Rethinking Political Islam Discursive Analysis of Syed Abul Ala Maududi and Rached Al Ghannauchi Of late, the world came to know that political Islam is not a unified response to the modernity and modern politics. It varies from Pakistan to Turkey to Egypt and Tunisia. Abul Ala Maududi, Syed Qutub, Necmettin Erbakan and Hasan Turabi all have tried to theorise how the Islam can be re-politicized for a modern nation state which is not a Caliphate. ‘Islamic State’ appeared more or less a most popular and ambitious objective of these thinkers and their parties. Because of its anti-colonial, anti-Israeli and anti-war overtones, these movements were primarily identified as anti-West, anti-American and anti-Israel, a myth later on problematized by American scholar John L. Esposito. The process of making and branding of political Islam continued at international political level but it was not appreciated for its socio-political dialectics which had made these movements not only a unique experiment in the history of Islam but also a major shift from traditional Islam. From a diverse range of challenges, human civilizations and individual and institutional agencies, Islamic movements have opened the doors of criticism and allowed for structural rebuilding of Islamic societies. Their approaches varied, so varied their responses and modalities. Within these diverse interpretations, discourse of ‘civilian state’ has been discussed with advocates of Islamic state. In this paper, the two models will be analysed. Islamic state was mainly propounded by Syed Abul Ala Maudui who articulated his politics mainly within politics of Indian subcontinent. On the other hand, emergence of civilian state or the Dawla Madniya has been attributed to the Tunisian thinker and leader Rached Al Ghannauchi. Without having differences, both thinkers have subtly differentiated on explanation of Islamic State, civil society and the civilizational role of Islam. Separation and autonomy of religious and institutions of public interests from state, institutionalization of “freedom of expression” and civil and human rights are main defining features of Ghannauchi’s Islamic politics. But Maududi has theorized for a greater role for defining civilization and culture. Individual agency of human being has not appeared as main component of his political discourse, institution and a big state has been advocated by Maududi. This paper compares analytical frameworks of first Islamic caliphate used by both thinkers. The way Maududi and Ghannauchi respond to the politics of modern nation state are not necessarily contradictory, rather they appear another extension of political Islam whose foundations are also to be discussed in this paper. It is not important how Maududi and Ghannauchi respond, but more important thing is their agreement on creating a state, a civil society, separation of powers and challenge of authoritarianism. Ghannauchi’s support to the Turkish model is not just a political position; it is appreciation of political objectives over cultural and religious objectives.
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This paper will situate political Islam and its engagement with the modern nation state particularly their role after Arab Spring which has given them first opportunity since they are established. Maududi’s model of Islamic politics has been tested by several power sharing in Pakistan and Bangladesh and their failures are often attributed to their unresponsiveness to the social and political transformation of the world particularly secular character of state and sovereignty of people in their decision making. Ghannaushi’s understanding is increasingly convincing many Islamic movements which talks about a civil state instead of Islamic State. Keywords: Maududi, Ghannauchi, Islamic state, Caliphate, Democracy, Shoura
Presenter’s short biography Omair Anas is PhD from Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi where he has worked on Transnational Arab Public Sphere. His recent publications include a chapter on “Role of Social Media in Arab Uprising: Case Study of Kulluna Khaled Said Facebook Campaign” which was published by Deutsche Welle Media Akademi, Bonn, Germany. He has contributed and presented many research papers in international journals and edited volumes. He was visiting fellow at Institute of Media and Communication Studies, Freie University Berlin during 2012-213. His research interests include media, democratization, public sphere and political Islam.
[email protected]
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Introduction: Islamic societies have historically been part of political systems which were governed by Caliphs, Sultans or Emirs who assumed a central authority over his subjects in a loosely defined territory called Dar Al Islam (DAI). They were part of political systems whose basic definition was not in accordance of modern political system in which territory and citizenship were primary components. More than three hundred empires and dynasties, called ass Dar al Islam, had ruled on Islamic world spread over three continents from Africa to Asia to Europe. Among them were Sunnis, Shites and many other sects originated from different schools. There were more than one Dar al Islam at one time, many of them have signed allegiance to the central Caliphate or many did not. Political advisors, scholars and philosophers living in different states such as Al-Kindi (801–873), al-Farabi (872-950), İbn Sina (980-1037), Al Mawaredi (972-1058), Ibn Hazm (994-1064), Ibn Bajjah (1095-1139), Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Al Gazali (1055-111), Al Shahrastani (1086-1153), Al Tousi (1201– 74), Ibn Taymiyya (1262–1327) or Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) have developed their political thoughts within their experiences from different Muslim dynasties and empires. Within these political discourses, there emerged many schools ranging from rationalist and traditional. If Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Al Arabi etc. represent rationalist’s school, Gazali and Ibn Taymiya represented Mutakallimin who have inspired a large size of Islamic intellectuals across the Islamic world. The competitive between the two and different other schools never stopped, though it was weakened by political defeats. In Indian subcontinent, Shah Waliullah Mohaddith Dehalvi (1703-1762) inspired many Indian Islamic thinkers such as Syed Abul Ala Maududi. Within Arab and especially in North African countries, Ibn Khaldun remained most influential thinkers who were most important reference point in defining sociology of Islam and Islamic movements. Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi (1905-1973) was inspired by Khaldunian traditions. Bennabi appeared as important reference within writings of Tunisian leader Rached Al Ghannauchi who has helped successful democratic transition of Tunisia after popular uprisings in 2011. Modern Islamic political thoughts largely referred as ‘political Islam’ or ‘Islamism’ represents an old debate between rationalists (Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn AlArabi tec.) and Mutakallimin (Gazali, Ibn Taymiya and Shah Waliullah Dehalvi). However a comparative analysis of modern Islamic thought suggests that the tension between different Islamic approaches has not yet ended rather it might be taking new discourses in response to new challenges. The competitive and relative nature of Islamism remained unappreciated by Islamic forces and their political opponents as well as academia. Misinterpretations of Arab Uprisings and Islamist’s ‘takeover’ are largely result of this gap. Mistrust towards Tunisian Islamic parties such as Ennahdha and Turkish ruling Islamic party or Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt can be found within branding a ‘universal political Islam’ defined by parochial Sharia law or Jihad of Osama Ben Laden. This paper will contest dominant discourse of ‘Universal Islamism’ and will try to identify diversity of Islamic discourses within Islamic world. To do that, it is important to ask to whom these Islamic scholars or leaders of revivalist movements have referred for their 3
projects of Islamic politics. For example, Maududi’s foundation of Islamism is based on a sound criticism of Tasaawuf to which Gazali, Shah Waliullah Dehalvi and Sheikh Sarhindi had greatly relied upon. According to Maududi (1978: 73, 119-130)1, Al Gazali and Shah Waliullah had failed in their Islamic revivalism because of their reliance and use of Sufism and because of their neglect of reasoning (Ma’qoolat). On the other hand, Rached Al Ghannauchi, the Tunisian Islamic leader has relied on a different set of philosophical foundation laid by Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi whose framework of civilization and politics have brought different discourse within Islamism. Islamic history, Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic texts are three major sources of political theory of Islam. With preoccupation of normative theories, empirical theories have not got justified space in rationale realm of Islam. Major references of Islamic politics so far are from philosophical and normative theories of Islam. But, it is not to say that Muslim empires behaviour was also guided by merely normative perceptions of religious duties. Muslim empires like any other empires have acted rationally and hence have behaved in terms of increasing their power against their rivals, Muslims or non-Muslims. Despite their noncompliance to Islamic standards of governance, Muslim scholars and jurists have given in to the reality of power. There is an agreement that Muslim and Arab empires have maintained at least basic functions of Islamic state; that is to protect life of Muslims, establishment of Islamic prayers and other Faraidh (Compulsory things) and Islamic education. Final decline of Ottoman Empire had caused much uproar and disappointment and psychological setback to the Muslim conscience and many pro-Caliphate movements such as Indian Tahreek-eKhilafat (1919-1924) started.2 This was a new historical epoch in Muslim mind-set in which they would have to live without having even a nominal central authority. Moreover, colonial control of Muslim countries and occupation of Palestine had doubled the sense of disappointment and subsequent an intellectual response was to include not only decline of Caliphate but also immediate political crises of colonial occupation of Arab and Muslim countries. In the complete hopeless period, there appeared October Revolution in Russia which later on emerged as powerful challenge to the western hegemony. Arabs were first to be inspired by these newly emerged revolutionary currents. This revolution was not only about a change of particular government but also about a change in a complete power distribution and resources allocation within a state as well as among the international 1
Tajdeed Ihyaye Deen Philosopher and poet Dr. Mohammad Iqbal had made a powerful criticism of Kamal Ataturk in his couplet Chaak Kar Di Turk-e-Nadan Ne Khilafat Ki Qaba Sadgi Muslim Ki Dekh, Auron Ki Ayyari Bhi Dekh 2
(The imprudent Turk has torn the cloak of the Divine Khilafah Look at Muslims’ simplicity at other’s cunningness also look) Popular Arab poet Ahmed Shouqi (1868-1932) said these lines: الـــــــهنـد والهـة ومصـر حـزيـنـة *** تبكـي عليـك بمــــــدمـع سحــــاح والشـام تسال والعـراق وفــــــارس *** أمحـا من االرض الخـالفـة مـاح واتت لك الجمع الجـــــــالئـل مـاتـما*** فـقعـدن فــــيـه مـقـاعـد االنـواح
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community. In the course of modernization, Muslim and Arab delegations were heading towards Europe only. There was no such strong inclination towards Russia for scientific and educational tours of Muslim scholars which had taken place during Mahmet Ali Pasha in Egypt. At this historical juncture, theoretically, Islamic world should have joined Russia or socialist movements to fight against colonial powers, but it didn’t happen. Why it didn’t happen, can be found in unfolding geopolitical developments in which many Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia sought for security guarantees from none other than western and colonial powers after oil discovery. Though, some Arab states sought support from emerging Soviet Union and subscribed revolutionary ideas through Baathist ideologies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon anti-communism literature from Muslim world didn’t appear unless Egypt has formally inclined to socialist ideas under military dictatorship of Gamal Abdul Nasser. Rivalry between Islamic Saudi Arabia and socialist Baathist neighbours led by Egypt has created several transnational and Pan Arab socialist and Islamic movements across the region. Islamist movements were patronized by Saudi Arabia and socialist and Baathist forces were supported by Egypt and Syria. Demonization of socialist ideas as “materialist, godless, atheist ideology” came only at this point and Saudi groups generously funded Islamic literature prepared by Islamic thinkers from Egypt, India, Pakistan and other countries. Nasser’s championing Palestinian cause and Arab nationalism mobilized Arab opinion in his favour which gradually declined after his repressive measures against Muslim Brotherhood and execution of its top intellectual Syed Qutb in 1966. Egypt’s defeat in 1967 war with Israel proved final blow to Nasserism and the pan Arabism and nationalism lost its appeal. In Indian subcontinent, Islamic community had to face imminent partition plan between India and Pakistan. British government and Indian leaders were ready for this partition plan while Muslim leadership was in great divide. The western part of India (now Pakistan) had Muslim majority but still majority of Indian Muslims were living in other states of India which included non-Urdu speaking regions such as Tamil, Malyalam, Kannad, Telgu (South India), Bengali, Assamese (North East of India) and Muslims in northern states. Major Islamic institutions such as Darul Uloom Deoband and Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulam were based in Urdu speaking states of Uttar Pradesh and had large following across the Urdu speaking populations of North India. Partition plan has divided largely this Urdu speaking population and there was no major migration from non-Urdu speaking Muslims in India.3 Muslims from Western states were chief exponents of partition. Syed Abul Ala Maududi who had shifted from South Indian Muslim state of Hyderabad of Nizam to the Western province of Punjab on invitation of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal and was running his newly established Jamat Islami, would have to face reality of partition in 1947. Despite his principle opposition to Muslim or Hindu nationalism, especially in his book Mas’ala Qaumiyat and Islami Siyasat, he chose to join Pakistan, a new country few miles from his headquarters in Punjab. Maududi’s post partition Islamic activism should be examined 3
Oskar Verkaaik (1994), A people of migrants: ethnicity, state, and religion in Karachi, Amsterdam: VU University Press.
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within this changing context which would better explain why Indian Jamat Islami did not follow model of Jamat Islami Pakistan. In his last speech in India, which he delivered in Madras (now Chennai), recommendations Khutba-e-Madras,4 Maududi (2011) appeared more realist than an idealist. The way Maududi later on engaged in constitutional process of Pakistan, it showed much of his Islamic Realism. Because of Maududi’s Islamic realism, it is questioned whether Maududi could have thought more pragmatically on crucial issues of Islamic politics, had the partition not happened. The two Islamic personalities, Syed Abul Ala Maududi and Rached Al Ghannauchi are among most important figures of their respective Islamic movements who were given an opportunity to test their thoughts in realpolitik. This paper agrees with the notion of postIslamism that political Islam has undergone a discursive as well as strategy transformation over the period of time (Bayat 2007, Irfan 2009) 5. But this paper tries to contest three basic assumptions of these transformation and a comparative analysis of Maududi and Rached Al Ghannauchi substantiates conclusion that this transformation is not just about change of power politics, or shift in middle class in the Arab Islamic world. Second assumption this paper will contest is that political Islam is merely a text driven phenomenon and that text is also immune from contextual dynamics. The final argument is about future of political Islam which is neither black nor white. This paper argues that future of political Islam is not about politics; rather it is about Islam alone and because of Islam’s internal flexibility of allowing a broader discussion and resilience in a given situation, changes in Islamic discourse is not a new phenomenon, rather it is a historical phenomenon which continues from long time. From his writings, it can be understood that his project of Islamic revivalism was not designed for a nation state such as Pakistan. The post partition Islamic discourse of Maududi is marked by competitive nationalisms of India and Pakistan, cold war and Pakistan’s alliance with the West against India’s alliance with the Soviet Union and his perception about India as Hindu state rather than a secular state. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s common interests in the global politics have allowed Maududi to extend his movement into the Arab world where his major books were translated and published by Saudi Arabia. 6 This was the Saudi Arabia’s dependency on Islamism for its regional and internal legitimacy also eased which also resulted into new alliances between Islamist and socialist forces in the region and their international solidarity mainly Iran, Russia, Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood so on ( ElHamalawy 2007).7Both forces have influenced each other in order to search for common grounds for common but competitive objectives of domestic politics. 4
The book is based on Maududi’s last speech in annual meeting of Jamat Islami, held in Madras on 26 April 1947. 5
Ahmad, Irfan. Islamism and Democracy in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
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T.K, Ibrahim (2011), “Saudi Arabia and Jamaat-E-Islami Indo-Saudi Relations” Vol. XLIX No.4, 2011-04-24, http://www.radianceweekly.com/252/7038/sarkozy-owes-a-cogent-reply/2011-04-24/indo-saudirelations/story-detail/saudi-arabia-and-jamaat-e-islami.html 7 http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/comrades-brothers, Comrades and Brothers by Hossam El-Hamalawy (2007), Volume 37
The newly found common ground between Islamic parties and socialist and secular forces was enough vast to include a diverse range of issues. 6
Syed Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) Syed Abul Ala Maududi was born in 1903 in India’s princely state of Hyderabad ruled by the Nizam. In May 1933, he started monthly Islamic journal Tarjumanul Quran which became launching pad of Islamic activism and he successfully mobilized a large number of Islamic scholars to join his Jamat Islami in 1941. He has been opposing nationalism and nation state because of their inherent nature of being based on exclusion and injustice. But after partition, Maududi chose to move to Pakistan where he remained active in politics until his death in 1979. His major political contribution was ‘Objectives Resolution’ added as preamble of in the Constitution of Pakistan. He had mobilized entire religious leadership of Pakistan and convinced political parties to endorse an Islamic constitution for newly created state. In his active life, he wrote 120 books and widely travelled to all over the world. In 1972, he resigned from post of Emir of Jamat Islami. He faced several arrests and jail along with a death sentence which was later on commuted to life term after international pressures. He died in the United States where he had gone for his kidney treatment in 1979. Maududi’s personality can be broadly divided in four discursive, not historical, features. First is the “critical Maududi” which has fiercely criticized Islamic history, Sufis, kings and rulers and Ulama. Second, the “activist Maududi” invited all scholars to join a mission for Islam and his missionary activism; he appeared to be acting on behalf of common interests, instead of his own critical understanding. Third feature is “scholar Maududi” in which he is a serious scholar of Islam, defending Islamic jurisprudence with his powerful arguments. The fourth is the “leader Maududi” who has acted to act on collective decision of Jamat Islami, compromising between his critical feature and leadership priorities. In his critical phase, his major intellectual contribution is his criticism of traditional Islamic thinking especially with regard to politics. He criticized Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehalvi, Sarhindi, Syed Ahmed Shaheed and then Husain Ahmad Madni. When Maududi said that Islamic Caliphate would not be represented by some Ulama, he actually meant abolishment of priesthood and its religious, political and cultural role. The model of Jamat Islami itself was a unique Ijtihad which does not have any such precedent within Islamic history. On Islamic state, Maududi has talked in different places. If constitution of Pakistan and Khutbat-e-Madras was Maududi’s realism then Khilafat wa Malukiyat was Maududi’s original vision of Islamic state. In another book, Maududi has talked about rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state. Political institutions in Islamic text have never been a sacred issue. How Caliph or head of the Islamic state will be elected, how other institutions will be made are completely subject to Ijtihad of Islamic scholars of the period. When Maududi defended limited Theocratic Democracy, he only meant that as long as this system helped implement Islamic values, the institution could be used. Among his important political writings are The Islamic Law and Constitution (1960), Muslaman aur Majooda Siyasi Kashmikash (1941), Tahreek-e-Azadi-eHind aur Musalman, Tajdeed-o-Ahyaa-e-Deen, Four Basic Quranic Terms, Khilafat wa Malookeyat, Islamic Civilization: its foundational beliefs and principles,
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Islamic State Maududi has questioned the nation itself. In his conception, Nation is a Jahili term which was never defined on the cultural basis. Their main source of solidarity is racial and historical traditions. In Arab history also, Qaum was used for people for a certain tribe and similarly today’s nation is used for people of common descent. This is against Islamic concept and Quran has also not used terms like Sha’b or Qaum for Muslims and it was impossible to use this for a group of people who had emerged with migration and cutting of all relations. Quran has used the term Hizb for group of Muslims which is constituted on principles. Another term which Quran has used for Muslims is Ummat a group which is united by a uniting factor (Amr Jame). For example people of a period are also called as Ummat and Muslims were called Ummat not because of their common race, country or economic goals, rather it is a mission of life and principle of their part which unite them as Ummat (Mas’al-e-Qaumiyat 1962: 160-165).8 The third term Quran has used for Muslims is Jama’at. This ‘Islamic State’ will be based on ‘conscious commitment of its people’ to accept principle of sovereignty of Allah, however, this sovereignty would be represented by popular will of all believing citizens and privileges of people of wisdom will be decided by the people’, (Maududi 1967: 49). This state will not be based on any race, ethnicities, colour and territorial identities, rather, anyone form anywhere from the world can be part of this system, provided s/he accepts principles of this state. Maududi further explicates his conception of state that all states based on these values wherever they are, regardless of their geographical locations and their rulers, will be called an ‘Islamic State’. Even if there are more than one states established on these principles, will find their way for cooperation, instead of engaging in rivalry and conflict and can make a universal federation of like-minded states. Maududi also explains that this state will be based on a balance between individual and the state. Neither totalitarian state nor unrestricted freedom will be allowed (Maududi 1967: 38-50). There are debates over Maududi’s ‘Islamic State’ conception and then its politicization through a powerful social movement. The secular state, which gradually evolved after treaty of Westphalia in 1648, has a historical conflict the church controlled states of Europe. Evolution of secular state was departure from religion controlled state. It is argued that the world is safer and more prosperous since the emergence of nation state (Zakaria 2008). It is not only the political institutions, but also the social and cultural institutions have undergone huge transformation. The question is how the concept of ‘Islamic state’ has been proposed. The Muslim world has not undergone any serious critical process; there has been no significant critical deliberation within Muslim societies in order to have a new politics. What Jamal Afghani proposed to the collapsing Ottoman Empire was to create a new Pan Islamic Empire as ‘Jamia Islamia’ in order to allow more federal structure within Islamic world. However reaction on abolishment of Caliphate in 1923 was such as it was an Islamic State and then the movements followed to revive the Caliphate. Still most of Islamic movements have been advocating for revival of Caliphate without much demarcation between its 8
Maududi, Syed Abul Ala (1962), Tajdeed Ihya-e- Deen, Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami
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Ottoman, Abbasid and Umayyad versions. Perhaps Maududi was more careful in his reaction and has rarely referred to revival of Caliphate in his discourse of establishing an Islamic state. Maududi explains objectives of an Islamic state; to implement all reforms which Islam has brought for welfare of humanity. It main responsibility is not only to protect borders, maintaining peace and security, upliftment of ordinary life. Its key role which distinguishes it from a non-Muslim state is that it also strives to propagate virtues and eliminate evils (Maududi 2000: 357). Maududi agrees that head of the state cannot be without election though Islam does not specify any single way of election but the essence of models of first period of Calipahte is that Muslims publics must be consulted and opinion of a large number of people should be taken. This is also clear that the ruler cannot appoint himself or appoint his family member. Islam emerged as a ‘revolutionary movement’ in Mecca where there were few people and all were consulted in issues where Quran had no direct guidance. During the Hijra (migration from Mecca to Madina) time, there were two groups, first group of converts (Al Sabiqoon Al Awwaloon) and then second group of those entered Islam after first group. Then in Madina, first group of converts remained as main advisors to the prophet. Most important feature of Islamic state was that head of the state was not like the heads of Romans and Persian’s head. He was not like today’s heads of the states. There was no parties, no opposition. All members of the advisory were to support the ruler as long as he was on right path and they were against him whenever he deviated from the right path. He was easily accessible to the public. But to establish a state of this vision is not possible unless society is trained on these Islamic teachings. When there was decay in society, this vision also lost its application (Maududi 2000: 368-369). About eligibility to become part of state and government, Maududi requires that only people who have faith in state’s basic functions can be part of its operation. Islam has designated Muslims as responsible to control the state. Only they are entitled to elect president and office bearers and be part of its Shoura. No Zimmi was ever given a membership of Shoura, or appointed as governor, or judge or a minister or commander in the military. He was not even allowed to elect the Caliph of Islam. But Islam ensures all civil, economic, cultural and personal law rights of Zimmis. With exception of key responsibilities of the state, and defence, they can be allowed for government jobs (376). Women cannot be given any key posts (presidency, ministry or membership of Shoura) in Islamic state. To appoint women in these posts; is against the Islamic text, Maududi argues (Maududi 2000: 402).9 In his explanation of La Ikraha fiddin [there is no force in religious affairs] Maududi summarises that in matters of worship, Islam does not force any individual to pray according to Islamic way because these practices are directly linked with belief in certain Aqaid (beliefs) and practicing Islamic worship is meaningless without accepting these Aqaaid. Islam has given full freedom to practice religion of his choice for a non-Muslim citizen. But it does not tolerate that civil and cultural laws which are basis of a state be established on other than Islamic laws, that Muslims accept a system imposed by rebels of God and in this matter 9
Maududi gives reference from Quran (4: 34) and a Hadith from Al Bukhari: Those who appoint a woman as their leader will never succeed)
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either side would be compelled to interfere in religion the other. If Muslims do not interfere in Mazhab-e-Kufr then Kafir would interfere in Mazhab of Islam and eventually Mazhab-eKufr will be applied on a large part of Muslims’ life. So, Islam requires Muslims to occupy the system of life and then they implement law of La Ikraha fiddin, [there is no force in religious affairs] (Maududi 2000: 67). Maududi shirks off the impressions that this Islamic state has resemblance with today’s totalitarian and authoritarian state or communist state. If I am allowed to coin a new term for Islamic state, I will call it Theo-Democracy because it incorporates paramountcy of God in which Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty whereas executive and legislature will be formed by popular opinion of Muslims. Issues which do not have clear guidance of Quran, will be decided by Ijama of Muslims and Islamic laws if required an explanation, will not be sent only to a limited group or race, rather each Muslim who is qualified for Ijtihad can contribute in explanation of that law. In this sense, it is a democracy. But the laws which have clear instruction of God, cannot be changed even entire Muslim community agrees to change it (Maududi 2000: 138-140).
Civilization Maududi’s framework of civilization is directly dependent on Islamic belief system (Nasbul Ain) and because of this dependency; Islamic civilization becomes a completely different civilization from others which has its completely different value system. There may be some common features between Islamic and other civilizations but in Islam they are directly linked to a whole (Kull) so there commonality does not share a common whole (Kull) and hence Islamic civilization takes a different form (Maududi 2008: 102) 10For example, art and culture and literature (Funoone-e-Lateefa) may have prominent role in a civilization and some artists may take position of national icons, but for Islam, art and literature enjoys conditional acceptance. There are some allowed, some disliked and some are prohibited. Islam allows aesthetic exercise to the extent that does not take the person away from Allah so that he remains able to perform his duty of being ‘vicegerent of Allah’ on earth so will Islam’s social and cultural dispositions take a shape (Maududi 2008: 106-107). For Mauadudi, Islamic civilization is not a national or a racial civilization, it is a human civilization. It addresses humans as human and takes a person inside its orbit who has belief in Tawheed (oneness of God), Resalath (faith in prophethood and finality of Prophet Muhammad), Books (Quran, Bible and Torah) and life after death. It creates a complete different nationality in which anybody from any class, colour, and language can be part. It unites entire humanity in a single order of Millat and makes them followers of one civilization. This is not in order to increase number of its followers, rather than to bring benefits of good deeds and good knowledge [ilm Saleh and Amal Saleh]. This universal civilization is also governed by a strict discipline and control of individual and collective roles of its followers. From worldly perspective, this civilization aims to establish a collective system and a pious society which is not possible to establish without 10
Maududi, Syed Abul Ala (2008), Islami Tahzeeb ke usool wa mabaadi New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami (MMI) p. 102.
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having individuals’ characters according to better moral values. This Islamic civilization is constituted by five major concepts; 1. What is the concept about the life in this world? (Duniyawi Zindagi ka Tasawwur) 2. What is main objective of life (zindagi ka nasabul ain), 3. What will be the basis of human behaviour and his moral make up (Asaasi Aqaid wa afkaar) 4. What kind of a human, this civilization aims to make (Tarbiyat-e-Afrad) and 5. What will be relation of a man with another man (Nizam-e-Ijtimaayee) (Maududi 2008: 1012, 326-331)? About civilization, Maududi says, Islam is a special attitude of mind and an outlook of life. It is also a special way of life which is determined by that attitude of mind and outlook of life. From this way of life, what is achieved is mazhab-e-Islam and that is the Islamic civilization. Mazhab and Islamic Tahzeeb (Islamic civilization) are not two different things here rather they constitute one whole (Maududi 2000: 42).11 This outlook and attitude of mind determine a very esteemed and high objective of life and a pious spiritual centre. All activities of life, regardless of their discipline, return to that one centre. Value of every activity is determined by this centre, whatever reaches to that centre, is adopted and whatever stops to move towards that centre is rejected. From minor issues of individual life to important affairs of collective life, this is the standard. Cuisine, wearing, industrial relations, transactions, economy and politics should return to that centre (Maududi 2000: 43). Role of God or Allah: Explaining role of Allah, Maududi explicates the term of Allah in its historical, textual and philosophical meanings which he understands is equal to a sovereign authority who alone is to be obeyed in all spiritual and worldly affairs to be a Muslim. He explains This authority is indivisible. It is not possible that, while the control over creation should rest with one authority, that of providing for its food and drink should be with someone else; or that-the sun should be under the control of one authority and the earth that of another; or that while one has the power to create, that of preserving health or causing illness should be possessed by another and that of ending life rest with still another. Had there been such division of authority and power, there would certainlyhave been utter confusion and chaos in the universe and it could never have ordered the way it has been operating all along. Hence, it is essential that all authority and power should and does vest in one, central authority, in One Sovereign. Since all authority and power vests in one Sovereign only, with noone else having the least share in it, it must equally logically follow that godhood is special and exclusive to Him alone, and in this too there is absolutely no share (in Urdu p. 36)12 Then he further explains that this sovereignty is not limited only to affairs of the nature, it is also extended to the politics, society and culture. This is the Ilah (God) ‘not only in the supernatural sense but also as the Supreme Sovereign and the ultimate Law-giver in all matters whether political, cultural, or social (in Urdu p. 72).’ Maududi says If anyone regards the word of someone else to be deserving of obedience without any sanction from God, he is as much guilty of the offence of shirk as the one who prays to or worships someone other than God. And if someone regards himself as the lord and master and absolute monarch of any part of the earth in the political sense, his act too amounts as much to a claim to godhood as it would if he 11
Maududi, Syed Abul Ala (2000), Islami Riyasat: Falsafa, Nizam-e-Kar aur usool-e-Hukmarani.Lahaur: Islamic Publication Private Limited 12 Maududi, Syed Abul Ala (2000), Four Terms of Quran [in Urdu: Quran ki Char Buniyadi Istilahen, Lahore: Islamic Publication Limited],
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were to tell people that he was their helper and patron and guardian in the supernatural sense (in Urdu p.36).13
With God’s overwhelming powers, Maududi explained that Arab pagans were not unbelievers, neither was they atheists, but they had ‘associated others with God, and thought that in some way or other the angels, the men of piety, and the heavenly bodies, had also a share in the realm of cause and effect. Also they did not regard God as the Rabb with regard to mundane affairs like culture and politics, etc. (in Urdu 85). Allah’s role in political and social affairs is not direct, it is indirect and
through the institution of vicegerency, known as Khilafah. Theorising state in Islam, Maududi elaborate that Islamic state is based on concept of vicegerency, not sovereignty, powers of rulers are not absolute rather, he has delegated powers only. And that this vicegerency is not an individual rather than popular vicegerency in which all Muslims have been promised to be vicegerent of Allah Apostasy and Freedom of Faith: As western democracy has allowed its citizens to choose any religion of individual’s choices, Islamic laws with regard to apostasy has been matter of controversy and dispute among Islamic and nonMuslim scholars. For many, right to choose a religion of his/her choice is a fundamental right, and right to promote a religion is also a fundamental right which can never be supressed. Political Islamic parties have been defending prohibition of conversion from Islam to any other religion. Maududi and Ghannauchi have used same framework of argument supporting the view that Islam is a complete way of life which is also source of political and social order, but eventually both thinkers have ended up with two different conclusions on this crucial issue. This difference of interpretations between the two is not just a difference of Fiqh but also difference of philosophical framework in which thw two leaders have interpreted their positions. Maududi, for example, is of an extreme view who has powerfully advocated for execution of apostate in all cases. To everyone acquainted with Islamic law it is no secret that according to Islam the punishment for a Muslim who turns to kufr (infidelity, blasphemy) is execution. Doubt about this matter first arose among Muslims during the final portion of the nineteenth century as a result of speculation. Otherwise, for the full twelve centuries prior to that time the total Muslim community remained unanimous about it. The whole of our religious literature clearly testifies that ambiguity about the matter of the apostate's execution never existed among Muslims.
Responding an inquiry whether “under a truly Muslim rule should non-Muslims receive the same right to propagate their religions as Muslims ought to receive to propagate their religion?”, Maududi says To a great extent the law of the execution of the apostate itself has decided the matter in that when within the boundaries of our authority we do not grant any person who is a Muslim the right to leave Islam to accept another religion (madhhab) or way (maslak), then we must infer from this only that within the confines of the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam) we also do not tolerate the proclamation and spread of any other religion in opposition to Islam. To grant other religions and ways the right to propagate and then to declare a Muslim's change to another religion a crime are affirmations which contradict each other. The second law automatically negates the first law. Therefore, the law of the execution of the apostate, by its very nature, suffices to lead us to conclude that Islam does not tolerate 13
Translation by Abu Asad, Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt) Limited Islamic Research Academy, Karachi, available on http://www.islambasics.com/index.php?act=download&BID=98
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the propagation of kufr within the boundaries of its authority. According to this verse the true position of Dhimmis under Islamic rule is to be content to remain low (saghirun). As Dhimmis they cannot try to become great (kabirun). Similarly non-Muslims from abroad who come seeking protection may enter into the House of Islam. They can certainly come for commerce, arts and crafts, politics, education and all other cultural purposes. But they can never come with the purpose of exalting the message of their religion at the expense of God's Word. The sole purpose of the help which Allah gave His messenger and, following him, the Muslims against the kuffar or in the future will give them, and as a result of which the House of Islam was previously established or will be established in the future at some point, was and will be in the future also to make low the word of kufr and to lift high the Word of God.
Entire basis of Maududi’s advocacy for execution for apostate is that Islam is not a religion in popular sense believing in ‘metaphysical concerns’, if Islam is a religion of merely this nature then, Maududi argues, “it would be absurd to prescribe the penalty of execution for those people who wish to leave it because of their dissatisfaction with its principles”. [Islam] is not only a "religion" in the modern technical sense of that term but a complete order of life. It relates not only to the metaphysical but also to nature and everything in nature. It discourses not only on the salvation of life after death but also on the questions of prosperity, improvement and the true ordering of life before death. It establishes a dependence of salvation after death upon the true ordering of life before death. ……. It is not a belief whose existence or change has no noticeable effect on the great and significant ramifications of human life but a belief on whose continuation the continuation of civilization and the state depend and the changing of which means changing the order of civilization and state…. It is that faith on the basis of which a society of people establishes a complete order of a civilization in a particular form and brings into existence a state to operate it. A faith and idea of this nature cannot be made into a game for the liberties of individuals.
Rached Al Ghannauchi (1941) Rached Al Ghannauchi was born in southern Tunisian city Al Hammah. The socio economic divide between South and North Tunisia played an important role in defining Tunisian politics. 14 He was grown up in an environment charged by speeches of Gamal Abdal Nasser and his calls for Arab nationalism and unity. Ghannauchi’s Uncle Al Bashir had taken part in war of liberation of Tunisia and was member of Bourguiba-led national liberation movement (Tamimi 2001: 6). Nasserism for many Maghareb youths was identified with Islam and Arabism and so was Ghannauchi’s perception which was finally broken after he was expelled by Nasser’s government in 1964 following improving relations between Tunisia and Egypt. Arab youth, not only in Egypt and Syria but also in Maghareb started looking for Nasser’s alternative. Ghannauchi came to Syria to further his studies, switching from agriculture to philosophy. In Syria, Ghannauchi was also initially influenced by Tablighi movement and then writings of Syed Qutub, Hasan Al Banna and Abu Ala Maududi appealed him. Syrian scholar Mostafa Sebai’s journal Al Hadarah Al Islamia appealed him very much (Tamimi 2001: 18). Here he started reading Maududi, Syed Qutb. But he was more attracted by Algerian thinker Malik Bennabi whose writings were based on critical analysis. Though Maududi’s writings have greatly influenced Ghannauchi but it is Bennabi’s writings became main source of his philosophical and intellectual deliberation. Maghrebi scholar Ibn Ashour, 14
Parker, Emily (2000), “The Tunisian South: Regionalism, Marginalization, and Unfulfilled Revolutionary Expectations”, 24 December 2011, accessed online on 25 February 2014, URL: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3743/the-tunisian-south_regionalism-marginalization-and
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Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi and Sudanese leader Hasan Turabi are among most referred writers in Ghannauchi’s philosophical interpretation of Islam. 15 Ghannauchi has translated Bennabi’s French book Islam and Democracy in Arabic [Al Islam Wal Demoqeratiya] in 1983. Maqasid-e-Shariah appeared more importantly in his writings than the Islamic state itself. Ghannauchi and Maududi have different points of references, analytical framework and different prognosis. A key element of Ghannauchi’s understanding is his reluctance to accept text determinism in ‘Islamic norms’. Tamimi points out Ghannauchi’s unease to accept Maududi and Syed Qutb’s vision of ‘reality’ which was driven mainly from the text. That Ghannauchi ‘leads a school in modern Islamic political thought that advocates democracy and pluralism’ is qualified by his understanding that secularism; the modern territorial-state, the new world order, and radical trends within Islamic movements are major factors in hindering democratization in the Muslims world (Tamimi 2001 VIII). Unlike Maududi, Ghannauchi’s march towards Islamic activism has gone through several experimental phases in which he has brief attractions towards Nasserism, Bathism, then to student activist who was again inspired by an influential Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi. What was more important in his experimental processes is that he had an opportunity to understand social reality not from the text determinism of Maududi but also the socioeconomic factors which shape the reality to some extent. Within this process, he realised that the Tunisian society has some specificities and hence it needs an approach different form other countries’ Islamic activism. These Tunisian specificities were 1. Al tadayyun al taqlidi at tunisi [the traditional Tunisian religiosity]: which through its philosophical articulations has eventually supported and legitimized authoritarian systems of governance. Ghannauchi through his academic work on "al-Qadar 'Inda Ibn Taymiyah tried to shake cultural foundations of authoritarians, though the confrontational approach was later on abandoned by Ghannauchi. 2. Salafi religiosity: this religiosity was base on rejection of doctrinal or jurisprudential taqlid (imitation) and the call for a return to al-masadir (the original sources), that is the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the experience of the first three generations of Muslims. This Al Masadir determinism (text determinism in extreme Salafi approach) introduced the principle of hakimiyah (sovereignty) which was said as exclusive prerogative of God. According to Tamimi, the Muslim Brotherhood was chief exponent of this approach [though not limited to Ikhwan alone], and its model of Islamic activism required return to these origins and declaring existing regimes to be un-Islamic and consequently launching a struggle to change them. In order to achieve this goal, Ikhwan needed to have an educational and training program as well as intellectual exercise in order to reassert the doctrinal and moral aspects at the expense of the political and social aspects. Tamimi understands that Ghannouchi is critical of this approach also which overwhelmed by the tendency to judge situations and people against a doctrinal scale (Tamimi 2001: 41-42). 3. at-tadayyun al-'aqlani [rational religiosity]:Ghannauchi’s own experiment of Islamic activism entered a post Ikhwan intellectual deliberation which involves rationalization of Islamic texts. Many of Ikhwan’s philosophical interpretations were challenged by Tunisian Islamists mainly in the work of Dr. Fat-hi Osman, questioned the validity of the Ikhwan's ideology and methodology. In this stage, Ghannauchi and his party entered a debate between at-turath al-islami al- 'aqlani (the Islamic legacy of rationality) verses at-tadayyun at-taqlidi at-tunisi (traditional Tunisian religiosity), a 15
See his books Al Hurriyat Al Amma fi al daula Al Islamiya,
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kind of rational deliberation he called 'aqlana (rationalization), though this process failed. (Tamimi 2001: 42). Regardless of the normative result of rationale deliberation started within Ghannauchi and his party, the process itself brought a larger recognition to a variety of Islamic trends within making of Islamic thought. It relied not only one source, rather it welcomed a wide range of Islamic intellectuals, though many of the were severly criticized by Muslim Brotherhood such as Tahtawi, al-Afghani, Abduh, al-Kawakibi, and Qasim Amin (2001: 43). But the process has its origin in Bennabi’s intellectual traditions which have underlined contextual factors along with texts. This, Ghannauchi called alfahm almaqasidi (the purposive cognition) than toward alfahm annassi (the textual cognition) of Islam. An Islamic movement based on almaqasid (the purposes) rather than supremacy of text emerged in further interpretations of Ghananuchi. In his further writings, he emphasized on Maqasids such as 'adl (justice), tawhid (monotheism), hurriyah (liberty), and insaniyah (humanism). Many thinkers of Muslim Brotherhood also followed the tradition later on (Salah Sultan, Jasem Auda). The rational process within Islamic movement led by Ghannauch gained much significance because it started challenging most prominent, rather foundational thoughts of Muslim Brotherhood such as Sayyid Qutb and his concept of Jahiliya and Hakimiyah. Though in this process, his part faced several splits and break away in 1970 and a whole range of Islamist spectrum emerged on Tunisian politics which include taqaddumi (progressive), yasari (leftist), and mustaqbali (futurist); and the second comprising those who were raj'i (reactionary), yamini (rightist), and madawi (living in the past). (Tamimi 2001: 44). A fundamental difference between Maududi and Ghananuchi is their approach towards problematizing the west and rennisance and revolutions in the west. Because of these different appraoaches, Maududi concluded to reject democracy as Taghoot or and unislamic and Ghananuchi concluded it as natural outcome of tensions between religion and authority in the west. Both thinkers talk about democracy, state and religion but both conclude to a different model of engagement with the modern world. For example about the early Islamic society, Rached Al Ghannauchi better problematized the system than Maududi. In his book, Al Muqarebat fil almania wal mujtama al madani (Comparison between Secularism and Civil society 1999), unlike Maududi, Rached Al Ghannauchi’s explanation of Islamic society during and after prophet is analytical rather than prescriptive. He explains that there was not much gap between leadership, society and politics during the first period of Islam as the government was run from the mosque of the prophet where common people were witnessing day to day affairs of the state. Caliphs after that also remained part of the society serving the society. In this period, religion and politics were integral to each other. Leadership was under direct people’s watch and consultation was direct. Second period started when the Islamic caliphate was over turned and a tension between religion and politics ensued but Islamic scholars were given authority to represent religion, in exchange of king’s recognition to the scholars and their right to explain Islamic texts. But scholars were not given power to execute the text and rulers were not given rights to intervene in religion institutions such as Waqf, mosques and public interests (Mossisat al nafa’ al aam). The last stage came when the separation between religious authorities and rulers ended and ruling class subordinated the 15
scholars and their institutions. By dominating all institutions of civil society, authority of religion, nationalisation of Waqf (making it public property under state’s supervision), and power of state increased out of proportion. While explaining state, Ghannauchi emphasized more on role of civil society and independence of scholars, Waqf and educational institutions, 16 Maududi appears in favouring a strong overpowering state. Most interesting part is that Ghannauchi then sketch a comparison of same relationship between state-religion and civil society in Europe. In the first phase, the Greece society was marked by marginalized role of religion, superiority of reason and despite being male dominated ruling system; it was representative to interests of all. Then in second stage, Christianity captured authority and rulers were dictated by churches which resulted in tensions between religious and political leadership and in third stage there was a period of reform in which religion was kept for private domain and state secured larger space in people’s life. Ghannauchi argues that concept of modern civil society emerged in Islam and modern secular politics are of different origin, because separation between social institutions in Islam is of different nature than that of emerged in post Christianity Europe. Civil society emerged as opposite to both state and Christian religious authority. State became a completely worldly affair which has no relation with religion and was to be governed completely by reason (Ghannauchi 1996 pp. 47-55). Democracy Relationship between democracy and Islam has a different perspective in writings of Maududi and Ghannauchi. If Ghannauchi is inspired by his mentor Bennabi and writings of his own colleagues such as Dr. Fathi Osman, Maududi’s propositions are largely theoretical and he goes up to rejecting Ibn Khaldoun. Unlike, Maududi, Ghannauchi’s approach is more inclusive, he starts from appreciating the fact that democracy does provide most effective tool to secure civil rights and provides kind of governance which enables citizens to use it (Al Hurriyat Al Ammaa second chapter). But he goes further on questioning, like Bennabi, what are basic principles of democracy, did democracy see any evolution, if yes what is that, and what are factors behind such evolution, and what are the basic principles of Islamic government? As Bennabi says that democracy is not just an institution for transferring power peacefully, and in this sense democracy didn’t exist in Great Britain, democracy is also a process of training at psychological, political, and social levels. It was reasoning of British people which ensured the democracy, not merely the institution. Bennabi, in his approach is somehow close to Hannah Arendt and Habermas’ theories of communicative action. Ghannauchi not only appreciates the historical process of democratic evolution in Europe but also underlines the fact that citizens need to have that training. If the principles of equality, election, separation of power, respect to plurality and rights of minorities freedom of expression and assembly, and union, and right of majority to rule and right of minority to oppose, to the extent that individual citizens are protected by social and political rights, on the other hand content of democracy is about recognition of individual’s respect, his dignity, and his rights.
16
AL Hurriyat Al Amma chapter 2 p. 37
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Key different between Maududi and Ghananuchi is that Maududi is an advocate of ‘Islamic State’ with so much power and Ghannauchi’s primary basis of an state is an institution able to ‘stop authoritarianism and repression’ and to protect civil liberties. 17 Marxism is not but to establish “dictatorship of proletariat” which is another or form of repression. Marxist’s state lacks ethics and values because the ethics of proletariat is the ethic. In this state, many parties are allowed but one for government and others for jail (p. 2). On the other hand, the western democracy also fails to provide protection from authoritarianism and repression. Liberal capitalism and globalized economy has allowed capitalist s and their institutions and their masters to dictate terms of peace and war all over the world. Public opinion is being purchased to impose war in other countries. Western democracy promotes “soft and secret dictatorship” (p. 3). In his conception of Islamic state, Islamic state must not turn into a another dictatorship in order to finish opposition or other races, or group. Islamic state is not an institution to secure ‘national or racial pride at the cost of other nations and people’. Accepting that ‘absolute social justice is never possible in this world’ and war and conflict will also be there. What is more needed is a “set of many solutions based on two main objectives, first is to minimize repression of a man against fellow man and second is to reach closer to justice and freedom along with their intellectual, cognitive, legal and social conditions (p. 4).” Ghannauchi’s approach to the conception of Islamic state is largely inspired by, not disappointing period of post Ottoman Caliphate, rather by disappointing performance of independent Arab and Muslim states mainly their failure to protect basic civil rights and freedom. Institutions of state, are based on 1. pirnciples of Al Shariya and Al Mashrooiya 2. Al Imama: ruler will be elected, and allegiance between ruler and the ruled will be basis of relation. 3. Separation of powers based on principles of Tawheed
State and Religion About state, Ghananuchi explains that there has always been a religion, a god and or supernatural power to be believed as source of law. But in the name of supreme authority or God, all Godmen, priests had become the God himself, such as Pharoh’s famous statement “ana Rabbukum al ala”. Most of the empires and kingdoms in the West were religious in the nature and hence were centred in an individual’s authority. All Byzantine or Persian rulers were nothing but authoritarian rule of an individual. Revolutions in the west were against such roles of Godmen and priests or authoritarian rulers who were seeking their legitimacy from religion. The brought them down and power transferred from an authority of an individual to authority of law. This is the basic content of modern state in the west which they call as rule of law. Civilization:
17
Al hurriyat al amma third chapter p. 1.
17
Azzam Tamimi, while explaining making of Ghannauchi into a moderate Islamist gives background of his intellectual training in initial period when his intellectual mentor Malek Bennabi and Egyptian intellectual of Muslim Brotherhood Syed Qutb had a brief but fundamental differences over definition of civilization. According to Bannabi, Islam is constituted of principles and guidelines or a project which as a result, allow emergence of a civilization only when it is practiced. A Muslim is not always civilized just because he or she is a Muslim. Based on Bennabi’s definition of civilization, Ghannauchi warns about Takfiri tendencies which are inspired by the extreme view that every Muslim must be perfectly civilized and that all those who are backward are not Muslims. This view is inspired by Kharjites who had called every sinful Muslim infidel (Tamimi 2000: 32). In Ghannauchi’s words (quoted in Tamimi 2000: 32) By the civilization of a given people we mean the provision of at least the necessary level of social guarantees: food, housing, clothing, education, and security, in addition to a specific level of intellectual and spiritual consciousness. If we were to distinguish betweencivilized man and uncivilized man, or what Bennabi refers to as the pre-civilization man, it suffices to look at the direction in which the activities of each of these two human models proceed. Both of them initiate activity aimed at self-preservation: food, drink, sex, and accommodation. But whereas the backward one restricts such activity to what we may call "the circle of selfpreservation," the civilized one—even though he too exerts an effort within the same circle to self-preserve—is superior in two ways. First, the instinctive self-preserving activity is not steered nor checked by desires as in the case of the uncivilized. The civilized one is subdued to an idea or a value or a principle. In his case desires are checked by a principle or an idea, and are therefore influential only within the circle drawn for them. Hence, not everything that fulfils the desire, or anything that is within the reach of the living being, should be sought after; nor should every edible thing be eaten; nor should anything that fulfills the sexual desire be practiced. For a civilized person there are the good and the evil, the halal (permissible) and the haram (forbidden), and there is that which undermines the chastity, the honor, the pride, and the faith. The second thing that distinguishes civilization man from pre-civilization, or backward, man is that even though the civilized exerts an activity within the circles of selfpreservation he is not its prisoner. He surpasses it to another horizon, the horizon of values, ideals, ideas, and principles. This he considers to be the horizon that befits him, the horizon for which he was created. A civilized man considers his activity within the circle of selfpreservation not an end in itself, but a necessary ladder to ascend to the second horizon. Whenever it becomes clear to him that his activity within the circle of self-preservation is accomplished only at the expense of what he believes in of ideals, ideas, and principles, civilization man does not hesitate to sacrifice life that is in conflict with what he cherishes of values and principles. Principled men are the cream of the human race; they are the lamps that illuminate the roads when issues are confused and when darkness prevails. (Ghannauchi’s Interview to Azzam Tamimi in 1998, Quoted in Tamimi 2001: 33).
Apostasy in Islam Ghannauchi explains this crucial issue in a different way, though he uses Maududi’s arguments also but he comes with a different conclusion. Initially, he uses Maududi’s powerful argument that Dhimmi and Muslims have equal rights and duties before the state and Muslims and Dhmmis can criticize the government within same level of limitations and freedom which means that ‘Islamic civilization’ recognizes plural identities and their freedom to be part of Islamic civilization regardless
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of their differences, this is different from the view of western state which is more hegemonic and assimilative.18 Then he explicates issue of apostasy in Islam: Apostasy is to abandon Islam or its Faraid or its key principles and belifs like belief in God and Prophethood, to allow what is prohibited and refusal to practice compulsory duties. This is a crime in Islam and has been condemned in its most serious way and harsh punishment in life after death. There is no clear Quranic verse about a fixed punishment of this crime but in Sunnah, there are texts about executing the apostate. Companions of prophet had agreement on it and most of Islamic jurists have opined in favour of death sentence for apostate. Only few have opposed this. To Ghannauchi, this difference is in two issues: Whether this is a political crime which is equal to sedition to state, if yes, it will allow the Imam to determine the punishment from among those which are not mentioned in the text (Ghair Mansoos). Or it is it is a crime which comes within Hdud allah [crimes whose punishments have been fixed in Quran like theft, adultery, use of alcohol which cannot be pardoned even by the Imam, Tazeer are the punishments which are determined by the ruler and the government and can be pardone]. In Ghannauchi’s words, now the question is whether freedom of faith given by Islam at the time of accepting Islam, will remain after he accepts Islam, which means that he would not be punished for his apostasy as he was not punished for his not accepting Islam? Rationale behind death sentence for apostate and all civil rights for non-Muslims in Islamic state is that rejecting Islam is like raising doubts about its credibility and ability which may result into collapse of Islamic union (Al Jamia Al Islamiya). It is also because no-body enters Islam except when he or she is fully convinced and know that he cannot leave once he enters. Based on second opinion that apostasy is a political crime and is not within Hudud allah, Ghannauchi favours second opinion that it is not a Hudood allah rather it comes within Tazeerat. In most of the cases in which apostates have been given death sentences during the time of prophet, there were other crimes involved. Had it been a Hudood, woman and man other people would not have been pardoned by prophet. Despite having a common ground with Maududi on defining Islam as more than a religion, he concludes that apostasy is a political crime which comes under Tazeerat not a Hadd. Problematizing this debate within freedom of faith, Ghannauchi raises several questions and refers to many exceptional cases practiced by prophet, his companions and Islamic jurists. For example, what of punishment of apostate woman and child, Hanafi says that woman is not supposed to carry arms (Mazinnatu assilaah), so a woman apostate will not executed. Here at this point Maududi and Ghananuchi have different trajectory of defining Islamic law. Maududi favours execution of woman and Ghannauchi favours Hanafi view which is also subscribed by various other Arab scholars like Mohammad Abduhu, Abdul Muta’al Al Saidi, Abdul Wahab Khallaf, Abu Zohra, Abdel Aziz Shawesh, Fathi Othman, Abdel Hamid Metwalli, Abdel Hakeem Al Ayeli, Hasan Turabi, Dr, Saleem Al Awa. Because of woman issue and prophet’s different practices in cases of apostates, it is clear that apostasy is a political crime; hence it will attract Tazeer, not the Hadd.19
18 19
Al hurriyat alamma chapter one p. 21 Ghnnauchi, al hurriyat al amma chapter two p. 23
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Conclusion:
Among all scholars who have advocated for an ‘Islamic State’, Maududi is most critical to the Islamic history. From his book Khilafat wa Malukiyat, it can be understood that Maududi is not proposing revival of Ottoman era Caliphate. Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman (1994), Ismael Raji Al Faruqi and many other scholars have questioned current state of Islamic politics. Maududi has critically analysed evolution of Islamic caliphate into monarchy. As Abu Sulaiman argues that Islamic social sciences have lacked in empirical and systematic analysis and Fazulrahman has accused of using ‘normative Islam’ over empirical Islam. An analysis of Maududi and Ghannauchi suggests that Ghannauchi is deeply influenced by Maududi and he has frequently quoted Maududi in his books without criticizing him. But Ghannauchi’s basic understanding is driven by Bennabi’s philosophical foundations in which concept of civilization between Maududi and Ghannauchi is fundamental. They have adopted different trajectory of historicizing of Islamic institutions in the domains of religion, state and the civil society. By so doing, Ghannauchi prescribes a state which is less dominating, less intervening in religious affairs and people’s freedom and Maududi prescribes a state which is necessarily comprehends all domains of life. Though Syed Qutub is more powerful in his discourse of Islamic state but his most of the ideas are based on Maududi’s propositions. Hence a comparison between Maududi and Ghannauchi will not only be comparison of two different problems but also two different generations where transformation must have responded new problems of their respective times. A key outcome of Ghannauchi’s understanding is that the Takfiri tendency has been recognized as against the Islam and Takfiri practices have been widely discouraged within Islamic movements, a development which was undermined by the critics who do not recognize differences between different understandings of Islam such as Abu Zaid (1993). Asef Bayat’s observation that Islamism has undergone ideological, intellectual, strategic and discursive shifts towards more inclusive, pluralistic and ambiguous ideological dispositions is based on his observation of Islamic revolution of Iran and its journey from idealism to realism. Though These shifts are diverse versions of post-Islamist trends, not Iran specific, however, real problem is to identify patterns of these trends which may led to formulation of post Islamism. The way Islamism has evolved and it is revising itself has questioned a popular theme of looking compatibility between Islam and democracy. Asef Bayat’s observation is very close to reality that a response to political, social and economic problems and the power struggle was articulated mainly within a religious language which had also ‘rebuffed western cultural domination, its political rationale, moral sensibilities, and normative symbols’ (Bayat 2007). But the question still remains whether the political struggle of middle class high achievers who felt marginalized had stopped or the struggle is going inside these movements or the struggle has faced new avenues of marginalization at the hand of better of Muslim societies. This power struggle, though very important, was not a single defining feature of Islamism and political Islam. Question of text still remains a key defining feature of Muslim societies.
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