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Report WP 1 .

Project:

The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres

Project acronym: Project website:

Europub.com http://europub.wz-berlin.de

Funded by:

5th Framework Programme of the European Commission HPSE-CT2000-00046 WP 1 (Analysis of multi-level opportunity structures) Donatella della Porta D 1.1 + D1.2 (combined)

Contract No. Work package: WP Coordinator: Deliverable number:

REPORT

Dimensions of Political Opportunities and the Europeanisation of Public Spheres

Editor:

Donatella della Porta

Date:

February 2003

Copyright notice:

Non-Europub.com members are allowed to draw on this report for their own research purposes, provided that they make appropriate reference to this source, and the web address where it can be found.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Dimensions of Political Opportunities and the Europeanisation of Public Spheres Report on Work Package 1 of the EUROPUB.COM Research Project Edited by Donatella della Porta INTRODUCTION Forms of Europeanisation of the Public Sphere and How to Explain Them: An Introduction By Donatella della Porta PART I Dimensions of Political Opportunities and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere: Hypotheses for a Cross-National Comparison By Donatella della Porta with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta

4

9

I. Geopolitical opportunities and Europeanisation

9

II. Institutional isomorphism and Europeanisation

12

III. Institutional appropriateness and political cultures IV. Differential empowerment of political and social actors at the national and supranational levels References

19 24 39

APPENDIX A. ANTI EU-PARTIES IN SINGLE COUNTRIES (Written by all teams) References

43 52

APPENDIX B. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SINGLE COUNTRIES (Written by all teams) References

54 65

PART II Media opportunity structures - A brake block for the Europeanisation of public spheres? By Silke Adam, Barbara Berkel, Barbara Pfetsch 1. Introduction 2. Media systems and information capacity in national public spheres 3. Media systems and patterns of political discourse in national public spheres 4. Conclusion Appendix References

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PART III Opportunity structures for specific policy issues Agricultural policy by Margit Jochum (Swiss team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of agricultural policy 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue Selected web sites providing information on CAP References

106 116 119 119

Annexe: Treaty Establishing the European Community Part Three: Community policies; Title II: Agriculture

121

Education policy by Spanish team 1. Degree and forms of institutional Europeanisation of educational policy 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue References

105 106

124 124 129 140

Immigration policy by Virginie Guiraudon (French team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of immigration policy 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue Statistics Web sites References

141 145 150 150

Monetary policy by Jovanka Boerefijn and Jeannette Mak (Dutch team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of EMU 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue References

153 153 162 165

Pensions and retirement policy by Jessica Erbe (WZB team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of pension policy 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue References

167 167 171 180

Troops deployment policy by Emily Gray (UK team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of defence policy 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue References

182 182 185 189

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Forms of Europeanisation of the Public Sphere and How to Explain Them: An Introduction By Donatella della Porta

Our research focuses on the Europeanisation of the public sphere, a delicate issue in terms of both the weak development of the process (Gerhards 1993) and the lack of research on the topic (Le Torree et al. 2001). Most analyses have attributed the lack of legitimacy of European institutions to being one of the negative effects of the weakness of the European public sphere. Exploring this issue further, one encounters a number of characteristics of European Union politics: their democratic deficit, the secretive working not only of the EUbureaucracy, but also of executive institutions, and the lack of an institutionalised opposition. The way the EU media system functions is also an issue seen, for instance, in the tendency of journalists to use traditional categories instead of perceiving the novel aspects of the European enterprise; the lack of a common language and a unified public, the dominance of national networks among journalists, the prevalence of national agenda even in the disseminating EU news, and the prevalence of intergovernmental and elite-driven images of the EU conveying an image of weakness on the part of certain European institutions (seen, for instance, in the prevalence of the European Commission over the Parliament) (Gerhards 1993; La Torrec et al. 2001). Although rarely in an explicit way, the (very few) studies on Europeanisation of the public sphere present the tension between a (normative) transnational approach, assessing the need for the formation of a European public opinion and a (descriptive) intergovernmental approach, describing the European media system as mainly nationally oriented. The largely pessimistic research on the European public sphere and its weaknesses, compares it with the forms and institutions of public spheres at national level and assess the difficulies it is experiencing in emerging at supranational level. In our research, we do not exclude the formation of genuine, supranational forms of European public spheres (i.e. a sort of Europeanisation by way of “supranationalization”), but speculate on the different paths towards Europeanisation, such as an increasing focus by national media on European institutions and policies, emergence of a pro-anti Europe cleavage, or the development of common frames either imposed from above (at EU level) or diffused cross-nationally (see, for the research project, Koopmans and Statham 2002). By Europeanisation we mean not only “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001, 3), but also the impact these have at domestic level, aiming at assessing the varying degree of Europeanisation in the different countries and concerning a variety of issues. In general, we expect neither a total convergence nor a continuing divergence in the political institutions of the member states—we assume, however, that “Europeanisation matters”, in so far as it leads to “distinct and identifiable changes in the domestic institutional structures of the member states” (Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001, 3). Focusing on the public sphere, it is clear that this is not the only arena for presenting claims. While some actors are less dependent upon mass-media by virtue of their ability to achieve direct access to decision-makers, others, because they do not have access to the media, may be obliged to resort to alternative communication channels. Some may choose to address public opinion because their claims resonate with the majoritary opinion of the public, others may opt for less visible channels because they have more support among the elite than

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in the wider population etc. However, we may assume that the printed media is one of the most important arenas, and that most actors will, at one stage or another, tend to use it in order to expound their views publicly. Additionally, we set our investigation on the printed media, parallel to one concerning the Internet in terms of the degree to which it is conducive towards developing a more pluralistic, transnational public sphere. Therefore, taking the media as an important source for analysing Europeanisation, we shall attempt to verify different hypotheses developed in literature in order to assess the nature of the Europabuilding process. With particular regard to actors and strategy, I wish firstly to shed light on the following dimensions of public sphere Europeanisation. •

We shall first of all draw a distinction, according to the actors’ territorial level, between the supranational versus the intergovernmental paths toward Europeanisation. European institutions have an effect on the domestic actors and policies since nation-states are influenced by pressures from outside which give rise to consequences felt within. Our choice of the term Europeanisation indicates a clear intention of going beyond both the extremist theories which envisage building Europa as a nation-state and also the realistic approach which sees the European Union as an intergovernmental organization, to examine instead the interplay between the national and the supranational in multilevel governance. We take for granted, however, that the specific mix of territorial governamental intervention in the public sphere changes according to the country and, especially, the issue involved. With specific regard to this, we shall verify to what extent European institutions intervene as supranational actors in the public sphere, and, by contrast, the extent of the relevance of national governments; also to what extent European institutions are recognized targets of action, and, by contrast, to what degree national or subnational institutions function as power-wielders, or at least gatekeepers. Our data on the actors addressed in or who address the public sphere shall be of help in discussing the role of national and supranational actors in multilevel governance.



Over and above the territorial level of the actors involved in the public sphere, it is important to comprehend their nature distinguishing between patterns of Europeanisation initiated from above and from below. Both the realist and functionalist standpoints perceive European development as mainly an élite-driven, top-down process. State actors, of all territorial levels, have been seen as the driving force of policy-making (see Tarrow and Imig 2002). Important legal studies in the field seem to place emphasis on institution building as being a formal process involving formal actors. Much research on the formation of nation-states, however, reveals that over and above constitutional input “from above”, their construction involved the development of a common identity, through participation “from below”. Nowadays, the development of European citizenship is of increasing interest to both scholars and policy-makers. In our research, therefore, we shall also attempt to measure the impact in the public sphere of actors of so-called civil society, in a “bottom up” process.



The development of territorial politics follows both consensual and conflictual paths. The construction of the nation-state developed through conflicts of a greater or lesser degree of politicization between the center and the periphery, and between Church and State, both cleavages contributing to the shaping the characteristics of national politics (Rokkan 1982). Mobilization of other cleavages, in particular that dividing social classes, also contributed to the building of the nation-state (Bendix 1964), the struggle

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to build polity at national level interacting with the process of production of national policies. Furthermore, not only can the debate on Europe and the construction of a public sphere be carried out in an atmosphere of greater or lesser consensus, but moreover conflicts can (and do) develop either around the very existence of a European polity or the specific policies implemented by European institutions. •

With specific regard to the framing of policy issues, other characteristics of the Europeanisation of the public sphere can also be identified. Studies on diffusion showed clearly that (good) ideas tend to spread from unit to unit, by either hierarchical (from the most powerful to the less powerful) or horizontal (based on geographical or functional proximity) diffusion. In our research, we shall verify not only the extent of similarities among countries on a variety of issues, but also try to assess the provenance of the various frames, from EU institutions or European states.

In short, the Europeanisation of the public sphere may take the following forms which are not not mutually exclusive: According to the territorial actors involved

Intergovermental

Supranational

According to the social/institutional nature of the actors involved

From above

From below

According to how the polity/politics/ policy characteristics of the EU are judged

Consensual

Conflictual

According to the direction of diffusion of ideas

Vertical

Horizontal

Our data on seven issues in seven countries, encompassing newspaper articles, editorials and the Internet, over different periods of time enables verification of the extent to which Europeanisation occurs and the forms of the public sphere in cross-time, cross-nation, crossissue and cross-media comparisons. The aim of this report is to single out a number of series of hypotheses relative to the institutional, political, geopolitical, cultural, social and economic variables which could have an effect on our dependent variable – the Europeanisation of the public sphere – and then to collect data that we think may be useful in order to account for different forms of Europeanisation. First of all, therefore, we reviewed hypotheses existing in literature on Europeanisation and/or on the public sphere. While not aiming to confer equal importance to these, however, we consider it useful to list them and spell out their implications for our analysis of the Europeanisation of the public sphere. In order to be able to verify these hypotheses against our data at a later date, we also operationalized the main independent variables with existing data. As scholars working in comparative politics are painfully aware, the search for common quantitative indicators is hampered by the trans-national differences in empirical statistics gathering, and by apparently similar concepts which can however hold vastly different meanings depending on their social and political context (della Porta 2002c). These difficulties are greater the less the analysis focuses on specific, narrowly defined hypotheses. In our case, given the wide range of political, social, cultural and economic variables involved in our hypotheses, we decided to reduce the risk deriving from weak crossnational comparability by extensive use of cross-national data banks, with a widespread EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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(although never undisputed) reputation for reliability. When possible, we also reported data from alternative sources, sometimes giving different measures. The ranking list of our countries on the different measures is therefore only indicative, and further research is necessary to obtain an in-depth test of hypotheses on Europeanisation of the public sphere. Moreover, on the hypotheses we found particularly relevant, we collected also qualitative information, based on reports from each national team. The report is divided into three parts. In the first, we suggest hypotheses and data that can be useful, especially for cross-national comparison. As far as possible, data were collected in different periods so as allow to monitor evolution over time. The time dimension is however particularly relevant for part II, which, instead, focuses on the six substantial issues we investigated in our research: monetary politics, agriculture, immigration, troop deployment, pensions and education. On each issue, we gave particular emphasis to the evolution of the division of competence between territorial and national levels considering what is at stake. The third part deals with the media system in each country.

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Cross-national Report WP 1a .

Project:

The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres

Project acronym: Project website:

Europub.com http://europub.wz-berlin.de

Funded by:

5th Framework Programme of the European Commission HPSE-CT2000-00046 WP 1 (Analysis of opportunity structures) Donatella della Porta D 1.2

Contract No. Work package: WP Coordinator: Deliverable number:

Report

Dimensions of Political Opportunities and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere: Hypotheses for a Cross-National Comparison

Author:

Donatella della Porta with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta Appendix written by Europub teams’ members

Date:

February 2003

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PART I.

Dimensions of Political Opportunities and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere: Hypotheses for a Cross-National Comparison• By Donatella della Porta with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta

Our decision to analyze Europeanisation in various European countries is based on the assumption that national characteristics have some influence in the process of Europeanisation. In order to narrow down the range of variables potentially relevant to our topic, in the tradition of literature on Europeanisation, we shall distinguish sets based on geopolitical characteristics (intergovernmentalist and functionalist approaches), institutional isomorphism (appropriateness of fit), cultural appropriateness (neoinstitutionalism) and differential empowerment (multilevel games). As far as possible, we shall adjust our hypotheses in keeping with the different forms of Europeanisation of the public sphere already mentioned.

I. Geopolitical opportunities and Europeanisation Hypotheses on international relations often stress the role of geopolitical factors in determining the degree of openness vis-à-vis international markets and institutions. Intergovernmentalist approaches view the nation-state whose standpoints are heavily influenced by domestic economic interests as the main actor in international relations. If this were true, the dominant actors within each country would be more in favour of Europe the more they stood to gain from EU participation. If, within a realistic approach to international relations, we consider the European Union as an intergovernmental organization, it may be assumed that the stronger the interest toward market integration, the higher would be the degree of Europeanisation in terms of support for Europe and development of a European discourse. We can look here at the following specific hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Size of the country. Traditionally, smaller countries with an open economy have been considered as more open to international integration. In terms of Europeanisation, we can assume that the smaller the country and the smaller its economy, the larger is its (political and economic) dependence on the outside world, and the more consensual is Europeanisation (but also in a wider sense transnationalization) of the public sphere. Small countries are also more likely to be have both a horizontal and a vertical path in the diffusion of frames. As can seen from the following table, our sample of states is composed of two small ones (Netherlands and Switzerland) and the five larger European states. Previous



Most of the hypotheses emerged during a meeting of the Europub research group. In the elaboration of the hypotheses on the political opportunities we also relied upon della Porta 2002a. I am grateful to the Swiss team for help in the collection of data on their country.

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studies on TV news indicate however a very low degree of Europeanisation in the Netherlands vis-à-vis France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Table1. Size of countries Reference France Germany period

Italy

Netherlands Spain

Switzerland

UK

Euro area

59755 (2000) 121 (2000) 0.9 (2000)

301417 (1999) 121 (1999) 0.9 (1999)

Population Total ’000

2001

59190 82311

57348 15987

40266 7231

Density

2001

107

190

80

231

392

175

inhabitants/km2

Net average 2001 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 annual increase over previous 10 years % GDP (data refers to the definition of population described in the System of National Accounts 1993) Per capita Gdp 2001 25255 26542 26074 27847 20961 31005 24455 using current (2000) (Methodology (2000) prices and current based on PPPs 1968 SNA) Value added in 2001 2.8 1.2 2.7 2.6 (2000) 3.4 1.6 (SNA) 0.9 agriculture as % (Western of Gdp Germany) Value added in 2001 24.8 29.9 27.7 26.2 (2000) 29.0 29.0 (SNA) 26.5 industry as % of (WG) GDP Value added in 2001 72.4 68.9 69.5 71.1 (2000) 67.5 69.4 (SNA) 72.6 services as % of (WG) GDP

24320 (2000) -------------

Source: Oecd: August 2002, http://www.oecd.org/EN/documents/0,,EN-documents-0nodirectorate-no-1-no-0,00.html Hypotheses 2. International orientation of the economy. Another hypothesis that would resonate with a realistic approach is that the greater the dependence of a national economy on foreign (and especially intra-EU) trade, the more consensual would be the support for European integration. Moreover, one would also expect the most integrated countries to be affected more by horizontal, cross-country diffusion of frames. As indicated in the table below, the two small countries are indeed those with a greater integration in international markets, both in terms of investments and trade. The UK has however also a very high outwards investment (14% of GDP). Spain’s international integration is lower, but its growth is fastest, while Italy has a very low (and declining) flow of direct foreign investments, Table 2. Economic dependence from international markets Reference France Germany period

Italy

Netherlands Spain

Switzerland

UK

Euro area

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS (based on official national statistics from the balance of payments) Inward as % of GDP Outward as % of GDP

1999

2.6

2.5

0.4

8.4

1.6

1.3

5.8

...

1999

6.2

4.7

0.3

11.5

6.0

7.0

14.0

...

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FOREIGN TRADE exports of goods and services as % of GDP (at current prices and exchange rates) average annual growth over the previous 5 years as % of GDP (at 1995 constant prices) imports of goods and services as % of GDP (at current prices and exchange rates) average annual growth over previous five years as % of GDP (at 1995 constant prices)

2001

22.5

30.9

22.0

57.0

19.8

33.2

20.1 30.3 (2000) (2000)

2001

0.5

1.7

-0.8

1.5

2.5

0.6

0.9

2001

22.3

26.3

21.2

51.4

26.4

33.9

23.8 29.5 (2000) (2000)

2001

1.4

1.2

2.4

1.3

4.8

1.4

2.8

1.6 (2000)

2.4 (2000)

Source: Oecd: August 2002, http://www.oecd.org/EN/documents/0,,EN-documents-0nodirectorate-no-1-no-0,00.html Hypothesis 3. Net material gains from European integration. If the strength of national interests is considered as an influencing factor on the position of each country, one could surmise that countries who are net-payers would be more likely to be critical of, and/or have higher levels of conflict regarding Europeanisation than countries that are net-receivers. Conflicts on economic issues should also trigger contestation from below, especially when élites support EU policies. As indicated below, Spain is the only winner state, followed by France, and then the UK and Italy, with Germany and the Netherlands as the countries with higher net contributions. Table 3. “Operational” budgetary balance (after UK correction) based on the UK rebate definition* 1994 Mecus

1995 %GN P

Mecus

Fr

-1900.9

-0.17

-1587.8

Ge.

-11302.2

-0.65

-12207.8

It.

-1881.3

-0.23

Ne.

-492.8

Sp. UK

1996 %GN P -0.14

Mecus -1486.0

1997 %GN P -0.12

Mecus

1998 %GN P

Mecus

1999 %GN P

Mecus

2000 %GN P

Mecus

%GNP

-1947.9

-0.16

-1486.7

-0.12

-640.6

-0.05

-1415.3 -0.10

-0.66 -11457.9

-0.62 -11588.8

-0.63

- 8962.7

-0.48

-9478.9

-0.49

-9273.2 -0.47

-396.3

-0.05

-2178.5

-0.23

-655.8

-0.07

-1888.2

-0.18

-1260.2

-0.12

713.4 0.06

-0.17

-725.9

-0.24

-1467.4

-0.46

-1265.1

-0.39

-1716.3

-0.50

-2014.2

-0.55

-1737.7

-0.44

3934.4

4.68

3535.9

3.95

3980.7

4.07

4302.5

4.05

4676.3

4.35

3755.6

3.22

4373.9

3.61

1078.3

0.13

-3077.4

-0.36

-855.0

-0.09

-742.4

-0.06

-4193.7

-0.34

-3506.8

-0.26

-3774.7

-0.25

*There are many possible methods of measuring budgetary balances, the one preferred by the Commission is based on the “UK rebate definition”. Under this method, Member States’ total payments of the VAT and GNP based resources are set to equal total allocated expenditure. These budgetary balances show the relation between the share of a Member State in total payments of the VAT and GNP resources and its share in total expenditure allocated to the Member States. A positive figure means that the Member State, according to this calculation method, is a “net beneficiary” from the EU budget and a negative figure that it is a “net contributor”. This method also implies that the overall EU-% balance is in principle restricted to sum up to zero.

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source: Allocation of 2000 EU operating expenditure by Member State, p. 126, http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm Hypothesis 4. Duration of EU membership. We could expect that the longer a country had been a Member of the European Union, the more developed it’s interests in Europe would have become, and consequently the greater its consensus on Europe as a polity (although perhaps not necessarily on specific policies of the EU). The countries we have under consideration, France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands, were founding members of the European Economic Community, the UK joined in 1973 and Spain in 1986, Switzerland is still not part of the European Union.

II. Institutional Isomorphism and Europeanisation Risse, Green, Cowles and Caporaso suggested that EU activities impact on national institutional settings, rules, norms etc.; in some cases, a “good fit” between EU and domestic institutions makes adaptation easy; in others, there is a misfit with an accompanying conflictual process that may lead to the transformation of domestic institutions towards convergence, or vice versa, to the survival of divergences. Indeed, “The lower the compatibility (fit) between European institutions, on the one hand, and national institutions, on the other, the higher the adaptational pressures” (2001, 7). In its analysis of Europeanisation of the German state, Peter Katzenstein (1997) suggested that the similarities between the EU and the German constitutional norms facilitated convergence. A set of hypotheses on the Europeanisation of the public sphere starts therefore from the assumption that (although there is no Europeanisation without some misfits), the better the fit between national political institutions and the institutions of the European Union, the more consensual Europeanisation will be—therefore also the greater the support for Europeanisation. These hypotheses may be integrated with Lijphart’s typology of majoritarian versus consensual models of democracy. The former characterizes the British system—in the recent redefinition of Lijphart (1999) it consists of ten principal elements: 1.

Concentration of the executive power: single-party governments

2.

The prevalence of the executive power

3.

Bipartisan system

4.

Majoritarian electoral system

5.

Pluralist systems of interest representation

6.

Unitary and centralized government

7.

Asymmetrical bicameralism or monocameralism

8.

No written constitution

9.

Parliamentary sovereignty in the legislative function

10.

Central banks dependent from the executive

While the majoritarian model is based on a principle of exclusion of the minority, the dominant logic of the consensual model is to protect minorities. Thus the consensual model envisages:

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1.

Dispersion of the executive power in governments of large coalitions

2.

Equilibrium between executive and legislative power

3.

Multi-party systems

4.

Proportional electoral law

5.

Neocorporatist interest representation

6.

Federalism and territorial decentralization

7.

Balanced bicameralism.

8.

Rigid constitution

9.

Constitutional control of the legislation

10.

Central banks Independent from the executive.

In general, it may be taken that EU institutions resonate with the consensual model (versus the majoritarian one) in particular because of the strength of autonomy of parliament, the executive, the judiciary, the central banks, and the territorial decentralization of power. It must, however, be added that (as opposed to the consensual model) the European parliament is very weak, it has very limited legislative powers and an even weaker control over the executive; moreover, there is a largerly pluralist representation of interests and as yet no constitution. We shall now seek to identify the different sets of indicators: the separation of power between Parliament and Government, the degree of independence of the judiciary, the autonomy of the National Bank, and the geographic distribution of power. Hypothesis 5. Assessment of fit between national representative institutions and EU governance institutions. In terms of the relationship between representative institutions, one would expect those of the EU to resonate more with domestic ones (and therefore to produce less conflict on Europeanisation) in countries with a stronger division of power between Parliament and Government. In general, the consensual model has a high level of separation while the majoritarian one is charaterised by a stronger control of the executive. Indicators for the degree of separation between Parliament and the Government have been traditionally singled out by political scientists as follows: Types of parliament. Different political systems have different types of Parliament. On the basis of the number of chambers, the role of the committees, the number and the internal unity of the parties in parliament, political scientists distinguish between: a) adversarial parliaments, i.e. unicameral (or with only formal bicameralism); committees with little power; this leads to a bipartisan system with highly compact parties and is generally used to identify a majority and government (monoparty) in which parliament has little autonomy (non è comprensibile questo passaggio); b) polycentric parliaments, i.e. a bicameral structure with a strong system of committees and many parties with little internal cohesion. This strengthens the autonomy of parliament vis-à-vis government because there is a weaker relationship between the parties making up the majority and the coalition government. The presence of a bi-cameral symmetric parliament is an indicator of a consensual democracy (good fit with EU institution; support for Europeanisation)—however, we can expect that, ceteris paribus, members of parliament are more present in the public sphere in a polycentric type of parliament. The position of our countries on two important indicators of types of parliament are indicated below. Among them, the UK is a typical example of adversarial parliament

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while Switzerland and Germany, being federal states, have different electoral mechanisms for the two chambers with one of them representing the single federal regions. The other countries are situated between these two poles. Table 4. Number and types of parliamentary chambers Country

Index

Definition

ranking

France

3

Asymmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous

3

Germany

4

Symmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous

1

Italy

3

Symmetrical bicameralism, homogeneous

3

Netherland

3

Symmetrical bicameralism, homogeneous

3

Spain

3

Asymmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous

3

Switzerland

4

Symmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous

1

United Kingdom 2,5 Weak bicameralism Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 231

7

Coalitions. The consensual model is characterized by large coalitions; single-party governments with minimal winning coalitions are vice versa indicators of a majoritarian model (therefore, not a good fit with EU institutions). Moreover, the executive power tends to be stronger where governments are single party—especially governments based on “minimal winning coalitions” which have the potential to reduce scope for internal struggle; multiparty systems, by contrast offer greater potential access to government. As indicated in our table, Switzerland, and Italy belong to the consensual model with large coalitions, the Netherlands and Germany score in the middle, France, Spain and the UK belong to the majoritarian model, with a high percentage of minimal winning coalition-governments. Switzerland and Italy have therefore a better fit; France, Spain and the UK less so. If Europeanisation involved lower conflict in consensual model states that fit better to the institutional model of the EU, one would expect the executive of a majoritarian democracy power in disagreement with EU institutions to have a strong presence in the public sphere. Table 5. Single party government with minimal winning coalition (1945-1996) Country

%

ranking

France

62.5

5

Germany

36.2

4

Italy

10.9

2

Netherlands

25.3

3

Spain

73.0

6

Switzerland

4.10

1

United Kingdom

96.7

7

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 334 Electoral systems. Majoritarian (plurality) systems are indicators of majoritarian models of democracy in so far as they tend to reduce the number of potential options; proportional systems, by contrast augment (or, better, reflect) pluralism. On the basis of this variable, our

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countries rank as follows: the UK is a typical majoritarian system, followed by France and Spain. The fit with EU institutions is better in proportional-model countries, with a consequently diminished expectation of conflict on Europeanisation, although the plurality of opinions inherent in this system also involve an inevitable number opposed to Europeanisation, which are heard in Parliament and in the public sphere. Table 6. Disproportionality in the election for the legislative (1945-1996) Country

Disproportionality

France

Electoral system

ranking

21.08 Majority

7

Germany

2.52 Proportional

2

Italy

3.25 Proportional

4

Netherlands

1.30 Proportional

1

Spain

8.15 Proportional

5

Switzerland

2.53 Proportional

3

United Kingdom

10.33 Plurality

6

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 183. Number of parties. The principal characteristic of the majoritarian model of democracy is its foundation on a two-party system; consensual models have more parties, therefore, the greater the number of parties, the better the fit with EU institutions leading to an easier adaptation and swifter development of Europeanisation. As indicated below, the number of effective parties is high in Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and France; low in Germany, Spain and (especially) the UK. Table 7. Number of effective parties (1945-1996) Country

Average

Minimal

Maximal

n. of election

ranking

France

3.43

2.49

4.52

10

4

Germany

2.93

2.48

4.33

13

5

Italy

4.91

3.76

6.97

14

2

Netherlands

4.65

3.49

6.42

15

3

Spain

2.76

2.34

3.02

7

6

Switzerland

5.24

4.71

6.70

13

1

United Kingdom

2.11

1.99

2.27

14

7

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 97. Summary Index. Synthesizing the various indicators (summing their rankings in the tables) into an index shows Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands with a high degree of division of power, followed by Germany, and then Spain, France, and the UK as examples of majoritarian countries. Applying the fits/misfits model should lead to the hypothesis that conflicts on Europeanisation would emerge more where the EU institutional design clashes with the domestic one. National institutions would be then involved in a debate (“from EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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above”) on Europeanisation. Furthermore, given the stronger division of power in consensual democracies, we would however expect that the institutional presence in the public sphere be more pluralistic than in majoritarian countries. Table 8. Index of functional separation of power between Parliament and Government (1=high separation) Country

points ranking

France

19

6

Germany

12

4

Italy

8

3

Netherlands

7

2

17

5

5

1

20

7

Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 97. Hypothesis 6. Assessment of fit of the national judiciary institutions to EU Courts. Despite the formal division of power, the judiciary in all contemporary democracies is subject to some degree of political control. This can either be through the organizational and functional subordination of the District Attorney to the Minister of Justice (as in France and Spain), or by the control over the careers of judges (through, for example, the popular election of the Public Attorney in the United States or in Great Britain with the entry into the magistracy delayed until late in their legal career of individuals who’s loyalty to the establishment is beyond doubt). Since the eighties, however, research has shown increased autonomy of the judiciary—indicating judicial power is spreading into areas hitherto held exempt and judicial procedures, typical of trials, into many arenas of public decision-making (Tate and Vallinder 1995). Four areas are mentioned in which judicial power has extended: a) increased participation by judges in law drafting; b) extension of the range of conduct subject to judicial decision; c) increased "demands of justice" on the part of the citizenship on the judiciary, and d) the judiciary’s monitoring of the conduct of public administrators (della Porta and Reiter 2001). An independent judiciary fits well with the EU model, and thus can be expected to have lower resistance, especially among its elite, to Europeanisation. As Conant (2001) observed, in comparing certain national legal traditions and institutions with the EU’s, the latter’s dispersion of power fits well with the German system, but not with the French one – and in fact German courts refer to the European Court of Justice (article 177) much more frequently than do the French. We could however expect a high level of autonomy of the judiciary to be seen also in a more widespread representation in the public sphere. As indicated below, the index of the strength of jurisdictional control shows strong autonomy in Germany, Italy and Spain and low autonomy in the other countries. It was however observed that the way EU law functions is more similar to the British tradition of common law than to those in continental Europe (more in general, an increasing similarity with the common law has been noticed, with a resurrection of the old lex mercatoria—see Pizzorno 2002).

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Table 9. Constitutional amendments and strength of jurisdictional control 1945-1996 Country

Index for qualified majority

ranking

Jurisdictional

ranking

control France

2

5

2.2 (weak)

4

Germany

3.5

2

4 (strong)

1

Italy

3

5

2.28 (medium)

3

Netherlands

3

3

1 (none)

5

Spain

3

4

3 (medium)

2

Switzerland

4

1

1 (none)

5

United Kingdom 1 7 1 (none) Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 239 and 247

5

Hypothesis 7. Assessment of fit of national central bank traditions with the European bank. Particularly relevant, because of the effect it has on decisions affecting economic and social policies, is the degree of autonomy of the central banks: a central bank independent from the political power is an indicator of a consensual model. As Fritz Scharpf (2002, 26) remarked, a policy supported by a national central bank may resonate with that of the European Bank—for instance, in Germany “the shift from a severe monetary policy defined by the Bundesbank… and a severe monetary policy supported by the ECB … should appear as more an opportunity than a menace”. On this variable, our countries are ranked as follows: in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands the central bank has a high degree of independence while those of France, Italy, the UK and Spain much less so. In the former countries, there is, therefore, a higher degree of fit with the powerful European bank—Europeanisation can thus be expected to be more consensual. Table 10. Independence of the central bank (1945-1996) Country

Index Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti

Index Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini

Average

ranking

France

0.27

0.37

0.32

4

Germany

0.69

0.69

0.69

1

Italy

0.25

0.27

0.26

6

Netherlands

0.42

0.53

0.48

3

Spain

0.23

0.27

0.25

7

Switzerland

0.56

0.64

0.60

2

0.32

0.31

5

United Kingdom 0.30 Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 258

Hypothesis 8. Assessment of fit of the national geographical distribution of power between center and periphery with the EU decentralized institutions. The European Union has been described as characterized by multilevel governance, a form of sui generis federalism. Decentralized, federalist states therefore have a higher degree of fit with EU institutions. Two sets of indicators may be examined: Local governments. All states devolve varying degrees of power to organs of sub-national government. The peculiarity of the tension between national and local government stems from

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the existence, at sub-national level too, of elected governments. Western democracies have however different levels of territorial decentralization which appear in particular contrast with each other when examining decentralized and unitary states. In the former there is a plurality of independent centers of power, albeit with some level of coordination; in the latter, the legislative and executive power at national level holds sway over the peripheral organs. As regards legitimisation of power, the former emphasizes pluralism, task-sharing and control from below whereas the latter especially privileges output, through rigid coordination (Allum 1991, 419). Different indicators have been proposed for measuring the degree of decentralization: demographic and geographical size of the local units; degree of division of power between the center and the periphery, controls and financial relationships between the different levels of government. It was noticed however that, besides legal competences, the peripheries may exercise an influence on the central state via political resources. While, for instance, local governments in Great Britain have more legal empowerment, those of France and Italy have important political resources to play against the center (Page 1991, 1-2). Federalism and regions. On a mesolevel of territorial power, a distinction has been drawn between federalist and unitary states. According to William H. Riker (1964, 11), federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are shared between regional governments and a central government in such a way that (1) the two levels of government command extend over the same territory and the same people; (2) each level has at least one area of responsibility in which it is autonomous and (3) there is some guarantee of autonomy in the sphere proper to every government. On this variable too, however, western democracies have converged: while federal states have became more coordinated, unitary states—such as France, Italy and Spain—have developed regional levels of government (della Porta 2002b). As indicated in the table below, according to Arendt Lijphart, our countries are divided into unitary (France, Italy and UK), semi-federal (Spain and the Netherlands) and federal (Germany and Switzerland). Other scholars have, however, argued for different assessments (for instance, the Netherlands has been considered as a unitary state by Kriesi et al. 1995). We may expect the presence of local governments as claim makers to increase with the degree of decentralization of territorial power. A general expectation is that decentralization fits with EU institutions, limiting conflicts on Europeanisation. Decentralized political systems and pluralistic society have been considered as more open to trasnational links (Tarrow 2001, 6). The EU can also empower regions through the implementation of structural funds—in order that Regions more able to use funds be particularly favorable to the EU. In countries where Regions lack power and resources and are centre-dependent, they may therefore enter the public sphere supporting Europe. However, the EU can also subtract competencies in the case of stronger regions (Boerzel 2001): in countries where Regions already have power and resources, this may lead to their attempting to resist Europeanisation by delegitimating Europe through public speeches.

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Table 11. Degree of federalism and decentralization Country France Germany Italy

Index of pluralism Definition

ranking

1.3 Unitary

5

5 Federal

1

1.3 Unitary

5

Netherlands

3 Semi-federal

3

Spain

3 Semi-federal

3

Switzerland

5 Federal

1

United Kingdom

1 Unitary

7

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 209.

III. Institutional appropriateness and political cultures Institutional approaches stress the role of norms as the basis for the principle of appropriateness. We can therefore expect public debates on Europeanisation to be influenced by general attitudes towards Europe, in both the public and the elites. Support for Europe and European institutions has varied in different countries. In general, satisfaction is declining: at the turn of the 21st century, about half of Europeans were dissatisfied with the development of the European institutions (Pache 2001; Méchet and Pache 2000). This trend is usually taken as an indicator of the failure of EU legitimation “on output” (that is, in the effectiveness of policy outcomes, instead of the representativeness of the input procedures) based on the “expertocracy” of the Eurocrats (Eder 2000, 172). This type of bureaucratic legitimacy— which is particularly characteristic of the European Commission’s activity—is becoming more and more problematical the lower a “permissive consensus” there is on the effectiveness of the EU policies. The development of critical public spheres—even in the “elite” forms of social movements--challenges the “Arkanpraxis” of commitology (Eder 2000, 179-80). In fact, “European institutions are regularly criticized for being bureaucratic, inefficient and for lacking transparent procedures” (Le Torrec et al. 2001, 8). Eurobarometer’s opinion polls indicate in general greater support for intergovernmental rather than supranationalist frames (Reif 1993). Traditional representative legitimacy, which should underpin decisions reached by intergovernmental institutions (such as the Council of Ministers) becomes, moreover, less effective when decisions are not discussed in national parliaments and the public sphere. The “conjunct decision-making” adopted by the Commission on most on the issues of the first pillar have lost intergovernamental characters (Scharpf 2002, p. 28), being in fact legitimized in terms of deliberative democracy, instead than a representative one (Joergen and Neyer 1997). The launching by EU institutions of campaigns on general ethical issues (such as gender-equality, anti-racism, human rights) (Trenz 1999) is evidence of a search for a moral basis for a collective identity (similar to what the Nation had represented in the construction of the State). If, as some scholars state (for instance, Majone 1998), the EU is a regulatory agency, with therefore different a legitimatory principle than a liberal representative state (Beetham and Lord 1998), however, the new bases for legitimacy should be justified. Hypothesis 9. Degree of general support for Europe in the public opinion. As far as Europeanisation of the public sphere is concerned, a plausible hypothesis is that scepticism in

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public opinion is reflected in low support for Europeanisation (and therefore conflict on Europeanisation) in our sources. If distrust in public opinion did not resonate with the Euroskepticism of institutional élites, than we could expect a high level of dissent from below. In general, the most satisfied countries with EU democracy are Spain, followed by the UK and France, Italy occupying a centre position. Germany and the Netherlands have a higher percentage of dissatisfied citizens. It is worth noticing, however, that there is a high volatility of opinions, and different trends in different countries (with acceptance in Spain and France growing strongly). The European Commission is considered particularly unreliable in the UK and Germany, and comparatively very reliable in Spain and Italy (countries where the national governments are not considered as reliable). In general, it may be expected that countries with stronger national identification and who set trust in national institutions will manifest stronger resistance to Europeanisation, while, viceversa countries with a weak or problematic national identity and/or high levels of distrust/dissatisfaction, will show greater support for integration as a way to overcoming identity and governance problems at national level. Dissatisfaction with democracy in one’s own country and in Europe tends, however, to correlate differently in different countries: while in general there are similar values on the two variables, the rapport of people dissatisfied with their own government minus dissatisfaction with EU is +22% in Italy, but – 30% in the Netherlands. If we compare degrees of dissatisfaction of governmental EU institutions with governmental domestic institutions, and parliamentary EU institutions with parliamentary domestic institutions, we can see that Spaniards and Italians tend to believe that their own governments are much more unreliable than the EU commission, followed by the French and then the British; the Germans and the Dutch seem, by contrast to perceive their countries’ governments as reliable/unreliable as the that of the EU. Similarly, the Spaniards and the Italians trust the EU parliament much more than their domestic parliaments, less so do the French and Germans, while the Dutch trust their own more than the EU parliament, and the British find both quite unreliable. The Dutch trust their national parliament a lot, the EU Parliament little. As for the percentage of participation in EU elections, an indicator however sensitive to national electoral styles, shows the Italians and Spaniards as the only nations with more than 50%, while only about a quarter of the Dutch and British electors turn out. Table 12. Dissatisfaction with and unreliability of European and national istitutions. a) Dissatisfaction with democracy in various institutions Dissatisfaction with democracy in the European Union (% not satisfied) 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000

F I NL UE12 D E UK

51% 47% 46% 48% 47% 55% 47%

46% 39% 50% 43% 54% 32% 36%

51% 35% 43% 41% 49% 34% 38%

40% 32% 41% 36% 42% 23% 37%

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Ranki ng in 2000 3 4 6 5 1 2

Dissatisfaction with one’s own country minus dissatisfaction with EU in 2000 0 22 -30 -1 -2 -3 -2

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Dissatisfaction with democracy in one’s own country (% not satisfied) 1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 F 46% 46% 45% 40% 47% 50% 34% 42% 54% 52% 48% 39% 41% I 72% 83% 86% 72% 82% 77% 77% 75% 80% 76% 72% 67% 67% NL 38% 32% 29% 32% 31% 45% 36% 40% 43% 43% 38% 30% 35% UE12 48% 40% 36% 34% 39% 42% 38% 40% 41% 41% 40% 36% 36% D 55% 19% 18% 19% 15% 21% 23% 26% 22% 22% 24% 17% 21% E 29% 38% 43% UK 54% 43% 36% 31% 40% 43% 42% 34% 30% 34% 43% 43% 37% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 Ranking in 2000 F 40% 34% 55% 56% 51% 49% 56% 37% 35% 4 I 68% 65% 76% 87% 79% 66% 68% 64% 62% 6 NL 25% 24% 27% 30% 28% 27% 23% 20% 17% 1 UE12 35% 36% 39% 45% 51% 42% 43% 31% 33% D 17% 28% 32% 42% 35% 52% 48% 30% 42% 5 E 40% 36% 39% 55% 56% 41% 44% 26% 23% 2 UK 45% 36% 36% 46% 47% 25% 30% 25% 31% 3

1988 42% 71% 34% 38% 20% 48% 38%

b) Un/reliability of European and national institutions (% No) EU 1995 commission F I NL UE12 D E UK

1996

35% 25% 21% 35% 38% 30% 44%

30% 23% 17% 33% 40% 23% 43%

National 1995 1996 governments F 42% I 49% NL 24% UE12 46% D 39% E 54% UK 55%

EU parliament 1995

F I

37% 22%

1997

1999

38% 27% 21% 34% 38% 27% 44%

1997 42% 51% 20% 43% 36% 50% 51%

1996

33% 13% 32% 28% 39% 16% 38%

Ranking

28% 21% 32% 28% 38% 16% 40%

3 2 3 5 1 6

Unreliability of one’s own country gov. minus unreliability EU gov. in 1999 +20 +25 -2 +19 +5 +30 +12

1999 57% 52% 21% 41% 45% 37% 33%

1997

27% 21%

2000

53% 58% 30% 47% 43% 46% 50%

1999

39% 26%

2000

32% 13%

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26% 20%

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NL UE12 D E UK

24% 34% 40% 29% 42%

21% 32% 38% 23% 42%

National 1995 1996 Parliaments F 42% I 45% NL 22% UE12 41% D 35% E 42% UK 46%

29% 34% 38% 26% 43%

1997 39% 46% 19% 38% 33% 38% 42%

34% 25% 29% 15% 39%

34% 26% 31% 15% 42%

5 4 1 6

-4 18 11 28 6

1999 54% 46% 22% 38% 43% 32% 33%

48% 55% 30% 44% 42% 43% 48%

Source: Our elaboration based on Eurobarometer

Table 13. Vote in the elections for the European Parliament (%) Country

1999

Ranking

France

47,0

3

Germany

45,2

4

Italy

70,8

1

Netherlands

29,9

5

Spain

64,3

2

UK

24,0

6

Source: Our elaboration based on The Economist, Pocket Europe in Figures. Hypothesis 10. Degree of elite consensus on European integration. Mass opinion polls do not, however, reflect the attitudes of the elites—although we can expect that political elites tend to follow the opinion of their electorate to a certain extent. Research stressed in fact the importance of an elite opening and learning process in Europeanisation by convergence. An hypothesis to be checked is to which extent support for Europe in the public discourse depends on the opportunities provided by elite attitudes towards institutionalization. As Risse (2001) suggested in an empirical study of three European states, convergence towards a European identity in the elite is eased when the image of Europe resonate with national identities. For instance, elites’ national identities are quite different in Germany (where elites easily incorporate Europe in their definition of “Germanness”) and in Great Britain (where this did not happened). Where a broad elite consensus on European integration still prevails at national level, we can expect low levels of conflict over European integration issues and a predominance of positive references to Europe. SEE ALSO APPENDIX A

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Hypothesis 11. National styles of conflict and conflict resolution. In general, a democratic system works more smoothly in cultures which are more homogeneous. Almond and Powell (1978), for instance, distinguished between countries endowed with a consensual culture and those, characterized by a polarized culture, with deep disagreements. Conflict evolution is influenced by the attitudes of the elites. Historically, an inclusive tendency led to more pragmatic and moderate challengers; viceversa, a repressive attitude brought about a prevalence in the left of the most radical ideologies (Rokkan 1982, 187-88). In general, the most radical ideologies have been present in countries with low parlamentarization, tough obstacles in the representative system and the political isolation of the working class movement (Bartolini 2000, 565-566). While in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian countries, open and pragmatic élites avoided extreme forms of repression, in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain, they instead made recourse to violence in order to exclude the new groups from the political representation. The effect was a more polarized political culture in the latter countries. In some heterogeneous cultures, however, countries divided by ethnic or religious cleavages have succeeded in creating stable democracies, thanks to a consociational agreement among the elites. The Netherlands and Switzerland are examples of culturally divided countries that do however maintain stable democracies. In these countries, the leaders were oriented towards compromise and cooperation (Lijphart 1977). Citizens' groups, separate by religion or language, identify themselves, if not with the rest of the citizenship, at least with their leaders. Research on Europeanisation stressed the facilitating role of consensus-oriented, or cooperative decision-making (Boerzel 2001). Therefore, the more consensual a political culture, the less conflictual Europeanisation should be. The impact of the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the political culture on the Europeanisation of the public sphere is, however, ambivalent. On the one hand, consensual democracy may absorb conflicts which may, by contrast, emerge more openly in a polarized system. On the other hand, it is also plausible that consensual democracies tend to discuss political issues more openly, while an high degree of polarization may reduce access of minority opinions to the public sphere. Assuming that the degree of consensus is reflected in the range of distance of positions in the party system, the tradition of our countries ranges from high distance in Italy, France, Spain, and the Netherlands to low distance in UK, Germany and Switzerland. It must be observed, however, that within “pillarized” systems, the distance between parties on the political spectrum does not automatically translate into conflicts (on the Dutch case, Kriesi et al. 1995). More recent data, referring to support for extreme parties, indicate less polarization in UK, Germany and the Netherlands, medium in Spain and Switzerland, high in Italy and France. Table 14. Overlapping, similarity and differences between parties, per country Overlapping

Similarity

Distance

Ranking

Switzerland (PS/PDC)

0.56

0.30

0.27

7

Germany (SPD/CDU-CSU)

0.51

0.26

0.28

6

UK (Labourist/Conservatory)

0.47

0.25

0.33

5

Netherlands (PvdA/ARP-CHU)

0.15

0.08

0.47

3

Spain (PCE/CD)

0.15

0.08

0.47

3

France (PCF/UDR)

0.06

0.02

0.57

2

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Italy

1

PCI/MSI

0.12

0.02

0.64

PCI/PLI

0.13

0.07

0.44

Source: Our elaboration based on Sani and Sartori 1983, 324. Table 15. Polarization index: support for communist, left-socialist, populist and ultra-right parties Country

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-97

17.6

21.4

23.6

27.4

0.4

0.6

6.0

-

39.6

34.2

15.5

25.2

Netherlands

4.9

1.8

8.3

-

Spain

4.6

7.2

9.6

10.6

Switzerland

7.7

8.5

11.1

9.6

United Kingdom

0.1

0.0

0.0

2.6

France Germany Italy

Sources: Our elaboration based Lane and Ersson 1999, table 5.4, 145. IV. Differential empowerment of political and social actors at the national and supranational levels European institutions have been described as being part of a multi-level system of governance (Marks 1993), in which powers are shared among institutions, while national, subnational and supranational actors tend to act in two-level (or multilevel) games (Putnam 1988). The general idea is that Europeanisation facilitates and constrains the strategic opportunities of different actors in different ways. If European institutions work as an additional level of opportunity, it is, however, open to debate whether the actors who are powerful at national level tend also to be powerful supranationally, or whether the European institutions offer more leverage to actors who are powerless at home. As far the specific position on Europeanisation is convcerned, one could expect that actors who are relatively well-placed nationally and have established access to national authorities (eg., labour unions in corporatist countries) would be critical of Europeanisation and/or remain more strongly nationallyoriented in making their claims. Actors who can use the EU-level to compensate for relative weaknesses or marginalization at national level (e.g., regional minorities, immigrants) could take advantage of new resources whenever Europeanisation provides them with the means to overcome a hostile national executive (Schmidt 1997; Green Cowles 2001)—and would therefore support Europeanisation. However, an equally plausible counterhypothesis is that power is cumulative: the EU-system of goverment could also strengthen even more those who are already nationally strong and marginalize the weak even more than they are already at national level. For instance, it has been observed that Europeanisation strengthens national executives whom, because of their institutional resources, are the most important players in EU institutions (Moravcsik 1994). Irrespective of the direction this hypothesis points towards, it can be assumed that the relative resources and policy access of different actors at national, as well as at European level, play

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an important role in defining the attitudes of these actors towards Europeanisation, and their tendency to voice them in the public sphere. Indeed, it is reasonable to take as a starting point the assumption that “The extent to which domestic actors are able to exploit new opportunities depends on their previous resources and identities provided by domestic institutions” (Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001, 11-12). In our research we shall check the degree of participation in Europeanisation of the public sphere of such actors as parties, interest groups and social movements. Although a number of these characteristics changes in accordance with different policy issues, some features tends to be constant cross-issues (Green Cowles and Risse 2001, 225). Hypothesis 12. National political parties will be more active supporters/opponents of Europeanisation the most powerful they are in their domestic sphere While at the dawn of democracies parties were loose aggregates of notables, primarily gathered around electoral committees, the ideological mass party emerged, with its permanent organizational structure, professional politicians and strong ideologies as those democracies developed. This type of party accomplished a function of social integration: it was not only able to represent its members, but also to offer them collective identities (Pizzorno 1996, 1018). The dense network of associations near the parties were present even during the most different aspects of daily life. Research on the political parties has pointed out, however, that the ability of the parties to build an identity has declined (della Porta 2001). The parties have evolved toward a “catch-all model” (or professional-electoral, or cartel party) directed to conquer the largest number of electors through ideological moderation and the use of mass media. Data on membership, electoral volatility, and electors’ identification with parties point in particular to a fall in parties’ abilities to forge collective identities. There are however differences in the various countries with, apparently, stronger parties in Switzerland, Italy, Germany and (increasingly so) in Spain, and instead weaker parties in France, UK, and Netherlands. Electoral participation is, in the nineties, still high in Germany and Italy, low in France and very low in Switzerland. It is to be expected that stronger parties have a larger say in European claims making—but they may also be critical of institutions that challenge their (domestically established) power. Table 16 Changes in party membership between 1980 and 2000 Country*

% of members upon electors in 1980

% of ranki Changes in Changes in ng % absolute members numbers upon electors in 2000

Membership decline in % %

France

5.05

1.57

7

-3.48 -1,122,128

-64.59

Germany

4.52

2.93

4

-1.59

-174,967

-8.95

Italy

9.66

4.05

2

-5.61 -2,091,887

-51.54

Netherlands

4.29

2.51

5

-1.78

-136,459

-31.67

Spain

1.20

3.42

3

+2.22

+808,705

+250.73

Switzerland

10.4

6.50

1

-3.90

-90,800

-50.39

United Kingdom

4.12

1.92

6

-2.20

-853,156

-50.39

* The first elections oscillate between 1977 and 1980, the final one between 1998 and 2000.

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Source: Our elaboration based on Mair & van Biezen, 2001. For Switzerland, source: Ladner 1995. According to Gruner (1977), there were about 390,000 party members in the mid 1970s (cited by Ladner 1999, 245). If we divide this by the number of Swiss citizens, i.e. persons entitled to vote (3,735,037 persons in 1975), we get an organizational rate of about 10.4%. In relation to the number of electors, i.e. citizens who participated in the election, this rate amounts to about 19.9%. According to a survey among the presidents of cantonal parties, Switzerland counts about 299,200 party members in the mid 1990s (Ladner 1999, 246). Divided by the number of Swiss citizens (4,596,209 persons in 1995), an organizational rate of about 6.5% is arrived at. In relation to the number of electors, i.e. citizens having participated in the election, this amounts to about 16.1%.

Table 17. Strength of trust in party, 1975-1992 Percent who feel very near or quite near to a party Year

IT

FR

D

NL

GB

SP

EU- CH avera ge

1975

-

25

29

31

-

-

-

59

1978

46

28

29

40

40

-

37

53

1980

39

19

32

33

37

-

32

54

1985

37

18

34

31

30

11

30

48

1990

31

17

28

30

32

13

27

(64)

1992

31

16

28

28

41

13

29

42

rank

3

6

4

4

2

7

29

1

Source: Eurobarometer, various issues. For Switzerland (with % referring to 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995), Nabholz 1998. This is a measure of party identification at the moment of national elections from 1975 to 1995. Note that the percentage for 1991 has to be interpreted with care because other studies calculated the number of party sympathizers at about 45% at the beginning of the 1990s (Longchamp 1991, cited by Nabholz 1998: 34). Moreover, this measure is not exactly “% very near or quite near to a party” in the table above, but the only that easily available for Switzerland.

Table 18. Electoral participation in % (1940s to 1990s) Country

First elections After the II WW

Last Last elections in the 1990s elections in the 1960s

ranking

Difference between the 1960s and the 1990s

France

(1946) 71.5

(1968) 68.2

(1997) 68.0

5

- 0.2

Germany

(1949) 78.5

(1969) 86.7

(1997) 82.3

2

- 4.4

Italy

(1946) 89.1

(1968) 92.8

(1996) 82.9

1

- 9.9

The Netherlands

(1946) 93.1

(1967) 95.0

(1998) 73.0

3

- 22.0

United Kingdom

(1945) 75.8

(1966) 75.8

(1997) 71.6

4

- 4.2

Switzerland

(1947) 72.4

(1967) 65.7

(1999) 43.3

6

- 29.1

Source: della Porta 2001; for Switzerland Bundesamt fuer Statistik 2002.

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Hypothesis 13. National interest groups will be more active supporters/opponents of Europeanisation the most powerful they are in their domestic sphere. The traditional structure of interest representation has been defined as pluralist—with multiple, voluntary, competing, non-hierarchical associations which have no license, are unrecognized, un-subsidized, and are not created or controlled by the state (Schmitter 1974, 55). Their activities are typically based on parliamentary lobbying, campaigning to mobilize public opinion and, sometimes, actions of protest (Offerlé 1994, 37). Since the seventies, research has focused widely on a neocorporatist model of representation, typical, for instance, of the Scandinavian countries, in which the constitutive units are monolithic, necessary, not in reciprocal competition, hierarchical and diversified according to functional criteria. They hold a licence, are recognized, subsidized, and sometimes sponsored and controlled by the state (Schmitter 1974). The institutional contacts between groups and governments are frequent and effective; the groups often have responsibility in policy implementation. The two models follow different logics of interaction between the members and the outside. A pluralist system is characterized by a fragmented organizational structure, poor in resources, which has to rely heavily upon its base for support. A neocorporatist system is formed instead by strong, integrated and rich associations, relatively independent from their members (Kriesi 1994, chap. 12). While lobbying is typical of a pluralist influence, a corporative influence typically relies instead on concertation—i.e. the consultation of organized interests with the public institutions and their participation in the implementation of policies. Our countries are divided between pluralistic (Italy, France, Spain, Great Britain) and neocorporatist (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). At EU level, participation in concertation activities (comitology) is an important mode of decision-making and policy implementation. It could be expected that the stronger the domestic tradition of concertation, the more interest groups are fit to compete at European level and therefore support Europeanisation. However, it is also plausible that the stronger the interest groups are at home, the more they resist devolving power to the EU. We may expect that stronger interest organizations be more present in the public sphere (with, therefore, a debate “from below” on Europeanisation)—however, it is also plausible that organizations that are weaker in institutional resources make a larger use of the public sphere. Table 19. Pluralism of interest groups (from the sixties to the eighties) Country

Index of pluralism ranking

France

2.84

4

Germany

1.38

5

Italy

3.12

2

Netherlands

1.19

6

Spain

3.25

3

1

7

3.38

1

Switzerland United Kingdom

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 197.

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Models of interest representation are in part reflected in the organizational strength of interest organizations. We may expect that organizationally stronger interest groups be more vocal in expressing their opinion on Europeanisation. According to official statistics, unions are stronger in terms of members in UK, Italy and Germany, followed by Netherlands and Switzerland, much weaker in Spain and France. Table: 20. Trade union density. Country Trade union density 1

Trade union density 2

(% based on employed)

(% based on dependent work)

1950

1960

1970

1980* 1990

1997** 1950

1960

1970

1980* 1990

1997**

30.2

19.2

21.0

17.1

9.2

8.6

-

19.6

21.7

18.5

10.3

9.9

Germany 40.8

38.7

37.7

40.6

38.5

33.4

36.2

38.2

37.5

39.1

35.8

29.7

Italy

47.8

29.3

41.5

60.8

65.5

73.4

43.8

26.5

38.2

54.5

55.4

61.2

NL

44.2

44.1

39.8

39.4

29.5

28.9

43.0

43.5

39.3

36.6

27.0

27.1

Spain

-

-

-

8.3

12.1

15.1

-

-

-

5.7

8.9

11.5

CH

40.1

38.6

33.2

34.6

30.6

26.9

40.1

38.6

33.2

34.5

30.4

25.6

UK

44.8

44.9

49.8

56.3

42.8

36.4

44.1

44.3

48.6

52.8

40.1

32.2

France

Sources: Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, pp. 270-72, 322-23, 416-17, 488-89, 599, 692-93, 74445. For Spain, * 1981; ** For France and UK, 1995. For France, all years, net density. Hypothesis 14. National social movements will be more active supporters/opponents of Europeanisation the most powerful they are in their domestic sphere Social movements are (a) nets of predominantly informal interactions, based on (b) shared beliefs and solidarity, that are mobilized on (c) conflictual issues through (d) a frequent use of varied forms of protest (della Porta and Diani 1999, chap. 1). Social movements in the countries we are studying seem however to vary in their organizational structure, ideologies, and repertoires of action. New social movements, based on left-wing, libertarian concern, have been usually described as better structured in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands than in France (see Kriesi et al. 1995 for a comparison of these four countries), Italy, and Spain—with the UK considered as a somewhat “exceptional” case. Social movements have tended to use more moderate repertoires in Switzerland and the Netherlands, followed by Germany and the UK, more radical in Spain, Italy and France (on Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany and France, see Kriesi et al. 1995). We may expect these differences to play a role in the presence of social movement actors as claim-makers for Europeanisation—with more presence in the media for the better structured groups. The stronger the social movement sector, the more widespread will be “bottom-up” forms of Europeanisation of public debate, with participation by societal actors with either pro- or anti-Europeanisation position. We can however expect that conflicts would develop more on the policy (decisions) and politics (democratic deficit) of the EU rather than upon the

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existence of a European polity. Weaker movements may make greater recourse to protest in order to compensate for their lack of other channels of access to claims making. Although strong indicators on forms of unconventional political participation are hard to find, opinion polls indicate cross-national differences on the degree and forms of protest within a common trend towards a larger use of non-electoral forms of participation from the 1950s to the 1990s. In the 1990s, respondents in Britain declared a higher percent of engagement in forms of political participation beyond voting (77), those in Spain were the lowest (32), with all other countries near 55%. The very recent results of the World Value Survey show widespread protest in the form of signing petitions (very high in all countries except Spain), followed by attending lawful demonstrations (less popular in Switzerland and the UK). About one tenth of the population joins boycotts (up to 23.4% in the Netherlands, but only 5.6% in Spain); a lower percentage declares going on official strikes (very low in Switzerland and Germany, high in France). Occupying buildings is quite widespread in Italy and France, followed by the Netehrlands and Spain. The referendum, that specific form of direct democracy has been used almost exclusively in Switzerland and Italy—and in the latter country not often by social movements. Table 20. Participation beyond vote (in %) Country

1959

1974

1981

1990

Ranking 1990

-

-

52

57

2

Germany

16

34

48

57

2

Italy

10

34

50

56

4

Netherlands

-

28

37

54

5

Spain

-

-

32

32

6

Switzerland

-

-

-

-

France

18 31 66 77 1 United Kingdom source: Civic culture (1959), Political Action (1973-6), European Value Survey (1981), World Value Survey (1990), as reported by Topf 1995, 69.

Cross-national differences emerge, moreover, in the forms of political participation, with more disruptive forms of protest being more widespread in France, Italy and Spain. However, the last polls of the World Value Survey reveal an increasing use of most forms of protest in most countries.

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Table 21. Extent to which people have taken different political action for or against a particular cause. Country

In percentage of all respondents

1990-1993

2000

Sign petition

Join boycott

Attend lawful demonstrat ion

Join official strikes

Occupy building

Sign petition

Join boycott

Attend lawful demonstrat ion

Join official strikes

Occupy building

France

53.7

12.5

32.7

10.1

7.9

68.3

13.2

39.7

12.6

9.0

Germany*

56.5

10.0

20.5

2.3

1.1

54.5

8.5

34.1

1.8

0.8

10.9

36.0

6.1

7.6

54.6

10.3

34.8

5.4

8.0

Italy

48.1

Netherlands

50.8

7.8

25.3

1.9

3.0

61.3

23.4

34.1

4.6

5.5

Spain

20.4

5.6

23.5

6.9

2.9

28.6

5.6

26.9

8.7

3.1

Switzerland

62.9

0.0

15.4

2.1

0.0

63.6

12.2

16.9

1.9

1.1

75.4 14.7 13.6 8.5 2.3 U. K** * 1990-1993 data West Germany only. ** UK excluding Nothern Ireland for 1990-1993 data.

69.9

15.2

17.6

9.6

2.3

Sources: European Values Survey, Worc, Tilburg University Netherlands, 1999-2000, by permission; World Values Survey, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, by permission; Inglehart, R., Basañez, M., and Moreno, A., Human Value and Beliefs: A CrossCultural Sourcebook: Political Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies: Findings from the 1990-1993 World Value Survey, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1998. All in Glasius, Kaldoar and Anheier 2002.

Table 22. The referendum institution 1945-1995: number of referendums Country

1975-84

1985-92

1993-95

1945-95

France

0

2

0

12

Germany

0

0

0

0

Italy

7

12

20

41

Netherlands

0

0

0

0

Spain

1

1

0

4

83

62

27

285

0

1

Switzerland

1 0 United Kingdom sources: Our elaboration based on Lane and Ersson, 1999, table 7.1, 198

Social movements mobilize organizational resources present in the surrounding ambient. The presence of voluntary associations, especially with values compatible with those defended by the movements, provide social capital for the protest. For their part, movements contribute to the development of an organizational structure for protest. On comparing participation in community action, third world/human rights, environment and peace associations, we observe EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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a growing trend (especially for third world and environmental interest groups) in the Netherlands (where rates of participations are highest), but also in Italy and Spain, where they reached, and even sometimes surpassed, those of countries traditionally considered as more “civic”. Table 23. European and World Value Surveys. Questions: Which, if any, do you belong to? Country

In % of respondents per country who are members of organizations, by type.

1990-1993

2000

Membership Community action

Membership

Third Environment world/huma n rights

Peace

Community action

Third world/human rights

Environment

Peace

France

3.3

2.6

2.3

0.5

2.5

1.2

2.1

0.4

Germany*

1.7

2.1

4.5

2

0.7

0.4

2.2

0.2

Italy

2.5

1.1

2.9

1.1

2.4

2.9

3.8

1.4

5

14.1

23.3

2.9

6.9

24.4

45.1

2.8

1.2

1

1.4

0.7

2.1

2.7

2.0

1.1

Switzerland

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

United Kingdom**

3.5

2.3

5.9

1.3

3.2

2.5

1.4

1.2

Netherlands Spain

* 1990-1993 data West Germany only. ** UK excluding Nothern Ireland for 1990-1993 data. Sources: Glausius, Kaldor and Anheier 2002.

Table 24. European and World Value Surveys. Questions: a) Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid work for? Country

In % of respondents per country who volunteers in organizations, by type.

1990-1993

2000

Volunteering (unpaid) Community action

Third Environment world/huma n rights

Volunteering (unpaid) Peace

Community action

Third world/human rights

Environment

Peace

2.9

1.4

1.5

0.5

1.7

0.6

0.9

0.1

Germany*

1

0.8

1.4

1

0.3

0.1

0.9

1.8

Italy

2

0.7

1.4

0.6

2.8

1.9

1.8

0.4

Netherlands

2.5

3

2.9

1.3

4.0

4.1

2.4

0.5

Spain

0.4

0.8

1

0.5

1.7

1.4

1.1

0.8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.8

0.6

1.4

2.9

8.2

1.1

France

Switzerland

1 1.1 United Kingdom** * 1990-1993 data West Germany only.

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** UK excluding Nothern Ireland for 1990-1993 data. Sources: Glausius, Kaldor and Anheier 2002. Although protest still seems to target national institutions in particular, international nongovernmental organizations (INGos) and transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) are on the rise (della Porta 2003). As can be seen in the tables below, INGOs are very present, especially in Switzerland, the Netherlands and France (countries which hold the highest number of meetings convened by INGOs, followed by the UK and Germany). Table 25. Organizational density, membership density, International non-governmental meetings and number of paid workers and unpaid volunteers of Non-profit section. Country

International NGOs and Internationallyoriented NGOs: Organizazional density for million of population

Only International NGOs: Membership density per million of population

Number of Number of paid workers International nonand of volunteers of governmental total non-profit-section meetings according to in 1995/1996 the country in which the event was held

1991

2001

1991

2001

1999

2000

2001

Paid workers

Volunteers

29.4

25.6

73.7

110.4

857

963

723

959,821

1,021,655

Germany

9.3

11.4

51.5

78.5

715

656

502 1,440,850

978,074

Italy

8.2

10.4

67.0

102.7

462

549

443

597,655

565,310

34.9

51.0

248.2

365.7

478

414

277

661,652

390,101

4.2

7.5

87.1

139.4

366

421

356

475,179

253,599

Switzerland

98.6

96.1

477.9

726.5

286

365

301

-

-

United Kingdom

25.3

31.6

68.1

105.8

754

765

510 1,415,743

1,120,283

France

Netherlands Spain

Source: Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations: Guide to Civil Society Networks, Brussels 1991 and 2001. For data on numbers of paid workers and volunteers of total non-profit-section: The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, 1999, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 1999. SEE ALSO APPENDIX B ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES Hypothesis 15. Strength of the welfare state. The process of Europa-building has often been linked to economic interests. Since Europe adopted a neoliberist approach of “negative integration”, with abolition of barriers to free movement of capital, market competition (with reduction of subsidies), and checks on public expenditure (Scharpf 1999), it is to be expected that the more developed national welfare state arrangements are, the more globalization in general, and Europeanisation in particular, will meet with resistance. Greater polarization within such countries on integration issues is also possible because some groups (eg, employers) may also be particularly in favour of European integration as a way to lessen EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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welfare state burdens on them. In the countries under study, expenditures in social services tend to be high in France and Switzerland, followed by the Netherlands, Spain and Germany, low in Italy and the UK. Total tax receipts is lower in Switzerland and Spain, followed by the UK and Germany, then the Netherlands, Italy and France. Table 26. Public spending on welfare, 1985-1995 (OECD, various years) Country

Year

govt. final consumptio n (less defence) as % of GDP

Social securit y spendi ng as % of GDP

France

1985 1990 1995

16.17 14.96 16.41

20.68 21.31 23.22

4.98 3.19 4.63 3.06 5.16 3.44

20.85 21.70 26.66

1.15 0.13 0.44

5.60 9.87 5.34 7.30 m m

18.08 3.49 19.55 3.18 m M

2000-2001

m 17.24 16.20 16.02 m 14.37 15.51 14.58 m m 11.46 11.32 m 12.76 14.06 16.61 m 13.35 13.44 15.03 m 15.72 15.99 17.36 m

m 16.14 15.22 16.19 m 17.16 18.15 13.21 m m 19.62 19.68 m 15.96 15.88 17.34

m 0.38 0.83 m m 4.63 4.91 0.55 m m m m m 2.63 2.98 m m m m m m 3.80 3.67 4.48 m

m 18.17 17.33 m m 0.72 0.75 0.68 m m m m m 1.61 1.66 m m m m m m 1.44 1.52 1.88 m

m 0.31 0.30 m m 0.52 0.49 0.51 m m m m m 0.86 0.90 m m m m m m 0.67 0.60 0.61 m

m 0.96 1.41 m m 5.08 0.33 0.97 m m m m m 3.75 4.17 m m m m m m 4.85 4.87 5.35 m

m 19.03 17.77 m m 15.98 16.63 17.88 m m m m m 14.77 14.86 m m m m m m 14.73 1.12 16.64 m

German 1985 1990 y

1995 2000-2001 1985 Italy 1990 1995 2000-2001 Netherla 1985 nds 1990 1995 2000-2001 1985 Spain 1990 1995 2000-2001 Switzerla 1985 nd 1990 1995 2000-2001 1985 UK 1990 1995 2000-2001

13.75 13.55 19.45 m 13.90 12.21 14.67 m

Govt. final consumption as % Total spending as % GDP GDP educatio healt welfar housin educati healt welfar Hou n e g on e sing

m 6.00 5.62 m m 3.08 3.50 3.38 m m m m m 3.47 3.71 m m m m m m 4.71 4.71 5.72 m

m 6.36 5.96 m m 5.42 1.30 1.71 m m m m m 4.67 5.11 m m m m m m 5.02 5.04 5.81 m

M 1.10 1.13 M M 1.88 1.41 1.17 M M M M M 2.02 2.29 M M M M M M 2.08 2.05 1.63 M

Source: Crouch, 2001, table A13.1

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Table 27. Size of governments Reference France Germany period

Italy

Netherlands Spain

Switzerland

UK

Euro area

-1.6

...

36.3

40.4

GENERAL GOVERNMENT Net lending as % of GDP Total tax receipts as % of GDP ranking

2000

1.5

0.1

4.7

-2.5

45.8

-0.2 (WG) 37.7

43.3

42.1

35.1

11.9 (1999, SNA) 34.4 (SNA)

1999

7

4

6

5

3

1

3

8.6

7.9

9.5

2.4

13.0

2.5

5.0

8.3

37.6

51.5 (2000)

63.4

43.5

44.0

29.9

27.7

47.4

LABOUR Standardised 2001 Unemployments rates (%) Long-term 2001 unemployed (> 12 months), % of total unemployed

Source: Our elaboration based on Oecd: August 2002, http://www.oecd.org/EN/documents/0,,EN-documents-0-nodirectorate-no-1-no-0,00.html Hypothesis 16. Degree of pacification of old cleavages. Europeanisation can cause the emergence of a new political cleavage between its supporters and its opponents. An hypothesis that has been put forward in literature is that when old cleavages (labour-capital, church-state, rural-urban, center-periphery, perhaps also materialist/postmaterialist) have been pacified/accommodated, there is more space on the political and media agendas for the emergence of new conflictual dimensions (Kriesi et al. 1995), such as that between supporters and opponents of globalization and Europeanisation. However, we can also expect that conflicts on Europe do overlap with other cleavages (e.g. those on class and the centerperiphery) especially when old cleavages have not been pacified . According to Lijphart’s data, the socio-economic cleavage is still strong in all countries, the State-Church in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, the ethnic one in Spain and the post-materialistic one in Germany. The index of religious fragmentation is low in Spain and Italy, high in Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. However, the State-Church cleavage is traditionally politicized especially in Italy, France and Germany, although pacified in the latter by the creation of a Christian-Democratic Party, which includes both Catholics and Protestants; in France and Italy this cleavage has instead overlapped mostly with classcleavages (for France and Germany, see Kriesi et al. 1995). The centre-periphery cleavage has more potential for politicization along ethnic lines in Switzerland, Spain, UK and France, but while Switzerland provides a sort of institutionalization of this conflict through the federalist institutional system and the conflict lies in a “latent” phase, in Spain (in a most radical form), the UK and France, the centralised system has not helped to pacify this traditional conflict.

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Table 28. Cleavages in the party system (1945-1996) SocioReligi Ethnic Urban/ Regim Forei Postm Total Ranking ateriali gn economic ous rural e suppor Polic stic y t

Country

France

H

M

M

Germany

H

H

Italy

H

H

M

Netherlands

H

H

M

Spain

H

M

H

Switzerland

H

H

M

United Kingdom

H

M

2,5

5

3

1

M

3

1

M

3

1

2,5

5

3

1

1,5

7

M

M

M M

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart 1999, 101 Table 29. Religious fragmentation index 1900-1995 Country

1900

1970

1995

Ranking

France

0.06

0.33

0.42

3

Germany

0.48

0.59

0.66

6

Italy

0.01

0.17

0.28

2

Netherlands

0.50

0.59

0.68

7

Spain

0.00

0.05

0.10

1

Switzerland

0.49

0.52

0.61

5

UK

0.17

0.41

0.45

4

sources: Our elaboration based on Lane and Ersson 1999, table 2.2, 46 Table 30. Religious awareness: church attendance (%). Contry

Weekly

Monthly

1960s

1970s

1980s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1

2

3

4

5

1

3

4

5

France

25

22

-

11

10

47

-

17

17

Germany

27

29

33

19

17

54

36

35

30

-

51

36

32

38

-

53

48

51

42

38

43

26

20

55

56

40

31

-

-

-

40

29

-

-

53

40

30

36

24

-

24

60

43

-

43

-

14

16

15

15

23

20

24

26

Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland UK

Sources: Lane and Ersson 1999, table 2.7, 52.

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Table 31 Ethnic fragmentation, dominant ethno-linguistic group Country

Ethnic fragmentation

Dominant ethno-linguistic group (% of people that use dominant language)

1920

1990

1920

1990

Ranking

France

0.15

0.24

92

87

3

Germany

0.04

0.13

98

93

5

Italy

0.08

0.12

100

94

6

Netherlands

0.08

0.15

96

92

4

Spain

0.50

0.34

67

80

2

Switzerland

0.45

0.55

71

64

1

UK

0.04

0.06

98

97

7

Source: Our elaboration based on Lane and Ersson 1999, table 2.8, p. 55.

The class cleavage has been an important one in every European country for two centuries or more. But, as a result of the “mid-century compromise” after WW II (Crouch 2001), and the building of an effective welfare state throughout Europe, both the transformation of the makeup up national classes and the increasing standard of living lowered conflict between the workers and the bourgeoisie, and, as a consequence, the impact of this cleavage on electoral behaviour has declined (Franklin et al. 1992). Nevertheless the degree to which this old cleavage has been considered pacified varies cross-countries: in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, where Social Democrat parties have long held power, modern systems of industrial relations institutionalized the role of the unions and reduced the bite of class conflict (Kriesi et al. 1995). Class conflict remained instead a more central issue in France, Italy and Spain—countries characterized by a more exclusive tradition in dealing with the labour movement. In the UK, starting from the eighties, the class cleavage has largely overlapped with the regional one: especially because of the territorialization of class composition (Budge 1999). Besides, in Italy and France the split of the Left between socialists and communists, in competition with each other for more votes from the same class, made this line of conflict more vigorous. On examining the number of strikes and lockouts, and the number of workers involved in them, a cluster of countries are encountered with high levels of conflict, such as Italy, France (where data exclude agriculture and public administration) and Spain while in another, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland have a less-mobilized labour force, and the UK somewhere in the middle. It is worth noticing, however, that protest on labour issues still accounts for a very high percentage of unconventional participation, even in countries (for Germany, see Neidhardt and Rucht 2001) where the class cleavage has been considered tamed. Postfordist evolution and the crisis of the welfare state seem, moreover, to have remobilized the class cleavage (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002). Post-material attitudes are more present in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, with a quick jump also in Spain for the youngest cohort.

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Table 32. Estimates of class voting: the Alford index 1945-60

1961-70

1971-80

1981-1990

Ranking

France

24.4

18.3

17.0

11.7

1

Germany

36.0

24.8

14.9

13.4

4

Italy

26.6

14.5

17.8

13.1

3

Netherlands

14.0

14.7

21.8

15.5

5

Spain

-

-

18.4

15.5

5

Switzerland

-

-

17.6

12.8

2

UK

37.3

38.3

24.3

23.4

6

source: our elaboration based on Lane and Ersson 1999, table 2.26, 71. Table 33. Old and new cleavages and party choice 1990 (Eta-coefficients), Religious- Ranking left-right Ranking secular materialism

materialism-postmaterialism

Ranking

France

0.37

3

0.42

4

0.28

1

Germany

0.34

2

0.30

1

0.41

5

Italy

0.46

5

0.30

1

0.28

1

Netherlands

0.51

6

0.45

5

0.44

6

Spain

0.43

4

0.36

3

0.32

3

Switzerland

-

UK

0.16

1

0.46

6

0.38

4

Source: Our elaboration based on Lane and Ersson 1999, table 4.6, 122. Table 34. Number of strikes and lockouts per country and per year each 1,000 inhabitants France Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland Germany United Kingdom

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2040 1790 1572 1494 1472 1671 2066 1439 1607 1475 2319 1297 1094 791 903 1054 861 545 904 920 1103 753 966 27 29 28 23 12 17 14 12 18 22 24 23 16 1094 1312 1645 1360 1209 908 883 830 744 632 749 750 737 2 2 1 3 0 8 2 3 2 7 5 8 3 701

630

369

253

211

205

235

Source: our elaboration from International Workers http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/textle.htm

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216

Organization

166

205

(ILO)’s

212

194

data:

37 /190

Table 35. Number of strikes and lockouts per country and per year each 1,000 inhabitants 1989 3,4465 2,2616 0,1689 2,7169 0,0277 1,1731

France Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

1990 3,0242 1,9077 0,1814 3,2583 0,0277 1,0543

1991 2,6559 1,3793 0,1751 4,0853 0,0138 0,6175

1992 2,5241 1,5746 0,1439 3,3775 0,0415 0,4234

1993 2,4869 1,8379 0,0751 3,0025 0,0000 0,3531

1994 2,8231 1,5014 0,1063 2,2550 0,1106 0,3431

1995 3,4905 0,9503 0,0876 2,1929 0,0277 0,3933

Source: our elaboration from International Workers http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/textle.htm

1996 2,4312 1,5763 0,0751 2,0613 0,0415 0,4083

1997 2,7150 1,6042 0,1126 1,8477 0,0277 0,3615

Organization

1998 2,4920 1,9233 0,1376 1,5696 0,0968 0,2778

1999 3,9179 1,3130 0,1501 1,8601 0,0691 0,3431

(ILO)’s

data:

2000

2001

1,6845 0,1439 1,8626 0,1106 0,3548

0,1001 1,8303 0,0415 0,3247

Table 36. Number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts per country and per year each 100.000 inhabitants. France* Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom Germany**

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20300 18500 18800 16300 19900 18000 43476 11363 12161 10106 14908 4451833 1633996 2952242 3178000 4384000 2614000 445000 1689100 718000 434700 935000 687000 15356 24978 42050 52419 20662 21809 55020 8126 7221 30770 58865 10256 37400 1396000 977000 1983800 5192100 1076800 5437400 573500 1087800 650600 680600 1132655 2067287 1244634 22 578 51 220 0 6901 83 5888 327 16125 2255 3894 20098 727000 298200 176000 148000 385000 107000 174000 364300 130000 92700 140900 183200 179900 43934

257160

208177

598394

132555

400676 183346

165721

13472

4286

187749

7428

Legenda: * excl. Agriculture and public administration. **before 1990 - data refer to the former Fed. Rep. of Germany.

Source: our elaboration from International Workers http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/textle.htm

Organization

(ILO)’s

data:

Table 37. Number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts per country and per year each 100.000 inhabitants. 1989 France* Italy Netherla nds Spain Switzerla nd United Kingdom Germany **

34,2963

1990 31,2553

1991 31,7621

1992 27,5384

1993 33,6205

1994 30,4105

1995 73,4516

1996 19,1975

1997 20,5457

1998

1999

17,0738

2000

2001

25,1867

7762,839 2849,264 5147,942 5541,605 7644,556 4558,136 775,9643 2945,351 1252,005 758,0038 1630,396 1197,949 96,0530 156,2394 263,0262 327,8852 129,2425 136,4171 344,1546

50,8288

45,1679 192,4689 368,2054

64,1521 233,9401

3466,944 2426,364 4926,737 12894,50 2674,216 13503,70 1424,278 2701,534 1615,755 1690,259 2812,931 5134,075 3091,029 0,3042

7,9934

0,7053

3,0425

0,0000

95,4363

1,1478

81,4272

4,5222 222,9982

31,1852

53,8515 277,9422

1216,634 499,0377 294,5360 247,6780 644,2975 179,0645 291,1890 609,6561 217,5550 155,1335 235,7962 306,5852 301,0627 53,3756 312,4248 252,9152 726,9915 161,0417 486,7831 222,7479 201,3352

16,3672

5,2071 228,0971

9,0243

Legenda: * excl. Agriculture and public administration. **before 1990 - data refer to the former Fed. Rep. of Germany.

Source: our elaboration from International Workers http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/textle.htm

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(ILO)’s

data:

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Table 38. Distribution of postmaterialistic attitudes by cohort 1973-91 (%).

Cohorts born in 190110

1911-20

1921-30

1931-40

1941-50

1951-60

1961-70

Post 1970

France

2

5

8

10

14

17

20

16

Germany

4

7

8

10

14

21

27

24

Italy

2

3

4

6

8

13

14

17

Netherlands

5

8

10

13

19

24

28

27

Spain

3

3

3

5

10

18

23

24

Switzerland

-

-

6

14

23

16

16

25

UK

4

7

8

10

12

14

19

19

Fonte: Lane e Ersson 1999, 122. For Switzerland: Sgier 2002; World Values Survey 1996. Note that Sgier lists the distribution of post-materialism by age, not by cohort. As a consequence, the percentages given in the table do not exactly correspond to those given in the above table (classification used by Sgier: 20-29 year olds, 30-39 year olds […] 70-79 year olds).

References Allum, Percy, 1991, Democrazia reale, Padova, Liviana. Almond, Gabriel A. and B.G. Powell, 1978, Comparative Politics, Boston, Little, Brown and Co. Andretta, Massimiliano, Donatella della Porta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter, 2003, Global, No Global, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, forthcoming. Bartolini, Stefano, 2000, The Political Mobilization of the European Left 1860-1980. The Class Cleavage, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bendix, R., 1964, Nation Building and Citizenship, New York, Wiley e Son. Beetham, David and C. Lord, 1998, Legitimacy and the European Union, Harlow, Longman. Boerzel, Tanja, 2001a, Shaping States and Regions: The Domestic Impact of Europe, Cambridge, Cambridege University Press. Boerzel, Tanja, 2001b, Europeanisation and Territorial Institutional Change: Toward Cooperative Regions?, in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, pp. 137-158. BUNDESAMT FÜR STATISTIK (2002). Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 2002. Neuchâtel: BfS. Conant, Lisa, 2001, Europeanisation and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among National Judiciary, in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, pp. 97-115.

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Ladner, Andreas (1999), Das Schweizer Parteiensystem und seine Parteien, in Ulrich Kloeti et al. (eds..). Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Zürich, NZZ Verlag, pp. 245-246. Lane, J.E. and S. Ersson, 1999, Politics and Society in Western Europe, London, Sage. Lijphart, Arent, 1977, The Politics of Accomodation, Berkeley, The University of California Press. Lijphart, Arend, 1999, Le democrazie contemporanee, Bologna, Il Mulino (vers. or. 1984). Le Torrec, Virginie, Philippe Blanchard, Guillaume Garcia, and Charles Patou, 2001, Framing Europe: News Coverage and Legitimacy of the European Union in Five Countries, Paper presented at the European Community Studies Association, Madison, Wisconsin, May 31-June 2. Marks, G., 1993, Structural Policy and Multicultural Governance in the European Community, in A. Cafruny, G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community II: Maastricht Debates and Beyond, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner. Mair, Peter and I. Van Biezen, 2001, Party Membership in Europe, in “Party Politics”, VII, pp.- 5-21. Majone, Giandomenico, 1998, Europe’s Democratic Deficit : The Question of Standard, in «European Law Journal », 4, pp. 5-28. Méchet P. and R. Pache, 2000, L’autre Europe que veulent les Européens, in D. Reynié and B. Cautrès (eds.), L’Opinion publique europeénne 2000, Paris, Presse de Sciences-Po, pp. 167-180. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1994, Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation, Working Paper 52, Harvard University. Nabholz, Ruth (1998), “Das Wahlverhalten in der Schweiz: Stabilität oder Wandel? Eine Trendanalyse von 1971-1995, in Kriesi, Hanspeter, Wolf Lindner and Ulrich Kloeti (eds.). Schweizer Wahlen 1995. Bern, Paul Haupt, p. 17-43. Neidhardt, Friedhelm and Dieter Rucht, 2002, Protestgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-1994: Ereignisse, Themen, Akteure, in Dieter Rucht (ed.), Protest in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag. Offerlé, M., 1994, Sociologie des groupes d’intéret, Paris, Montchrestien. Pache, R., 2001, L’insatisfaction croissante des opinions publiques europeénnes, in D. Reynié and B. Cautrès (eds.), L’Opinion publique europeénne 2001, Paris, Presse de Sciences-Po, pp. 241-248. Page, E.C., 1991, Localism and Centralism in Europe. The Political and Legal Bases of Local Self-Government, New York, Oxford University Press. Pizzorno, Alessandro, 1996, Mutamenti nelle istituzioni rappresentative e sviluppo dei partiti politici, in La storia dell’Europa Contemporanea, Torino, Einaudi, pp. 961-1031. Pizzorno, Alessandro, 2002, Globalizzazione e classe politica, in Donatella della Porta e Lorenzo Mosca (eds.), Movimenti sociali e globalizzazione, Roma, Manifestolibri, in preparazione. Putnam, Robert D., 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organizations 43, pp. 427-60.

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APPENDIX A. WRITTEN BY ALL TEAMS ANTI EU-PARTIES IN SINGLE COUNTRIES

France Until the beginning of the 80’s, Gaullist and Communist parties were the only and traditional Euro-sceptic movements. The difference between Euro-sceptic and anti-European movements is significant in our view because the first have a general program that includes some elements against European integration while the second are founded on the opposition to Europe. Except for extreme right wing parties (whose program is based to a large extend against all that is foreign), there was no anti-European party in France before 1992. Many parties are “euro-sceptic” (like the communist party, the Trotskyite parties, etc.) but do not consider criticizing the EEC as their central goal. They denounce the liberal economic policy of the EEC, are against giving new competence to the European level, but have other political projects in their program. During the 80’s, the French RPR begins to rejoin the European project when Jacques Chirac ratifies the Single European Act in 1986. A lot of RPR MPs, like several socialist or communist MP’s, stay however against all that seems supranational in Europe. In 1992, for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the debate internally divides political families for the first time. The Communist party, the Trotskyite parties, the Nationalist party Front National and some RPR (Charles Pasqua) and PS (Jean-Pierre Chevènement) politicians called to vote “no” while the major part of the PS, RPR and the unanimous UDF and Green Party called to vote “yes”. The very close results encouraged some politicians to create their own list at the European elections of 1994 with a certain success: the list of Chevènement obtains 2,54% and the future “Mouvement pour la France” of de Villiers obtains 12,34% of the votes. The creation of the “Mouvement des citoyens” (Chevènement) is seen as an answer to the euro-scepticism of numerous French socialist and RPR politicians (Jardin 2000). The debate on the Amsterdam Treaty is reflected in the European elections of 1999 which shows the new legitimacy of the “sovereignist” movements: with 13,1% of the votes, the RPF (“Rassemblement pour la France”, under the direction of Pasqua and de Villiers) obtains a better electoral result than the RPR (12,82%) while the government of “Gauche plurielle” forces Chevènement to form an alliance with the Socialist Party and the Left radical party. After the results of 1994, these 1999 elections seems to be the real birth of the anti-European movements (Fourquet 2001): with 28,82% of the votes, structured parties and well-known politicians. The struggle upon the EU is seen by many scholars to be the most important division of the French political field, and to attenuate the right-left polarisation1. However, after many ups and downs, Philippe de Villiers decides to leave the RPF and to continue his political struggle under his RPF’s flag. After he resigned from the “gauche plurielle” government, Chevènement tries to build a third alternative between left and right at the presidential elections of 2002, but his very weak electoral result will certainly not permit him from managing a big anti-European party. The strong result of the Front National at the presidential election could be interpreted as an anti-European vote too. But it seems to be more motivated by internal reasons, which are not totally linked to the Euro-scepticism of the

1

At the end of 1999, the RPR has 50000 members while 91000 in 1998 and 150000 in 1995. In 1999, the RPF has 23000 members. According to an ISPOS study published in Le Point, the half of the RPR sympathizers supports the candidatures of Pasqua and de Villier in 1999. See Le Point, 16 janvier 1999. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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population. Some little parties, clubs or movements, who don’t participate all to the national elections, are active too.

Table A.1. “Eurosceptic” parties at European elections in France (1979-1999) (from: francepolitique.net)2

Trotskyism

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

Laguiller (LO, LCR) 03,08

Laguiller (LO) 02,06

Laguiller (LO) 01,42

Laguiller (LO) 02,27

Laguiller (LO, LCR) 5,18 5

Gauquelin (PCI) 00,90

Gauquelin (MPPT) 00,60

Gluckstein (PT) 00,44

Marchais 20,52

PCF

Marchais 19 11,20

10 Herzog 07,71 7

Wurtz 06,89

7

Hue (PCF) 6 6,78

Chevènement (MDC) 02,54

MDC CPNT

Souvereignists TixierVignancour (PFN) 01,31

Extreme-right

Goustat 04,13

Goustat 03,96

Joyeux 00,75

de Villiers (MPF) 12,34

Le Pen Le Pen (FN) (FN) 10,95 10 11,73

Le Pen (FN) 10 10,52

Saint-Josse 6,78 6 Pasqua (RPF) 13 13,06

13

Le Pen 11 (FN) 5,70

5

Mégret (MN) 3,28 Guerrin (LN) 0,00 Total Euro-sceptic parties

24,91

19 25,11

20 26,34

17 38,96

31 40,79

35

Total anti-European parties

1,31

0

10 16,61

10 29,36

24 28,82

24

11 listes

81 14 listes

81 15 listes

81 20 listes

87 20 listes

87

10,95

Exprimés

96,83

98

98,6

97,23

94,04

Votants

60,71

56,73

48,81

52,71

46,76

Table A.2. Results of the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in France (1992)3 Date

Objet

% des inscrits

% des exprimés

2

Are excluded: Jacques Cheminade (Parti ouvier et européen, extreme right) in 1984 and 1989 whose positions on Europe are ambivalent, regionalist candidates like Hallier (1978), Moutoussamy (1994), Simeoni (1994), Jos (1999), and other candidates like Malaud (1978), Nicoud (1984), Aillaud (1994), Maudrux (1999) and Touati (1984, 1989, 1994) whose positions on Europe are often unknown. 3

http://doc-iep.univ-lyon2.fr/Ressources/Documents/DocEnLigne/Elections/referendums.html.

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Abstentions 20.9.1992

Ratification du traité de 30,30 Maastricht sur l'Union européenne

Blancs et nuls

Oui

Non

2,37

51,04

48,95

Germany Due to Germany’s history, there exists a strong consensus among the German elite that European integration should be supported. Thus anti-European parties are first of all rare and second not be found within the major German parties (SPD, CDU / CSU, FDP, Greens, PDS). The major anti-European party in Germany is the “Republikaner” (others right-wing parties like “DVU” were less successful). The “Republikaner” has recently been the most successful right-wing party, but did not experience a comparable electoral success as its European counterparts (Cole 1996,133). Due to the five percent clause, they failed to become part of the national parliament (results at national elections: 1990: 2.1%; 1994: 1,7%, 1998:1,8%; 2002: 0,6%). Founded in 1983, the “Republikaner” made it into the European parliament and regional parliaments (e.g. they gained 7,1% in 1989 in the election for the European parliament, 10,9% in 1991 in the region of Baden-Württemberg and 8.3% in 1993 in Hessen). Although being clearly anti-European, the “Republikaner” and other right-wing parties have always been looking upon European elections and the EU as beneficial because doing well in EU elections would enable them to receive public money for campaigns. The emphasis on the “specific German interests” leads to an opposition of the European Union in general, the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of the Euro (see also Veen et al. 1992, 17). This rightwing and anti-European stance gained its significance by legitimising these ideas in the German political arena. Right-wing issues, long taboo, have been openly discussed, as e.g. the notion of German interests taking precedence over European interests (Cole 1996:151). Italy Political parties in Italy have all traditionally taken a pro-EU stance, notwithstanding the low compliance with EU laws. The only party that recently took an anti-EU position is the Lega. Until Italy’s entry in the European Monetary Union in 1998, the Lega had supported European integration within a vision of a “Europe of the regions”. In fact, since its origins in the early 1990s, the Lega has combined ethno-nationalistic appeals with a populist approach, neoliberism and xenofobia, allying more often with the center-right, but sometime with the center-left. After the 1996 elections, won by the center-left, the Lega went in the opposition, attacking the government as unable to meet the parameters set by the Maastricht treaty and calling on this basis for a secession of the Northern regions from Italy. When instead Italy succeeded in entering the EMU, the Lega developed an anti-EU strategy, profiling itself on the protection of the “people” againt the “Europa dei potenti”. Although the center-right, with which the Lega had allied, won the 2001 national election, the Lega dropped from 8% to 4%-loosing especially in its stronghold in the area of the dynamic small firms, which remained intead favourable to European integration (della Porta 2002, 156-159). Positions against EU policies on economic as well as defence issues emerged recently also in Forza Italia.

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The Netherlands In general, there is a widespread consensus amongst the Dutch political elite on the desirability of European integration and the benefits of EU membership for the country. Only on a limited number of occasions, and in the current discussion on enlargement of the EU, politicians have been more critical. Outright anti-European political parties do not exist. The only eurosceptic party that ever purely campaigned in Dutch elections on the issue of the EU was the Nieuwe Midden Partij (new party of the middle), led by an ex-MP Martin Dessing. During the one and only attempt for the 1998 elections, it did not manage to reach the threshold for a seat in Parliament. In the traditional understanding of the Dutch attitude towards European integration, the strive for supranationalism in the Community plays a major role. However, the strong ideological pleas in favour of federalism and supranationalist institutions by the Dutch governments in the past, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. It has been argued that they were the result of a rational calculation of interests (Cf. Van den Bos 1991; Hellema 1995) and that they have been instrumentally used to both encounter intergovernmentalist tendencies (Cf. Kwast-van-Duursen 1985) and as an excuse to tackle undesirable plans (Cf. Voorhoeve 1985). While the Dutch governments have officially argued in favour of stronger European institutions out of concern for the European democratic deficit, ‘it is difficult to ascertain to what degree this concern for European democracy is real, or whether it merely serves as a flag of convenience under which to strengthen the supranational character of the Community in defence of Dutch national interests’ (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 222) As a result, it can be concluded that elite support for EU membership is largely based on the fact that economic co-operation and integration has been very beneficial to the Netherlands over the years. Typically, the elite consensus on European politics was for the first time interrupted by the debates in 1995 on the Delors II package. This new financial framework changed the position of the Netherlands from being a net beneficiary of the EU to the second largest net contributor per capita. The second time the consensus was challenged was during the debate on the EMU convergence criteria in 1997. In reaction to this discussion, the Socialistische Partij (SP), a small left-wing political party, profiled itself as the nation’s anti-euro party and pleaded for a referendum on EMU in the Netherlands. This suggestion was however not seriously discussed at the political level. The personal “crusade” of Mr. Bolkestein, former leader of the VVD (the Dutch liberal party) and current Commissioner for the internal market, against a possible weak euro seems to have had a bigger impact on the discussion on EMU in the Netherlands. Before the ultimate decision on which Member States would take part in EMU was taken, he stressed that his party would not accept participation of any Member State unless they fully met the convergence criteria. Given the traditional elite consensus on EMU, the discussion initiated by Mr. Bolkestein was by the major actors in the Netherlands regarded as “not done”. The third time conflict on European integration openly occurred was during the IGC of 1996, and the Dutch presidency in the first six months of 1997. GroenLinks (the Green left party) took part in the “Dutch coalition for a different Europe" (Nederlands Platform naar een ander Europa). This group was not necessarily eurosceptic altogether but disagreed with the hegemonic view of European integration, which in their opinion was undemocratic and with too little attention for a social Europe. The SP decided not to participate in this platform and organised its own, more critical activities. With a view on enlargement, the parties that governed between 1994 and 2002, the PvdA (labour party), VVD (liberal party) and D’66 (democratic party), were already rather critical on the costs of an enlarged European Union. The latest Dutch government, with participation

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of the LPF (party of the assassinated populist Pim Fortuyn), has been in office for only three months. While it has had limited political impact in terms of policy output, this governments has nevertheless for the first time in history threatened to veto a European agreement. The VVD and LPF deem Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania not yet ready for accession, and want certain guarantees before these countries become full-fledged EU member states. Even though the outgoing cabinet currently seems to have reached a positive final verdict, this can not be communicated to the European level before the Dutch parliament has approved this position. In general, the hottest issues at stake at the moment in the discussion on the EU are the need to reform the agricultural policy in view of enlargement, and the outright indignation with the loosened criteria of the stability and growth pact. With regards to voting on the Treaties in Parliament, the following can be observed. On the Treaty of Maastricht, GroenLinks and the small conservative Christian parties objected (SP only entered in 1994). The Treaty of Amsterdam was rejected by GroenLinks, the SP and the small conservative Christian parties. The Treaty of Nice was only rejected by the SP. The party is in favour of enhanced co-operation on for example environment and a common asylum policy but it objects to any transfer of competences to the European level as longs as the democratic deficit has not been solved. Spain There has always been a clear and widespread association between membership of the EU and the democratic consolidation in Spain. There is consensus in favor of European integration and anti-European parties or movements are almost non-existent. In general, the relative salience of the European issue in the public agenda and elections is low. When the Spanish parties compete at the European level it is clear that domestic considerations take precedence over European ones (Morán 1996). Moreover, the lack of referenda on membership in the EU and on the Maastricht Treaty have minimized still more the opportunities for the emergence of anti-European movements. In this context, only two parties have expressed some opposition and resistance toward certain aspects of European integration: the national left-wing coalition Izquierda Unida (IU) an the Galician nationalist, left-wing group, Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG). Their position is conceptually close to “soft-Euroscepticism” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). They may criticize certain aspects of the UE policies but it is not their central goal to defend an antiEuropean position. What they criticize is that the current process of European integration is leading toward reductions in public expenditures and social protection (Gómez-Reino, Llamazares and Ramiro 2002). Table A.3. shows the electoral evolution and institutional representation of the two parties. United Left (IU) is a left-wing organisation that includes the Communist Party of Spain in 1986 and other minor parties and groups. The BNG (Galician Nationalist Block) is a peripheral nationalist organisation that is only active in the region of Galicia. The BNG was founded in 1982 by two small Galician Communist and Socialist parties and other nationalist organisations. They adopted an organizational model close to that of electoral coalitions and federations of parties. The IU has been represented in the European Parliament since the 1987 Euro-elections and its political programme combines a general acceptance of EU membership with strong criticisms to the monetary and socio-economic policies. This does not mean, however, that it questions the European project, nor the EU, but rather it expresses the conviction that the EU needs to be reformed (Morán 1996). The debate about the Maastricht Treaty almost caused a schism in this political organization between “pro-European” and “anti-European”. Eventually, some parliamentarians led by the leader of IU at that moment, EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Julio Anguita, voted against the Treaty in the Spanish Parliament , while a small group abstained. In 2002, the IU has organised a campaign called “Otra Europa es possible” (Another Europe is possible) that calls for a greater emphasis on the social aspects of European integration. The BNG platforms have traditionally emphasised such classical left-wing policies as employment, social welfare and so forth. In addition, the BNG has advocated the defence of the Galician language and the reform of the Spanish Constitution, with the goal of restating the position of Galicia as a real nation. The BNG has strongly defended the Galician industrial sectors that have been in crisis, it has supported union mobilizations and it has supported the Galician agriculture and fishery against EU policies such as the Common Agriculture Policy. It has also asked for a greater allocation of the structural funds to Galicia. As indicated in Table A.3, support for the BNG has continuously increased since its foundation in 1982. It is a highly relevant actor in the Galician party system. Since 1997 the BNG is the second party in the Galician regional Parliament (in opposition to the Partido Popular (PP) in the regional government) and it is also currently represented in the Spanish and European parliaments (1 MEP in the 1999 European elections). Table A.3. Electoral evolution of the IU and BNG European Elections IU %

General Elections

BNG seat

%

IU

seat

%

Local Elections

BNG seats

%

seats

IU

BNG

%

%

1985 1986

3.7

1987

5.3

3

0.2

-

1989

6.0

4

0.2

-

6

0.1

Galician Elections BNG %

seats

4.1

1

7.9

5

18.3

13

24.6

18

22.4

17

6.8

9.0

17

0.2

-

9.5

18

0.5

-

0.3

1991 1993 1994

13.9

9

0.8

8.1

0.5

11.6

0.9

-

1995 1996

9.3

19

0.9

2

1997 1999

5.7

4

1.6

2000

1

6.5 5.4

8

1.3

1.4

3

2001 Source: http://www.eleweb.net

Switzerland Anti-European parties in Switzerland have only emerged in the late 1980s, when the debate on Swiss integration into the European Union (EU) became increasingly salient and opened new political opportunities for the small radical right-wing parties which had entered the

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political scene a decade before (Gentile and Kriesi 1998, 125). Since the referendum campaign against Swiss participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992, one of the established governmental parties, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), has also engaged in the struggle against Switzerland’s institutional rapprochement with the EU and has since taken a leading role in this fight. Amongst the radical right-wing parties with a clear anti-European stance, one can count the Swiss Democrats (SD, formerly National Action), the Federal Democratic Union (FDU), the Liberty Party (LP, formerly Swiss Automobilist’s Party) and the Lega dei Ticinesi. Since their foundation in 1961, 1975, 1985 and 1991 respectively (Ladner 1998, 235-237), all of them have maintained their representation in the National Council even though a growing part of their electorate has recently switched to the SVP (OFS 1999, 7). Table A.4.: Development of the radical right-wing parties and the SVP compared to the established right at the federal level since 1983 (national elections, in %) Parties

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

Radical right-wing parties

3.3

6.0

10.8

9.3

4.9

Swiss Democrats

2.9

2.5

3.3

3.1

1.8

Liberty Party

-

2.6

5.1

4.0

0.9

FDU

0.4

0.9

1.0

1.3

1.3

Lega dei Ticinesi

-

-

1.4

0.9

0.9

SVP

11.1

11.0

11.9

14.9

22.5

Established right

43.5

42.5

39.0

37.0

35.8

Christian Democrats 20.2

Radical Party

19.6

23.3

18.0

22.9

16.8

21.0

15.9

20.2

19.9

Source: Office fédéral de la statistique (1999). Les élections au Conseil national de 1999. Neuchâtel: OFS, p. 29. As indicated by table A.4, radical right-wing parties attracted more than 10% of the electors in 1991. However, this electoral success was not based on an anti-European discourse, but resulted from an important campaign on the issue of refugees (Gentile and Jegen 1995, 347). In the subsequent election, in 1995, Europe became the dominant issue of the campaign and proved to be decisive for the success of the SVP (Linder 1998). As Linder notes, the SVP became a “reservoir” for all opponents to Switzerland’s entry into the EU (1998, 156). However, it is in the more radical (“blocherian”) cantons where the anti-European wing of the party dominates that the SVP progressed whereas the support for the party weakened in more moderate cantons, notably in Bern (Caramani 1996, 135). In 1999, the SVP continued to progress and eventually became the strongest party in Switzerland (together with the Social Democrats). Once again, its anti-European profile contributed considerably to this result (Sciarini 1999, 2). Even though the radical right-wing parties lost much of their electoral force in favour of the People’s Party, they continue to play an important role in the struggle against European integration (see below ). Because of the federal structure of the country, the radical right is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and a lack of organization (Gentile and Jegen 1995, 346; Gentile and Kriesi 1998, 132). Whilst the established right and the Social Democrats are represented in

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(almost) all of the cantons, radical right-wing parties are organized only in few cantons or even restricted to one canton, as the Lega dei Ticinesi4. Moreover, these parties suffer from a lack of personnel and financial resources. Even the SVP, one of the governmental parties, has only recently spread over most of the cantons with the foundation of several cantonal sections in the 1990s. Despite this organizational extension, the party is still only weakly represented in the French-speaking part of Switzerland (with the exception of the canton of Vaud, which is a traditional basis of the SVP). As in most Swiss parties, in each right-wing party and the SVP the General Assembly, composed of cantonal representatives, is the formal decisionmaking organ for actions at the federal level. Nevertheless, regional sections have a large degree of autonomy and can decide to support or reject a federal referendum or initiative irrespectively of the General Assembly’s opinion. As we will see below, this cantonal autonomy has recently resulted in tensions within the SVP, opposing the most radical section from the canton of Zurich to more moderate ones from Berne or Vaud. Even though the above-mentioned parties share their opposition to Switzerland’s entry into the EU, the Swiss radical right is a divided family. The SD, the oldest radical right-wing party, has engaged in a struggle against foreign “overpopulation” since the early 1970s, and has emphasized a strong state to guarantee the well being of Swiss people. Since the 1980s, the SD has additionally opposed Swiss membership in any supranational organization. Whereas the LP has also sought to reduce the number of foreigners in Switzerland and opposed participation in the UN or EU, it fights state interventions and advocates the virtues of the free market (Gentile and Kriesi 1998, 131-132). The Lega dei Ticinesi, for its part, has formed a parliamentary group with the Swiss Democrats. Like the latter, they favour state interventions for specific purposes and more social aids for pensioners (Mazzoleni 1999, 85) and mobilize against Europe and the central state. The SVP, finally, has a programme that successfully combines market liberalism with social conservatism and opposition to Europe (Kitschelt and McGann 2002, 18-19). According to the findings of Gentile and Kriesi (1998, 135-136), men show greater affinity with the SD or the LP than women, as do young people more than pensioners. In terms of education, a majority of their supporters have completed a professional school or an apprenticeship. With regard to social class, SD supporters do not have the same standing as LP sympathizers. While the former is more attractive to blue-collar workers and low-status employees, the old middle class is over-represented among the latter. While the SVP has traditionally recruited farmers and small independents, it has recently attracted a growing number of workers and low-status employees (Kitschelt and McGann 2002, 16-17). The SVP supporters distinguish themselves from the electors of other parties by their firm antiEuropean attitudes, their market liberalism and their socio-cultural authoritarianism (Kitschelt and McGann 2002, 21). While the electoral force of these anti-European parties provides some indications of their importance within Swiss politics, their real strength stems from their ability to use the instruments of direct democracy (referendum and initiative) at the national level. At the occasion of a compulsory referendum on December 6, 1992, the Swiss had to decide whether or not to participate in the EEA. All the small radical-right wing parties as well as the SVP opposed massively to the treaty and recommended its rejection to the citizens. However, two cantonal sections of the SVP, Bern and Vaud, called for Swiss membership in the EEA. The campaign of these radical right-wing parties is said to be responsible, to a large extent, for the 4

The Socialists and the Radical Party are only absent in the canton of Appenzell Inner-Rhoden, which does not have a party system in the proper sense. The SD had 7 cantonal sections in 1999, the FDU 15 and the LP 16. In the latter case, some cantonal parties were however dissolved after the disastrous electoral results in 1999 (Brändle 2001, 51-52). EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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defeat of the EEA treaty, which was rejected by a majority of the people and the cantons (Année politique suisse 1992, 72)5. In July 1992, the Lega dei Ticinesi and the Swiss Democrats launched a popular initiative that was handed in with 101,337 signatures in January 19946. On the one hand, this initiative wanted to withdraw Switzerland’s demand for membership negotiations with the EU, which the Federal Council had submitted to the EU in May 1992. On the other hand, it aimed at assessing that the people, not the Government, should have the right to initiate future membership negotiations. Supported only by the four small radical right-wing parties (SD, Lega, LP and FDU), this initiative was rejected by all cantonal sections of the SVP and voted down by the electors in June 1997 (Année politique suisse 1997, 70-72). In the fall of 1999, the Swiss Democrats and the Lega dei Ticinesi launched a referendum against the bilateral agreements with the EU. This referendum was voted in May 2000 and accepted by a popular majority of 67.2%. This time, more than half of the cantonal sections of the SVP supported the radical right-wing parties (SD, Lega, LP and FDU) and rejected the agreements despite the contrary decision of the national party (Hirter und Linder 2000, 5-6). In March 2001, the Swiss voted again on a European issue. The popular initiative “Yes to Europe”, launched by pro-European organizations, wanted the Federal Council to engage immediately in membership negotiations with the EU. Again, radical right-wing parties and the SVP mobilized against this rapprochement with the EU. This time, all but two cantonal parties of the Christian Democrats and several sections of the Radicals equally opposed the initiative, as did 76.9% of the Swiss in the popular vote (Hirter and Linder 2001). United Kingdom Britain’s political elites have been perhaps more divided than any others in the current EU on the question of European integration, although the current Labour administration is broadly pro-European. Both Labour and Conservative parties contain significant Eurosceptic elements, although the Tories have the greater proportion of Eurosceptics and have been less able to maintain party unity on Europe than Labour, meaning that of the three major parties, only the Conservatives could be said to be broadly anti-EU. Current Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith is opposed in principle to ever joining a single currency, and in the run-up to the 2001 election, then party leader William Hague ruled out entry into the euro in the next parliament if the Tories were elected. Among the fringe parties, there is also widespread opposition to European integration, with both the far left (Green Party and socialist parties) and right (British National Party) against the EU. Furthermore, separate political parties have been established to campaign against further European integration or for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union altogether. These are the UK Independence Party [UKIP], set up in 1993, and Sir James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, which was formed to contest the 1997 election and subsequently disbanded. The UKIP had around 8000 members in 1999, and as such can legitimately claim to be Britain’s fourth largest political party. It fielded candidates in the 1994 European Parliament elections and has contested at least 20 local by-elections since then. It won 3 seats at the European Parliament in the 1999 elections, benefiting from the proportional representation system used in the EP elections, although it has never won a seat in the UK general elections.

5

Note, however, the opposition of the Greens in the German-speaking part of the country as well as of two cantonal sections of both the Radical Party (Grisons and Schwytz) and the Christian Democrats (Ob- and Nidwalden). 6 This initiative was entitled “Membership negotiations with the EU: the people shall decide!”. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Table A.5. Electoral support for anti-EU parties (in italics): 2001 election: % of total vote achieved: Conservative

31.696%

Green

0.631%

Liberal

18.259%

Labour

40.675%

National Front

0.009%

UKIP

1.476%

Source: Political Science Resources, hosted by Keele University, at: http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/e01/partycand.htm

References Braendle, Michael, 2001, “Strukturen der Parteiorganisationen”, in Ladner, Andreas und Michael Braendle. Die Schweizer Parteien im Wandel, Zürich, Seismo, pp. 45-72. Caramani, Daniele, 1996, “The Swiss Parliamentary Election of 1995”. Electoral Studies vol. 15, no. 1: 128-138. Cole, Alexandra, 1996, The Republikaner: A Party at Odss with Itself, in Dalton, Russels J. (ed.): Germans Divided. The 1994 Bundestag Elections and the Evolution of the German Party System. Oxford / Washington D.C., Berg, pp. 133-157 Fourquet, J., 2001, De la percée des européennes de 1999 aux cantonales et municipales de 2001 : éléments d’analyse sur le courant souverainiste de droite à la veille de la présidentielle, CEVIPOF, juin 2001, http://www.cevipof.mshparis.fr/moment/rpf/doc0000.htm. Gentile, Pierre and Hanspeter Kriesi, 1998, Contemporary Radical-Right Parties in Switzerland: History of a Divided Family, in Betz, Hans-Georg and Stefan Immerfall (eds.), The New Politics of the Right, Houndmills, Macmillan, pp. 125-141. Gentile, Pierre and Maya Jegen (1995). Paradise News, in Baumgartl, Bernd and Adrian Favell (eds.), New Xenophobia in Europe, London, Kluwer Law International, pp. 344-357. Hirter, Hans and Wolf Linder, 2001, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 4. März 2001, VOX no. 73, Bern: GfS und Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern. Hirter, Hans und Wolf Linder, 2000, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 21. Mai 2000, VOX no. 70, Bern: GfS und Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern. Jardin, X., 2000, Le déchirement européen des gaullistes : de l’acquiescement sous conditions à l’acceptation sans condition ?, Atelier électronique Les partis de droite en Europe, Paris, http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/activite/cyberdte/textes/jardin.pdf. Kitschelt, Herbert und Anthony J. McGann, 2002, Die Dynamik der schweizerischen Neuen Rechten in komparativer Perspektive: Die Alpenrepubliken 1999. Unpubl. Ms. Ladner, Andreas, 1999, Das Schweizer Parteiensystem und seine Parteien, in Kloeti, Ulrich et al. (eds.), Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Zürich, NZZ Verlag, pp. 213-260. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Linder, Wolf, 1998, Parteien-, Persönlichkeits-, Europa- oder Traditionswahl? Eine systematische Untersuchung des Einflusses der Sachthemen auf den Wahlentscheid, in Kriesi, Hanspeter, Linder, Wolf und Ulrich Kloeti (eds.), Schweizer Wahlen 1995., Bern, Paul Haupt, pp. 131-160. Mazzoleni, Oscar, 1999, “La Lega dei Ticinesi: vers l’intégration?”, Revue suisse de science politique, 5 (3), pp. 79-95. OFFICE FEDERAL DE LA STATISTIQUE (1999). Les élections au Conseil national de 1999, Neuchâtel, OFS. Sciarini, Pascal, 2000, “Europa als Erklärungsfaktor des SVP-Wahlerfolgs von 1999”. News of the Europainstitut no. 35: 1-2. Della Porta, Donatella, 2002, Introduzione alla scienza politica, Bologna, Il Mulino. Gómez-Reino, Llamazares and Ramiro, 2002, Euroscepticism and political parties in Spain”. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshops, Turin, March 21-27, 2002. Morán, M. L., 1996, Spain. in Morgan, R. and Tame, C. (ed.), Parliaments and Parties. The European Parliament in the Political Life of Europe, London, MacMillan. Taggart, P. and A. Szaczerbiak, 2002, The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU member and candidate states, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshops, Turin, March 21-27, 2002. Veen, H.-J., 1992, Die Republikaner-Partei zu Beginn der 90er Jahre – Programm, Propaganda, Organisation, Wähler und Sympathisantenstrukturen, Bonn, Konrad-AdenauerStiftung.

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APPENDIX B. WRITTEN BY ALL TEAMS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SINGLE COUNTRIES

France France has a long-lasting tradition of protest. As for the ideology of the social movements, in France as in other European countries, social movements turn in the 70’s from “workers movements” characterized by a Marxist ideology to “post-materialist” movements with the rising of the Green party, and “identity” movements, etc. (Touraine, Wieviorka and Dubet 1984). Yet, this observation should be put into perspective: according to Fillieule (1997), unemployment, school problems and salaries continue to be central in the political claims in the eighties. Also at the end of the seventies, the membership of the traditional trade unions begins to decline. In 1981, the victory of the Left (Socialist and communist government until 1983) at the presidential and legislative elections stops the rise of demonstrations and strikes (Duyvendak 1994), and the share of the Communist party vote decreases in the legislative elections from 20.6 in 1978 to 4.9 in 2002, accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the social movements of December 1995, the movement organizations are much more influenced by the extreme-left with the rising of “Trotskyite” unions like Sud, movements like Attac and many other “alternative” organizations (antifascist movements, Droit au logement, Agir contre le chômage, etc.). Still, this radicalisation is only one face of social movements; the other one being a rising of “pragmatist” movements with little structured ideology and very specific political goals: the more a movement is specialized, the more it will be efficient, the experts becoming the new “heads” of activist movements. The eighties saw a changing in the organizational structure of social movements in France. From very structured organizations (PCF, CGT, leftist organization in general), there was a move towards “coordinations” whose ideal-type is the coordination of the nurses’ movement (Geay, 1991 and Hassenteufel, 1991), which was imitated by teachers, students, civil servants, etc. This type of structure tries to be more democratic and flexible, and against the traditional representation of unions. At the same time, experts are becoming central in the organizations. Political activism is also changing: while pbefore the eighties activism tended to be exclusive, today it allows for overlapping and not-totalizing membership. According to Ion (1994), we may consider that the organizations and associations however continue to play an important role in social movements, defining political identities and permitting the mobilization of resources and supports. Traditionally, the protest repertoires of French social movements are considered to be often confrontational and violent (according to Duyvendak, 55% of the French demonstrations between 1975 and 1989involved violence, while only 34% in Germany or 46% in the Netherlands did). And it is true that organizations rarely begin negotiations before entering a political conflict. Nevertheless, using police sources, Olivier Fillieule and Pierre Favre showed that only 5% of the demonstrations in Marseille, Nantes or Paris were violent between 1980 and 1989: it seems that social movements that use more radical forms (such as peasants’ or students’ ones) have a larger impact in the press and this introduce biases in the analysis. Strikes, demonstrations, occupations, and marches are common in France and coexist with lobbying, silent corporatism, etc. (Garraud 1989). The second characteristic of social movements in the 80’s and 90’s is the development of a media-oriented repertoire (Act Up, Greenpeace, etc.), which offers “ready-made” events to journalists. The mobilization of EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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experts permits new strategies and cooperation-negotiations between activists, journalists and authorities. Moreover, new forms of political actions like web-petition, information networks (samizdat.net, etc.) appeared at the end of the nineties (Ollitrault 1999). Germany During the seventies, after the students’ protests, the potential for unconventional forms of participation like petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, etc. reached a middle size in Germany compared to the United States, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK (Barnes et al.1979, 169 f.). Looking at results from 1981 to 1995, it becomes clear that only a minority of the population in Germany, but also in the Netherlands and the USA participates in protest events. As for the legal protests Germany resembles the other countries, differences remain regarding the potential and factual participation in illegal protests—with the lowest figures for Germany and Spain (World Values Survey). Between 1990 and 1992 protest movements are very active in Germany (see the peaceful revolution in East Germany). In the nineties, the actual participation in legal protests is not lower than during the seventies, but it changes very much from situation to situation. Figures collected in 1998 indicate that around 40% of german citizens have participated in petitions, 17% in demonstrations, around 9% in “Bürgerinitiativen” (Allbus 1998). The organisational structure of social movements in Germany differs greatly. The German agriculture movement is highly centralised. The main interest group is “Der Deutsche Bauernverband” with regional associations in all 15 states and offices in Berlin and Bruxelles. It represents 90 percent of all 420.000 farms in Germany and due to its own information one of the major goals is to actively influence politics (Der Deutsche Bauernverband 2002). The German labour movement is organised around the principle of industrial unionism. Their goal is to exert political pressure on traditional labour class concern. But the “comprehensive organizational structures as well as a number of restrictions in the realm of strike legislation, which the unions had to accept, facilitated the integration of the unions into the German policy networks. […] Given its pacified character and the widespread lack of class identities reflected by relatively low union densities, the mobilization potential of the German class cleavage is rather limited” (Kriesi et al 1995, 16). Despite this institutionalisation and pacification a study of protest events conducted by Friedhelm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht showed that the old conflict between labour and capital has constantly (apart from a short period between 1965 and 1970) been the main reason for protest events in Germany (Neidhardt and Ruch 2001, 161). In this respect, among the strongest and most influential unions are „IG Bau-Agrar-Umwelt“, „IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie“, „IG Metall“ and „Gewerkschaft öffentlicher Dienst“. In comparison, peace, ecological and solidarity movements are highly decentralised: large associations as Greenpeace, unions and the churches work together with parties such as the Greens and a variety of small initiatives, groups and networks. In this area, Germany has experienced a surge of the so called new social movement activity after 1980 (Kriesi et al. 1995, xvii ff.). During the eighties, new social movements have had a highly mobilizing effect in Germany. Concerning „unconventional“ events (actions of a demonstrative, confrontational, or violent type) as well as the number of participants in protest events new social movements are responsible for the largest share of the overall mobilization in Germany between 1975 and 1989 (Kriesi et al. 1995, 20, 74). Since the goals of the new social movements gained wide acceptance in the population and because protest movements can mobilize a wide population specific protest becomes powerful in Germany (Gabriel 1999, 465). As it had happened for the labour movement, the political system has tried to integrate EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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the bottom-up pressure of the new social movements in party platforms, administrative departments, research programs, etc. The career of “Bündnis90/Die Grünen” is the best example of the learning process of the political system in Germany that has proved to be rather flexible (Neidhardt and Rucht 1999, 159-161). But though most new social movements have institutionalised in the sense that they have become a stable item in politics they did not loose their movement character--which can be called “paradox of institutionalisation” of new social movements (Roth 1994). During the seventies and early eighties, the self-image of environmental movements for example was characterised by its readiness for offensive action. Despite its intensified presence in political negotiation processes, Dieter Rucht and Jochen Roose found a stable number of groups, an increase in the size of membership and other resources, as well as the maintenance of a decentralised movement structure (Rucht and Roose 2001). Especially the anti-nuclear movement still is highly decentralised and operates mainly in a frame of (half)informal groups and networks. In comparison the pro-environmental movement has far more professionalised. Here the number of employees have increased, especially in large associations that became the main carriers of environmental protests. In both areas the authors have found a growing importance of large associations. Greenpeace, “Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz” (BUND), Robin Wood and “Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Bundesschutz” (BBU) have particularly large membership (Rucht/Roose 2001, 186 ff). A major exception of the described development of pacification of social movements is the conflict area “immigrants and ethnic minorities”. During the 90ies, boosted by the problems of the German unification, this area has become highly explosive. Especially in former East Germany right extreme movements have mobilized and took a militant dimension (Neidhardt and Rucht 1999, 162). Italy Italy has an history of sustained protest, which peaked in the seventies, with the development of quite radical social movements (della Porta 1995; della Porta 1996; della Porta and Diani 1997). The first offensive wave of strikes in the large factories of the North that took place at the beginning of the sixties was a prelude to the widespread mobilization that developed later in the decade. From the mid-sixties on, new types of social movements emerged. Up to 1973, collective action expanded into different sectors of society in what Tarrow (1989) has described as part of a "cycle of protest". In the mid-seventies protest declined, leaving small and radicalized left-libertarian movements in its wave. In the eighties, protest did not reach the peaks of disruption attained in the sixties and the seventies, but we witness instead the growth and "institutionalization" of the new social movements. The new millennium opened with a „return to the street“. Until well into the second half of the seventies the Italian protest movements were characterized by the prevalence of a traditional Marxist stance. At the beginning of their protest, the students used forms of action that combined traditional means of exerting pressure (that is, within the institution), with more innovatory forms of action (sit-ins and go-ins). The repertoire of action and the ideology of the protest gradually changed as the movement interacted with other groups: from the hostile right-wing groups to the supportive factory activists. Violence occurred in the attacks by the neo-fascists, and in some brutal assaults by the police. Consequently, a spontaneous type of violence developed. The "need for selfdefence" became a relevant--albeit contested--issue.

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Two major elements characterized the first half of the seventies: the decline of mobilization within the universities and the growth of protest beyond the academic world, in particular regarding urban problems and gender discrimination. The expansion of protest to the most diverse social groups heightened political tensions and favoured the dominance of the New Left in the left-libertarian movements. The activists--particularly the student movement, which had expanded to include high-school students--couched their hopes for radical social change in the traditional discourse of class conflict. In Italy, more than in any other country in Europe, the left-libertarian movements--under the hegemony of the New Leftist discourse--used symbols and frames of reference that were known and accepted by the Old Left. So although the Oirld Left and the New Left competed for the support of leftist activists, the frames and strategies were to a large extent compatible. At least until 1973, the larger part of the left-libertarian movements perceived the Old Left, and in particular the PCI, as their main ally and support. Trade unionists, PCI activists, and New Left activists launched campaigns on such themes as housing conditions and the price of public transport. Generally, the hope for radical political change fuelled cooperation between the left-libertarian movements and the Old Left, while a fierce antagonism characterized the movements' attitudes towards the state. Political violence developed throughout this period (della Porta and Tarrow 1986). The process of radicalization, however, did not involve all components of the left-libertarian family, and during this period we witness an increasing strategical differentiation between movement organizations. Some parts of the movements criticized the use of violence, even for defensive aims, as this tended to increase the risk of isolation; whereas other groups thought that "the best form of defence is attack" and shifted to a model of organized violence. Semi-military violence escalated more in Italy than enywhere else in Western Europe. Small groupings of the New Left radicalized their ideology and strategy, preparing the ground for the development of the autonomous type of violence. In particular, a new form of radicalism-more anarchist and spontaneous than its predecessors--developed in the groups that intervened among marginalized youth. It was in this environment that the radicalized leaders of the previous movement wave sought their new recruits. While the Red Brigades carried out their first premeditated murder, other groups also began to organize underground. The situation began to change between 1981 and 1983 as the protest campaign against the NATO plan to deploy cruise missiles in various European countries gained strength. The peace movement remained highly visible throughout the period 1981-1983. With its nearly 600 peace committees and a few coordinating meetings, the peace movement was able to (re)mobilize the collective actors active in previous years--student activists, feminist groups, squatted youth centers, and the environmental groups. Unlike the mobilizations of the previous decade, this campaign relied on conventional forms of pressure (petitions, parliamentary initiatives, conferences, tax boycotts) together with non-violent direct actions (for example, the occupation of the military base at Magliocco in January 1982); violence was rare. In the early eighties most of the terrorist organizations disappeared, and even the two major groups--the Red Brigades and Front Line--experienced serious setbacks when some of their members began to collaborate with the police. When collective action reappeared in the eighties, after the "lull" in the late seventies, it had very different characteristics from those of the previous decade: the impact of the New Left ideology declined with the decline of the New Left groups, and many of the organizational and cultural characteristics often described as peculiar to the New Social Movements emerged. An important event in this phase was the rise of the ecological movement with a pragmatic political orientation. Also in the nineties, women’s groups organized especially at

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the local level, with also a pragmatic attitude and often involvement in the Third Sector, although without loosing their critique of hierarchical, macho politics (della Porta 2001a). Citizens’ commitees flourished in the cities as well as in the countryside, protesting against pollution as well as on security issues. Youth protest (and counterculture) developed in squatted „social centers“ (della Porta 2001b). Especially in the nineties, with the increase in immigration flows, migrants rigths movements started to mobilize, opposing racist attacks and also performing services for the migrants groups, who instead had themselves difficulties in getting organized. In the nieneties, protest aginst milk-quota were carried out by peasants, that challenged also the traditional interest groups, addressing wider social and political issues on the role of the primary sector (della Porta 2003). Especially in the nineties, the social movements found easy channels of access to the public administrators and the press, acquiring a more formal structure, moderate repertoire and pragmatic identities (della Porta 2000; della Porta and Andretta 2001).The relationship between the left-libertarian movements and their allies were marked by pragmatism, and a frequent cooperation on single issues. In addition, the movements' attitude towards their opponents was moderate and open to bargaining on single issues. Other movements-especially the student movement and the women's movement--joined forces with the environmentalists in various campaigns, among them, the anti-Mafia campaign of the late eighties (Andretta 1999). Both conventional and unconventional forms of action were used, but none were violent. In the beginning of the years 2000, formal associations, voluntary groups, youth centers and city committees converged in a series of mobilization on globalization and demands of social justice, peace and new forms of democracy “from below” (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca, Reiter 2002).

The Netherlands According to a survey in 1992 that applies the standard definition of social movements (loose networks, and so on) (Duyvendak et al. 1992), the Netherlands is marked by a plurality of vital social movements. These movements include the movement against nuclear energy, the movement of squatters, the movement against racism, the movement against apartheid, the environmental or green movement, the movement of social security clients (poor, unemployed, disabled citizens), the human rights movement, the peace movement, the movements for solidarity with oppressed or poor peoples, the women movement, the movement of gays and lesbians, and the movement of patients in mental homes. Dutch politics after de-pillarisation (the long 1960s) remained multi-partisan, corporatist, and consensual, while changing because of the entry of new movements which were – generally – free (often even subsidized by the central government and included in the formal framework of public policy consultation) national, peaceful, progressive or left-wing, and cooperative vis-à-vis the state, parliament, political parties, interest groups and (multinational) corporations. In 2002 we can observe the strengthening of some of these movements, indeed their institutionalisation (the environmental movement, the human rights movement, the women movement, to a lesser extent the movement of social security clients); the collapse of a number of movements (the peace movement, opponents of nuclear energy, squatters, patients in mental homes); the change of movements (the transformation of anti-apartheid and solidarity movements into non-governmental associations operative at the national and international levels, such as movements for the rights of refugees); the consolidation of movements (gays and lesbians, antiracists); and the rise of new movements, in particular the EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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anti-globalisation movement, the extreme right movement, the movement of elderly citizens, and immigrant movements (such as Milli Görus for Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands). There is no strong movement for or against the European Union (except for the small Vereniging voor een Democratisch Europa (VDE), founded in 1998, a platform for public debate on the democratic deficit, EMU and Eastern enlargement). The Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau issues annual reports on the quantitative and qualitative development of associations in the Netherlands. The most important ones in terms of members and donors are public broadcasting associations, consumer associations, associations for health care (such as the Red Cross), associations for international solidarity (such as Doctors without Frontiers and Amnesty International), associations for the protection of the natural environment, associations of the elderly, political parties, women’s associations, associations for and against abortion and euthanasia, employers’ associations, trade unions, associations of clubs for sport and recreation, and religious associations. The prominent features of Dutch civil society are, on the one hand, the high numbers of associations combined with low intensity of members’ participation, and, on the other hand, the recent growth of movements for environmental protection, international solidarity and moral issues (abortion, euthanasia) combined with the recent decrease of membership of political parties and trade unions. Further research on the Dutch public sphere of social movements relevant to European integration should include: the antiracist movement; the anti-globalisation movement; the elderly movement (pensioners); the environmental movement; the extreme right movement (populism); the human rights and international solidarity movements; immigrant movements; the movement of social security clients; the women movement.

Spain As for the movements’ ideology, traditional cleavages in Spain, such as class and centerperiphery, have not disappeared during the period of democratic consolidation. The labour, nationalist and student movements have also remained active in several periods of the Spanish democracy, thus leaving little ground for new social movements to find a space when compared to developments in other Western European countries. Traditional left and regionalist movements have reached much higher levels of mobilisation during the 80’s and nineties than new social movements (Álvarez 1994; Pastor 1998; Adell 2000). According to some authors (Pastor 1998, Herreros 2002), three cycles of New Social Movements mobilization can be distinguished in democratic Spain. The first is characterised by a high level of mobilization of the emerging feminist, ecological and urban movements that arose between 1977 and 1982. The second (1982-1995) is a period of de-mobilisation that coincided with rule by the Socialist party and the referendum about Spain NATO membership of 1986. The best example of de-mobilisation in this period is the pacifist movement, after the NATO referendum (Riechmann and Férnandez Buey 1994). The third period coincides with rule by the center-right Partido Popular since 1996, and corresponds to a rise in mobilisation by new social movements. A greater degree of institutionalization and a more pragmatic approach by some ecological and solidarity organisations co-exists in this period with an upsurge of radicalism by some movements, such as the squatter and new urban movements in large cities, and an increasingly active anti-globalization movement (Herreros 2002). Moreover, ecological and solidarity issues become part of the political agenda and of the content of most party programmes, especially of those of leftist parties.

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Membership in new social movements organisations is low comparing other Western European countries (affiliation in traditional organisations such as parties or trade unions is also low). Individual data from the 1990 WVS shows that only 3,8% of the Spanish respondents participated then in social movement organisations. In 1995 there was an increase to 8,7%, with data referring only to involvement in the ecological movement. This percentage remains low in comparative terms. There exist variation among new social movements in their organizational structure. The organizations involved in these NSMs play a significant role in providing support, resources, and access to the media (this is especially the case of the solidarity, ecological and feminist movements). The ecological, solidarity, and, to some extent, feminist movements are the most institutionalised. These movements benefit from siginificant financial resources and have access to political institutions at the local and regional level, especially in places governed by leftist parties. Jiménez (1999), for instance, argues that the Spanish environmental movement is increasingly dominated at the state level by a small number of professional organisations; he also points out to the existence of a division of work and specialisation among state-wide organisations. In the nineties, environmentalist are widely recognised as legitimate discussion partners in new emerging policy arenas (Jiménez 1999). Solidarity committees, citizen networks, and platforms against racism have also been created during the nineties (Gomà 2000) within the framework of a new solidarity and ecological movement that co-exists with institutionalised organisations. Other movements such as the antimilitary, the squatter, and urban autonomous movements (mainly in Madrid and Barcelona and their metropolitan areas) tend to be more horizontal and flexible and less well organized than the ecological or solidarity organisations. In general, they lack formal access to national or sub-national institutions (Ibarra, Martí and Gomà 2002). The same description can be applied to the anti-globalization movement, which has been increasingly active in Spain (specially Madrid, Catalonia and Basque Country) and is organized around assembly meetings. There is not systematic data available at the country level about the protest repertoires of different social movements. As it was mentioned above, membership rate in new social movements are low. Levels of protest –basically, participation in demonstrations and strikes-, on the other hand, are not as low in comparative terms (see WVS data). The highest level of participation in demonstrations, however, was obtained in the three general strikes organised by trade unions in 1988, 1994 and 2002. Since 1997, there have also been mass demonstrations against ETA, led by political elites and intensively covered by the mass media. It is difficult to generalise among movements with respect to repertoires of action. The prevailing forms of environmental protests are moderately unconventional, basically demonstrative and, to a lesser extent, confrontational (Jiménez 1999). With some exceptions (see the participation of the terrorist group ETA in the conflict of Lizarán, the route of a highway), the repertoire of action during the eighties and the nineties remained moderate. The institutionalised sectors of the solidarity and feminist movements -especially their formal organisations - have relied on cooperative strategies when dealing with authorities at the local and regional levels. Only exceptionally have they followed a confrontational strategy (Ibarra 1999). Demonstrations are the most common forms of action used by these movements. The antimilitary movement has gained the upper hand within the Spanish pacifist movement (Prevost 1993), as represented by the Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia (MOC) (conscience objectors’ movement). During the eighties, the MOC launched a campaign of civil disobedience (campaña de insumisión, or campaign of “insubordination”) against all compulsory military and civilian service. By 1996 those choosing total rejection of the conscription system (called insumisos) reached 14.000 (Sampedro 1998). New forms of political acts such as petitions on the Web and information networks developed at the end of the nineties. There is an increasing reliance on the organisation of festivals (such as the Fiesta EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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de la Diversidad organised by SOS-Racismo o the Fiesta de la Esperanza by IntermónOxfam, both with thousands of participants) and popular marches (for instance, in the conflict against the Plan Hidrológico Nacional in 2001), and on campaigns geared to get the mass media’s attention (especially among the ecological and solidarity movement) (Adell 2000). The occupation of buildings, the use of strategies of civil disobedience and tax payment resistance, and the organisation of a Social Consulta for the abolition of the Foreign Debt, are also part of the repertoire of action by the less institutionalised part of the new social movements. In sum, there seems to be a repertoire comprising mixed strategies among the NSMs. The most institutional sectors - mainly their organisations - use action repertoires such as participation in demonstrations, lobbing with political institutions, web-petition and information networks. In contrast, the less institutionalised NSMs use more confrontational strategies. What has happened within the anti-racist movement exemplifies this description:. An institutionalised organisation such as SOS-Racismo (the main anti-racist Spanish organisation, with close connections with the Socialist Party) uses lobby pressure, denonciation campaigns, and demonstrations as its main repertoire of protest. Meanwhile, illigal immigrants (“sin papeles”) use a more confrontational strategy that includes the occupation of churches and hunger strikes. Among the NSMs, radical forms of protest (that met with strong government repression) are observed in the squatter movement. Most of the instances of political violence in Spain are related to the separatist extreme-left movement in the Basque Country and not part of the NSMs’s action repertoire. Switzerland The four traditional cleavages (center-periphery, religion, urban-rural and class cleavage) in Switzerland have been pacified to a large extent. The corresponding movements (regionalist movements; education; farmers; the labor movement and other left mobilizations) therefore give rise to a rather low level of mobilization concerning these traditional topics and groups of population. In order to illustrate these facts we can consider e.g. the following data: The traditional social movements share of unconventional events (such as demonstrations or violent forms of protest etc.) amounts to only 17 per cent in Switzerland as compared to about 40 per cent in France (Giugni 2002; Kriesi et al. 1995). The pacification of traditional cleavages however opens mobilizing space for new social movements such as the pacifist movement, the antinuclear and ecologist movements, the solidarity movement and the urban autonomous movement which have been very active in Switzerland – in terms of events as well as in terms of persons mobilized. Remarkable is the rather low mobilization level of the feminist movement which seems not to have exploited all the opportunities offered within the Swiss political system (Giugni 2002). Concerning the organizational structure of new social movements two factors can be considered to play an important role: number of members and financial resources. Data for the year 1989 – unfortunately no more recent data are available – shows that in Switzerland membership in new social movement organizations was 16 500 000 (2 550 000 million inhabitants). Compared to France or even Germany these figures are extremely high: in France only 130 000 per million inhabitants and in Germany 1 020 000 per million inhabitants can be considered member of a new social movement organization. (Kriesi 1996, in Giugni 2002) Data on financial resources reinforces the hypotheses that Swiss new social movement organizations can count on a rather solid organizational structure. The above mentioned comparative analysis of Switzerland, Germany, France and the Netherlands shows that only Dutch new social movement organizations dispose of more financial resources. A

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cross movement comparison however depicts clearly the vast differences between different types of movements regardless of the country. The ecological movement is by far the richest in terms of members as well as in terms of financial resources. Additionally, it shows the highest degrees of formalization, professionalization and bureaucratization – a characteristic that it shares with the solidarity movement (Kriesi 1996, in: Giugni 2002). Furthermore – and this leads us to the question of action repertoires of social movements in Switzerland --the extreme openness of the Swiss political system leads to frequent and widespread co-operation of new social movement organizations with public authorities. At least the most moderate and structured organizations tend to be integrated into the political system as consequence of concessions, negotiations and sometimes even subsidies granted by the public authorities. Such an institutionalization took place especially within the ecological, the feminist and the solidarity movement, while other movements such as the antinuclear, the pacifist or the urban autonomous movements maintained their original features to a stronger extend. According to Giugni and Passy, direct democracy is the key factor of this institutionalization (Giugni and Passy 1997). As already indicated, the structure of political opportunities in Switzerland is distinguished by an extreme openness vis-à-vis challenging groups/actors, offering them many formal and informal canals of access. The Swiss political system is characterized on the one hand by a weak state with an extreme formal openness due to federalism, a fragmentation of power, weak administration and the importance of direct democracy. On the other hand – on an informal level – the prevailing strategy is clearly inclusive with a political system tending toward consensual integration of conflicts (Giugni 2002; Kriesi et al. 1995). Consequently, new social movements tend to adopt a rather moderate protest repertoire – at least at the national level. A clear exception to this general tendency has been the urban autonomous movement (during the early eighties, especially in Zurich), which adopted radical and even violent forms of action. (Giugni, 2002; Giugni and Passy 1997; Kriesi et al. 1995) Within the moderate protest repertoire two main action forms have been applied most frequently: demonstrative actions such as pacifist manifestations, sit-ins, petitions etc. on the one hand and strategies that directly imply the media such as resolutions, press releases, scientific reports etc. on the other hand. (Giugni and Passy, 1997) Analyses by Kriesi et al. (1995) showed that demonstrative forms of action represent – with 58.3 per cent – the greatest share of events initiated by new social movements (compared to 44.4 per cent of all events initiated by other movements). Action forms related to direct democracy – popular initiatives, compulsory or optional referenda – do not constitute a very important number of events, but are however very weighty action forms in terms of mobilization. While direct democratic action is responsible for only 4.3 per cent of all events initiated by new social movements, such action forms have been able to mobilize 534 000 persons per million inhabitants compared to e.g. petitions – the second most important action form in term of mobilization – with 144’000 persons per million inhabitants. (Kriesi et al. 1995) Concluding we can retain two major characteristics concerning (new) social movements in Switzerland: Firstly, the mobilization potential of (new) social movements in Switzerland is rather high. Secondly, due to various factors of the political opportunity structure (on a formal as well as informal level) action forms adopted by (new) social movement organizations tend to be moderate. United Kingdom The old and new social movements active in the UK experience very different levels of membership and support, as this overview of two traditional social movements – labour and EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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agriculture – and three new social movements – the environmental movement, the peace movement and the solidarity movement – shows. Looking at the labour movement, conventionally two main strands of the UK labour movement have been distinguished: the trade unions, and the Labour Party, created by the union movement in the early twentieth century. The main UK union organisation is the Trades Union Congress [TUC], which represents nearly 7 million people and over 70 member unions, and brings together unions to draw up common policies. The largest member union is UNISON with over 1.3 million members across the public service sector7. While the labour movement was a powerful force in UK politics for most of the twentieth century, past decades have seen union membership decline and traditional relations between the Labour Party and the unions become increasingly strained. Figures demonstrate that membership of trade unions is slowly declining, with research by the Department for National Statistics showing that in 1998 fewer than one in three employees in Great Britain were members of unions, and that overall union membership in Great Britain had declined by 1.3 million between 1991 and 20018. The unions have attempted to address this decline in membership, most notably through the TUC’s ‘New Unionism’ initiative, launched in 1996, which made recruitment and organisation a top union priority. Despite the decline in union membership, public opinion on unions remains stable; in 1990, 80% of all adults agreed with the statement that ‘trade unions are essential to protect workers’ interests’, while in 1995 79% agreed9. Trade unions tend to favour conventional forms of action such as political lobbying in Parliament, although there are occasions when unions resort to unconventional action such as strikes and picketing. In the UK, the labour movement is highly institutionalised through the Unions and there is very little ‘autonomous’ mobilisation, e.g. by the unemployed, or precariously employed. The UK has a highly developed and organisationally diverse environmental movement, reflecting the fact that environmentalism has had the greatest impact out of all issues raised by the new social movements, with many countries now having a ministry or department of the environment as a result. The Green Party has been a negligible factor in British politics. As regards campaigning groups, the UK environmental movement can be divided into two groups, conservationists and ecologists. The former consists of groups campaigning to preserve the countryside and animals, including the Royal Society for Protection of Birds (RSPB) and the National Trust (NT). Both organisations experienced significant membership increases in the late twentieth century, with NT membership reaching over 2.5 million in 1990 (more than nine times its level in 1971)10, while the RSPB currently has more than 1 million members11. Conservationist groups pursue aims within existing mainstream political institutions and without recourse to unconventional political action, in contrast to ecological groups, which use a wide variety of conventional and unconventional tactics. Ecological movement organisations such as Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace have more radical action repertoires and ideological positions than conservationist organisations. While FOE attempts to influence policy using campaigns based on civil protests, research, lobbying and active promotion of greater popular activism, Greenpeace focuses more on ‘direct action’ based on high profile cases (now favouring non-violent protests), and targets media exposure, though research and lobbying are also seen as important. The ecological movement expanded massively throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with FOE having 150 branches nationwide and a 7

UNISON online, www.unison.org.uk/about/about.asp [1/10/02] National Statistics online, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=4&Pos=1&ColRank [3/10/02] 9 MORI online, ‘Attitudes towards trades unions’, http://www.mori.com/polls/indunion.shtml [25/9/02] 10 National Statistics online http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/xsdataset.asp?More=Y&vlnk=235&All=Y&B2.x=61&B2.y=12 [3/10/02] 11 RSPB online, http://www.rspb.org.uk/features/default.asp [3/10/02] 8

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membership of 190,000 by 1990 (Byrne 1997)12. Both Greenpeace and FOE suffered stagnation or decline in membership and support numbers in the mid-1990s, albeit from very high levels, and each has sought to address the problem of how to involve rank-and-file supporters in campaigns that are centrally directed. However, public support for environmentalism is still relatively high, with one in five people in the UK supporting an environmental group and 21% having held membership in a group over the past year.13 The UK peace movement comprises relatively few organisations, the largest being the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND]. CND was established in 1964 and reached its peak membership of 100,000 in 1984. Since then membership has been in steady decline, falling from 62,000 in 1990 to 47,000 in 1995 (Byrne 1997, p. 91). Despite this decline in membership, support for what the peace movement stands for remains strong with more than 400,000 people taking part in a peace march and demonstration against the war on Iraq in London organised by the Stop the War Coalition.14 Protests are not the only form of action associated with CND; marches, leafleting and lobbying are all used by this organisation to express their views. The peace movement is left-libertarian, and it has a relatively formal organisational structure that is indicative of a conventional pressure group more than a new social movement. The UK has no single unified solidarity movement; instead there are several issue-led movements operating in specific issue fields. These include the anti-racist movement, groups which mobilise over overseas development and aid issues, human rights organisations and pro-migrant groups. The major organisations in these movements – Oxfam, Amnesty International and the Refugee Council – share relatively similar repertoires of action, typically using a combination of insider and outsider campaign strategies ranging from lobbying Parliament, carrying out research and drawing up proposals for improvement of policies and practices through to petitions and protest demonstrations. The Anti-Racist Alliance [ARA] is the central organisation in Britain’s anti-racist movement, comprising support from over 800 organisations that campaign at local and national level against racist murders, attacks and harassment. Its repertoires of action are largely ‘outsider’ tactics, including demonstrations, festivals and publication of research reports.15 At times of particular contention over racial issues, such as activity by the British National Party, diverse coalitions of organisations ranging from trade unions to NGOs, and other anti-racist organisations (e.g. the Anti-Nazi League) typically come together to demonstrate against racism. Public awareness of such issues is high, as a MORI survey conducted in May 2002, which found that race relations and immigration had risen into second place in the list of most frequently mentioned important issues facing the country, with 39% of the public naming it as an important issue.16 The development and aid movement largely consists of NGOs and churches, one key organisation being Oxfam, which campaigns on issues concerning international trade and welfare. The majority of these organisations rely on volunteers for much of their activity, with Oxfam having approximately 23,000 volunteers in Britain, in addition to about 1,300 staff and 1,500 locally recruited staff working overseas.17 For human rights campaigning, the major NGO operating in the UK is Amnesty International. Launched in the UK in 1961, Amnesty currently has more than 150,000 members nationally. Amnesty makes the formal claim that it is independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or

13

MORI online, www.mori.com/polls/1998/iem_01.shtml [3/10/02] The March took place on 28/09/02. See report in The Guardian, 30/09/02. 15 Anti-Racist Alliance http://www.blacknet.co.uk/youthara/section1.htm [3/10/02] 16 MORI online www.mori.com/digest/2002/c020621.shtml [3/10/02] 17 Oxfam online www.oxfam.org.uk/atwork/org1.htm [3/10/02] 14

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religion18, although in practice human rights activism tends to be associated with leftlibertarian positions. Turning to pro-migrant groups, the Refugee Council is the largest organisation in the UK working with asylum seekers and refugees. It is a membership organisation, which has increased its membership base from 50 to nearly 180 organisations since 1983. Finally, the National Farmers Union (NFU) is the most significant organisation within the UK agricultural movement, representing farmers and growers in England and Wales. Its membership currently runs at over 150,000, which includes 75% of full-time farmers and growers. The organisation is not affiliated with any one political party, and employs both conventional and unconventional types of action when campaigning, with a bias towards the former19. Of late, there has been significant rural unrest in Britain, most visible in the London ‘Liberty and Livelihood’ march on 22 September 2002 organised by rural rights organisation the Countryside Alliance. The march, in which 407,791 people participated, called on the government to help rural minorities in defending their rights and jobs20. References Ádell, R., 2000, Los movimientos sociales en los años noventa: volumen, actores y temas de movilización, in Grau, E. and Ibarra, P. (eds.). Una Mirada sobre la red. Anuario Movimientos Sociales, Barcelona, Icaria. Álvarez, J., 1994, Movimientos sociales en España: del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista, in Laraña, E. and Gusfield, J. (eds.). Los nuevos movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad., Madrid, CIS. Andeweg, R.B. and Irwin, G.A., 1993, Dutch Government and Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd., London. Andretta, Massimiliano, Sistema politico locale e protesta a Palermo, in “Quaderni di sociologia”, n. 22, 1999, pp. 68-89. Andretta, M., D. della Porta, L. Mosca, H. Reiter, 2002, Global, noglobal, new global. Le proteste contro il G8 a Genova, Roma, Laterza. Barnes, Samuel H. and Kaase, Max, 1979, Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, Beverly Hills / London: Sage Byrne, P., 1997, Social Movements in Britain, Routledge, London. Budge, Ian, 1992, Gran Bretagna e Irlanda, in Josep M. Colomer, ed., La politica in Europa, Bari-Roma, Laterza. Della Porta, D., 1995, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press. Della Porta, D., 1996, Movimenti collettivi e sistema politico, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Della Porta, D., 2000, Immigrazione e protesta: il caso italiano in prospettiva comparata, in “Quaderni di sociologia”, 21, 14-45. Della Porta, D., 2001a, Diritti di cittadinanza e movimento delle donne, in P. Di Cori and D. Barazzetti (eds), Gli studi delle donne in Italia, Roma, Carocci, pp. 191-206. 18

Amnesty International online www.amnesty.org.uk/amnesty/mand.shtml [3/10/02] NFU online www.nfu.org/ [4/10/02] 20 Countryside Alliance online www.countryside-alliance.org/news/02/02927march.htm [4/10/02] 19

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Della Porta, D., 2001b, Social Movements and New Challenges to Representative Democracies, in „Politique Europeénne“, n. 4, pp. 73-103. Della Porta, D., 2003, Social Movements and Europeanisation, in G. Bettin (ed.), European Societies, forthcoming. Della Porta, D. and M. Andretta, 2002, Social Movements and Public Administration, in “International Journal of Urban Research”, 24, n. 2, pp. 244-265. Della Porta, D. and M. Diani, 1999, Social Movements, Oxford, Blackwell. Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow, 1986, Unwanted Children. Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy. 1966-1973, "European Journal of Political Research", 14, pp. 607-632. Der Deutsche Bauernverband, 2002, Mit einer Stimme, Warendorf, Plantamedium. Diani, Mario, 1990, The Network Structure of the Italian Ecology Movement, in "Social Science Information", 29, pp. 5-31. Duyvendak Jan Willem et al., 1992, Tussen verbeelding en macht , Amsterdam, SUA, 1992. Duyvendak, J.W., 1994, Le poids du politique, Paris, L’Harmattan. Favre, Pierre, 1990a, La Manifestation, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1990 Favre, Pierre, 1990b, Nature et statut de la violence dans les manifestations contemporaines », Les cahiers de la sécurité intérieure, 1. Fillieule, O., 1997, Stratégie de la rue. Les manifestations en France, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po. Franklin, Mark N., Tom T. Mackie, Henry Valen et al., eds., 1992, Electoral Changes: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Garraud, P., 1990, « Politiques nationales : élaboration de l’agenda », L’Année sociologique, vol. 40, 1990, pp. 17-41. Gabriel, Oskar W., 1999, Politische Einstellungen und politisches Verhalten, in Ahlstich, Katja; Gabriel, Oskar W.; Holtmann, Everhard (eds.), Handbuch politisches System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, Odenbourg Verlag, pp.381-499 Geay, B., 1991, « Espace social et coordinations: le mouvement social des instituteurs de l’hiver 1987 », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 86-87, pp. 2-24. Giugni, Marco, 2002, Les mouvements sociaux: structures, processus et consequences, in Klöti, Ulrich; Peter Knoepfel; Hanspeter Kriesi; Wolf Linder; Yannis Papadopoulos, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 3, überarbeitete Auflage. Verlag NZZ, Zürich, 259-293. Giugni, Marco; Florence Passy, 1997. Histoires de mobilisation politique en Suisse. De la contestation à l’intégration, L’Harmattan, Paris. Gomà, R., 2000, “Pluralisme participatiu i xarxes d’acció collectiva”, Àmbits de Política i Societat 15. Grau, E. & Ibarra, P. (eds.), 2001, Participando en la red. Anuario de Movimientos Sociales, Barcelona, Icaria. Hassenteufel, P., « Pratiques représentatives et construction identitaire, une approche des coordinations », Revue française de science politique, 1, 1991, pp. 5-26. Hellema, D. (1995), Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland, Het Spectrum BV, Utrecht. Herreros, T., 2002, “Moviments socials i globalització econòmica: el cicle de protesta del capitalisme global”. Àmbits de política i societat 22.

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Ibarra, P., 1999, “Los movimientos de la solidaridad; ¿un nuevo modelo de acción colectiva?”. REIS 88: 233-258. Ibarra, P., Martí, S. and Gomà, R. (eds.) (2002) Creadores de democracia radical. Movimientos sociales y redes de políticas públicas, Barcelona, Icaria. Ion, J., 1994, L’évolution des formes de l’engagement public , in Perrineau, P. (ed.), L’engagement politique. Déclin ou mutation?, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 23-40. Jiménez, M., 1999, Struggling for the environment: a profile of recent environmental protests in Spain. Estudio/Working Paper 1999/143. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. Kriesi, Hanspeter, 1996, The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context, in McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (editors), Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 152-184. Kriesi, Hanspeter and Jan Willem Dyvendak, 1995, National Cleavage Structure, in Kriesi et al, pp. 3-25. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Marco Giugni, 1995, New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis,University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Kwast-van-Duursen, M., 1985, Het Nederlandse EG beleid: Afscheid van de Supranationaliteit, (The EU Policy of the Netherlands: Departure from Supranationality) in Internationale Spectator, November 1985. Neidhardt, Friedhelm and Dieter Rucht, 1999, Protestgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-1944. Ereignisse, Themen, Akteure. In: WZB, WZB-Jahrbuch, Berlin, Sigma, pp. 129-163. Ollitrault, S., 1999, De la caméra à la pétition-web : le répertoire médiatique des écologistes, Réseaux, 98. Pastor, J., 1998, La evolución de los nuevos movimientos sociales en el Estado español, in Ibarra, P. and Tejerina, B. Los movimientos sociales. Transformaciones políticas y cambio cultural, Madrid, Trotta. Prevost, G., 1993, “New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics”. West European Politics 2: 144-164. Riechmann, J. and F. Fernández Buey, 1994, Redes que dan libertad. Introducción a los nuevos movimientos sociales, Barcelona, Paidós. Roth, Roland, 1994, Demokratie von unten. Neue soziale Bewegungen auf dem Wege zur politischen Institution, Köln, Bund. Rucht, Dieter and Jochen Roose, 2001, Zur Institutionalisierung von Bewegungen: Umweltverbände und Umweltprotest in der BRD, in Annette Zimmer and Bernhard Wessels (eds.), Verbände und Demokratie in Deutschland, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, pp. 173-210. Sampedro, V., 1998, Institutional political and unconventional political action. Governmental “gag rules” and opportunities for dissent. Estudio/Working Paper 1998/117, Madrid, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. Tarrow, Sidney, 1989, Democracy and Disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Touraine, A., Wieviorka, M., Dubet, F., 1984, Le mouvement ouvrier, Paris, Fayard.

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Van den Bos, J.M.M., 1991, Dutch EC Policy Making, A Model-Guided Approach to Coordination and Negotiation, PhD thesis, Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht. Voorhoeve, J.J.C., 1985, Peace, Profits and Principles, A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden.

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Cross-national Report WP 1b .

Project:

The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres

Project acronym:

Europub.com

Project website:

http://europub.wz-berlin.de

Funded by:

5th Framework Programme of the European Commission

Contract No.

HPSE-CT2000-00046

Work package:

WP 1 (Analysis of opportunity structures)

WP Coordinator:

Donatella della Porta

Deliverable number:

D 1.2

Report

Media opportunity structures A brake block for the Europeanisation of public spheres?

Cross-national

France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom

Analysis

Author:

Silke Adam, Barbara Berkel, Barbara Pfetsch

Date:

February 2003

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1. Introduction The deficit of a European public sphere was identified as a major brake block of the European integration process. This criticism comprises the general problem of a de facto Europeanisation of political competences, for instance in monetary politics, that is accompanied by a lacking feedback of European citizens. This gap results in a democratic deficit and partly as a consequence thereof in a deficit of a common European public sphere (Gerhards 2001: 8). Reasons for the slow flow of information between countries, resp. between countries and the European Union are seen in language barriers, the absence of European media, as well as in the fact that most European decision-makers as the members of the European Council or the European Commission are legitimised by national electorates (Schmuck et al. 1990: 280-285). However, the increase of political competences at a European level requires the analysis of the constituting conditions of the Europeanisation of national public spheres (Neidhardt et al. 2000). In the first part of this report political opportunity structures were analysed that might push a Europeanisation of national public spheres. In this part of the workpackage we pay attention to mass media that play a crucial role in structuring public spheres. A public sphere comes into existence when speakers communicate in public arenas whose borders are not delimited (Neidhardt 1994: 10). As speakers are unable to reach their audience directly, public communication changes to mass communication (Neidhardt 1994: 10). The liberal model of a public sphere – as proposed by Gerhards and Neidhardt – accounts for this mode of communication and identifies mass media as the highest and most stable level of the public sphere (Gerhards et al. 1991:42f). Media in European countries are organised in a national framework, they appear in the national language and they are sold to and used by national audiences. Thus there are hardly any transnational media that have the potential to reach the majority of the European citizenry. We start from the assumption that in terms of the constitution of a European public sphere it is realistic to expect a Europeanziation of national public spheres (Eilders et al. 2003). As mass media are the condition as well as the forum for public communication processes (Pfetsch 1994: 12), one tends to hold the national mass media responsible for the deficit of a European public sphere. This often disregards the particular characteristics of European media systems that imply very different structural conditions for the process of Europeanisation. Especially the connection between media structures and the Europeanisation of public spheres has not been investigated until today. To fill this gap we will formulate tendencies about which opportunity structures of national media systems can push or hamper Europeanisation. We assume that two major dimensions determine the chances of a Europeanisation of media inducted public spheres: The information capacity of national media systems for the citizens and the patterns of political discourse in national public spheres that refer to the complexity and abstractness that media allow for in public discourses. These dimensions can be derived from (1) democratic theory that points to the requirements that the media ought to fulfil in modern mass democracies and (2) to findings in communication science about the working of mass media. In modern democracies mass media are a key actor in political processes. Media serve as news and opinion agencies for and between political and civil actors. Individual opinions and voting decisions are largely based on the information provided by media (Voltmer 1997: 5, Neumann 1986). Political actors therefore rely heavily on the presence in media to mobilise public support and to reach their goals. Obviously the democratic performance depends on the media’s capabilities and performance qualities to produce and distribute political information. We will therefore focus

on the information capacity of the media systems and the patterns of political discourse in the public spheres of the countries under study. 2. Media systems and information capacity in national public spheres In democratic theory the diversity of media was identified to be one central precondition of a functioning democracy and of media’s ability to provide complete and reliable information. Ideally any viewpoint should have the opportunity to access the public forum. Only if the pros and cons of an issue become visible in public debate, the citizens are able to build their opinion according to their political preferences (Almond 1960, Dahl 1979). In this respect the citizens are referred to as the ultimate sovereign of democratic decision making for whom “alternative information is particularly necessary to satisfy the criterion of enlightened understanding” (Voltmer 1997: 8). The information capacity depends mainly on the degree of plurality and the degree of commercialisation of a media system. The plurality of a media system determines the diversity of issues and opinions it represents. In commercialised media systems however, political information tends to be edged out from the public agenda. 2.1 External plurality The concept of plurality within a media system captures its degree of representation of varying interests, opinions and attitudes. Structural conditions in a media system can support or hamper this ideal free flow of political information (McQuail 1992: 160ff). The literature on media performance differentiates between internal and external plurality. Internal plurality refers to the range of opinions that a single medium represents, whereas external plurality measures the degree of diversity that the media offer altogether. Internal plurality of a media system is given if different political opinions are equally represented in the contents of a single medium. Internal plurality is usually measured by content analyses of media items. For the purposes of our study however external plurality is the relevant aspect. We aim to assess the plurality of the media systems under study in terms of the diversity of media outlets, the degree of concentration and the geographical diversity. As a first step we shall focus on the diversity of media outlets. Since media organisations operate in a free market system, the question of external plurality is closely linked to the criterion of media ownership concentration. The dominance of one supplier in a media market implies the danger that this supplier will dominate and also control the market of opinions. “Market dominant corporations in the mass media have dominant influence over the public’s news, information, public ideas, popular culture, and political attitudes. The same corporations exert considerable influence within government precisely because they influence their audience’s perceptions of public life, including perceptions of politics and politicians as they appear – or do not appear – in the media.” (Bagdikian 1990: 4f)

Most democracies have therefore legal restrictions for media ownership as it is assumed that the plurality of suppliers will rather lead to an external plurality of opinions. Far more restrictively organised than printed media are broadcasting stations. The reason is that until the 80s in most European countries television and radio markets were in the hands of public broadcasting stations. This monopolistic market structure lead to the creation of specific rules and control mechanisms to guarantee internal plurality. But since private broadcasting companies and the principle of market competition were introduced in all European countries, external plurality has also become a crucial requirement of broadcasting systems.

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With regard to Europeanisation we argue that geographical diversity that media outlets represent (local, regional, national, European or foreign scopes) is a crucial question. Local television or press will naturally focus less on the EU or other European countries than national or Pan European ones. However, one can as well assume an opposite tendency and expect that a diversity of scopes will positively influence the chances for Europeanisation. To summarize this point, we see the media system as one element of an opportunity structure that influences the Europeanziation of a media inducted public sphere. The media cater to the basic need of the citizens to be informed about European actors and issues. It is plausible that the plurality will also effect European matters in that the more plural a national media system is the more opportunities it will offer European actors and issues to access national public spheres. The more plurality a media system exposes the more one can expect that the diversity of publicly discussed interests, opinions and attitudes come to the fare. In sum, the plurality of a media system indicates its general openness for political issues and opinions. The higher the degree of plurality of a national media system the higher the chances for Europeanisation of a media inducted public sphere. 2.1.1 Diversity of media outlets As a first step, we compare the diversity in terms of the numbers of media that the populations in the countries under study can access. a. Daily newspapers The external plurality in the markets of daily newspapers can be measured in terms of numbers of titles and in terms of circulation (Table 1). By far most daily newspapers are published and circulated in Germany, followed by Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Interestingly enough, a small country like Switzerland issues as many daily newspapers (104) as the United Kingdom. Later on in this report when we will elaborate on the circulation of these newspapers, it becomes obvious that the British press in total sells far more copies than the Swiss press. This also implies a more pronounced readership concentration on the British market. Table 1: Offer of Daily newspapers 2000 1 Number of Titles France Germany

Daily newspapers’ Circulation (000)

*

81

8.799*

382

23.946

Italy

88

6.024

Netherlands

35

4.443

Spain

136

4.300

Switzerland

104

2.666

United Kingd.

104

19.052

* Numbers from 1999 and 1998 1

Source: World Press Trends 2001

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An indicator that takes the size of national consumer markets into account is the relative offer of daily newspapers that is measured by the number of titles per one million resp. one thousand of the adult population (Table 2). Switzerland shows the biggest richness of the print media: More than 17 papers per one Million of Swiss adults are published every day. Germany ranks second, as the relative offer is six papers. The offer in France, Italy and the United Kingdom is far smaller. In the British case however, the relative circulation numbers show that less papers serve a rather big readership. This again implies a more pronounced concentration on the British readers’ market. In France and Italy on the contrary the relative low offer of titles corresponds to relative low numbers of circulation. Table 2: Offer of Daily newspapers / Adult Population 1 Number of Titles

Daily newspapers’ Circulation

Absolute 1

Relative 2

Absolute (000) 1

Relative 3

France

81*

1,8

8.799*

190,0

Germany

382

6,0

23.946

375,2

Italy

88

1,8

6.024

121,4

Netherlands

35

2,7

4.443

345,9

Spain

136

4,1

4.300

129,4

Switzerland

104

17,7

2.666

453,7

United Kingd.

104

2,2

19.052

408,5

*) Numbers from 1998 or 1999 1

Source: World Press Trends 2001

2

Number of Titles/Adult Population (Titles per Million), Source: World Press Trends 2001

3

Average Circulation/Adult Population (Copies per Thousand), Source: World Press Trends 2001

b. Television The external plurality in television markets depends in the first place on the opportunity to access information that is free of charge. This flow of free information is highly determined by technical preconditions. In principle television reaches nearly the entire citizenry in Europe: According to the European Key Facts (Table 3) approximately all households in the countries we investigated own a television set (between 95.1 percent in Switzerland and 99.7 percent in Spain). However, the plurality in free television markets relies heavily on the penetration rates of cable and satellite distribution as these offer a far bigger choice of programs. The rates of TV distribution show clearly two groups of countries. In Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland it was a political decision to heavily invest in the cable infrastructure and satellite distribution to allow the audiences for more programs and to foster the free flow of information. As consequence thereof most households can access a rather big variety of free television programs.

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Table 3: TV Distribution Total number of TV TVHH in % households of all HH1

(TVHH)1

in % of TVHH Cable (connec.)

1

Satellite 1 Terrestrial only2

Digital TV 2

France

22 840 000

93,6

13,2

12,1

79

8,4

Germany

33 560 000

98,7

53,3

38,2

25

2,3

Italy

20 700 000

97,5

0,2

8,8

95

3,8

6 693 000

98,4

94,2

3,8

7

0,4

12 181 000

99,7

2,8

10,5

83

8,8

3 007 252

95,1

82,9

9,3

n.a.

n.a.

24 375 000

97,0

13,6

17,8

65

6,0

Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingd. 1

Source: Television 2001, European Key Facts, Country reports

2

Source: Lange (2000: 97)

In contrary the vast majority of television households in France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom depend to a much higher degree on terrestrial distribution. Comparative studies show that the dependency on terrestrial channels is the major explanation for the distribution of digital television. Thus it is assumed that the diversity of free information is more important than other factors as the size of a television market or the readiness of the audience to spend money for the use of media (Lange 2000). This reason also accounts for the success of pay TV in these countries. The increasing subscription rates for digital/pay TV demonstrate the preference of the audience of a bigger variety and choice. As consequence of the different national situations the audiovisual offer that more than 70 per cent of all television households can technically receive varies strongly between the countries (Table 4). In Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland the majority of television consumers can choose between up to eight times more free television channels than in France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Thus the plurality is obviously independent from the size of a television market, but dependent on technical preconditions.

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Table 4: Audiovisual Offer 2001 1 Number of Channels > 70% Technical Penetration France Germany Italy

38 9

Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom 1

7

39 5 16 5

Source: Television 2001, European Key Facts, Country reports

In sum, as far as external plurality of media is concerned, the German, Dutch and Swiss free television markets exceed that of the other countries under study. Concerning daily newspapers, Switzerland and Germany have the biggest diversity, followed by Spain. Thus, Germany and Switzerland, followed by the Netherlands and Spain, reveal the highest level of external plurality of their media systems as far as the distribution of daily newspapers and free television is concerned. However, at this stage, the conclusion must be regarded as preliminary, since the plurality of a media system is closely linked to the degree of concentration. 2.1.2 Degree of concentration Concentration processes in media markets take place on the side of demand and the side of supply. Concerning the concentration of demand, the relevant criterion is the number of media outlets that are used by the audience. As in all countries under study the various media belong to a few media corporations, the supply is also concentrated in few hands. The relevant criterion is the number of media corporations that dominate the consumers’ market. a. Daily newspapers The concentration rates on the markets of daily newspapers under study differ considerably. Regarding the circulation shares of the main daily newspapers the market leaders cover between ten and twenty percent (Table 5). In Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom the most popular newspapers are tabloids, whereas in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain quality newspapers are the market leaders. This aspect is part of a specific media culture that we will analyse later in more detail. In the United Kingdom the five most popular daily newspapers have a share of about half of the circulation. In comparison, the French newspaper market is the least concentrated, followed by Germany and Spain. Italy and the Netherlands take a middle position. Switzerland is an exception in so far as Swiss readers read more than one newspaper outlet every day. In the Italian speaking region of Switzerland the added share of the top three daily newspapers therefore exceeds 100 per cent. The readership concentration rate in Switzerland thus have to be interpreted cautiously.

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Table 5: Concentration on the readers’ market 2001 1 Circulation Shares of Main Daily newspapers (in %) Share of market leader 1

Share of Top Five Daily newspapers

France

8,9: Ouest-France (Regional)

27,5

Germany

18,3: Die Bild (Tabloid)

28,5

Italy

11,9: Corriere della Sera (Quality)

43,6

Netherlands

18,2: De Telegraf (Quality)

44,1

Spain

10,1: El País (Quality)

37,9

Switzerland – German*

18,1: Blick (Tabloid)

52,4

Switzerland – French*

22,7: Le Matin (Tabloid)

71,9

Switzerland – Italian

46,2: Corriere des Ticino (Tabloid)

United Kingdom

18,2: The Sun (Tabloid)

113,7 (only

top three d.n.)

51,8

* Readership shares 1

Own calculation based on: World Press Trends 2001

Regarding the ownership of the daily newspapers the picture of concentration is aggravated (Table 6). The market leaders in many countries cover a relevant part of the readership. In the French speaking part of Switzerland the products of Edipresse SA cover even more than 60 percent of the readers’ market. Table 6: Concentration on the owner market 2000/01 1 Readership Shares of main Publishing Companies (in %) Share of market leader 1

Share of Top Four Publishing Companies

France

n.a.

n.a.

Germany

23,6: Axel Springer Verlag

39,0

Italy

16,8: R.C.S. Group

38,3

Netherlands

30,4: PCM Holding

94,8

Spain

n.a.

n.a.

Switzerland – German

20,6: Tamedia AG

59,7

Switzerland – French

64,2: Edipresse SA

n.a.

Switzerland – Italian

n.a.

n.a.

United Kingdom

34,0: News International *

88,0 *

* Circulation shares of 1987 1

Source: Country specific data

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An important actor in the British newspaper market is News International that publishes among others The Sun and The Times. News International is owned by the Australian Rubert Murdoch who has hit the headlines several times because he is said to influence the editorial policies of his media to pursue political or economical goals. The most concentrated owner markets are the Netherlands and Great Britain. In the Netherlands five publishing companies serve more than 90 percent of the readers of daily newspapers. In comparison the German and Italian market allows for much more diversity. b. Television The television markets in the countries under study are altogether far more concentrated than the markets of daily newspapers. The data on the degree of concentration on the audience markets (Table 7) basically show four important points. First, the audience markets in all countries under study are highly concentrated. For instance, the market leaders cover up to a third of the audience market. The fact that in most countries public television stations are leading the markets, indicates that public television is still very successful despite the introduction of private channels. Only in the UK and France commercial channels enjoy the biggest popularity, but both countries are obvious exceptions as their commercial channels did not suffer from competitive disadvantages compared to public channels. “ITV” was already founded in 1954 and “TF1” is a former public station that was sold to the construction company Bouyghes in 1987. Table 7: Concentration on the audience market 2001 1 Audience Shares of Main Channels (Adults 12+, all day, in %) Share of market leader 1

Share of

Share of

Top Five channels

splinter channels

France

33,1: TF 1

(private)

89,3

7,0

Germany

14,8: ARD

(public)

61,5

7,3

Italy

23,8: RAI

(public)

81,0

7,3

Netherlands

17,7: Nl 2

(public)

62,8

18,1

Spain

25,4: TVE 1 (public)

93,2

4,6

Switzerland – German

24,7: SF

(public)

58,6

26,2

Switzerland – French

26,8: TSR

(public)

71,3

19,6

Switzerland – Italian

23,4: TSI

(public)

72,0

17,7

United Kingdom

29,9: ITV

(private)

85,1

14,9

1

Source: Television 2001, European Key Facts, Country reports

The second point shows that the technical preconditions obviously influence the concentration on the audience markets. Shares of about 60 per cent of the top five channels in Germany, the Netherlands and the German speaking part of Switzerland are far below those in other countries. For example nearly the whole Spanish audience market is dominated by five channels.

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As a third point we underline the role of so called splinter channels. The term “splinter channel” refers to a variety of small channels that reaches only very small shares of the audience market. Consequently a high proportion of splinter channels on the audience market stands for a higher degree of plurality. In this respect the popularity of splinter channels is an obvious compensation for concentration. The data reveal that in small countries as the Netherlands and Switzerland splinter channels are able to achieve bigger market shares than in big countries. In the German speaking part of Switzerland for example more than a quarter of the audience market is divided by a variety of small splinter channels. Fourthly, Switzerland cannot be treated as one unit. Instead, one has to regard the German, French and Italian speaking regions separately. Concerning the question of concentration these regions show similar patterns as their corresponding neighbouring countries. The concentration of the German speaking part of Switzerland is comparatively low, whereas it is rather distinct in the French and Italian speaking parts. As is shown below this can mainly be explained by the use of German, French and Italian channels. An analysis of the owners that produce different television programs aggravates the result that the television markets under study are highly concentrated (Table 8). Table 8: Concentration on the owner market 2001/02 Audience Shares of main Media Corporations (in %) Domestic Public Stations 1

Top Two Media Corporations 2

France

43,9

46,6

Germany

44,1

51,0

Italy

48,1

46,4

Netherlands

37,4

48,5

Spain

33,1

n.a.

Switzerland – German

31,9

6,3

Switzerland – French

31,9

-

Switzerland – Italian

29,5

1,1

United Kingdom

38,5

52,0

1

Own calculation based on: Television 2001, European Key Facts, Country reports (Country sp. Data)

2

Source: Country specific data

The data on the concentration on the owner market show in nearly all countries under study a clear triple monopoly between the domestic public stations on the one hand and the top two private media corporations on the other hand. The only exception again is Switzerland. There are only three private TV channels for the German- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland that were founded between 1998 and 1999. About one third of the audience focuses on domestic public stations. As we will discuss later, two thirds of the audience watch mainly foreign channels. Finally, the importance of Dutch splinter channels, that we have underlined before, becomes relative if ownership concentration comes into play: Obviously many splinter channels belong to the top two media corporations.

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In sum, the concentration rates in daily newspaper markets are much lower than in television markets. The French, German and Spanish newspaper markets are the least concentrated. The television markets in all countries under study however, are organised by a triple monopoly between the domestic public stations on the one hand and the top two private media corporations on the other hand. If we compare the countries under investigation, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands suffer from the lowest concentration rates on their television markets, whereas Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom reveal quite high levels of concentration of electronic media. 2.1.3 Geographical diversity Concerning Europeanisation it is important to analyse the degree of external plurality in terms of the representation of regions that a media system exposes (local, regional, national, PanEuropean and foreign scopes). However, regarding the set up of a media system in terms of geographical diversity two contrasting hypotheses came into play as far as the Europeanisation of the public sphere is concerned. On the one hand, one can look at geographical diversity as core element of external plurality of the media system and assume that the higher the degree of representation of regions in the media is the higher will be the chances for a broad representation of actors of all political levels to appear in public discourse. This assumption applies in particular to countries with strong federal elements in the political system where European politics are also processed in regional or federal institutions. On the other hand, since European politics is a policy area which falls into the competence of the national government, one could also assume that a media system that roots on strong national media is more open to European issues and actors. Thus, depending on the structural setting of the mediated political process, geographical diversity of the media system might play out differently. a. Daily newspapers To analyse the scopes of daily newspapers we broke the titles down into the two categories “national” and “regional/local”. The numbers of titles and their circulation (Table 9) show that nearly all press systems are dominated by regional outlets. An exception is Italy where national daily newspapers dominate the market as the circulation numbers show a clear overweight of national compared to regional and local papers.

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Table 9: Scope of Daily newspapers 1 Number of Titles France

national regional/local

Daily newspapers’ Circulation (000)

20 * 61 *

2.531 * 6.268 *

9 378

1.653 22.293

88 -

3.655 2.369

11 24

2.008 2.435

5 131

1.500 2.800

104

2.666

10 94

13.371 5.681

Germany

national regional/local Italy

Total national regional/local Netherlands

national regional/local Spain

national regional/local Switzerland

national regional/local United Kingd.

national regional/local

*) Numbers from 1999, 1998 or 1997 1 Source: World Press Trends 2001

In France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom regional/local papers are more numerous and have a greater circulation than the national press. Germany and Spain have a far bigger importance of regional/local papers. A closer look at the circulation reveals that the Spanish regional/local papers may be more numerous, but sell hardly more copies than the five national papers. In contrary the German regional/local papers are not only more numerous (378 compared to 9 national daily newspapers), but have also a far bigger circulation (more than 22.000 copies compared to about 1.400 copies). In that respect the scope of the German press system can be characterised as outstandingly regional. On the other hand, if we look at the distribution between national and local newspapers, we can identify that France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom stand out by a strong national press that might be crucial for covering European politics to the national public.

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Table10: Scope of Television 1 Number of Channels France domestic regional 7 domestic national 26 Pan Eur./supranat. 6 other foreign 25 Germany domestic regional 18 domestic national 14 Pan Eur./supranat. 11 other foreign 4 Italy domestic 10 Pan Eur./supranat. 7 other foreign 17 Netherlands domestic regional 14 domestic national 10 Pan Eur./supranat. 7 other foreign 13 Spain domestic regional 11 domestic national 4 Pan Eur./supranat. 10 other foreign 6 Switzerland domestic regional 13 domestic national 8 Pan Eur./supranat. 6 other foreign 23 United Kingd. domestic regional 14 domestic national 10 Pan Eur./supranat. 5 other foreign 15 1

Average Tech. Pen. (%) 35,0 13,8 4,0 42,1 83,8 43,9 5,5 94,5 1,2 6,7 96,8 56,6 60,3 12,9 99,3 0,5 0,2 5,2 75,0 66,2 65,4 9,0 73,4 12,0 -

Own Calculation based on: Television 2001, European Key Facts, Country reports

To analyse the scope of television systems we included only channels with a generalist, news, cultural or educational offer. As we are interested in the plurality of political information we excluded channels that are specialised on movies, sports, children, music or teleshopping. The number of channels and their average technical penetration (Table 10) show that most television markets have predominantly national scopes. Regarding the technical penetration rates Pan European, supranational and foreign channels mostly play an inferior role. Exceptions are Germany where regional channels play a far stronger role. 18 regional channels reach on average more than 40 per cent of the population (potentially). By contrast, in small countries like Switzerland and Netherlands in contrary Pan European, supranational and foreign channels play an important role. In sum, the television markets under study have predominantly national scopes. In the German television market regional programs are quite strong, whereas the Swiss and the Dutch markets are dominated by Pan European, supranational and foreign channels. This EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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dominance of geographically wider scopes provides for better chances for a Europanization of public discourses. Conclusion: The presented data show a differentiated picture of the degrees of plurality in the television and press systems under study. Independently from national differences the print media systems are more plural than the broadcasting systems. This structure is explained by the fact that most European television systems were organised by public monopolies until the 80s. Concerning the countries under study the only exception is the British model that for a long time had a duopoly between the programs of BBC and the private, but heavily regulated channel ITV. Today the television systems in most countries under study are organised by a triple monopoly between the domestic public stations on the one hand and the Top Two private media corporations on the other hand; the only exception here is Switzerland where private companies have only entered the market a few years ago and thus only play an inferior role. The choice of channels for the citizens is determined to a large extent by technical preconditions. In Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands only a small part of the television households depends on the terrestrial distribution, the majority receives a variety of programs via cable or satellite. Consequently the concentration rates on these markets are the lowest. Regarding the geographical diversity, the German television market has a regional focus, whereas in Swiss and Dutch television markets a widespread offer of Pan European and foreign channels can be found. Partly these patterns of plurality are valid for the newspaper markets as well. Again the German, Dutch and Swiss daily newspaper markets can be characterised as comparatively plural. But all three markets have weaknesses that may at least partially contradict the fostering effect on Europeanisation that we expect from the degree of plurality. The plurality of the German media market is focused on regional newspapers, whereas the Swiss and Dutch markets suffer from high concentration rates of owners. In this respect the French daily newspaper market that in general is very little pluralized might offer better chances for a process of Europeanisation. Here the concentration rates are exceptionally low and national newspaper compared to regional or local newspaper outlets play an important role. In sum, the results concerning the plurality of the media markets under study have to be interpreted cautiously. It will depend on the specific goal of research which aspect of plurality should gain greater weight. We suppose that with regard to Europeanisation a country with a high diversity of media outlets provides higher chances for Europeanisation than a country with low diversity. 2.2 Commercialisation of the media system The second factor that influences the information capacity of a media system is its degree of commercialisation. Commercialisation means that mass media are dependent on advertisers. The multitude of media channels through which advertisers can reach their target audience leads to strong competition between media outlets. As the attractiveness to advertisers and thus the income from advertising depends on audience shares21, every medium tries to attract as many readers or viewers as possible. Audience taste thus becomes the crucial variable for the form of presentation and the content of the media.

21

The number of people is definitely not the only decisive factor for the attractiveness to advertisers. Special interest magazines show, that a small, but very distinct group of readers can be very attractive to advertisers, too. Since we are looking on the political public sphere in general, our main focus is on general interest media, for which the criteria of high number of readers / viewers is of special importance. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Regarding the content we hypothesize that commercialisation increases those aspects that are most popular. Popularity is usually delivered by high levels of entertainment content within a program or newspaper. Commercialisation thus leads to high entertainment pressure on the market. We may hypothesize that commercialisation of a country’s media system may hinder the Europeanisation of the public sphere. Europeanisation of the public sphere means Europeanisation of the political public sphere as the deficit of the public sphere is defined as a misfit between the political competences and the national reporting (Gerhards 2000: 288). Prerequisite for the Europeanisation of the political public sphere is that there is enough space for information and news within the media system. Thus: Europe needs political reporting and consequently a focus on information. Research has shown that the more commercialised a system is, the less information one can find in prime time news (see Blumler et al. 1986, Bens et al. 1992: 85). Moreover, more recent studies have shown that for example in Germany the public stations that are not as much dependent on advertising than their private counterparts, show much more news programs (see Gerhards et al. 1999). Another example of the effect of commercialisation can be found in the United Kingdom: In 1999 the commercial station ITV has shifted its flagship newscast “News at Ten” to slots before and after prime time. Els de Bens et al. (1992:83f.) show that the competition with commercial broadcasters also reduces the quality programs in public broadcasting. This can be interpreted as an effect of inter-media agenda setting. The authors conclude that “[t]he process of commercialisation had a downmarket effect on the overall TV programme supply…TV in Europe thus becomes increasingly an entertainment medium.” (Bens et al. 1992:95) Regarding the form of information presentation we assume that in highly commercialised systems those aspects of events that cater to audience tastes are more strongly emphasized than in non-commercial systems. Communication research has identified those factors that can possibly capture audience’s attention and thus guide the journalists’ news selection. Conflict, high status, negativity and proximity towards the population can be taken as examples for news factors (see for complete lists: Schulz 1997:70f.; Galtung et al. 1965), that are particularly dominant in commercial news. Hallin et al. (2001: 15) hypothesize that commercialisation not only edges out political information, but also changes the form of its presentation. Commercialisation leads to a form of info-tainment, that mixes formats of information and formats of entertainment. Other research also points to the fact that commercial pressure changes prime time reporting (see Altheide et al. 1988: 211, 213). To get Europe into the media, does not only require a focus on information, but also a competitive edge of European politics towards national politics. Gerhards (1993: 102f; 2000: 298) points out that the political process in the European Union does not fit the popular news values and thus the selection criteria of the media. The lack of open conflicts, the lack of clear responsibilities and the lack of a personalized style of politics make the political process within the European Union stand in sharp contrast to the commercial media logic. a. Daily newspapers The press market is by its nature highly commercialised. Here we do find weaker influence of the political system (see chapter “Politicisation”), but a stronger market orientation. Table 11 shows the ratio of advertising in comparison to sales revenue of all daily newspapers. Newspaper markets that rely more strongly on sales revenue are assumed to be less EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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commercialised. The only market where sales revenue exceeds advertising is France. We also find low levels of commercialisation in the Spanish press. The strongest commercialisation we can find in Germany and the United Kingdom. In Germany for example advertising contributes with more than 65% to the total revenue of the newspaper companies. Table 11: Ratio of advertising to sales revenue of daily newspapers in percent (2000) Advertising

Sales

Advertising - Sales

France (1998)

41

59

-18

Germany

65

35

+30

Italy

58

42

+16

Netherlands

59

41

+18

Spain

53

47

+6

Switzerland

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

United Kingdom (1999)

63

37

+26

Source: World Press Trends 2001: 4

From 1991 to 2001 commercialisation has increased in all countries. The most extreme case is Italy. Italy has switched from a weakly commercialised country to a now pretty strongly commercialised system within 4 years. Thus regarding our indicator of commercialisation the chances for a Europeanisation of the public spheres diminish.

b. Television (Broadcasting): The television market within our countries under study can be characterised as a dual market. We find public and private television stations today in all countries. The United Kingdom and Italy are those markets where private competition has the longest tradition. In France and Germany terrestrial competition from private broadcasters started 1984, in the Netherlands and Spain 1989. Only in the 90s the Swiss public TV monopoly came down. To measure the degree of commercialisation of a television market, we can concentrate on public broadcasters, since private broadcasters are in all our countries under study completely financed by advertising revenues. Public stations in contrast are financed – at least partly – by non-commercial sources due to their obligations as public interest organisations. Public TV is held responsible for programs that serve public information and culture, like news, information, culture and children’s programming (see Mattern 1998: 14). It is assumed that this distinctiveness of public broadcasters should contrast with the straightforward goal of private TV to gain high market shares with cost efficient methods. Depending on public broadcasters’ degree of commercialisation we expect different levels of resistance against entertainment pressure. This should influence the number of quality programs that serve the public interest.

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As data are difficult to get for public television only, we shall focus in the following analysis on public broadcasters in general which includes television as well as radio. Included are national and regional public stations (e.g. S4C in Wales and las Autonomicas in Spain). As we will see later on (see chapter politicisation) most countries still rely on the traditional form of public financing, the licence fees. Only Spain and the Netherlands have a tax- or grantbased system. Within our countries under study Germany has the highest proportion of pubic revenues (see table 12). 79,7% of public broadcasters’ revenue stem from licence fees. Germany is followed by France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Spanish and Italian public broadcasters do get less than 50% of their revenue from public funds. Regarding commercialisation the second column in table 12 is the most relevant one. Here we can see that public broadcasters themselves are commercialised in Italy, Spain and – to a lesser degree – in the Netherlands. The United Kingdom, France and Switzerland occupy a middle position. Germany stands out as the least commercialised public system. So far we have only analysed the shares of income. Now we are going to focus on the total sum that public broadcasters can spend. This indicator is necessary since systems with a strong dependency on licence fees or government grants can only raise the information capacity of the system as a whole if they get enough public funding. If public TV stations have advertising restrictions and thus strongly rely on licence fees, it is of greatest importance for the quality of the program how much revenue the stations can get. Table 12 shows that the budget per capita of public television is highest in those national systems that are less advertising driven. These are the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland. Public broadcasting in these countries can rely on a sufficient amount of public funds. An exception seems to be France. Here public broadcasters do not depend too much on advertising, but the overall income is rather low. In Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain public broadcasters do not only depend on advertising but are also poor. From these countries Spain lies on the edge: public broadcasters can spend only 33,9 Euros per inhabitant at all and do get only 7,4 Euros from public sources. Table 12: Average income of public television and radio per inhabitant (2000) Public finance in Euros

Advertising / Sponsoring in Euros

Other (merchandising , pay TV, selling of programs etc.)

Total Amount in Euros

France

36,7 (65,8%)

12,1 (21,7%)

7 (12,5%)

55,8

Germany

77,5 (79,7%)

8,4 (8,6%)

11,3 (11,6%)

97,2

24 (48,8%)

20,6 (41,7%)

4,6 (9,3%)

49,2

Netherlands

25,6 (56,9%)

15,0 (33,3%)

4,4 (9,8%)

45,0

Spain

7,4 (21,8%)

20,5 (60,5%)

6,0 (17,7%)

33,9

Switzerland

100,1 (64%)

44,3 (28,3)

12,1 (7,7%)

156,5

United Kingdom

67,6 (65,2%)

18,1 (17,5%)

17,9 (17,3%)

103,7

Italy

Source: Europäische Audiovisuelle Informationsstelle

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These figures show that public broadcasting does not mean the same in all countries of inquiry. We assume that public television stations can only resist entertainment pressure if they are independent – or at least not strongly dependent – from advertising. We do expect that in Spain, where public television does not even get one quarter of its income by noncommercial sources, the distinctiveness of public programming diminishes - entertainment then also sweeps into the public broadcasting sector. Also the Netherlands and Italy are countries where public broadcasting is in itself partly commercialised. Regarding the development over time, we can conclude that commercial income increases on average throughout Europe (from 28,4% in 1995 to 32,3% in 2000) while public funds are reduced (from 69,1% in 1995 to 65,4% in 2000) (see Lange 2002). These overall figures are also reflected if one regards the financing of public television only. The British BBC is free of any advertising pressure. It is solely financed by licence fees and the marketing of BBC programs. Relatively little commercialisation is found in Germany. The ZDF for example gets 79,1% of its income by licence fees and only 11,2% by advertising. Swiss pubic television receives 71% of licence fees and 20% by advertising. Public broadcasters in France are subject to quite some commercialisation (France 2: 37,7% advertising; France 3: 21% advertising, 2000). In Italy only around half of public television’s income comes from licence fees. Thus commercialisation is pretty strong in Italy. As we are not only interested in how commercialised public broadcasters are, but also how strongly these public broadcasters can influence the media system in general, we will now focus on the question of how much quality pressure the less advertising driven stations can exert on the system as a whole. This can be regarded as an effect of inter-media agenda setting. To analyse this question we propose the audience market share of public and private TV stations in a country as an indicator of the possibility of “pressure transfer” into other markets.22 Thus we can assume that TV markets with public broadcasters, that have sufficient funding, are less dependent on advertising and have a high market share, can pose their quality pressure on the media system in general and thus limit effects of commercialisation. This assumption is supported by various studies that show that public TV sectors, with funding models less dependent on advertising and high market shares, have a better quality of reporting (see e.g. Mattern 1998; McKinsey 1999) – not only in the public sector itself, but also in the private sector as the viewing standards of the entire market are raised (e.g. McKinsey 1999: 4; see Bens et al. 1992:95) Table 13 shows that the highest audience market shares can be found in Spain and Italy (> 45%). These public broadcasters have a high possibility to influence the rest of the media system. As we have shown before these systems are themselves highly commercialised. Thus we do not expect too much of an entertainment resistance from them. Audience market shares between 40% and 45% can be found in France and Germany. Since France’s public broadcasters are poorly financed and also experience some commercial pressure themselves, we do expect more resistance against entertainment pressure from the public broadcasters in Germany. Also the British system will be able to transfer quality pressure23 (see table 13). The Swiss case has to be treated separately (see table 13). Swiss national public broadcasters – although they are not too heavily dependent on advertising - have a relatively low market share. But since foreign television has a strong position in the Swiss markets, we can add the 22

Here we limit our analysis once again to public television. This does not seem to cause a very big problem since the funding of public broadcasters in general did reflect the funding of public television in a rough way. 23 For the British system it is important to state, that Channel 4 is a private channel that from a quality aspect can be added to the public broadcasters. See the chapter on media culture. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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German ARD and ZDF to the public broadcasters in German speaking Switzerland, France 2 and 3 in French speaking Switzerland and RAI 1,2 and 3 in Italian speaking Switzerland. This makes public broadcasters very strong in Switzerland. Thus we can assume that public broadcasters can put much quality pressure on the rest of the system. Mainly in Germanspeaking Switzerland, we can add weakly commercialised stations, namely the German public broadcasters. In the French and Italian speaking part, we add much more commercialised public broadcasters to the Swiss national public broadcasters. Thus, although the market share is higher, we do not expect as much resistance of entertainment pressure as in the Germanspeaking part of Switzerland. Table 13: Audience Market shares: Public vs. Private Television in percent (2000) Public TV

Private TV

Private - Public

France (France 2 +3, La Cinquieme)

43,9

56,1

12,2

Germany (ARD, ZDF, 3Sat, Arte, Kinderkanal, Phoenix, ARD III, BR Alpha)

44,1

55,9

11,8

Italy (RAI 1+2+3)

48,1

51,9

3,8

Netherlands (NED 1+2+3)

37,4

62,6

25,2

Spain (TVE 1, LA 2 + Autonomicas)

50,3

49,7

- 0,6

Switzerland – GER (SF 1+2, ARD, ZDF)

41,8

58,2

16,4

Switzerland – FR (TSR 1+2, France 2 +3)

47,2

52,8

5,6

Switzerland – IT (TSI 1+2, Rai 1,2,3)

53,1

46,9

-6,2

United Kingdom (BBC 1+2)

38,5

61,5

23

Television 2001: 24, 295, 252, 277f.

To sum up we can come up with three groups of countries regarding commercialisation of public TV / broadcasting. The United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland are those systems that are very well financed, mainly by non-commercial sources, but also to some degree by advertising. In all of these countries public television has a high enough market share to influence the standards of the other market segments24. The second group includes Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. These are the poor public broadcasters with high commercial pressures. Therefore the relatively high market shares in Spain and Italy will probably not raise the information capacity. France lies in the middle. It lacks heavy funding, but does not have too much commercialisation. 3. Media systems and the patterns of political discourse in national public spheres The two central features that determine the patterns of political discourse in a country are the politicisation of the media system and the country’s media culture. It is hypothesised that these two factors shape the discourse that takes place in national public spheres – mainly the 24

In the United Kingdom this share is somewhat lower. But the analysis in the next chapter on the media culture will show, that here we find a private channel that also fulfils public tasks and thus raises the market share to more than 50%.

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system’s capacity to convey complex and abstract issues. To have the capacity to convey these kinds of issues in a media system is important for the Europeanisation of national public spheres, since European issues or a European dimension to national issues increase the complexity of the political process. The multi-level game of European politics produces complex, often unclear responsibilities. It takes politics even further away from every-day experiences of the citizens. Thus also reporting about these issues increases the abstractness and complexity of a medium’s information section. 3.1 Politicisation of the media system Politicisation means that the political elite influences, dominates and / or controls substantial parts of the media system. Politicisation refers to the financial, structural and personal dependence of a media system from politics. The main means of influencing are the control over financial resources, the influence through control bodies and the decisions taken regarding the licencing process. This political influence contrasts the commercial influence that we analysed in the chapter before. Political influence makes the media less dependent from market pressure and thus makes them come closer to the logic of the politics, which is characterized by complex, and long-lasting bargaining processes. We therefore hypothesise that the political elite has a better starting position in a politicised media system to convey not only complex political issues in the media, but also their points of view. This idea is supported by agenda setting research, which points to the possibility that the political agenda influences the media and public agenda (see e.g. Kleinnjjenhuis 1989). Politicisation thus increases the chance that the media show an elite-orientation and thus reflect the emphasis and attitudes of the political elites towards Europe. Politicisation thus has the potential to change the patterns of political discourse in a quantitative and qualitative way: Quantitatively the stronger orientation towards the political elite leads to a stronger information focus (see Pfetsch 1993: 114), since the political elite tries to put their issues at the public agenda (Kriesi 2001:8). Whether this leads to a Europeanisation of the public sphere depends on the elites’ emphasis on Europe and other European countries. Qualitatively the stronger elite orientation makes the media prone to also more or less reflect the views of the major political actors. Whether this leads to a Europeanisation of the public sphere once again depends on the elites’ support or rejection of the project of European integration. The first dimension deals with a topical Europeanisation. The second dimension focuses on the Europeanisation of opinions and frames. It can be assumed that at least in most countries under study politicisation of the media system is accompanied with a Europeanisation of the public spheres, since European integration is widely regarded as a project of the political elite. a. Daily newspapers: Indicators for the politicisation of daily newspapers can be distinguished into tax reductions, discounts for the distribution, direct state subsidies and indirect state subsidies like loans or specific funds. Table 14 shows that all countries have some kind of tax reduction for specific forms of income within the newspaper market. Except for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the press also gets special conditions regarding the distribution of the newspapers. Direct state subsidies for the daily press can be regarded as an exemption in our countries under study: only the French and Italian government directly support their daily press. Indirect subsidies are more frequent. In Italy the press market gets cheaper interest rates. In France and the Netherlands there are fund systems that support new ventures in the press EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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market. In the United Kingdom newspaper companies can depreciate their plants at the usual straight-line rate of 25%.

Table 14: State Support for daily newspapers (2001) Tax Reduction

Discounts

Direct state subsidies

Indirect state subsidies

France

Sales (18,5%), Post, rail, fax composition (∅ 57%) (15,1%), (newsprint)

39,8 million Euro Fund system for (2000) investments

Germany

Sales (9%)

Post (86,45%) --

Italy

Sales (16%), newsprint (16%), composition (16%)

Post, telephone (∅ 45%)

56,81 million Euro25

Lower interest rates (2,45% instead of 4,9%)

Netherlands

Sales (13%)

--

--

Press fund for new ventures

Spain

Sales (12%)

Post (52%)

--

--

Switzerland

Sales (5,2%)

post26 (∅ 22,5)

--

--

United Kingdom

Sales (17,5%)

--

--

Plant may be depreciated at the usual straight-line rate of 25%

--

Source: World Press Trends: Country Reports, p.100,104,128,161,197,206,223

This comparison shows that Italy and France have the strongest politicisation of the newspaper market within our countries under study. Here we expect a stronger elite 25

for newspapers published by parties, movements and newspapers managed by cooperative companies or published by linguistic minorities 26 The discounts regarding posting of newspapers are under revision at the moment. The sub-commission “Media and Democracy” of the Nationalrat is developing a new conception. The actual discounts, which amount to a total of 100 Mio. F, will continue for 2003. Then there will be a reduction till 2007, limiting the discounts to 80 Mio.F. See: http://www.uvek.admin.ch/gs_uvek/de/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen/artikel/20020703/01103/ EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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orientation, what might lead to the fact that within these countries the major political actors’ emphasis on and their attitudes towards Europe become more prominent in the media. b. Television: Politicisation of television can best be studied by analysing the political influence on public broadcasters. For sure there are also regulations concerning the private television market, like licencing, concentration control, minimum standards, etc. We will focus in the following on the political influence on public broadcasters, since this is the most overt and dominant one. Here we have to distinguish between two potential sources of political influence. The main source are state governments. Since the idea of press freedom represents a barrier to complete direct state control of public broadcasters, a second source of politicisation comes into play: the political parties. In European party democracies political control of the media is often mediated by parties. This influence is assumed to be weaker than government influence since political parties can be pushed out of government. Our analysis shows (Table 15) that all countries have some form of government influence on public broadcasters. In Germany and Italy political parties do additionally influence public broadcasting. Table 15: Involvement of government and political parties in the control bodies of public TV (2001) Government

Political parties

France

yes

no

Germany

yes27

yes

Italy

yes

yes

Netherlands

yes

no

Switzerland

yes

no

United Kingdom

yes28

no

Spain

Source: country-specific

Table 16 shows the areas of government or party influence. Here it becomes clear, that most of our countries under study have some form of political influence on all aspects of control, that is on licensing, advertising rules, revenues, program and news policies, leadership decisions and internal boards and budget agencies. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom feature not as much opportunities for political influence.

27

In Germany the state governments, not the national government, influence broadcasting. According to Jarren et al. 2002: 126 the department of culture, media and sports regulates the revenues. In theory this should be done by the parliament.

28

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Table 16: Areas of government / party control (2001) Licensing

Advertising Revenues rules (ads, fees, subsidies)

Program / News policy

Leadership and personnel

Internal boards / budget agencies

France

x

x

x

x

x

x

Germany

x

x

x

x

x

x

Italy

x

x

x

x

x

x

Netherlands

x

x

x

--

--

--

Switzerland

x

x

x

x

x

x

United Kingdom

--

x

x

--

--

--

Spain

Source: country-specific

In a next step we concentrate on one specific area of government and party control, namely the revenue. Studies have shown that public broadcasters that depend on taxes for their public revenue have a less predictable income than those who are financed by licence fees. Taxbased funding is subject to the annual budget decisions of the political system. This makes it much more susceptible to reductions in times of economic downturn (McKinsey 1999: 30f.). Tax-based systems thus are characterized by a stronger politicisation. Our analysis shows that in Spain and the Netherlands the system is purely tax-based / grantbased. In the Netherlands this is quite a new development: up to the year 2000 public broadcasting in the Netherlands was financed by licence fees (see table 17). The Spanish grant- based system does not allow for the conclusion that politicisation in Spain is very strong. In Spain public broadcasters do get less than 25% of their income form public sources. Table 17: The form of financing of public TV (2000/01) Tax /Government Grants

Licence Fees

France

x

Germany

x

Italy

x

Netherlands

x

Spain

x

Switzerland

x

United Kingdom

x

Source: country-specific estimation

Table 18 presents an overall estimation of how strongly governments and political parties can influence public broadcasters. Government influence was estimated to be very strong in Italy and Switzerland, very weak in the United Kingdom. The other countries take on a middle EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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position. Parties do not seem to have a big chance of influencing the public broadcasting system in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Only in Italy this influence is regarded to be very strong. Germany takes a middle position in this category. Table 18: Strength of government / party influence (2001) Government

Political parties

France

somewhat

Very weak

Germany

somewhat

somewhat

Italy

Very strong

Very strong

Netherlands

Somewhat

Weak

Switzerland

Very strong

Not at all

United Kingdom

weak

Very weak

Spain

Source: country-specific estimation

To sum up our findings, we maintain that the politicisation of the daily newspaper market is strongest in France and Italy. Here one can find all forms of political influence. For public television the conclusion is not as easy. We can demonstrate that governments have a crucial impact on public broadcasters in all countries. Parties become relevant in Italy and Germany. In the Netherlands and Great Britain the influence is limited to specific areas. In the other countries all forms of control are exercised. What makes the Dutch and Spanish system very dependent from politics is the tax-based form of financing. Having shown that politics still influence the media, we do not want to follow Jarren (1998: 85) who states that media today are primarily the servants of the audience, not the tool of organisations or politics. Commercialisation and politicisation are two factors that influence the media system. To evaluate which factor is more important depends on the specific country, situation and media market one takes into consideration.

3.2 Media culture The second feature that determines the character and patterns of the discourses possible in national public spheres is the media culture. “Indeed, culture is not simply mediated through mass media; rather, culture – in both form and content – is embodied in mass media.” (Altheide et al. 1988: 196). Differences of media cultures are grown historically. The ongoing construction of culture is reflected in the media system in different formats (Altheide et al. 1988: 196). Formats refer to the way how something is communicated, not to the fact what is communicated (Altheide et al. 1988:195). Thus we may expect differences in the way how information is conveyed to the audience within our countries under study. This idea gives primacy to the form over the content, since the form or format shape and limit the content within their own parameter: “How we communicate precedes and limits what we communicate.” (Altheide et al. 1988: 218). All media have their own format and can be EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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distinguished by it. Their format then determines which content they select and how this content is packaged (Meyer 1988: 274). We assume that media systems yield specific formats that can better or lesser contribute to a Europeanisation of the public sphere. These are those formats that not only allow to convey information at all, but also convey it in a much more complex and abstract way. The more space there is in a media system for complex and argumentative discourse, the bigger the chance for a Europeanisation of the public spheres. We would assume that in countries where TV is the main source for information with only small segments of recipients of daily newspapers we will find a less Europeanized public sphere. Features of television formats include the accessibility, the visual quality of events, drama and action, audience relevance, and thematic encapsulation29 (see Altheide et al. in Meyer 1988: 225). In accordance with the necessity for visual quality “television news remains relegated to presenting whatever it does best – but that is certainly not complex issues.” (Meyer 1988: 226). Reports that fit the format - what means have the best visuals get the most air time and the most prominent place for broadcasting (Altheide et al. 1988:201). This emphasizes the dramatic images over the dry analysis, the simple and timely over the complex and long-term and ´infotainment` over civic affairs (Norris 2000: 88). Television thus is more entertaining and eye-catching than print. As a consequence researchers see the capacity to learn about public affairs in decline. “Newspapers are believed to be far more effective than television for conveying the detailed information necessary to understand complex and detailed policy issues” (Norris 2000: 63). Regarding this one has to consider the fact that a TV report of two minutes can only transfer the information of 50 lines of a newspaper article (Graber 1996: 93). Our analysis refers to the distinction between television based and newspaper based media cultures. In a next step we are interested in the differences in historically grown formats of newspapers – what would lead to different newspaper cultures within our countries of study. The same idea must be applied to television. Distinct formats lead to distinct television cultures. We can distinguish two different newspaper cultures: a tabloid culture and a quality culture (see for a discussion of the term tabloidization Norris 2000: 70f.). A newspaper market that is strongly dominated by a broadsheet culture, is characterized by some features of television. Once again visual images, drama and action become important. This limits the space for complex and abstract patterns of discourse and thus limits again the chance for a Europeanisation of national public spheres. In contrast, a newspaper culture that is dominated by a quality culture, allows for the reporting of these complex and abstract issues and thus also helps to convey information with a European dimension, that is further away from the every-day life of the audience. The same idea can be applied to television. We distinguish also between a tabloid and a quality culture. In television markets that are dominated by quality cultures the chances increase that the characteristics of TV formats like visual quality and dramatic events are not as dominant as in markets where a tabloid style predominates. Thus we hypothesize that a quality culture raises the chance for a Europeanisation of national public spheres. These ideas of newspaper vs. TV cultures and the further distinction within each market into tabloid and quality cultures gain their importance since we do assume that a strong tabloid segment in a market does put pressure on the rest of the market to adapt its formats. Here the 29

Thematic encapsulation means that an „event can be briefly presented and linked to a similar event or a series or reports in a praticular newsacast or over a period of time.“ (Meyer 1988: 225)

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idea of inter-media agenda-setting comes into play. This idea not only applies to the content, but also to the form of information transmission. The hypothesis is that a strong quality segment raises the reading and viewing standards of the whole market (see for the TV market McKinsey 1999: 4). 3.2.1 Newspaper vs. Television countries: Data on the daily usage of TV news programs and the daily reading of newspapers serve as indicators for the distinction of our countries under study into newspaper and television cultures. The data show that France, Italy and Spain can be regarded as television countries. The television format is the only relevant force. In contrast Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands are characterised by a mixed culture. They can be regarded as newspaper and television cultures. This possibly offers the chance for a more abstract and complex information environment. If one tried to draw a continuum of TV vs. Newspaper cultures, the United Kingdom would lie somewhere in the middle. (see Table 19) Table 19: Daily usage of TV news programs and daily reading of newspapers (2001) in % of the population TV

Daily newspapers

France

62

26

Germany

68

59

Italy

83

30

Netherlands

77

60

Spain

72

24

Switzerland

n.a.

6130

United Kingdom

71

47

Source: Eurobarometer 2001, spring; Romondie 2001: Baromedia

3.2.2 Newspaper Cultures: To analyse the newspaper cultures within our countries under study we are interested in the share of boulevard and quality reporting of the daily circulation (reading). A strong surplus of boulevard reporting serves as an indicator for a tabloidization of the newspaper culture. Our analysis shows (see table 20) that the United Kingdom has a clear tabloid culture within its newspaper market. More than 50% of the circulation of daily newspapers can be regarded as some kind of boulevard papers. This is only contrasted by a circulation share of 14,1% of the quality press. Germany ranks second regarding the tabloidization of its newspaper culture. Tabloid papers have a share of 22,1% of the total circulation, quality papers of 7,1%. These figures show that the German newspaper culture strongly relies on regional and local papers. In Switzerland the boulevard press surmounts the quality press by only 5,7%. France, Italy and the Netherlands are countries that do not have a boulevard press at all. Thus their newspaper cultures are dominated by quality outlets – especially strong is the Dutch quality culture, since here 45,1% of the total circulation are quality outlets. As a result the Dutch 30

These data do not include the Italian speaking part of Switzerland.

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press market can be regarded as the one most open to abstract and complex information, what makes it prone for a Europeanisation of the public sphere. For more detailed information of our countries under study see appendix.

Table 20: Share of circulation of boulevard and quality press of the daily newspaper market (2000/01) (%) Boulevard Press

Quality Press

Boulevard - Quality

France

0,0

13,9

- 13,9

Germany

22,1

7,1

15,0

Italy

0,0

35,1

- 35,1

Netherlands

0,0

45,1

- 45,1

Switzerland31

14,1

8,4

5,7

United Kingdom

53,6

14,1

39,5

Spain

Source: country-specific, World Press Trends 2001:10

These figures are confirmed if one takes into account the share of boulevard and quality reporting of the whole readers’ market (Table 21). These figures differ from the circulation numbers, since more than one person usually reads a newspaper. Here the tabloidization of the newspaper cultures become even more pronounced. For more detailed information of our countries under study see appendix. Table 21: Share of boulevard and quality reporting of the whole readers’ market (2000/01) (%)

France

Boulevard Press

Quality Press

Boulevard - Quality

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

32

Germany

22,7

7,4

15,3

Italy

0,0

35,0

- 35,0

Netherlands

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Switzerland - Germ

18,1

7,3

10,8

Switzerland – French

22,7

8,9

13,8

United Kingdom

55,9

12,9

43,0

Spain

Source: country-specific, World Press Trends 2001:10

31

We could not distinguish between German, French and Italian speaking Switzerland, since we only had the total daily circulation of the whole country. 32 Without Tageszeitung (TAZ) and Neues Deutschland EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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3.2.3 Television cultures To distinguish tabloid and quality cultures within television markets is not as straight forward as within newspaper markets. In this analysis we have assumed that public broadcasters are geared towards a quality format, whereas private broadcasters are more influenced by a tabloid format. The former assumption is drawn from the obligations public broadcasters have to fulfil. The core area of public TV is widely regarded as programs with a specific interest for the public, like news, information, culture and children’s programming (see Mattern 1998: 14). It is assumed that this distinctiveness of public broadcasters should contrast with the straightforward aim of private TV to gain high market shares with cost efficient methods.33 There are also private stations that are forced by law to keep a higher standard of reporting, to support a quality culture within the television market. Our analysis shows that in all countries except for the United Kingdom only the public broadcasters can possibly contribute to a quality culture within the television system. In the United Kingdom one national private channel (Channel 4) was set up to provide programmes with a distinctive character, which appeal to interests not catered for by ITV or other private channels.34 In Switzerland foreign public broadcasters do contribute to a quality culture within the television market. Swiss national public broadcasters have a market share of around 30%. ARD and ZDF have a market share of 9,6% in the German speaking part of Switzerland, France 2 and 3 one of 15,3% in the French speaking part of Switzerland and RAI 1, 2 and 3 one of 23,6% in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland. Table 22 shows that a quality culture within the television market can be found in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland, in Spain, in the United Kingdom and Italy. Also the French speaking part of Switzerland tends towards a quality culture in television. In France, Germany and the German speaking part of Switzerland there is a substantial surplus of tabloid television. This surplus is most sharply pronounced in the Netherlands. Here we find the strongest tabloid culture of television. Table 22: Audience Market shares: Quality vs. Entertainment Television in percent (2000) Quality TV

Tabloid TV

Tabloid - Quality

France (France 2 +3, La Cinquieme / Arte)

43,9

56,1

12,2

Germany (ARD, ZDF, 3Sat, Arte, Kinderkanal, Phoenix, ARD III, BR Alpha)

44,1

55,9

11,8

Italy (RAI 1+2+3)

48,1

51,9

3,8

Netherlands (NED 1+2+3)

37,4

62,6

25,2

Spain (TVE 1, LA 2 + Autonomicas)

50,3

49,7

- 0,6

Switzerland – GER (SF 1+2, ARD, ZDF)

41,8

58,2

16,4

Switzerland – FR (TSR 1+2, France 2 +3)

47,2

52,8

5,6

Switzerland – IT (TSI 1+2, RAI 1,2,3)

53,1

46,9

-6,2

UK (BBC, Channel 435)

49,3

50,7

1,4

33

For a critique regarding this measure see the chapter “commercialisation”. Here it becomes clear that not all public broadcasters have the same possibility to offer distinctive programs because of the different funding models. Some public broadcasters do heavily depend on advertising money and are poorly financed. 34 Another channel that was set up to offer distinct programs is S4C, the fourth channel in Wales. We did not consider it in these figures since its market share is very low. 35 Independent producers currently enjoy the protection of statutory independent production quotas. These provide that public service broadcasters (the BBC, ITV1, Channel 4, S4C and Channel 5) must commission at EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Television 2001: 24, 295, 252

Summing up, we can conclude, that Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and perhaps the United Kingdom can be regarded as newspaper countries. The format of newspapers was assumed to increase the chance for a Europeanisation of national public spheres. If we then look closer at the newspaper cultures of our countries under study, we have to conclude, that only the Netherlands and Switzerland can be regarded as newspaper countries with a quality culture. The United Kingdom has the strongest tabloid culture within the newspaper market. Germany is placed in a middle position. All countries, also those who have a strong newspaper focus, can be regarded as television countries. Daily usage of television news programs is above 60% of the population in all our countries. Here the Netherlands stands out as the country with the strongest tabloidization of its television culture, followed by Germany and France. A critical view must be kept regarding our measures of tabloidization of television, since the assumed quality tendencies of public broadcasters must be questioned if they are commercialised themselves (see the chapter “commercialisation” in this report). 4. Conclusion The goal of this cross-national analysis was to investigate the connection between media structures in the countries under study and the potential for Europeanisation of the media inducted national public spheres. We therefore formulated tendencies about which opportunity structures of national media systems can push or hamper Europeanisation by identifying two major dimensions, the information capacity of national media systems for the citizens and the patterns of political discourse in national public spheres that refer to the complexity and abstractness that media allow for in public discourses. These dimensions that determine the chances for Europeanisation were measured in terms of four aspects, the external plurality, the commercialisation, the politicisation and the media culture of national media systems. With regard to external plurality we expect that a high degree of plurality implies better chances for a Europeanisation of national public spheres. The results concerning the external plurality in the media systems under study however, cannot be interpreted in one direction. Instead, the peculiarities of external plurality point to differing effects on the potential of Europeanisation. In the first instance the systems of television and of daily newspapers have to be regarded separately. In general, external plurality in economic terms of outlet numbers and degrees of concentration is far less developed in television systems. Thereby the audiovisual offer in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland was found to be the highest. Correspondingly the concentration of audiences is the lowest in theses three countries. Regarding the press systems the relative offer of daily newspapers (in numbers) in Switzerland, Germany and Spain exceeds the offer in the other countries. With regard to the degrees on concentration however, these results become relative. The readership

least 25% of "qualifying programmes" (excluding news, Open University programmes, repeats and acquired programmes) from independent producers. All other broadcasters in the UK are subject to a European quota of 10%. Channel 4 and S4C (the fourth channel in Wales) were set up to provide programmes with a distinctive character and which appeal to interests not catered for by ITV and are also funded through advertising. S4C also has to provide a certain amount of Welsh language programming. Channel 4 has two digital services, FilmFour and E4, a youth entertainment channel. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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concentration, is the lowest in France, Germany and Spain,36 and the owner concentration is the highest in the Netherlands where four publishing companies combine more than 90 per cent of the overall circulation of daily newspapers. Commercialisation and as a consequence thereof the importance of audience taste was assumed to edge out political information and also change the form of its presentation. We can conclude that the French and Spanish press is weakly commercialised. Strong degrees of commercialisation were found in Germany and the United Kingdom. In television systems we found contrasting results. Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have public systems that are well funded and less dependent on advertising compared to the other countries. These systems may raise the quality of the whole market. In Spain and Italy public broadcasters are themselves commercialised what limits their possibility to increase the information capacity. Regarding politicisation we assumed that a stronger politicisation may contribute to an elite orientation of the media. Our results indicate that France and Italy are those countries where politics still has a grasp on the press. To summarize politicisation of television is not as straight forward. Here it becomes clear that all countries experience some kind of political influence on the public broadcasting system. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands this seems to be limited to some areas of control. What makes the system in Spain and the Netherlands more dependent on politics than the other systems is their form of financing: both systems depend on tax money for public funding. Our last indicator dealt with the media culture of our countries. Here we assumed that media systems yield specific formats that more or less contribute to a Europeanisation of the public sphere. Newspaper countries and countries whose media culture is not characterized by tabloidization may have a better chance for Europeanisation. France, Italy and Spain clearly can be characterized as television countries. Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom do have in addition to their television culture a newspaper culture. A critical view reveals that the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Germany show a strong trend towards tabloidiziation in their newspaper cultures. No tabloidiziation of the newspapers can be observed in France, Italy and the Netherlands. The tabloidization of television is strongest in the Netherlands. Also in France, Germany and German speaking Switzerland a surplus of tabloid television can be found. The results show a mixture of possible tendencies in the countries under study that will have to be confronted with empirical findings on the varying degrees of Europeanisation in the national public spheres. Evidently the analysed media opportunity structures are closely connected with the specific political opportunity structures in a country. Only the interplay of both forces can capture and explain processes of Europeanisation in national public spheres.

36

The high degree of readership concentration in Switzerland is caused by the fact that many Swiss readers use different newspaper outlets every day. The Swiss readership concentration is therefore a sign of a wide reach of many outlets and cannot be interpreted as lack of plurality.

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Appendix: Country-specific information regarding the newspaper culture France:

France: Quality Press Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

Le Monde

415 324

n.a.

Libération

174 310

n.a.

Le Figaro

372 661

n.a

La Croix

91 662

n.a

L’Humanité

51 518

n.a

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

7.950.000 (1999)

Germany:

Germany: Quality Press Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

Süddeutsche Zeitung

448.185

1.400.000

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

428.089

1.170.000

Frankfurter Rundschau

191.854

580.000

Financial Times Deutschland

81.826

180.000

Welt

275.089

830.000

Handelsblatt

157.517

610.000

Tageszeitung (TAZ)

65.303

n.a.

Neues Deutschland

57.592

n.a.

Junge Welt

14.500

n.a.

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

23.946.000

Germany: Tabloid Press Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

Bild

4.270.471

11.350.000

Express

213.990

BZ Berlin

221.553

Abendzeitung München

182.716

TZ München

164.863

Blitz

118.720

Hamburger Morgenpost

119.044

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Düsseldorfer Express

76,200

n.a.

Morgenpost Sachsen ges.

114.145

n.a.

Berliner Kurier am Morgen

176.466

n.a.

Berliner Kurier am Abend

n.a.

Italy:

Italy: Quality Press Title

Circulation37 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

II Corriere della Sera

246.776.950

11,8%

La Republica

224.972.741

10,8%

La Stampa

136.739.100

6,6%

II Giornale

83.807.761

4,0%

II Giorno

31.195.732

1,5%

II Manifesto

9.024.678

0,4%

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

2.087.708.871

Netherlands

Netherlands: Quality Press Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

Algemeen Dagblad

359.923

n.a

Nederlands Dagblad

32.033

n.a

NRC Handelsblad

271.802

n.a

Reformatorisch Dagblad

58.042

n.a

De Telegraaf

808.300

n.a

Trouw

125.547

n.a

de Volkskrant

346.377

n.a.

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

4.443.000

Switzerland

Switzerland: Quality Press38 Title 37 38

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

The circulation is calculated on a yearly base. Note that the % do not refer to the whole country, but to German-speaking Switzerland for German-speaking newspapers and to French-speaking Switzerland for French-speaking newspapers respectively

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Neue Züricher Zeitung

170.113

297.000 – 7,3%

Le Temps / Le journal de Geneve

53.522

117.000 – 8,9%

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

2.666.000

Switzerland: Tabloid Press39 Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

Blick

309.444

734.000 – 18,1%

Le Matin

65.498

299.000 – 22,7%

Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

The Telegraph

970.555

2.235.000 – 4,8%

The Times

668.557

1.575.000 – 3,4%

Financial Times

451.640

598.000 – 1,3%

The Guardian

399.421

1.024.000 – 2,2%

The Independent

198.078

571.000 – 1,2%

TOTAL circulation of daily papers

19.052.000

Great Britain:

Great Britain: Quality Press

Great Britain: Tabloid Press

Title

Circulation 2000/01

Readership 2000/01

The Sun

3.471.230

9.591.000 – 20,5%

Daily Mail (not tabloid – mid market)

2.392.161

5.564.000 – 11,9%

Daily Mirror

2.148.405

5.733.000 – 12,3%

Daily Express (not tabloid – mid market)

888.836

2.168.000 – 4,6%

Daily Star

725.115

1.460.000 – 3,1%

Daily Record

586.525

1.631.000 – 3,5%

39

Note that the % do not refer to the whole country, but to German-speaking Switzerland for German-speaking newspapers and to French-speaking Switzerland for French-speaking newspapers respectively

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References Altheide, David L; Snow, Robert P. (1988): Toward a Theory of Mediation. In: Anderson James (ed.): Communication Yearbook. p.194-223 Almond, Gabriel A. (1960): Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics. In: Gabriel A. Almond; James S. Coleman (eds.): The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.3-64. Bagdikian, Ben (1990): The Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press. Bens, Els de; Kelly, Mary; Bakke, Marit (1992): Television Content: Dallasification of Culture? In: Karen Siune; Wolfgang Truetzschler, (eds.): Dynamics of Media Politics. Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe. London / Newbury / New Delhi: Sage. p.75-100 Blumler, J.G.; Brynin, M.; Nossiter, T.J. (1986): Broadcasting Finance and Programme Quality: An International Review. In: European Journal of Communication 1. p.343-372 Dahl, Robert A. (1979): Procedural Democracy. In: Peter Laslett, James Fishkin (eds.): Philosophy, Politics and Society. Oxford: Blackwell, p.97-133. Eilders, Christiane; Voltmer, Katrin (2003): Bringing Europe In? The Marginalization and Domestication of Europe on the German Media Agenda. Manuscript. Gerhards, Jürgen; Neidhardt, Friedhelm (1991): Aspekte moderner Öffentlichkeit. Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit: Fragestellungen und Ansätze. In: Stefan MüllerDohm; Klaus Neumann-Braun (eds.): Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation. Oldenburg: bis-Verlag, p.31-89. Gerhards, Jürgen (1993): Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie. Jg.22. Heft 2. p.96-110 Gerhards, Jürgen (2000): Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. In: Maurizio Bach (ed.): Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft. Westdeutscher Verlag. p.277-305 Gerhards, Jürgen (2001): Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien. In: Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung Berlin (ed.): Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa, p.1-27. Gerhards, Maria; Grajczyk, Andreas; Klingler Walter (1999): Programmangebote und Spartennutzung im Fernsehen 1998. In: Media Perspektiven 8. p.390-400 Graber, Doris A. (1996): Say it with pictures. In: Kathleen Hall Jamieson: The Media and Politics. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 546. London: Sage, p.85-96 Hallin, Daniel C.; Mancini, Paolo (2003, in publication): Americanization, Globalization and Secularization: Understanding the Convergence of Media Systems and Political Communication in the U.S. and Western Europe. In: Barbara Pfetsch; Frank Esser (eds.): Politische Kommunikation im internationalen Vergleich. Grundlagen. Anwendungen. Perspektiven. Wiesbaden / Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag

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IP International Marketing Committee (CMI) (ed.) (2001): Television 2001. European Key Facts. 8th edition. September. Köln Jarren, Otfried (1998): Medien, Mediensysteme und politische Öffentlichkeit im Wandel. In: Ulrich Sarcinelli, (ed.): Politikvermittlung und Demokratie in der Mediengesellschaft. Beiträge zur politischen Kommunikationskultur. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. p. 74-94 Jarren, Otfried et al. (2002): Rundfunkregulierung. Leitbilder, Modelle und Erfahrungen im internationalen Vergleich. Eine sozial- und rechtswissenschaftliche Analyse. Zürich: Seismo Verlag. Kleinnijenhuis, Jan (1989): News as olds. A test of the consonance hypothesis and related news selection hypotheses. In: Gazette 43. p.205-228 Kriesi, Hanspeter (2001): Die Rolle der Öffentlichkeit im politischen Entscheidungsprozess. Ein konzeptueller Rahmen für ein international vergleichendes Forschungsprojekt. Discussion Paper P 01-701. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Lange, André (2000): Der Entwicklung des digitalen Rundfunks in der Europäischen Union. In: Internationales Handbuch für Hörfunk und Fernsehen 2000/2001. Baden-Baden, p.89110. Lange, André (2002): Pressemitteilung. In: Europäische Audiovisuelle Informationsstelle. http://www.obs.col.int Mattern, Klaus et al. (1998): Fernsehsysteme im internationalen Vergleich. In Ingrid Hamm (ed.): Fernsehen auf dem Prüfstand: Aufgaben des dualen Rundfunksystems; Internationale Studien, Kommunikationsordnung 2000. Gütersloh: Verl. Bertelsmann Stiftung. p.13-50 McKinsey & Company (1999): Public Service Broadcasters Around the World. A McKinsey Report for the BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/bbc/pdf/McKinsey.pdf McQuail, Denis (1992): Media Performance. Mass Communication and the Public Interest. London: Sage Publications. Meyer, Timothy P. (1988): On Mediated Communication Theory; The Rise of Format. In: Anderson James (ed.): Communication Yearbook. p.224-229 Neidhardt, Friedhelm (1994): Öffentlichkeit, öffentliche Meinung, soziale Bewegungen. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 34, Öffentlichkeit, öffentliche Meinung, soziale Bewegungen. Neidhardt, Friedhelm; Ruud Koopmanns; Barbara Pfetsch (2000): Konstitutionsbedingungen politischer Öffentlichkeit: Der Fall Europa. In: Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.): Zur Zukunft der Demokratie: Herausforderungen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Berlin: Rainer Bohn Verlag, p.263-293. Neumann, Russel W. (1986): The Paradox of Mass Politics. Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. Norris, Pippa (2000): A Virtuous Circle. Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies. Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University Press. Pfetsch, Barbara (1993): Politische Fernsehwelten: Die Politikberichterstattung in privaten und öffentlich-rechtlichen Sendern. In: Otfried Jarren (ed.): Politische Kommunikation in Hörfunk und Fernsehen. Elektronische Medien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Opladen. p.111-122 EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Pfetsch, Barbara (1994): Themenkarrieren und politische Kommunikation. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament. Bd.39, p. 11-20. Schmuck, Otto; Wolfgang Wessels (1990): Die Streitkultur in der EG: Konfliktlösung zwischen nationaler Identität und gebündelter Interessenwarhnehmung. In: Ulrich Sarcinelli (ed.): Demokratische Streitkultur. Theoretische Grundpositionen und Handlungsalternativen in Politikfeldern. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, p.273-287. Schulz, Winfried (1997): Politische Kommunikation. Theoretische Ansätze und Ergebnisse empirischer Forschung. Opladen / Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Siune, Karen; Olof Hultén (1998): Does Broadcasting Have a Future? In: Denis McQuail / Karen Siune: Media Policy. Convergence, Concentration and Commerce. London: Sage, p.23-37. World Association of Newspapers (ed.) (2001): World Press Trends 2001. The Definitive Guide to the Changes Taking Place in the Press Industry Around the World. Paris: zenith media. Voltmer, Katrin (1997): Structures of Diversity in Press and Broadcasting Systems. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin: Manuscript, p.1-53.

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Cross-national Report WP 1c .

Project:

The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres

Project acronym: Project website:

Europub.com http://europub.wz-berlin.de

Funded by:

5th Framework Programme of the European Commission HPSE-CT2000-00046 WP 1 (Analysis of opportunity structures) Donatella della Porta D 1.2

Contract No. Work package: WP Coordinator: Deliverable number:

Report

Opportunity structure for specific policy issues

Cross-national Analysis

France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom

Authors:

M. Jochum, Spanish team, V. Guiraudon, J. Boerefijn and J. Mak, J. Erbe, E. Gray

Date:

February 2003

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Agricultural policy by Margit JOCHUM (Swiss team)

1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of agricultural policy Agricultural policy has been considered as one of the core issues since the very beginning of the European Communities. As early as in the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 provisions on the communitarization of agricultural policy were made: “The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. ‘Agricultural products’ means the products of the soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these products.” (Treaty establishing the European Community, 1957, incorporating the changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, part three: community policies, title II: agriculture, article 32, para. 1) As the excerpt of the Treaty of Rome shows, European agricultural policy has been imbedded into the “pillar of the European Communities”, the so called “first pillar”, since the rise of European integration. The member states delegated part of their competences to the Communities where agencies execute power partly independently form national states. Consequently, common agricultural policy (CAP) and its forms of decision making are to a very large extent supranational, even though member states’ agriculture ministers remain key actors in the domain of CAP. There have been clear reasons why the integration of agriculture into the common market would be supported and promoted by the then six EEC member states: Firstly, the agricultural lobby was convinced that a common market with common market regulations would probably be more efficient in protecting European agriculture than purely national mechanisms would be. Secondly, especially those countries with a high share of the agricultural sector on the GNP such as France and Italy – where those shares amounted to 15 and 25 per cent in 1956 – were thus able to partly “externalize” costs of their agricultural policy. Agricultural subsidies would be paid for by the community budget and the pressure on national budgets would diminish as consequence of the community solidarity (Herz, 2002, p. 38). In terms of the degree and importance of CAP’s Europeanisation it is also valid to mention the share of budget spent on the agricultural domain. It amounted to over 70% of the EEC budget in the early 1980s. In recent years, about 46% or 50 Billion € (budget proposal for the financial year 2002) are spent on CAP (Herz, 2002, p. 90). By the mid 1980s, as a consequence of the inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) starting in 1986 a shift towards internationalisation of agricultural policy took place. The EEC faced heavy criticism particularly pronounced by the USA and the Cairns Group (led by Australia) for its policy of community priority and related measures such as agricultural levies, export subsides and the like. In terms of our political claims analysis, we might expect a very high and not varying degree of Europeanisation over the period of study, since agricultural policy has constituted a core European issue since way before the period of interest to us. European actors are expected to predominate though national (governmental) actors might be quite present: EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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(1) in routine affaires via the Agricultural Council (2) to an even larger extend in periods of reform discussion when national interests are at stake. As already suggested above, a considerable degree of internationalization of claims making on agricultural policy is to be expected, since our period of study parallels GATT and WTO negotiation rounds and agreement implementation. Chronology of main European agreements and developments concerning CAP40 •

March, 25th 1957: The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are signed by the Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands) in Rome ("Treaties of Rome"). The Treaty establishing the EEC includes a chapter on common agricultural policy (CAP).



July, 3rd to 11th 1958: A conference held in Stresa (Italy) lays down the basis of the CAP.



1960: Adoption of the CAP-mechanisms by the six signatory states of the EEC Treaty.



January, 14th 1962: The Council adopts the first regulations on the CAP created for the establishment of a single market for agricultural products and for financial solidarity through a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).



July, 30th 1962: The regulations creating a CAP enter into force.



July, 1st 1964: The EAGGF is set into place.



December, 30th 1964: The Council instructs the Commission to submit proposals on the financing of the CAP and to submit proposals on the conditions for implementing the transfer to Community budget of levies on agricultural products.



July, 1st 1965: France breaks off the negotiations on financing the CAP. The French Government recalls its permanent representative. For the time being, the French delegation will not take part in Council’s or Permanent Representatives Committee’s meetings.



July, 22nd 1965: The Commission submits to the Council a memorandum on the financing of the CAP and on independent revenues for the Community.



July, 26th to 27th 1965: The Council accepts the memorandum of the Commission on the financing of the CAP as a sound basis for discussion.



March, 31st 1966: The Commission lays before the Council its proposal concerning the financing of the CAP, independent revenue for the Community and wider powers for the European Parliament.



May, 11th 1966: The Council adopts decisions and resolutions governing the timetable and the financing of the CAP and determines its objectives in other fields of common interest.



December 1968: Memorandum on the reform of CAP: decision on the so-called Mansholt-plan which foresees the limitation of financial support to farms with development potential as well as the reduction of labour force in agriculture by half in the middle-term.

40

Sources: Grant, 2002, p. 79; http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm (15/12/2002); http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/index_en.htm (7/2/2003); http://www.europa-digital.de/text/dschungelbuch/polfeld/agrar/chrono.shtml (13/12/2002)

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April, 22nd 1970: Signature of the Treaty of Luxembourg. The Council decides the gradual introduction of a system of own-resources under which the Community will receive all customs duties on products imported from non-member countries, all levies on agricultural imports and resources deriving from value-added tax.



May, 12th 1971: The Council introduces a system of monetary compensatory amounts for trade in agricultural products between member states in order to maintain the unity of the common agricultural market.



April, 17th 1972: Adoption of structural guidelines with the aim to change the structure in European agriculture (e.g. directive on modernisation of farms).



November, 20th 1973: The Council discusses in detail the measures proposed by the Commission regarding the reorganisation of the CAP that is to be set into place by the end of 1977.



April, 1st 1974: Following a change of Government in the United Kingdom, the British secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs makes a statement to the Council on the new government’s policy on the Community. He calls for major changes in the CAP, “fairer methods of financing the Community budget” and solutions to monetary problems.



1975: first subsidy plan for disadvantaged regions – agriculture shall be maintained in these regions and movement of labour shall be stopped.



February, 28th 1975: The Community and the 46 ACP states sign the first Lomé Convention concerning preferential trade relations including agricultural products.



December, 13th 1977: The first meeting of the International fund for Agricultural Development, set up on recommendation of November 1974 World Food Confernce, is held in Rome.



October, 31st 1979: The EEC and ACP states sign the second Lomé Convention.



November, 29th to 30th 1979: A European Council is held in Dublin. The points discussed include the proposals for regulation of agricultural markets.



December, 4th to 5th 1983: A European Council is held in Athens. It presents some options on the forthcoming financing of the Commission, on the budgetary unbalances, on the adaptation of the CAP, on the strengthening of the Structural Funds and on the development of new Community policies.



April, 2nd 1984: Introduction of production quotas for milk.



December, 8th 1984: The third Lomé Convention is signed by the EEC and 65 ACP states.



July, 23rd 1985: The Commission sends to the European Council a Green paper on the perspectives for the CAP.



September, 15th to 20th 1986: The ministers of 92 nations agree to a new round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round).



February, 1988: Brussels European Summit: fixing maxima for agricultural expenditure and guarantee quantities for certain agricultural products such as cereals.



1990: The fourth Lomé Convention is signed by ACP states and the EEC.

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November, 26th 1991: The Community accedes to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) becoming the first organisation for economic integration to enjoy full membership of a United Nations specialised agency.



1992: MacSharry reform of CAP.



November, 1992: USA and EU reach “Blair House” agreement (GATT negotiations).



December, 1993: USA and EU reach “Blair House II” agreement leading to conclusion of Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.



February, 19th 1994: The Court of Auditors publishes the special report concerning controls of irregularities and frauds in the agricultural area.



1994: Signature of the GATT agreement between the EU and USA in Marrakesch.



March, 27th 1996: The Commission adopts a decision on urgent measures to be taken for protection against BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy). It imposes a worldwide export ban on British beef and beef products.



June, 21st to 22nd 1996: The European Council is held in Florence. It endorses the framework plan presented by the Commission for eradication of BSE.



1997: Publication of the “Agenda 2000”.



February, 19th 1997: The Parliament adopts a resolution on results of the (it’s) temporary committee of inquiry into BSE.



October, 20th 1997: The Commission adopts the final report to the Parliament’s temporary committee of inquiry monitoring recommendations of BSE.



December, 9th 1998: The Court of Auditors publishes the special report concerning the Community financing of certain measures taken as a result of the BSE crisis, together with the Commission’s replies.



June, 14th 1999: The Council presents its conclusions on the contamination of certain foodstuffs by dioxin.



July, 9th 1999: The Commission adopts decisions on protective measures with regard to dioxin contamination of certain products of animal origin intended for human or animal consumption, and decisions authorising an aid package for farms and businesses affected by the dioxin crisis in Belgium.



July, 23rd 1999: The Commission adopts a decision setting 1 August as the date on which dispatch of United Kingdom bovine products under the date-based export scheme may commence.



January, 15th 2000: The opening session of the Ministerial Intergovernmental Conferences for accession negotiations of Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, is held in Brussels. Mr Gama (head of EU delegation) reminded candidate countries (amongst other things) of the importance of: ensuring a good functioning of both the internal market and EU policies, agriculture, justice and home affaires and the environmental ones in particular.



June, 23rd 2000: Signature of the Cotonou Convention (replacing former Lomé Conventions) between EU and ACP-states.



October, 9th 2002: The European Commission recommends the conclusion of accession negotiations by the end of the 2002 with the following countries: Cyprus, the Czech

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Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Commission considers that these countries will be ready for EU membership from the beginning of 2004. •

January, 22nd 2003: Presentation of Fischler’s latest CAP reform proposals calling for less quantity but more quality.

EU decision making on agricultural policy The Treaty establishing the European Community foresees the following decision making rules on CAP: “The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, acting by a qualified majority, make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions, without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make.” (Treaty establishing the European Community, 1957, incorporating the changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, part three: community policies, title II: agriculture, article 37, para. 2) The central agency of decision making on the CAP is clearly the Council of Agriculture Ministers where the various interests of the member states have to be reconciled. “Such a process of intergovernmental bargaining in response to domestic political pressures invariably produces suboptimal policies and at times of crisis it has been necessary for matters to be referred upwards to the European Council of heads of government for resolution” (Grant, 1997, p. 172). Other than in all other EU policy fields, it is not COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents des Etats Membres auprès de l'Union européenne) who prepares the meetings of the Council of Agriculture Ministers but the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA). The latter is made up of senior permanent officials from the member countries plus a Commission representative. It is their task to ensure that as many points as possible of the agenda are readily negotiated so that the Agricultural Council can adopt them formally. The Agricultural Council differs from other Councils in various points: It meets more frequently; meetings usually are fairly long; it takes many more legislative decisions; and shows a much greater propensity to vote than other Councils (Grant, 1997, pp. 172/173). As indicated in the Treaty establishing the EEC, the Council could have delegated the entire decision making on executive measures to the Commission. However, the member states were not ready to do so. Therefore, execution rules are being decided upon by the Council with qualified majority on the proposition of the Commission. Furthermore, the member states insisted on the participation of national administration in the management of agricultural policy. Therefore, management committees for each of the main farm products have been set up. These committees are composed of civil servants from all EU member states; the distribution of votes equals the one in the Council of Ministers. The Commission is obliged to submit each proposal of measures in CAP to the Committee which has to pronounce its standpoint within fixed delays (Roth/Cazes, 1997, pp. 25/26; Grant, 1997, p. 177). The European Commission’s representation in decision making mechanisms is somehow twofold. On the one hand there is the Agricultural Commissioner who can – according to Grant (1997, p. 149) – be very influential and able to “force hands” on the DG VI if he (a woman never held the office until now) is assertive, as Fischler has proved to be. On the other hand DG VI, the agriculture directorate-general of the Commission makes substantive policy inputs by formulating policies to a very large extent. The system of consensual decisionmaking in the Council “[…] encouraged DG-VI to develop the expertise and contacts necessary to finesse proposals through the system” (Grant, 1997, p. 147). DG VI has the largest staff in the Commission and is divided into directorates and units with high specialisation. Although all member states are represented within DG VI, it has the reputation of being under strong French influence (Grant, 1997, p. 156). EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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While DG VI tends to maintain the status quo because of lack of human resources and time to consider new ideas for the CAP, a Cabinet is appointed by the Commissioner within DG VI. This group of experts, having little commitment to existing policies, can more easily explore new policy ideas and take into account the feasibility of eventual reforms (Grant, 1997, p. 157). The European Parliament (EP) remains a rather marginal actor in CAP, although it must be included in a process of consultation if timing is not urging. Neither the Single European Act nor the Treaty of Maastricht improved the EPs position. The European Parliament can exert its main influence by lobbying activities at the European Commission or the Council (Roth/Cazes, 1997, p. 27). However, the EP provides itself a platform for access to the decision making process to lobbyists. In terms of “policy preferences” it is a player that tends to represent Third World, consumer and more general public interests (Grant, 1997, p. 175). The Court of Justice has no primary role in decision making on CAP and is not being mentioned in article 37 of the Treaty. Yet, it is an instance of appeal which is called upon frequently if negotiation results seem to be unacceptable to a member state. In this decisive role the Court of Justice establishes policy interpretations which may have far-reaching consequences. As such, it adds a dimension of uncertainty to the already very complex legislative process. Seen from a different point of view, the Court of Justice plays an essential role as “guardian” of the treaties and the constitutionality of the Commission and the Council (Roth/Cazes, 1997, p. 27; Grant, 1997, p. 181). Especially in the beginning of the CAP the Commission and Agricultural Council had close working relationships with the agricultural lobby. Characteristically, farmers’ organisations are however highly fragmented in most of the member countries. Only the Deutsche Bauernverband operates as a sort of umbrella organisation, as does the British National Farmers’ Organisation (Grant, 1997, p. 166). At the European level two main farmers’ organisations working closely together can be identified: COPA – Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles and COGECA – Comité Genéral de la Coopération Agricole des Pays de la Communauté. Their internal coherence became however difficult to maintain as new member states with divergent interests joined (Grant, 1997, p. 169). Additionally, the great complexity of the CAP causes difficult access to the policy community. Especially the farm lobby has become marginalised in recent years while generally the circle of actors in the agricultural policy has been widened. New issues related to agriculture – such as food quality, health and environment – and the inclusion of agricultural issues into the Uruguay Round (GATT) have allowed for this widening of the actor circle. During the 1990s as consequence of the international trade negotiations for example, DG I (external affaires) has become a more central actor, as did DG III, concerned with the food industry. Independent criticism has been pronounced by consumer organisations, environmental groups and agricultural economists – all of whom also remained rather marginal actors because of insufficient specialisation or – as in the latter case – lack of political sophistication (Grant, 1997, pp. 148/158). The Financing of the CAP The EU budget knows four main sources of financing: (1) Income of customs duties from the common custom tariffs; (2) agricultural levies, which are taxed on the EU external borders for agricultural imports = customs duties in the agricultural sector; EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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(3) a share of one per cent of the national VAT incomes; (4) additional allocations (so called “fourth sources”) from the member states with which the Community budget may be filled until at most 1.27 per cent of the GNP of the Union (Herz, 2002, p. 77). As table 1 shows, agricultural levies account for just 1.5 per cent of the EU budget in 2003 (1.5 per cent equally in the year 2002). The two main income sources of the EU (VAT share and additional allocations) are both based on the GNP. Consequently, “richer” countries contribute more to the financing of the EU household than “poorer” member states do. In view of the important share of expenses on agriculture and redistribution according to the principle of community solidarity, countries with a rather small and competitive agricultural sector – such as Germany or the United Kingdom – will receive relatively little back and therefore be “net payers” contrary to e.g. France whose important but partially inefficient agricultural sector benefits largely from the CAP (Herz, 2002, p. 77). Table 1: 2003 EU budget, breakdown by type of revenue Type of revenue Agricultural duties and sugar levies Customs duties VAT Fourth resources Miscellaneous + surpluses from the previous year Total

EUR million 1 426.4 10 713.9 24 121.3 59 403.9 1 837.4 97 502.9

% 1.5 11.0 24.7 60.9 1.9 100.0

Source: European Commission (2003). p. 18

CAP is financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) which has been installed in January 1962 according to the Treaty of the establishment of the EEC. It is itself part of the EU household. In 1964 EAGGF has been divided into a much more important Guarantee Section and a minor Guidance Section. The Guarantee Section finances measures in relation to market and price policy. Since the reforms of 1993 however, measures not directly related to market policy such as the set-aside of farmland, direct income support or environmental protection are also to be financed by the EAGGF Guarantee Section. The Agenda 2000 added the financing of all structural and agricultural policy measures outside the Objective 1 areas to the tasks of the EAGGF Guarantee Section. (EP: http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_1_4_de.htm; 31/1/2003). Rural development measures in Objective 1 areas are financed by the EAGGF Guidance Section. (Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/160026.htm; 13/12/2002) As table 2 shows clearly, EU budget expenditure is dominated by agricultural and structural policies. A total of 81 346 million € (or 79.7 per cent of the EU budget) will be spent on those two policy domains in the financial year 2003. 47 378 million € or 46.4 per cent alone will be devoted to agricultural policy and managed by the EAGGF’s two sections. Another 564 million € are included for agricultural measures in the context of so called pre-accession aid for candidate countries. The evidence of such figures provoked Heinemann’s claim that the EU remains – against alternative rhetoric – primarily “an instrument of subsidization of agriculture” (Heinemann, 2002, p. 516).

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Table 2: 2003 EU household proposal by policy area41 Appropriation for commitments Agriculture

EUR million 47 378

Thereof for agricultural expenditure (except rural development)* Thereof for rural development and supporting measures**

Structural operations Internal policies External policies Administration Reserves Pre-accession aid Thereof for agriculture

Appropriations for commitments – total Appropriations for payment - total

% 46.4

42 680 4 698

33 968 6 796 4 972 5 211 434 3 386

33.3 6.7 4.9 5.1 0.4 3.3

564

102 145 102 767

100.1***

Source: European Commission (2003). p. 7 * managed by the EAGGF’s Guarantee Section; ** managed by the EAGGF’s Guidance Section; *** the total of 100.1 per cent is the effect of truncation.

The prospect of eastern enlargement puts EU budgetary policy under high pressure. Because of candidate countries’ fairly important agricultural sector and low levels of per capita income, future middle and eastern European member countries will no doubt be substantial net beneficiaries (Heinemann, 2002, p. 515). The so called phasing-in concerning direct income support for farmers in the future new member countries – which was introduced in order not to amplify pressure on the EU budget – remains one of the most contested measures and conditions of access (NZZ online, 19/11/2002). One alternative model of CAP financing being discussed over the last years is the so called “co-financing”. This would mean that EU agricultural subsidies would be complemented by national allowances. Such a new financial option would in reality mean a partial renationalization of agricultural policy. In view of the French opposition to such plans however, this policy option stands little chances of being implemented in the middle-term (Heinemann, 2002, p. 519; Herz, 2002, p. 90/91). Issue definition and policy linkages to other EU policies The Treaty establishing the European Community (1957) lays down five main objectives for the CAP which have to be seen in the light of the aftermath of the 2nd World War: “The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: (a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; (b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; (c) to stabilise markets; (d) to assure the availability of supplies; 41

In more detailed form for agricultural policy.

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(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices” (Treaty establishing the European Community, 1957, incorporating the changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, part three: community policies, title II: agriculture, article 33, para. 1). In order to realise these goals, market regulations have been established for the first time in 1962. As at present, market regulations exist for over 20 domains of agriculture, each of them taking into account the specificities of the production. These market regulations used in principle three strategies. First, the Council of Ministers decided every year on a “guaranteed price”. This meant that every quantity of a product could at least be sold for the guaranteed price since the European Commission would intervene if the price level would fall below the fixed level. Second, a “community preference” protected the European agricultural sector from the significantly lower price level of the world market. Agricultural levies artificially raised the prices of imported products to the European price level. At the same time export subsidies (export refunds) allowed European agriculture to compete on the world market by lowering the European prices to the standards on the world market. Third, direct subsidies (direct income support) were meant to improve and stabilize the social and economic situation of farmers (Herz, 2002, p. 88). Especially the success in reaching the first goal – the increased productivity in agricultural production – meant an overproduction that had to be financed by the European Community. As one of the first measures, milk quotas have been introduced in 1984 (Bravo-Baumann, 2002, p. 8). CAP reforms such as the so called “McSharry reform” and the “Agenda 2000” also tried to overcome this vicious circle of quantitative incentives by subsidies and overproduction. The guaranteed prices were lowered progressively and a shift towards direct income support regardless of specific products has been introduced. At present 27 per cent of the expenditure on agriculture is devoted to the backing of prices, while 73 per cent are used as direct income support (Herz, 2002, p. 90; von Urff, 2002, p. 428). Very similar issues characterise the (history of) agricultural policy in Switzerland. Post-war Swiss agricultural legislation has largely been devoted to the same principles as the CAP: Farmers’ incomes should be put on solid grounds, food security for the population should be assured; efficiency and technical progress should be promoted. The Swiss government did so by fixing product prices as well as by protecting the domestic market from cheap imports. And just as the EU, Switzerland faced very similar and problematic consequences of its agricultural policy, the most important of which was costly surplus production of milk and cereals. Also policy responses have been fairly similar to those of the EU. 1992 a shift from market policy to direct income support has been introduced, including the possibility to link such direct subsidies to environmental compliance (Rieder, 1998, pp. 1151/1152). Switzerland’s latest agriculture policy proposal entitled “Agrarpolitik 2007” principally wants to focus on further market liberalisation and more ecology (Parlamentsdienste, Medienmitteilung, 13/9/2002). Most recent reform proposals formulated by EU Agriculture Commissioner Fischler earlier this year put a strong emphasis on a shift from quantity to quality. The link between production and subsidies shall be brought to an end. Such fundamental reforms, which could almost be called a paradigm shift, are being highly welcomed by the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. France, in particular, remains strongly opposed to a move towards this direction, as does Germany who wants its large farms in the former east to be taken into account (NZZ, 28/1/2003, p. 21). In terms of quality, a new subsidy system as proposed by Fischler, would take into account standards of environmental protection, food safety, animal protection and health an well as occupational safety and health (ORF ON EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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News, 27/1/2003; NZZ Online, 23/1/2003). These reform tendencies reflect clearly the necessity of taking into account non deniable policy linkages. Concerning environmental protection, so called cross compliance has already been introduced by the Agenda 2000. Those regulations, agreed upon in 1999, allow member states to make environmental compliance a condition for direct income support (von Urff, 2002, p. 431). Visibly however, the implementation of this outlined agri-environmental policy remains a national domain, whereas the EU just sets up a frame work. Food safety and consumer protection could no longer be neglected in relation to agricultural policy at least since the BSE crisis in the mid 1990s. “Consumers questioned not only the safety of beef generally but also the safety of other products of a system (the CAP) that emphasizes mass production and pays little attention to product quality.” (Dinan, 1999, p. 345) In order to rebuild public confidence an eradication scheme (slaughter of targeted cattle) has been implemented. Financial consequences were heavy and not foreseeable which “[…] threw the CAP into a new phase of disarray” (Grant, 1997, p. 128). Eurobarometer data shows that questions of food safety and environmental protection remain on top of the list of European citizens’ concerns still in 2002. Asked about what CAP should be used for (thirteen suggested objectives) 90 per cent of all interviewed persons thought that it should be used to “ensure that agricultural products are healthy and safe”; 88 per cent agree with the statement that CAP should “promote the respect of the environment” (Eurobarometer 57.0, report, p. 21). As already mentioned further above rural development and supporting measures are integrated part of the CAP. As table 2 shows, only a minor part of the EU budget is actually devoted to such policies. Fischler’s recent reform proposal however includes also major changes in this respect: In view of EU eastern enlargement and heavy protests of member states, a redirection of financial resources from direct income support to rural development is being suggested (diepresse.com, 22/1/2003). Finally, a policy link between European agricultural policy and development aid policy can be seen in the Lomé Convention. Herz calls the latter the most important element of EU development assistance. Basically, the Lomé Convention – more recently named the Cotonou Convention according to the city where the latest agreements have been concluded in the year 2000 – allows for preferential trade relations between 77 former colonies of the EU member states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP-states). Whether or not this particular agreement compensates for the disadvantages of all those countries not included, notably Latin American countries, has be questioned (Herz, 2002, p. 88). What other scopes beside the European level? Ex ante expectations Undoubtedly, European scope will be predominant in terms of issue as well as in terms of actors in our six EU countries of study. Although the central role of the Agricultural Council does allow for a strong influence of national interests at the European level, the Council is clearly defined as an actor with European scope. National scopes – especially of actors – are to be expected to some degree in relation to issues of food safety and livestock diseases. A regional or even local dimension is expected to be marginal, but might be brought into play by non-governmental actors such as interest groups or consumer organisations. However, most of them are also expected to aggregate and then operate at least on a national level. We strongly suppose that the recent debate about an eventual regionalisation of common agricultural policy, as vaguely proposed by Agricultural Commissioner Fischler several times, will not be reflected in our political claims data. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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In the case of Switzerland, national scope is expected to be predominant, since agricultural policy traditionally is of national concern. In the course of the bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union however, a European scope has been introduced to Swiss agricultural policy. The bilateral agreements, which entered into force in June 2002, include a chapter on agriculture foreseeing a step by step opening of EU and Swiss markets respectively. For our EU member countries as well as Switzerland, some degree of internationalization in the claims making on agriculture has to be expected as a consequence of the above mentioned inclusion of agriculture into the GATT / WTO negotiations.

2. Salience and national stakes in the issue One of the main challenges of the common agricultural policy is to balance the interests of its different member states. On the one hand, there is a certain number of member states – such as France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and partly also Italy, Austria and Finland – which are highly oriented on agriculture. On the other hand, member states – such as Germany and the United Kingdom in particular – are highly industrialised, export oriented economies. This act of balance is further complicated by the fact that in most of the European countries agricultural interest groups are well organised although fragmented and are relatively successful in making their voices heard (Herz, 2002, p. 87). Wyn Grant classifies the EU 15 in 5 categories of countries according to two principle variables: the centrality of agriculture and first stage food processing in the member state’s economy and its general level of efficiency. For the fifth group he introduces two more variables: the importance of part-time farming and the priority given to environmental and public health issues. The aim of this classification is to generate a preliminary understanding of the form and character of each country’s agricultural economy. On the basis of such knowledge an understanding of the member states’ political strategies and tactics concerning the CAP might be easier, although – as the German case shows – the “[…] limited importance of agriculture in the German national economy bears no relationship to the vigour with which Germany defends the interests of its farmers at the EU level […]” (Grant, 1997, p. 61). Our EU countries of study are dispersed over all of the five categories Grant introduces. The Netherlands are part of the group of “small north European countries with a high level of agricultural employment, efficient food processing industries and a surplus in trade in food and agricultural products” (Grant, 1997, p. 33). Environmental pressures are quite important for Dutch farmers, since its intensive agriculture constitutes a significant source of pollution in such a densely populated country. Contrary to The Netherlands, the United Kingdom can be classified amongst the “northern European countries in which agriculture is not a key economic activity” (Grant, 1997, p. 33) in terms of employment rate and share of the GDP. This does not signify however, that agriculture is considered to be unimportant. Especially the food processing industry is strong domestically as all as throughout Europe. Historically the rapid industrialisation in the UK created the need to provide cheap food to a large urban working class. This lead to a “cheap food policy” which was largely based on imports form British “Dominions”. After the 2nd World War food security and related to it the maximisation of production have been considered – just as in many other European countries – as a central and desirable goal. Although the 1947 Agricultural Act introduced a system of price supports and a variety of grants, the UK preserved a more fully capitalist form of agriculture with an emphasis on profit maximisation. Not at least because of the relatively large size of average British farms EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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(biggest average farm size of all EU member states), “Britain is predisposed to a more commercial orientation to farming than many other member states” (Grant, 1997, p. 48). This predisposition and the “paradigm” of cheap food policy made British EEC membership for a long time very little attractive. Britain was and remained strongly opposed to a co-financing and subsidizing of continental European agriculture. Within the Council of Agricultural Ministers Britain is one of the most enthusiastic members of a general reform coalition (Grant, 1997, p. 160). France as well as Spain can be described as countries “[…] in which agriculture is a significant economic activity and in which progress is being made towards greater efficiency, but current efficiency levels vary significantly within the country” (Grant, 1997, p. 33). Low efficiency levels – related to particularly high personal intensity and very low competitive capacity – may be seen as the main reason why France historically has been very eager to integrate the agricultural domain into the common market of the European Communities. While highly industrialised Germany got access to the markets of largely agriculturally dominated France, France got comprehensive agricultural and structural promotion and could somewhat discharge its budget (Herz, 2002, pp. 33/87). The description of France as beneficiary of the CAP holds still in the mid 1990s when France received just about a quarter of European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) spending. (Grant, 1997, p. 181) In the mid 1990s, “[…] subsidies accounted for an estimated 38 per cent of French farmers’ incomes […]” (Grant, 1997, p. 48). However, in spite of the substantial variations in levels of efficiency and productivity, France is the world’s second largest food exporting nation and surely the leading agricultural economic power in the EU. However, as GATT negotiations showed, Germany is able to exert influence on France. It can therefore be argued that Germany is the single most important actor (Grant, 1997, p. 161). According to Grant, Spain can be classified in the same group with France, since it saw a particularly rapid fall in agricultural employment. Compared with other Mediterranean countries, the average size of farms is relatively big. Concerning livestock farming, Spain is second in terms of sheep farming, goat farming and pig production after the UK, Greece and Germany respectively. EU membership has had beneficial effects on Spanish farmers who saw a rise in income significantly higher than the average in other member states. Subsidies now account for 25 per cent – in some sectors such as cereals, sunflowers and sheep even for 80 per cent of Spanish farmers’ income. Spain comes third in the ranking of EAGGF beneficiaries and is a net beneficiary overall (Grant, 1997, pp. 50/181; see also table 4 below). Italy is a representative of the fourth group of countries which share a predominance of very small producers. Italy – just as Greece and Portugal – is characterised by a significant but relatively inefficient agricultural sector with poor potential for future growth. The Po valley is an exception to this overall picture. “The economic research institute, Nomisma, has suggested that it is not so much Italian agriculture as Italian farmers who need modernisation. The goal of farmers is often to achieve a marginal existence with the aid of subsidies so that some are producing almost exclusively for intervention.” (Grant, 1997, p. 53) Germany can be distinguished with respect to the above mentioned second dimension of part-time farming and priority given to environmental and pubic health issues. In Germany, agriculture is perceived to be a significant economic activity (Grant, 1997, p. 33), although the share of agriculture in GDP (0.8 per cent in 1998) is the second lowest after the UK (0.6 per cent in 1998) (see table 3). The structure of the German agricultural sector is twofold. Particularly in the new Bundesländer, but also in the north of former West Germany large farms dominate. The average size of a farm in former East Germany is 212 hectares while in Southern Germany the average size is 16 hectares. Many of those small family farms are EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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worked on a part-time basis. Since the Green movement became an entrenched feature in Germany’s political landscape, farming practices are affected by political pressures opposing the productionist models of agriculture and concerned about the consequences of intensive methods of farming. (Grant, 1997, pp. 57/58) Table 3: Key data on agriculture in selected EU member countries

Germany France Italy Spain The Netherlands United Kingdom Switzerland****

Share of agriculture on GDP*

Share of agricultural exports on total exports*

(%) 0.8 1.9 2.5 3.3 2.6 0.6 1.3

(%) 5.2 12.9 6.8 5.8 19.9 6.6 --

Proportion of the civilian population working in agriculture** (%) 2.8 3.9 6.6 8.1 4.2 2.1 5.9

Average size of farms (without forests)*** (ha) 32.1 41.7 6.4 21.2 18.6 69.3 13.6

Source: for selected EU member states: Bundesanstalt für Agrarwirtschaft, Wien: www.awi.bmlf.gv.at/gb/tabellen/Tab_3402.xls; for Switzerland: Bravo-Baumann, 2002, p.4 * Data from 1998; ** Data from 1996; *** Data from 1997; **** all data for Switzerland from 1996

Table 4: Incoming payments of selected EU members to the EAGGF, guarantee section, return flows and balance; 2000 in Millions € Germany France Italy Spain The Netherlands United Kingdom

Incoming payments* 9 975 6 650 5 038 2 954 2 519 6 352

Return flows 5 642 8 982 5 002 5 469 1 397 4 059

Balance - 4 333 + 2 332 36 + 5 515 - 1 122 - 2 293

Source: Ernährungs- und agrarpolitischer Bericht 2002 der Bundesregierung: http://www.verbraucherministerium.de/landwirtschaft/ab-2002/ab02.htm * Without the veterinarian division; ** Additionally, direct payments of 31 million € have been financed by the EAGGF’s guarantee section. A listing according to member countries is not possible.

Obviously, Switzerland has to be considered as a case apart in terms of agricultural policy. Institutionally it has no linkages to the CAP of the European Union. The first round of bilateral agreements – which entered into force on June, 1st 2002 – however, included agriculture as one of the seven negotiated domains. Measured in terms of the producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) Switzerland has one of the most protected agricultural markets worldwide. Its PSE amounts to 78 per cent compared to a PSE of the EU 15 of 43 per cent or a PSE of 16 in the USA (Rieder, 1998, p. 1150). Compared to all our other countries of study with the exception of Italy, Switzerland has the smallest average farm size. The proportion of civilian population working in agriculture amounted however still to 5.9 per cent in 1996 and comes just behind Spain and Italy in a ranking of our seven countries of study. Swiss agricultures share on GDP remains in the lower fields with 1.3 per cent (see table 3). As the latest major crisis in first stage food processing (concerning Swiss Dairy Food) showed, EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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agricultural policy remains independently from its objective stakes a major issue of political concern in Switzerland just as well as within EU countries.

Selected web sites providing information on CAP • • • • • •

Europa-digital: http://www.europa-digital.de/dschungelbuch/polfeld/agrar/ (Europadigital is an independent information platform concerning several issue fields including “Europe”) Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm (general historical information) (agriculture Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/index_en.htm “home page” Europa-Server: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/bse/index_en.html (Food safety / BSE “home page”) Eurobarometer: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ European Parliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/default_en.htm (fact sheets on agriculture under 4. Common policies – 1. Common agricultural policy)

References Bravo-Baumann, Heidi (2002) Die Europäische Union. Schweizerischer Bauernverband, Departement Agrarwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen. http://www.bauernverband.ch/de/tatsachen_meinungen/EU/EU.pdf (6/2/2003). Bundesanstalt für (31/1/2003).

Agrarwirtschaft:

http://www.awi.bmlf.gv.at/gb/tabellen/Tab_3402.xls

Deutsche Bundesregierung (2002) Ernährungs- und agrarpolitischer Bericht Bundesregierung 2002. Berlin http://www.verbraucherministerium.de/landwirtschaft/ab-2002/ab02.htm .

der

diepresse.com (22/1/2003) Landwirt im Zentrum, nicht die Zahl der Kühe. Wien. Dinan, Desmond (1999) Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Eurobarometer 57.0: The European Research Group (EORG) (2002) Europeans and the Common Agricultural Policy 2001 – 2002. Report written for the Agricultural Directorate-General. Brussels. Europa Digital: http://www.europa-digital.de/text/dschungelbuch/polfeld/agrar/chrono.shtml (13/12/2002). Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm (15/12/2002). Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/index_en.htm (7/2/2003). EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Europa-Server: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/160026.htm (13/12/2002) European Commission (2003) General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2003. Brussels, Luxembourg. European Parliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_1_4_de.htm (31/1/2003). Grant, Wyn (1997) The Common Agricultural Policy. Houndmills, London: MacMillan Press. Heinemann, Friedrich (2002) “Die Haushaltspolitik der Europäischen Union”. In: Weidenfeld, Werner (Ed.) Europa-Handbuch. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 515-522. Herz, Dietmar (2002) Die Europäische Union. München: Verlag C.H. Beck. NZZ online (Neue Züricher Zeitung) (19/11/2002) Die EU-Erweiterung erfolgt am 1. Mai 2004. Zürich. NZZ online (Neue Züricher Zeitung) (28/1/2003) Fischler konkretisiert die EU-Agrarreform. Zürich. NZZ (Neue Züricher Zeitung) (28/1/2003) Wenig Begeisterung für EU-Agrarreform. Zürich, p. 21. ORF ON News (27/1/2003) EU-Beratungen über Agrarreform. Wien. Parlamentsdienste (13/9/2002) WAK-S: Erste Anhörung zur Agrarpolitik 2007, Bereinigung des Steuerpakets (Wohneigentumsbesteuerung) und Diskussion zum Stiftungsrecht. Medienmitteilung, Bern. Rieder, Peter (1998) “Auswirkungen eines Beitritts zur Europäischen Union auf die schweizerische Agrarpolitik und Landwirtschaft”. In: Cottier, Thomas; Kopse, Alwin R. (Eds.) Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union: Brennpunkte und Auswirkungen. Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag. Roth, Christian; Cazes, Sylvian (1997) La politique agricole commune: fondement du développement rural durable. Paris: Editions A. Pedone. Von Urff, Winfried (2002) “Agrarmarkt und Struktur des ländlichen Raumes in der Europäischen Union”. In: Weidenfeld, Werner (Ed.) Europa-Handbuch. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 425-438. Treaty establishing the European Community (signed in Rome on 25 March 1957), consolidated version incorporating the changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997, Part Three: Community policies, TITLE II: Agriculture.

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5. Annexe TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (signed in Rome on 25 March 1957)

Consolidated version incorporating the changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 199742 Part Three: Community policies TITLE II: Agriculture Article 32 (ex Article 38) 1. The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. “Agricultural products” means the products of the soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these products. 2. Save as otherwise provided in Articles 33 to 38, the rules laid down for the establishment of the common market shall apply to agricultural products. 3. The products subject to the provisions of Articles 33 to 38 are listed in Annex I to this Treaty. 4. The operation and development of the common market for agricultural products must be accompanied by the establishment of a common agricultural policy.

Article 33 (ex Article 39) 1. The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: (a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; (b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; (c) to stabilise markets; (d) to assure the availability of supplies; (e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 2. In working out the common agricultural policy and the special methods for its application, account shall be taken of: (a) the particular nature of agricultural activity, which results from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities between the various agricultural regions; (b) the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees; (c) the fact that in the Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a whole.

Article 34 (ex Article 40) 1. In order to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, a common organisation of agricultural markets shall be established. This organisation shall take one of the following forms, depending on the product concerned:

42

Source : Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997, pp. 173-308

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(a) common rules on competition; (b) compulsory coordination of the various national market organisations; (c) a European market organisation. 2. The common organisation established in accordance with paragraph 1 may include all measures required to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, in particular regulation of prices, aids for the production and marketing of the various products, storage and carryover arrangements and common machinery for stabilising imports or exports. The common organisation shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 33 and shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community. Any common price policy shall be based on common criteria and uniform methods of calculation. 3. In order to enable the common organisation referred to in paragraph 1 to attain its objectives, one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee funds may be set up.

Article 35 (ex Article 41) To enable the objectives set out in Article 33 to be attained, provision may be made within the framework of the common agricultural policy for measures such as: (a) an effective coordination of efforts in the spheres of vocational training, of research and of the dissemination of agricultural knowledge; this may include joint financing of projects or institutions; (b) joint measures to promote consumption of certain products.

Article 36 (ex Article 42) The provisions of the Chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council within the framework of Article 37(2) and (3) and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein, account being taken of the objectives set out in Article 33. The Council may, in particular, authorise the granting of aid: (a) for the protection of enterprises handicapped by structural or natural conditions; (b) within the framework of economic development programmes.

Article 37 (ex Article 43) 1. In order to evolve the broad lines of a common agricultural policy, the Commission shall, immediately this Treaty enters into force, convene a conference of the Member States with a view to making a comparison of their agricultural policies, in particular by producing a statement of their resources and needs. 2. Having taken into account the work of the Conference provided for in paragraph 1, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and within two years of the entry into force of this Treaty, the Commission shall submit proposals for working out and implementing the common agricultural policy, including the replacement of the national organisations by one of the forms of common organisation provided for in Article 34(1), and for implementing the measures specified in this Title. These proposals shall take account of the interdependence of the agricultural matters mentioned in this Title. The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, acting by a qualified majority, make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions, without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make. 3. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority and in accordance with paragraph 2, replace the national market organisations by the common organisation provided for in Article 34(1) if: (a) the common organisation offers Member States which are opposed to this measure and which have an organisation of their own for the production in question equivalent safeguards for the employment and standard of living of the producers concerned, account being taken of the adjustments that will be possible and the specialisation that will be needed with the passage of time; (b) such an organisation ensures conditions for trade within the Community similar to those existing in a national market.

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4. If a common organisation for certain raw materials is established before a common organisation exists for the corresponding processed products, such raw materials as are used for processed products intended for export to third countries may be imported from outside the Community.

Article 38 (ex Article 46) Where in a Member State a product is subject to a national market organisation or to internal rules having equivalent effect which affect the competitive position of similar production in another Member State, a countervailing charge shall be applied by Member States to imports of this product coming from the Member State where such organisation or rules exist, unless that State applies a countervailing charge on export. The Commission shall fix the amount of these charges at the level required to redress the balance; it may also authorise other measures, the conditions and details of which it shall determine.

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Education policy (Spanish team) 1. Degree and forms of institutional Europeanisation of educational policy Education issues have traditionally not played a central role within the European Union. The degree of power that have actually been transferred at the European level in education is still marginal comparing other sectors, although an increasing role of the EU in the field of education has been observed in recent years (Fredriksson 2002). Education is generally considered to be a state responsibility and it still takes more intergovernmental than supranational forms of policy making. The EU does not have a 'common education policy', nor a top-down approach in education. The policy development process in the field of education is based on open co-ordination and wide consultation, reflected in White Papers, declarations, resolutions and the joint definition of objectives rather than the EU's heaviest legal instruments, regulations and directives. In this section, the EU role, its institutional capacities in education and the main changes over time are presented. In general terms, three periods of the EU activity in the field of education can be considered (Muñoz-Repiso 2002). First, until 1992, education is not a domain of the EU policy. Second, in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty gives the legal basis to co-operation in education. Third, since year 2001, after the Lisbon European Council (March 2000), when convergence among European education systems is establish as a goal in the long-term. Education becomes one of the elements in a European strategy to become more competitive. Nevertheless, under the principle of subsidiarity every Member State of the EU retains full responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of its own education system. In the past, one of the EU’s major concerns in the field of education and training was related to mobility and how to make sure that qualifications and diplomas were recognised on equal terms among all member states. In 1976, education ministers first decided to set up an information network, as the basis for better understanding of educational policies and structures in the then nine-nation European Community. This reflected the principle that the particular character of education systems in the Member States should be fully respected, while co-ordinated interaction between education, training and employment systems should be improved. In 1980, it was formally launched Eurydice, an information network on education in Europe. In 1986, attention turned from information exchanges to student exchanges with the launch of the Erasmus programme. Yet it was not until 1992 and the creation of the single European market that education became formally recognised, in the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, as a legitimate area of EU responsibility in its own right. The Maastricht Treaty revitalized the legal base for action in the fields of education and vocational training (articles 126, 127). For the first time the term “education” appeared in an EU Treaty (Gram 1997: 44). In Article 126, the Community is charged with promoting co-operation between the member states and with supporting and supplementing their actions in the field of education. Article 126 refers to the Community’s role being to contribute to quality education while fully respecting the responsibilities of Member States for educational services and their cultural and linguistic diversity. Educational action is aimed to develop a ‘European dimension’ through helping to improve language skills, to increase mobility and exchanges among students and staff,

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through work to ensure the recognition of qualifications, to promote co-operation between educational establishments and long-distance education. Nevertheless, the legislature powers of the EU remain limited in the area of education: “acting by a qualified majority on a proposal form the Commission [the Council] shall adopt recommendations” (Article 126(4)). Thus EU action is limited to the implementation of nonbinding recommendations, so a common education policy and the harmonisation of policy measures are specifically excluded. However, the inclusion of a Treaty article on education, viewed as distinct from vocational training, is an important example of the institutionalisation of existing policy actions on the part of the Commission. Viewed from this perspective, the way in which the new Treaty basis helped to legitimise the transformation of the Task Force into a new Commission Directorate-General (DGXXII –Education, Training and Youth) was significant (Gram 1997:45). The new Directorate-General was established on 23 January 1995. A much stronger remit concerning vocational training had already been established in the early years of the Community but this is now clarified in amended Article 127 (Duff et al. 1994: 137). From the start, the EEC had certain responsibilities in the field of vocational training and these have led to its gradual move into educational work. The dividing line between training and education is increasingly hard to draw since it is now believed that, in the past, educational systems were too divorced from economic reality so that many young people left school ill-prepared for the world of work (El-Agraa 1998: 405). Three years after the approval of the Maastricht Treaty, a new drive on education and vocational training policy was symbolized by the ‘White Paper on Education and Training: Towards the learning society’ (COM (95) 590). Its themes are linked to the need for a better quality of education, a spread of qualifications throughout the population and work to make the national systems more comparable. Following the White Paper the Commission regrouped the many programmes it was running into three main groups. The Youth for Europe scheme that develops youth exchange schemes, short visits and voluntary participation in common projects in order to increase European awareness. Leonardo da Vinci is concerned with vocational training and promoting language skills. Thirdly, the Socrates programme has responsibilities in higher education. A new period started after the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. During this Council it was established that education plays a decisive role “in order to become (the EU) the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (mentioned in the ‘Report from the Commission. The Concrete future objectives of education systems’ 2001: 3). Following this goal, the Lisbon European Council called on education ministers "to undertake a general reflection on the concrete future objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns and priorities while respecting national diversity (...) and presenting a broader report to the European Council in the spring of 2001" (from the Commission web). On the basis of a Commission proposal and contributions from the Member States, the Council adopted the ‘Report on the concrete future objectives of education systems’ on 12 February 2001. It is the first document to set out a coherent overall approach to national education policies in the context of the EU on the basis of three objectives: 1/ improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU. 2/ making lifelong learning accessible to everyone. 3/ making EU education and training systems more outward-looking as regards the rest of the world. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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This report was approved in March 2001 by the Stockholm European Council, which asked that a detailed work programme be drawn up. This was adopted on February 2002 and was the subject of a joint report transmitted by the Commission and the Council to the Barcelona European Council on March 2002. The Council underlined these objectives by pointing out that education was one of the bases of the European social model and that Europe's education systems should become a "world quality reference" by 2010. Instead of building on the provisions of the treaty, the work programme will be implemented using the "open method of co-ordination" between Member States, and establishing “processes”, partly outside the traditional EU framework. The new Open Method of Co-ordination was defined in the Lisbon conclusions as “a means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals and indicated that it would be a fully decentralised approach using variable forms of partnerships and designed to help Member States to develop their own policies progressively” (mentioned in the ‘Detailed work programme on the follow-up of the objectives of education and training systems in Europe 2002: 10). While respecting the breakdown of responsibilities envisaged in the treaties, this method provides a new co-operation framework for the Member States with a view to convergence of national policies and the attainment of certain objectives. It draws on tools such as indicators and benchmarks enabling Member States to know where they stand and to assess progress towards the objectives set, as well as on comparing best practice, periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, pilot projects, etc. A recent application of this approach on education is ‘the European report on quality of education’. The other new working method can be referred to as “processes” partly outside the traditional EU framework. The main process has been referred to as the Bologna process. It takes its name from the Bologna Declaration, which was signed on 19 June 1999 by the Ministers of Education of 29 countries in Europe. The Ministers signed the Declaration on establishing the European Area of higher education by 2010 and promoting the European System of higher education world-wide. As in other areas of social policy at European level, it is difficult to evaluate the success of policies for education and training or to assess their impact on national policy making. The Commission has clearly defined its role in this area: it sees itself essentially as a ‘catalyst and facilitator of cooperative and common action’, working in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and respecting diversity of provision (Hantrais 1995: 56-57). Although tangible results have been achieved in terms of the mutual recognition of qualification and the increase in the number of students and young people who have had the opportunity to spend periods in other member states and who might not otherwise have done so. As Fredriksson (2002) points out, whether the new interest in education will lead to any actual changes in the EU countries is still an open question, as well as the question of whether education will play a more dominant role in EU co-operation or not. The objective of a European recognition of qualification and diplomas may be possible to achieve without too many controversial changes in national education policies, but the strategies to achieve quality education is a much more national political question where strategies are embedded in a national political context. Degree and forms of European funding43 The distribution of the 2002 budget of the EU by policy areas is given in Table 1. The proportion of the total budget for education is less than 1% (780.7 EUR million). The data 43

All the data gathered in this section is from the European Commission web.

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shows that the EU spending on education -culture is also included in this category- is rather marginal comparing other policy areas. For instance, in areas such as employment and social affairs or agriculture, the proportion of the total budget represents over 10% and 51% respectively. TABLE 1. 2002 Budget of the EU by Policy Area (in EUR million) Policy Area

Financial Management interv. & Support (1) 442,1 52,1 Economic and Financial Affairs 172 119 Enterprise 0 73,9 Competition 9629 109,4 Employment and Social Affairs 47456,1 135,6 Agriculture and Rural Development 916,5 106,2 Energy and Transport 180,9 82,8 Environment 2303,8 220,3 Indirect Research 953,2 118 Information Society 44,8 213,1 Direct Research 1059,3 36,2 Fisheries 0 65,9 Internal Market 21728,6 79,1 Regional Policy 36,6 53 Taxation and Customs Union Education and Culture 665,6 115,1 73 77,4 Media and Communication 637,2 106,8 Health and Consumer Protection 110,7 36,2 Justice and Home Affairs 2854,2 416,1 External Relations (3) 7,6 59,6 Trade (3) 924,5 194,6 Developmet and Relations with A.C.P. countries (3)(4) 1692,9 124,1 Enlargement (3) 646,7 24 Humanitarian Aid 6,1 42,1 Fight against Fraud Commission's Policy co-ordination and Legal Advice Administration Budget Audit Statistics Pensions Not attributed (5) Total

Total 494,2 291 73,9 9738,4 47591,7 1022,7 263,6 2524,1 1071,3 257,9 1095,6 65,9 21807,8 89,6 780,7 150,4 744 147 3270,3 67,1 1119,1

Human resources (2) 469 856 595 669 883 929 520 1578 1022 2084 277 408 514 399 653 607 696 240 2999 482 2095

1816,9 670,8 48,2

796 151 335

20,1

177,4

197,5

1213

0 0,6 0 39,9 0 0 92602,1

539,1 52,4 19 77,6 701,7 15,8 4243,4

539,1 53 19 117,4 701,7 15,8 96845,5

5644 416 182 699 58 69 28538

Source: European Commission. (1) Includes BA -lines, administrative expenditure for research and structural funds minibudgets, as well as salaries, building costs etc. administrative expenditure. (2) Includes statutory and support staff. (3) Includes the appropriations for and staff working in the EC delegations covered by Policy Area. (4) Including staff employed with European Development Fund. (5) Decentralised expenditure; not yet attributed to Policy Areas EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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A more detailed view of what is considered inside the area of Education and Culture is presented in Table 2, which contains the distribution of the 2002 budget for the area of Education and Culture by activities. As it is shown in Table 2, education is one third of the total appropriations of the budget. Besides, vocational training, language and youth are other activities that might be considered part of EU educational intervention. TABLE 2. 2002 Budget of the Commission for the policy area of Education and Culture (in EUR million) ACTIVITY Management and support expenditure for Policy Area Education and Culture Education Vocational training Culture and language Audio-visual policy and sports Dialogue with the citizens Youth Establishment plan staff Support staff Horizontal services * TOTAL

Total appropriations

Human resources

94,1 271,7 189,7 40,6 83,0 27,7 72,6

776,4

554 100 55 709

Source: European Commission. (*) Attributed to this policy area from SDT, JICS and Legal service.

A third aspect to look into is how the funding for education of the EU is distributed among programmes. At present, three programmes received most of the funding: First, Socrates is the European programme for education. Its aim is to promote the European dimension and to improve the quality of education by encouraging co-operation between the participating countries. The programme sets out to develop a Europe of knowledge in three aspects: to promote lifelong learning, to encourage access by everybody to education, to acquire qualifications and recognised skills. The first phase of the Socrates programme was for five years (1995-1999). The programme has been renewed and the second phase will run for seven years (2000-2006). Socrates has a budget of 1 850 million euros for the seven-year period.44 The second main programme is Leonardo da Vinci, which has in charge the implementation of the European Community's vocational training policy. It supports the action taken by the Member States in this field. The total budget for Leonardo da Vinci is 1.15 billion euros over seven years (2000-2006). The differences among the amounts aimed to Socrates respect to the 44

The Socrates programme consists of eight actions: 1. Comenius: school education 2. Erasmus: higher education 3. Grundtvig: adult education and other education pathways 4. Lingua: learning and teaching of European languages 5. Minerva: information and communication technologies in education 6. Observation and innovation of education systems and policies 7. Joint actions with other European programmes 8. Accompanying measures.

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Leonardo da Vinci are partially explained by the traditional interest of EU intervention on the vocational training sphere. The last programme is Tempus. This is the trans-European programme of co-operation in higher education established in 1990. It provides assistance in the countries of central and eastern Europe (PHARE) and the republics of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia (TACIS). The Tempus budget is decided annually. For 2000, it totalled 18.5 million euros. 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue Education is a primary concern of government in all European countries, but the structures of education systems differ considerably, both within and between countries. There is a great variety of responsibilities in Europe for the funding, management and evaluation of education and training. There are different approaches to private and specialist schools, apprenticeship and vocational training, higher and further education, examinations and qualifications. In this section, we describe different aspects of the relevance of education on the countries under analysis. Tables 3, 4 and 5 present measures of the degree of public expenditure on education by levels of education and over time. Table 6 illustrates the level of enrolment at different levels of education. Table 7 gives an idea of the importance of the private sector institutions in primary and secondary education in each of the countries. Then, the weight of the teaching staff as a percentage of the labour force is shown in Table 8. Last, in Table 9 is presented the proportion of education attainment by age groups. TABLE 3. Public expenditure on education by level of education as % of GDP. 1998

EU-15 France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

Others

0.91 1.18 n.a. 1.20 1.25 1.15 n.a. 1.12

2.56 2.96 2.95 2.34 1.94 2.08 n.a. 2.19

1.08 1.03 1.07 0.79 1.42 0.88 n.a. 1.04

0.55 0.72 0.59 0.69 0.37 0.34 n.a. 0.40

Source: Eurostat (2002)

TABLE 4. Expenditure on public educational institutions as a % of GDP (1998, 1995, 1990)

France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

1998

1995

1990

5.88 4.35 4.82 4.49 4.44 5.38 4.65

5.94 4.49 4.5 4.57 4.56 n.a. 4.84

5.23 n.a. 5.77 4.45 4.07 4.97 4.45

Source: OECD (2001)The percentage includes direct expenditure on educational institutions from international sources.

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TABLE 5. Expenditure per pupil/student in public institutions by level of education in PPS. 1998 Primary

3715 3 586 3 304 5 254 3 590 3 505 n.a. 3 080

EU-15 France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Secondary

Tertiary

5015 6 725 4 180 6 189 5 171 4 705 n.a. 4168

7357 6 626 9 087 6 083 10 188 4 870 n.a. 8363

Source: Eurostat (2002). PPS= Purchasing Power Standard

TABLE 6. Enrolment in education by level. 1998/99 (1000s)

EU-15 France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Total

Preprimary

Primary

Lower secondary

84 299 14 329 16 842 10 729 3 513 9 030 n.a. 15 990

10 718 2 393 2 333 1 578 390 1 131 n.a. 1 155

23 064 3 944 3 767 2 876 1 268 2 580 n.a. 4 661

18 037 3 307 5 508 1 823 736 1 898 n.a. 2 250

Upper Postsecondary secondary not tertiary

18 955 2 649 2 677 2 627 629 1 401 n.a. 5 842

999 24 469 28 20 232 n.a. -

Tertiary

12 525 2 012 2 087 1 797 470 1 787 n.a. 2 081

Source: Eurostat (2002) TABLE 7. Primary and secondary students in public and private institutions. 1999

France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Public

Governmentdependent private

Independent private

79.2 94.9 93.7 23.3 69.8 94.4 65.1

16.8 5.1 0.8 76.3 24.5 2.2 30.7

4.0 5.5 0.5 5.7 3.4 4.2

Source: OECD (2001)

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TABLE 8. Teaching staff as a percentage of the labour force, by level of education. 1999 Classroom teachers as a percentage of total labour force Primary and Tertiary education All levels of secondary education education

2.7 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.4

France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

0.5 0.7 0.3 n.a. 0.7 0.7 0.3

3.7 3.1 3.7 n.a. 3.8 3.2 3.0

Source: OECD (2001) TABLE 9. Percentage of the population that has attained at least upper secondary education, by age group. 1998 25-64

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

61 84 41 64 33 81 60

75 88 55 74 53 88 63

63 87 50 68 38 83 62

56 84 35 59 23 80 58

41 76 19 50 12 71 53

France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

Source: OECD (2001)

Differential empowerment of actors The State has a central role in educational policy making and it is the main agent to ‘create’ educational policy (Dale 1989). But education interest groups are also part of the constraints that establish the limits and possibilities of policy making. At the same time, the emergence, maintenance, capacity for influence and survival of interest groups mainly depends on the State educational policy agenda and, of course, on the historical specificities of each social formation and each education system (Bonal 2000). To ensure the participation of all those involved in the management of education, education authorities frequently have recourse to standing committees which include representatives of education staff, parents and pupils, the world of work or business, local authorities and the scientific world. These bodies have the task of submitting advice or proposals and in some cases they even take part in the decision-making process. It is necessary to differentiate at the outset the various types of bodies which provide for participation by the different parties with an interest in the management of education. At national level, consultative councils have the task of advising Ministers on all questions of education. They provide for discussion and consultation and give representatives of all the interested parties an opportunity to express their opinions. These consultative councils must not be confused with the other advisory committees which also have the task of advising Ministers and whose membership also includes people from outside the education sphere. These bodies differ from consultative councils in that they do not provide for representation EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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of the various groups interested in education: their outside members (mainly experts or people from business or industry) are generally appointed by Ministers for a fixed period. Apart from these permanent bodies, Ministers can also undertake ad hoc consultation before proceeding with a major reform. They can also ensure social participation by organising a public debate or a referendum. In general, National Consultative Councils exist for each of the main levels of education and are integrated by different actors of the education system (Eurydice 1996). Consultative councils generally have the same type of structure. They comprise representatives of the various groups of people interested in the education system: - the Minister or someone representing him and - more rarely - representatives of other ministries; - teaching staff associations and usually representatives of technical and administrative staffs; - representatives of parents and frequently also of pupils or students; - representatives of the various economic and social sectors (business and industry, minority language groups and cultural associations. In Germany, in most of the Länder, these bodies also include representatives of the churches). The membership of these committees may vary in size. As a rule, the representation of the various parties interested in education is balanced. In some Member States, however, such as France and Italy, education staff representatives are in the majority. The remit of these committees is in the main to give advice on proposals for reform or on any education questions of national interest - aims, reforms or the operation of the education system - referred to them by the Minister. They can also generally make proposals on their own initiative. They are responsible for all levels of non-higher education in Germany, Spain, France and Italy. Only in the Netherlands consultative councils whose responsibilities are prescribed in relation to one particular level of education. The council for the Onderwijsoverleg Primair en Voortgezet Onderwijs (Primary and Secondary Education Consultative Committee) in the Netherlands, with the task of advising the Minister on education questions in relation to the levels of education for which they are responsible, have from 14 to 23 members. At local level, and more particularly at school level, the participation of parents, pupils and others outside the education system can also be ensured through standing bodies. Some of these have mainly consultative functions and their remit is to advise the headteacher while others are responsible for the running and even for the governance of the school. They sometimes appoint the headteacher who has to put their decisions into effect. The distribution of these bodies closely reflects the degree of centralisation of the authority responsible for managing human and material resources. In all the countries in which school organisation depends on the ministry, consultative councils are found at this level, usually with responsibility for all matters. This is the case as regards all the Member States in the south of the European Union and a majority of those in the centre. On the other hand, in those Member States in which authority for education is at local level (commune or municipal authority, for example) or even at the level of the school itself, the Minister's consultation with the various social groups takes different forms. While, in those countries in which administration is decentralised, some ministries can refer to a national consultative council with limited powers (in the Netherlands), most have no such body. In United Kingdom, national consultative councils are unknown. In England and Wales, where the greater part of decisions in relation to the management of schools are taken at EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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school level, the main means of ensuring social participation is the representation of the various interested parties on the school's governing body. Various groups, however, such as parents associations and representatives of business and industry, are also regularly invited by the government to take part in consultation procedures before major reforms are approved. In Scotland, the various social groups participate through the numerous national agencies set up by the government to advise on the curriculum, promote research and development and undertake school evaluation. Comprising for the greater part representatives of the education authorities or staff, these bodies also include people from outside the world of education, usually from business and industry (see section on consultation with the world of work). They give advice and information to parents, employers and other organisations. In the last 30-40 years, most of the European countries have taken steps to reform their methods of financing and awarding resources in compulsory education. In most cases, changes in this respect have reflected decentralisation towards local authorities or schools (Eurydice 2001). The motives for changes in patterns of centralisation are manifold and they vary from country to country. The most common ones are increased efficiency and improved financial control, a reduction of bureaucracy, increased responsiveness to local communities, creative management of human resources, improving the potential for innovation and create conditions that provide more incentives for improving the quality of schooling (OECD 1998: 292). Among the countries under analysis, the education systems of Netherlands and United Kingdom are the ones that have experienced a great process of placing more decision-making authority at lower levels of the system (Eurydice 2001). In the next pages, it is presented an overview for each country of the institutional structure and administrative control of the education systems45. In France, the State assumes overall responsibility for educational policy. The Ministry of Education lays down guidelines for teaching, draws up the school curriculum and administers staff recruitment, training and management. It also determines the status and regulations of schools, allocating them their appropriate quota of teachers and administrative staff. In order to implement this policy and the accomplishment of its numerous management tasks, the Ministry has ‘external’ administrative departments known as académies with jurisdiction over a particular geographical area of the country. France is thus divided into 30 such académies each headed by a rector acting directly on behalf of the minister. A single académie covers several départements (smaller administrative areas), each managed by an inspecteur d’académie who runs the national education services provided for it by the ministry. Within the overall system established at national level, schools are to some extent independent as regards their administrative and teaching activity and, at secondary level (in collèges and lycées), their financial affairs too. In practice, this relative independence takes the form of a plan for each school, known as a projet d'école and projet d'établissement at primary and secondary levels respectively. The system is supervised by several inspectorates. The Ministry of Education establishes educational curricula and basic guidelines compulsory full-time, upper secondary and post-secondary education. Teachers choose teaching methods and materials. Private education centres generally depend on different religious communities, professional associations and even private individuals; but in order to receive their respective subsidies 45

All information is from national reports on education systems available on the database of EURYDICE and from national webs of the Ministries of Education of the respective countries.

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from the State –which often pays the salaries of the teachers too- they must sign an agreement or a contract laying down rules and norms concerning the qualifications of teachers, and keep to the programmes established by the educational authorities. In Germany, responsibility for the education system is conditioned by the federal structure of the State. According to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), educational legislation and administration are primarily the responsibility of the Länder (in a system comprising the Land Ministries of Education, Cultural affairs and Science, the regional authorities (Bezirksregierung/ Oberschulamt) and the schools' offices at local level (Schulamt). This particularly applies to the school system, higher education and the adult education/continuing education sector. The responsibilities of the Federal Government in education are defined in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Among these responsibilities are the legislation concerning the general framework for higher education, and the financial assistance for individual training, including promotion of younger academic staff. The Basic Law also provides for particular forms of co-operation between the Federation and the Länder, such as that which occurs in the sector of educational planning and the promotion of research. The Länder ministries determine the curriculum, recommend teaching methods and approve textbooks at primary and secondary education. School supervisory authorities in each Land are responsible for inspection and exercise academic, legal and staff supervision within the school system. Each school has a teachers' council responsible for educational matters, and a school council (comprising teachers, parents and pupils), which decides on school regulations or disciplinary rules. The relative powers of these councils vary between the Länder. As regards initial training in the dualen System (the Dual System of vocational training in both the workplace and at school), which is experienced by two-thirds of all young people, the training in the workplace is financed by firms, and the school element by the Länder. The workplace activity follows nationally coordinated rules for training, while there are curricula for the school-based work which are adapted to these rules and established by the Länder. Vocational training in the workplace is supervised by public-law corporations (such as chambers of industry and commerce, chambers of craftsmanship, etc.). By virtue of the federal structure of the German state, discussions on education reforms are carried out at both Länder and Federal level. Although the individual Länder are initially responsible for the implementation of reforms in their education systems, they co-operate with each other within the framework of the Kultusministerkonferenz (Conference of Ministers for Education and Cultural Affairs) on matters of importance for all Länder in order to prepare educational reforms by means of joint recommendations. The discussion forum responsible for all educational issues jointly affecting the Federal Government and the Länder is the Bund-Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung (BundLänder Commission for Educational Planning and Research Promotion), in which the Federation and the Länder cooperate under the provisions of Article 91b of the German Constitution. The permanent advisory bodies of the Federation and the Länder also include the Wissenschaftsrat (Scientific Council), which draws up recommendations concerning development of the content and structure of higher-education institutions, science and research. In Italy, overall responsibility in education lies with the Ministry of Education, University and Research. The Ministry of Education, University and Research is represented at local level by regional and provincial education offices. Regions may delegate certain responsibilities to the provinces and municipalities. From the school year 2000/2001, all the schools have autonomy in the fields of administration, organisation, pedagogy, research, EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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experimentation, and development. A technical inspectorate, answerable to the Ministry, operates at national and regional level and supervises the education system as a whole. The general curriculum on compulsory full-time education is nationally determined and adapted to local needs by each school. Teachers select teaching methods, textbooks and materials. In upper secondary and post-secondary education central government determines basic curricula for each type of education and gives guidance on teaching methods. At higher education level, the private sector comprises university institutions, promoted and managed by bodies and private citizens, authorised by the Ministry of Education, University and Research (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca – MIUR) to issue academic qualifications equivalent to state qualifications. Universities have gained autonomy in different stages. The first one dealt with administrative, financial and accounting aspects. Since 1994, the public state and private university institutions have had their own budgets. The tasks of the Ministry are the allocation of funds, monitoring and evaluation. The universities are responsible for the content and flexibility of courses within a framework that establishes general and specific criteria at national level. In recent years, some key reform initiatives in the education sector have already been approved and are in the process of being implemented. They involve the reorganisation of school cycles with the extension of compulsory schooling and reform of education content. Other reforms in progress involve school administration with the reorganisation of the Ministry of Education, University and Research (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca) and decentralisation of administrative and managerial responsibilities from the State to local and regional authorities (regions, provinces and municipalities), and the reform of the consultative bodies. A bill concerning the equal status of State and State-recognised schools (scuole paritarie) was approved in March 2000. The Dutch education system combines a centralised education policy with the decentralised administration and management of schools. Central government controls education by means of legislation and regulations, with due regard for the provisions of the Constitution. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science exercises overall responsibility and oversees the structure and funding of the system, inspection, examinations and student support. The municipal authorities have a dual role as the local authority for all schools in their area (whether publicly or privately run), and as the competent authority for public-sector schools. A national inspectorate for education, funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science ensures that schools comply with statutory regulations, monitors the state of education in its inspection of schools, consults with their authorities and staff, as well as with regional/local authorities, and reports to and advises the Minister of Education, Culture and Science. One of the system’s basic principles is freedom of education, by which is meant the freedom to establish a school and organise the education provided in it. As a consequence of that, schools differ in ideological and denominational terms. Education is the hard core of a verzuilling system that has historically separated society into four social and political blocs (protestants, roman catholics, socialists and liberals). Following this system, private schools for each denomination exist. In the two main categories of publicly-run and privately-run schools, almost 65% of all pupils attended privately- run schools in 1999. According to the Constitution, both categories are on an equal financial footing. The Ministry of Education determines the overall curriculum and details of compulsory subjects in primary and secondary education. Schools devise their curricular plan and teaching methods and select materials.

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In recent years, it has become possible for municipalities in the Netherlands to delegate to secondary schools expenditure associated with the external maintenance of buildings. At the end of 2000 the Minister and State Secretary outlined the direction of the changes that are needed in order to allow the education system to respond to the challenges of the 21st century. This resulted in the policy document ‘Onderwijs in stelling: kracht en creativiteit voor de kennissamenleving’ (‘Education in place: power and creativity for the knowledge society’) which is a follow-up to the educational policy document ‘Sterke instellingen, verantwoordelijke overheid’ (‘Strong institutions, responsible government’), which was published in 1999. The new policy document contains proposals, studies and possible solutions in which quality, accessibility and variety play a key role. Schools will be able to determine themselves how much of the money they receive will be allocated to teaching staff, teaching resources and accommodation. In primary and secondary education one forum is being set up in which the government and the representatives of the relevant sectors participate. Changes are being implemented in the decision-making structure which allows for participation. For secondary education and upper secondary vocational education, decision-making processes switch to the Wet op de Ondernemingsraden (‘Works Councils Act’). Participation in decision-making by parents and pupils will be regulated in the form of a schools council or a participatory council. Other forms of participation in decision-making in primary education are being studied in primary education. In Spain, The central government retains responsibility for the general regulation of the system, but since 1978, certain responsibilities have been devolved to the 17 regional governments (Autonomous Communities), all of which currently exercise full powers over education. Each school has a council, comprising representatives of the teachers and other staff, parents and students, whose responsibilities include the election of the head teacher. Each education authority is responsible for the organization and functioning of its own inspection service. The state senior inspection service monitors the structure and organization of education and a technical inspection service operates in each of the Autonomous Communities. In 2001/02, 71,95% of students attended public-sector schools while 28,05% attended private institutions. There are two kinds of compulsory-level establishments that are not in the public sector: centros concertados, which are financed by public funds and account for approximately 90% of all private schools, and centros no concertados which are totally private. The minimum core curriculum in compulsory full-time education is determined at State level. The Autonomous Communities establish their own curriculum based on the State minimum core curriculum and schools develop and adapt the curriculum to their own context. The government passed in December 2000 the Royal Decree 3473/2000, which establishes that the contents of Lower Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO) are to be sequenced by year and no distinction is made between concepts, procedures and attitudes, whereas the evaluation criteria are also established separately for the first cycle and for each year of the second one. The Bachillerato (secondary education) minimum core curriculum is determined at national level, but the Autonomous Communities educational authorities and the schools develop and adapt the curriculum to their own context. In December 2000, the government passed the Royal Decree 3474/2000, which introduces modifications concerning the structure, minimum core curriculum and teaching load of Upper Secondary Education. It establishes the common subjects for each year. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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In higher education, the university entrance examination, which is regulated by the Ministry of Education and Culture and administered by the Autonomous Communities, is organized and planned jointly by the universities and Bachillerato teachers. The Organic Act on Universities, (LOU), has been passed in December 2001. It regulates the university system, and repeals the former Organic Act on University Reform (Ley de Reforma Universitaria –LRU) of 1983. The LOU, without modifying the organisation of studies, promotes the action on the part of the State Administration in the structuring and cohesiveness of the university system, heightens the powers of the Autonomous Communities with respect to higher education matters and increases the degree of independence of Universities. The Spanish conservative government is currently working on the Organic Act on Quality in Education. It will affect the existing legislative framework which regulates the Spanish nonuniversity education system. Both Organic Acts on Universities and on Quality have strongly been debated on the public sphere. An important part of the educational interest groups have been actively mobilised against these projects. Besides, the students unions in the nonuniversity sector are excluded from institutional spaces of negotiation, so during the eighties and nineties they showed a notable capacity to mobilise students and to stop school classes. The Swiss education system is characterized by marked federalism, with the 26 cantons having basic responsibility for schools. Each canton is highly independent and selfresponsible. The cantonal Ministries of Education are the highest authorities of the school administration. Thus, Switzerland does not have a central Ministry of Education and accordingly no general school system, but 26 different school organisations. Therefore one cannot really talk about a Swiss educational system but only of several independent and different systems. The differences in the education systems for the first eight or nine years of school have arisen through the federal structure of the state and the variation even shows itself within the different language regions. Depending on the canton, there are two, three or four different types of lower secondary schools to match performance requirements, and teaching hours for the nine compulsory years of schooling vary between 7100 and 8900 per child. However, if they are looked at in very simplified terms, certain common characteristics can be made out among the cantonal school systems. After a voluntary period of kindergarten fully financed by the state, most cantons have nine years compulsory schooling (in eight cantons eight years). This compulsory schooling for all children capable of normal education consists of a primary school period of four, five or six years. There then follows a choice of schooling, putting varying demands on the pupils, and known collectively as the secondary level I. In many cantons both levels of compulsory schooling are called the Volksschule (elementary school). Individual cantons are largely responsible for their administration and curricula. The elementary school normally passes their pupils on to either vocational training or into a secondary level II. These high schools (gymnasium) are a preparation for university. At this level the independence of the cantons is limited considerably by the matriculation requirements laid down by the Confederation. Vocational training is also supervised by the Confederation. Elementary education is free while at the higher levels of education, even if they are state supported, fees are charged in individual cases or students are at least expected to pay for their learning material. There are 12 official higher education institutions in Switzerland (10 cantonal universities and 2 federal institutes of technology) as well as a number of other colleges of higher education. The Swiss educational system started to took part in external educational programs during the 90’s (Jenzer, OECD www document). In 1990, Switzerland signed the European treaties EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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regarding education, subjected its educational system to OECD assessment for the first time in 1989/90, participated in international comparative studies of school performance, and took part in OECD educational programs of the European Union (Erasmus and Comett). Class instruction now has a more European orientation and international education is being encouraged. The Bund and the Swiss Conference of Canton Education Commissioners (EDK) have therefore taken initiatives in the area of school structure, specially given more autonomy to teachers. An effort is also being made to shorten the length of schooling leading to the Matura and the length of study courses at universities as well. This is all in keeping with the idea of harmonisation with Europe (Jenzer). In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the national education system has been administered locally since 1870. The central government’s function has been limited to providing financial support to locally elected bodies and ensuring the effective execution of national policy for education. At national level, the responsibility for the education service lies with the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) in England, with the National Assembly for Wales Training and Education Department (NATED) in Wales, and, in Northern Ireland, the Department of Education (DE) and the Department of Employment and Learning (DEL). The national level bodies with responsibility for funding higher education in England and Wales are the Higher Education Funding Council for England and the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales respectively. In Northern Ireland, this is the responsibility of the Department for Employment and Learning. At local level, the 172 local education authorities (LEAs) in England and Wales, and the five Education and Library Boards in Northern Ireland are responsible for organising publiclyfunded school education within their area. LEAs also have a responsibility for quality assurance in the schools that they maintain and for promoting high standards of education for pupils of school age in their area. All institutions have a governing body, responsible for the general direction of the institution, which includes representatives from a range of different stakeholders. All schools have a high degree of autonomy. In England and Wales, the legal framework for primary and secondary schools divides them into community, voluntary and foundation schools. The majority of schools are community schools; schools established and fully funded by local education authorities (LEAs). Foundation schools are also funded by LEAs, but are owned by the school governing body or a charitable foundation. Voluntary schools were originally established by voluntary bodies, mainly churches, who retain some control over their management. They are now largely funded by LEAs. There is a separate legal framework in Northern Ireland, where, despite the establishment of a number of integrated schools, the school system remains largely segregated on religious lines. Further and higher education institutions are fully autonomous. In England, the Secretary of State for Education and Skills is advised on all matters affecting the school curriculum by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), a nondepartmental public body. The QCA works closely with the Qualifications, Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales (known by its Welsh acronym ACCAC), which performs similar functions in relation to Wales, and with the Northern Ireland Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) which performs these functions for Northern Ireland. All schools are required to provide a balanced and broadly-based curriculum and have discretion to develop the whole curriculum to reflect their particular needs and circumstances.

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There are no compulsory subjects at upper secondary and post-secondary level. Students choose courses of study from the range offered by the school or further education institution depending upon the qualification they seek. Teachers are free to decide on appropriate teaching methods and teaching materials. Higher education institutions include universities, higher education colleges and a small number of university colleges. All major higher education institutions are autonomous bodies and each determines its own admissions policy and requirements. Following the General Election in June 1997, which returned a Labour government, three major pieces of education legislation were introduced in England and Wales. The School Standards and Framework Act 1998 introduced measures to raise standards of school education, and created a new framework of community schools, foundation schools and voluntary schools. The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 made new provisions with respect to teacher training, and to student fees, grants and loans. The Learning and Skills Act 2000 reformed the organisations responsible for funding the further education sector. Furthermore, schools have been granted greater autonomy in the area of financial management (Eurydice 2001). For instance, funding for building maintenance and repairs is now managed by schools. In addition, all schools in England now receive a “Formula Capital Grant” based on pupil numbers which can be used on small capital projects or can be saved to fund future large scale works. Furthermore, schools in England are being encouraged to initiate and manage capital works through the Seed Challenge Grants provided by the DfEE via local education authorities (LEAs). Schools may apply to the LEA for money from these grants provided that they meet a percentage of the expenditure form their own funds. In Scotland, the First Minister for Scotland is responsible for the overall supervision and development of the education service. Day-to-day responsibility for education is delegated to the Minister for Education and the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning. They are served by the Scottish Executive Education Department (SEED) and the Scottish Executive Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department (SEELLD). The First Minister is advised by Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Schools and the national bodies dealing with the development of the curriculum and public examinations. Local authorities have a statutory duty to provide adequate and efficient school education. Independent schools provide education for about 4% of the school-age population. Further and higher education institutions are autonomous bodies funded by the Scottish Executive through the two funding councils, the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council and the Scottish Further Education Funding Council. In primary and lower secondary, the curriculum is not determined by statute or regulation but by advice from the SEED in various curriculum documents. In upper upper secondary and post-secondary education, students choose courses of study leading to nationally recognised qualifications from the range offered by the school or further education institution. A new programme of national qualifications for everyone studying beyond Standard Grade was introduced in August 1999 for schools, further education colleges and other centres. There are twenty Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), comprising fourteen universities and six other institutions. All major higher education institutions are autonomous bodies and each determines its own admissions policy and requirements. At present, several reforms in school organisation and management have been implemented. Among them: the reduction of class sizes, the Alternatives to exclusion programme or the creation of New Community Schools to promote social inclusion and raise attainment in education. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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References Bonal, X. (2000) “Interest groups and the State in contemporary Spanish education policy”, Journal of Education Policy 15/2: 201-216. Council of the European Union (2001) The concrete future objectives of education and training systems. Brussels: Council of the European Union. Council of the European Union (2002) Detailed work programme on the follow-up of the objectives of education and training systems in Europe. Brussels: Council of the European Union. Cram, L. (1997) Policy-making in the EU. London. Routledge. Dale, R. (1989) The State and education policy. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Duff, A., J.Pinder and R.Pryce (ed.) (1994) Maastricht and beyond. Building the European Union. London: Routledge. El-Agraa, A.M. (1998) The European Union. History, institutions, economics and policies. London: Prentice Hall. European Commission (2000) The European report on quality of education. Brussels: European Commission, DG Education and Culture. European Commission (2002) Increased co-operation in European vocational education and training. Brussels: European Commission, DG Education and culture. Eurostat (2002) Eurostat Yearbook 2002. Luxembourg: European Commission. Eurydice (1996) Consejos consultivos y otras formas de participación social en los Sistemas Educativos de la Unión Europea. Brussels: European Unit of Eurydice. Eurydice (2001) Diagrams showing financial flows in compulsory education in Europe. Brussels: European Commission. Eurydice Database on education systems in Europe (www.eurydice.org) Fredriksson, U. (2002) “Changes of education policies within the European Union in the light of globalisation”. Paper presented at the workshop on “Globalisation, education restructuring and social cohesion in Europe”, Barcelona, 3-5 October 2002. Jenzer, Carlo “Development of education in http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00025000/M00025174.pdf

Switzerland”

(www.document)

Hantrais, L. (1995) Social Policy in the European Union. London: MacMillan. Lindblad, S. (2001) “Education by the numbers: on international statistics and policymaking”. Paper presented at the conference “Travelling policy/Local spaces: globalisation, identities and education policy in Europe”, Keele, 27-29 June 2001. Muñoz-Repiso, M. (2002) “Luces y sombras de la pertenencia al espacio educativo europeo”. Crítica 898: 36-40. OECD (1998) Education at a glance. OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD/CERI. OECD (2001) Education at a glance. OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD/CERI.

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Immigration policy by Virginie GUIRAUDON (French team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of immigration policy Two elements must be kept in mind here. (1) Immigration is a policy area where competence is shifted to intergovernmental forums, then to the EU, then in part to the EC (first pillar) during our period of study yet only partially so. Moreover, the decision-making framework remains largely intergovernmental to the extent that EU institutions (aside form the Council of ministers) have a limited role and (2) this is an area typical of “Europe à la carte” or multispeed Europe since not all of our country cases joined Schengen at the same time (Italy and Spain joined later than founding members France, Germany and the Netherlands) and not all our cases have opted in (the UK selectively opts in). The Swiss albeit not members of the EU nor of Schengen and Dublin participate in most intergovernmental forums on the issue.46 On June 26, 1999, in Luxembourg, they signed an agreement on the free movement of persons with the EU that has been ratified by all member states so that free movement progressively occurs over the next 12 years. For our hypothesis on the impact of institutional Europeanisation on public debates, this means that, in this policy area, there should be a straightforward rise in claims-making with a EU scope over time but still a predominance of national or regional/local scope. Regarding the hypothesis according to which “supranational forms of Europeanisation lead to more conflict between the EU and national actors, while intergovernmental forms are more likely to produce conflicts between member states,” this policy area should thus lead to interstate conflict at least until May 1st 1999 when the Commission gained the power of co-initiative and started to have some input and could therefore be criticized. In addition, there should be cross-national variation to the extent that, for the UK and Switzerland, the issue is still about signing and joining intergovernmental cooperation agreements. EU Decision rules In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (articles K 1-9) created the third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs with one full group (GD1) of the K4 committee dedicated to asylum, visa and migration yet the framework required unanimous decisions by the Council and remained outside the community legal order. In five years' time, the Justice and Home Affairs council only agreed on one joint position on the common definition of a refugee and on five legally binding joint actions, regarding school travel for third country national children, airport transit procedures, a common format for resident permits, burden sharing for displaced persons and human trafficking. In 1997, the treaty of Amsterdam integrates Schengen by protocol into EU/EC framework and moves immigration and asylum to the first pillar ( the Dutch were in favor of this change). Decisions by JHA Council of Ministers are still unanimous, a German demand (the EP has also consultation role). The Commission has co-initiative powers with the Council until 2004 and member-states do propose quite a bit, especially during their presidency of the EU. The ECJ has a circumscribed competence over this new domain (the French insisted upon it): the 46

As of 2002, migration and asylum are part of the negotiating mandate of the EU/Swiss bilateral negotiations.

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application of preliminary rulings to the ECJ in areas covered by Title IV is restricted since only courts of last instance will be able to use Article 177. Furthermore, the Court of Justice cannot rule on national measures adopted in relation to the crossing of borders to safeguard internal security, and its rulings “shall not apply to judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which have become res judicata.” So there are very few “EU” actors aside form the Council of ministers. There are also few interest groups at EU-level: one Brussels NGO (Migration policy Group), a London-based federation of pro-refugee organizations with a Brussels office (European Council for Refugees and Exiles) and a now disbanded “Forum of Migrants”, a 1990 creature of the Commission that never fulfilled its desired function and has gone through several mismanagement crises. Chronology of main European agreements and EU developments •

1985 signature of first Schengen agreement (France, Germany, Benelux)



1990 signature of Dublin convention (determining country responsible for examining asylum request)



1990 signature of Schengen implementation agreement



1993 Title VI of the treaty of Maastricht creates a “third pillar” devoted to Justice and Home Affairs that includes immigration and asylum issues



1993 (August 2) Special French-British Sangatte Protocol regulating border control on both sides of the Channel comes into force (an additional protocol signed in 2000)



1995 (26 March) Schengen comes into force. Two new members, Spain and Portugal (who had joined in 1991) are also allowed to implement it.



1997 (26 October) Italy who had joined Schengen in 1990 is allowed to begin implementation of the agreement



1997 Dublin comes into force



1999 Treaty of Amsterdam comes into force on May 1st: Schengen is incorporated by protocol into the EU framework. A new title IV ("Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons") “communautarizes” this policy area.47 This means that they no longer belong to the “third pillar.” Decisions remain unanimous in the Council and the Commission will have sole initiative powers only in 2004. All candidate countries must comply with acquis before admission.



1999 (June 26), Luxembourg EU/Switzerland free movement agreement is signed.



1999 (October) European Council Tampere summit. During this special summit on creating “an area of freedom security and justice”, EU chiefs of state and government declare that “[t]he separate but closely related issues of asylum and migration call for the development of a common EU policy to include the following elements: partnership with the countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals and management of migration flows”

47

Relevant articles in the new title : articles 62-68 of consolidated treaty can be consulted at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre214.html

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2000 (November) Communication of the Commission on a Community migration policy (COM(2000)757 Final of 22.11.2000) . This is the first comprehensive statement of the Commission on its vision in this issue area.



2002 (January) Rumania becomes last of 12 candidates for EU membership to be put on EU visa-free country list.



2000 (June) Article 13 of Cotonou agreement between EU and 77 ACP countries calls for adoption of “readmission agreements”



2001 Council Regulation 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 lists the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the EU



2001 Directive 2001/51 on carrier sanctions adopted in May



2002 (June) EU Seville summit largely dedicated to “the fight against illegal migration” concludes with a focus on integrating the issue in relations with third countries and encouraging joint actions at the external borders (with the long-term objective of creating a “common border police”)



2002 (July) New France-UK agreement on border controls and the closing of Sangatte red cross center.



2002 (October) Commission communication on a community return policy on illegal residents (COM(2002)564 Final of 14.10.2002).

Table 4. Frames and decision rules by policy area at EU level Dominant frame

Alternative frame(s)

Rules of the game

Internal free movement

Internal market, Treaty “four freedoms”

Social security and education remain within national competence

Commission sole expansive initiative, ECJ competence, vote by Social Affairs council with codecision power of EP

extension of free movement to TCNs

National sovereignty single market over rights of TCNs, national basis of EU citizenship

Unanimity by JHA Council that shares initiative role with Commission

Migrant integration

Social exclusion

Citizenship

Unanimity by Social Anti-discrimination Affairs CofM on a article and directives Commission (expansive) proposal, preliminary rulings to ECJ by lower courts allowed

Labor market needs, need for funding pensions

Unanimity by JHA Council of ministers that shares initiative role with Commission

Equal opportunities

Migration control

Security threat

Given demographic deficit

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blockage

Visa, carrier sanctions, SIS database, Schengen border control cooperation, readmission ECJ power restricted agreements etc. (restrictive)

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Asylum

Refugees=bogus

human rights (article Unanimity by JHA 6 of Amsterdam Council of ministers treaty) that shares initiative role with Commission

Safe third country, manifestly unfounded claims, Dublin, EURODAC database

ECJ power restricted (restrictive)

Source: Guiraudon (2002)

Issue definition and policy linkages to other EU policies One factor that should not be overlooked when examining ex ante the possibility that EU immigration policy, albeit still very intergovernmental in its character, is linked to important other issues pertinent to European integration. The most obvious case is that of enlargement. Just as a measure, 10% of all PHARE funds (the money given to candidate countries in East and central Europe) is devoted to beefing up border controls, 40% just for the Polish border and (illegal) migration issues have taken in the 1990s a large place in accession negotiations. Although only Germany (along Austria, not one of our cases) are the most adamant at imposing transition periods to delay the free movement of persons after accession, it should be acknowledged that claims about the policy linkage between migration and enlargement could increase the number of claims in this policy field with a EU scope. Furthermore, immigration and asylum have been linked from the beginning to transnational crime (drugs, arms, terrorism, etc.), a phenomenon known as the “securitization” of the issue (Huysmans 2000, Bigo 2001, Lavenex 2001), rather than labor market issues. This of course has incidence on the salience of the issue in the debate but also on the actors involved (predominantly interior and justice officials, rather than business and labor). What other scopes beside the European level? Ex ante expectations A priori, the national scope should be dominant in this policy area given that it is generally at that level that prerogatives are defined, with few exceptions: the Swiss case is one to the extent that the cantons do have some important control over the immigrant quota system. Germany, although a federal state, is in a slightly different situation, the Lander have to apply federal laws in the area of entry and stay and can only delay the application of guidelines by six months e. g. repatriation and expulsion. Still, there has been an on-going conflict (especially until the 1993 asylum reform) and therefore in our way of thinking a possibility for public debate between the state/federal level over the costs of migration and asylum, which can become a debate about competence, and in rare cases, about regions having a say in EU-level policy. For the record, some regions have participated as such in intergovernmental forums (e. g. Bavaria). Still given how we code WP2, this means claims with a national scope; and only that regional actors may be more present than in unitary states as claimants but that cannot be a ground-breaking result. Even in unitary states, regional/state debates arise given that both borderland regions and receiving regions are likely to “voice” their discontent and pressure the national government for change in immigration policy. Given that immigration is about border-crossing, bilateral disputes can arise as is the case since 1999 between France and the UK. A note on transnational scopes other than the EU. The Council of Europe has been very active in the area of migration. In particular, the main intergovernmental body responsible for EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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migration activities is the European Committee on Migration (CDMG), whose terms of reference are, inter alia, "to develop European co-operation on migration, on the situation and social integration of populations of migrant origin and refugees and on community relations". A series of texts containing policy guidelines have been adopted over the years by the Committee of Ministers as well as by the Parliamentary Assembly. The culmination of this process of setting European standards was the adoption of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, which entered into force in 1983. Yet, it is through the European Court of Human rights and the application of the European Convention of Human Rights that most developments on entry and exit of foreigners have taken place. Rulings from the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights that condemn states for violating article 8 (the right to lead a normal family life) and article 3 (protection against torture and inhuman and degrading punishment) have been increasingly referred by some national courts and invoked by pro-migrant groups to denounce the expulsions of aliens. At the transnational level, in spite of a number of UN and ILO agreements, there has been little concerted action. What has been more common are bilateral or multilateral agreements including with the EU as signatory. Some are mentioned in the timeline (the ACP/EU agreements, the Swiss/EU agreement). Others are strictly bilateral (involving a European country and a sending country) and there have been a plethora of socalled “readmission agreements” in the 1990s to induce sending countries to accept taking illegal aliens that are sent back. 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue The question of issue salience is key in the immigration field to explain policy outcomes (Guiraudon 2002). Put simply, salience in opinion is generally detrimental to furthering foreigners’ rights. Positive outcomes for foreigners are more likely to be found when only organized interests are mobilized. This idea has been theorized in the US case by Gary Freeman (2002). He draws upon Wilson’s policy model (1980) that predicts policy outcomes on the basis of the nature of the costs and benefits involved (diffuse or concentrated) that lead to different degrees of conflictuality. Freeman predicts that concentrated benefits for foreign labor employers or migrant groups and diffuse costs for society in the US explains why low conflict usually prevails and outcomes are pro-migration. In Europe however, immigration is more salient than Freeman’s model would predict. Employers are less active, migrant groups less organized and without electoral clout. The hypothesis here has two components: one has to do with political salience and the other about “objective stakes”. On the first element, the kind of data that could be used are proxy measures such as the strength of extreme-right, populist or other anti-immigrant parties (see WP1a). Also important is the ranking of importance of issue in opinion polls during election campaigns. Specific attitudinal surveys such as those by Eurobarometer on xenophobia and racism (CEC, various years) are also useful, although Switzerland is not included in the survey. The number of respondents unwilling to accept non-EU migrants is much greater than those that refuse EU migrants and correlates with the actual numbers of non-EU migrants in the country. .

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Public Attitudes toward EC/EU and non EC/EU Migrants, by country Portugal Spain

Don't accept EU/EC Migrants

Ireland Italy

Don't accept non-EU/EC Migrants

Luxembourg Netherlands Great Britain Germany Denmark Greece Belgium France

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Source: Eurobarometer 39.0 (spring 1993). Those responding "Not be accepted" to question, "If people from different countries of the South of the Mediterranean wish to work here in the European Community". Those responding "Not be accepted" to the question "And what about people coming from other countries of the European Community who wish to settle in (our country)".

40%

The question of “national stakes” can be measured by proxy as well referring to statistics of incoming migrants and asylum-seekers or residing foreign population. There are several problems with that. Not just because the statistics are bad, do not count illegal residents, departures, back log etc…) but because the numbers are not what explain “stakes” necessarily. Spain and Italy among our cases are good examples of that, since in numbers there are at the bottom of our case list but still the issue is considered a high “national stake”, is salient, and leaders foster Europeanisation ( e. g. Seville summit in June 2002). The comparative data is cross-national but somewhat static. What can be said briefly about change over time in that the 1980s were a low point in terms of entries until asylum-seekers’ numbers rose in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Germany took in most in absolute numbers (and Switzerland most relative to its population, with the Dutch coming soon behind that) but numbers go down in Germany after 1996 (following in part a 1993 asylum law reform). At the turn of the century, numbers rise in the UK quite significantly. The GermanUK comparison when looking at 1990 and 2000 should thus be telling: in 1990, Germany has the highest stake and immigration is pretty much a non-issue in the UK and vice versa almost in 2000. Given the variety of the countries that we study (in terms of size, population, wealth…), it is interesting to use statistics that, rather than use absolute numbers, use percentages of the total population or in any case analyze incoming flows relative to other data (GDP in the table below for instance is used as a proxy for “reception capacity”). Eiko Thielemann (2002) has also argued that the case of Kosovar refugees welcomed in various countries in interesting since, in their case, the refugees did not spontaneously choose the country of destination but countries chose the numbers that they were willing to host. It is a measure in some sense of the “bounteousness” of the countries, regardless of their power of attraction for asylumseekers or migrants.

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Asylum and Kosovar refugee figures by Population and GDP (1990-1999). R A N K

1 Austria

Number of Kosovo refugees accepted in per 100,000 inhabitants

Numbe r of Kosovo refugee s accepte d per $1billio n of GNP

627.94 Austria

2 Denmark

Total Asylum Applications (per 1000 inhabitants) (averages 199099)

24.78 Sweden

Denmark

27.71 Sweden

Germany

Gro Natio Prod ($ billio (199

Total Asylum Applications per GNP ($ billion)

209

16.40

22.90

United 897.18 Kingdom

145

530.08 3 Sweden

420.99 Sweden

15.94 Denmark

21.14 Netherlands

811.97 France

1432

4 Ireland

274.67 Ireland

13.04 Netherlands

20.34 Belgium

721.60 Italy

117

5 Netherland s

256.80

6 Luxembour g

232.56

7 Finland

191.49 Finland

Portugal

Belgium 11.76

Netherlands

8 Germany

Denmark 17.62

Austria 10.25

Germany

Germany

1049.32 Germany

7.80 Luxembourg

Spain

592

Netherlands

39

653.95 Austria

16.03

632.73

13.26 Luxembourg

316.67 Belgium Sweden

25

234

178.95

United 7.01 Kingdom

United 6.29 Kingdom

257.85

9 Portugal

127.13 Luxembourg

5.56 France

5.02 Ireland

232.28 Austria

20

10 Belgium

119.14 Italy

4.98 Ireland

4.89 France

207.30 Denmark

172

11 France

106.60 Belgium

4.88 Finland

3.53 Greece

196.88 Finland

12

12 Italy

102.14 France

4.40 Greece

2.34 Finland

143.86 Greece

12

13 United Kingdom

United 72.44 Kingdom

2.97

2.12

14 Spain

36.28 Spain

2.42 Italy

1.57 Italy

76.46 Ireland

7

0.00 Portugal

0.56 Portugal

51.76 Luxembourg

1

15 Greece

0.00 Greece

Spain

Spain

Portugal

Source: Thielemann (2002). It is possible to rank our country cases by building an index based on % of foreign-born population, % of third-country nationals, average of incoming foreigners/pop and average of incoming asylum applications/pop. It is a tie between France and the UK and between Italy and Spain.

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141.15

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UNHCR

Foreign

Main country of origin

rank*

population** of flows in 1998

Switzerland

1st

19%

ex-Yugoslavia

The Netherlands

3rd

9,6%

Morocco

Germany

5th

8,9%

Poland

France

14th

6,3%

Algeria

United Kingdom

11th

3,8%

USA

Italy

25th

2,1

Albania

Spain

23rd

1,8%

Morocco

*UNHCR ranking: annual average per 1,000 inhabitants based on number of asylum applications submitted in 30 industrialized countries, 1992-2001. The ranking is slightly different than in the previous table since the data covers a longer period (until 2001). ** Number of foreigners (not foreign-born) as part of the total population. Although Italy and Spain still have lower numbers of foreigners than their Northern neighbours, flows have increased in the 1990s. This means that the salience of the issue has risen over time in these countries. As it happens, this increase in immigration is concomitant to the development of Schengen and EU cooperation in this policy field. One can therefore expect that in these two cases, the rise of the issue on the policy agenda and in public debates could take on a European dimension from its inception, whereas, in older immigration countries in Europe (such as Germany, France, the UK), debates remain parochial or inwardlooking. Legal rules on entry and exit Migration policies have been shaped and continue to be shaped by nationally specific sets of considerations (e. g. geographic position and colonial history) although there are areas of convergence (business needs, demographic considerations). In this section, the emphasis is on the differences between our cases regarding entry and exit rules for foreigners. In France, since 1973, most foreigners legally immigrating to France are family members and asylum-seekers, although, for both categories, 1993 reforms have made it more difficult. France also welcomes a large number of foreign students. There is a definite reluctance to introduce quotas or publicize the equivalent of a German green card scheme, as “brain drain” is seen as detrimental to Third World development. Regarding exit, France has a comparatively lenient regime. There are categories of foreigners that are protected against expulsion (permanent residents, spouses and parents of French citizens, minors). However, convictions of at least one year in prison may lead to expulsion, and foreigners who are deemed a threat to national security may be expelled. This is called in France “double peine” (double penalty) and has led to numerous mobilizations. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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The Netherlands, not unlike France, recruited foreign workers until 1973 (such as Turks and Moroccans) but also welcomed post-colonial migrants. In the early 1980s, legislation granted more secure residence rights for legal residents. The trend in the 1990s, as elsewhere, has been restrictive both to stem the number of asylum-seekers and deter illegal migration. Still, regarding exit, the Dutch system provides protection against expulsion comparable to the French: foreigners are no longer expelled for depending on welfare benefits and the longer they stay the more they are protected against expulsion even if they commit crimes. After ten years of residence, foreigners can only be expelled for crimes punishable with at least five years in prison. Foreigners born in the Netherlands after fifteen years of residence cannot be expelled. Foreign-born foreigners cannot after twenty years of residence. The UK, another ex-colonial power, was the first in Europe to enact strict migration control policies (it stopped labour migration by 1971) Stemming migration flows was seen as a necessary condition for the integration of migrant minorities (part of the migration control consisted in reforming citizenship/nationality law to deny rights of entry and stay to the Queen’s subjects). Notwithstanding, the UK has been attracting migrants in the 1990s and a new law came into force. British authorities have a great leeway when it comes to expulsion. Even a foreigner with a permanent residence permit, the so-called Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) granted at the discretion of the authorities (usually after ten years of residence) can be expelled if he has a criminal record, threatens the national interest or relies on public benefits. In Germany, the 1990s have seen important changes with respect to entry and stay. First, the Basic Law was revised in 1993 to restrict the right of asylum and procedures were accelerated. Second, resident foreigners that had lived for a long time in Germany saw their status consolidated by a 1990 law that also defined clearly the right to family reunification. Third, Germany re-introduced systems of foreign labor rotation known as the Gastarbeiter system with Eastern and Central European countries. Moreover, in 2000, the government introduced “green cards” (20000 residence and work permits) for highly-skilled IT workers. Regarding exit, expulsion orders may also be issued to minors of fifteen years and older. With a permanent residence permit, foreigners are better protected against expulsion. Unless they have criminal convictions to more than two years in prison or for drug trafficking or political violence. Switzerland As noted above, Switzerland has the highest number of foreign workers (and asylum-seekers) per capita of the countries in our study. Comparatively, it is the only country in our sample that recruits foreign workers via a quota system negotiated annually to accommodate business interest groups and regional elected officials. Yet Switzerland also the country that grants few rights to foreigners. Its policy resembles the post-war guest-worker system yet, in practice, there has been family reunification and there are unemployed foreigners in Switzerland. The determinants of the quota system are not purely economic. It is a way of responding to anti-foreigner movements and parties that have been very active through the use of direct democracy instruments and successful in national elections. Regarding exit, Swiss law gives wide discretionary powers to the authorities. Even foreigners with a permanent resident status may be expelled. The reason that can justify expulsion range from being a threat to public order and national security, to dependence on welfare benefits or “offences against the public mores”, and the law specifies that if a foreigner shows that he is unwilling to adapt to Swiss ways, this is a ground for expulsion. Spain and Italy have only experienced significant in-migration after they joined the EEC. Their geographical position makes them particularly vulnerable to migration from the South (and South-east) of the Mediterranean where the “push factor” is important. Conversely, they have absorbed many legal and illegal migrants in low-skilled jobs (the “pull factor”) in the EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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three main sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry (leather, construction…), services. They also both play as role as “transit countries” for migrants seeking to settle in Europe. As both countries have sought to comply with Schengen border control requirements, rather than tackling these push-pull factors, they have focused on creating or revamping their legal apparatus. In Italy, until 1998, there was no organic law on immigration. The former law 39/90 (Martelli Law) was never successfully implemented. Law 40/98 ( “Turco-Napolitano” law) was the first attempt towards an effective immigration policy although it did not include an organic law on asylum-seekers. The emphasis has been on trying to convince Schengen partners that the Italian government had adopted the appropriate instruments for repatriating illegal immigrants (such as the CPT- Centri Temporanei di Permanenza where undocumented aliens are confined until repatriation). In Spain, there has been a flurry of legislative and executive innovations in the last 10 years. The 1996 Implementation rules, the Immigration Act 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 attempted to define a framework that would regulate migration and guarantee rights for foreigners. The 2000 Act for instance was the first Act to define who had the right of family reunification and to create a Permanent Residence Permit. As soon as Aznar’s Popular party won the General elections in 2000, his government announced that it would revise the law in a restrictive sense (after a regularization campaign). The new law came into force on January 23rd, 2001. It focused on the fight against illegal migration (including accelerated procedures for the expulsion of undocumented workers and sanctions against those hiring and helping “illegals”, denial of basic rights for illegal aliens). After agricultural interests protested that they needed foreign workers, the Center-Right government negotiated bilateral agreements with several countries to welcome guest-workers (Poland, Morocco, Ecuador…).

Statistics Web sites •

UNHCR asylum statistics: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=statistics



OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2001 Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 2000 Edition Paris: OECD Publications. This source compiles data for certain nations based on work permits issued, national censuses, and other sources. If you go to http://www.gcir.org/about_immigration/world_map/europe.htm, you will find a map of Europe and by clicking on the country you’re interested in, you’ll get the figures.



John Salt’s 1999 Current trends in international migration in Europe is at http://www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/action/publi/migrants/currentmig.htm



Eurobarometer: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/

References Baldwin-Edwards, Martin (1997) “The Emerging European Immigration Regime: Some Reflections for Southern Europe” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 35/4: 497-519. Bigo, Didier (2001) « Migration and Security » in Controlling a New Migration World edited by Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, London : Routledge.

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Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (1993; 1997; 1999). Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community. Nos. 35-50. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. CEC. (1989) Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Community: Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia, Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication, and Culture, (November) 1989. CEC (1999) Eurostat Yearbook: A Statistical Eye on Europe, Data 1987-1997, 4th ed. 98/99. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. CEC (2001) Flash Eurobarometer 114: International Crisis. (November). Danese, Gaia (1998) ‘Transnational collective action in Europe: the case of migrants in Spain and Italy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 24, no. 4 Etienne Piguet et Hans Mahnig « Quotas d’immigration : l’expérience suisse ». Cahiers des migrations internationales 17 Bureau international du travail. Génève. Freeman, Gary (2002) “Towards a Theory of Migration Politics.” Paper presented at the Tenth conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 14-17. Geddes, Andrew (2000a) Immigration and European Integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Geddes, Andrew (2000b) ‘Lobbying for migrant inclusion in the European Union: new opportunities for transnational advocacy’, Journal of European Public Policy 21/4. Guild, Elspeth and Paul Minderhoud (eds) (2001) Security of Residence and Expulsion. Protection of Aliens in Europe. The Hague and London: Kluwer Law International Guiraudon, Virginie (2000) "European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policymaking as Venue Shopping" in Journal of Common Market Studies (juin 2000). Guiraudon, Virginie (2001) "Weak Weapons of the Weak? Mobilizing around Migration at the EU-level » in Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity edited by Sidney Tarrow and Doug Imig. New York : Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 163-183. Guiraudon, Virginie (2002) “Setting the agenda on immigration and asylum in the EU: Experts and ‘the public’.” Paper presented in the panel “Developments in the Study of Immigration in Europe: A Panel in Honor of Martin Schain” of the American Political Science Association meeting, Boston, August 30th, 2002. Hix, Simon and Jan Niessen (1996) Reconsidering European Migration Policies, Brussels: Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe. Huysmans, Jef (2000) "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," Journal of Common Market Studies 38/5: 751-777. Lavenex, Sandra and Emek Uçarer (eds) (2002) Migration and the Externalities of the European Union, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington books. Lavenex, Sandra (2001) "Migration and the EU's New Eastern Border: Between Realism and Liberalism," Journal of European Public Policy 8/1: 24-42. Lavenex, Sandra (2001) The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and Internal Security, Aldershot: Ashgate. Lavenex, Sandra (1999) Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Central European Press. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Lavenex, Sandra (ed.) (2003) Immigration and Asylum Policy in the EU, Sheffield Academic press Contemporary European Studies series. Lobkowicz (de), Wenceslas (1994) "Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Field of Migration - from the Single European Act to Maastricht" in Joerg Monar and Roger Morgan (eds), The Third Pillar of the European Union: Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels: European University Press, pp. 99-122. Ruzza, Carlo (1999) Normal Protest: Social Movements and Institutional Activism, unpublished ms. Thielemann, Eiko (2002) “Forced Migration and the Politics of Burden-Sharing Beyond the State,” paper presented at the UACES Workshop “Theorizing the Communitarisation of Migration policy,” Liverpool: university of Liverpool. Online at: http://www.liv.ac.uk/ewc/html/thielemann-bs-liverpool.htm Ugur, Ehmet (1995) “Freedom of Movement versus Exclusion: A reinterpretation of the “Insider-Outsider” Divide in the European Union,” International Migration Review 29/4:96499. Vink, Maarten (2001) Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies European integration online papers, vol. 6 (2002) Number 13, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-013.htm (see also his ECPR 2001 paper at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws24/vink.pdf)

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Monetary Policy Jovanka Boerefijn and Jeannette Mak (Dutch team)

1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of EMU Within the rich literature, there is wide disagreement on the origins of EMU. What has become clear though is that political reasons have been very influential, both in the (re)launching of the idea of EMU, and the form is has eventually taken. Not only the French and German governments, but also the Commission, have been regarded as the driving forces behind the creation of EMU, with the ultimate goal of establishing a political union. (Cf. Congdon 1998; Szász 1999) It has even been argued that EMU was initiated with the sole purpose ‘to bring a set of public institutions into being which are in turn expected to contribute significantly to the development of the Euro-polity’. (Verdun and Christiansen 2000:163) While this assumption may be too far fetched, it should be taken as a bottom-line that by no means can EMU be regarded as a purely economic project. National sovereignty versus gouvernance economique? Two extreme forms of the relationship between the national and the European level in economic and monetary co-operation can be pictured. At one end of the spectrum, we would find complete autonomy of the national executive; an image that has no longer any resemblance to reality for the member states of the EU. However, this is still the case for Switzerland. The other extreme would be a complete fusion of both levels in the field of economic and monetary policy; a gouvernance économique. (Wessels and Linsenmann 2002) In between, there may be a large variety of co-operation and co-ordination between the national and the European level. Legally there are three sets of rules that have different implications for modes of governance: a supranational one for monetary matters, ‘hard’ coordination in fiscal policy, and ‘soft’ co-ordination on macro-economic and employment issues. In the supranational field of monetary policy, the main decision-making competences rest with the ECB and officially, there is no role for the Council of Ministers. Strictly speaking, this means therefore a complete loss of competences by the national governments and the national central banks to the ECB. The European Commission has virtually no role to play here. The hard co-ordination in fiscal policy foresees in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This pact, which was agreed at the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, is aimed at safeguarding sustained non-inflationary growth and job creation and contains an excessive deficit procedure. The Ecofin Council may, on advise of the Commission and after consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee, decide by qualified majority on a financial sanction against a member state whose budget deficit is approaching three percent.48 The same procedure applies to giving member states an ‘early warning’ that this might happen. Consequently, the national executive has given up autonomy in favour of the shared sovereignty of the Ecofin Council, in which it has no veto power.

48

Article 104. The exact figures of the criteria are laid down in a protocol, attached to the Treaty.

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Soft co-ordination in macro-economic and employment policy, also called the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), finally involves the use of peer-pressure, benchmarking and best practices. It was agreed at the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 that the Commission would formulate the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and that all member states would annually report to the Commission on their macro-economic and structural policies. The Ecofin Council may give a member state, deviating from the standards, a reprimand. As this has no legal implications, it is a clear informal, yet public, matter. The national executive may not loose competences according to this procedure, it may however loose its face. (Wessels and Linsenmann 2002) Expectation on Europeanisation on public debates In spring 1990, 51 percent of the respondents of the 12 member states of the European communities thought currency matters should be decided at the European level. (EB33) In autumn 1990, 55 percent said to be in favour of a single currency. (EB34) The Eurobarometer started to measure explicit support for the single European currency in a consistent way in 1993. Between 1993 and 1997, the average percentage of the European population ‘in favour’ of EMU has been around fifty percent, whereas the average percentage ‘against’ has been more or less 35 percent. (EC 1999) In May 1998, when it was decided which member states would participate in EMU, support for the euro was at the highest level since the Eurobarometer started asking people for their opinion on the common currency: 60 percent of the people said to be in favour. (EB 49) According to the Eurobarometer of autumn 2001, the last one before the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins, 61 percent of the population of the member states agreed with the statement that ‘there has to be one single currency, the euro’. (EB 56) The Eurobarometer of spring 2002 showed that, ‘with the euro in the pocket’, this percentage had peaked at 67 percent being in favour of the euro. The autumn results of 2002 show however that this percentage had fallen back to 63 percent.

Percentage in favour

Public Support for the euro

02 20

01 Sp

rin

g

20

00 Sp

rin

g

20

99 g Sp

rin

g

19

98 Sp

rin

g

19

97 Sp

rin

g

19

96 rin Sp

Sp

rin

g

19

95 19

94 Sp

rin

g

19 g rin

Sp

Sp

rin

g

19

93

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Time Public Support for the euro

Source: Eurobarometer Men are in general more favourable to the single European currency than women are, higher educated people more supportive than lower educated, and the younger more enthusiastic than EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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the elderly. People who believe that their country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing are three times as likely to support the euro than people who regard their country’s membership as a bad thing. However, this relationship is not equally strong in all member states. In the UK, more than a third of the people who regard their country’s membership of the EU as a good thing, nevertheless oppose the euro. (EC 1999) This is contradictory to the general trend in recent years, where support for the euro has been higher than for EU membership in general. According to a research carried out in 1996 on request of the European Commission, there is a significant difference between public opinion on European matters and the opinion of ‘Top Decision Makers’49. The study showed that 91 percent of the Top Decision Makers supported the single currency, whereas only 66 percent of the general public did. (EC 1996) The phenomenon that people with a higher social status are in general more positive towards the euro has been confirmed by other research. (Cf. Pepermans and Müller-Peters 1999) While there are mass-elite splits on the issue in all member states, these are not equally large everywhere. According to above mentioned research, differences in opinion range from as much as 50 percent in Germany to only ten percent in Italy.

Opinion on the single currency

Percentage in favour

100 80 60

Top Decision Makers

40

General Public

20 0 E

NL

F

D

I

UE15 UK

Country

Source: European Commission According to Eurobarometer data, people who feel better informed on European integration in general and on the euro, have a more positive attitude towards both. However, it can be argued that people who have a more positive attitude towards European integration and the euro have the feeling that they are better informed on these issues since they feel more at ease with them. Van Everdingen and van Raaij (1998) have indeed shown that individuals who feel more informed on the euro have a more positive view on the single currency, while the actual knowledge (measured by answering factual questions) does not correlate to opinions on the euro. The self-perceived knowledge on the euro has almost linearly increased over the past 49

Defined as ‘holders of high office’, which includes elected politicians, senior national servants, business and labour leaders, media leaders and finally people playing a leading role in the academic, cultural or religious life of their country.

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years. There have however been significant national differences. The Netherlands has been continuously amongst the countries whose populations felt best informed, while people in Italy had the lowest self perceived knowledge levels.

Percentage feeling well informed

Self Perceived Knowledge of the euro EU-15 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Autumn 1995

Autumn 1996

Autumn 1997

Autumn 1998

Autumn 1999

Autumn 2000

Autumn 2001

Time

These general findings only allow us to conclude that there has been a large elite consensus on the issue on EMU, which might lead to limited debate. Moreover, for the EU as a whole (12/15), a majority has been in favour of a single currency over the years. Finally, the selfperceived knowledge has increased over time. This might be either a result of more debate on the issue in the national context, or a cause. Nevertheless, these findings do not reveal any variation amongst member states, which is considerable. One thing that does for example stand out is the large difference in mass-elite split between Italy and Germany. Consequently, one would expect a more heated debate in Germany than in Italy. And even more important, one could conclude that less discussion might take place in the UK, as the mass-elite split is smaller there than it is in Germany. However, we know that other aspect are very influential there. National differences will be dealt with in more detail below.

Brief history of EMU 1979-2002 50 • 1979 (March): Creation of European Monetary System (EMS), all member states join at the exchange-rate mechanism except the United Kingdom •

1985: Adoption Single Market Programme

• 1988 (June): Hanover European Council set up a committee to study economic and monetary union under chairmanship of Jacques Delors • 1989 (April): Report of Delor Committee, proposed the introduction of economic and monetary union in three stages 50

Dinan, D., (1998) ‘Ever closer Union’. An introduction to the European Community, 2nd edition, Basingstoke, Macmillan; http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25007.htm#top EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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• 1989 (June): The Madrid European Council decides to launch first stage of EMU: full liberalisation on capital movements in eight member states by 1 July 1990 • 1989 (Dec.): Strasbourg European Council called for intergovernmental conference that would identify what amendments needed to be made to the Treaty in order to attain full economic and monetary union •

1990 (1 July): start first stage EMU

• 1991(Dec.): Adoption of the Treaty on European Union by Heads of State and government at the Maastricht European Council •

1992 (June): Negative result of a referendum in Denmark



1992 (September): Positive result of referendum France

• 1992: Italy and the UK are forced to withdraw their currencies from the European exchange-rate mechanism because of monetary turbulence •

1994 (1 January ): Establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI)

• 1995 (Dec.): Madrid European Council. Decision on the changeover and the name “euro” •

1996 (Oct.): The Finnish markka joins EMS Exchange-Rate Mechanism



1996 (Oct.): The Italian Lira returns to the ERM

• 1997 (June): Amsterdam European council. Agreement on Stability and Growth Pact and ERM II • 1998 (May): Brussels Council. Decision on participating member states51 in stage III of EMU. Fixing bilateral conversion rates. Decision on president and executive board of the European Central Bank (ECB) • 1998 (1 June): ECB set up in Frankfurt under presidency of Wim Duisenberg. European system of central banks set up • 1999 (1 January): Execution of single monetary policy, foreign exchange operation in euros, operation of TARGET payment system, new public debt to be issued in euros •

2000 (June): Greece was accepted as the 12th member of EMU



2002 (1 January): euro notes and coins put into circulation in the 12 euro-countries

EU decision rules As was pointed out before, there are different sets of rules within EMU. They are however part and parcel of the same institutional framework. Treaty Articles The idea of an Economic and Monetary Union has been on the cards for a long time and was already included in the initial plans drawn up by Monnet’s ‘Action Committee for the United 51

Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

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States of Europe’ in 1961. The original mission laid down in Article 2 of the the EEC Treaty was to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it. In order to attain these goals, the Treaty foresaw in the establishment of a common market and the convergence of the economic policies of the member states. To facilitate co-ordination of the national economic policies, a Monetary Committee was set up, and in 1964 a Committee of Governors of the national Central Banks was created. The Single European Act (SEA) concluded in 1987 foresaw in the completion of the single market and acknowledged that the adoption of a single currency would complete this aim. The final design of EMU was negotiated in December 1991, and laid down in Article 102 to 109 of the Treaty on European Union. This Treaty formed a set of amendments and elaboration on the Rome Treaty, and came into force on 1 November 1993. The completion of the EMU was divided in three phases. The first one was supposed to end by late 1993 with the fulfilment of the liberalisation of capital movement and the completion of the internal market. The second phase started on 1 January 1994 and was meant to foresee in the independence of the national banks, establishment of the EMI, the predecessor of the ECB, and to allow the member states to bring their economies in line with the four convergence criteria. These conditions were designed to safeguard coherence amongst the participating member states and would form the standards by which to judge whether each individual member state could participate or not. The convergence criteria were laid down in a protocol mentioned in article 109j TEU and attached as protocol 6 to the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty did not foresee in a fixed date for the start of the third phase. The beginning of the final stage was subject to the condition that a majority of the member states would fulfil the convergence criteria. If by the end of 1997, the date for the beginning of the third stage would not have been set, it would automatically begin at 1 January 1999. Therefore, the Council would have to establish what member states fulfilled the criteria before 1 July 1998. In December 1995 at the Madrid Council, it was decided to name the single currency the ‘euro’ and the scenario for the changeover was laid down. At the Amsterdam Summit, the heads of government and state agreed on 16 June 1997 the Stability and Growth Pact. This pact foresees in intensive policy co-ordination, once the third stage is entered, and is aimed at safeguarding sustained non-inflationary growth and job creation. The Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 1 May 1999 and resulted in a renumbering of articles. Consequently, the provisions on EMU are now to be found under articles 98 to 124. Institutions: ECB: The primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. In order to do so it has four basic tasks: define and implement the monetary policy of the Community, conduct foreign exchange operations, hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the member states, and promote the smooth operation of payments systems. Moreover, it has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of banknotes and coins, while both the ECB and the national central banks may issue these notes. The Governing Council is the major decision-making body of the ECB and consists of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB and governors of the national central banks. Finally, the major characteristic of the ECB is its political independence. This is however not completely undisputed. Whereas some member states plead for greater political influence of the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin Council), others stress the importance of a fully independent central bank. Currently, there has been some disagreement about the institutional status of the ECB as a result of the so called ‘OLAF case’, in which the Commission has taken the ECB to court because it refused to accept EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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investigations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The Court has expressed the opinion that the ECB is not completely independent and instead forms an integral part of the Community framework.52 European Commission: The official responsibilities of the Commission concerning EMU are rather limited and involve its role as initiator of legislative proposals and guardian of the Treaty. Its main tasks are aimed at co-ordination and technical support. The Commission needs to propose every year the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) to be pursued by the member states, support the close co-ordination of economic policies and multilateral surveillance by reporting on economic developments in the member states, and finally ensure respect for the rules of the SGP. Nevertheless, the Commission seems to feel itself fully responsible for the success of EMU and appears determined to remain actively involved in all aspects of the policy process. Ecofin Council: The Ecofin Council is collectively responsible for the strategy on the euro but this body is not able, or at least officially not allowed, to pursue exchange rate policies which the ECB deems inconsistent with price stability. The Eurogroup: This body was initiated at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997 and got its current name during the French presidency in the second half of 2000. The Eurogroup is effectively an Ecofin Council of the member states participating in the euro zone. It discusses macro-economic matters directly related to EMU and meets before the Ecofin Council does. Although the Eurogroup was established as an informal body, it is highly institutionalised. Nevertheless, its legal competences are limited, as it is a group that only represents a number of member states. For the same reason, it could not bear the name of ‘Council’. The provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, as modified by the Nice Treaty, on closer co-operation do not allow for exceptions to the single European institutional framework. Consequently, decisions can only be reached by unanimity in the Eurogroup and they are not binding. Nevertheless, competences have shifted away from the Ecofin Council to the Eurogroup. Whereas it was foreseen in the Treaty that the Ecofin Council would decide on a common position of the EU concerning EMU, the European Council has decided that this discussion would be held in the Eurogroup. Moreover, the French presidency has tried to strengthen the Eurogroup during the first six months of 2000. While the European Council of Nice has approved such an increased role, it nevertheless emphasised that the group should remain informal and that ultimately decisions had to be taken by the Ecofin Council. (Louis 2002) The Economic and Financial Committee consists of representatives of the member states, the Commission and the ECB and should, amongst others, be consulted on the report of the Commission concerning excessive budget deficits. European Council: This body is responsible for reaching an agreement on the BEPG, which need to be confirmed by qualified majority in the Council. The sensitive issue of monetary policy has enforced the tendency in the EU to elevate decisions to the level of the European Council. This has increased the informality of the decision-making process, as officially the European Council can make only recommendations that need to be confirmed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, it has shifted decision-making preparation from the General Affairs Council to what has been recently called the “sherpa’s”: a term for a group of personal representatives of the heads of government and state that has been lent from G7 / G8 52

Case C11/00. On 14 January 2000, the Commission sued the ECB on the contested competences of OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office, to control the Bank’s proceedings. On 3 October 2002, the Advocate General gave his opinion that OLAF is entitled to investigate the ECB, as the latter is one of the institutions of the European Community.

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practices, and introduced into EU politics under the Portuguese presidency in the first half of 2000. European Parliament: The competences of the EP are confined to consultation on the most important legislation. Furthermore, the Commission and the Council need to report on the major developments in general economic policy. However, the EP does have a rather large influence by its supervisory role, as the operational independence of the ECB is balanced by accountability for its actions to the EP. In this framework, the president of the ECB is required to present an annual report to the plenary session of the EP. European Court of Justice. The Court does not have any specific competences with regard to EMU but above mentioned example of the OLAF case shows that, indirectly, its role may be significant. This is I line with the role of the ECJ in most policy areas. Actors involved The field of EMU can be characterised by the limited number of actors involved. It has been rightly argued that EMU has been created by ‘elites distant from public debate’ (Featherstone 1999:325) and in ‘the absence of elaborate attention to consensus-building between state and civil society’ (Dyson 1999:105). Once in place, the situation with regard to EMU has not significantly changed. The policy field is dominated by economic and financial actors. European level The main state-actors at the European level have been described above. The most important European non-state actors that have been actively involved with EMU are the following. The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). Members of this Round table are leading industrialists (chairmen and chief executives of large multinational companies) on personal title. The organisation has been set up in 1983 and has mainly pushed for the completion of the single market. The Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AUME). This organisation has been set up in 1987 by a group of European industrialists who agreed on the objectives of monetary stability and a single currency for the success of the single market. AMUE is a private, non-profit association of banks and companies, which has been functioning as a lobby group for Economic and Monetary Union since. European Association of Craft and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME). This Association was formed as a result of the merger of various European trade associations and organisations of medium-sized enterprises in 1979. -

Federation of European Accountants (FEE).

Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE).This organisation was set up in 1958, to track the political consequences of the community, created by the Treaty of Rome. European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). This confederation was set up in 1973 to provide a trade union counterbalance to the economic forces of European integration. -

The European Consumer’s Organisation (BEUC).

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National level At the national level, it has been mainly the ministries of finance and the national central banks that have been involved in the European discussion on EMU. Both the heads of state or government and the ministers of finance are believed to have gained weight in the domestic political constellation, as a result of increasing economic and financial European integration. This is a direct result of the increased importance of both the European Council and the Ecofin Council. The debate at the national level is in general dominated by the ministries of finance and economic affairs (rather than the ministries of European affairs), the national central bank, the national parliament, employers organisations, organisations for small and medium enterprises, multinational and large companies, trade unions, bank associations, and finally consumer organisations. Several EU countries have more specific pro- or anti- euro organisations. Issue definition and policy linkage to other EU policies As has been pointed out before, economic and monetary integration forms part and parcel of European integration as a whole. This becomes evident when we look at the different policy areas, and consequently the respective Directorate Generals of the Commission and Council and the committees of the EP, that are involved. Examples of the policy fields involved are the following: Agriculture: Historically, part of the necessity to stabilise exchange rates within the EU stems from the Monetary Compensating Amounts. EMU, and in particular the single currency, is still of influence on minimum prices, intervention prices, import and export levies etc. For our research, this is partly important for agricultural subsidies. Employment and Social Affairs: One of the main disputes at the creation of EMU has been the Social Chapter. A certain harmonisation of social and working conditions was deemed necessary in order to prevent social dumping. More recently, social expenditures such as pensions and unemployment benefits have gained attention as convergence in national budgets is regarded as necessary to safeguard stability of the euro. For our study, the link with pensions is particularly interesting. Enterprise: The changeover to the euro is regarded as the completion of the single European market. A single currency will make it easier to compare prices across the EU, and is expected to increase intra-EU trade and competition. Internal Market: Apart from above mentioned aspects, the single currency is important for the internal market since non-financial trade distortions will become clearer and demand regulation. Justice and Home Affairs: The need for police and legal co-operation has become clear as a result of the measures against counterfeiting of the euro banknotes. Consumers: The euro is not only significant for consumers as a result of its practical consequences (changeover, changing scale of value etc.) but also for prices of financial services, such as international payments or other bank services. Enlargement: The relation between the EU-12 and the three pre-ins is arranged under the ERM II system. Similar arrangements are expected to be made with the accession countries. In principle, all candidate countries are supposed to take part in EMU in due time, as this is part of the acquis communitaire they are obliged to accept in full. However, long

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transition periods are foreseen and the new member states will have to fulfil the convergence criteria. Several countries have already pegged their currencies to the euro. External Relations: The euro has been partly introduced in order to compete with the hegemony of the dollar. Consequently, it is supposed to be of influence on international relations. One of the consequences of a single currency is that the ECB will be involved, on behalf of all the participating national banks, in international exchange rate interventions. Trade: A single currency and common monetary policy will finally have an effect on trade, as the exchange rate, interest rate etc. have a direct influence on the competition position and economic growth of the EU as a whole. Other scopes Whereas for most European policy fields, the significant change of governance is from the national to the European level, EMU has forced a real shift in multilevel governance. Partly, a global regime has become a bi-polar one. Whereas in the old days of the Bretton Woods System, the European national currencies were pegged to the dollar, which had a parity to gold, they would later on commonly fluctuate against the dollar. Recently, the euro has in some parts of the world replaced the dollar as main currency. At the same time, national affairs have partly become regional ones. This is particularly the case for federal member states of the eurozone, who saw themselves compelled to create an internal Stability and Growth Pact, in order to fulfil the requirements for the European one. Other supranational monetary institutions that are involved with EMU are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue The Identity Aspect A currency is by some regarded as a more effective means to spread a national message than a flag or an anthem. (Cf. Burgoyne et al 1999; Servet 1999) It should therefore not be too surprising that the introduction of the euro involved the emotional issue of national versus European identity. In May 2002, 60 percent of the respondents in the euro zone agreed with the statement that by using the euro, instead of one’s national currency, one feels a bit more European than before. This percentage was slightly lower than in January 2002, just after the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. 79 percent of the people regarded the euro as a major event in the history of Europe. (Flash EB 121/3) There are however large differences between the various member states regarding this matter, broadly coinciding with the NorthSouth divide in the EU. Qualitative research has shown that for many citizens in Italy and Spain, the euro has been regarded as a symbol of European unity, and economic progress and welfare of their countries within the EU. In France, one equally regarded the euro as a symbol of European integration. However, less strongly than in the Southern member states. The Dutch have at the same time not only been rather passive about the changeover, but also negative about the identity aspect of the single European currency. In Germany, it is unsurprisingly mainly the elderly who felt strongly about the euro as a symbol of the construction of Europe. (EC 2002) In the UK, the only pre-in country of our research, low levels of public involvement and knowledge, combined with a eurosceptic press, makes public opinion negative, yet volatile, towards the euro. On 7 June 2003, the British government will announce the results of the ‘economic test’, meant to determine whether Britain is ready to join the euro zone. A referendum is most likely to take place in autumn 2003 or early 2004. The actual changeover EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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to the single currency has nevertheless also affected the EU member states outside the euro zone. After the euro banknotes and coins had been in circulation for five months, 31 percent of the British had already had one or more euro coins in hand and 28 percent a euro banknote. A majority of the population disagreed that the inhabitants of the countries that did adopt the euro would feel more European as a result of it. They also did not agree with the statement that they would feel themselves less European because they are not taking part in the euro. 65 percent of the British thought that their country would eventually adopt the euro while only 35 percent would find the euro acceptable. A high percentage of 55 of the respondents in the UK would be ‘unhappy’ with the single currency. (Flash EB 121/3 outside euro) While compared to the regular Eurobarometer data of late 2001, the British seems to have become slightly more negative. (EB 56) Monetary traditions and practices National variation in support of the euro, and approach towards EMU, may correlate with the following aspects: -

Independency national central bank

-

Pride in national currency

-

Stability of national currency

-

Historical monetary tradition, such as experience with inflation.

-

Dependency external trade and trade partners

Efforts needed in order to comply with the convergence criteria The convergence criteria were laid down in a protocol mentioned in article 109j TEU and attached as protocol 6 to the Maastricht Treaty. It was agreed that it meant that the inflation rate should not be more than 1.5 percentage point higher than the average of the three best performing member states; the budget deficit should not exceed 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and compliance of the currency with the bands was required for the last two years and finally the gross public debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP (unless it would approach this figure at a satisfactory pace on a downward trend). The national debate on the convergence criteria is expected to be influenced by the efforts that were necessary to comply with these criteria. -

national debt

-

budgetary deficits

-

inflation

-

interest rate

-

exchange rate fluctuations

For very detailed comparative and country-specific reports on the changeover to the single European currency, covering 1999-2002, refer to the website of the Eurospectator project: http://www.iue.it/OnlineProjects/LAW/eurospectator. These reports cover the following aspects: Public opinion on the single currency; Legal aspects of the changeover to the euro;

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Main actors involved in the policy area of EMU; Reporting of the issue-specific financial media on the euro. Switzerland is a small, open economy and its main trading partners are EU member states (especially Germany, France and Italy). Moreover, the monetary policy philosophy of the Swiss National Bank is not much different from the one of the ECB. Consequently, Switzerland could theoretically gain from joining EMU. However, the function of the Swiss Franc as a reserve currency may weigh up to the stability offered by EMU. Furthermore, the inflation rates in Switzerland have been lower than in the EU member states for the last decade. Therefore, it is argued that neither EMU membership nor pegging the Franc to the euro is an attractive option. Yet, the strongest argument is that the Swiss are still critical towards EU membership in general. An opinion poll, carried out by the Swiss newspaper Le Temps in 1999, showed that 54.7 percent of the Swiss would be willing to exchange their Franc for the euro. This was as much as 72 percent for the French speaking part of the population, but only 49 for the German speaking part. However, in the referendum of March 2002, in which the population was asked for its opinion on reopening negotiations on EU membership, 77 percent reacted negatively. Nevertheless, Switzerland is to a certain extent affected by EMU. In a large number of cash machines it is for example possible to withdraw euros. Hypotheses The Europub.com project started off with five hypotheses on the transformation of political mobilisation and communication in the public sphere. Which one of these hypotheses are likely to be valid for the field of EMU? General Hypotheses Supranationalisation: Given the degree of supranational decision-making with regard to monetary affairs, and the large number of European institutions involved, supranationalisation of the debate is likely to have developed parallel to the policy development. A good example of such a debate is the fact that the ECB president is accountable to the EP, rather than to the national governments or parliaments. Increased national focusing on Europe: This hypothesis is most likely to apply for instances preceding transfer of national sovereignty to the European level, or other sensitive issues. An example is the national debate about the EMU convergence criteria. In this case, the basics of national budgetary politics was highly influenced by European guidelines. European affairs got internalised as domestic disputes arose on the way in which best to comply with the criteria. The same may be valid for the national debates about whether to comply with the SGP. Vertical convergence from above: This hypothesis is most likely to apply with regard to ECB policy. An interest rate adjustments or exchange rate intervention will theoretically have the same impact on all member states of the eurozone. Horizontal convergence through cross-national diffusion: This hypothesis is more likely to apply to policy ideas than to policy-making itself. An example is the spread of the hegemonic concept of the strong currency paradigm. Recently, the slow shift in discourse on the necessity of strict compliance to the SGP can be equally regarded as such. Europe as a new conflict dimension in public spheres: Disagreement on the role of the Eurogroup and its position vis-à-vis both the Ecofin Council and the ECB is an ongoing one, and goes to the core of the debate on independence of the ECB. Whereas the question of autonomy EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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of the bank has been disputed ever since the creation of EMU, it has gained importance after the introduction of the scriptual euro on 1 January 1999. Especially under pressure of the ever lower exchange rate of the euro against the dollar in autumn 2000, several member states have disputed the single right of the ECB to decide whether or not to intervene in the external exchange rate. Furthermore, a number of national governments has made its opinion very clear on the interest rate policy of the ECB. The bank in turn is believed to have postponed interest rate adjustments on several occasions, in order to prove to the outer world that it resisted political pressure to do so. Finally, there has been disagreement on who may function as the spokesman for the euro. The Commission has clearly condemned the idea of the Council to appoint a High Representative for Economic Policy. Based on the Treaty provision that the Commission is responsible for the overall assessment of the economic policy of the EU, it is according to the institution clear that it is the Commission, acting on a mandate of the Council, who should be the interlocutor for the ECB. (EC 2000) This lack of political consensus and a single voice has had a negative impact on confidence in the euro, of both the financial markets and the general public. National Differences Kaltenhaler and Anderson (2001) have argued that general public support for the single currency can be explained by attitudes about domestic politics, experience with European institutions and collective utilitarian considerations. In other words a positive attitude of a population towards the euro depends on national pride and age of the respective nation state, the historical commitment of the member state to European integration, and the expectations that one’s country as a whole would benefit from the common currency. With respect to the latter explanation, the difference is primarily between hard currency countries and weak currency countries. The validity of this argument, as well as other data presented above, would have consequences for several of our hypotheses on national variation in Europeanisation. Such as: Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3: size of the country, international orientation of the economy and net material gains from membership (EMU); Hypothesis 7: goodness of fit of national central bank with the European central bank; Hypothesis 9 and 10: degree of general support for Europe, and elite consensus on EMU; Hypothesis 15: Strength of the welfare state

References Congdon, T., (1998), Could EMU be Europe’s ‘Maoist leap forward’?, in Tempterton, P.(ed.), (1998), 2nd edition, The euro:187-203, John Wiley & Sons, Chicester. Dyson, K. (1999), Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, a transformation of governance, in Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (1999), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union: 98-118, Routledge, London. European Commission, Eurobarometer, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/polls.html. European Commission (1999), European Public Opinion on the Single Currency, Special Edition, DGX, Brussel, January 1999. European Commission, (2000), Speech by Romano Prodi to the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Speech 00/352, 3 October 2000, Strasbourg.

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Featherstone, K., (1999), The Political Dynamics of EMU, in Cram, L., Dinan, D. and Nugent, N.(eds.), (1999), Developments in the European Union:311-329, St. Martin’s Press, New York. Kaltenhaler, K. and Anderson, C. (2001), European and their money: Explaining public support for the common European currency, in European Journal of political Research, 40:139-170. Louis, Jean-Victor (2002), The Euro Group and Economic Policy Co-Ordination, in Louis, JeanVictor (ed.), (2002), The Euro in the National Context: 351-371, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London. Pepermans, R. and Müller-Peters, (1999), Differences in Information Requirements Among European Citizens: More Psychology Than Socio-Demographics, in Journal of Consumer Policy, Special Issue on The Euro: Consequences for the Consumer and the Citizen:81-90, Vol. 22, , Nos 1-2, June 1999. Szász, A., (1999), The Road to European Monetay Union, Macmillan Press Ltd., London. Verdun, A. and Christiansen, T. (2000), Policies, Institutions, and the Euro: Dilemmas of Legitimacy, in After the Euro, Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union, (2000), Crouch, C. (de.), Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wessels, Wolfgang and Linsenmann, Ingo (2002), EU’s Impact on National Institutions: Fusion towards a ‘Gouvernance Economique’ or Fragmentation? in Dyson, Kenneth (ed.), (2002), European States and the Euro, Europeanisation, Variation and Convergence: 53-77, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

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Pension and retirement policy Jessica Erbe (WZB team) 1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of pension policies The European Union has only very limited competence in the field of pension policies. Two main areas must be distinguished: (a) general pension policy and its reform and (b) problems of migrant worker’s pensions. Real decision power is allocated at EU level only in the very limited field (b) of pension problems arising from the free movement of workers/self-employed within the EU. Two main EC laws were adopted in this field: a regulation in 1971 on safeguarding state pension rights acquired in other Member States, and a directive in 1998 that extends the protection to supplementary pension rights, which have become more and more important in the total oldage insurance system. While the regulation is itself binding law in all Member States, the directive must first be implemented at national level by July 2001, with an explicit reference to the EU law. There would thus be an opportunity for EU scope claims in this period; however it is unlikely that the implementation be widely debated in the mass media, as it only concerns a minority of all employees, i.e. those working in more than one Member State. There is no opting out in this form of Europeanisation, all Member States are concerned alike; variations in claim should only be expected depending on a country’s status as sender or receiver of EU migrant workers, and therefore representing beneficiaries of EU rules or bearing the financial burden of such rules. For Switzerland, we should expect claims-making with EU scope in this specific field only since the period of negotiation of the free movement chapter of the EU/Swiss bilateral agreement, which was signed in June 1999 and entered into force in July 2002. With this agreement, the above EU cross-border rules concerning pensions are fully applicable to Switzerland. As before this step, Switzerland had bilateral agreements with most EU countries on pension matters, one might expect more bilateral claims-making with actors from migrant labour sending countries until then. All general pension policy decisions (a) such as the choice of the welfare design (e.g. funded vs. unfunded systems), and concrete decisions on statutory retirement age, amount of contributions to insurance schemes, actual pension payments, etc., are still exclusively taken at national level (or below). Also the pension reforms under way in most Member States are decided upon at national level only. Although the European Union does not have any legislative competence, it has become increasingly active in this field since 2000. This activity is limited to non-binding declaratory action at the European Councils, who are responsible for defining the general policy orientation of the EU, and to supportive action by the Commission and expert groups in the form of statistical services, comparative analysis, and forums for mutual learning and voluntary intergovernmental cooperation. For supporting Member States’ pension reform efforts, a relatively new instrument is applied: the so-called open method of coordination. For our hypothesis on the impact of institutional Europeanisation on public debates, this means that there should be hardly any claims-making with EU scope in the nineteen nineties and an increase starting in 2000, and that this increase should remain modest because of the EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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weak form of Europeanisation. For Switzerland, which is not involved in the European Councils nor in the open method of coordination, there should be no EU scope claims-making throughout the whole period. One new element that provides EU actors with a justification for being active in this field is the Monetary Union stability pact. As the financing of state pension systems has a direct impact on national budgets, which are subject to common rules (such as the 3% limit), it can be discussed at European level. This would make such claims as EU or national actors calling on other national governments to reform their national pension system more likely to occur. It also would explain if within the category of state actors, it is not only the social experts (such as parliamentary committees, ministries or Commission directorate generals, and Councils on social affairs) that intervene as claimants, but also those dealing with budget, economy and finance. For Switzerland and the United Kingdom, which do not participate in the EMU and are therefore not bound by the stability pact, this new element should be irrelevant. Beyond institutionalised Europeanisation, there is an indirect spill-over effect of EU integration that can be expected to influence national pension debates. As Dudek and Omtzigt (2001) argue, pension reform in one Member State of a single financial market can have direct economic impact on other Member States of this market, and can even make later pension reforms in these countries more costly. So, even if the national claim-makers do not explicitly refer to other EU countries, one might expect their ultimate aims to converge with those of actors from other national spheres, in particular as far as the transition from unfunded to funded pension systems is concerned. EU Decision rules (a) General pension policy and reform: characterised by intergovernmental cooperation The activities at EU level mainly consist in intergovernmental debates and statements on common objectives of the European Council, and in research work in the form of communications and reports, which aim at monitoring whether the objectives are implemented. A relatively recent form of EU policy making, the so-called open method of co-ordination (OMC) has become the institutional frame for these activities since 2001/2. This method is a means of spreading best practice, meant to be a learning process for all players who participate in the process. Domestic politics are linked to transnational agenda setting. The OMC has been criticised from two sides: Actors in favour of supranational decision making reproach it to be used to the detriment of more traditional and “hard” forms of policy making based on legislation. The other criticism concerns the lack of social dialogue; while the social partners are intensively involved in formulating and implementing national welfare policies, the OMC did not foresee their involvement (see Revue belge de sécurité sociale, June 2002). As an exception to this situation, there are three very limited fields of pension policy which show a higher degree of institutional Europeanisation: -

The Treaty and a number of European Directives require equal treatment for men and women in pension schemes (with some exceptions on statutory retirement age and survivors allowances, where discrimination is allowed).

-

Two European Directives protect the pension rights of workers in the event of a company take-over or bankruptcy.

-

A European Directive allowing pension funds to operate at a European level are currently in the legislative process. This aims at creating a Single Pension Fund

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market in the EU. (However such funds only account for a small share of total pension financing.) Regarding the hypothesis according to which “supranational forms of Europeanisation lead to more conflict between the EU and national actors, while intergovernmental forms are more likely to produce conflicts between member states,” this policy area should rather lead to interstate conflict than to vertical conflict. However the specific form of policy making in this field, i.e. the declaration of consensual policy objectives based on scientific-political networking of experts, is not likely to produce intensive media attention. In addition, there are not yet any distributive issues decided at EU level. (b) Cross-border aspects of pension policy: more Europeanised Free movement of workers and self-employed as one of the core elements of the Common Market is already inherent in the “old” Community pillar, including the principle that these persons may not be discriminated against in social security matters (Article 42 (ex-51) EC Treaty). Pensions are not foreseen explicitly in the Treaty. For cross-border aspects of pensions, it was therefore necessary to use the single authorisation provision of Article 308 (ex-235) EC Treaty. This decision rule requires a proposal by the Commission, a (nonbinding) consultation of the European Parliament and a unanimity decision by the Council. The two acts presented above were adopted according to this rule. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, this field has been moved under the more supranationalised co-decision rule (Article 251 (ex-189b) EC Treaty). This gives real codecision power to the EP and reduces the power of the Member States, as the Council decides with majority. Further steps in increasing the “portability” of occupational pension rights are developed in the newly created European Pensions Forum, an advisory committee of experts from governments, the two sides of industry and the pensions sector. Switzerland, although applying the EU free movement rules, is not involved in the decision making process. Chronology of main European agreements and EU developments •

1971 EC Regulation 1408/71 provides for “portability” of pension claims obtained in other Member States (in the frame of free movement of workers, Article 52 of the Treaty; they cannot loose their entitlements because they continue working in another MS); applicable also in CH since June 2002



1993 (June 30) Council adopts a Resolution on flexible retirement schemes (following a Council Recommendation of 1982 and a Commission report of 1992)



1998 (June 29) Council Directive 98/49/EC on safeguarding the supplementary pensions rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community (important steps leading to the Directive: first Commission initiative taken in 1991, expert group discussions in mid-nineties, Green Paper in June 1997)



2000 (March) Lisbon Council stresses the need to study the sustainability of pensions systems in a long-term perspective and the Gothenburg Council in June 2001 agrees on three broad principles for modernising pension systems, namely: "safeguarding the capacity of systems to meet their social objectives, maintaining their financial sustainability and meeting changing societal needs"

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2001 (December) Laeken Council receives a joint report by the Social Protection Committee and the Economic Policy Committee on Quality and viability of pensions Joint report on objectives and working methods in the area of pensions, which calls for the use of the open method of co-ordination in the area of pensions to help Member States achieve the three Gothenburg goals, and specifies them in eleven common objectives



2002 (March) Barcelona Council calls for the reform of pension systems to be accelerated, and stresses in this context "the importance of the joint Commission and Council Report on Pensions to the Spring 2003 European Council, to be drawn up on the basis of the National Strategy Reports due in September 2002."



2002 (June) EU Seville summit agrees on common goals for the pension systems in the EU (within the frame of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines). The three prongs are: raising employment rates, reducing public debt levels, and reforming pensions systems themselves. The aim is to contain pressures on public finances and place pension systems on a sound financial footing. The measures taken by the Member States include, in particular, limiting the flow into early retirement schemes, increasing incentives for lengthening working lives and retiring later, and increasing future budgetary margins by reducing public debt or building up public pension reserve funds.



2002 (December 17) EU Commission adopts first draft report on reforms of national pension systems, including the National Strategy Reports submitted by the Member States in September. This draft report still needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and will be discussed at the next European Council in Spring 2003, with a view to decide on the objectives, methods and timetable for the continuation of this co-ordination on pensions, i.e. eventually a second round of such a Report.

Main actors in the field At the EU level, the intergovernmental European Council is the key actor in the field of pension reform, although it has no legislative competence. The European Commission plays an active role in both the general field of pension reform and the specific cross-border aspects. In the latter, it can set the agenda and influence the design of legal acts thanks to its prerogative of initiative, but has no decision making power. In the more general field, its main role is the supply of comparative information, raising awareness and indication of best practice. The European Parliament has, since recent Treaty revision, full co-decision power in the field of cross-border aspects of pension rights together with the Council of Ministers. In the general field of pension policies however, its role is marginal: it may be informed of the outcome of Commission and expert reports on pension reform in the Member States, but must not even be regularly consulted. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is competent on the legal acts on cross-border aspects of pension rights that were adopted within the Community framework. National courts are competent to judge whether these acts are correctly implemented by the national legislatives and applied by national social security organisations, in case an individual challenges this. They may (or must, in case that they are the last national instance) submit the case to the ECJ for comment. The ECJ has in turn no authority in the field of general pension policy. Hence there is a clear dominance of the intergovernmental element within the EU institutions in pension politics. Besides this broad sketch, one needs to look more in detail at the different actors, as there is kind of competition between two “camps”, which are distinguished both by their sphere of EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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competence and by their approach to the pension problematic, each trying to frame the reform needs differently using expert knowledge (Math/Pochet 2001). The first camp, presently setting the pace of the debate, can be labelled as the economists’ bloc, and has its real competence in the field of monetary union and budgetary politics. It is centred on the Economic Policy Committee, which advises the ECOFIN Council of Ministers, and is supported by external actors such as the big banks, insurance companies and investors, but also by the European Central Bank. The second camp is composed by the Council of Employment and Social Affairs Ministers and supported by the Employment Committee and the more recent Social Protection Committee, and in particular the High Level Panel for Migrant Workers, chaired by Ms Simone Weil (the HLP is analysing the problems of workers who have acquired supplementary pension rights in other member States and who risk to loose them when moving to another country). This camp, in whose core competence pensions fall as part of the welfare systems, has less homogenous approaches and national divergences are more important. Within the group there are actors who also agree with reform requests brought forward by the economic bloc. With the two Directorates General Economic Affairs and Social Affairs, the European Commission is represented in each of the camps, and may therefore play the role of a mediator. In this sense, and given that it has a role of “animateur” and initiator in the open method of coordination, it can be expected that interest groups direct their claims towards the Commission be it publicly or through lobbying. For both EU level camps, the main actors belong to technocrat actor categories, such as the "Indicators Sub-Group” of the Social Protection Committee or the "Ageing Working Group” set up by the Economic Policy Committee. As "faceless", impersonal actors, who meet regularly and whose task it is to supply politicians with expert information, they have low chances of becoming publicly visible in the mass media according to news value theory. Social interest groups are certainly the most important non-state actors in the field of pensions: trade unions and employers’ interest groups. The European Trade Union Federation is regularly consulted by the Social Protection Committee, but due to divergent national viewpoints, negotiating an internal compromise is a complex process. The actors that are found at national level, such as interest groups of the elderly or of the insured, or tax payer organisations, do not play an important role at EU level. The elderly as a large voter group are normally considered to have strong veto power in any pension reform, but as the European Parliament’s role is very weak in the field of pensions, European elections are very unlikely to be used in this sense. The future or current young generations as the main beneficiaries of a reform of the current generational balance, have no advocacy groups. Their interests are in turn invoked by all political actors claiming budgetary austerity instead of increased public debt for financing the pension burden, namely finance ministers, Commission DG Economy and finance, and international institutions such as the OECD, Bank for international settlement and World bank. 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue For formulating hypotheses on cross-national variances in claims-making in the Europub countries, one must take into account (a) their different pension system designs, and recent reform policies and (b) statistical data on the salience of problems in the current public pension systems.

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(a) Overview on pension systems and reform strategies of the Europub countries A widely used typology of welfare systems is the 3-regime cluster approach developed by Esping-Andersen (1998); sometimes these regimes are labelled with reference to geographical areas. The liberal or Anglo-Saxon social protection regime: Means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate. In turn, the state encourages the market by subsidizing private welfare schemes. The conservative-corporatist or continental social protection regime (sometimes also labelled as Bismarckian type): Instead of the market, corporatism subsumed under a state edifice is the main provider of welfare. Private insurance plays a marginal role; but as the state preserves social status differences, the redistributive impact is negligible. The social democrat or Scandinavian social protection regime: Principles of universalism and de-commodification of social rights are extended to the new middle classes, benefits aim at equality at highest standard. All social classes are incorporated under one universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated according to accustomed earnings. Even if there are no one-dimensional nations in the sense of a pure case, the Europub countries are clustered around these three regimes as follows: France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands: corporatist welfare-state regime, United Kingdom and Switzerland: liberal regime. Spain was not included in the 18 country study. With regard to their pension systems, France, Germany and Italy thus have the most similar systems, showing a strong bias towards contribution-financed social insurance operating on a pay-as-you-go basis, an arrangement under which benefits are paid out of current revenues and no funding is made for future liabilities. National specificities within this model are the Italian social pension and the French solidarity funds. The Dutch pension system, although belonging to the continental type as well, is fairly different: First pillar53 statutory provision consists mainly of flat-rate pension benefits, and the second pillar has a very high coverage rate (up to 91% of employees in the Netherlands). Most countries have developed earningsand work related schemes to complement the usually modest benefits awarded by the flat-rate universal plans. The subsequent country level information is quoted from the European Commission Report COM(2002) 737, pp. 41-3; and from several sources for Switzerland, mainly from Oxley/Zarin-Nejadan (2000). For each country, the main elements of the national system and recent strategies to ensure the adequacy of pensions are provided, followed by general observations. It should be noted that the Commission has compiled the data on the basis of national government information, which may therefore be less critical than scientific sources. Its advantage is the comparability across countries. Switzerland The Swiss pension system relies on three pillars: 1. A public precautionary system (AHV, IV) mandatory for all citizens, securing their subsistence and financed by taxes; 2. Occupational provisions (BV) mandatory for all employees; 3. Individual voluntary provisions promoted by tax reductions. The Swiss pension reform of 1997 introduced a splitting of pensions and credits for child raising and care periods for women. The statutory pension age for women was increased to 63 years from 2001 and to 64 years from 2005. Pension reform debates in other countries often refer to the Swiss system as a model for successful top-down redistribution and for universal coverage of the whole population. 53

The different elements of pension provision in welfare states are usually summarised as pillars. Since the 1994 World Bank report, the term first pillar is used for a publicly provided scheme financed by mandatory contributions, second pillar refers to occupational schemes negotiated between employer and employee, and the third pillar consists in voluntary savings or investments of individuals.

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Germany The earnings-related statutory pension scheme is the main source of income in old age. A slight decline in its replacement level54 is to be compensated for by increased private provision which receives substantial financial support through tax rebates and grants (targeted at lower income groups). The minimum income guarantee through the social assistance scheme has been made more effective by disregarding the income situation of descendants. Poverty risks in old age are low and the relative income level of the elderly is high; women however are still over represented among low pension receivers. Recent reforms should improve the situation of low-income pensioners and, provided government-supported supplementary pensions develop well, income replacement should remain adequate. Spain The public earnings-related pension scheme is the main source of income. An income floor is guaranteed through contributory (after 15 contribution years) and lower non-contributory minimum pensions. The development of occupational pensions is to be boosted, notably in small and medium size enterprises, through collective bargaining. Poverty risks are low and relative living standards of older people high. The Spanish public pension scheme offers high theoretical replacement rates. It can be expected that this will translate into increasing pensions as more pensioners have full insurance careers. France A two-tiered first pillar provides high replacement rates. The first tier is the public scheme with stronger solidarity elements; the second tier is based on collective agreements and has a strong link between contributions and benefits. There is little scope for second pillar provision. A minimum income is guaranteed in the form of a minimum pension or a lower non-contributory means-tested benefit. Poverty risks are low and relative incomes high. Adjustments in benefit levels to maintain financial sustainability are unlikely to threaten adequacy, especially if working longer allows individuals to achieve a better pension income. Italy A new defined-contribution pension scheme is being phased in. This will reduce replacement rates compared to the current defined-benefit scheme, but offers the opportunity to achieve similar levels through longer careers. The government also promotes occupational pension schemes, notably through the transformation of severance pay schemes into pension schemes. An income floor is guaranteed through the minimum pension. Poverty risks of older people are low and relative incomes high. The reduction in replacement rates as a result of the introduction of the new pension scheme can be offset by working longer and possibly a greater contribution of supplementary schemes to incomes. A large number of atypical workers appear to have only minimal pension provision. Netherlands A universal flat-rate pension is paid on the basis of residence. The amount is linked to the net statutory minimum wage which is based on average earnings. Maintaining living standards is the task of occupational pension schemes which, thanks to binding collective agreements, cover more than 90% of the workforce. The Dutch system protects the elderly better against the risk of poverty than the young and provides good relative living standards for men and relatively less so for women. Women's occupational pension rights can, however, be expected to increase. 54

The terms replacement rate or level refer to the level of living standard after retirement compared to the situation before retirement.

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United Kingdom Entitlement to a flat-rate basic pension linked to prices is acquired through earnings-related contributions. A compulsory earnings-related tier also exists in the first pillar, which offers improved accrual rates for lower earners; others may choose to contract out in favour of an occupational or personal pension plan. Apart from that, supplementary pension provision is voluntary. ‘Stakeholder pensions’ have been introduced to enhance access to supplementary private pensions. Minimum income guarantees linked to earnings have been strengthened, and the new Pension Credit provide additional amounts to reward people who have modest incomes from occupational and personal pension servings. The improved minimum income guarantee should reduce poverty risks for older people. Voluntary occupational and personal provision is well-established for many but the challenge is to increase coverage to ensure people are saving enough to meet their expectations for retirement. The overview on the public-private pension mix in figure 1 shows the relative role of the state in total pension provision in the Europub countries. Social security pensions do not vary much (67-72%) from one country to the other, but the amount of benefits for public employees which are also a burden on public budgets differs heavily: In Italy and France they correspond to as much as a fourth of total pension expenditure, less in the UK, Netherlands and Germany (21-18%), and only 9 percent in Switzerland. Fig. 1: Public-private pension mix, in % total pension expenditure, 1980 Social security pensions

Public employee pensions

IT

Occupational pensions

72

Individual annuities 26

1 1

FR

DE

UK

NL

CH

68

70

4

19

67

8

18

9

5

7

11

21

69

71

2

25

14

1

5

6

Source: Data from Esping-Andersen (1988): State and market in the formation of social security regimes, EUI Working Papers, Florence, as quoted in Esping-Andersen (1990), p. 85.

Statistical data The most important indicators for the salience of pension politics in a given country are its current demographic structure and trends, in particular the fertility rate and aged ratio; the aged/non-aged spending ratio (if available); poverty in retired households; and the ratio of public pension expenditure in gross domestic product. The fertility rates have a direct impact on the future aged ratio, unless low birth rates are levelled by immigration. For most of the Europub countries, a clear downward trend was stopped in the mid 1990s and, with the exception of the UK and Germany, fertility began to recover until 2000. All countries’ birth rates were clearly below the reproduction threshold of EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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2.1 throughout the whole decade, and particularly low in Spain, Italy and Germany (see table 1 and figure 2). As low birth rates have adverse effects on the aged/non-aged ratio in the future, and hence put pressure on the financing of pensions, we should expect reform debates in all countries and particularly in Germany, Italy and Spain, the two latter witnessing low birth rates for almost 30 years. Compared to the EU countries, Switzerland has maintained much longer a ‘sustainable’ fertility rate (until the early 1980s), so that the pressure on the pension financing here might increase about a decade later than elsewhere. Table 1

Switzerland Germany Spain France Italy Netherlands UK

1970 2.90 2.47 2.57 2.43 2.10 2.03 2.42

1975 2.80 1.93 1.66 1.81 1.61 1.48 2.20

Fertility rate (in births per woman) 1980 1985 1990 1995 2.20 1.64 1.59 1.48 1.95 1.81 1.45 1.25 1.60 1.51 1.36 1.18 1.90 1.79 1.78 1.70 1.55 1.52 1.33 1.18 1.56 1.37 1.62 1.53 1.64 1.42 1.83 1.71

2000 1.50* 1.34* 1.22* 1.89 1.25* 1.72* 1.64*

Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2002 and New Cronos Database. (* = Estimate)

The impact of fertility rates on the composition of the population depends also on the relative size of the current generation of women at child-bearing age, and on death rates. This relation is measured by the so-called natural population growth indicator (which excludes population change due to migration). This population change indicator varies considerably in the Europub countries: In the Netherlands, France and Switzerland, there was a clear natural population increase throughout the whole decade of the 1990s (NL: 3.3-4.6 increase per 1000 inhabitants each year, FR: 3.1-4.2, CH: 2.0-3.6). The United Kingdom and Spain also witnessed positive growth (1.2-2.7 and 0.1-2.2 increase, respectively). In Italy, there was hardly any change (-0.8 to +0.5, varying each year), and Germany even recorded negative natural growth all through the nineties (-0.2 to -1.5). This, as well age cohorts, must be taken into account when comparing countries’ demographic structures. For instance, Italy will face more demographic pressure than Spain, which had an almost identical fertility rate, but higher natural population growth. Comparing Netherlands with Germany, their opposite natural population growth rates over a decade should result in a very different salience of the ‘ageing bomb’ issue.

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3,0

Fig. 2: Fertility rates 1970-2000 ES 2,5

IT FR

2,0

NL UK CH

1,5

DE

1,0 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2002 and New Cronos Database.

Besides the fertility rate, the most telling demographic indicator is the old age ratio, which is calculated as the number of people aged over 65 over the working age population (16-64) 55. Especially in unfunded pension systems (pay-as-you-go), this ratio reflects the financial burden on people at working age for financing the income of the elderly. While the ratio was between 19 in the Netherlands and 24 in the UK in the first year of analysis, 1990, it increased within only a decade to 24-27 in most countries, increasing less only in the Netherlands and Switzerland (see figure 3). Population projections by the United Nations predict a dramatic increase by the year 2030: In Italy, which will come close to 50, and in the Netherlands the old age ratio will double the current level. Fig. 3: Old age ratio 50

1990 2000 2030 projection

25

0 UK

FR

ES

NL

DE

CH

IT

Sources: Data from OECD (2000): Labour Force Statistics, Paris, and United Nations (1999): World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision, New York.

55

When looking at the adjusted old age ratio, which is based not on the number of people at working age, but on those actually in a job, the ratio is already between 25 and 50 in present years. Unemployment being difficult to predict, this adjusted ratio is less suitable for long-term forecasting. However the adjusted ratio gives a more realistic picture of the financial implications.

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Eurostat population projections (baseline scenario) even predict that in 2050, the old age dependency ratio will reach 60 in Spain and Italy, 45-50 in France and Germany, and stabilise around 40-42 in the UK and the Netherlands. From these demographic indicators one would expect to find the most controversial public debate in countries with a low fertility rate and a high old age ratio either thirty or fifty years ahead. But the same demographic situation in two countries can have very different implications on the financing of the pension system: a funded system where, for instance, most people have private savings plans or own their houses for old age income, will be more resistant against negative trends in old age ratio. In turn, pay-as-you-go systems where the working generation pays directly the pensions of the elderly, face a high pressure in the same demographic situation. Within total public social expenditure, cash benefits to retired persons represent the most important share. The relative amount of public pension expenditure in terms of gross domestic product has noticeably increased in all Europub countries except Netherlands over twenty years since 1980. The share of GDP spent on public pensions in 2000 reaches from about 6-7 per cent in the Netherlands and Spain to as much as 13% in Italy, and is roughly at 10-11% in the other countries (see table 2 and figure 3). At present, the problem is therefore most salient in Italy, followed by Switzerland, France and Germany. Table 2

CH DE DE (2002) 1) ES FR IT NL 2) UK

Public pension expenditure (incl. most public replacement incomes to people aged 55±), before taxes, as a percentage of GDP; projection based on legislation in force in 2000 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Peak chg. : : : : : : : 11.8 11.2 12.6 15.5 16.6 16.9 5.0 10.8 14.9 4.1 9.4 8.9 9.9 12.6 16.0 17.3 7.9 12.1 13.1 15.0 16.0 15.8 : 4.0 13.8 13.9 14.8 15.7 15.7 14.1 2.1 7.9 9.1 11.1 13.1 14.1 13.6 6.2 5.5 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.4 -1.1

Source: Table 8 in COM (2002) 737, p. 62, original source quoted: Economic Policy Committee (2001), “Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: the impact on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly and possible indicators of the long-term sustainability of public finances”, EPC/ECFIN/655/01-EN final. 1) New projections submitted by Germany to take account of the latest pension reform. Germany indicated that the projections are based on the same assumptions as those used in the EPC projections; however, coverage of pension expenditures is somewhat different. 2) In the Netherlands, the second pillar is well developed. This has a direct positive impact on the public pension scheme by reducing the burden of ageing populations on the first pillar. However, there is also an important indirect implication: taxes on future pension benefits (which are drawn from the private funds) are expected to be quite high and may partially counterbalance the rise in public pension benefits.

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Fig. 4: Old age cash benefits expressed as % GDP 15

1980 1990

10

1995 1998

5

0 FR

DE

IT

NL

ES

CH

UK

Source: Data from OECD Social Expenditure Database (Public social expenditure by main category, SNA93).

Another measurable factor that should be considered for estimating low or high salience of the pension reform debate is poverty in retired households, which originally stimulated the creation of the current old age insurance systems. In some countries, poverty in retired households has been virtually eradicated (< 5% in the Netherlands); it remains fairly high in the United Kingdom (15-20%), and about half that in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. (Esping-Andersen/Sarasa 2002). In many countries, most pension-age households are homeowners, and the average elderly household in Europe enjoys a disposable income equivalent to 80 percent of the national mean (OECD 1998). Most of Europe’s remaining elderly poor are widows or workers with problematic careers, who end up depending mainly on residual assistance pensions. Public Opinion on pension reform across Europub countries The Commission collected public opinion data in a special Eurobarometer survey on the issue of “Reform on the pensions” in September-October 2001, however this data source is not yet publicly accessible.56 With regard to the awareness about the problem of ageing population and its impact on pension systems, there are notables differences between the Europub countries (see figure 5). The issue is seen as a major problem by less than half of the population, while in France and Italy almost two-thirds consider it as a major problem. Assuming that problem awareness in the general public correlates positively with political claim making and media coverage, one would expect the highest claim ‘density’ in Italy and France, closely followed by Germany and Spain, clearly less in the Netherlands and least in the UK.

56

Data are under embargo until December 2003. The only place where results of this survey have so far been published is the Commission’s draft report COM(2002) 737. The problem with these results is that they are presented in form of graphs rather than tables and include all EU countries, but not Switzerland. An earlier Eurobarometer survey was conducted in 3-4/99 on “Europeans and the elderly” (no 129), but there is no report on it indicated in the Eurobarometer site.

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Fig. 5: The population in our country is ageing, due to lower birth rates and increasing life expectancy. Do you think that in the future this will pose...? 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

DE ES FR IT NL UK A major problem (3.0)

Don't know

A minor problem (2.0)

No problem at all (1.0)

EUROBAROMETER 56.1 AUTUMN 2001

Source: Chart 4 in COM(2002) 737, p. 14. Other EU countries deleted.

Besides Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey on pensions and on the protection against unemployment risk was carried out in four of our project countries by Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001). From a survey among 5500 people in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, they found out that most respondents underestimate the true costs of the pension system, but nevertheless expect a crisis in the next two decades. It also showed that a clear majority supports the overall size of the welfare state, not just a powerful minority, but that at the same time, a broad majority opposes further increases of taxes and expenditure. However large segments of the population would welcome changes in the way the welfare benefits are allocated. A majority of employees is willing to opt out of the public pension system, replacing it with private pensions. A peculiarity in the Italian responses is the large support for re-allocating public spending from old age benefits towards unemployment payments (which seems to correspond to the fact that the share of pensions in total expenditure is the highest in Italy, see chapter 3 of this report). Three main conflict lines concerning the welfare state were discerned: young versus old, poor versus rich and ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ in terms of labour market status. The trade-off type questions asked include the following: “Given all the contributions currently paid by employers and employees, and the pensions currently paid out to retirees, do you think that (a) the sum of all contributions exactly match the amount necessary to finance the sum of all pensions, (b) the sum of all contributions exceed the amount necessary to finance the sum of all pensions, or (c) the sum of all contributions falls short of the amount necessary to finance the sum of all pensions such that there is the need to use other government funds to subsidize the pension system? Table 3 Don’t know/no answer (a) Balance (of those who answered) (b) Surplus (of those who answered) (c) Deficit (of those who answered)

France (%) 25 27 18 55

Germany (%) 1 39 7 54

Italy (%) 3 11 8 82

Spain (%) 23 21 28 51

Source: Boeri/Börsch-Supan/Tabellini 2001, p. 24.

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pensions must be financed by additional public spending. In Spain, more than a quarter of those who answered believed that there is a surplus from pension contributions. These results correspond to the Eurobarometer findings for these countries and support the hypothesis that among the Europub countries with continental type pension systems and with similar demographic situations, Italy can be expected to witness the most virulent media debate. References Bank for International Settlements (1998): The macroeconomic and financial implications of ageing populations: A report by the Group of Ten. Basel: BIS. Boldrin M.; Dolado J.J.; Jimeno J.F.; Peracchi F. (1999): The future of pensions in Europe, Economic Policy, October, vol. 14, no. 29, pp. 287-320. Boeri, Tito; Börsch-Supan, Axel; Tabellini, Guido (2001): Would you like to shrink the Welfare State? The Opinions of European Citizens, Economic Policy no. 32. COM (2002) 737/F of 17/12/2002, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Draft Joint report by the Commission and the Council on Adequate and sustainable pensions, Brussels. The report is summarised for the broad public in a “frequently asked question” format in MEMO/02/298 of 17.12.2002. Dudek, Carolyn Marie; Omtzigt, Pieter (2001): The role of Brussels in national reform pension, Corporate source European University Institute (EUI) (Florence). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI working papers. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990): The three worlds of welfare capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta; Sarasa, Stefan (2002): The generational conflict reconsidered, Journal of European Social Policy, February, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 5-21. Esping-Andersen, G.; Gallie, D.; Hemerijck, A.; Myles, J. (2001): A new welfare architecture for Europe? Report submitted to the Belgian Presidency of the EU, Brussels Economic Policy Committee (2001): Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: The impact on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly and possible indicators for long-term sustanability of public finances. Brussels: European Commission. Guillemard, Anne-Marie (2002): L’Europe continentale face à la retraite anticipée. Barrières institutionelles et innovations en matière de réforme, Revue française de sociologie, AprilJune, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 333-68. [Case study : NL, FI] Hinrichs, Karl (2000): Elefants on the move. Patterns of public pension reform in OECD countries, European Review 3, pp. 353-78. Math, Antoine; Pochet, Philippe (2001): Les pensions en Europe: débats, acteurs et méthode, Revue belge de sécurité sociale, June, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 345-63. Ney, Steven (2001): The rediscovery of politics: Democracy and structural pension reform in continental Europe. Draft. Vienna: ICCR. OECD (1996): Ageing in OECD countries. Paris: OECD. OECD (1998): Maintaining prosperity in old age. Paris: OECD. OECD (2001): Social Expenditure Database. Paris: OECD. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Oksanen, Heikki (2002): Pension reforms: key issues illustrated with an actuarial model. European Economy No. 174, July, Brussels (edited by the European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs). Oxley, Howard; Zarin-Nejadan, Milad (2000): Le système suisse de prévoyance-vieillesse face au vieillissement démographique, La Vie économique – Revue de politique économique no. 12, pp. 12-17. Pampel, F. (1994): Population aging, class context, and age inequality in public spending, American Journal of Sociology, no. 100, pp. 153-95. PEN-REF Consortium (2002): Public participation and the pension policy process: The citizen and pension reform. Final report, Deliverable D6. Revue belge de sécurité sociale, June 2002, vol. 43, no. 2: Special issue on three conferences on a new architecture of social protection in Europe. See in particular the article: Berghman, Jos; Okma, Kieke G.; Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (2002): Vers une nouvelle architecture de la protection sociale en Europe, pp. 419-566. Schludi, Martin (2001): The politics of pensions in European social insurance countries. MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/11. Köln: MPIfG. World Bank (1994): Averting the old age crisis: Policies to protect the old and promote growth. Oxford University Press and the World Bank.

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Troops deployment policy by Emily Gray (UK team)

1. Degree and form of institutional Europeanisation of defence policy The issue of troops deployment across borders is not a policy field in its own right; rather, the issue is a subset of both foreign and defence policymaking. Therefore, assessing the degree to which this sub-policy field has become Europeanised in institutional terms involves examining the extent to which the EU institutions have come to play a role in foreign and defence policy, gathering information specific to troops deployment wherever possible. Much of our period of study (1990-2002) has been characterised by the actual institutionalisation of a common European foreign and security policy lagging behind the rhetoric used by many of Europe’s politicians. Since the Franco-British St Malo Declaration of 1998, moves towards enhanced defence cooperation within the EU have been more substantial. Crucially, however, where the EU is involved in policymaking on deploying troops, decisions are made in intergovernmental forums and the supranational institutions – the Commission, Parliament, and Court of Justice – have little power. Troops deployment remains an area where the key players are national governments and supranational institutions (in particular Nato), while the EU institutions play a rather minor role. It is clear that ‘defence… has not developed the complex and powerful institutional framework at the European level that characterises many other policy areas’ (Menon 1997). Foreign and security policy forms the second pillar of 1992’s Maastricht Treaty on European Union, meaning that policies in this area are driven by the member states, not by the European Commission57. The main means of EU policymaking in the area has been the intergovernmental institutions (European Council and Council of Ministers), and the area has been characterised by the involvement of a distinct circle of key national policymakers and the development of special arrangements for managing cooperation. While EU forums have become increasingly important in making policy on troops deployment since 1998, with the 1999 Helsinki European Council agreeing on the ‘Headline Goal’ of creating a joint military rapid reaction force by 2003, the EU institutions involved continue to be the intergovernmental ones. For the hypothesis that supranational forms of Europeanisation lead to increased conflict between national actors and the EU, while intergovernmental forms are more likely to produce conflicts between member states, we might therefore expect that where debates over troops deployment in national public spheres involve the EU at all, the area would be characterised by interstate conflict over the whole time period from 1990 to 2002. ‘As the burden of the Cold War has been lifted, so Europeans have come increasingly to talk in terms of equipping Europe with a defence capability of its own’ (Menon 1997). However, until the late 1990s, the progress of EU foreign and defence policy integration was registered ‘as much in terms of rhetoric and bold intentions as through practical institutional (let alone legal) developments’. This has changed somewhat since, with the 2000 Nice Treaty setting out the institutionalisation of European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP] for the first time. This created a new Political and Security Committee [PSC], an intergovernmental body with one member each from the 15 member states. Two other new institutions – the European Union Military Committee [EUMC], composed of the 15 Chiefs of Defence, and the 57

‘European Security and Defence Policy After Nice’, Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper No. 20, Apr 2001.

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European Union Military Staff [EUMS] – were also strengthened in the course of 2001. These developments have deepened the institutional Europeanisation of defence policy, although the decision-making framework remains largely intergovernmental. Over our time period, we can expect a rise in claims-making with an EU scope from the late 1990s onwards, and also a rise in claims-making with a multilateral scope, as multilateral cooperation increasingly came about in this policy area following the end of the Cold War. However, the scopes that would be expected to predominate throughout our time period are supranational (troops deployment under the auspices of Nato and the UN) as well as bilateral (decisions by national governments to deploy troops abroad for invasion/attack, or to address conflicts in former colonies – examples over our time period include the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, British involvement in Sierra Leone, and so on). Given the longstanding political rhetoric over a common EU foreign and defence policy that Menon identifies, we might also expect that even when institutional Europeanisation of foreign and defence policy was less developed than it is now, in the early 1990s, debates in European public spheres would nonetheless feature conflicts over European capabilities for troops deployment and defence. If we hypothesise that the military alliances of which a country is a member are likely to impact on national debates over troops deployment, we are also likely to see more Europeanisation in the six countries which are EU, Nato and WEU members (UK, F, DE, I, S and NL) than in Switzerland, which is a member of none (although it is a Nato partner, i.e. it participates in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council)58. It should also be remembered that in the area of defence policy, ‘Europe’ does not necessarily mean the EU. The states in our study have often opted for non-institutionalised, ad hoc intraEuropean arrangements to manage defence cooperation, including bilateral initiatives (the Franco-German corps set up in 1983, or the Anglo-Dutch naval force) or multilateral projects such as the Eurocorps. Over the period 1990-2002, key events in the Europeanisation of defence policy have been as follows: Chronology of main European agreements and EU developments • 1991 Rome declaration by Nato members, which accepted a European defence identity through the Europeanisation of Nato, and decided to reorient Nato towards more political tasks, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. • 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union establishes a common foreign and security policy, including a common defence policy, which ‘might in time lead to a common defence’. The treaty also sub-contracts defence to the WEU and timetables a treaty review by 1996. • 1992 WEU Petersburg Declaration by WEU members, committing the WEU to peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks. • 1997 Amsterdam Treaty between EU members, which anticipated a strengthened crisis-management role for the EU, including strengthening the ability of the European Council to ‘instruct’ the WEU to carry out missions. Strengthening of CFSP planning, creation of post of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana, elected to Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), and financial basis for CFSP secured. 58

All seven countries in the Europub study are OSCE members.

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• 1998 St Malo Agreement between France and Britain, agreeing to enhance defence cooperation inside the EU. • 1999 Cologne European Council. Commitment to further develop a more effective European military. • 1999 Helsinki European Council between EU members, where practical impetus was given to the process decided on in Cologne. It was agreed to develop a common European security and defence policy, including the ‘headline goal’ of creating a joint military ‘rapid reaction’ force of 50,000-60,000 troops, able to be deployed within 60 days and sustained for at least one year, by 2003. • 2000 Nice Treaty, which set out the institutionalisation of European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP] for the first time. Main actors in issue field International organisations other than the EU (Nato, UN, OSCE), and extra-European states, in particular the US, are likely to be key actors in the area of troops deployment. This can be ascribed to the defence arrangements that were set up following the Second World War, since military cooperation between Western European states developed within the Nato framework. Since 1949, when Nato was established, foreign policy and defence were coordinated among Western European states under American leadership. Although the Western European Union [WEU] was created in 195459 as a European intergovernmental compromise on defence, it has always been a relatively weak institution, created to enhance defence cooperation between Western European states but doing so explicitly within a Nato framework. Until the end of the Cold War, maintenance of the American commitment seemed to most Western European governments essential to their security, the reasons for this being twofold: concern about the Soviet threat, and concerns about West Germany re-emerging as Europe’s ‘alternative hegemon’ (Forster and Wallace 2000). Given the removal of the Soviet threat following the end of the Cold War, over our time period a particularly thorny issue for European states has been whether European defence cooperation should take place within Nato or develop a more autonomous capacity to act, with the more Atlanticist governments (such as UK and NL) typically preferring the first option, and France advocating the latter. EU involvement in defence affairs has been limited as a result of the existence of alternative institutional structures with a proven track record through which necessary cooperation can be carried out, i.e. Nato, and to a lesser extent, the UN (Freedman and Menon 1997). The weakness of the EU in this area reflects the fact that the big decisions ‘are still national’ (Freedman and Menon 1997). National governments – executives in particular - have been the main players in the area of troops deployment. It can be expected that debates in national public spheres across Europe about troops deployment are likely to exhibit an increasingly European scope over our time period, but the actual actors involved in the issue field will remain national and supranational actors. Western European states, even the smaller ones such as the Netherlands, ‘have remained wedded to the notion of national control over decisions’ although geopolitical shifts have rendered ‘the ability of individual European states to implement these decisions with military action ‘almost negligible’.

59

At that time the WEU consisted of seven countries, including all of the countries in the Europub study other than Spain and Switzerland (UK, F, DE, NL, I, plus Belgium and Luxembourg); Spain joined in 1987, and Switzerland has never joined. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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Of the European institutions, we have already seen that the key institutions have been the intergovernmental European Council and Council of Ministers; the Commission has played at best an auxiliary role, the Parliament has had little influence and has devoted little attention, and the Court of Justice has no authority in the field (Forster and Wallace 2000). ‘The supranational institutions… have only a very minor, consultative role to play’ (Freedman and Menon 1997). Within the EU, interest groups have played no significant role in this policy field. For example, the Helsinki European Council involved agreements among ministers and officials, with ‘little involvement of parties or parliaments, and only limited coverage in national media’ (Forster and Wallace 2000). The EU decision-making process on deploying military force is complex, which can slow down decision-making in crises. The process is first initiated by the Council of Europe; the Council of Ministers then makes the decision to deploy military forces (unanimity is required for action); the Commission prepares a recommendation on the details of the implementation; finally, the Council of Ministers makes the decision on implementation, by the procedure of qualified majority voting60. As for policy style, throughout our time period ‘questions of sovereignty and of distinctive national influence have remained important; cooperation has edged forward on the basis of consensus’. In EU policymaking on common foreign and security, the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union, progress has been marked by ‘dependence on mutual trust and consensus more than on rules’, since the central EU institutions have been weak in this area and the common budget has been small (Forster and Wallace 2000). 2. Salience and national stakes in the issue Foreign, security and defence policy has been described as an area ‘of high sensitivity in terms of traditional state politics’ (Wallace 2001). When compared with the other policy fields examined in the Europub project, we might well expect higher national stakes in troops deployment, monetary policy and immigration than in the policy fields of agriculture, pension provision and education, since the former areas are all crucial powers of the nation-state. As a result, it may well be that Europeanisation in the former domains is more likely to become the object of national controversy, since ‘defence and diplomacy, like border controls, policing and citizenship – and money – are part of the core of state sovereignty’ (Forster and Wallace 2000). As regards national stakes in the area of troops deployment, the countries in our study can be divided into three subsets: those with high national stakes in the issue due to strong military traditions (F, UK), those with lower national stakes in the issue thanks to weak military traditions (I, D, NL and S), and Switzerland, which despite not being an EU member is likely to have medium national stakes in the issue due to its tradition of neutrality and low international involvement. One rather blunt way of assessing ‘objective’ national stakes in the area of troops deployment is to look at military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Defence spending decreased across Western Europe following the end of the Cold War, as figure 2 shows.

60

‘Foreign Policy Decision-making: the US and the EU compared’. Center for European Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Available online at http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp8.html, accessed 15 Nov 2002.

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Fig.2 Military expenditure in Europub countries Country

Military expenditure constant US$bn

in Military expenditure share (%) of GDP

as Ranking of the 7 countries, in share of GDP spent on military 2000 expenditure (2000)

1990

1995

2000

1990

1995

France

45.6

42.0

39.9

3.5

3.1

2.6

1=

UK

47.6

38.8

37.3

3.9

3.0

2.5

1=

Italy

22.2

19.7

26.0

2.1

1.8

2.1

3

Netherlands

8.3

6.9

6.9

2.5

1.9

1.6

4=

Germany

47.3

35.0

33.1

2.8

1.7

1.5

4=

Spain

8.5

7.8

8.0

1.8

1.5

1.3

6

Switzerland

4.7

3.5

3.0

1.8

1.4

1.1

7

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] Military Expenditure Database, http://first.sipri.org. The definition of ‘military expenditure’ used by SIPRI includes all current and capital expenditure on the armed forces, including peace keeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations; military space activities. Taking military expenditure as a crude measure of national stakes in an issue, we might expect Europeanisation of defence policy to be more the object of controversy in France and the UK, which spend the highest percentage of GDP on defence, than in states with relatively low military expenditure such as Spain and Switzerland. The high defence spending by France and the UK reflects these countries’ stronger military traditions; where a state has a strong tradition of military intervention abroad, higher stakes are likely to be involved in the area of troops deployment than for countries with weaker military traditions. Chuter (1997) argues that in Western Europe only the British and the French have ‘a wide spectrum of defence capabilities and a global reach’, and in the light of these continuing national defence identities, both states consider it crucial that a great deal of control is retained over the process of ESDP. It is worth quickly reviewing national responses to European defence integration here for the countries in our study, since it can be seen that defence policies have been shaped and continue to be shaped by nationally specific sets of considerations. Menon (1997) argues that ‘different histories and geographies have led to very different outlooks on, and responses to, European defence integration’. The UK and France are the states in our study that are the most likely to send troops to participate in international military action. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War the UK supplied as many forces as the rest of non-US NATO combined (roughly 35,000 troops) while France provided around 15,000, totalling as many as the four other non-US NATO contributing members combined. Similarly, in the 1999 peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, the UK and France provided about half of the ground troops for KFOR (approximately 14,500). While some of the EU states with weaker military traditions (the Netherlands, Germany and Italy) also participated, they sent far fewer troops. EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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A key difference between France and the UK is that successive French governments have argued strongly for the development of a European defence capability, while the UK has favoured continuing arrangements via Nato. Howorth (1997) argues that ‘France is intensely committed to the creation of an integrated European defence structure and to a common foreign and security policy’. However, the UK has a ‘history of coolness towards European defence integration’ (Chuter 1997) given its strong Atlantic ties and support of Nato. This has shifted somewhat since the 1997 general election; the incoming Blair government came to recognise European deficiencies in defence capability following US-led Nato interventions in Bosnia, meaning that strengthening of European defence arrangements became desirable as a means of preserving American involvement and thereby promoting a strong Nato, as well as forming a plank of European integration. The Franco-British St Malo Declaration (1998) was a turning point in UK involvement in shaping European defence; Blair and Chirac called for the EU to have the capacity for military action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so. The official UK government position remains that ‘whatever we do in Europe, the UK is in no doubt that Nato is and must remain the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defence’61. This reflects the facts that the UK has traditionally been Atlanticist and the issue of ‘a European army’ continues to be highly controversial in the UK public sphere. Weaker national military traditions may mean that the governments of countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have lower national stakes in the defence policy field than do France or the UK. National histories mean that there are important differences with regard to deploying troops abroad even among the states with weaker military traditions. Germany ‘has pursued with determination the policy of encouraging enhanced European defence integration’, particularly since the end of Cold War. Bohnen (1997) argues that Germany ‘has viewed European cooperative schemes in the defence realm as a means of gaining influence over its militarily more active and independent European partners’. Furthermore, Europe has acted as a useful means for the German government to circumvent domestic pressure over troops deployment abroad, since public disquiet about troops deployment has been prevalent in Germany over the time period of our study. Italy does not have a strong and independent military tradition, and within the EU it has typically fallen in behind Franco-German plans for a common foreign and security policy; it has been argued that ‘the actual evolution of European FSP has found Rome unable to do more than applaud from the sidelines’ (Andreatta and Hill 1997). Italy has relied on multilateralism in the defence and foreign policy spheres, and since the early 1990s Italian governments ‘have pursued a number of policies aimed at reinforcing and functionally linking the different multilateral organisations of which the country is a member’ (Croci 2002). The Netherlands also has a weak military tradition, but unlike the other EU states with weak military traditions it has traditionally been ‘highly Atlanticist’ (van Staden 1997). However, Dutch defence policy has reoriented from its traditional Atlanticist leanings over the period of time of our study and is now ‘more focused on security cooperation among the countries of Western Europe than some years ago when such cooperation was thought to erode the Western alliance’. Following military restructuring since the early 1990s, Dutch troops deployment is characterised almost wholly by multinational cooperation, forces usually only taking part in military operations as part of an international alliance. Spain has not been a major player in the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Following its post-1975 61

Ministry of Defence Policy Paper no.3, ‘European Defence’, available at www.mod.uk.

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democratic transition, it joined Nato and the EU decades later than the other EU countries in the Europub study (Nato in 1982, the EU in 1986). It thus has little recent history of deploying troops abroad, although Spanish troops took part in UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the UN force in Kosovo, and have also been involved in peacekeeping in Central America. Finally, Swiss debates on troops deployment are shaped by the country’s tradition of neutrality. Switzerland did not participate in either world war, and the concept of integral neutrality continued to prevail during the Cold War (Braillard and Schwok 2001). However, the 1990s saw increased Swiss recognition of the need for international cooperation; while traditionally Switzerland ‘has avoided alliances that might entail military, political, or direct economic action’, in recent years the Swiss have ‘broadened the scope of activities in which they feel able to participate without compromising their neutrality’62. This gradual shift towards international involvement seems set to continue, as the Swiss public voted by a 55-45 margin for UN membership in March 2002, and the country became a full member in September 2002, a move which may well re-ignite debate on EU membership. In the 1990s, the electorate rejected a government proposition to deploy Swiss troops as UN peacekeepers (Blue Helmets) in 1994. However, Switzerland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1996 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997, deployed Yellow Berets to support the OSCE in Bosnia, and contributed a force (SWISSCOY) to the UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Additionally, in June 2001 Swiss voters approved new legislation permitting the deployment of armed Swiss troops for UN or OSCE international peacekeeping missions. Public opinion on European defence across Europub countries As a final remark, it may be useful to note differences in public enthusiasm for common European defence between the countries in the Europub study, since domestic public opinion can affect decisions and debates over troops deployment in national public spheres. The tentative hypothesis can be put forward that there is likely to be more conflict over the Europeanisation of defence policy in national public spheres in those countries where domestic public opinion is more opposed. For example, a Eurobarometer survey in Nov/Dec 2000 questioned respondents in all EU member states about the creation of a European rapid reaction force63. The results are shown in figure 4 below.

62

US State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘Background Note: Switzerland’, March 2002 63 The question was: ‘Recently, the EU has decided to set up a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men. Personally, do you believe it is a very good thing, a rather good thing, a rather bad thing, or a very bad thing?’ EUROPUB.COM Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046 – WP 1 – Deliverable D1.2

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PublicopinioninEuropubcountriesonthecreationof aRapidReactionForceof 60,000troops(%'verygood' or 'rather good' thing, bycountry)

%of respondents 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Italy

81

France

81

77

Netherlands Country

90

73

EU15

70

Germany

69

Spain

UK

60

According to the hypothesis, this may suggest that there is likely to be a higher degree of conflict over troops deployment in national public spheres in the UK, Spain and Germany than in the other EU states in the study. References Andreatta, Filippo, & Christopher Hill (1997). ‘Italy’, in Howorth & Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Bohnen, Johannes (1997). ‘Germany’, in Howorth & Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Braillard, Philippe, & René Schwok, ‘The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy by the European Union and its POSSIBLE consequences for Switzerland’. Columbia International Affairs Online Working Papers, at www.ciaonet.org/wps/brp01/. Chuter, David (1997). ‘The United Kingdom’, in Howorth & Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Cornish, Paul, & Geoffrey Edwards (2001). ‘Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture’. International Affairs 77:3, pp.587-603. Croci, Osvaldo (2002). ‘The Second Berlusconi Government and Italian Foreign Policy’. The International Spectator, Feb 2002. Forster, Anthony, & William Wallace (2000). ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in Wallace, Helen, & William Wallace (2000), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Freedman, Lawrence, & Anand Menon (1997). ‘Conclusion’, in Howorth & Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Howorth, Jolyon (2001). ‘European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 39:4, Nov 2001, pp.765-89. Howorth, Jolyon (2000a). ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’. Survival 42:2, Summer 2000, pp.33-55. Howorth, Jolyon (2000b). ‘Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics’. European Foreign Affairs Review 5, pp.377-396. Lezzi, Bruno (2001). ‘Experience as a Newcomer: Switzerland’s Contribution to International Peace Support Operations’, Studien zu Zeitgeschichte und Sicherheitspolitik vol.19, ETH Zürich. Available online at http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/Studies/volume_9/content.htm. Manigart, Philippe (2001). ‘Public Opinion and European Defense’. Paper presented at International Symposium on ‘Public Opinion and European Defense’, Brussels, 3 Apr 2001. Menon, Anand (1997). ‘Introduction’ to Howorth, Jolyon, & Anand Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Miskimmon, Alister John (2001). ‘Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and the Trans-Atlantic Relationship’. German Politics 10:1, pp.83-106. Van Staden, Alfred (1997). ‘The Netherlands’, in Howorth & Menon (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge). Wallace, Helen (2001). ‘The Changing Politics of the European Union: An Overview’. Journal of Common Market Studies 39:4, Nov 2001, pp.581-94.

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