary schools to national-medium secondary schools. This conversion stemmed from the promulgation of the Razak Report, which stipulated the aim to establish National Secondary Schools (NSSs) that prepared the students to sit for a common public examination conducted in the official languages of the country, namely English and Malay.30 As previously mentioned, the Razak Report was willing to accept only the Chinese primary schools as an integral part of the national educational system but not the Chinese secondary schools, hence this attempt to convert the Chinese secondary schools via public examinations. Lim stood by the Chinese educationists and demanded that if public examinations were to be conducted in the official languages of the country, the Chinese language should then be recognised as an official language.31 Lim was not entirely unaware that his open collusion with the Chinese educationists had deviated from the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government. In fact, prior to assuming the leadership of the MCA, he was one of the MCA representatives in the Razak Committee, which promulgated the Razak Report, most noted for its compromising stand in balancing the educational needs of the Malays and the non-Malays. Clearly, Lim was trying to use the collaboration with the Chinese educationists to win the support of the Chinese community to consolidate his newly acquired position within the MCA. As expected, Lim’s open collusion with the Chinese educationists was viewed with much apprehension by the UMNO, putting the position of the MCA within the Alliance government in jeopardy. The position of the MCA within the Alliance government took a sharp turn when Lim wrote a personal letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman demanding the allocation of more seats to the MCA in the forthcoming 1959 General Election. This demand was made on the basis that since the 1955 Federal Legislative Election, the Chinese electorate had increased about fourfold. However, before Tunku could address the demand, the letter was purportedly leaked to the press without Lim’s knowledge. Meanwhile, Yong Pung How, Head of the MCA Publicity Unit, had also released a statement saying that if the Alliance government did not concede to Lim’s demand the MCA would contest the election of its own accord. Tunku in particular and the UMNO in general were most upset by this demand and decided not to cooperate with the MCA in the forthcoming general election if the demand was not retracted. Such a strong stand from Tunku caught the MCA by surprise and resulted in a political crisis within the MCA. The MCA Central Working Committee (CWC) met on 12 July 1959 and arrived at a decision that Lim should retract the demand and sack those who were responsible for the MCA’s political crisis. Following this unexpected development Lim felt that his days in the MCA were numbered as the CWC was no longer on his side, and he went on a leave of absence before resigning as the President of the MCA in September 1959. In fact, Lim had no choice but to resign from his position in the MCA as his close working relationship with the Chinese educationists and his open demand for the allocation of more seats to the MCA could not fit in with the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government.
30
Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee 1956, 12. Tan, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaysia, 1945–1961, 256–7.
31
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Deadlock in political collaboration The resignation of Lim Chong Eu paved the way for the MCA old guard to regain control of the party. The party’s leadership was temporarily entrusted to Cheah Toon Lok, a close ally of Tunku Abdul Rahman, who assumed the position of Acting President. Cheah subsequently managed to normalise the MCA’s relationship with the UMNO. Under Cheah, the MCA was determined to distance itself from the Chinese educationists. This was clearly illustrated by its handling of the issue relating to the conversion of the Chinese secondary schools to national-medium secondary schools as a result of the promulgation of the Rahman Talib Report in 1960. The promulgation of this report alarmed the Chinese educationists over the future status of the Chinese secondary schools in the country. This was because the report recommended the conversion of these schools to national-medium schools to uphold the ultimate objective of the Razak Report to elevate Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system.32 This recommendation was subsequently incorporated into the 1961 Education Act, which only made provision for two types of fully assisted government secondary schools, namely the NSS that used Malay as the main medium of instruction and the National-Type Secondary Schools (NTSSs) that used English as a medium of instruction.33 The Chinese secondary schools were given an ultimatum to conform to this provision, failing which financial assistance in the form of grants-in-aid would be withdrawn from them and they would have to exist as Independent Chinese Secondary Schools (ICSSs) or Duli Zhongxue (Duzhong).34 Much to the disappointment of the Chinese educationists, the recommendation of the Rahman Talib Report was fully supported by the three MCA representatives on the Rahman Talib Committee, namely Leong Yew Koh, Wong Pow Nee and Koh Kim Leng. Immediately after the release of the report, the Chinese educationists urged the MCACECC to convene a meeting to discuss the conversion of the Chinese secondary schools. But the MCA leaders were reluctant to do so. They also rejected a subsequent invitation by the Chinese educationists to attend a meeting with the representatives of the Chinese secondary schools to discuss their predicament. Some MCA leaders even tried to convince the management committees (boards of governors/ directors or dongshibu) of the Chinese secondary schools of the practical benefits derived from conversion to the national medium, among which was better educational mobility for the Chinese students within mainstream education.35 Clearly, the MCA was no longer keen to collaborate with the Chinese educationists to safeguard the Chinese secondary schools. The most drastic measure taken by the MCA was perhaps the dissolution of the MCACECC. These developments frustrated the President of the UCSTA, Lim Lian Geok, who accused the MCA representatives on the Rahman Talib Committee in particular and the MCA in general of selling out the interests of Chinese 32
See Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Review Committee 1960 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1960), 3. 33 Federation of Malaya, Education Act, 1961 (Kuala Lumpur: Acting Government Printer, 1961), 222–3. 34 See Tan Liok Ee, ‘Chinese Independent Schools in West Malaysia: Varying Responses to Changing Demand’, in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, ed. J. W. Cushman and Wang Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988) 35 Jiao Zong Jiaoyu Yanjiu Zhongxin [Educational Research Centre of the UCSTA], ed., Huawen Jiayu Shiliao [Historical Documents on Chinese Education], Vol. II (Kuala Lumpur, UCSTA, 1984), 31–7.
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education. Lim was subsequently involved in a heated debate with Leong Yew Koh over his decision to support the conversion of the Chinese secondary schools. This debate was marked by insults and name-calling,36 indicating the extremely strained relationship between the MCA and the Chinese educationists, though both Lim and Leong had had a long history of personal grudges against each other. Without the support of the MCA, the Chinese educationists were unable to safeguard the Chinese secondary schools despite their incessant calls on the management committees to be self-reliant by rejecting state funding. A large number of Chinese secondary schools, i.e. 55 schools out of 71 schools that existed at the time, decided to switch to the national medium in exchange for state funding. They were known as the National-Type Chinese Secondary Schools (NTCSSs) or the conforming schools. Those that did not switch to the national medium were forced to become ICSSs. Although the NTCSSs initially used English as the main medium of instruction, they were expected to switch their medium of instruction to Malay when the status of English as the official language of the country was reviewed 10 years after independence as prescribed by the Federal Constitution and, hence, the fulfilment of the Razak Report’s ultimate objective to elevate Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system. The conversion of a large number of Chinese secondary schools to the national medium was indeed a severe blow to the Chinese educationists who had, until then, put in immense efforts to develop the Chinese secondary schools. Although the Chinese educationists were initially demoralised by such a disastrous development, they soon reorganised their efforts to strengthen the ICSSs through a revival movement.37 Despite initial hiccups that stemmed from declining enrolments, the ICSSs managed to turn round and gradually emerged as an alternative secondary education pathway for the Chinese in Malaysia.38 This was accomplished without the support of the MCA. Instead, the main driving force came from the Chinese public who provided the much needed financial assistance to the ICSSs for physical development. However, the refusal by the government to recognise the Unified Examination (Duzhong Tongkao) conducted by the Chinese educationists beginning in the mid1970s prevented a more rigorous development of the ICSSs in the country. Meanwhile, despite conversion to the national medium, the NTCSSs are still regarded by the Chinese community as ‘Chinese schools’ for the reasons that Chinese is still being taught as a subject within the school curriculum, the internal culture of the school remains identifiably Chinese and the schools have retained close links with the local Chinese community.39 More importantly, these schools are predominantly attended by Chinese students. However, all this could not deny the fact that they are actually national-medium secondary schools that do not cater to the mother-tongue education of the Chinese community. The deadlock in political collaboration with the MCA was also one of the reasons that foiled the attempt by the Chinese educationists to establish a Chinese36
Tan, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, 271. Shen Ting, ‘Pilizhou Huawen Duzhong Fuxingshi [History of the Revival of the ICSSs in Perak]’, in Jiao Zong 33nian, ed. Jiao Zong 33nian Bianjishi (Kuala Lumpur: UCSTA, 1987). 38 Tan Liok Ee, ‘Chinese Schools in Malaysia: A Case Study of Cultural Resilience’, in The Chinese in Malaysia, ed. Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (Shah Alam: Oxford University Press, 2000), 247. 39 Tan, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, 1–2. 37
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medium university, namely Merdeka University. The proposal to establish the university was first mooted by the Chinese educationists in 1967 when the government imposed the condition that only students with the Senior Cambridge (SC) or Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE) qualifications taken at the end of Secondary Year Five would be allowed to further their studies overseas.40 This condition deprived the ICSS students of opportunities to further their education overseas, especially in Nanyang University, a Chinese-medium university in Singapore, since they did not sit for the SC or MCE examinations. However, the proposal was also underpinned by the aspirations of the Chinese educationists to establish a complete system of Chinese education in Malaysia with Merdeka University serving as the pinnacle of this complete system of Chinese education. Despite favourable response from the Chinese community, the MCA, under the leadership of Tan Siew Sin (the son of Tan Cheng Lock), who was elected the President of the MCA in November 1961, decided not to support the establishment of the university. This decision was taken at the party’s CWC meeting on 13 February 1968.41 The MCA was perhaps worried that the establishment of a Chinese-medium university would further infuriate the Malays who were then extremely unhappy over the enactment of the 1967 National Language Act. Although the Act elevated Malay as the sole official language of the country, it had, to the despair of the Malays, retained the use of English, a colonial legacy, for official purposes despite the constitutional provision to review the status of English 10 years after independence.42 Thus, the establishment of Merdeka University would constitute yet another threat to the status of Malay as the national language and official language of the country. The most vocal critic of the proposal to establish Merdeka University was none other than the President of the MCA, who was reported to have said that ‘it would be easier for hell to freeze over than for Merdeka University to be established under the prevailing conditions in Malaysia’.43 But the Chinese educationists were determined to go ahead and officially launched the Merdeka University project at the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall on 14 April 1969.44 A private company, the Merdeka University Berhad, was subsequently incorporated with an initial injection of M$600,000 to kick-start the project.45 In a desperate move to win the support of the Chinese community in the forthcoming 1969 General Election, the MCA proposed the establishment of the Tunku Abdul Rahman College (TAR College), a pre-university college catering to Chinese students. Such a move was deemed crucial by the MCA as the Merdeka University project had been popularly supported by the DAP, its main political adversary in the 40
Jiao Zong 33nian Bianjishi, ed., Jiao Zong 33nian, 492. Cheah See Kian, Malaixiya Huaren Zhengzhi Sichao Yanbian [The Evolution of Political Thoughts of the Malaysian Chinese] (Penang: Author, 1984), 137. 42 Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976); Margaret Roff, ‘The Politics of Language in Malaysia’, Asian Survey 7 (1967). 43 N. L. Snider, ‘Race, Leitmotiv of the Malayan Election Drama’, Asian Survey 10 (1970): 1078. 44 Quan Sheng, ‘Duda de Lailong Qumai [The Development of the Merdeka University Project]’, in Duda Shiliaoji [Historical Documents on Merdeka University], ed. Dong Jiao Zong Quanguo Huawen Duzhong Gongweihui [Dong Jiao Zong National ICSS Working Committee] (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Merdeka Berhad, 1993), 19–20. 45 Yap Sin Tian, The Chinese Schools of Malaysia towards the Year 2000: A Hundred Years of Struggle and its Future Development (Kuala Lumpur: UCSCA, 1992), 40. 41
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forthcoming general election. Unfortunately, the TAR College could not match the ethnic appeal of Merdeka University. In the end, the MCA paid a heavy price for rejecting the Merdeka University project. The party suffered a humiliating defeat in Chinese-dominated urban constituencies. However, the Merdeka University project was temporarily halted following racial riots in the aftermath of the hotly contested 1969 General Election. Although the Chinese educationists tried to revive the Merdeka University project in the 1970s, new legislation enacted by the government had compounded their efforts. This legislation came in the form of the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, which made it mandatory to obtain approval from the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (His Majesty, the King) and the parliament before a university could be established.46 Clearly, the Act provided the legal basis for the government to reject the Merdeka University project. Despite initiating two legal actions against the government for rejecting the project, the courts ruled in favour of the government, marking an end to the Chinese educationists’ aspirations to establish Merdeka University. Brief renewal in political collaboration There was a brief renewal of political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists in the 1970s. As we shall see, this was not targeted at the Merdeka University project but the autonomy of the management committees of the Chinese schools, namely the Chinese primary schools and the NTCSSs. This renewal of political collaboration had a lot to do with the emergence of a reformist movement within the MCA in the early 1970s that attempted to arrest the party’s political decline following its dismal performance in the 1969 General Election. It was also a timely response to the changing political orientation of the UMNO, which began to assert its political dominance to redress Malay grievances after the 13 May racial riots. As mentioned, one of the factors that sparked the 13 May racial riots was the grievances of the Malays over their lack of socioeconomic mobility, and these grievances were redressed by the implementation of the NEP and a new educational policy that safeguarded the interests of the Malays in the early 1970s. In fact, the changing political orientation of the UMNO was most evident when the cabinet was reshuffled after a period of emergency rule under the National Operations Council following the racial riots. By then, Tunku Abdul Rahman had retired and his position was taken over by Abdul Razak, who subsequently transformed the Alliance government into the National Front government. There was a marked contrast between Tunku and Abdul Razak in capitalising on Malay political dominance to serve the interests of the Malays. Tunku was regarded by many as a ‘supra-communal arbiter’,47 who subscribed to the need for an ‘ethnic balance’48 and Malay political dominance was, therefore, not overly strident during his tenure as the Prime Minister. But it was a different case when Abdul Razak assumed the leadership of the country. He was more assertive in safeguarding the interests of the Malays and, thus, the relationship between the component political parties in the 46
Malaysia, Universities and University Colleges Act, 1971 (Kuala Lumpur: Pemangku Pencetak Kerajaan, 1971). 47 Von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus, 205. 48 Terence E. Gomez, ‘Malaysia’, in Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Wolfgang Sachsenroder and Ulrike E. Frings, Vol. I (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1988), 246.
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coalition government degenerated to one of expediency. He was indeed more pragmatic and less sentimental than Tunku regarding the multi-ethnic bonds within the coalition government.49 His strategy was to assert Malay political dominance and the UMNO was to be, to a greater degree, the foundation of the political system, while all other component political parties in the coalition government were there to provide peripheral support.50 This was best illustrated by the reshuffling of the cabinet mentioned earlier in which key positions were given to senior UMNO members. It goes without saying that the dismal performance of the MCA in the 1969 General Election, coupled with the changing political orientation of the UMNO, had resulted in the political marginalisation of the MCA. This prompted the MCA to rethink its political future. It finally opted to revitalise its political standing through a more rigorous cooperation with the Chinese associations, including the UCSTA and the UCSCA, culminating in the launching of the Chinese unity movement. While the Chinese associations recognised the need for such a movement, they were not willing to put the movement under the political patronage of the MCA, indicating their lack of confidence in the MCA’s political ability to see the movement through. Instead, they sought to establish their own platform to spur the movement with the hope that the MCA would endorse their efforts. However, this was construed by the MCA as detrimental to its political interests. It was at this point that the MCA decided to launch a reformist movement within the party to secure the support of the Chinese community. This reformist movement culminated in a revamp of the party’s political structure, part of which was the establishment of state liaison committees, which incorporated young potential leaders to revitalise the political set-up of the MCA.51 It was amidst this reformist movement that the MCA renewed its collaboration with the Chinese educationists. The development of Chinese education was then confronted by the promulgation of the Aziz Report, which took stern action against the management committees of the Chinese schools for malpractices that had gone beyond their terms of appointment. Among other things, these malpractices included interference in administrative matters and mismanagement of school funds.52 The Aziz Report was initially promulgated in 1964 but because of strong opposition by the Chinese educationists it was reviewed in 1968. However, the review of the report did not change its earlier decision to act against the management committees.53 It should be noted here that the management committee is an essential component of the Chinese schools that comprises members elected from the benefactors of the Chinese schools.54 These benefactors are involved in the establishment of the Chinese schools and some serve as trustees of the schools. Prior to the promulgation of the Aziz Report, the management committees were entrusted with the role of Stephen Chee, ‘Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities’, Asian Survey 13 (1973): 152. 50 Means, Malaysian Politics, 20. 51 See Loh Kok Wah, The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia: Reform and Conflict in the Malaysian Chinese Associations 1971–73 (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982). 52 Malaysia, Laporan Suruhanjaya Diraja Mengenai Perkhidmatan Guru-Guru Malaysia Barat [Report of the Royal Commission on the Teaching Service in West Malaysia] (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1969), 33. 53 Malaysia, Laporan Suruhanjaya Diraja Mengenai Perkhidmatan Perguruan, Malaysia Barat [Report of the Royal Commission on the Teaching Service, West Malaysia] (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971). 54 Tan, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, 244. 49
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overseeing the physical development of the school, managing the operating expenditure of the school and recruiting administrators and teaching staff under the Unified Teaching Service (UTS) scheme. As such, they were regarded by the Chinese community as an autonomous body that played a key role in maintaining the character of the Chinese schools through the upholding of Chinese as the language of instruction, administration and wider communication in the case of the Chinese primary schools and the upholding of an internal Chinese school culture in the case of the NTCSSs. But much to the despair of the Chinese educationists, the Aziz Report had largely marginalised the management committees by limiting their role to the physical development of the schools.55 In many ways, such a development was inevitable. For one thing, the Chinese schools had by then become an integral part of the national educational system funded by the government and as such the government was solely responsible for ensuring the proper management of the operating expenditure of the schools. Also, the management committees ceased to be the employers of the administrators and teachers following the phasing out of the UTS scheme by the Aziz Report, which emplaced these administrators and teachers under the government service scheme. But the government did recognise the fact that most Chinese schools were built by the Chinese community on land belonging to the trustees and therefore it had no legal standing over the physical development of the schools. Thus, when the MCA renewed its political collaboration with the Chinese educationists in the early 1970s, there was nothing much that the party could do to restore the original role of the management committees. However, the MCA and the Chinese educationists demanded of the government through a memorandum that the management committees should be consulted over the appointment of administrators. This was instrumental in maintaining the character of the Chinese schools. The management committees were wary that there might be a change of school character if administrators not well versed in the Chinese language were appointed to the schools. But this demand was not accepted by the government. Instead, the appointment of administrators remained under the purview of the government but the management committees could appeal within a stipulated period if they questioned the suitability of administrators appointed to the schools. However, the final decision on the appeal rested with the government.56 Although far from meeting their original demand, this decision by the government was the best that the MCA and the Chinese educationists could achieve in view of the changing status of the management committees. Unfortunately, the MCA’s renewed collaboration with the Chinese educationists, which was spurred by the reformist movement from within the MCA, was shortlived. This was because the reformist movement was abruptly aborted as it had resulted in an internal conflict within the MCA following the attempt by the old guard to block the movement. Also, the emergence of radical reformists, in particular Lim Keng Yaik (the MCA Perak State Liaison Committee Chairman), who was spearheading the movement, was not to the liking of Tan Siew Sin, the President of the MCA. When Tan instructed the reformists to cancel a gathering to officially launch the reformist movement, this culminated in protests among the reformists 55
Malaysia, Laporan Suruhanjaya Diraja Mengenai Perkhidmatan Guru-Guru Malaysia Barat, 36. 56 Dong Zong Chubanzu [Publication Unit of the UCSCA], ed., Huajiao Gongzuozhe Shouce [Handbook of the Chinese Educationists] (Kuala Lumpur: UCSCA, 1989), 38.
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who regarded this intervention as unwarranted. Lim was the most vocal critic of this intervention. His strong stand against this intervention resulted in his sacking from the MCA and, hence, the demise of the reformist movement.57 Termination of political collaboration The political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists was officially terminated in 1975. The event leading to this termination was the submitting of individual memoranda by both the MCA and the Chinese educationists to the Cabinet Committee established in 1974 to review the implementation of the national educational policy. Among other things, the committee recommended the introduction of a back-to-basic school curriculum that emphasised the acquisition of the 3Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic) skills among primary school students. This recommendation was underpinned by empirical findings from the Curriculum Development Centre, which indicated the lack of the basic 3Rs skills among primary school students. The strengthening of these skills was driven by the aim to provide the required manpower to fulfil the short- and long-term needs of the country. However, the committee had also stipulated the need to ensure that the national educational system could serve as a crucible of the nation-building process, especially in the fostering of national unity among students of all races.58 The main thrust of the problem was not so much with the strengthening of the basic 3Rs skills but how the national educational system could serve as a crucible of the nation-building process. This problem was often associated with the aspirations of the government that the national language should play a more effective integrative role to strengthen the nation-building process within the school domain. These aspirations could be traced to the Razak Report promulgated in 1956, which stipulated the ultimate objective to elevate Malay as the main medium of instruction in the national educational system. Although this ultimate objective was achieved through two earlier measures, namely the conversion of the Chinese secondary schools to national-medium secondary schools in the early 1960s and the conversion of the English-medium schools to Malay-medium schools beginning in the early 1970s, there was much fear among the Chinese educationists that this ultimate objective might be imposed on the Chinese primary schools, despite the assurance by the government that the ultimate objective was not targeted at the Chinese primary schools. Thus, the memorandum submitted by the Chinese educationists to the Cabinet Committee was firm in upholding the basic rights of the Chinese to go through mother-tongue education by arguing for a multilingual policy as against the monolingual policy advocated by the ultimate objective of the Razak Report. However, the stand of the MCA differed markedly from that of the Chinese educationists. In the memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Committee, the MCA upheld the basic rights of the Chinese to go through mother-tongue education but also endorsed the integrative role of the Malay language within the national educational system.59 57 Loh, The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia, 65–8; Cheah, Malaixiya Huaren Zhengzhi Sichao Yanbian, 238–9. 58 Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia [Ministry of Education Malaysia], Laporan Jawatankuasa Mengkaji Pelaksanaan Dasar Pelajaran [Report of the Cabinet Review Committee on the Implementation of Educational Policy] (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980), 1. 59 Cheah, Malaixiya Huaren Zhengzhi Sichao Yanbian, 275–7.
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Thus, to the Chinese educationists, the MCA’s memorandum did not augur well for the interests of the Chinese school system. The different positions adopted by the MCA and the Chinese educationists became a topic of heated debate. It was during this debate that the then President of the MCA, Lee San Choon, maintained that the aspirations of the MCA were no longer compatible with those of the Chinese educationists and warned that actions would be taken against those who continued to politicise its memorandum.60 Clearly, such a strong stand marked the end of political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists to advance the cause of Chinese education in the country. Conclusion The political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists from 1952 to 1975 failed to spur the development of Chinese education in Malaysia. This could be attributed to two intervening factors. The first intervening factor was the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government. It was clear that, prior to becoming a partner in the Alliance government, the MCA did not encounter any problem in its collaboration with the Chinese educationists. However, things changed when the MCA joined the Alliance government. By subscribing to the elite accommodation model adopted by the Alliance government, the role of the MCA in addressing ethnic issues became incompatible with that of the Chinese educationists, who acted as an uncompromising pressure group. In other words, the Chinese educationists were free to demand the educational rights of the Chinese but the MCA was not. The MCA had to negotiate issues relating to Chinese education along a middle path to achieve some degree of ethnic balance in accordance with the elite accommodation model. But such an accommodative approach became a dilemma to the MCA as it was construed by the Chinese community in general and the Chinese educationists in particular as lacking in political will to pursue the cause of Chinese education. The danger for the MCA to act beyond the elite accommodation model was rather self-evident when this was boldly attempted by Lim Chong Eu in the late 1950s. The other intervening factor was the tendency of the MCA leaders to put personal interests ahead of the larger interests of the party, indicating a lack of internal cohesion within the party to safeguard the interests of the Chinese. This was clearly illustrated by the failure of the reformist movement launched in the 1970s, which might otherwise have provided a chance for the MCA to revitalise itself following its rejection by the Chinese electorate in the 1969 General Election and also for the Chinese educationists to work with the MCA to safeguard the development of Chinese education, if not for the conservative outlook of the old guard within the MCA. All in all, the political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists from 1952 to 1975 was mired by structural limitations within the political set-up of the Alliance government and internal conflict within the MCA that restrained this political collaboration to the detriment of the development of Chinese education. With the benefit of hindsight, it was indeed most unfortunate that the MCA had chosen to terminate the reformist movement. For one thing, this reformist movement might have had the potential to strengthen the MCA’s political position to counter the political dominance of the UMNO within the coalition government. It is generally recognised that the emergence of Malay political dominance in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial 60
Ibid., 277–82.
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riots further compounded the development of Chinese education in Malaysia. In fact, this Malay political dominance reached new heights during the long tenure of Mahathir Mohamed as the Prime Minister of Malaysia (1981–2003) to the extent that the Chinese educationists, together with other Chinese associations, were forced to launch a civil rights movement to seek a fair and equitable development of Chinese education beginning in the 1980s through the formation of a two-party system within the Malaysian political landscape as a means to counter the political dominance of the UMNO.61 The civil rights movement eventually culminated in the emergence of a multi-ethnic oppositional front in the 2008 General Election capable of challenging the political dominance of the UMNO.62 In some ways, the development of Chinese education had benefited from this new political development, especially in terms of financial assistance for physical development, though the struggle for a more rigorous development of Chinese education was far from over as the oppositional front was unable to form a new federal government that could come up with an educational policy favourable to the development of Chinese education. As far as the Malaysian Chinese political landscape was concerned, the emergence of this oppositional front was at the expense of the MCA with the DAP becoming the preferred choice of the Chinese electorate. In fact, following the termination of the political collaboration with the Chinese educationists in 1975, the MCA remained committed to the elite accommodation model. But the MCA’s role within this model was largely circumscribed by the political dominance of the UMNO. Meanwhile, the MCA continued to show a lack of internal cohesion to revitalise its political fortune to win over the support of the Chinese electorate, just like the case of the aborted reformist movement, though it managed to perform well in some elections due to the country’s favourable macro-economic development and not because of its assertive stand in addressing the many issues faced by the Chinese in the country, including issues relating to the development of Chinese education. In the final analysis, the development of Chinese education in Malaysia is always a hotly contested area as illustrated by the political collaboration between the MCA and the Chinese educationists. Given that educational rights of the Chinese in Malaysia are increasingly being tied to civil rights instead of ethnic rights, the continued reliance of the MCA on the elite accommodation model will not bring about a lasting solution to spur the development of Chinese education in Malaysia. Notes on contributors Yao Sua Tan is a senior lecturer and research fellow at the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. His main research interests include educational history and development, educational policy analysis, minority education, bilingual education, sociology of education and Malaysian Chinese studies. He has published a number of papers in these areas. Hooi See Teoh is a lecturer in the Department of Chinese Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Her main research interests are in the areas of Malaysian Chinese studies and Asian Literature. 61 See Kua Kia Soong, The Malaysian Civil Rights Movement (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information Research Development, 2005). 62 See, for example, Ooi Kee Beng, Johan Saravanamuttu and Lee Hock Guan, March 8: Eclipsing May 13 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Kee Tuan Chye, March 8: The Day Malaysia Woke Up (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2008).