Idea Transcript
A
Never-Ending Necessity
The Ten Commandments of
Counterinteffigence
James M. Olson 0 that thou hadst hea;he;icd
It?) peacc /xcnl
rie~i7!(()i,s)les.c
a.c
the
neiclear weapons
n/the
uaees
tsaiali
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)eputv
f
)r
U
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need for
likely
The United States, as the worlds only remaining superpower, will be the constant target of
jealousies,
resentments, rivalries.. .This inevitably means
that the United
States will be the
target of
large-scale foreign espionage.
has Cl I,
not
gone away,
t I treat from
of
t
end
tie
lie
new
elenic
It
us.
Ames fr
)m
hi.tndling predecessor.
its
It. in 1991. ran
It
CIA officer I lar( )ld
19%.
It
against
the S\R R
was
handling
FBI
\\lIen
was
he
special
phi tited
a
fere lice
l( )( )iii
I
SV R R
t
(
in
I tat
was
arrested
t tat
James
M. Olson served in the
1 )irectorate o( (
)pcra
Ut
ns
and is
the f~tc iilt~ of the Gec irge Bush School of ( overoflient and
iii iw
on
Public Service ~ niversitv.
at
Iexa~. A~S~M
have
Russians
And
it
handling charges
been
concerns
are
I nited
sertoets.
mini
:tk
well-
was
remaining
its
to
in
a
at
orlcls
mid cliti I
a
wellbeing.
leadership inevitably
in the
means
I. n heel States \il I lie
largescale foreign
ill he
.~
jealoetsies.
ri~a Iries.
lhis
c~
that
tIre target
espu )nage
con
A Choice
m
Assignment
in t lie
\Xlicn ~ as
the
HIt spe
of espit
I
joined
the
)
ing.
il
of
one
I
was
assigned
to
write
history of the Rote Kapellc. Soviet espionage
mc.
CIA,
my
first interim assignments was with lie old ( ~l Staff. I i( )lttiel it fasci nat
ere
occupied \Xorld \Xar ~l.
net~c
1
stern
n
:1
the
ork in Nazi pe el u ring
puhlicii.ed
lhe
1)epart or Energy significantly
increased security
(:1 threat
superpower,
vcononiic
securin. and
the
the
:is
target of
resentments,
or
about Chinese espionage
in the I nited States~
pervasive
a
States,
constant
world.
2001
not
France,
Israel. the Phil
the I nited States.
\\e
The
rlv
coun
the SVRR that
\Xasliingt(
cv
ea
South korea. and laiw;tn.
)f the State
on
nage in Fchrua
to
lenges to
cial agent Robert I ianssen when he was
including
lIe warned of
tire
the
agent Earl Fitts
was
of 1999.
in
least 41
at
Indonesia
reece,
only
Jan les
listening device
)epartinent
surnmei
It
total of
eral friends,
Ihe
arrested for espu
nage in 19%.
Select
Intelligence
in
active
that
from I 99t
its
the CIA.
nent
are
ippines.
the SVRR that
~ as
lerma
trying to spy on the I nited Besides uienth )ning Russia. China, and Cuba. he also cited se~ C
ot AIciriLli
the
o~ er
the
I?azi edI~i
the S\RR
~ as
at
)tnmittee
tries
cratic Rus
(SVRIfl. has remained
against took
to
ntell igenci
States.
former Societ
sia. the SIi,zhbci ~iw.c/iri~ Rossi
e
is ir
h )reign i ntell igence
Ihe
liii )fl.
ser\ tee
nor
end of the Cold \Var
ihe
to.
)unterinteli gene
not even meant an
~~dcIiolson
9~
cc
)ei
Operath )ns
use
a
Assi
rnier
I )irector 1)1
)unterl
2001) that (CI) has
secrets.
Paul Rednu mel. the f ate I
sea
Ihe
that China had stolen IS
allegations
aiid tin
,ei~
as a
In
1:1(1(1
cnninia;icline;itc! //iuu
nit
NSA
was
messages
its national
laboratories last year iii response
With its expa ncleel
center to
ct
breaking sent
)rnpum(r ~( iwer. thie,tctu~tl
out
between die NK\l)
in \Iuscow arid the
tine radros
of the
,
clanele.s
ariotis cells in
81
CI Commandments
When the
meeting with
Angleton] vowed ~~stern
came to
messages There I
incredibly,
Europe.
was, a
was over... I
myself that
to
these
1
would
never
me.
brand
go
chiefs
to see
the
9
traf
daytoday
with
he from these life-and-death
these messages.
privileged an
to
Above all, I felt
have been
given
methodically attacked every
such
conclusions.
my
raffic
opportunity.
Building on an earlier study of the Kape/le by the Cl Staff, I com pleted a draft several months later that incorporated the new mate rial.
To my great
study
was
immediate that I
by
superiors, and
was to
I
my was
be rewarded with
told a
congratula tions from lames Jesus Angleton. the legendary head of the Cl Staff from 1954
to
was
the
on
and
ther
how
to
went
The
an
small
aides briefed
was
Angletons Angleton that the light
on
trouble and
reason
add
was
just
one
desk.
I
had eye
hurt his
convinced the real
for the semidarkness
his mystique. worked on me~ to
was to
could
ever
I nervously briefed
Angleton
on
my
study. and he listened without
interrupting, just nodding
82
time.
have
from time
When I finished. he
than I I would
imagined.
5( ane
obser
personal
vations
in the form of The
G
ndments of Counterintelli
)lllma
len
I have chosen the form of
as
a
brand
officer.
new
was
immutable
aie
around the bend.
of the
most
bizarre
It
was one
experiences
and should be
scrupulously
lowed.
view, it makes little
In
my
the Russians, the Cubans. the East Germans. the Chinese,
of
fol
difference whether the adversary is
else.
or someone
It likewise makes little differ
my career.
whether
the to
meeting
get myself that I would
to
go anywhere not keep that
I
was over.
good
was
2005.
of there, and I
out
near vow.
Ci
again.
In
never
I did
1
(:1 today. I
c(
I
Nothing seemed to pulse more, and I was
Ci operations.
quicken my delighted when I was called back to I leadquarters in 1989 to join the new Counterintelligence Center (GIG) as Ted Prices deputy. When led moved upstairs in early 1991 to become the Associate Deputy Director for Operations. I was
1985
in
Cl
are
not
or
principles
nsider fundamental
I
being followed as
con
effective
to
fully and consistently
in
I watch IS
as
increasingly
am
about
talking
are
nfortunately,
cerned that the
my over
assignments with the Agency,
we
(.1 practices
as care
they
should be.
ilo,se
commandments
handed d( ~wn
to me
taintop. and I make they tivt.
were not
from no
a
inspired or even Tliey are simply the
dehni
culmination, for what they worth, of my experience.
primarily for
moun
claim that
art
intended
to
more
offer
to
gence.
named chief of the Center.
it certainly
begins
that ended up
Cloriented
the basic rules of Cl
found myself drawn toward Soviet
sanctum.
that
row
am.
and fur
seas
(lark, the curtains
drawn, and there
but I
getting further
Then I
later heard that
eves.
on,
me on
alone into the inner
lamp
first
office, where
outer
conduct myself.
room was
were
was
a
I
out.
vowed
Original Headquarters Building. 1
Ihere
went
could tell that this great mind, this Cl genius. had lost it. I thought he
glad
sec
in
career
1974.
office
ushered into
a
being
ence
ond floor of the
Angletons
lie
counterintelligence
seven
far
like
of
conimanthne,il.c because I believe on
\Xhen
Angletons
to me
German double?
Even I,
interview and
personal
it
this
surprise,
well received
Hadnt
deception? that Leopold lrep leader of the Role Kapelle,
per. the was a
of
one
1 know the
was a
occurred
Rote
Didnt
photos
Angleton.
So. alter
operations I was deeply affected by the fear, heroism, and drama in
the
displayed.
are
number
officer, literally the first person in the CIA
~~here
leadqiiarters.
all former CIA
anywhere near CI again. I did not keep that vow.
junior
new
I
are
They
are
my felk)\v
Today, many years after that initial disagreeable encounter with CI, I
practitu )ners in Cl today. but also
find it hard
for
ally
my
to
believe that it is
picture
GIG conference
on
actu
the wall of the
room
at
CIA
an~
younger officers in the
Intelligence CommLinity
(IC) who
might someday
join
want
to
us.
CI Commandments
The truth is that CI officers The First Commandment: Be Offensive
CI that is
fail.
passive
\Vc cannot hunker down in
cleknsive to
and defensive svill
1w)de and 1 believe
happen.
ing far t(
safes. alarms
defensive
and other
measures to
lhat
secrets.
we are
niuch money
)O
is mu h
been liLirt
in
have hurt
us.
wrong.
things spend
protect we
have
We should operate
)ffensive.
Aggressive (k)uhie agent essential
( I)~\) oper
to .in~
Ci
program. hut not the 1redictahle. hackne~ ed kind we have so often
controlled operations. and we need the oj )position ser more of them. vices should be kept onstantly off .
that
that they
suspect have actually controlled the
we
ne~ er
operatlo ins the~ hel eve the~ initi ated from the I )egi nning. \Vhen time req uiremnents. ninthis
pers~
ma
I ity
objectives
operaizth.
and
of the T)A
only
one out
recruitnients
And CI
should o\~ n
of 10
or
20 of these
lhcv
should
adage
is
that the old
are
or
against
sI iould
us, we
foe.
friendly
We should dress up
morsel, made
test
thing as
e
we
we
have learned
needed
to
kno~~
some
and
learned es ent.
~i
something.
becali5e
it.
llie
services.
testing
is penetration
American spy, there
are
lor
to
bad reputation. It It did not lead
a
promotions
good assign
or
left
Angleton
legacy that for CI profession.
a
distasteful
years discredited the
Ted Price did
more
than anyone else in the Agency to reverse that trend and to rehabili tate
CI
a
as
respected professional
discipline.
e
a
Nevertheless, that battle is still
more to
moted.
a
to
no ser
that
so
get
CI
recognized. our
be attractecl we
our
know is
have
Xe
won.
to
not
do
people pro and respected
best young officers will to follow us into what a
noble
where the nerd is
professh
so
in
and
great.
lifetime pass front
Cl operations.
The Third Commandment: Own
and
key
of
many
fast track.
completely
In either
to).
we are
traditional adversary:
of fensis
my career,
we
plausible deniahil itv has strictly preserved. Fvery for.. eign service is a potential no in
no-
.
Operation. if the) reject friends should, we have
an
true
of
It had
not
ments.
cific target. and send it
they take it.
Ct
to
order f~r that spe by them. If
to
it is
Ci?
)ple ~iV tided becoming specialists. (:1 was not presti
was
enticing
an
on
best pec
giolis.
operating them.
are
long. If they are why not?
anyone.
they spent
For much our
gence services. If we suspect f~r whatever reason that the opera tives of a foreign intelligence service, friend
If they
roasted for
are
so-
friendly intelli
no
criti
Their
go wrong.
win.
intelligence
there
correct:
bad to
What have they done with all that money
the Street
officers from the opposition
intelligence success
us
vice should get
con
stantly
recruit
vince
as
he
professionals. of course. rely exclu~.ively on their
prod their lit ~llNl colleagues to identify. target.
well
bring marks
their failures.
spy. the taken so
having catching
I ios~
easy
things
not
need of
we
are
successes are
aggressively as
usually
11mev
Ilie)
a
truth is that
p pular. llmev always welconie when they
not
catch
friend.
takes, it is worth it.
not
efforts.
to
operations against Americans by called friendly countries to con
ha~
operati( in have been a chieved. we should in a greater flu rnber of cases pitch the opposit i( in cisc officer. If
do
examples
nations. hut
pursued. We need to push our I )right and imaginative people to produce clever new scenarios for
so
hirse
the traditional adversaries. many
guard
we
against the nontraditu)nal
Cl
adversaries.
ations are
what it takes,
have penetrations.
esteem, or
not
are
cize when matter
been
they
lhie
)gnitic ~n.
rec(
news.
Spies
not
extent
ards. praise.
ments. a~
walk in.
our
the
to
deserved, with promotions. assign
are
nindset
oi r
favored,
CI officers
~9
have
professionals
(:1
other
a
purely
~w
( )iir CI
go after
to
need
popular... They usually bring bad news. And they are easy marks to criticize when things go
fences.
( )fl
recent veiirs.
should I )e relentlessly We
for
sv ut
are not
Ci
every
The Second Commandment: Honor Your ProfessionaLs
Ibis
several
members of the opp ) sition service who knos~ ssiio he om she is No
is
It has been
true
for
ing degrees throctgh
yearsb mt
vary
the ICthat
is
fundamental
so
prohahl
the commandments. pr( gram
w
to
Cl, but it
the least folb )wed of
)~t
11)
1
Any
)f the
Cl
name
has
t
83
CI Commandments
I do not think it would be
excessive
thumb in he able
engage the opposition the Street. the held of play for
on
rule of
as a
top notch CI
a
to
service to be
If
we
are
the
street. it is worse
ing
been there
at
beaten
than
Ignore Analysis
Not
operators and analysts.
Analysis has
,,
consistently understaffed it. have
we
of the worlds
capitals.
the major espionage
including
failures in
virtually conceded
For years,
the
streets
cen
ters, to the KGB. the GRU. and the
East
services because
European
either did
not
know how
not
price for
a
reliable, fulltime, lance
to
do
it or
local surveil
capability.
Opposition intelligence officers have
ing
be watched, known
to
have
areas
when often
an on
to
identify
to cover
participants.
it,
and obtain
evidence.
Ibis
capability
is
expensiveselec
tion, training, vehicles, photo gear. video, radios, safe apartments, observation posts. and on and on but, if we do not have it, we will
he
second-rate CI service and will
a
not
break the
major
cases.
The Fourth Commandment:
discouraged when I talk to young Cl officers today to find how little they know about the his tory
could
today
practitioner
her trade without
of American CI.
Cl is
a
~
ply
or
we
l.()ginov
case.
,
and
Sltadrin?
Are
Aspillaga
and tile Cuban DA deba
cle?
I lave
examined
do it.
we
current
an
indispensable part
study the CI
obligationto
failures of the past, make
to
reflect
ble
courses
they
being
positive step,
not.
as
to
their
on
past
make operators dou
own
analysts.
As
a
vsis historically has been the
weakest part of the business. Pro fessional CI analysts have been
underappreciated.
are
offered
hut there
substitute for
at
borne.
lhey find They write
sedentary.
could
tinderval ued and sure
a
per
the part of
professionals to read their history, usually on their own time our
Cl
They
cerebral,
result, in the United States, Cl anal
A
a
arc more
and
we
good
(21 program will recruit and
train true
he
at
on
repeated.
are a
been g~ )Od
A lot of (:1 programs in the
of the formation of any American CI officerand certainly a profes
never
not
have tried
different.
are
lliev
have tried
now
really
and The
Haii iied Wood?
will
n( )t
is we
I )etter.
releases like The
Mi! ru/thin Archiie
The many CI
when
have
analysts
Irtie
love it.
our
things
to
our
it.
patient,
they staying
I believe it is
analysis
thingand
mistakes in the Ames and 1-loward
recent
away from
are
Research and
cases?
with
are
and shakers;
they familiar with
they
At-c
movers
We love the street.
desks.
I TONET()l,,
Nosenko, lollard,
different
are
quick. maybe a little impul Our maybe a little cowboy.
best times
to
MFICI lAOS
We
people. Operators
are
sive,
our
horrendous mistakes.
84
tile
doers.
actors.
Do they know the
sonal commitment
Their
his
indepth knowledge of the Angleton era. I lave our officers read Mangokl? I lave they read I.eend and Wilder
dangerous discipline. Many good, well-meaning CI peo ple have gone wrong and made
difficult and
ak)ng. cheap.
go
on
kinds of
an
History
very
we
do it
read the Ci
not
find it inconceivable that any Cl
not
am
as
We
make it up We have tried to to
Generally speaking. operators make
them, and
I
lost if
~~re
tried
5( )Tnet i ines
bad analysts. I
sional
Know Your
well doc
literature.
,l~.c
operation goes down short noticeundetect
the
officers do
our
meet
he observed, and.
able surveillance has
most cases are
umented. but the lessons~
we
willing to pay tile tllor( )ughly professional.
we were
the Cl
lhroughout have fairly
cotllTnunitv. we
all.
often been the
too
of (:1.
stepchild
on
hav
not
The Fifth Commandment: Do
divided between
espionage. And when we do go to the street, we have to he the best Service there.
evenly
bers,
I
analysts
do not
excessive
as a
in sizable
num
think it would be
nile of thumb in
top notch CI service
to
he
a
evenly
divided between operators and analysts. \ery few of our US CI
agencies that
ratio.
come
anywhere
close
to
CI Commandments
More harm
been done Wonderful
things happen
when
in sutficient
num
good analysts bers pc
over our
)re
tcltap transcripts.
than
by
our
enemies.
9,
maps. travel data,
They
specialized
training (an ~ duce t hem. Such training is expensive, so (:1
on
a
possible and
should do it
we
basis
Community
duplication
find
and
regular,
extensive,
whenever
udio and
and ~urveiIlance reports.
has
the years by interagency sniping and obstruction
I )A reports,
presence lists, SIGINT,
probably
to US CI over
to
avoid
quality.
to ensure
the clues, make the connections, afld beLls
our
that will be
efforts
roost
the
in
commu
have gotten the message and
nity have
incorporated trained analysts
into their operations. bi it others
have have
hoard,
Across the
not.
shortfalls in
serious
age other Cl
still
we
CI is
difficult,
mod the
ar
same.
in the best of
even
only
to
wa~
do it is
together. We should not let personalities, or jeak)usies, or turf
battles get in the way of Our
mission.
sister
our
solid Cl analysis.
do the
circumstances, that the
mon
good.
so
supervisors to
community
productive.
parts of the I. S (.1
~\1any
areas
our com
colleagues
services are as
in
dedicated.
professional, hardworking, and patriotic as we are, and they The Sixth Commandment: Do
deserve
Not Be Parochial
known in
harm
M
)re
to
I. S CI
has been done
probably
the years
over
than by
specialists. Each specialized training curriculum. It takes a long time to develop Cl specialists, and requires its
area
that
We
training.
but
ter.
we
own
sustained investment
means a
in CI
have been CI
of their or~afliZa So let us 1
people, regardless a
The
are
are
not
getting bet
there yet.
Commandment:
Eighth
are
people
the intelli
in
gence business and other groups in
the LS Government who do when the CIA and the PHI did even
talk
to
each otherand
had disdain for the vices.
It is
no
miltary
bly damaging for ~ long.
spies
particularly
Train Your
officers have
uncovered
CI is
wings in my
or
outright
bad
matter
mon
sarcasm
mouthing of by
discipline
of
an
us
cynicism infected
our
get
just
hatters.
and
my
CI has
way
Case officers
of
them.
and got in the way of
cooperation. These often were intended
c
t
supposed superiority
mments
flaunt
by
our
demean
ing the capabilities of the other organizations.
by telling
knock
off,
it
my not
really ~
our own
need are
CI.
a
separate Cl
sec
all Cl officers: well
That is
a
recipe
do
for
compromise and failure.
I dealt with these
situations
the officers
and 1 would
to
encour
to
There
are
no
substitutes for
sional CI officers, and
want
be bona lide,
managers do not
or
not
tion.
We
only
cause
original
head
black
their operations
Senior operations want to
that their operations
he learned.
know how many times in we do career I have heard. No,
I do
We
We get in the
com
operations. hut is
other
junior offic
be overzealous.
It is nor
That kind of attitude and
officers.
mixed reputation.
way of operations. aches. We are the
we
a
to
a
not
CI
ptohlems everywhere.
our
when
officers.
see
can
It is not automati
applying logic
sense to
instead
and
highly specialized seeing things and analyzing
I. IS Government agenc:es
ers
case
as
I
caraer.
encountered instances of
distinct
a
acquired skill. cally infused in a
Occasionally
People
\Ve was
like Cl officers.
The Seventh Commandment: both
incredi
some
went
not
sei
wonder that CI
shambles and that
a
Do
Not Be Shoved Aside
There
l legial.
] remember
enemies.
our
officers, technical
case
experts, and DA
inter
sniping and obstruction
agency
include analysts. surveillance spe
cialists,
I have
people
my career
tR)nal affiliation.
by
dis
respect and coopera
our
The best
tion.
(:1 is a congh )merate of several ciplines and skills. A typical operation, for exainple. might
profes
penetrated by
There is on
a
are
believe
controlled
the opposition.
natural human
the part of both
case
tendency
officers
and senior
operations managers to scrutiny. lhev believe that they are practicing good CI themselves and do not welcome being second-guessed or told how to run their operations by resist otttside CI
so-called CI
specialists
who
aie
not
85
CI Commandments
If there
be
to
were ever
a
mascot for US
counterinteffigence, it should be the pit bull.
directly involved in the opera I have seen far more ti()ns. of this in
examples than I
By the
contractors
running
crats
sensitive
and
to
resist
to
problems
them.
their
and
be
can
your health.
to
I do
believe
not
make
Cl inter
in prevent
anyone
of CI.
the old Cl hand
it:
seen
hit
a
uncovered generate tremendous heat. It is not surprising that the~
(listort ion. warp creeping pa ing, and overzealoiisness in ones
often viewed
net
as a
and twisted world of CI
arcane
without
falling
thinking. that led
and groups it is
with
locked
out or
pro
the host
to
and his
of the
lhe
sadly succUmbed. results.
danger
been this:
always hkxked
liv
you
some senior,
are
obtuse,
anti-Cl officer, go around him
through
him by
has
colleagues
If
going
to
cooperation.
carrying flOt. as
it
out
~~lien
other
who
was
working
your Cl mission.
to
If
soniething
goes wrong. likely will in that kind of situa
at
the
When I
was
Cl is
a
Too
hazardous
slioLild be
86
Do
profession.
warning signs
on
There the
What if the
important.
eight
years instead of
ninth?
if,
\Xhrat
own
five months instead CI
into the
experi
had discontinued
ence, we
such
going
in my
a
operation after of continuing
history
is full of
examples.
lhe
FRI is
making
cases
against espi
Aniericans today that involved
1 970s.
The
Armys
Foreign
Coun
with her that evening
not
home.
at
response, I thought. was tIre mark: Okay. hut do t( )o
right
I Icr on
not stay
is persistence.
CI officers who
nage. and ( )ur
we
o\vn
should
CI needs
ing.
there
should he
constant
rotational
tours.
iniperative that
a
be safe and will
they
never
Fl
)r
not
i cIa
(
1 )ng ago of their Am a f rmer t S
Reserve col( )nel for
g(x)d
nage
service
will
never
have
)f
I also believe it is CI
Iraitors
a
peaceful nights sleep. I applauded IUV (:1 colleagues in the FBI when I read
on
not create one
nact iofl.
should know that
productive
are
patient need not tppjy There is no statute of limitations for espio
Nv
long.
flowthrough. ~sonCI officers should he brought in regularly
Long
most
terintell igence Activity is doing the The name of the game in CI same.
lots of ventilation and fresh think
Stay
the
offering me the position as Ted lrices deputy in the new Counter intelligence Center. I discussed it
Sensible and
Not
TI ie tenth and last commandment is
onage committed in the 1960s and
serving
and recei\ ed the cable
tion. you in Cl will take the blame.
The Ninth Commandment:
Up
well
was
with this reputation of CI and the stories about its practi
overseas
higher
obstruction
Never Give
certain surveillance
as
acquainted tioners.
or
management. And ckcument all instances of denied access, lack of or
Others in
is always there.
CIA when I met her, Cl
the wilderness
or
The Tenth Commandment:
into the sixth?
My wife, my
syndrome.
mirrors.
Ames mole hunters had quit after
history. Angleton
our
coterie
devastating
well.
traits
cannot
do his oh.
.\Iv advice to
to
C!
worst
the CIA and elsewhere have
is
invited in only when
it is convenient
eventually
precisely these
to some
disasters in
A Cl
prey
It is
When necessary. a CI service has to impose itself on the organizations
tect.
seems
of
ma n( )ia
nuisance.
assigned to professional ~~ho
the school of
It is
spooky.
the
are
to
profes
immerse oneself daily in
problems are invisible and impossible to measure, hut their whistle blowing when problems are
to
and less likely
doublethink, the us-against-them mindset. the nothing-iswhat-it
We all who work in
who has gotten
hard
should
hack
come
smarter.
into the nether world of
f~il
uninterrupted
entire,
an
career
CI have
CI
ing
~~ill
lhev
refreshed,
sr()nal CI:
overreact to
successes
steady diet of C!
A
too
minimize Cl threats
stir up
walls:
dangerous
CS
professional
out
t
tect.
and bureau
CI officers, in their view,
vention.
assignments
specialists. Ihev
spend two or three years lie operators or with the other groups they are charged to pro with
Government programs have often tended
)tatR)nal
n
sh iukl go
career
token, defense and
same
intelligence
Cl
my
remember.
to
care
build in
side CI for its CI
arrest
in
iv
alleged espio
against the United
States
CI Commandments
niany years earlier.
ously
never
It
keep
obvi
Th.~y
In Conclusion
Ihese we
even
(:1 investigation alive
a
it, the
defector,
and stay
on
tile
next
penetration, the
the
next
surveillance,
next
cr
clue will break it br
u~.
U there
be
next
tile
tip,
next
of Cl.
my ten commandments Other Cl professionals will
are
have their
own
mine.
Ihat
because
is
as a
as
disagree
for t ~S
ever to
a
counterintelligence,
be the pit bLill.
mascot
country and
it should
vigorous debate
with
on
direction of US Cl. will agree with the
What
Recent
we
news
reports from l.os and else
\Vashington.
where have
again underscored
continuing need for Cl
it should he.
Intelligence Community were
ity.
Alamos.
and
priorities
exhortations and will
the priorities.
should agree on, however, is that strong CI has to he a national prior
gave up.
the
vigilance.
as an
we
need
a
the fLitlire Not
e~ervone
speciFics,
or
87