Idea Transcript
Religion and the Democratization Movement Kang In-Chul
I. Introduction After liberation from the Japanese colonial occupation, the Korean peninsula was swept up in intense conflicts between leftists and rightists vying to determine the nature of the state’s power, and who the key players might be. In the southern part of the peninsula, the conflicts practically came to an end in summer 1948 in favor of the rightists. The 3-year-long Korean War (1950-1953) and the Second Republic, which lasted for about a year, initially provided an opportunity for the hunkered-down leftists and centrists to make a comeback, but in the long run it helped “annihilate the seeds” of leftist and centrist political forces from Korean society. Once they surfaced, radical political forces were thoroughly ferreted out and severely punished, wiping out the social class movement to virtual extinction. The soil of the social resistance movement turned barren, and civil society slipped into a long period of silence, suffering colonialization by a stronger state. Despite this, however, from the late 1960s or 1970s at the latest, the Protestant and Catholic churches were positioned to lead the democratization movement, countering the naked power of the authoritarian state, and they served as a cradle for other social Kang In-Chul (Kang, In-ch’¡l) is Assistant Professor of Sociology of Religion in the Department of Religion and Culture at Hanshin University. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology from Seoul National University. He published Korean Protestant Churches, State, and Civil Society: 1945-1960 (1996) and has written many articles on the political role of Korean religions, North Korean Christian churches, and globalization since 1992.
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movements to arise and grow. As a political scientist noted, during that time some Protestant and Catholic churches “played a central role in the political opposition movement and functioned as a kind of refuge for other dissident forces” (Ch’oe Chang-jip 1985, 210). During the period of successive authoritarian regimes, Christian churches were virtually the only channel by which to vent political and social discontent. However, in this same period, the majority of Protestant churches experienced rapid quantitative growth and strengthened ties with the authoritarian state, while Korea’s main indigenous religions such as Buddhism and Ch’¡ndogyo maintained their traditional, conforming attitude towards the state. This “unique” phenomenon observed in the relationship between the Christian social movement and the social resistance movement in Korea was noted by some political scientists and sociologists (Kim Ny¡ng 1996; Ch’oe Chong-ch’¡l 1992; Ch¡ng Ch’¡l-h£i 1995; Kim Tong-ch’un 1997). The “Korean model” of the Christian social movement developed in a considerably different context from Western and Latin American countries. A main characteristic of the Western and Latin American counterparts (such as the Christian Socialist Movement, the Social Gospel Movement, Catholic Action, etc.) is that they were a defensive counteraction to the trend of Christians forsaking their religion amid the growth of radical labor and socialist movements. That is, they arose and developed “afterwards” and “against” the preexisting forceful social movements. Meanwhile, the Christian social movement in Korea was formed “prior to” the social resistance movement and helped “promote the growth” of the latter in its own development process. Most of the existing studies on the Christian democratization movement in Korea focus on how Christian churches could make a major contribution to the development of the democratization movement, or more broadly, social movements in general. It appears to me that in doing this, they commit a critical mistake by failing to ask “Why only a part of Christian churches could do that?” in a comparative context with other religions or denominations. In this paper, I will highlight the “structural conditions” which have not received
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due attention in prior research. In more concrete terms, I will stress that “the exceptional autonomy Christian churches enjoyed due to their relationship with the core country in a dependent authoritarian state” served as a key basis from which they could wage the democratization movement via public confrontations with the state. Even though churches have religious autonomy, they do not confront the state automatically. Existing studies do not give a satisfactory answer to the question of “Why some Christian church leaders began employing religious autonomy as a weapon to confront the state in the late 1960s?” To remedy this defect, I believe that the following several aspects or factors must be considered, which have been largely overlooked by scholars. First, one of the most important factors that led some Korean Christian churches to confront the state was “religious dependency.” Second, between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, there was a generational shift in the leadership of both clergymen and laymen, which was accompanied by some meaningful changes in the method and strategy the church used to intervene in society. Third, we must pay due attention to religious leaders, who consider the institutional interest of the church before anything else and act according to that principle. Under certain conditions, religious leaders may choose a bold line of action, anticipating that it will maximize social and moral influences through confrontations with the state. The circumstances of the late 1960s are believed to have provided favorable elements for the choice of such a course of action. Fourth, it needs to be emphasized that the resistance in Christian churches centered around activities called “special pastorate,” “social mission,” or “Christian social action,” which target universities, industrial complexes, urban poor neighborhoods and rural areas. This requires us to achieve a clear understanding of the characteristics of those religious-pastoral activities. Fifth, although the social mission developed a considerably different culture from the dominant church culture after a relatively long period of separation, conflicts were usually met with church-wide solidarity. This raises the question of what made it possible to instantly bridge this gap.
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II. Dependent Authoritarian State and Religious Autonomy The most important political and social basis on which some Christian churches could wage the antidictatorship or democratization movement through pubic confrontations with the state since the late 1960s was their “exceptional autonomy” from state control. 1 The autonomy of the Christian church, which could not be enjoyed by other religions or social organizations, can be viewed as the combined result of several structural conditions: the state’s authoritarian behavior, its dependency on external forces, and the linkage between the Korean and U.S. Christian churches. A conclusion we can draw from the combination of those structural conditions is that “The Korean Christian church, which has internal ties with the core country (the U.S.), enjoys a relatively wide range of autonomy in a society which is firmly controlled by an authoritarian state.” Let us examine the above-mentioned structural conditions in more detail. In Korea, the military-led government continued for 30 years through the Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Taewoo regimes. Since the 1960s, the state—including the extended arms of the dominant elites—controlled all facets of society. As the tight grip of the state penetrated deep into the private sphere, it was difficult to maintain separation between religion and state. In the 1960s and 1970s, many religious leaders were practically won over by state power, and major indigenous religions such as Buddhism and Ch’¡ndogyo were reduced to lower-level partners entrusted with the role of justifying state policy. The constitutional provision that stipulates the separation of religion and state was faced with the constant danger of turning into a mere scrap of paper due to the restrictive lower-level laws and supra-legal state actions.2 The unstable 1. Based on O Ky¡ng-hwan’s (1990) definition, “religious autonomy” refers to “the ability of religious organizations and ministers to endure pressures from the state and the powerful Christians associated with it.” 2. The court used to recognize religious freedom as an absolute freedom, but from the late 1960s, it began to adopt a conservative interpretation on the boundary of religious freedom by emphasizing national security and maintenance of social order (Ch’oe Chong-go 1983).
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boundary between the spheres of state and religion produced two noticeable features: one was that religious leaders, regardless of their church affiliation, showed great interest in politics, and the other was that the simmering tension due to conflicting interests between the state, which tried to control religion forcefully, and the church, which strove to guarantee its autonomy, became an ever-present problem. According to Im Hy¡n-jin (1987, 249-273), a distinct characteristic of the Korean state during the postliberation period is that it revealed “the instrumental autonomy from the ruling class at home and at the same time, the limitations of structural autonomy due to its dependence on the world system.” While the state secured a high level of autonomy from societal pressures, it had a low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the structural pressures from abroad due to its peripheral status in the world system. At the heart of this external dependency was the asymmetric relationship between Korea and the U.S. From the beginning, most Korean Protestant churches were placed in a structural network with their U.S. counterparts through the mediation of missionaries, which was indeed the most important channel linking the countries. Also, Korean Catholic churches strengthened their ties with U.S. Catholic churches after the liberation. Based on his observations of the U.S. and other Western societies since the 1970s, Robbins (1988) notes the fact that even though state regulation over society is ever increasing, churches remain as relatively immune “privileged enclaves,” and as a result of this, a “regulatory gap” exists between secular and religious organizations. He views that with the increasing dominance of the state over society, the privileges and immunities of the church will become more visible and controversial, intensifying the potential tension between state power and religion. I believe that Robbins’ insight can be further developed in relation to the problem of the state’s external dependency. In peripheral societies like Korea, a considerable “regulatory gap” may exist between religious and nonreligious realms and between Christian denominations—which receive support from churches in the core nations—and other religions. If this regulatory gap indeed exists, the church is very likely to enjoy exceptional autonomy from
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the interventionist state in social and religious realms. While the state’s authoritarianism and interventionism make its intervention in the overall society (including religion) an ordinary phenomenon, its external dependency operates as an effective structural condition to restrict its control over Christian denominations. Here, we can infer a “paradox of dependency,” that “religious” dependency increases “political” autonomy. Also, as state control over religion increases, or the church adopts a progressive missionary policy, its relative autonomy from the state has the potential to work more positively for resistance. The state’s external dependency provides an important clue to understanding why the Christian church remains an “Achilles’ heel” and functions as the hub of antiestablishment resistance, even when civil society is frozen under the tight grip of the state. The military regimes of Korea learned some important lessons from their conflicts with the church during the 1970s. The following facts became clear through the clashes: 1) the Korean government was dependent on the U.S. government politically, militarily and economically, and Korean Christian churches had a solid network with their U.S. counterparts; 2) the U.S. Protestant and Catholic churches had considerable lobbying power in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch and exert a strong influence on the Vatican and the World Council of Churches (WCC); and 3) based on this, the Korean Christian church secured a considerable degree of autonomy from the government. Further, the clashes demonstrate the political and religious effects these facts had. The typical process is described as the following: 1) the state represses a certain religious organization associated with the social movement in order to strengthen its grasp over civil society; 2) this religious organization is usually associated with foreign missionaries; 3) the first local confrontations and repressive actions cause the highest-level church leaders to mount defiance against infringement on their religious autonomy and organizational interests, making it a national issue; 4) at the same time, the problem is spread internationally by missionaries, who make appeals to churches in Korea, the U.S. and other parts of the world for support;
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5) U.S. churches and international religious organizations make direct protests to the Korean government and appeal to the U.S. Congress, the U.S. government or the United Nations, exerting pressure to make an announcement criticizing the Korean government or to make direct sanctions against it; and 6) faced with international criticism and negative public opinion, the Korean government withdraws repression against the religious organization, which results in weakening its grasp over civil society and discrediting its political legitimacy. Since the initial repression which targets one or two people, the number of people implicated in the incident multiplies exponentially (chain effect) and the scope of effect magnifies quickly on all fronts (snowball effect), and eventually, the incident concludes in a direction opposing the intention of the Korean government (boomerang effect). This process of negative feedback tends to create an effect that makes the Korean government exercise more caution as to future attempts at religious oppression. By noting this structural context, we can understand more clearly the meaning of the so-called “sacred zone debate,” which occurs frequently in Korean society even today. It will also clarify why Christian churches function as a “shelter for antiestablishment forces” in Korea. Here it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the state’s external dependency restricts its control over Christian denominations and secures the religious autonomy of Korean Christian churches linked with U.S. churches. Despite this, however, it is also true that “the boundary of autonomy always remains vague” under an authoritarian regime. This means that for the state, the necessity of control and its danger always coexist, while for the church, religious autonomy is something that can be maintained only with endless vigilance and sacrifice. Although the consolidation of control is an imperative of national security, the difficulty of control always exists due to its external dependency. Because of this, the boundary of control and autonomy in the religious realm always remains vague and undetermined, compared to other social realms, where total control is usually realized. Further, although the state aimed at sophisticated social control,
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the burden to maintain minimum formal procedures and elements of liberal democracy did not disappear entirely and some Christian church leaders began to assert that religious freedom is the “last stronghold” of liberal democracy. Due to the “structural fluidity and instability of church and state relations,” their interrelationship is characterized as a tense one in which “vigilance and suspicious scrutiny intersect.” In these circumstances, several spaces in the church which were used for rallies and protests of antiestablishment forces— such as My¡ngdong Cathedral and the Christian Center— turned into “sacred places.” “Sacred places” are spaces in the church situated in the boundary zone between the church and the state, full of tension and fluidity. Rather than being a clandestine, safe shelter protected from the eyes of the outside world, they were public spaces where the autocratic regimes were openly protested and criticized, surrounded by riot police and exposed to concerned citizens. In many instances, the state helped them become “sacred places” by taking an ambivalent attitude made up of implicit recognition and public denial. When the state dispatched official forces to penetrate those places in the name of civil governance on some occasions, Christians organized nationwide demonstrations protesting the socalled “violation of sacred places.”
III. Factors Promoting Church and State Confrontations 1. Religious Dependency and Generational Shift Religious dependency of the Korean Christian church is derived primarily from the limitations associated with being founded and nurtured by foreign missionaries, or in other words, the fact that Korean church was on the periphery of the world religious order (Kang 1996, 39-44, 72-128). As missionaries, who had been expatriated during the late colonial period, made a comeback in the postliberation years, and the society suffered huge losses of human and physical resources during the war, the Korean church maintained a high level of reli-
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gious dependency in the 1950s. Here the main point of my argument is that the religious dependency of the Korean church increased the likelihood that religious innovations practiced in the core of the world religious order could be successful in Korea. Here, the core of the world religious order refers to Western churches, especially, the “mother churches” of Korean churches, while “religious innovations” indicate a shift in the focus of missionary policy to democratization and human rights. Despite the conservative religious attitude of Korean Christians, it was highly possible that the same change in missionary policy could occur in the Korean church. Let us take the example of the Protestant church. In 1959, the three major denominations of the Korean Protestant church, i.e., the Presbyterian Church, the Methodist Church and the Evangelical Holiness Church, underwent a serious internal division. Conflicts began to surface within the Korean church with the claim that the WCC and the USNCC (United States National Council of Churches), a leading organization of the WCC, were turning “procommunist” by pursuing peaceful coexistence with communist nations and inviting Soviet and Chinese churches to join the WCC, so the Korean church should secede from the WCC and reconsider its relationship with the U.S. church. Although this view was widespread in Korean churches at that time, the churches were divided into two groups: those that wanted to maintain ties with the WCC and the U.S. church, and those that wanted to part with them. As a result of this division, preferential benefits (mainly, financial support for missionary activities), which were handed out based on their relations with the existing foreign missionaries, came to be concentrated in a few denominations. Those denominations, in turn, deepened their dependency, subjected as they were to the direct influence of policy changes in the foreign nations where the money came from. Keeping pace with the U.S. church, they were rewarded by a monopolistic appropriation of mission funds. Thus, through the 1950s and 1960s when the U.S. church was moving towards a clearly progressive line, the Korean church had to accept “offensive” demands from the outside. In the 1960s, such watchwords as justice, peace, human rights, development,
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democracy, indigenization, etc., dominated the discourse in churches in the U.S. and other parts of the world. This meant an “international shift of dominant theology to progressivism.” Amid this change, “theological progressivism” was established to justify the critical social participation of the church, despite the predominantly conservative theological milieu of the Korean church. Meanwhile, the denominations which severed their ties with the foreign missionaries after the division held fast to their traditional, conservative belief systems and maintained a cooperative and conforming relationship with the state. In the Catholic church, the Second Vatican Council held in the early 1960s played a role in changing the direction of missionary policy to a progressive one at the international level. Also, the 1970s saw the clearly visible emergence of another “paradox of dependency,” that religious dependency enables the church to be more autonomous from the state and to employ more confrontational strategies vis-à-vis the state. The Korean church’s structure of internal weakness to external pressure facilitated and expedited a double-sided shift in principle from noninterventionism to participation, and in the direction and method of social participation. In the 1950s, the Korean Protestant and Catholic churches participated in politics in different directions, but by similar methods. Under the two-party system established immediately after the Korean War, most Protestant church leaders openly supported the ruling Liberty Party, whereas most Catholic church leaders supported the opposing Democratic Party. As the First Republic was toppled by the April 19 Revolution of 1960, most Protestant church leaders withdrew from the political scene, while after the May 16 Military Coup d’Etat of 1961, Catholic church leaders refrained from expressing their interest in politics. Therefore, both the Protestant and Catholic churches took a noninterventionist position with regard to political and social issues. However, by the late 1960s or the early 1970s at the latest, a considerable number of Protestant and Catholic church leaders began showing strong political and social interests. The political and social participation of the church during the 1970s was very different from that of the 1950s in
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direction, method and main actors. While the political and social participation during the 1950s were mediated by professional politicians who were lay Christians supported by high-level religious leaders, the democratization and human rights movements of the 1970s were led by young Christian activists in universities, industrial complexes, rural areas and poor districts in urban areas, as well as young clergymen who attended seminaries in the 1960s and young foreign missionaries dispatched after the 1950s. The leaders of the 1970s had virtually no ties with the “political establishment” or various privileges that came with it. Criticizing the corruption and incompetence of established politicians of both the ruling and opposition parties, they had tense relations with all political groups. Instead, they formed alliances with critical intellectuals and the masses. After the 1970s, resistant Christian church leaders employed progressive theology and social doctrines, which they learned from the WCC and the Vatican, as theoretical weapons to back up their struggle. Meanwhile, the denominations which severed ties with the U.S. church and missionaries in the late 1950s produced few resistant church leaders. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, U.S. Protestant churches began assigning missionaries—who had usually held positions within the Church—to special pastorate or social action organizations. With this, financial support for missionary activities was redirected to those areas. Old conservative missionaries who opposed this line of policy were recalled to the U.S. and were replaced by young, liberal, professionalized missionaries. During this period, a generational shift in foreign missionaries as well as participation-minded Korean church leaders progressed rapidly. A primary effect of this generational shift was that it promoted a more liberal religious experimentation, compared to the past, and as a result, it fostered the creation of new missionary strategies and areas. For example, industrial missions, college education, religious broadcasting, social welfare, and rural development were cultivated by the initiatives of missionaries with the injection of bulky missionary funds. An important fact is that most resistant church leaders who were active after the 1970s worked together with missionaries in these areas, which became
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strongholds in the struggle against the state. 2. Institutional Interests of the Church and the Strategic Choice of Religious Leaders Religious leaders have a tendency to consider the “institutional interests” of the church before anything else, and act according to that principle (O Ky¡ng-hwan 1990, 322-324). That is, their action is oriented towards protecting the institutional interests of the church and maximizing its influence and thus, they show sensitive responses to situations in which “the institutional interests are violated or the attempts to maximize the interests are foiled or baffled.” Especially when church leaders perceive that those situations are promoted by the state or the political elites, they are more likely to express their “religious” discontent as “political” discontent. Religious leaders may make a strategic choice that will maximize social and moral influences through confrontations with the state, taking the following factors into consideration: 1) the degree to which the church receives preferential benefits from the state; 2) the degree to which the state approves of religious autonomy; 3) religious leaders’ subjective assessment of the effectiveness of existing missionary methods; and 4) the existence or absence of organized demands from its followers that the church should voice concerns about social discontent against the state. One important thing to note is that the circumstances in Korea during the late 1960s had relatively favorable conditions to opt for this. From the viewpoint of the Christian church, both the preferential benefits offered by the state and the degree of religious autonomy approved of by the state remained at a low level between the 1960s and 1970s. The Syngman Rhee regime managed the state as if it were a “Christian nation” and provided various benefits to the Protestant and Catholic churches. Christmas was designated as a national holiday, gradually becoming a nationwide festival. All sorts of ceremonies of state were conducted in Christian style and the qualifications to perform mission work in public organizations, including the
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military and jails, were limited to the church (Kang 1996, 185-190). Then, the Park Chung-hee regime erected in the early 1960s revealed a slight religious preference to Buddhism, which Christian church leaders saw as an attempt at a new religious make-over. Ceremonies of state, such as the Memorial Day ceremony, were conducted in Buddhist style, and a system of military officer-monks was introduced. Buddha’s Birthday was designated as a national holiday and Buddhist temples were allowed to charge an admission fee to tourists. Because these actions were not extended to Ch’¡ndogyo, Confucianism, or other religions, they could be interpreted as proBuddhist measures.3 The Christian church did not have a privileged status in its relationship with the state in the 1960s, which means that despite clashes with the state, the church did not have much to lose, or in other words, it was relatively free to choose the format of its relations with the state. Also, the Park regime increased control over religion in general, including Christianity. Let alone direct repressive measures such as arrests and imprisonment of church members, it attempted to enact the Social Organization Registration Law, which was designed to bolster state control of religious organizations. Restrictions were placed on religious education practiced in schools established by religious organizations. The ritual of making bows to the national flag was strengthened, and worship of Tan’gun (the founder of Korea) was promoted in the name of fostering nationalism. These are only some representative examples that demonstrate state superiority and control over religion. This change, which could be summarized as a preferential treatment of Buddhism and increased control of Christianity, was perceived by church leaders to infringe on the institutional interests of the church on the one hand, and to create pressure for new exertions and religious reforms on the other. As this became obvious in the 1970s, the Catholic church employed a public confrontational line to the state, while Protestant denominations tried
3. Reflecting these changes, the number of Buddhists grew at a remarkable rate in the second half of the 1960s.
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different religious reforms, such as confrontation with the state, alliance with the state, and adopting an inclusive or eclectic stance mixing confrontation and cooperation.4 Religious leaders’ subjective assessment of the efficiency of existing missionary methods can affect the rearrangement of church and state relations. If they conceive that the existing missionary methods are not efficient, they search for more effective missionary strategies, which may include organizing or supporting the democratization movement in an attempt to defy an authoritarian state with low political legitimacy. Many Protestant church leaders learned a valuable lesson from the fact that in the second half of the 1950s, the Protestant church saw the growth rate of its followers falling, while the Catholic church, which confronted the Rhee regime by forming alliance with the opposition party, achieved the highest growth rate. But then, as I mentioned above, the Catholic church approved of the military regime and refrained from making political statements in the 1960s, and its growth rate stagnated between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. These circumstances are believed to have fostered the pressure to reform within the church. More direct and powerful pressure for reform was built in universities, industrial complexes and rural areas, which were the real origin of the Christian democratization movement. Through the 1960s, it became clear that missionary methods tried in these areas proved very inefficient. Indeed, it was in these areas that Christians made organized demands that the church speak out and express social discontent against the state. The next part discusses this point in detail.
4. The Korea Christian Presbyterian Church (KCPC) gradually increased confrontation with the state, while the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK, Haptong) and other conservative small denominations formed alliances with the state. the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK, T’onghap) and the Christian Korean Methodist Church (CKMC) adopted an inclusive or eclectic stance combining confrontation and cooperation.
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3. Social Mission as the Origin of Resistance During the late 1960s, the origins of resistance in the Christian churches were the areas of “special pastorate,” “social mission,” or “Christian social action,” which targeted universities, industrial complexes, urban poor districts and rural areas, among others. It is important to examine why those places, which took on initial importance as the sites of new Christian recruits, became the sites of frequent clashes with state authorities from the late 1960s, and why accidental, local conflicts in those places accelerated to national or international conflicts. Ministry in those areas was different from the ministry that normally occurred around a local church (or parish) in several aspects and this seemed to help promote and diffuse confrontations with the state. First, as mentioned above, those areas continued to remain as “missionary targets” even after religious power began to be transferred in full scale away from the churches’ traditional center after World War II. In most cases, ministry in those areas was initiated at the suggestion of missionaries, and as the role of missionaries was redefined, these areas were given high priority to receive young missionaries (replacing old ones) and a sufficient, steady flow of mission funds. Most of those areas were also part of international networks. Second, being protected by the missionaries and situated on the fringe of the institutional church, they were relatively free from state intervention and the conservative theology and control of the institutionalized church, and to this extent, new religious experiments and reforms were actively tried. With a considerable degree of ideological autonomy, they became free spaces where alternative concepts and counter-cultures were produced, taught and transmitted. Here were attempts of “seditious” ideological experimentations to Koreanize imported radical religious discourses, among which were variations on liberation theology and Minjung theology (popular theology). Third, unlike an ordinary ministry conducted in a church, that is, a sacred place separated from everyday life, ministry in those places “reached out” to people, being performed in secular places. There-
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fore, the relationship between the pastor and laymen tended to be more horizontal and democratic, and conservative church members were likely to be “contaminated” by progressive ones. As it became more difficult to execute missionary methods in separation from real life, the boundary between religious activities and the social movement blurred, which increased the possibility of clashes with the state. Fourth, with their association with the diocese or general assembly, and ecumenical organizations, and with a large number of missionaries and international networks on their side, they had an advantage in transmitting initial conflicts to high-level church leaders and international religious organizations. Indeed, pastors and church activitists in those areas served as the main conduits to turn local issues to national or international issues. Finally, I must emphasize that pastors and church staff active in those areas were in contact with a homogeneous group of church members who were very articulate in expressing their religious interests and therefore, they were under higher pressures to be more sensitive to the demands from the laymen. Here, it is important to ask “What was the content of the demands of the homogeneous group?,” considering that it might have the effect of promoting confrontation with the state. Actually, this was very likely for the following reasons. In contrast to overarching state authoritarianism in society during the 1960s and the 1970s, interest groups and voluntary associations were nonexistent or weak, relative to the level of social differentiation, and most of the channels to express political views were shut down. At the same time, due to economic backwardness and constant large-scale outflows of economic surplus to foreign nations, the state had limited resources to mobilize to expand their base of popular support. Under these circumstances, the state had to rely on repressive and exclusive means to control latent discontent widespread in society at large and to maintain social order. Occasional eruptions of the discontent among the “popular masses” (such as laborers, farmers and the urban poor) were put down by merciless violence of the state. In this situation, social pressure was mounted on religious organizations with relative political autonomy to politi-
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cally delegate the socially limited function of expressing popular interests on the one hand; on the other hand, as legitimate methods of resistance were closed by the state, dissident forces infiltrated into religious organizations and made steady attempts to mobilize religious resources for resistance. These pressures and attempts were concentrated in church-run college student associations, youth associations, night schools, youth labor associations, industrial mission organizations, small churches and nurseries in poor urban districts, farmers associations, etc. If a significant number of clergymen and intellectuals respond to the popular demands, and this can continue to be justified through religious production, religion can operate as a medium to resist pressure from the state. Furthermore, the state’s regionally unbalanced development policy, which favored the Ky¡ngsang-do provinces, bred dissatisfaction among the residents of the Ch¡lla-do provinces. The Korea Christian Presbyterian Church (KCPC) on the Protestant side and the Kwangju Archdiocese on the Catholic side, two very combative agents of the democratization movement, defied regional discrimination and performed the function of speaking for the interests of the Ch¡lla-do residents and voicing their frustration. Because the special pastorate or social mission began to fulfill the evangelical aims to recruit new Christians in new locales in the wake of social changes, such as urbanization, industrialization and expansion of higher education—with the cooperation of national agencies or businessmen, if necessary—clashes with the state in those places were regarded largely as an “unintended” result. Here again, the clergymen adhered to religious purism, which is wary of political intervention of the church, and followed the traditional authoritarian line of ministry. The Protestant missionary activities in the industrial complexes during the late 1950s reached both workers and entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, Catholic missionary activities mainly targeted clerical workers (the privileged class of workers) and sometimes, even college students and military servicemen, with the main focus on evangelism and public welfare work rather than labor activism. But soon they realized that they had communication prob-
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lems with laymen and this reduced the effectiveness of their ministry. Those clergymen who made keen observations of the lives of laymen and listened to their concerned voice while exploring new alternatives of ministry were awakened to their wretched conditions and unjust social conditions. In this process, the social mission was changed from a simple evangelic means employed in response to urbanization and industrialization to a social movement seeking change in the social structure, while “innocent clergymen” turned into “social activists with conviction.” This is the real meaning of the shift from “industrial evangelism” to “industrial mission,” which occurred in the second half of the 1960s. Entering the mid 1960s, the Young Christian Workers (YCW) (widely known as the JOC [Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne]) made a clear to shift of focus to that of a labor movement, with manual workers at the center. The Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and the JOC became the centripetal bodies of the so-called “democratic labor union movement.” The JOC launched new social movements such as the Catholic farmers movement and the Catholic urban poor movement during the 1970s. For some time after this, the Catholic church served as a leading force of the farmers movement and the urban poor movement in the nation.5 Over the 10-year period from the late 1950s, the special pastorate or social mission developed a religious culture and a theology quite different from those of the dominant church. In the areas of the social mission, various religious experiments distinct from those of the dominant institutionalized church were tried in accordance with the
5. After the “Rural Youth Chapter” was created in the JOC in 1964, it became an independent organization in 1966 with the establishment of the Korea Catholic Rural Youth Association (or JAC). At the end of 1971, the association abandoned their previous line of action, focusing on the improvement of the rural village environment and enlightenment activities and decided to shift the focus to the protection of farmers’ interests and the realization of social justice. The birth of the Korean Catholic Farmers’ Movement (CFM) at the beginning of 1972 was the result of efforts to lend systematic support to new action agendas. Another branch movement initiated by some JOC members in 1968 opened a new realm on the social movement called the “Catholic Urban Poor Movement.”
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demand and situation of the locales, which resulted in deepening the heterogeneity of the two religious cultures. As it was pointed out above, pastors engaged in the social mission were more sensitive to the sentiment of the locale and its residents and less authoritarian, while the followers were more homogeneous and critical of the existing social system. As the boundary between conventional religious activities and social movement becomes vague, there is a higher possibility of clash between the social mission and the state, and at the same time, the social mission may be estranged from the dominant religious culture and have the danger of becoming “ghettoized.” Despite the potential danger of isolation from the dominant religious culture, when conflicts arose in the locales of the social mission, the entire church banded together and defied repression from the state. This seems to have been possible because “the shared consciousness of the crisis of potential infringement on the institutionalized interests of the church” overwhelmed the differences in religious cultures and theologies. Despite the differences and heterogeneity, the many cases where the state repressed those involved in the social mission from the late 1960s and 1970s ended in the united resistance of churches, rather than worsening division latent in the church. No doubt the “dynamics of social conflicts” were working there too, according to which internal division is temporarily concealed and solidarity is strengthened in the presence of external enemies. Moreover, the relative homogeneity of clergymen was another important factor. It may be seen that this homogeneity came from the systematic, intensive and standardized nurturing system of clergymen, based in single-denomination seminaries. Actually, this contrasts with the priest nurturing system of Buddhism, Korea’s largest religion, which is characterized as unsystematic, disintegrated and dependent on individual masters. The strong human solidarity built from seminary served as a basis to deploy concerted actions among the clergymen for the protection of the institutional interests of the church.
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IV. Conclusion: The Continuity and Strength of the Democratization Movement in the Christian Church Existing research on the democratization movement in the Christian church commonly shows a great interest in the “conditions for the emergency of the movement,” while ignoring its “continuity.” The democratization movement in the Christian church emerged in the late 1960s and exerted a strong influence for about two decades until the mid 1980s. It also had a sizable influence on NGOs, which began to spring up from the late 1980s. Moreover, the movement was effective in discrediting the political legitimacy of the military regimes and was “successful” by contributing to realizing the power transfer from a military to a civilian government. Where do the continuity and strength of the movement in the church come from? Based on the discussion so far, we can draw the following conclusions. First of all, we should note the church’s “religious dependency” and “international support system” as the main factors of its continued involvement in the movement, despite violent repression by the authoritarian state. Besides these external factors, there are several internal factors as well. The most important of them is the fact that even before the 1960s, the church institutionalized various social movement sectors in its internal system in the forms of special pastorates, social missions, Catholic Action, etc. Social movements institutionalized within the church, or “Intra-Church Social Movement Sectors (ICSMSs)” overlapped considerably with the special pastorates or social missions. However, the former are more comprehensive than the latter because, in addition to official organizations operated by material and human resources from the church, they included a wide range of informal organizations remaining outside the direct control of the church, which were greater in number than the official ones. The ICSMSs functioned as a “pool of social activists,” and at the same time, as a social space with active contacts between the institutional church and society, and as a central axis to form and coordinate dynamic mutual influence between the two. Despite the (potential
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and manifest) conservatism of the institutional church and highestlevel clergymen, the ICSMSs, on the one hand, performed the role of a “pulling device” by calling the church’s attention to social causes and drawing it to social issues. On the other hand, they actively sought to form alliances among individual sectors and put in place a “united system” that encompassed the human rights movement, the student movement, the youth movement, the labor movement, the farmers movement, the urban poor movement, etc. Some examples of the united organizations are the Christian Social Movement Conference (CSMC) on the Protestant side, the Catholic Social Movement Council (CSMC) and its descendant, the National Conference of Catholics for the Realization of Justice (NCCRJ), and the Lay Apostolate Council of Korea (LACK) on the Catholic side. The existence of these organizations increased the effectiveness of the social movement in the church. The strong and broad “human network” the Christian church developed in the process of the democratization movement has been conducive to the continuity and effectiveness of the movement. The human network can be explained primarily as a result of the “cradle function” of the church to protect and nourish the weak and vulnerable social movement. Today in Korea, there are few representative social movement activists who do not have the experience of having been involved in church-related organizations or supported by churches. Most Korean social movement leaders are “old comrades” who came to know each other through churches. Also, those active in the ICSMSs—which have wide-reaching action agendas and a huge organizational system—are building new human networks in almost all areas of the social movement. While the first two factors are related to the organizational resources of the Christian democratization movement, another internal factor conducive to the continuity of this movement is related to the characteristics of religious leaders, who always emphasize the institutional interests of the church. The democratization movement of the church made a great contribution to the quantitative expansion of the church, particular in the increase of church membership
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(mainly among the masses). Also, the movement enhanced social credibility of the church, which worked positively for recruiting new Christians (especially among the youth and intellectual). As the church’s strategy to criticize the system and seek social participation proves to have a “evangelizing effect,” religious leaders are more likely to hold on to that strategy.
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