Idea Transcript
Theme: Domestic & Global
SMALL ENTERPRISES IN BRUNEI DARUSSALAM: ETHNOCENTRIC OR REGIOCENTRIC ? Work In Progress Syed Aziz Anwar Associate Professor University of Brunei Darussalam
Address for all correspondence: Syed Aziz Anwar Associate Professor Department of Management Studies University of Brunei Darussalam Bandar Seri Begawan 2028 Brunei Darussalam
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SMALL ENTERPRISES IN BRUNEI DARUSSALAM: ETHNOCENTRIC OR REGIOCENTRIC ? Work In Progress ABSTRACT Brunei Darussalam has been making unfailing efforts to diversify its economy in line with the emerging trends in the ASEAN region. Policy makers expect small enterprises to play a vital role in this process. The main objective of this paper is to examine whether or not the small enterprises are responding to the policy tracks designed by Brunei Darussalam. Survey results show that only a minority of small enterprises is able to internationalise and adopt a regiocentric marketing approach in order to play an active part in AFTA, BIMP-EAGA, and APEC.
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An influential body of research has been built up in recent years focusing on the “ Dutch disease” ( Corden 1984, Heeks 1998 ) or “ resource curse thesis “ ( Auty 1993 ), which expound on potentially dysfunctional implications of a large minerals export sector for a balanced economic development. In response to these arguments and other factors, several oil exporting countries have designed diversification strategies aimed at improving the contribution of other sectors to the economy. Interestingly, considerable research work has taken place on a parallel scale focusing on the valuable role of small enterprises in accelerating the pace of economic diversification in several oil exporting countries including Brunei Darussalam ( Hans, et al, 1985, Thomas, et al, 1991, Mead and Leedholm1998, Heeks 1998 ).However, the logical influence of growing international business linkages of a diversifying economy such as Brunei Darussalam on the behaviour of small enterprises has not been subjected to rigorous analysis. This neglect may be attributed mainly to the non-availability of empirical data. This paper seeks modestly to fill this gap in the existing literature by examining and analysing the managerial decisions of some of the small enterprises in response to the regiocentric policy track being pursued by Brunei Darussalam. In recent years, Brunei Darussalam has made important policy decisions to strengthen its trade and economic links with regional organisations such as ASEAN Free Trade Area ( AFTA ), Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum , and East ASEAN Growth Area, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines ( BIMP-EAGA ). In fact, it is pursuing a policy of rapid economic diversification and development in line with the trends in South East Asia ( Cleary and Wong, 1994). Undoubtedly, small enterprises have come into sharper focus in all the policy tracks being pursued by Brunei Darussalam to diversify the economy and integrate it effectively into the ASEAN region. Therefore, the analysis presented in this paper has important implications for policy. This paper is organiseed in three sections as follows. Section 1 highlights the salient features of the economy of Brunei Darussalam and examines the relevance of the “ Dutch disease “ against the backdrop of these features. Section 2 explains the role of small enterprises in the process of economic diversification in Brunei Darussalam. The final section presents empirical evidence pertaining to the behaviour of small enterprises in the context of the regiocentric policy track being pursued by Brunei Darussalam.
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1. THE ECONOMY OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM: SOME REFLECTIONS In recent years, Brunei Darussalam has witnessed a downturn in the contribution of the oil and gas sector to GDP. Evidence presented in the Seventh National Development Plan ( 1996-2000 ) unveiled by the Ministry of Development, Brunei Darussalam in 1996 shows that the contribution of non-oil sector to GDP has increased from 49.6 percent in 1991 to 64.1 percent in 1995. The size of the economy of Brunei Darussalam topped US$ 5 billion in 1995. The country has no foreign debt and it enjoys a comfortable balance of payments surplus (CIA, 1997). Nearly half of government expenditure is financed by oil revenues, including taxation of oil profits ( 50 percent of profits from oil sales and 45 percent of profits from sales of gas are taken as tax ), shares in all the units of Brunei Shell ( Brunei government has 50 percent share in Brunei Shell ), and royalties ranging between 8 percent and 12.5 percent of crude oil prices. The other half is financed by investment income generated by the Brunei Investment Agency ( BIA ). It is remarkable that the government has invested oil revenues far and wide to generate revenues for development purpose. The BIA is estimated to have nearly US$ 60 billion in assets overseas ( Asia and Pacific Review, 1995 ) The government has been incurring massive expenditure under the auspices of National Development Plans. In the Sixth National Development Plan ( 1991-95 ), the government spent US$ 11.5 billion, 23 percent higher than in the Fifth Plan. In 1995, the government expenditure was nearly US$ 8,000 per capita ( CIA, 1997 ) By spending fantastic sums, the government has been able to improve the quality of life in the country. With a population of 280,000, Brunei Darussalam’s GDP per capita stood at US$ 17,000 in 1996. This is in line with the average of all OECD countries. As per the UNDP parameters that define quality of life, Brunei Darussalam is among the best in the world. For instance, car ownership has risen ten-fold between 1970 and 1990 and more than 50 percent of Bruneians now have TV sets.Life expectancy has risen dramatically to 75 years and literacy rate has also risen to 90 percent ( Heeks, 1998 ). In fact, the quality of life in Brunei Darussalam can be compared with several OECD countries ( UNDP, 1997 ). The quality of life of Bruneians is further enhanced as there is no personal income tax and generous subsidies are available on utilities, housing, transport, education, foodstuffs, and healthcare. There is no denying the fact that oil and gas revenues have contributed immensely to the development process in Brunei Darussalam. However, there has been a forceful argument in the literature suggesting that oil-driven development may have some problems ( Heeks, 1998 ). In fact, the “ Dutch disease” and the “ resource curse thesis” have been subjected to rigorous analysis in a number of
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countries ( Heeks, 1998; Jazayeri, 1986; Stuthers, 1990; Fardmanesh,1991). While the “ Dutch disease “does not necessarily inhibit growth, the “ resource curse thesis” suggests an economic loss due mainly to the absence or lack of diversification in an economy. It is in the fitness of things to state that the term,”Dutch disease” was first coined when Holland’s manufacturing exports lost competitive edge in view of the discovery of natural gas in the 1960s. Admittedly, the “Dutch disease” model cannot exactly be replicated in Brunei Darussalam as there is hardly any manufacturing activity in the country ( Heeks, 1998 ). However, some of the ideas behind this model and the “ resource curse thesis” which explains the problems associated with the booming minerals sector are still relevant to Brunei Darussalam. Consider, for instance, the following. •
The dependency effect
Interestingly, the decline in the contribution of oil and gas to GDP in recent years has been more apparent than real ( Cleary and Eaton, 1992 ). Brunei Darussalam continues to depend heavily on oil and gas revenues to finance a wide array of government and private sector activities. Almost the entire quality of life in Brunei Darussalam depends on oil and gas revenues. The external sector of the economy of Brunei Darussalam depends, to a great extent, on oil and gas exports, which constitute nearly 95 percent of total exports ( MIPR, 1994 ). Surely, income from oil and gas exports finances import flows.Evidence shows that imports have gone up from US$ 0.67 billion in 1986 to US$ 2 billion in 1996 ( CIA, 1997 ) An index reflecting the contribution of minerals to GDP and trade ( Davis, 1995 ) has ranked Brunei Darussalam second in the hierarchy of minerals-based economies in the world.Thus, despite the fall in the contribution of minerals to GDP, the economy of Brunei Darussalam continues to depend heavily on oil and gas. •
The expenditure effect
Brunei Darussalam has been able to spend generously on non-traded goods and services. The ordinary government expenditure accounted for 66.1 percent of total expenditure in 1994 followed by development expenditure ( 21.7 percent ) and charged expenditure ( 10.2 percent ) in the same year. Health ( 66 percent ), infrastructure ( 18.9 percent ), education ( 13.5 percent ), defence ( 17.9 percent ), and other services ( 43.9 percent ) made up the structure of government expenditure in 1994 ( EPU, 1994 ). In line with the trends in so many oilexporting countries, there has been a large-scale expansion of non-traded sector, including services in Brunei Darussalam (Heeks, 1998 ).The trade and services sector put up a steady growth of 6.3 percent in 1996 ( Seventh Plan, 1996 ).
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Table 1 presents information about the breakdown of non-oil GDP in Brunei Darussalam in 1995. Table 1. Non-oil/gas GDP ( 1995 ) Activity Proportion of non-oil/gas GDP Wholesaling 4.24 % Retailing 8.47 % Hotels and Restaurants 2.82 % Transport and Communications 7.79 % Banking and Finance 7.78 % Insurance 2.35 % Business Services 2.1 % Ownership of Dwellings 2.09 % Community and Social Services 62.37 % Source: Seventh National Development Plan ( 1996 ) In view of the ability of the government to spend fantastic money on services, the government sector has come to occupy commanding heights to provide jobs to more than half of the entire working population in the 1990s. Interestingly, it is popularly perceived that the private sector is no match to the government sector when it comes to providing privileged jobs that guarantee quite attractive compensation packages ( Heeks, 1998; Cleary and Wong, 1994 ). It is thus clear from evidence at hand that in a minerals-based economy such as Brunei Darussalam, the government spending pattern is not in conflict with the “ Dutch disease” argument. •
The resource movement effect
One of the arguments developed in the “ Dutch disease “ model and “ resource curse thesis “ suggests that investors are likely to concentrate on the minerals sector if it is conspicuously booming in an economy. As noted earlier, there is hardly any manufacturing activity in Brunei Darussalam. However, the oil and gas sector has certainly paved way for a number of sub-contractors to undertake light engineering activities in the country. While the resource movement effect of the type existing in other minerals-based economies is hardly visible in Brunei Darussalam, there is evidence indicating that sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing have lagged behind due to the existence of a booming oil and gas sector. This trend appears to be in line with the evidence available in literature ( Benjamin, et al, 1989 ).
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•
The currency appreciation effect
There is official parity between the currencies of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. In other words, Brunei dollar is a legal tender in Singapore. Evidence shows that the currencies of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore have appreciated nearly 35 percent against the US dollar between 1986 and 1997. A buoyant Singapore economy has given solid support to the currencies of both the countries. The recent currency crisis in South-East Asia has hardly affected the Brunei dollar. A strong Brunei dollar has accelerated the pace of import-flows. As a consequence of this trend, import substitution activities in Brunei Darussalam have remained almost absent in line with the “ Dutch disease “ model. •
The technology substitution effect
Like many other oil-based countries, Brunei Darussalam has witnessed rising labour cost ( Webster, 1993 ). In view of the scarcity of skilled labour, the country has relied on capital-intensive production processes. In fact, its oil and gas sector is already capital-intensive. The labour-intensive industries have not been able to grow despite government’s explicit support for entrepreneurs. The high-cost of labour has been a constraining factor in the development of the private sector in Brunei Darussalam. •
The enclave effect
There has been massive investment of capital and technology in the oil and gas sector. But, this sector has not led to the creation of many logical externalities, as suggested by the “ Dutch disease “ model. Considerable oil income has been invested overseas and in welfare projects in Brunei Darussalam. The manufacturing sector has remained insignificant and the development potential of the economy has not been exploited fully ( Cleary and Wong, 1994 ). Thus, while it is not possible to exactly replicate the “ Dutch disease “ model in the context of Brunei Darussalam, it is apparent from the discussion so far that several important conclusions of the model and the “ resource curse thesis “ reflect on the pattern of economic development and growth of Brunei Darussalam. In recent years, policymakers have made explicit efforts to diversify the economy and strengthen its links within the region. The increasing contribution of non-oil sector to GDP in recent years, as explained above, indicates that the process of diversification has already started in the economy of Brunei Darussalam.In order to give a fillip to this process, policymakers have made efforts to liberalise trade regimes and expose the economy to the economic trends in the region.
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Brunei Darussalam is a member of AFTA. According to the AFTA treaty signed in Singapore in 1991, the member states will iron out tariffs on a wide range of products and services by January 1, 2003. The member countries have also agreed to take steps in the direction of integrating their economies with a view to promoting industrialisation in a competitive framework and improving consumer welfare. Brunei Darussalam has been implementing the AFTA treaty faithfully in order to be able to benefit from the business potential of the grouping. AFTA has a combined population of over 331 million and a market worth nearly US$ 550 billion. Intra-AFTA trade is about 40 percent of ASEAN’s total international trade. Despite the recent currency crisis in the region, the longer-term scenario appears to be optimistic.Brunei Darussalam has also been playing a leading role in promoting economic co-operation and integration at the sub-regional level through the mechanism of East ASEAN Growth Area including Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines ( BIMP-EAGA). The rationale of cross-border co-operation is to exploit the exploit the comparative advantages in factor endowments and facilitate investment flows. BIMP-EAGA consists of a land area of 692,000 square kilometres and a combined population of over 28 million. Brunei Darussalam has invested heavily in this project with a view to creating business opportunities for small and medium enterprises operating in the private sector. Another regiocentric policy track being pursued very aggressively by Brunei Darussalam pertains to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ( APEC ) forum. APEC is the world’s largest trading region, accounting for nearly 50 percent of the world’s economy and global business. It includes a diverse group of industrial, newly industrialising and other emerging economies. Its members have expressed explicitly to liberalise their trade regimes in line with the avowed objectives of World Trade Organisation ( WTO ). An emerging economy such as Brunei Darussalam can hope to benefit from its trade and economic ties within the APEC network. APEC members are committed to the question of promoting small and medium enterprises ( APEC, 1996 ) It is thus clear that the “ Dutch disease “ model and the “ resource curse thesis “ have proved relevant in the context of the economy of Brunei Darussalam. Policymakers have taken steps to liberalise and link the Brunei economy to that of ASEAN. However, the effectiveness of this policy depends, to a great extent, on the response of small enterprises, which constitute nearly 98 percent of the business sector of Brunei Darussalam ( MIPR, 1994 ) We now turn to highlight the role of small enterprises in the economy of Brunei Darussalam.
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2. ROLE OF SMALL ENTERPRISES IN THE ECONOMY OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM Small enterprises in Brunei Darussalam are the ones that employ 100 workers or less. These enterprises account for over 91 percent of total employment in the private sector ( MIPR, 1994 ). Table 2 shows the breakdown of small enterprises in the private sector and the spread of the workforce. Table 2. Breakdown of Small Enterprises in Private Sector
Sector
Total
1-5
Number of Employees 6-10 1021-50 50-100
enterprises Wholesale and retail
702
395
182
82
28
12
Social services Mining and Manufacturing Restaurants and Hotels Transport, storage, and
427 367
221 155
116 99
57 49
25 45
1 15
166
44
41
55
20
4
158
76
31
25
15
8
Financial, insurance, and business services Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Construction
154
64
29
26
30
3
147
93
33
16
4
-
508
158
89
107
85
32
Source: MIPR ( 1994 ) Unfortunately, data pertaining to small enterprises presented in Table 1 are rather out-dated and incomplete. Unregistered small enterprises are not shown in the table. Nevertheless, some interesting broad currents are revealed. For instance, small enterprises account for nearly 90 percent of all non-oil/gas private sector employment. Over the years, expatriates working in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, oil and gas, construction, transport and communications, finance, insurance, business services and social services have outnumbered the Bruneians ( EPU, 1994b ). Judging by the share of small enterprises in the economy, Brunei Darussalam has a far greater proportion of small enterprises and employment than the average OECD country ( Heeks, 1998 ).
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Two government surveys of small enterprises in Brunei Darussalam ( MIPR,1994 and 1997 ) explicitly suggest that these enterprises are characterised by inadequate financial resources, out-dated technology, labour-intensive work processes, lack of professionally-trained workforce, low productivity, and lack of marketing strategy. The Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources ( MIPR ) has the responsibility to address the problems faced by small enterprises in Brunei Darussalam. Ever since its establishment in 1989, it has been making efforts to support the small business sector in the country. The Industrial Development Plan for Brunei Darussalam prepared by the Manchester Business School, UK in 1996 under sponsorship of MIPR has given a high priority to the promotion of small enterprises. Various agencies in Brunei Darussalam have been co-ordinating their strategies to facilitate the development of small enterprises. For instance, the Development Bank of Brunei provides credit facilities to small enterprises in line with the policy of MIPR. The Business and Trade Development Council set up at the ministerial level has the authority to oversee policy and development of businesses including small enterprises in the country. Surely, small enterprises have to play a great role in the emerging business scenario in Brunei Darussalam. It would be interesting to find out, in the following section, whether or not the small enterprises are responding to the regiocentric policy track designed by Brunei Darussalam to transform the economy.
3. SMALL ENTERPRISES :ETHNOCENTRIC OR REGIOCENTRIC ? A sophisticated body of literature has been built up during the last three decades focusing on the theories of internationalisation of firms. For instance, product cycle theory ( Vernon, 1966 ), oligopolistic theory ( Knickerbrocker, 1973 ), monopolistic advantage theory ( Hyner, 1976 ), internalisation theory ( Buckley and Casson, 1976 ), Uppsala school’s stage theory ( Johanson and Vahline, 1977 ), eclectic paradigm ( Dunning, 1988), and the network theory ( Axelson and Easton, 1982 ) have explained the mechanics and dynamics of internationalisation of firms. These theories indicate a general tendency to study the internationalisation behaviour of large firms. The question of internationalisation with reference to small firms has been addressed in the literature. But, most of the studies have focused on small firms operating in developed countries ( Ray, 1989; Knight, 1997 ). Interestingly, these enterprises are active across countries and continents, and have the ability to operate anywhere in the world. Such enterprises contribute to nearly 30 percent of global manufactured exports ( UNCTAD, 1993 )
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The question of internationalisation of small firms operating in developing countries and particularly in oil-based economies has hardly been subjected to rigorous analysis in the literature. This question is particularly relevant in the context of an oil/gas-based developing country such as Brunei Darussalam, which is trying to address the problems of the “ Dutch disease “ by creating new international trade and economic links through the involvement of small firms. We tried to address this important question with the help of a modest empirical exercise in Brunei Darussalam. Specifically, we tried to find out whether or not the small firms in Brunei Darussalam are responding to the regiocentric policy track being pursued aggressively by Brunei Darussalam. It is in the fitness of things to define here the regiocentric behaviour of small firms as the process of increasing involvement in international operation within the framework of AFTA. This definition is a slightly modified version of the one oft-quoted in literature ( Welch and Loustrainen, ( 1988 ).Our questionnaire reflected this definition. For the purpose of this study, information on small enterprises in Brunei Darussalam and their marketing activities was collected through personal interviews and a mail survey. The mail survey consisted of a structured questionnaire which was sent to 100 small enterprises operating in all the four districts of Brunei Darussalam. Of these enterprises 65 returned the questionnaire. From these, 50 were considered usable. Table 3 shows distribution of small firms surveyed for the purpose of this study. Table 3. Distribution of Firms Nature of Industry Wholesale and retail Manufacturing Financial institutions Construction Agriculture Total
Number 25 10 5 5 5 50
% 50 20 10 10 10 100
Due to time and budget constraints, we could not enlarge the sample size to cover small firms operating in all the sectors of the economy of Brunei Darussalam. Moreover, the sample selected was non-random. Hence, the results obtained through the modest survey exercise cannot be safely generalised. Some respondents were unable to comprehend the questions fully. We tried to clear their doubts through personal encounters. Despite the constraints, it is believed, whatever information was generated did indeed provide a sense of direction of behaviour.of small firms in response to the regiocentric business policy track designed by Brunei Darussalam. While designing the questionnaire for the purpose of this study, we focused on (a) internal characteristics of firms, and (b) environmental factors in order to examine
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the regiocentric behaviour of firms. This approach is in line with conventional wisdom in the area of international business ( Johnson and Czinkota, 1982; Cavasgil, 1984 ).We found that only 30 percent of the 50 firms surveyed were proactive in deliberately searching for business opportunities in AFTA, BIMPEAGA,and APEC countries. The managers of these firms appeared to be responding to the pull factors operating in the region. Forty percent of the firms ( 20 ),including all the firms categorised as proactive in adopting a regiocentric marketing behaviour appeared to be reactive also to the changing conditions in the environment. Table 4 presents the factors that have contributed, according to the managers/owners to the regiocentric behaviour of small firms in Brunei Darussalam. Table 4. Factors Affecting Regiocentric Behaviour of Small Firms Proactive
Reactive
Internal Factors *Product uniqueness *Strategic alliance *International orientation of managers ( frequency of foreign travel, foreign language competency,and level of education of managers/owners ) *Exclusive information about segments in the region ) • Local market constraints • Excess production capacity • Motive to reduce inventories
External Stimuli • Opportunities in AFTA market • Brunei government assistance for doing business in BIMP-EAGA • Liberalisation of import regime • Ease of market access • Market potential
• • •
Saturated local market Proximity to customers and ports Competitive pressure
As indicated earlier, only a minority of small enterprises has adopted a regiocentric approach in designing marketing strategies. These enterprises have been proactive and reactive in the sense stemming from factors highlighted in Table 4. All the owners/managers of small firms surveyed considered Brunei government assistance as a factor of highest importance ( on a three-point scale) in helping their firms become regiocentric. Among the push factors, local market constraints were considered by 80 percent of the respondents as of least importance. In other words, local market is popularly perceived as good enough for small enterprises. In the light of this perception and some other factors, the majority of these enterprises, has adopted an ethnocentric marketing philosophy and has not responded in any significant way to the coming into being of AFTA, APEC, and BIMP-EAGA. This survey has validated the widely held view ( MIPR, 1994 ) that the knowledge base of small enterprises in Brunei Darussalam is weak. The owners and/or managers of these enterprises , in general, are unable to fully appreciate the importance of regiocentric economic policy being pursued with emphasis by
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Brunei Darussalam. This fact was conspicuously visible during our personal encounters with them. Admittedly, the behaviour of small enterprises in interaction with the process of diversification of the Brunei economy and the regiocentric policy track designed by the government has important managerial implications. Unfortunately, the selection of small firms on a non-random basis for the purpose of this study and our inability to get accurate and reliable information from all the respondents through a structured questionnaire sent by mail in all the four districts of Brunei Darussalam constrained our efforts to present a sophisticated analysis in this paper. We can only hope, this exploratory study would lead to further research focusing on the internationalisation dynamics of small enterprises in a minerals-based economy such as Brunei Darussalam.
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