688128 research-article2016
PUS0010.1177/0963662516688128Public Understanding of ScienceGunnarsdóttir and Rommetveit
P U S
Theoretical/research paper
The biometric imaginary: (Dis)trust in a policy vacuum
Public Understanding of Science 2017, Vol. 26(2) 195–211 © The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516688128 DOI: 10.1177/0963662516688128 journals.sagepub.com/home/pus
Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir
University of Surrey, UK; Lancaster University, UK
Kjetil Rommetveit University of Bergen, Norway
Abstract The decision in Europe to implement biometric passports, visas and residence permits was made at the highest levels without much consultation, checks and balances. Council regulation came into force relatively unnoticed in January 2005, as part of wider securitization policies urging systems interoperability and data sharing across borders. This article examines the biometric imaginary that characterizes this European Union decision, dictated by executive powers in the policy vacuum after 9/11 – a depiction of mobility governance, technological necessity and whom/what to trust or distrust, calling upon phantom publics to justify decisions rather than test their grounding. We consult an online blog we operated in 2010 to unravel this imaginary years on. Drawing on Dewey’s problem of the public, we discuss this temporary opening of a public space in which the imaginary could be reframed and contested, and how such activities may shape, if at all, relations between politics, publics, policy intervention and societal development.
Keywords biometrics, European Union, expertise, imaginary, politics, public participation, security
1. The dawn of an old era The attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 is commonly considered to mark the dawn of an era, characterized by suspicion of travellers’ intentions and the safety of identity documents (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Mobilities became a serious risk to public safety and a cause for distrust that inspired greater availability of data on persons, property and cargo across borders. It inspired the incorporation of digitized body characteristics into existing tokens of trust: passports, visas and residence permits (Council of the European Union, 2004). This article draws on a 3-year-long study, examining the implementation in Europe of what we call the biometric imaginary.1 It emerged as part of a wider securitization agenda in the early Corresponding author: Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir, Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK. Email:
[email protected]
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2000s, propelled by political leaders and the biometric industry (Lodge, 2007). It emerged alongside what Amoore (2013) calls politics of possibility, an exercise in executive authority to prevent the imagined possible from happening. In this imaginary, technical artefacts and systems are necessary. Credence is given to biometric capture, information processing, interoperability and sharing, and the organizational capabilities of governing institutions and relevant industries. The imaginary projects and mobilizes notions of distrusted and dangerous individuals, yet the politics infused in these depictions and their effect upon social relations are poorly articulated. The implementation has centred primarily on the use of biometry to secure the links between documents and their holders, a European legislation that came into force without much public notice nor adequate consultation with relevant expertise. We discuss in this article a forum we managed online during the autumn 2010 for people to express their understandings, views and concerns about biometrics. We take examples that help us unpick the biometric imaginary of whom/what to (dis)trust and why. We build our case in part on discussions in a 2014 special issue of this journal 23(1), in which the authors draw attention ‘to the disjunctures, erroneous assumptions and tensions in the very definition of “public engagement with science”’ (Irwin, 2014: 74). Stilgoe et al. (2014) point out that the field has been too preoccupied with the right or wrong kinds of engagements, risking the literature becoming a ‘litany of engagement case studies and evaluations’ (p. 6). We should be stepping back to view the wider political contexts. Nowotny (2014) addresses the collective political imaginary (from Ezrahi, 2012) to underscore the far-reaching repercussions of powerful, political, causal and performative fictions that shape individual and collective thinking in the public sphere. We share the authors’ concern that the political control of public engagements, shifting modes of governance and ongoing transformations of political institutions have been marginal in the literature, while public participation is reduced to questions of how ‘qualified’ publics are according to experts (Wynne, 2014, 2008) or how instrumental engagements are to meet policy and political ends (Horst, 2014). The conditions that stepped up securitization in the early 2000s shaped an environment in Europe in which public debates were not an option. The use of biometry was initially decided in the highest circles of authority with input from experts in biometry, transport and mobility control on both sides of the Atlantic. The US-VISIT programme began requiring facial scans and fingerprints of all visitors to check against databases and watch lists (Zureik and Hindle, 2004).2 The same applies to visa applications and residence permits for European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also required biometric passports of member states of the Visa-Waiver programme. The 2002 Berlin Resolution of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (2006) chose facial recognition as the global biometric standard; however, European regulation on security features in documents added optional fingerprinting (European Council, 2004).3 These twin biometrics are most common in passports issued by EEA and Schengen countries, with the United Kingdom and Ireland (outside Schengen) using only facial biometrics. How securitization has unfolded over a much longer period is well documented (Aus, 2006; Lodge, 2015; Rommetveit, 2017). Our concern centres specifically on the policy vacuum, in which legislation was prepared and put into force on biometric documents. Properly consulting public reasoning and the relevant technical and organizational expertise was lacking in the decisionmaking process. Experts who could be considered very relevant effectively became irrelevant publics. Political urgency and the public good were articulated by executive powers who were taking advantage of a vacuum to dictate new policy outside the established institutional process among European Union (EU)/EEA countries. We participated ourselves in high-level workshops and consultations (2009–2011).4 We attended FP7-funded events on the wider securitization agenda: the ethical, legal and societal implications of biometry amidst developments in information technology (IT) systems for investigative purposes in policing, border protection and terrorism prevention. We
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attended meetings on governance issues and state of affairs in the security and travel industries. During this time, we were privy to candid assertions by industry spokespersons, computer scientists, EU member states officials, members of the Commission and EU Parliament, and officials from European and US security and border agencies. We were witnessing reactions to a politics of an old era, one of paternalism and dictation as opposed to democratic openness and inclusion. The task of strengthening freedom, security and justice in Europe, as outlined in the 2004 Hague Programme, became one of strengthening security by force in the name of the other two objectives (Bigo, 2006). One could argue that biometric travel documents are a reasonable development in a long history of technologizing identity, but the policy decision demonstrates nevertheless the exceptionalism that characterizes much of securitization in the early 2000s: secrecy and executive show of force, while opening the doors to unchecked mass surveillance (Lodge, 2007, 2012; Snowden cf. Lyon, 2015; Poitras, 2014). So far, publics in Europe and the United States have not had a meaningful way of challenging authorities in these matters, although the Snowden revelations have opened up some form of dialogue. They have spurred both public and political concerns over the handling by government agencies and private enterprise of all sorts of data on persons, marking what we call a Deweyan moment for publics and democracy insofar, as they engage the exploratory resources of publics and democratic protocol (Dewey, 1954 [1927]).5 A more inclusive process may not have changed the EU legislation on passports, visas and residence permits or the policies supporting widespread proliferation of IT systems for investigative purposes. There is no guarantee that public engagements of any type significantly impact decisions. The biometric imaginary was the locus of intervention as a political imaginary. It was not explored and contested to engage different frames of reference in assessing the societal (and technical) problems, building legitimacy around alternatives and enabling them for action (Nowotny, 2014). But, in opening up this politicized imaginary online in 2010, a Dewey-type exploration was facilitated to attract the imagination and raise concerns, irrespective of the assumptions and framing of problems used by authorities and experts. As Horst (2014) puts it, such exercises are not in vain even if they do not deliver recommendations or solve certain problems. They are events in their own right, a process, a dialogue, enacting and advancing checks and balances. In the following sections, we first discuss in more detail the biometric imaginary in relation to the wider securitization agenda. There is no evidence in the English-speaking news media of public debates about the European legislation coming into force, although, as Martin and Donovan (2015) point out, implementing such documents involves people by necessity. Consulting LexisNexis,6 we find opinion pieces from the biometric industry in the early weeks and months after 9/11, suggesting that biometric IDs would have prevented the attacks. The UK media reports extensively on debates surrounding the government’s position that compulsory biometric ID cards will help fight terrorism (see also London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2005). Occasional news items on issuing biometric passports in time before deadline are obscured from view. Business wires were appealing to private and public sectors to re-evaluate authentication protocols and, on biometrics and security more generally in mainstream news 2001–2005, the reporting centres on enemies and looming threats, war on terror, more security and an Iraq invasion to protect the public. It brings to mind Walter Lippmann’s (1993 [1927]) notion of phantom publics who are called upon for legitimacy and direction, not to consult with. Thereafter, we discuss the set-up and operation of the online forum. Drawing on dominant reporting in news media, we created a provocative short film that plays on the dramatics of the biometric imaginary to trigger response from participants. We extended invitations to various occupations, interest groups and experts,7 however, participation was effectively open to all with
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the option of anonymity.8 As we explain in more detail, our approach to convening the forum draws on Dewey’s work on publics and speaks to the topical focus of this special issue, that is, in framing the engagement as a work of the imagination and an event of trial and error. The data sections that follow show and discuss a few contributions that respond directly to the film. We analyse expressions of both certainty and doubt about biometry, about imagined us and others, the role and duty of governments, trust in technology and so on, all of which serves our efforts to unravel the biometric imaginary. Our analytic guides are the assumptions that help participants formulate their perceptions of uncertainty, risk, danger and control. Their contributions vary significantly, as they begin to challenge the referents of (dis)trust and confront the politics of securitization. In the concluding section, we summarize our findings in relation to critiques of public engagements and discuss expectations of ongoing relations between publics, politics, intervention and societal development.
2. Shaping the imaginary, shaping publics Expertise is paramount in shaping the rationalization of progress and societal development (Weber, 1947). Its role among other forms of observation, experience and public opinion, remains contentious, however, in democratic participation and political action (Habermas, 1992 [1962]). Who the relevant stakeholders are and which societal problems need consultation and debate is constituted in claims to authority, expertise and experience. It is constituted in the framing of issues and how to address them, and the ways in which experts, like publics, are imagined, ignored, observed, enacted and kept at bay by leaders and decision makers (Welsh and Wynne, 2013; Wynne, 2008, 2014). The policy vacuum we observe is characterized by Europe becoming a playing field for executive decisions that either bypassed or fast-tracked decision-making protocol within member states. Decisions were made by a trusted guardianship of a select few (Dahl, 1985; Liberatore, 2007), largely in the absence of relevant expertise and consultation. The 2004 draft Biometric Passport Regulation confirms the urgency and the counter-terrorism role of the mandate (Aus, 2006; European Council, 2004). Under these exceptional circumstances of imminent threat, new requirements imposed by international institutions needed sorting out, and new policy was dictated accordingly at the expense of well-established mechanisms across Europe of providing checks and balances (also Hosein, 2004, on policy laundering).9 Calls to action by US authorities were persistent and influential. In 2005, the US secretary of Homeland Security spoke in Brussels on a worldwide restructuring of security standards for passengers and cargo, describing a world, … banded together by security envelopes, […] through which people and cargo can move rapidly, efficiently, and safely without sacrificing security or privacy. […], with the proper security vetting, the proper technology, the proper travel documents, and the proper tracking of cargo, it would be possible to move relatively freely from point to point all across the globe. For those within the security envelope, we will have a high degree of confidence and trust, […] (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005)
The secretary was speaking to US–EU cooperation on a trusted traveller scheme and intelligence sharing, with only those outside the security envelopes requiring ‘in-depth analysis and the kind of in-depth vetting that is necessary to make sure those who seek to harm us do not slip through the cracks’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005).
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Not only is this simple trusted/distrusted binary deeply problematic in our view, the narrow confines of expert involvement were felt in the implementation of biometric documents and associated IT systems. The EU Parliament’s rapporteur for the 2004 regulation remarked that ‘the European Council made a political decision to introduce biometric identifiers in EU passports without any input from practitioners and without knowing the magnitude of the [threat] problem …’ (European Parliament, 2004: 6). Later, in March 2010, complaints were heard at a high-level workshop in Brussels,10 that biometry had been imposed on the security industry because Brussels wanted it, leaving the industry and border protection with serious implementation problems down the line (see also Goldstein et al., 2008).11 Considering the shortcoming of expert involvement here, the absence of publics is complete, except for the (dis)trusted subjects of biometric capture in the biometric imaginary. Arguably, publics have yet to transition to clear and effective roles in a more inclusive mode of decision making. Voices are ignored or missed, especially those debating societal change or asking who is really in charge (Levidow, 2007). According to Lippmann (1993 [1927]), authorities in highly specialized societies can lean on phantom publics as an idea or a possibility, for example, use presumed public opinion to legitimize decisions, not test their grounding. This possibility, in Lippmann’s view, is the best it gets while in Dewey’s (1954 [1927]) analysis that becomes the problem of the public. According to Dewey, publics need to mobilize to overcome prevailing imaginaries of ‘public good’ promoted on their behalf by authorities and experts. Such goods are inadequate if the assumptions on which they rest cannot be influenced by publics themselves. In deciding on biometric documents in Europe, it was never on the agenda to engage publics. The combined ID card/passport scheme in the United Kingdom was publicly debated but the attention it received periodically until it was finally abandoned obscured from view the EU legislation coming into force. So-called counter-publics, for example, Statewatch and Privacy International did not spark a European public into being, nor were there any notable issue-publics, as Marres (2007) puts it, challenging the legislation. Biometry is now well established in the security and transport industries.12 European airports increasingly have automated gates with biometric readers (Frontex, 2010). Travellers can observe the display (Figure 1) and its mandatory role in advancing the wider securitization agenda (also
Figure 1. To enhance passengers’ experience on arrival in airports while also strengthening border security: automated gates piloted in Dublin airport, 2013.
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cameras and other tangible controls). But, as Magnet (2011) argues, the success ‘… is defined primarily in terms of whether the technology appears to be keeping us safer rather than by marked or measurable improvements in our security’ (p. 18 (emphasis added)).13 These displays convey traditions in separating friend from foe and sending a message about the obligations of states to protect citizens (Foucault, 1995 [1975]). There is no opt-out, whether or not biometry works or helps to identify enemies.
Shaping the forum Much has been written on deliberation exercises and their role in debate and decision making (e.g. Davidson et al., 2011; Horst and Irwin, 2010; Irwin, 2006): focus groups, consensus conferences, science cafés, deliberative polls, surveys, citizen juries and so on. Online communications technologies are also of considerable interest to facilitate political participation and deliberation (e.g. Chadwick, 2011; Coleman and Moss, 2012; Dunne, 2010; Freelon, 2010). Elsewhere, we have reported in detail on our forum: on the affordances and limitations of social media for political/policy impact and the basis of our analysis in discourse studies (Gunnarsdóttir et al., 2011a, 2011b). The communications among our participants far exceed the initial responses to the film, and we underscore how the contributions are instances of discourse as action. We observe how participants position themselves in their encounters with the biometric imaginary and relating to imagined us and others, paying particular attention to the relevancy constraints of uncertainty, risk, danger and control, which are key notions in the dominant imaginary. We observe participants’ efforts at creative meaning making and world making in and through their argumentative and rhetorical strategies. We acknowledge that online venues are no more effective than other forms of engagement, say, in reversing political disengagement (Dunne, 2010). However, they often accumulate considerable amount of information from active participants by crowd-sourcing concerns, opinions and so on. Indeed, our aim was to operate an open blog and build a repository of perceptions and views over a 3-month period. We kick-started it by asking newcomers to first view the short film that dramatized the politicized imagined possible. This was effective in provoking and engaging the imagination (we recommend a viewing).14 Three broad discussion topics were suggested (Figure 2) based on a prior mapping of the policy and academic literature.15 A moderator kept track of contributions, intervened at times to refocus on the discussion topics and encourage further exchange on associated matters. Participation was somewhat coincidental however. Participants were recruited at a major European industry fair ICT2010 (offline) and in forums (online) dedicated to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), citizen rights and security. Backgrounds varied considerably, with some choosing to remain anonymous.16 Yet, by trawling the blogosphere during the same time period, we observed very similar issues, concerns and opinions to those garnered by the activity of our 45 registered contributors. Public engagements are unavoidably incomplete and so is the cultivation of credible conditions. Who is included and what participants can/cannot contribute is always partial. Our concern here is not with representative sampling nor the extent to which publics of one or other description can understand expert knowledge and communication, according to the experts. Rather, we are interested in the problem of framing (Wynne, 2003), that is, to explore disparities in the framing of concerns and issues, and the potential therein to reframe the problem domain. Hence, our efforts can be characterized as a Deweyan exploration, albeit, of decisions made in a political climate that relied on ‘Lippmannian’ notions of publics and democracy.
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Figure 2. The home page of the Technolife Biometrics debate.
3. Displays of (dis)trust Trust is the key referent in shaping the biometric imaginary and the wider securitization agenda. It refers to authority, institutions and technological intervention. It sorts individuals by juxtaposing the trusted and distrusted, presuming that technological intervention can separate the two (Lyon, 2009). As experience shows, however, simple constructs of us and them, friend and foe, whom/ what to (dis)trust, are notoriously hard to verify. Nevertheless, displays of (dis)trust demonstrate decisiveness in dealing with widely advertised threats, a phenomenon in keeping with Foucauldian reasoning on biopolitics and governmentality (Epstein, 2007). The tokens of (dis)trust are the passports, visas, residence permits, security gates, body scanners, smart cameras and so on, but none of these are foolproof. The inclusion of biometrics in large-scale passport registries, visa enrolment and other record keeping is greatly diverse in dependability (Kevenaar et al., 2010). Technical vulnerabilities and procedural problems have repeatedly raised alarm (Reid, 2006),17 and doubts conveyed about biometric capture and identification for investigative and preventative purposes (Hornung et al., 2010). The legal ramifications of advanced security and surveillance technologies were greatly underestimated early on (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2006), and the balance metaphor (freedom vs security) is a poor guide to address concerns over ill-defined threats used to encourage people to accept
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restrictions of their civil liberties. Pavone and Esposti (2010) discovered that public perception divides between those who see their liberties infringed while their security is not enhanced and those who see enhanced security without infringement on their liberties. But the definitional looseness of both threat and security plays into the hands of experts and political elites in sustaining over the years a risk and security-framed discourse (Bigo, 2006).
Going along with it Participants in our forum trust and distrust not only individuals but also authorities, organizations, technologies or anything else that relates to their own assumptions and expectations. Orienting to matters of (dis)trust is variably based on some knowledge, experience, provocation, propaganda and so on, hence, they begin to bring new possibilities to the biometric imaginary and securitization more generally. Exploring how participants position themselves, we soon notice how their understanding of the film is marked by the relevancy constraints of uncertainty, risk, danger and control, to which concerns about people, society and surveillance, biometrics and governance align. We give a few examples of how this happens, starting with claims that orient to the distrust of persons and trust in authorities and biometric necessity. Fragment 1 1 Anne 2 […] it is my point of view that the use of this kind of technology is bound to 3 occur. It will be implemented widely […] and I believe the intentions are good. 4 […] it is my belief that it will do us no harm, rather than make the society as 5 a whole more secure and more transparent. I think this is a new technology for 6 the future that the authorities will use wisely […] 7 8 Brian 9 […] extremely strong constraints need to exist to prevent one individual from 10 causing massive causualties. […] In my opinion, it is a crime against the 11 citizens of a country that it’s government doesn’t know exactly who is in the 12 country at any given minute […] Biometric data, cameras, and monitoring of 13 communications is but a few of the very necessary steps the government must take 14 to assure the continued safety and well being of it’s citizens.
Anne and Brian go along with the narration in the film on biometric necessity. ‘[T]he use of (lines 2–3). ‘Biometric data, cameras, and monitoring of communications […] very necessary steps the government must take’ (lines 12–13). Anne believes this ‘will do us no harm’ (line 4), but secure our society and make it more transparent. Brian is concerned that ‘extremely strong constraints need to exist to prevent one individual from causing massive casualties’ (lines 9–10). In his opinion, ‘it is a crime against the citizens’ if ‘government doesn’t know exactly who is in the country’ (lines 10–12), which again justifies the use of cameras, monitoring systems and biometrics. These two responses align with the imaginary of ‘us’ as opposed to those ‘others’ who are taken for granted as distrusted. This line of reasoning appears to put meaning making to rest since the film confirms that IT and biometrics must be implemented for reasons Anne and Brian explain, using affirmatives such as my point of view, my opinion, I believe, the extreme formulations, bound to occur and the government must. Contributions by others who later return to the subject of dangerous individuals, mention criminality, 5% psychopathy and so on, all of which ‘we’ need to defend against; hence, the profiles, whereabouts and movements of individuals ought to be known to authorities. Authorities are trusted in the pursuit of greater security, in which biometrics are a ‘technology for the future that the authorities will use wisely’ (lines 5–6). this kind of technology is bound to occur’
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Rather than questioning these built-in assumptions in the narration of the film, Anne and Brian perform them in reference to (1) uncertainties about who ‘others’ really are and what they do; (2) risks associated with mobility; (3) dangers posed by those who can harm us and (4) control, using biometrics, monitoring and personal data collection.
Ifs and buts, and the finer nuances In our Dewey-inspired exploration, participants can take securitization more or less at face value, as Fragment 1 demonstrates. However, meaning making is not that neatly put to rest. In the vast majority of contributions, participants build their own assumptions into new imaginaries and meanings. Their questions and claims manifest disunity in perceptions of biometry, security and governance, for example, contributions that openly discredit information systems in the hands of governments. ‘What would it be like if an authoritarian government could have access to this kind of infor-
Here is an example of a recurring theme in professional debates and popular media that harness a dystopian outlook on the state managing personal data on publics. Biometry renders the body into a machine readable object (Van der Ploeg, 2005), a data double who then is fused with the body in the coding of legal, cultural and moral indicators for consultation on whether that body/person is bona fide and free to move. People who travel are effectively participating in an ongoing trial of this identity processing, which is evidenced, for example, in errors and confusion still at the biometric gates. There are other issues that relate to the experimental character of biometry which openness to enquiry and critique can touch upon. For example, we observe agreement with the good of biometrics, however, articulated with ifs and buts that mitigate certainties and uncertainties about them.
mation? […] we could perhaps not exclude that possibility?’
Fragment 2 1 Emilia 2 It is easier to travel, make document, … But, what with privacy? Is it possible 3 to make some kind of turn off/on switch? If I want to be identified than I will 4 [be] tuned on. In same other cases I will turn off. 5 6 Frank 7 Very interesting systems, the question would be hat if I would be more safety 8 about this or what could happen if somebody else take my identity and us in a 9 bad way?
While biometric systems are interesting and make documentation and travel easier (lines 2 and 7), ‘what with privacy? Is it possible’ for the person to control being ‘tuned on’ and ‘turn[ed] off’ (lines 2–4)? According to Frank, ‘the question would be […] if I would be more safe […] or what could happen if somebody else take[s] my identity’ (lines 7–8), with reference to theft and abuse. Here, an interesting and helpful technology becomes the object of distrust, of high scope of abuse and in need for safety regulations. Emilia asks about ‘some kind of turn off/on switch’ (line 3) for her to control. Frank asks about the abuse of his identity. They both orient to biometry in relation to personal insecurities concerning their privacy and identity safety. In other examples, we observe openness to enquiry, in which participants indicate that they are well informed. This method of expression persuasively grants authority to distrust in biometric systems, governance and regulation, while being trusting of informed articulation and judgement. We observe a wide range of this line of reasoning:
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Fragment 3 1 Heather 2 But I do wonder about our increasing desire for more information and speed, […] 3 I can only guess in the haste to implement this programme no thorough review of 4 EU law was conducted. My point is, I suppose, this stuff often doesn’t work; […] 5 I question how we handle and manage, in this case, information and speed. 6 7 Ian 8 Who decides who can be within this security envelope? What requirements and 9 restrictions are imposed and to what extent? Moreover, if one of the thrusts of 10 the European Union is social cohesion, doesn’t this idea in general exclude 11 rather than include?
Heather raises a doubt, ‘I do wonder’ (line 2) and Ian asks, ‘who decides [… w]hat requirements (lines 8–9). Both follow with observations about the EU. Heather makes explicit that European countries were in a ‘haste to implement this programme [biometric documents]’ and that a ‘thorough review of EU law’ might be missing, ‘I can only guess’ (lines 3–4). Her concern is adequately managing information and speed, while Ian’s concern is ‘social cohesion’ as presumably ‘one of the thrusts of the European Union’ (lines 9–10). He frames this concern in an if clause to question decisions on inclusion (or not) in the security envelope. ‘[D] oesn’t this idea [of security envelope] in general exclude rather than include?’ (lines 10–11). Raising doubt or questions first is effective at opening a line of reasoning, presupposing that a general enquiry is needed. The presupposition is then supported with observations that lead to more specific enquiries, orienting here to EU governance as the object of distrust. Heather wonders about a (general) desire and then asks how it can be managed in relation to observed EU practices. Ian asks (generally) who decides and what the requirements and restrictions are and then asks in direct reference to an EU objective, whether indeed that objective is met. We establish with Fragments 2 and 3, among numerous other examples of mitigation, doubt and questioning, that participants advance the imaginaries dominating the film. Emilia adds her own assumption that personal control is preferable. Frank contributes that instituting new technologies is not safe and can be abused. Heather assumes that the EU may not adequately address the law, and Ian suggests that it does not adequately address one of its own key objectives. These contributions are performed with reference to (1) uncertainties based on the added assumptions (Is this safe? Does it work? Who decides?); (2) the risk of unfair targeting and identity theft; (3) the danger of the law not being adequately reviewed, potential abuses and problems not debated; and (4). control over inclusion/ exclusion, over private information and someone else’s identity. In other words, participants align concerns and uneasiness with their own assumptions. They not only progress the biometric imaginary they also actively draw on their own resources to engage new lines of reasoning and exchange views. and restrictions’
The bigger, right and real questions Engaging publics does not ensure that their views are heard by authorities, let alone taken into account. The biometric imaginary and securitization more generally are predicated on threat and emergency, very publicly centred on terrorism prevention and the trusted/distrusted which are classifications of interpretative flexibility. Public consultation is typically irrelevant to decisions in matters of security and combat. Political protesters, human rights and climate activists are more likely to be seen as part of the threat (Lyon, 2015). Following the Snowden revelations, Beck argued that the freedom risk is now another global risk (Beck, 2013), with human intentionality at the heart of risk scenarios.
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Relations between politics and technological intervention became unusually tight in shaping the biometric imaginary, putting publics in deficit for being themselves the risky objects. If the biometric imaginary was directed at individuals as free agents, it targeted their unknown intentions. Consequently, it poses a challenge if publics at large start shifting the framing of the problem domain, as we see in Fragments 2 and 3, not to mention if they turn the securitization agenda completely on its head. Fragment 4 1 Jay 2 Instead of asking how could new technologies erase borders and lower worldwide 3 inequalities and questioning current (outdated and dieing) socio-economic system, 4 they [the film] babble about terrorists, security threats and other symptoms. […] 5 Full positive utilization of those technologies is impossible until we answer 6 some bigger questions. Like: How can we delegate decision making to machines? 7 (resource management for example) Are we done with perpetual ‘growth’ economy and 8 consumerism? What makes human life good in most practical sense? Can we finally 9 abolish rat race we are constantly pushed in despite industrial automation, 10 technology and abundance? How can we minimize and eventually make politics 11 obsolete? Are we done with full employment spin and long dead economics? Are we 12 done with economy that is unsustainable without continuous wars and militarism?
Here, we observe profound disillusion with the socio-economic and political climate, the brunt of the critique directed at first-world leadership. ‘[T]errorists, security threats and other symptoms’ (line 4) are of unresolved issues: ‘perpetual “growth” economy and consumerism’ (lines 7–8), the question of ‘[w]hat makes human life good’ (line 8), the ‘rat race we are constantly pushed in’ (line 9) and putting up with obsolete politics and an unsustainable economy, calling for ‘continuous wars and militarism’ (line 12). We should be asking instead how to erase borders, inequalities, and a dying socio-economic system, and be clearer on how and why we ‘delegate decision making to machines’ (line 6). Technology use, economy, politics, rat race and so on need in-depth scrutiny or the ‘[f]ull positive utilization of those technologies is impossible’ (line 5). In short, the film babbles rather than asking the right questions. Jay departs sharply from majority reasoning we observe. He orients the reader away from the film, towards imaginaries about decision delegation (machines), practical good (human life), business-as-usual (rat race), obsolescence (politics) perpetual unsustainable consumerism, and employment spin and warfare (economy). The thrust of the critique is that typical questions of uncertainty, risk, danger and control never get at the bigger, right and real questions of what the world needs, what people want, why technology is central in problem solving, what meanings are attached to safety, the good life and so on.
Beyond the relevancy constraints The biometric imaginary was not inevitable, nor the mass surveillance resulting from the wider securitization agenda. Privacy advocates, parliamentarians, academics, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and individual observers emerged over the years against disproportionate measures, secrecy and rights violations (Lodge, 2007; Poitras, 2014). It transpired that the necessary preconditions for implementing seamlessly biometric documents and associated IT systems across European legislatures were hard to achieve. Cooperation has been inadequate across agencies and state lines to fortify Schengen and the outer EEA borders (Council of the European Union, 2008). Yet, law enforcement, border agencies and intelligence services seek to improve their ability to see the flows of individuals, cargo and keepsakes, and all sorts of new checkpoints involving some
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type of biometry have crept into mundane goings-on: public spaces, road traffic, transits, commerce and online activities (Lodge, 2012). Our participants may not be aware of some fact or be well versed in biometry and security as technological problem domains. What we learn from their contributions underscores primarily the importance of issue framing. The contributions acquire legitimacy, authorship and authority in ordinary articulation, in raising doubts, asking questions and substantiating claims about complex issues; however, they engage the imagination amidst a whole host of uncertainties in reference (not corresponding) to the dominant discourse. What still concerns us are the markers of belonging to indicate ownership of the issues. One of the affordances of online forums is anonymity and not clarifying one’s association with groups or causes. The home page asks how ‘biometrics will influence you, in your every day or professional life’ (Figure 2), but exercising the right to speak up, and on behalf of others, can easily give way to selfcensorship (Poitras, 2014). For example, contributors ignore social differentiation, when ‘we’ become anyone and everyone. ‘Maybe the real question is what we want’ or ‘the video and its topic is something we all have to relate to’. They reference control and (dis)trust as if ‘we’ were somebody negotiating the stakes. ‘I do welcome this oppertunity to easily identify people […] we must allow the authorities to identify the people who are here illegaly’. They assume authority as if ‘we’ were representatives of some governing body. ‘[W]e will […] be able to analyse patterns of movement for criminal intent, and automatically more closely scrutinize those individuals’ or ‘[w]e know that the potential for misuse is great’.
One can argue that distancing oneself from imagined others and personal investment in the issues is ordinary speak. It lends a voice of objectivity and authority, shifting the epistemological status of comments and claims in a world where the epistemological status of public understandings remains unclear (Jasanoff, 2003). Paradoxically, the uses of ‘we’ exemplify a distancing where biometry and securitization only concern imagined others.
4. Engagement under construction Critiques of public engagements centre on inadequacies and paradoxes, for example, whether greater participation cultivates idealism about deliberative democracy (Davidson et al., 2011). Consultation may not improve the credibility of decisions (Irwin, 2006), the link between dialogue and trust is weak, and no evidence that controversies are minimized by ‘talking’. Instrumentalizing engagements can also strip them of import, by allowing people to only choose between answers to questions they never chose to ask in the first place. In other words, demands for dialogue, transparency and consultation can always be muted (Callon et al., 2011 [2001]). All this is symptomatic of ongoing relations between publics, politics and intervention. Engagements typically do not enact the imagination. If anything, developments in recent years appear to be leaning towards Lippmann’s phantom publics with little room for improvement if the checks on exceptional circumstances give way to dictation. Our concern here is that engagements fail to engage if they proceed on uncontested presuppositions about who the publics are, the problem domains, the stakeholders, and the key issues of societal import and social justice (Wynne, 2008). They fail if the goal is consensus at the expense of silencing the voices deemed off-limits, and they do not happen at all if publics are the distrusted and the social order is assumed to be under siege rather than open to refiguration.18 The securitization agenda unfolded in the early 2000s by powerful interests asserting themselves (Bauman et al., 2014). As the Snowden revelations later confirm, the policies that filled that vacuum were not agreeable to publics. Serious concerns were raised about politically infused mass surveillance, secrecy and use of force. Such concerns have resonated on both sides of the Atlantic
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(Snowden cf. Poitras, 2014). Our forum had no part in decisions on the use of IT and biometry in surveillance and mobility control, but our exploits of dominant imaginaries in mainstream media and elite discourse was the ‘fiction’ with which we staged it. In keeping with Dewey’s reasoning on democracy and the public (Dewey, 1954 [1927]), it was an exploration based on the idea that giving people free rein with the biometric imaginary would unravel it and overcome the framing of key issues. The film indeed served the purpose of triggering response and challenging the referents of (dis)trust in the biometric imaginary. Simple depictions became a whole host of relationally contingent matters of (dis)trust in technical objects, politicized expectations, state power, transnational governance, security industries, corporate enterprise and the capabilities of individuals. The forum enacted the imagination to explore the socio-political implications of biometry and the securitization agenda, while affording alternative articulations of the political and public good. We witnessed this not only in numerous arguments responding directly to the film but also in many other issues that were raised in addressing more broadly the discussion topics (Gunnarsdóttir et al., 2011b). In many ways, our forum embodied the Lippmann/Dewey controversy. A Deweyan public was temporarily brought into being in a political climate that only had need for a Lippmannian phantom public. But once people are encouraged to engage the imagination, then the shifting orientations to whom and what to trust or distrust begin to tie together the politics of biometric necessity and calls for engagements that confront conventional engagement methods and presuppositions. Engagements are avenues for talk (Horst and Irwin, 2010). They can bring into being and reflect upon social and institutional arrangements, and push for change and a rethinking of priorities in political and policy development. The Snowden revelations are an important event in this respect. They opened up a new horizon of possibilities and public understandings, where the kinds of concerns voiced in our forum on the wider securitization agenda also find resonance. In other words, our exploration was not merely about ‘talk’ but held a promise of a Deweyan moment. We maintain that discussion and debate on the purpose and direction of the biometric imaginary are still relevant, although the EU legislation of biometric passports, visas and residence permits was already years in the past in 2010. These new documents are perhaps just another innovation for everyone’s convenience. They materialized relatively unnoticed, but the relevancy constraints of uncertainty, risk, danger and control still dictate what is communicated on behalf of publics to advance securitization politically and militarily. We also maintain that engagements should remain incomplete and under construction, given the shortcomings in the occasional exercise that seeks finite outcomes based on pre-given frames of reference. As Horst argues, engagements enact the strive for dialogue and social cohesion, the very process of the dialogue being enormously important in and of itself, despite the weaknesses when it comes to impact on policy and political direction. Perhaps, the onus is on publics themselves to cultivate new networks of actors and institutions, to defy authority and keep alive over the long term, concerns, mutual learning and difference of perception in matters of societal development. Acknowledgements Special thanks are due to our colleagues and partners in the Technolife project and the participants in our online forum. All were an inspiration to us to write this article. We also like to thank Luigi Pellizzoni, Juliet Lodge, Brian Wynne and the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful critique and advice.
Funding The research presented in this article was made possible with the funding support of the European Commission (2009–2012), FP7, Science in Society (Capacities) Work Programme: Contract: 230381.
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Notes 1. Technolife, FP7 SiS Capacities, contract: 230381. 2. For example, the Terrorist Screening Database and the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). 3. Potential source of confusion is that passports issued up until set deadlines are normally valid for 10 years. 4. Organizers were RISE, HIDE, ICTethics, European Biometric Forum and BIOSIG. 5. On democratic protocol, for example, hearings in European Union (EU) Parliament on NSA surveillance of EU citizens and companies, September 2013. 6. Consulting NexisLexis September 2001–December 2005 (including business wires and magazines) with different combinations (AND/OR) of ‘biometric passports’, ‘Europe’, ‘security’, ‘biometrics’, ‘terror’ and related terms. 7. Based on suggestions by Technolife partners, http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/pdf/Technolife-D2TheoreticalFramework.pdf. 8. Vast majority (19) identified themselves in ‘research or education’ (incl. doctors, students and artist); 4 said ‘rights activist’, 7 said EU and 5 non-EU citizen; 5 identified as ‘official’ (EU, gov, policy, foresight) and 4 as ‘technology developer’. 9. Tensions in EU versus Member State governance should have eased with the Lisbon Treaty abandoning the ‘three-pillar’ structure; however, the tensions prevail. 10. Report, http://www.eetikakeskus.ut.ee/sites/default/files/eetikakeskus/files/HL%20WORKSHOP%20 ON%20ETHICS%20OF%20MOBILITY%20AND%20SECURITY.pdf 11. 2007 report w/evidence (UK House of Lords, EU Committee) on legislating Schengen Information System II states that, ‘[t]he lack of transparency in Council proceedings, and in co-decision negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, is an issue relevant to all areas of EU policy-making, […]’ (Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/49/49.pdf, para. 48, p. 18). 12. Available at: http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/g53fht/global_biometric 13. Border guards are familiar to biometric passports not working at the gates. 14. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0rWXi79f3Q 15. Available at: http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/pdf/Technolife-D1-1-Scoping-Bio.pdf 16. See Note 8. 17. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric_passport 18. We credit these remarks to a meeting with the Icelandic parliamentarian, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, and Internet pioneer, Guðmundur Ragnar, in particular, their thoughts on digital self-defence and lack of teeth in European data protection.
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Author biographies Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir is a Research Fellow at the University of Surrey. Her work is focussed on newemerging Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), including sensors and the Internet of Things. Her primary research interests include the interdependencies of computational function and subtle human judgement, and the policy development and politics of ICT-driven innovation. Kjetil Rommetveit (Associate Professor, Centre for the study of the sciences and humanities, University of Bergen) has studied philosophy, law and science and technology studies (STS). His main research interests include the public dimensions and governance of technoscience. He focuses on issues relating to privacy, autonomy and democracy, and roles of assessments and interdisciplinarity in governance.