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REPUBLIC v. SALUDARES 327 SCRA 449, November 10, 2010
t 2012 (494) December (61)
FACTS:
November (47)
The PCGG issued a writ of sequestration against the Lianga Bay Logging Company, which was later lifted by the Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.
t October (113) ganzon caboverde ocamia
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against the company with prayer for preliminary attachment where PCGG was not impleaded as defendant nor was the sequestration made known to the RTC.
please submit)
The Court granted the preliminary attachment, and because of failure of company to answer complaint, it also declared the company in default and ruled in favor of private respondent.
mira FINALS digest
chua martinez
the final exam
Petitioner argues that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the sequestered assets are under custodia legis of the PCGG.
morandarte kristy lou lim bucayon marither lee
ISSUE:
arevalo
Whether if the RTC has the jurisdiction over the sequestration case and if whether the attachment is void?
SHERYL KRISTENE R. GARCIA
HELD:
MA. LOUMENA A. CANDELA RIA
The SC ruled that the order of default of the RTC is affirmed but should be held in abeyance until the sequestration case is determined. However, the order of attachment was declared null and void. The Court said that the disputed properties of the company were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG when the judge issued the writ of attachment. Since the writ of sequestration was already subsisting, it could not be interfered with by the RTC because the PCGG is a coordinate and equal body.
saldariega ocamia 2012 bar questions in political law harayo estoque
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002]
russel saracho russel saracho juvy ageas del cas ernst salaveria
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince
RAFFY RUIZ BULADO gumalal digest socorro lim digest dagumo dagpin PALOMA CASE DIGESTFINALS Jan Benoni MacarulayDigested Cases for Finals ...
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
HELD: No. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r, t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w a s t o t h e p o i n t o f re c k o n i n g f o r t h e determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
IVEN B. PACATAN G – Digested Cases for Finals AZNAR ... whether? or whether or not? ayuban digest thru kristine garcia Joseph Erick Q. Cimafranca bagarinao's corner napigquit's digest
CASTILLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 109271 (March 14, 2000)
gikan ni karen, ang paboritong apo ni lolo sa joll...
FACTS:
NHC V. NLRC (1985)
On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against petitioners with the Tanodbayan.
jacinto v. secretary of education (1997)
On Oct. 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a case for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation. The Ombudsman filed an information against petitioners on November 5, 1990 without first resolving the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed for unjustified delay in the filing of the information.
ISSUE: Whether if there is a violation against the constitutional right of the petitioner on speedy trial?
HELD: There was no violation of right to speedy trial. The delay was not capricious nor oppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initial stages of the case.
SECRETARY of JUSTICE v. MARC JIMENEZ, 322 SCRA (January 18,
2000)
gsis v. garcia (2006) alliance of government workers v. minister of labo... CENTRAL BANK V. EXECUTIV E SECRETA RY (2004) SACDALAN V. REPUBLIC (2008) SSEA V. COURT OF APPEALS (1989) Haifah M. Sapihi Case Digests for Finals ryan hernandez case digest Aristotle Ong Case Digest Finals
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the afore stated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
HMCasocot Case DigestFINALS LIONG CASE DIGEST FOR FINALS adrian sazon digest OLANDA V. BUGAYON G (2003) CAOIBES V. OMBUDSM AN (2001) MACEDA V. OMBUDSM AN (1993) HIMAGAN V. PEOPLE (1994)
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the government’s ironclad
duties under a treaty.
segovia v. sandiganba yan (1998) castillo-co v. barbers (1998) preventive suspensio...
HELD: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
LLAMAS V. ORBOS (1991) DIGESTED CASES FOR FINALS PORTUGU EZ, ZYLDJYH P. hernandez digest saldariega digest
CITY OF MANILA v. LAGUIO [G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005]
mira barroso v. ampig (2000)
FACTS: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. March 30, 1993 – City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services, and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. June 28, 1993 – MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitute a denial of equal protection under the law. Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
defensorsantiago v. ramos (1996) mendoza v. comelec (2009) de castro v.comelec (1997) cases for "digestion" for the final examinatio n lacson v. andiganbay an (1999) serapio v. sandiganba yan (2003) cojuangco v. pcgg(1996)
ISSUES:
republic v. africa (2011)
1. Whether or not the City of Manila validly exercised police power. 2. Whether or not there was a denial of equal protection under the law.
garcia v. sandiganba yan (2005)
HELD:
binay v. sandiganba yan (1999)
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
reoublic v. sandiganba yan (2011)
The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTALMINING COOP., et al.[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002]
dante yap go v. republic (1982) bayot v. bayot (2008) frivaldo v. comelec (1989) cuaki tan si v. republic (2009) parreño v. coa (2007) reyes v. deportation board (1983) alterejos v. comelec (2004)
FACTS: O n M a rc h 1 0 , 1 9 8 8 , M a rc o p p e r M i n i n g Co rp o ra t i o n (M a rc o p p e r) wa s g ra n t e d E x p l o ra t i o n P e rm i t No . 1 3 3 (E P No . 1 3 3 ) o v e r 4 , 4 9 1 h e c t a re s o f l a n d , wh i c h i n c l u d e d t h e Diwalwal area. On J une 27, 2991, Congres s enac ted Republic Ac t No. 7076, or the People's SmallS c al e M i ni ng A c t . T he l aw es t abl i s hed a P eopl e's S m al l S c a l e M i n i n g P r o g r a m t o b e implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control. S u b s e q u e n t l y , a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f E P No . 1 3 3 a n d t h e a d m i s s i o n o f a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeas t Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), whic h in t urn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geos c ienc es Bureau Regional Offic e No. XI in Dav ao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed. On Marc h 3, 1995, Republic Ac t No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Ac t, was enac t ed. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tas k ed to res olv e dis putes inv olv ing c onflic ting mining rights . The RPA s ubs equently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases. On J une 24, 1997, the DENR Sec retary is s ued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 whic h p ro v i d e d t h a t t h e DE NR s h a l l s t u d y t h o ro u g h l y a n d e x h a u s t i v e l y t h e o p t i o n o f d i re t s t a t e utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. On J uly 16, 1997, petitioner filed a s pec ial c iv il ac tion for c ertiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effec tiv ely impair its v es ted rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.
lo beng ha v. republic (1968) yu v. santiago (1989) epifanio muneses (2012) lopez v. comelec (2008) luchayco v. republic (1969) labo v. comelec (1992) lewis v. comelec (2006) republic v. sayo (1990) aznar v. comelec (1990) angat v. republic (1999) moy ya lim yao v. commission er of immigration (197... vilando v. electoral tribunal (2011) cordora v. comelec (2009) GRANTING PHILIPPIN E CITIZENSH IP TO CHRISTINE MARIE...
ISSUE:
immigration v. de la rosa (1991)
Whether or not the "direc t s tate utiliz ation s c heme" es pous ed in MO 9703 div es ted petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.
Valles v. comelec (2000) AASJS V. DATUMAN ONG (2007)
HELD: No. M O 9 7 -0 3 d i d n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y a d o p t " d i re c t s t a t e u t i l i z a t i o n " a s a p o l i c y i n res olv ing the Diwalwal dis pute. The terms of the memorandum c learly indic ate that what was directed hereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profitsharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party , for that matter, but s imply ins truc ted the DENR offic ials c onc erned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the is s ues rais ed in s aid c as es , with res pondents therein as s erting that M arc opper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner ac tually has a v es ted right ov er Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is s till an indefinite and uns ettled matter. And until a pos itiv e pronounc ement is made by the appellate c ourt in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely ev idenc es a priv ilege granted by the State, whic h may be amended, modified or res c inded when the national interes t s o requires . This is nec es s arily s o s inc e the ex ploratio n , development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due proc es s c laus es of the Cons titution, s inc e the State, under its allenc ompas s ing polic e power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e re c a n b e n o v a l i d o p p o s i t i o n ra i s e d a g a i n s t a m e re s t u d y o f a n alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the ex ploration, dev elopment and utiliz ation of the c ountry 's natural mineral res ourc es , by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Sec retary ac ted within his authority when he ordered a s tudy of the firs t option, whic h may be undertak en c ons is tently in ac c ordanc e with the c ons titutional polic y enunc iated abov e. Obv ious ly , the State may not be prec luded from c ons idering a direc t tak eov er of the mines , if it is the only plaus ible remedy in s ight to the gnawing c omplex ities generated by the gold rus h.
MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SUSANA M. CABALLES [G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2009] THE FACTS: Respondent Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were candidates for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the October 29, 2007 barangay elections. Having garnered four hundred and fifty-six (456) votes as against the four hundred and forty-eight (448) votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was declared as the punongbarangay-elect. Dissatisfied with the result, Caballes instituted an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sariaya, Quezon. On June 3, 2008, the MTC rendered a decision declaring protestant Caballes as punong barangay-elect, having garnered four hundred fifty-six (456) votes, or five (5) votes more than the four hundred fifty-one (451) votes of Nollen. Unable, as to be expected, to admit defeat, Nollen filed on June 5, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid the MTC the appeal fee of PhP 1,000. Following the elevation of the MTC’s records to the COMELEC, the First Division of the COMELEC, by Order of September 22, 2008 in EAC BRGY 360-2008, dismissed Nollen’s appeal for his failure to pay the appeal fee of PhP 3,000 prescribed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the reglementary period of five (5) days. From the above order, Nollen moved for reconsideration, praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules, but stating in the same breath that his PhP 1,000 appeal fee payment was sufficient to perfect his appeal. To still require him to pay the additional amount of PhP 3,000 as appeal fee and a bailiff fee of PhP 200 on top of what he already paid the MTC, would amount, so he claimed, to a denial of his right to due process. On October 6, 2008, Nollen, despite his earlier avowal to pay his deficiency only if the COMELEC En Banc would reconsider the dismissal order of the First Division, paid the poll body’s Cash Division the amount of PhP 3,200. By Resolution dated April 2, 2009, the COMELEC En Banc denied Nollen’s motion for reconsideration on the rationalization that, while he timely filed his notice of appeal and simultaneously paid the PhP 1,000 appeal fee with the MTC on June 5, 2008, the appeal would be deemed duly registered and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to the COMELEC. By its ruling, the COMELEC En Banc evidently had in mind Zamoras v. COMELEC, among other cases. And citing jurisprudence, the COMELEC held that the error in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC––in first dismissing Nollen’s appeal from the MTC and then denying his motion for reconsideration––acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction.
HELD: The Supreme Court decided the case in favor to the petitioner and therefore granted the petition for centiorari. The court had taken judicial notice on the Resolution No. 8654 on its following guidelines: 1. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the PhP 1,000-appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. 2. If the appellant filed his appeal before the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice from the Commission, in accordance with Resolution No. 8486. If the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then shall the appeal be dismissed. The Order of the COMELEC First Division dated September 22, 2008 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated April 2, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC for its review of the assailed June 3, 2008 MTC decision.
MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] FACTS: P et it ioner Rox as was t he Chairman, while Nac pil was a Member, of t he B ids a n d Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of NikkoHino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicatedon the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Cons equent ly , t he DI LG S ec ret ary f iled a c omplaint wit h t he Ombuds man agains t t he respondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor r e c o m m e n d e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t R o x a s , N a c pil, Codoy , K airan andRam irez . Form al c harges were f iled wit h t he S a n d i g a n b a y a n a g a i n s t N a z a r e n o , F l o r e s , Tanc hanc o, Cus t odio, Os ia, E s peña and S ant os . P et it ioners were not inc luded in t he c riminal information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turn about as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process.
HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001] FACTS OF THE CASE: On Augus t 28, 1990, PCGG s ent Corporate Sec retary Vic tor A. Afric a of Oc eani c Wireless Network, Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him to send notices to all s toc k holders of rec ord of OWNI for s pec ial s toc k holders ' meeting. On September 17, 1990,during the s pec ial s toc k holders ' meeting of OWNI, PCGG v oted all the Clas s "A" s hares in the election of directors and elected to the board of directors Commissioners Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing the Class "A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class "B" and "C" shares. None of the registered Class "A" shareholders of OWNI was present in that, specials t o c k h o l d e r s m e e t i n g . P C G G s e q u e s t e r e d t h e C l a s s " A " s h a r e h o l d i n g a b o u t 6 0 % o f t h e outstanding capital stock, and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares. On October 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa wrote the SEC questioning the electiono f P C G G n o m i n e e s a s d i r e c t o r s o f t h e O W N I b o a r d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t stockholders of OWNI. On J anuary 27, 1991, t he s pec ial s t oc k holders ' m eet ing of OWNI t oo k p l a c e . Stoc k holders owning 63,573 Clas s "A" s hares were repres ented. An elec tion of direc tors for Class "A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa and A. Africa were elected as directors for Class" A " s h a r e s f o r 1 9 9 1 u n t i l t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s a r e e l e c t e d a n d q u a l i f i e d . C l a s s " B " a n d " C " shareholders did not attend the meeting. No new directors for them were elected. On J uly 29, 1991, P CGG, ac t ing f or it s elf and in behalf of OWNI , f il e d w i t h t h e Sandiganbayan a complaint for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa, Nieto, Jr. and Ocampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with PCGG's management of OWNI and/or representing themselves as director.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG's takeover of OWNI is legal.
HELD: NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr ., the Court ruled that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares and consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The issue was still pending in the main case in the Sandiganbayan. This is only an inc ident of the main c as e and is limited to the s toc k holders ' meeting held on September 17, 1990. This is without prejudice to the final disposition of the merits of the main suit. The ownership of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known whether the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." We find the writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid because the suit in Civil Cas e No. 0009 agains t Nieto, J r. and J . Afric a as s hareholders in OWNI is not a s uit agains t OWNI. This Court has held that "failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing. Furthermore, PCGG issued the writs of sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26, of the 1987 Constitution provides. Sec. 26.The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratific ation of this Cons titution. Howev er, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period. A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, t h e corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided. The sequestration orders issued against respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to the failure of PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the respondents therein within the period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution. The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since the lifting of the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property are not illgotten. The effect of the lifting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be the termination of the role of the government as conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no longer exercise administrative or housekeeping powers and its nominees may no longer vote the sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of the subject firm.
MACALINO
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. 140199-200, February 6,
2002] FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Felicito S. Macalino was the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippines National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation. On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against the petitioner and his spouse Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. During the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlled corporation with the original character. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
HELD: No. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original character as it was incorporated under the general law on corporation, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The cases cited by respondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable because they were decided under the provision of the 1973 Constitution which included as public officers, officials, and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the government through organized and existing under the general corporation law. The 1987 Constitution excluded such corporations. The crime charged against petitioner was committed in 1989 and 1990. The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled that “the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the institution of the action.
Posted by rsb at 3:11 AM
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mercado v. manzano (1991) September (134) August (41) July (90) June (8)