The 2014 Presidential Elections, Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi) [PDF]

東南亞研究中心 6RXWKHDVW$VLD5HVHDUFK&HQWUH

Suhardiyoto HARYADI Former Reuters Fellow, Green Templeton College, Oxford and Peter CAREY Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Humanities University of Indonesia

Indonesia’s Tryst with Destiny: The 2014 Presidential Elections, Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Sixteen Years (Dwi-Windu) of Reformasi (1998-2014) A Commentary

Working Paper Series No. 155 July 2014

The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically © Copyright is held by the author or authors of the Working Paper. SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the author or authors. Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong. Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Mark R Thompson, Director Professor William Case Dr Bill Taylor Dr Nankyung Choi Dr Thomas Patton Editor of the SEARC Working Paper Series Professor Mark R Thompson Southeast Asia Research Centre The City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852 3442 6330 Fax: (852) 3442 0103 http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc

Indonesia’s Tryst with Destiny: The 2014 Presidential Elections, Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Sixteen Years (Dwi-Windu) of Reformasi (1998-2014) A Commentary by

Mr Suhardiyoto Haryadi (Former Reuters Fellow, Green Templeton College, Oxford) A commentary on an original presentation by Dr Peter Carey (Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia) at the City University Hong Kong (10 March 2014)

Abstract The sixteen years of Reformasi (Reform) in Indonesia have seen remarkable political changes as the country has moved from Suharto’s autocratic ‘New Order’ (1966-98) to full-fledged democracy. Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi’s) recent people-power victory over former Special Forces general, Prabowo Subianto, in the 9 July presidential elections, has underscored the scale of this change. Sixteen years marks an era in Javanese cosmology, each eight years completing a windu cycle, a doubly auspicious moment to take stock of Indonesia’s progress. The paper assesses the contribution of the four post-Suharto presidents to the reform process with the current incumbent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14), being seen as the least effective. B.J. Habibie’s April 1999 decentralisation legislation and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s (2001-4) introduction of direct elections for political office-holders from city mayors to the president have enabled new figures such as Jokowi to emerge from the grassroots to challenge the traditional oligarchic establishment. Although the former Surakarta mayor’s election triumph marks a turning point, the challenges for his incoming administration are huge, not least in the public health and education fields where Indonesia’s record is amongst the worst in Southeast Asia. The last part of the paper looks at the ways in which these challenges might be met, beginning with losing candidate, Prabowo’s, constitutional court appeal designed to delegitimize the election process. It also sets Jokowi’s election in a broader sweep of Javanese history looking particularly at his appeal as a Javanese ‘Just King’ or Ratu Adil.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

1

On Monday, 10 March 2014, my former Oxford tutor, Dr Peter Carey, made a presentation on the forthcoming Indonesian presidential election to the City University HK which was uploaded to youtube (available on the link http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4fivED0ukc).There was much of interest in Peter’s presentation, but perhaps also a few things that were left unsaid. Now that Jokowi-JK have been confirmed as the winners by the Electoral Commission (22 July 2014),i I will attempt to fill in some of the gaps in Peter’s presentation. As a former Indonesian journalist, I have been following Indonesian electoral politics since the dawn of the reformasi period in May 1998, and although no longer involved in the world of journalism, I continue to maintain a keen interest in the subject of Indonesian elections.

Slide 1 The presentation commenced with a slide entitled ‘What is at Stake?’ The answer was partly technical – namely, the 9 April legislative elections would determine the electoral ‘threshold’ for the respective parties relating to the 25 percent of the constituency vote or 20 percent of the seats required for parties to nominate their own candidates for the 9 July presidential election; and partly historical – namely the importance of this moment in Indonesia post-independence history Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

2

as a potential watershed in determining the nation’s future especially given the emergence of new candidates from the local grassroots of whom the Indonesian President elect, former Surakarta mayor (in office, 2005-12) and Jakarta Governor (in office, 2012-14), Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi, born 21 June 1961), is the most exceptional. There was an interesting remark made by Jokowi’s current running mate, former Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla (born 1942, in office, 2004-9), that to get elected he needed around 70 million votes, but to govern the country he only needed the telephone numbers of 500 key members of the Indonesian political, judicial and bureaucratic establishment – a small enough number to fit on his hand-phone’s memory chip!ii If true – and Kalla’s prediction of 70 million votes was almost spot oniii - this is a telling aside and could be said to reflect the solipsistic and self-regarding nature of the current Indonesian elite. The historical example of the British elite in June 1940 is telling here: namely, SS Brigadier-General Walther Schellenberg’s Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. (Special Search List G.B. = Great Britain), a list of 2,820 of prominent English and foreign nationals who would have been immediately arrested (and subsequently executed) had Hitler’s 1940 invasion plan for England been successful.iv In 1940, the population of the United Kingdom stood at just 48 million. So, if the Nazis deemed that they needed to get rid of nearly 3,000 individuals to tear the heart out of Britain’s resistance, one could imagine that a country like Indonesia, which has a population five times greater than the wartime UK, should have a political elite of at least 15,000. The fact that it has just three percent of that number – in Jusuf Kalla’s estimation – is a reflection of the huge distance the Republic still has to travel to develop an adequate pool of local and national leaders. This deficit in leadership is one of the principal challenges for the development of an effective democratic system in Indonesia. It is also one of the reasons why the country seems to be sleepwalking into its role as the seventh largest economy in the world by 2030 as predicted by the McKinsey Global Institute.v It has no sense of where it is going or what it wants to achieve as a nation.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

3

Slide 2 Slide 2 attempted to summarise what was at stake in the current 2014 election, suggesting that the elections would determine the country’s leadership for the next five years (2014-19) and probably longer (2014-24) given the likelihood that a successful first-term president – witness the current incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY, born 1949; in office 2004-14) – would almost certainly seek a second five-year term. Secondly, it indicated that the new presidency might provide a long-term vision for the country, perhaps even one which would envisage how Indonesia might look at the time of its independence centenary in 2045. Thirdly, it underscored that a top agenda item would be prioritising the present fight against corruption given Indonesia’s current place as the 117th most corrupt country in the world out of 174.vi At the very least, the role and authority of the State Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) would be expected to be expanded. In this regard, it is significant that one of the two

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

4

presidential candidates, Jokowi, seriously considered the current KPK head, the Makassar-born Abraham Samad (born 1966), as his running mate. Fourthly, it indicated that any new administration would be expected to enact pro-poor policies in education and health. Finally, Indonesia’s competitiveness and culture of excellence would need to be developed if it was going to hold its own with its G-20 partners and become a developed country.

Slide 3

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

5

Slide 4 Slides 3-4 then reviewed the history of the first six years of Reformasi, the so-called ‘Reform’ period, looking in turn at the administrations of Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie (born 1936; in office, May 1998-October 1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (‘Gus Dur’) (1940-2009; in office, October 1999-July 2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (born 1947; in office 2001-4). The argument here, following that of Professor Rhenald Kasali of the Social Sciences Department of the University of Indonesia (UI), was that this was an exceptionally innovative period.vii Despite the truncated nature (517 days) of Habibie’s administration, some 57 laws were enacted (roughly one every ten days). viii These included two major decentralization bills devolving power from the centre to the 330+ (now 509) districts or kabupaten (April 1999) and one government legal revision (Peraturan Pengganti Undang-undang, Perpu) recognizing East Timor (Timor-Leste’s) independence following the UN-sponsored independence referendum (30 August 1999). He also oversaw the dismantlement of the New Order state’s surveillance apparatus and held the first free elections in nearly a half century (the last had been in 1955).

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

6

Wahid’s roller-coaster twenty-one month administration was even more remarkable, according to Kasali, for its range of bold political initiatives. The UI Social Sciences Professor counted no less than ten.ix These ranged from the ending of all restrictions on the ethnic Indonesian Chinese minority – who constitute around 3.2 percent of the 250-million strong Indonesian population and control 75 percent of the country’s private corporate assets – to the curtailing of the political privileges of the Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia / TNI) and the abolition of the Resolution (ketetapan / TAP) of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) of 1967 banning the study of Marxism-Leninism. Some of Gus Dur’s initiatives – such as his sensible proposal that Indonesia should recognize the State of Israel – never gained traction in the face of opposition from the Islamic parties in his central axis (poros tengah) coalition, while others, such as his promise to the Aceh Independence Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka / GAM) that the rebellious province could use syariah law in its local courts following a successful peace accord were a betrayal of Indonesia’s secular constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar / UUD 1945).

Slide 5 Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

7

Slide 5 suggested that even Megawati Sukarnoputri (born 1947), a political cipher alongside the larger-than-life Gus Dur, had initiated some major reforms: the most important of these were the introduction of direct elections for the President (and Vice-President), and for Governors, Mayors and district administrators (bupati), a reform introduced for the first time for the 2004 presidential elections which Megawati lost to her former Security Minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Another Megawati initiative was the establishment of the State Corruption Eradication Commission (2003), which began its work in the last year of her administration and is now the most high profile government agency thanks to the spectacular corruption of the second SBY presidential term (2009-14), a period which was immediately reverted to in Slides 7-9.

Slide 6 Taking the yardstick of the root-and-branch reforms of the early Reformasi period, Slide 6 suggested that during the former general’s decade-long administration, there were just two major initiatives: the August 2005 Helsinki Accords, which brought a settlement to the Aceh conflict,

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

8

and – an entirely different reform this – the conversion of 58 million Indonesian low income households from kerosene to LPG (Liquified Petroleum Gas) for cooking (2007-9). As Slide 7 then pointed out, significantly, both were not the work of the President himself, but that of his deputy, Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, an astute South Sulawesi businessman who was able to ‘deliver’ on both initiatives because he paid attention to detail, had an appropriate sense of urgency and took risks – the art of the possible in politics.

Slide 7

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

9

Slide 8

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

10

Slide 9 In SBY’s second term, Slide 9showed how a form of scelerosis seemed to have set in: despite much talk none of the former general’s electoral promises were fulfilled. These included the reform of the country’s four-and-a-half-million-strong bureaucracy – a huge remora on the country’s progress; the eradication of corruption (one of SBY’s major campaign promises back in 2004); the regeneration of the agricultural sector and the introduction of floor prices for key cash crops; and the establishment of a top-quality academic standards and curricula in Indonesian schools and universities, currently rated bottom – 40th- out of 40 countries surveyed in the Pearson Global Index of Cognitive Skills and Educational Attainment.x In terms of education, Slides 8-9 looked more closely at what had happened during SBY’s tenyear administration. Had any of the reforms and improvements promised by SBY in his 2004 presidential campaign been achieved? The answer was almost entirely negative. This began with a comparison between Indonesia and Japan in terms of Research & Development capacity, which I found somewhat far-fetched given Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

11

the huge gap in HRD capacity between the two countries. Thus it came as no surprise that Indonesia’s USD150,000,000 per annum R&D expenditure in the 2001-11 decade was 45 times less than the approximately USD 7 billion per annum spent by its much more highly developed East Asian neighbour. More tellingly - and appropriate in my view - was the comparison between Indonesia and two of its closest middle-income ASEAN neighbours, Malaysia and Thailand. According to available figures, Thailand spent four times more on research than Indonesia, while Malaysia allocated over thirty percent of its education budget to R&D. During this time, Indonesia’s research expenditure remained stagnant at 0.08 percent of GDP, a situation reflected in the picayune eleven industrial patents registered internationally by Indonesian researchers, a sharp contrast to the 67 and 263 patents registered respectively by Thailand and Malaysia.xi In the same decade, Indonesia with at that time approximately 230 million people, published just 7,847 scientific articles in international academic journals while Thailand (population 69 million) and Malaysia (population 26 million) published over 30,000 scholarly articles apiece. xii The impact of this deficit for Indonesia, according to historian Anthony Reid, is that it is now one of the developing countries least able to explain itself to the outside world with over 90 percent of all articles published in international journals relating to its history, politics and society being written by non-Indonesians or former citizens, like the political scientist Arief Budiman (now an Australian citizen), who have elected to take up permanent residence abroad. xiii In his original presentation, Peter correctly pointed out that such a situation is not in Indonesia’s long-term interests given that knowledge is power and perceptions of a country are critically shaped by its international image – in particular its ability to project itself intellectually. A key test for Indonesia will come in October 2015 when it has the distinction of being the ‘guest of honour’ at the prestigious Frankfurt book fair, the first time it has received such an invitation. During that month, the country’s intellectual culture will be on display for the whole world to see. This poses a challenge. In the first two decades following independence in 1945, such an invitation would have presented few problems: the late Dutch colonial educational system produced a number of brilliant Indonesian intellectuals whose literary, philosophical and artistic output had a global resonance. One thinks here of Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006), Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004), HB Jassin (1917-2000), Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1908-1994), Sitor Situmorang (born 1924) and Ajip Rosidi (born 1938). Today, such public intellectuals are much rarer, in part the result of the intellectually stultifying effects of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ (1966-98) and the moral ambivalence of the subsequent reformasi era (1998-present) with its rampant corruption and erosion of academic standards and intellectual integrity.xivAlthough Indonesia today boasts many more PhDs (23,000) than in the two decades following independence (1950-70),xv the mental culture and commitment required Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

12

to support high quality research is lacking at all levels. In the words of the Northwestern University Professor of Politics, Jeffrey Winters, ‘the environment here [in Indonesia] is not supportive to research […]. Public appreciation [of intellectuals] and publication [opportunities] are also lacking. We have to create a completely different intellectual culture, attitude and identity’.xvi

Slide 10 When one turns to public health, Slide 10 showed that the record is even more problematic. In terms of mortality for birthing mothers, Indonesia posted the third highest death rate in South and Southeast Asia after Nepal and Burma - 359 per 100,000 live births –well over three times higher than its declared 2015 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of 102 deaths. By comparison, its nearest neighbours, Singapore and Malaysia, have just three and 29 deaths per 100,000 live births respectively. xvii One could argue that both these countries have nominal GDP rates (Singapore: USD54,775; Malaysia USD10,547) greatly in excess of Indonesia’s modest USD3,509, but even countries like the Philippines and Vietnam with much lower nominal GDP rates - USD2,790 and USD1,901 respectively – also have significantly lower death rates for Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

13

birthing mothers, the Philippines recording 99 deaths per 100,000 live births and Vietnam just 59.xviii Another grim statistic relates to Indonesia’s record with regard to leprosy. The country still ranks in the small category of just eighteen states worldwide where this disfiguring disease is classified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as endemic. Only India and Brazil have higher infection rates. Both its near neighbours, Singapore and Malaysia, closed their leprosaria on St. John’s Island (Pulau Sakijang Bendera) off Singapore,Pulau Jerejak off Penang, and Sungai Buloh in the Klang Valley (now a state prison) in 1971, 1969 and 2005 respectively.xix By contrast, in the decade when the last Malaysian asylum was being closed (2000-10), Indonesia posted by far the highest proportion of leprosy sufferers in Southeast Asia, with only tiny and impoverished Timor-Leste running it a distant second: of the 17-18,000 new cases reported every year, a significant percentage (10 percent) were children. xx According to the WHO and Indonesian Ministry of Health statistics, there are an estimated 375,000 former leprosy patients residing in the community of whom some 30,000 have been left with permanent physical damage.xxi But this figure is clearly an underestimate: if the 17-18,000 new cases a year statistic is valid (and the figure in previous decades was very much higher), this would suggest that the number of leprosy patients living in the community and those with permanent physical damage are in excess of 800,000. One reflection here, which was not apparently made in Peter’s initial presentation, is that such statistics reflect a fundamental flaw in the country’s April 1999 decentralization legislation. This surrendered too much responsibility to the regions (daerah) at a time when there was still a deficit in bureaucratic and administrative skills in the daerah to manage strategic national programmes in health and education. There are also budgetary issues involved in that, according to the World Bank, Indonesia spends the least on national health per capita (USD108 or 0.93 percent of GDP) of any middle-income country, comparing poorly to its Southeast Asian neighbours in a similar middle-income bracket such as Malaysia (USD410; 1.64 percent of GDP) and Thailand (USD215; 3.06 percent of GDP). xxii Until the national health budget is raised substantially one can hope for few real improvements in health provision. Indeed, current hopes for a nationwide health service based on the Kartu Indonesia Sehat (Healthy Indonesia card) scheme will also remain a distant dream.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

14

Slide 11 There is much talk today about the ‘demographic bonus’ (Slide 11) which Indonesia will enjoy in the coming two decades. This is the decline – set to reach 46.9 percent in 2030 – of those in the 0-14 and 65+ age groups, namely, non-economically active citizens, when compared to those aged between 15 and 64 and supposedly in work. But it has been correctly pointed out that to benefit from such a supposed ‘bonus’, Indonesia has to ensure a significant increase in public health as well as raise the quality of education and vocational training, and create sufficient jobs for the 1.8 million young men and women entering the job market every year.xxiii Since at present nearly 75 million (65.70 percent) of the 115 million registered work force have at the most junior high school educational qualifications, this is clearly insufficient to support a knowledge-based economy. Without education and health there will be no ‘demographic bonus’ and Indonesia’s new-found status as one of the world’s four most promising developing middle-income economies – what economist Jim O’Neill has termed the ‘MINTs (Mexico-Indonesia-NigeriaTurkey)’xxiv – will be blighted.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

15

Slide 12 Slide 12 asked what has happened to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY’s) promise to eradicate corruption? ‘Put the interests of the people first’ (Utamakan Kepentingan Rakyat) is the strap-line of SBY’s Democratic Party founded in 2001 and the vehicle for his election victories in 2004 and 2009. But since that last electoral triumph, which saw it garner almost 21 percent of the popular vote, it has proven the most spectacularly corrupt of all the country’s political parties. In the 9 April 2014 legislative elections its share of the vote was halved to just over 10 percent, a reflection of its disarray following the jailing of several of its prominent younger leaders, a roll call of dishonor which includes former party treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin, Youth and Sports Minister, Andi Mallarangeng, and former beauty queen, Democrat MP and party official, Angelina Sondakh, all three now serving long custodial sentences, as well as former Party Chairman, Anas Urbaningrum, currently standing trial - like his colleagues before him - for accepting bribes for helping to rig tenders for an athletes’ village built for the Southeast Asian Games in South Sumatra and a national sports centre (Hambalang) outside Bogor.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

16

Slide 13 SBY’s weak and cautious leadership in his second and last five-year term in office (2009-14), is – as was pointed out in Slide 13 - in part the result of the political deals which he has had to make with the small Islamic parties such as the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), whose former head, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, was jailed in December 2013 for attempting to corrupt Indonesia’s beef-import quota.xxv

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

17

Slide 14 SBY’s reliance on Islamist parties in his ruling coalition explains his reluctance to refer to the Pancasila (Five Principles of National Ideology) first enunciated by Indonesia’s founding President, Sukarno, on 1 June 1945 and implemented as a state ideology during Suharto’s ‘New Order’ (1966-98). Since this specifically omits any specific reference to Islam, the religion of the majority of Indonesians, it has little appeal for Islamist politicians.xxvi Indeed, as a result of the privileging of these Islamist allies, Sukarno’s inclusive nationalist vision and Suharto’s secularist pancasila state are both now endangered legacies (Slide 14).

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

18

Slide 15

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

19

Slide 16 But is everything doom and gloom? Slides 15-16 answered this with a resounding negative. They highlighted the introduction of elections for city mayors (walikota) and district administrators (bupati) following the constitutional reforms of President Habibie and Megawati Sukarnoputri in 1999-2002, which, it was argued, has opened up interesting perspectives for the re-greening of the Indonesian political elite and the emergence of new national leaders.xxvii The 4 and 28 June 2013 elections of H. Ganjar Pranowo (born 28 October 1968, in office 201318) and Mochamad Ridwan Kamil (born 4 October 1971, in office, 2013-18) as Governor of Central Java and mayor of Bandung respectively appear to have brought exceptionally promising figures into public office. At the same time, there are others, some far less well known, who had made their mark as reformers in their respective cities and districts (kabupaten). One could cite here the present and former bupati (district administrators) and mayors of Enrekang (South Sulawesi), Palu (Central Sulawesi), Surabaya, Pekalongan and Sawahlunto (West Sumatra), respectively Ir. H. La Tinro La Tinrung (born 18 October 1957, in office 2003-2013), Rusdi Mastura (born 8 February 1950, in office 2005-15), Tri Rismaharini (born 20 November 1961, in Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

20

office 2010-2015), Dr. H. Mohamad Basyir Ahmad (born 24 July 1953, in office 2005-2015), and Ir. H. Amran Nur (born 13 October 1945, in office 2003-2013), who have all made names for themselves as successful reformers.xxviii But undoubtedly the most remarkable of these is the former Governor of Jakarta and now President elect of Indonesia, Haji Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi (in office 2012 to present), who is the candidate of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan). Jokowi made his name as the reforming mayor of Surakarta (in office, 2005-12).xxix In 2012, the year he moved to the Jakarta Governorship, he was placed third in the World Mayor Prize for achieving the greatest success in ‘transforming a crime-ridden city into a regional centre for art and culture’.xxx Together with his former deputy – now Acting Governor - Ir Basuki Tjahaja Purnama MM, known familiarly as Ahok, his Hakka Chinese nickname (born 29 June 1966, in office, 2012-2017) – Jokowi’s modus operandi in Jakarta recalls the same ruthless urgency and skilful leadership earlier evidenced in Surakarta. This has involved a series of long-delayed initiatives to resurrect key infrastructural and social projects such as the Jakarta Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) system, the repair of long delapidated flood defences (Waduk Ria Rio, Waduk Pluit) and the relocation hawkers in the sprawling city wholesale markets of Tanah Abang and Pasar Minggu.xxxi He has also introduced healthcards (Kartu Jakarta Sehat /KHS) for economically challenged Jakarta citizens costing some IDR1.2 trillion (US$107.88 million), and a Smart Jakarta card (Kartu Jakarta Pintar) scheme costing IDR12.5 trillion (US$ 1.3 billion) - some 25 percent of the total city budget - to enable students from low-income families to defray transport, book and school uniform costs.xxxii Undeterred by the seeming intractability of many of the city’s problems, he has been prepared to tackle fundamental issues such as the control of state land, bureaucratic corruption and underperforming local leadership. Jokowi’s exceptionally democratic leadership style, in particular his so-called ‘blusukan’, ‘entering a place where no one wants to’ in the Javanese expression, which have involved him turning up unannounced in slum communities, and his uploading of both his own and his deputy’s meetings on youtube so that Jakarta citizens can monitor their representatives’ day-today administration of their city have opened out new perspectives on Indonesia’s culture of leadership.xxxiii In their first nine months in office (20 October 2012-20 July 2013), the JokowiAhok team are reported to have saved some IDR3 trillion (US$280 million) or six percent of Jakarta’s total annual IDR budget of IDR49.9 trillion (US$ 5.2 billion). xxxiv Given such remarkable achievements and the presence of abundant personal charisma, it is hardly surprising that Jokowi has triumphed in the recent9 July 2014 presidential contest.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

21

Slide 17 The achievements of the Jokowi-Ahok team in the capital city have set a new benchmark for local government in Indonesia. But, despite the new shoots from the grassroots in a number of regions and municipalities, the standards set by Jokowi and his deputy are not yet the norm. Corruption is still endemic in many parts of the Indonesian government and there are today an estimated thirty-seven local authorities – both municipalities and districts (kabupaten) - where the incumbents are related to office holders in adjacent jurisdictions. The tendency for nepotism and family influence to rule the roost in these local authorities is very marked (Slide 17).xxxv One of the most spectacular examples is the province of Banten to the west of Jakarta where the family of the now detained provincial governor, Ratu Atut Khosiyah (born 16 May 1962; in office, 2006-13), Indonesia’s first female governor, control many of the key local offices. The daughter of a controversial businessman and community – alias underworld (jawara) - leader, Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib (aliasHaji Hasan, died 2011), Atut’s family are literally everywhere in the impoverished and poorly administered province.xxxvi

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

22

Interestingly, when Ratu Atut was arrested on 20 December 2013 for alleged corruption involving the bribing of the chief justice of the constitutional court, Akil Mochtar (born 1960; in office, April-October 2013), the national Golkar Party executive rejected the ideaof choosing a regional party leader from outside her immediate family, deciding instead to select her sister, Ratu Tatu Chasanah, currently Serang deputy district head, to take her place asGolkar provincial representative. Despite the corruption charges, which also involved Atut’s brother, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (‘Wawan’), and his wife, South Tangerang Mayor, Airin Rachmi Diany, currently under investigation by the KPK on a completely separate charge ofprofiting from the procurement of medical equipment for local community health centres (puskesmas), the family continues to maintain its highly visible role in the political life of the province.

Slide 18 Such extensive family linkages within the political system have led to a debatein recent years in Indonesia about the dangers of 'political dynasties' forming at the local level, the current situation in Banten often being cited by the local and international media as an example of the dangers of family politics and the control of local offices by prominent local dynasties.But this is not just a Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

23

problem at the local level. Even the family of the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have their own dynastic agenda, as Slide 18 pointed out, with SBY’s youngest son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono(‘Ibas’) (born 1980), becoming Secretary-General of his father’s Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), and his wife, the formidable Ani Yudhoyono (Kristiani Herawati, born 1952), harbouring her own presidential ambitions and acting, according to leaked Australian intelligence reports, as a ‘cabinet of one’ in her husband’s administration.xxxvii

Slide 19 Slide 19 suggested that the political oligarchs of modern Indonesia, such as former LieutenantGeneral Prabowo Subianto (born 1951), a scion of the prominent Banyumas-based priyayi (provincial bupati) Djojohadikusumo family,xxxviii have been keen to recruit the ‘new blood’ at the grassroots for their election campaigns. Significantly, both Prabowo and his billionaire businessman younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo (born 1954), played a critical role in the rise of Jokowi by backing his candidacy as Jakarta Governor in 2012. xxxix It was they who persuaded the Chair of the Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

24

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Megawati Sukarnoputri, to drop her support for the incumbent, Ir Fauzi Bowo (in office, 2007-2012), and swing her party behind Jokowi’s successful bid for the governorship. They also identified an exceptionally able and principled running mate in the person of Ahok, a former East Belitung (Riau) district administrator (bupati) (in office, 2005-6) and Golkar legislator for this selfsame Belitung constituency (2009-12), who subsequently joined Prabowo’s Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party and became only the second Indonesian of Chinese descent to serve as Jakarta Deputy-Governor.xl Unfortunately, this relationship with Jokowi, a long-standing PDI-P member, would later rebound on the Djojohadikusumos’ political ambitions when Megawati chose him on 14 March 2014 to be the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’s candidate for the presidency. As we have just witnessed (9 July 2014), he would bring his candidacy to hard-fought victory when no less than eight of Indonesia’s credible quick-count polling agencies reported that he had won 53 percent of the popular vote thus trouncing his former patron, Prabowo, a form of senjata makan tuan (hoisting with their own petard) or comeuppance beloved of the Malays. In order for this to happen an often painful reorientation was required within Megawati’s PDI-P, which had been re-established in the aftermath of President Suharto’s July 1996 attack on her party HQ.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

25

Slide 20

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

26

Slide 21

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

27

Slide 22

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

28

Slide 23

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

29

Slide 24

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

30

Slide 25

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

31

Slide 26

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

32

Slide 27

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

33

Slide 28

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

34

Slide 29

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

35

Slide 30

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

36

Slide 31

Founded as a vehicle for the Sukarno family’s political aspirations, Slides 24-31 looked at the process of what was termed ‘renunciation’ as Megawati gradually moved aside to allow Jokowi to become the party’s 2014 presidential candidate. Peter equated this with the ‘grand refus’ (‘the big refusal’) of Henri d’Artois, Comte de Chambord (1820-1883), the mid-nineteenth-century (1844-83) Bourbon claimant to the French throne who had refused to accept the tricolour flag as a condition for his restoration during the early Third French Republic (1871-1940). I am not in a position to comment on this historical analogy since I have no knowledge of late nineteenth-century French history. But it seems somewhat far-fetched given that in Megawati’s case her ‘renunciation’ did not mean withdrawing her family from politics altogether, still less going into self-imposed exile as Chambord had done, but rather enhancing her family’s political influence.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

37

Megawati’s 14 March 2014 decision to back Jokowi’s candidacy thus had everything to do with ensuring that her party would get a realistic shot at the presidency after a decade (2004-14) in opposition. She had also been persuaded by her PDI-P advisers, in particular the head of her party’s youth wing, Maruarar Sirait, and her shy son, Prananda Prabowo, that she should back the former Surakarta mayor rather than run again herself as a presidential candidate or throw her weight behind her politically ambitious daughter, Puan Maharani (born 1973). xli PDI-P politicians also wanted to enhance their chances of gaining seats in the 9 April 2014 legislative elections by using Jokowi’s charisma and vote-drawing power. The bottom line here was political pragmatism not principle. Even then Jokowi’s association with the PDI-P party grandees has been problematic. He has been seen as an interloper who has upset existing power balances. Megawati’s daughter, Puan, in particular, is said to resent his presence, seeing herself as the legitimate heir to her family’s political mandate following her father, Taufik Kiemas’s (1942-2013), death (8 June 2013). A political nonentity, she soon found herself eclipsed by the charismatic and politically savvy Jokowi. These internal party rivalries were the main reason the party did so poorly at the 9 April legislative polls. Indeed, until three weeks into PDI-P’s lacklustre campaign, Puan refused to change the ‘Terrific Indonesia’ (Indonesia hebat) adverts tailored around her own presidential candidacy, to those focussing on the former Surakarta mayor. Even then Jokowi and his team had to find non-party sources to pay for their new advertisements. Inexplicably, Jokowi was also barred from speaking about policy in the legislative campaign – those discussions being reserved by party fiat for the presidential contest. Instead, he had to restrict himself to his signature blusukan and cosy chats with local voters urging them to vote PDI-P and guard against electoral fraud. PDI-P’s opponents, most notably Prabowo, meanwhile, had rolled out their full electoral armoury – lavishly financed by Hashim’s deep pockets in Gerindra’s case – and used it to significant effect with the Greater Indonesia Movement party more than doubling its constituency vote from 4.5 percent (26 National Legislative Assembly seats) in 2009 to 11.81 percent (73 seats) in April 2014.xlii None of these internal party issues were referred to in the presentation, a major oversight in my view. The only aspect explored in any depth in Peter’s presentation was the issue of Jokowi’s presidential running mate. Here, he correctly identified two of the front runners - Jusuf Kalla (JK) and the Makassar-born head of the National Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Abraham Samad (born 1966) (Slides 28 and 29), whom we know that Jokowi was considering right up to the moment of his 19 May announcement of JK’s candidacy.xliii However, what Slides 28-9 failed to explain was just why JK was chosen. True, Slide 7 had referred to the Makassar businessman’s experience as a former Vice-President to the current Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

38

incumbent, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (in office 2004-14), and his reputation as a ‘doer’, someone who actually ‘delivered’ rather than just strutted the presidential stage as SBY had done during his ten wasted years (Slides 6 and 8). But what was entirely overlooked was JK’s previous position within the former state party, Golkar, where he had served as party chair in 2004-9 during his first Vice-Presidency. This Golkar relationship was the critical element in Jokowi’s selection of JK as his running mate on 19 May. By this time, it had become clear (18 May) that the unelectable incumbent party chair, Aburizal Bakrie (ARB) (in office 2009-present) (Slides 22-23), had decided to throw in his lot with Prabowo and his Gerindra Party rather than stand as a Golkar presidential candidate in his own right.xliv This move proved highly controversial as Golkar was the second largest party after PDI-P, and had won substantially more votes (15.2 percent) in the 9 April legislative election than Gerindra (11.85 percent). It should by rights have fielded its own presidential candidate rather than join Prabowo’s party. Even though Bakrie was said to have been offered a post as ‘Senior Minister’ or ‘Prime Minister’ by Gerindra, his last-minute move split his party down the middle. Several senior figures from the Golkaradvisory council [Dewan Pertimbangan], including retired General Luhut Binsar Panjaitan (born 1947), who was one of Prabowo’s former Special Forces (Kopassus) commanding officers, along with one of the Golkar senior politicians, Ginanjar Kartasasmita (born 1941), a former New Order technocrat and Speaker of the Regional Representative Council (DPD-RI, 2004-9),resigned immediately. Most threw in their lot with Jokowi, Jusuf Kalla’s presence in the Jokowi camp proving a significant draw. As a highly respected former Golkar politician, JK’s partnership with Jokowi helped the PDI-P coalitionxlv pull in a significant number, over 40 percent according to a recent Kompas survey, of the 18.4 million strong Golkar vote.xlvi The choice of Jusuf Kalla was thus dictated by realpolitik and trumped Jokowi’s gut preference for a younger generation figure like Abraham Samad without any links to the tainted New Order past.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

39

Slide 32

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

40

Slide 33

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

41

Slide 34

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

42

Slide 35

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

43

Slide 36

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

44

Slide 37 Slides 32-37 looked at Jokowi and his specific appeal to the Javanese community as a latter-day Javanese ‘Just King’ or Ratu Adil. This focus was appropriate given that it would be in the Javanese heartland provinces of Central and East Java where the 9 July would be lost and won. But before moving on to consider this penultimate section, I have to enter a caveat: what I found extraordinary in Peter’s presentation was how little he had to say about Jokowi’s principal rival, Prabowo. Many other politicians – including the incumbent President, SBY as well as the Golkar Secretary-General, Aburizal Bakrie - came in for critical comment, but Prabowo was almost passed over. The only slide in which the former Special Forces General appeared (Slide 20), was one in which it was suggested that he might pair up with Jakarta Deputy Governor, Ahok, to profit from the so-called ‘New Blood’ from the grassroots, a far-fetched suggestion if ever there was one given Ahok’s Chinese descent. The Deputy Governor would have been an outright political liability for Prabowo since there is no space for a non-Muslim politician on the national stage either as a presidential or vice-presidential candidate. Given present political realities, the most one could Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

45

envisage is a figure like Ahok rising to ministerial rank but even then it would be in a nonpolitical portfolio such as that carried by the one Indonesian of Chinese descent in SBY’s two ‘Gotong Royong [Mutual Cooperation]’ cabinets, Tourism and Creative Economy (pre-2011, Trade) Minister Mari Elka Pangestu (in office, 2004-14). It thus came as no surprise that when Prabowo eventually chose a running mate – in exchange for a hefty feexlvii - it would be the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) chair (in office, 2010-present) and machine politician, Hatta Rajasa (born 1953), SBY’s Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs (Menko Ekuin).xlviii Some of the key concerns which attach to Prabowo’s candidacy have their roots in his controversial role during Suharto’s New Order when he rose high as the President’s son-in-law. The youngest Lieutenant-General in the Indonesian Army, Prabowo crowned his military career by his appointments as commander of the Indonesian Army’s Special Forces (1995-8) and much more briefly (March-May 1998) the Strategic Army Reserve (KOSTRAD). But, despite his stellar rise, his name will be forever linked with the Indonesian army’s illegal occupation (1975-99) of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor (post-2002, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste), where he served four tours of duty, each one marked by ever higher levels of violence against the civilian population through his sponsorship of local militias. It will also be associated with the abduction and torture by his Special Forces of democracy activists from the period before the July 1997 elections up to the downfall of Suharto in 1998. Some thirteen of these abductees never returned. Prabowo’s penchant for insubordination and willingness to use force to achieve his own ends – most ominously on 22 May 1998 when he brought his KOSTRAD troops to lay siege to the presidential palace and force the newly appointed incumbent, BJ Habibie, to appoint him Army Commander, led to his immediate removal from the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad). Instead, he was given a non-active post as Commander of the Indonesian army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) in Bandung.xlix Soon afterwards, his military career ended entirely following a July 1998 Military Honour Tribunal (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira / DKP) judgement ordering his dismissal from the Army for a number of violations including abduction of pro-democracy activists, illegal use of Special Force troops and insurbordination within the army chain of command. The DKP’s judgement was confirmed by presidential decree in August 1998 and the former Special Forces commander went into self-imposed exile (1999-2001) in Jordan where his friend and fellow Special Forces soldier,l King Abdullah II, had just become king (7 February 1999). As the Jakarta Post reminded us in their remarkable 5 July 2014 editorial: ‘There is no such thing as being neutral when the stakes are so high […] Good men and women cannot stay idle and do nothing. Speak out when persecution occurs, stand firm in rejecting the Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

46

tideof sinister forces. At certain junctures in a nation’s life, its people are called upon to make stark choices. No longer is it a mere ballot cast for one candidate over another, but rather a moral choice on the fate of the nation […] We are encouraged that one candidate [Jokowi] has displayed a factual record of rejecting faithbased politics. At the same time, we are horrified that the other [Prabowo] affiliates himself with hard-line Islamic groups who would tear the secular nature of the country apart. Religious thugs,who forward an intolerant agenda, running a campaign highlighting polarizing issues for short-term gain. We are further perplexed at the nation’s fleeting memory of past human rights crimes. A man who has admitted to abducting rights activists — be it carrying out orders or of his own volition — has no place at the helm of the world’s third-largest democracy. Our democracy will not consolidate if people’s mind-set remains wedged in a security approach in which militarism is an ideal. A sense that one candidate tends to regard civilian supremacy as subordinate to military efficacy. This nation should be proud of its military, but only if those in uniform acknowledge themselves as servants of the democratic, civilian governance. As one candidate offers a break from the past, the other romanticizes the Soeharto era. One is determined to reject the collusion of power and business, while the other is embedded in a New Order-style of transactional politics that betrays the spirit of reformasi. Rarely in an election has the choice been so definitive. Never before has a candidate ticked all the boxes on our negative checklist. And for that we cannot [sit on our hands and] do nothing. Therefore the Post feels obliged to openly declare its endorsement of the candidacy of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Jusuf Kalla as president and vice president in the July 9 election. It is an endorsement we do not take lightly. But it is an endorsement we believe to be morally right.’ That same spirit of morality had led a number of former Army generals, including Agum Gumelar (born 1945) and Fachrul Razi (born 1947) to confirm Prabowo’s previous dismissal from the Army due to ‘his misconduct which had caused great damage to the honour of Kopassus, the Army (TNI), the nation and the state.’li Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

47

Since the 9 July election, the Jakarta Post editorialist’s worst fears have been confirmed as the former Special Forces general and his coalition partners have connived to overturn the election result through concocted quick-count figures using the black campaign methods developed by their US-based spin-doctor, Rob Allyn, who had helped George Bush Jr win the US presidency in 2000 and 2004.lii While the nation digests the National Election Commission (KPU’s) official confirmation of the national vote count on 22 July, which confirmed Jokowi-JK’s victory by a margin of 53.15 percent to 46.85 percent of the 133.574.277 votes cast (almost 70 percent of the Indonesian electorate),liii the danger of violence and civil disorder remains. Here is a man who has gone on record as saying that ‘losing is not an option’.liv Such a man is no democrat. If he ever came to power Indonesia would be dragged back to a dictatorship every bit as brutal as that of his late and unlamented father-in-law, General Suharto (1921-2008; in office, 1967-98). Although we have lived through some anxious and uncertain days, let us assume that the rightfully elected candidates – Haji Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Jusuf Kalla – are not challenged by organised street violence and can proceed peacefully to their 20 October 2014 inauguration. What then? Prabowo will continue to fight his cause, alleging ‘massive rigging’ of the election process. This will almost certainly involve an appeal to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), even though he had declared earlier during the official Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) count (22 July) that he had formally ‘withdrawn’ (menarik diri) from the electoral process. lv But if he goes this route, he will be likely to meet with disappointment. Following the removal of the court’s deeply corrupt chief justice, Akil Mochtar (Slide 17), even with his brother’s deep pockets, he would not be able to buy a favourable ruling. So, assuming sanity – a big assumption in present-day Indonesia – what then ? In the final part of his presentation, Peter looked at the agenda which awaits the incoming government. But before he did so, he drew on his historical knowledge to set Jokowi’s style of leadership in the broad sweep of Javanese history as a latter-day ‘Ratu Adil’ (Just King), a righteous ruler, who, according to Hindu-Javanese historiography, would emerge after a period of moral degradation – the ‘Age of Kali’ (kaliyuga) - to establish an era of justice and plenty (Slides 33-34). As someone of humble background, Slides 33 and 35 suggested that Jokowi fitted into a long line of Javanese rulers and state founders from King Airlangga of Kahuripan (991-1049; reigned, 1021-49), the one ‘who crossed the water [from Bali to Java]’, to Joko Tingkir (1549-82) of Pajang, and Ki Pamenahan of Mataram, who had been either raised or spent long periods in village environments before founding new kingdoms.lvi The same slides also referred to the famous Prince Diponegoro of Yogyakarta (1785-1855), the leader of the Java War (1825-30), who had taken the ‘Just King’ (Erucakra) title at the beginning of the conflict. As a seven year-old, the young prince had been adopted by his great-grandmother, Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

48

Ratu Ageng (c.1734-1803), and taken to live in a rural environment some three kilometers to the northwest of the sultan’s court. lvii The Javanese saying ‘Aja Dumeh’ (don’t be proud) is significant here. These were humble people, men and women who had experienced the hardships and suffering of village life, and who used that experience to become effective leaders. By way of illustration, two quotes from Peter’s recent biography of Diponegoro are appropriate here. The first were the reported last words of the prince’s great-grandmother to her son, the second sultan of Yogyakarta, as she lay dying on 17 October 1803: ‘Sultan! The path I have to lay aside is difficult and now I feel that I am in essence no more than an ordinary person. My son! Be conscious of that and do not believe that, although you are now ruler, after your death you will be anything more than a common coolie. So live accordingly!’. lviii The second was the reflection of the Leiden lawyer and colonial government adviser, Willem van Hogendorp (17951838), early in the Java War, that: ‘A special characteristic about Diponegoro in the view of the Javanese, who are always extremely exalted and distant in their dealings between superiors and inferiors, is that he consorts as easily with the common man as with the great ones [and] because of this has made himself much loved everywhere.’lix Van Hogendorp’s reflection could well serve as a description for Jokowi’s particular appeal to the Indonesian masses through his blusukan (‘going to places where no-one else wishes to enter’), although, unlike Diponegoro, the former Surakarta mayor was not born a nobleman, but rather like Joko Tingkir and Ki Pamemahan, hailed from the minor village gentry. In Jokowi’s case, his family stemmed from the ranks of the lower priyayi (minor officials) in the court city of Surakarta, his father bearing the name Notomiharjo (organizer of prosperity). Forced to move from one rented house to another in riverside slum areas in the ancient royal capital, he had made ends meet with difficulty as a petty trader in bamboo and building timber, but had inculcated in his children the satria values of those who dedicate themselves to the service of their country. lx He had also placed a high value on education, scraping together enough to support Jokowi through a forestry degree course at Yogyakarta’s prestigious Gajah Mada University (UGM) in the early 1980s (Plate 36).lxi While a good education, high personal standards (budi luhur), personal simplicity and dogged capacity for hard work are all excellent foundations for a life of public service (Plate 37), they will not in themselves shorten the ‘to-do’ list for the incoming administration after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s wasted decade (2004-14). Slides 38-9 indicated that the twelve major challenges might include: 1. Job creation to absorb the 1.8 million young men and women entering the job market every year. 2. Major spending on infrastructure (USD30 billion for the Trans-Sumatra highway alone) to enhance the cost efficiency of the Indonesian domestic economy and attract foreign Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

49

investment. And the ending of fuel subsidies, which currently absorb some 16 percent, of the USD42.5 billion state budget. 3. Development of greater professionalism in public life, in particular the establishment of a culture of excellence following root-and-branch bureaucratic reform of Indonesia’s 4.5 million-strong civil service. 4. A radical overhaul of Indonesia’s education system to ensure that all Indonesia’s schoolage population have the chance of finishing Junior High School (SMP); and a tenfold increase in research spending to bring the country in line with its closest middle-income neighbours, Malaysia and Thailand. 5. Re-invigoration of pancasila as the country’s state ideology. 6. Development of religious tolerance by bringing common sense to bear on the interpretation of scripture and ensuring safeguards against the ‘tyranny’ of the Islamic majority to avoid Indonesia becoming a SE Asian Pakistan. 7. Enhancement of the rule-of-law and the establishment of a rechtstaat (rule-of-law state). 8. Meeting the challenge of the 2015 ASEAN Free Trade Zone. 9. Enhancement and extension of the powers of the national Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). 10. Development of a basic welfare state safety net for the most economically challenged 100 million of the population who live close to the UN poverty line of USD2.00 a day, and those 30 million living in absolute poverty (i.e. below one US dollar per day). 11. Development of bilingualism at the tertiary level with enhanced teaching of English and Mandarin to prepare Indonesia’s graduates to operate as ‘global citizens’. 12. Introduction of a New Economic Policy (NEP) for the development and empowerment of indigenous entrepreneurs and business people along the lines of that introduced in Malaysia following the 13 May 1969 race riots.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

50

Slide 38

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

51

Slide 39

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

52

Slide 40 The final Slide 40 illustrated the disastrous consequences ofSBY’s limp-wristed policy towards religious fascists and bullyboys from the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam/ FPI).This showed three middle-aged Batak women from the Batak Christian Protestant Church (Huri Kristen Batak Protestan, HKBP) in Bekasi on the eastern outskirts of Jakarta sitting disconsolately near the ruins of their church in Bekasi on the eastern outskirts of Jakarta on 21 March 2013 after an excavator had demolished it on the orders of the local mayor – ostensibly because it had no building permit, but in reality because the mayor had given in to pressures from Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders’ Front) religious thugs.lxii This was an appropriately sobering note which to end the presentation. While Jokowi’s election gives hope, the challenges which he faces are truly daunting. There are no easy answers or short cuts. The existing Indonesian political elite is corrupt to its core. It needs a clean bore. One sometimes feels that for the country to move forward it would benefit from the kind of shock therapy which the Nazis delivered to the embattled British Isles in the desperate summer of 1940 when a list of nearly 3,000 names of the members of the British elite were drawn up for immediate arrest and execution following a successful German invasion; or much closer to home, Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

53

when Napoleon’s only non-French marshal, Herman Willem Daendels (1762-1818), was tasked with cleaning out the Augean Stables of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)during his brutal forty-one month governor-generalship (1808-11).lxiii Perhaps Jokowi and his new administration will be able to develop such shock therapy in a more benign fashion. But it is clear that Indonesia stands on the edge of a revolution as deep and as radical as any in its recorded history. __________

Suhardiyoto Haryadi is a former Indonesian journalist whose career spanned the last fourteen years of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ (1966-98). In 2000, he was a Reuters (now Thompson Reuters) Foundation Fellow at Green College, Oxford, where he researched the Suharto regime’s influence on Indonesian politics and economics, subsequently publishing his research jointly with his supervisor, Peter Carey, as ‘Indonesia's Quest for a Democratic Culture: Pluralism, Tolerance and the Rule of Law, 1998-2013’, in Michael Hsiao (ed.), Democracy or Alternative Political Systems in Asia: After the Strongmen (London: Routledge, 2013), pp.137-56. He currently works as a business development consultant for PT Kalpataru Investama, a palm oil business group based in Jakarta.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

54

END NOTES i

‘Presiden Terpilih Ditetapkan [The Elected President to be Confirmed]’, Kompas, 22 July 2014.

ii

Jusuf Kalla, speech at the book launch of J. Osdar, Sisi Lain Istana; Dari Zaman Bung Karno ke SBY [A Different Side of the Palace; From the Bung Karno Era to SBY] (Jakarta: BukuKompas), Bentara Budaya Jakarta (BBJ), 7 March 2014.

iii

See, ‘Jokowi-JK: Saatnya Gerak Bersama [Jokowi-JK: The Moment to Move Forward Together]’, Kompas, 24 July 2014, p.15, which shows that Jokowi-JK (Jusuf Kalla) won 70.997.833 votes compared to Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa’s 62.576.444 votes. iv

Walther Schellenberg, Invasion 1940: The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain. By SS-General Walther Schellenberg (London: St. Ermin’s Press in association with Little Brown). Schellenberg (1910-52), Chief of the Amt VI (counterintelligence department) of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) under Reinhard Heydrich (1904-42), was principally concerned with foreign political intelligence. His SS Department was tasked with preparing the security aspects of Hitler’s 1940 invasion plan for Britain - ‘Operation Sea Lion’.

v

MGI [McKinsey Global Institute] (2012).The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential. Accessed 18 December 2012 at: www.mckinsey.com/.../McKinsey/.../The%20archipelago%20economy/MGI_Unleashing_Indonesia_potential_Exec utive_Summary.ashx. vi

CPI, Transparency International (Hong Kong), Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/interactive/ accessed 7 May 2014. vii

Rhenald Kasali, ‘Sepuluh Tahun, Dua Perubahan [Ten Years, Two Changes]’, Kompas, 19 June 2013.

viii

Anies Baswedan (Rector Paramadina University, in office, 2007-present), comment during Najwa Shihab’s interview with former President BJ Habibie, see MetroTV, ‘Mata Najwa [Najwa’s Eye]’, 5 February 2014, http://dodiheru.wordpress.com/2014/02/06/mata-najwa-dengan-presiden-ke-3-indonesia-prof-b-j-habibie/, downloaded 13 July 2014. ix

Kasali, ‘SepuluhTahun [Ten Years]', Kompas, 19 June 2013.

x

http://thelearningcurve.pearson.com/index/index-ranking, downloaded 24-05-2014.

xi

Irman Gusman, ‘Kementerian Pendidikan dan Ristek [The Education Ministry and the Research & Technology Ministry]’, Kompas, 6 March 2014. xii

Irman Gusman, ‘Kementerian Pendidikan [The Education Ministry]’, Kompas, 6 March 2014; ‘Anggaran Riset Stagnan [Research Budget Stagnant]’, Kompas, 20 Mei 2014. xiii

Tony Reid, ‘Indonesia dan Dunia sesudah 66 Tahun [Indonesia and the World after 66 years]’, Tempo (Indonesian edition), 14-20 November 2012. See also Fakhrunnas MA Jabar, ‘Mengapa Sastra Indonesia Kurang Mendunia? [Why is Indonesian literature so little known globally?]’, Kompas, 17 November 2013. xiv

‘Indonesia Minim Tokoh Intelektual [Indonesia has few Public Intellectuals]’, Kompas, 23 June 2014.

xv

Statistics quoted by former Chairman of the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal – BKPM), Gita Wiryawan (in office 2009-11), suggest that Indonesia produces just 800 new PhDs (Sarjana Strata 3) each year, compared to over 50,000 in China and upwards of 35,000 in India; interview, Gita Irawan Wirjawan, BKPN, Jakarta, 23-09-2011.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

55

xvi

Professor Jeffrey A. Winters (Northwestern University, Illinois) quoted in ‘Indonesia Minim Tokoh Intelektual [Indonesia has few Public Intellectuals]’, Kompas, 23 June 2014. xvii

‘Penurunan Angka Kematian Ibu dikebut [Accelerating the Decline for the Mortality Rate Figure for Birthing Mothers]’, Kompas, 21 April 2014; ‘Bonus Demografi Tidak Optimal [The Demographic Bonus not yet Optimal], Kompas, 3 March 2014. xviii

‘Penurunan Angka Kematian Ibu dikebut [Accelerating the Decline for the Mortality Rate Figure for Birthing Mothers]’, Kompas, 21 April 2014; GDP figures taken from International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database (April 2014). xix

Loh Kah Seng, Making and Unmaking the Asylum; Leprosy and Modernity in Singapore and Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2009), pp.113-14. xx

Khanchit Limpakarnjanarat (WHO) quoted in Jakarta Post, 1 September 2010.

xxi

The late Dr dr Endang Rahayu Sedyaningsih, Indonesian Minister of Health (2009-12), quoted in Jakarta Post, 1 September 2010.

xxii

Hasbullah Thabrany, ‘Visi Kesehatan Capres Perlu Terobosan [Presidential Candidates’ Visions for Health Sector in need of a Breakthrough]’, Kompas, 19 June 2014. xxiii

‘Bonus Demografi Tidak Optimal [The Demographic Bonus not yet Optimal]’, Kompas, 3 March 2014.

xxiv

Former Goldman Sachs Asset management chairman, Jim O’Neill, has coined the term MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) to identify four leaders among the variety of emerging economies and has grouped this quartet as "growth markets" within the overall BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) nations, see Tim Cocks, ‘Jim O'Neill: BRICs, MINTs Strong despite Emerging Market Wobbles’, Reuters, 25 March 2014, reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/emergingmarkets-oneill-idINDEEA2O0DY20140325, downloaded 25 June 2014. xxv

‘16 Years: Luthfi Jailed Until the Cows Come Home’, Jakarta Globe, 9 December 2013.

xxvi

These principles are:(i) Belief in the divinity of God(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa); (ii) Just and civilized humanity (Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab); (iii) The unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia); (iv) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives (Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan, dalam permusyawaratan dan perwakilan); and (v) Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia (Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia).The phrase ‘Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/Syari'ah’ (Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya) was dropped from what became the first principle (sila) on the day after independence (17-08-1945).

xxvii

Robert Endi Jaweng, ‘Daerah, Rahim Kempimpinan [The Regions, Womb of Leadership]’, Kompas, 27 August 2013. xxviii

Peter Carey, ‘Korupsi di Indonesia Kontemporer dan Pengalaman Sejarah Inggris 1688-1956 [Corruption in Contemporary Indonesia and the British Historical Experience, 1688-1956]’, in A.E. Priyono and Usman Hamid (eds), Merancang Arah Baru Demokrasi [Charting a New Course for Democracy] (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia [KPG], 2014), pp. 566-7.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

56

xxix

Alberthiene Endah, Jokowi; Memimpin Kota Menyentuh Jakarta [Jokowi; the City Leader Touches Jakarta] (Solo: Metagraf, 2012), pp.92-176.

xxx

Jakarta Post, 8 January 2013.

xxxi

Wisnu Widiantoro, ‘Jakarta Setahun Terakhir [The Past Year in Jakarta]’, Kompas, 28 October 2013.

xxxii

Fikri Zaki Muhammad and Corry Elyda, ‘New leaders Get to the Core of the City’s Woes’, Jakarta Post, 16

October 2013. xxxiii

Jerry Indrawan, ‘Bureaucratic Reform in Jakarta; Jokowi’s Leadership Style’, https://www.academia.edu/4859354/Bureaucratic_Reform_in_Jakarta_Jokowi_Leadership_Style, downloaded, 27 June 2014; Piter Randan Bua, Berkaca pada Kepemimpinan Ahok, Sang Pemimpin yang Berjiwa Melayani [Looking in the Mirror of Ahok’s Leadership; The Leader who has the Spirit of Service] (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Teman Pustaka Kristen Indonesia, 2013), p.57. xxxiv

Personal communication Ir Wardiman Joyonegoro, former Education Minister (1992-7), Jakarta, 20 July 2013. On the total DKI 2012-13 budget, see Muhammad and Elyda, ‘New Leaders’, Jakarta Post, 16 October 2013. xxxv

M. Alfan Alfian, ‘Arus Balik Politik Kekerabatan [The Counter-current of Kinship Politics]’, Kompas, 2 November 2013.

xxxvi

In November 2011, at the time of her reelection as Governor, her husband, Hikmat Tomet (died 2013), was a member of the former Government Party in the Indonesian parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Peoples’ Consultative Assemblyor DPR), her younger sister, Ratu Tatu Chasanah, was the deputy district head ofSerang Regency, her step-brother, Tubagus Haerul Nurjaman, was deputy mayor of Serang, while her son,Andika Hazrumy, and daughter-in-law, Adde Khairunnisa, were members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) in Jakarta, and deputy speaker of the Serang regional council respectively. In addition, her step-mother, Heryani, held the post of deputy regent (wakil Bupati) of Pandeglang Regency and her sister-inlaw, Airin Rachmi Diany, had justbeen elected as Mayor of South Tangerang following a controversial poll (20 April 2011). xxxvii

Ezra Sihite, ‘First Lady Rejects Claims of Cabinet Influence’, Jakarta Globe, 17 January 2014, citing information from a diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks entitled ‘A Cabinet of One — Indonesia’s First Lady Expands Her Influence’, which claimed that Australian agencies had found out Ani Yudhoyono was initially planning to run in the upcoming presidential election until her son was ready to take over the position. xxxviii

For a brief history of the Djojohadikusumo family, see Margono Djojohadikusumo, Reminiscences from 3 Historical Periods; A Family Tradition set in Writing (Jakarta: Indira, 1973; original Dutch title: Herinneringen uit Drie Tijdperken (een geschreven familie-overleveringen), Jakarta: Indira, 1971); and Hendra Esmara, Aristides Katoppo and Heru Cahyono (eds.), Sumitro Djojohadikusumo – Patriot, Economist, Teacher (Jakarta: Yayasan Arsari, 2014). Raden Mas Margono (1894-1978) and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2001), were respectively the grandfather and father of Prabowo Subianto.

xxxix

In 2010, Jokowi had been re-elected for his second and final five-year term as mayor of Surakarta with 92 percent of the popular vote, a record in any Indonesian election in the post-1998 Reformasi period.

xl

Ahok (Ir Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) took over from Jokowi as Acting Governor of Jakarta during the election campaign (4 March – 9 July 2014).When Jokowi is formally sworn in as Indonesia’s seventh President on 20 October 2014,, Ahok will take over as Governor and will remain in post until October 2017, when he will have the opportunity to run for a second five-year term in office (2017-2022).

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

57

xli

See Marcus Mietzner, ‘Jokowi: The Rise of a Polite Populist’, Inside Indonesia, 28 April 2014, downloaded from www.insideindonesia.org/current-edition/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populiston 10 July 2014. xlii

Mietzner, ‘Jokowi’, 28 April 2014.

xliii

Ya’cob Billiocta, ‘4 Alasan JK lebih dipilih dibanding Abraham Samad [4 Reasons why JK was chosen over Abraham Samad]’, 20 May 2014, http://www.merdeka.com/politik/4-alasan-jk-lebih-dipilih-dibanding-abrahamsamad.html, downloaded, 11 July 2014. It is possible that if Jokowi goes for a second five-year term in 2019, Abraham Samad may still be a top choice for him as he would have more appeal to younger generation voters. xliv

A. Lin Neumann, ‘Indonesian Politics: Last Minute Deals’, Asia Sentinel Consulting, 20 May 2014 http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/indonesian-politics-last-minute-deals/, downloaded, 11 July 2014.

xlv

Those in the PDI-P (18.95 percent) led coalition with votes gained at 9 April 2014 legislative elections included: (1) the Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama) movement’s National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional, PKB) (9.05 percent); (2) former Golkar politician, Surya Paloh’s, National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem) Party (6.72 percent); (3) former General Wiranto’s People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, HANURA) (5.26 percent); and (4) former General Sutiyoso’s Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia) (0.91 percent). xlvi

Bestian Nainggolan, ‘Pertarungan Loyalitas Pilihan [The Struggle for Vote Loyalty]’, Kompas, 11 July 2014. Greg Fealy, ‘Uneasy Alliance: Prabowo and the Islamic Parties’, New Mandala (ANU), 9 July 2014, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/09/uneasy-alliance-prabowo-and-the-islamic-parties/, downloaded 12 July 2014. xlvii

xlviii

‘A Hatta Trick’, The Economist, 24 May 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21602760-prabowosubianto-narrows-favourites-lead-hatta-trick, downloaded 12 July 2014. xlix

B.J. Habibie, Detik-detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi [Decisive Moments; Indonesia’s Long Road to Democracy] (Jakarta : THC Mandiri, 2006), pp 82-83; Sintong Panjaitan, Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando [The Journey of a Para-Commando Soldier], Hendro Subroto (ed) (Jakarta : Kompas Media Nusantara), 2009, pp 10-12. l

Abdullah, a graduate of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst (1980), became commander of the Jordanian Special Forces in January 1993 and was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1998, see Dale Holberg (ed), th Encylopaedia Britannica, vol.I (15 Edition, Chicago, Illinois: Enyclopaedia Britannica, 2010), p.23. li

‘DKP Nilai Prabowo Coreng Kehormatan Negara dan TNI [The DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira / Officers’ Honour Tribunal) Judged that Prabowo had Besmirched the Honour of the Country and the Army]’, Tempo, 11 June 2014, http://pemilu.tempo.co/read/news/2014/06/11/269584094/DKP-Nilai-Prabowo-Coreng-Kehormatan-Negara-danTNI, downloaded 17 July 2014. lii

‘Lembaga Survei Dilaporkan [Quickcount Survey Agencies Reported]’, Kompas, 13 July 2014. On Rob Allyn, see, ‘Rob Allyn: Si Pemecah Belah Indonesia [Rob Allyn: The Splitter of Indonesia]’, Indonesia 2014, 13 July 2014, www.indonesia-2014.com/read/2014/07/13/rob-allyn-si-pemecah-belah-indonesia?fb_action_ids.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

58

liii

‘Presiden Terpilih Ditetapkan [The Elected President to be Confirmed]’, Kompas, 22 July 2014; ‘Jokowi-JK: Saatnya Gerak Bersama [Jokowi-JK: The Moment to Move Forward Together]’, Kompas, 24 July 2014, p.15. liv

Zubaidah Nazeer, ‘Losing is not an Option, says Indonesia’s Prabowo’, The Straits Times, 6 July 2014, http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/indonesia/story/dark-horse-all-set-the-last-sprintindonesia-election-2014, downloaded 14 July 2014. lv

‘Usul Tolak Hasil Pilpres Datang Langsung dari Prabowo [The Proposal to Reject the Outcome of the Presidential Election Came Directly from Prabowo]’, Kompas, 23 July 2014.

lvi

Airlangga (991-1049), Joko Tingkir (1549-82) and Ki Pamenahan, had founded the kingdoms of Kahuripan (102149), Pajang (1549-87) and Mataram (1575-1755) respectively. The first had retreated into the forests at the age of sixteen for thirteen years (1006-1019) to become a recluse following the slaying of his entire family in Bali during the great pralaya (cataclysm), possibly a Srivijayan (Palembang, Sumatra) invasion; the second had been brought up in a village environment by the widow of a famous dalang (wayang puppeteer), Ki Ageng Tingkir, and the last was a palm-toddy (sugar) tapper and father of Panembahan Senopati, the first ruler of Mataram (reigned 15751601). lvii

Peter Carey, The Power of Prophecy; Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), pp.75-81.

lviii

Carey, Power of Prophecy, p.81, citing the letter of Matthijs Waterloo, Resident of Yogyakarta (in office 1803-8), to Nicolaus Engelhard, Governor of Java’s Northeast Coast (in office, 1801-1808), 28 October 1803.

lix

Carey, Power of Prophecy, p.78, citing H. Graaf van Hogendorp, Willem van Hogendorp in Nederlandsch-Indië, 1825-1830 (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1913), p.154.

lx

Alan M. Stevens and A. Ed. Schmidgall-Tellings, A Comprehensive Indonesian-English Dictionary (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004), p.880 sub: ‘satria’. lxi

Endah, Jokowi, pp.33-7.

lxii

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), Indonesia; Pluralism in Peril (London: CSW, February 2014), p.2, www.csw.org.uk/2014-indonesia-report, downloaded 28 February 2014. lxiii

See Schellenberg, Invasion 1940; and Peter Carey, Daendels and the Sacred Space of Java, 1808-1811; Political Relations, Uniforms and the Postweg (Nijmegen: Van Tilt, 2013).

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 155, 2014

59