The Enigma of Nationalism Imagined [PDF]

Trustees of Princeton University

Review: The Enigma of Nationalism Author(s): Yael Tamir Source: World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Apr., 1995), pp. 418-440 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950694 . Accessed: 03/07/2011 16:44 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

ReviewArticles

THE ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM ByYAELTAMIR* Benedict Anderson.Imagined Communities,2d ed. London: Verso, 1991, 224 pp.

Liah Greenfeld.Nationalism:Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1992, 571 pp.

AnthonyD. Smith.National Identity. Las Vegas:Universityof NevadaPress, 1991, 226 pp.

THE

biblicalstoryof the towerof Babel(Genesis11) couldbe interpretedas a mythicaldescriptionof the origin of nations.Accordingto the story,at this earlystagein humanhistory,the worldwas inhabitedby one peoplewho spokeone languageuntil, in theirvanity, humanbeingschallengedthe limits of theirabilityandjoined together to build a towerreachingup to heaven.Angry and apprehensiveabout this expansionof humanpowers,and about the conceit it conveyed, God said: Behold,the peopleis one, and they haveall one language;and this they begin to do:andnow nothingwill be withheldfromthem,whichthey schemedto do. Come, let us go down, and thereconfoundtheir language,that they may not understandone another'sspeech.(Genesis11:6-7)

Thus God scatteredhuman beings acrossthe face of the earth, and they dividedinto nations. Accordingto this originmyth,the birthof nationsis alsothe beginning of multiplicityand diversity;nationalexperiencesare,therefore, particularanduniversalat the sametime.The universalnationalnarrative enfoldsitself in manyforms;thus thereis more than one exodus, one divine redemption,or one moment of liberationfor all humankind. Liberationand self-determinationareuniversalexperiences,but each nationencountersthem its own particularway.This is the essence of the reiterativeview of nationalism.' * I am gratefuilto Batya Stein, Ruti Wintraub,Menachem Lorberbaum,and Dalia Drai for their usefuilcomments and suggestions. l Michael Walzer,"The National Question Revisited"(TannerLecture,Oxford, 1989), 40-45.

WorldPolitics47 (April 1995), 418-40

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

419

Most nationalists,however,tend to repressthe knowledgethat their nation is but a reiterationof a worldwidephenomenon.Ignoringthe strikinganalogiesamong the processesleadingto the creationof differentnations,they tend to emphasizethe particular.Socialscientists, discourses however,do the opposite.They reachbeyondparticularistic and exposethe similaritiesamongdifferentnationalnarrativesto produce varioustypologies of nationalmovements.The authorsof the books reviewedhere make a significantcontributionto the sociology and historyof nationalismby exploringthe interrelationsbetweenthe patterns of development of different national movements. Liah Greenfeld,in her interestingbook, Nationalism:Five Roadsto Modernity, surveysthe chronologicaldevelopmentof five differentnational movements,startingwith sixteenth-centuryEngland,and continuing through mid-seventeenth-centuryFrance,Russia during the second half of the eighteenthcentury,late-eighteenth-and early-nineteenthcenturyGermany,and the United Statesduringthe late eighteenthto mid-nineteenthcenturies.The nationalevolution of these societies, she argues,representsa coherent,thoughexceedinglycomplexprocess. Since these five nationssharedthe samesocialspace,the mutualinfluences amongthem areevident. The tendencyof nationalmovementsto follow in the footstepsof their predecessorsis also made evidentin BenedictAnderson'sbook, ImaginedCommunities. Anderson,wishingto breakawayfromthe conceit of Europeanscholars"thateverythingimportantin the modern worldoriginatedin Europe"(p.xiii), turnsour attentionto the Americas and providesus with a fascinatingaccountof the developmentof nationalismin that part of the world. National movementsin the Americas,he argues,have sharedsome featureswith their European predecessorsyet there have been markeddifferences.First,"language was not an element that differentiatedthem [Braziland the United States]fromtheirrespectivemetropolis"(p. 47). Second,unlikeEuropean nationalism,which promotedthe inductionof the lower classes into the politicalworld, in the cases of Venezuela,Mexico, and Peru, it was "thefear of the lower class politicalmobilizationthat playeda key role in spurringthe drive for independencefrom Madrid"(p. 48). The riddle,Andersonargues,is "Whywas it preciselycreolecommunities that developedso early conceptionsof the nation-ness-well beforemostof Europe?" (p. 50). The two new chaptersincludedin the second edition attempt to solve the riddle. They demonstratehow three institutions-the census,maps, and museums-shaped the way

420

WORLD POLITICS

in which colonies and the independent states that followed them imaginedtheirdomain. These chaptersraisethe questionsthat lie at the heart of National Identityby Anthony Smith: How do nations emerge?What holds them together?What accountsfor the intensityand scope of national feelings?We cannotbegin to understandthe powerand appealof nationalismas a political force, Smith argues,"withoutgroundingour analysisin a widerperspectivewhose focus is nationalidentitytreated as a collectivephenomenon"(p. vii). All threeauthorsarefascinatedby the mysteriousvitalityof nationalism. Why does nationalismprovidethe most compellingidentity mythin the modernworld?Why andhow can it motivateindividuals? Why does everysuccessfulrevolutionsinceWorldWarII defineitself in nationalistterms?But before turningto discuss these issues, one must strugglewith definitions:What does the term nationmean?In what ways is it distinct,if at all, from closely relatedtermslike state, people,and ethnicgroup. An inquiryinto the natureof these termswill revealan ironyhovering over the studyof nationalism:the morewe struggleto providean adequatedefinitionof nation,and the morewe learnaboutthe emergence of nationsand aboutthe originsandthe developmentof nationalism,the less credibleis the nationalistimage of nationsas homogeneous, natural,and continuous communitiesof common fate and descent.Yet, it is preciselythis image that nurturesthe uniquepower of nationalism. NATION: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION

A nation,Andersonargues, is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imaginedbecause the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community. (p. 6)

Andersoncarefullydistinguisheshis definitionfrom Ernest Gellner's claim that nationalism"inventsnations where they do not exist."2 Gellner,he argues,is so anxiousto show that nationalismmasquerades under false pretensesthat he equatesinventionwith fabricationand falsityratherthanwith imagingand creation,thus implyingthat there aretruecommunitiesthat can be advantageously comparedto nations. 2

andChange Gellner,Thought (London:WeidenfeldandNicholson,1971),169.

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

421

Communities,however,are to be distinguished"notby their falsity/ genuineness,but by the stylein which they areimagined"(p. 6). Anderson'sdefinitionis importantbecauseit emphasizesthe central role playedby the imageof a nationin creatinga nationalreality.Nevertheless,this definitionraisestwo theoreticaldifficultiesthat undermine its usefulness.The firstandmost seriousrelatesto Anderson'suse of the term imagined.Andersonarguesthat a nation is an imagined communitybecauseit is impossiblefor all its membersto engage in face-to-face contact with all fellow members at all times. Hence, memberscan only perceivethe nation as a whole by referringto the image of it that they have construedin their own minds.But this use of the termseemstrivialanduninformativebecauseall humanassociations, even if no largerthan familiesor primordialvillages,could, accordingto this definition,be consideredimaginedcommunities.For instance,it is highly unlikelythat any lecturerat Tel-AvivUniversity will ever have the opportunityto engagein face-to-facerelationships with all other members of the university-faculty, staff, and students. The university as a community, not an institution, thus would only be an image members carry in their minds. Would this criterion be sufficient to turn the university into an imagined community? Consider an even more problematic example. I know all the members of my extended family, and I have had, at one point or another, intimate face-to-face contact with most of them. They are not, however, physically present in my room while I write this review. Some are at work or at school, some are traveling abroad, one new member I have yet to meet, and I have spoken only briefly with my cousin's new spouse. Hence, at this very moment, my view of my family as a whole depends on an image that exists in my mind. According to Anderson's definition then, my family is no less an imagined community than the nation I belong to. Moreover, the image of my family as a whole has been formed not only through face-to-face encounters with its present members, but also through my awareness of the existence of former generations as well as future ones. It includes personal recollections of personal incidents related to the family, as well as collective memories of events I know of but have never experienced. Hence, even if all members of my family were now in the room with me, an account of this meeting would differ from the image of the family that lives in my mind. If the condition for a community to be considered imagined is that the only way to perceive it as a whole is to refer to its image, then all social groups, even the smallest, are imagined communities. It is in this

422

WORLD POLITICS

sense that the term imaginedcommunityis uninformative.Anderson might acceptthis objectionand arguethat,even if all communitiesare imagined,they can stillbe distinguishedby "thestylein which they are imagined."He does not, however,supplyevidenceof the existenceof suchdifferentstyles,nor does he explainof what they mayconsist. Anderson'sclaim could also be interpretedas referringnot to the style in which communitiesare imaginedbut by the attributesthat play a majorrole in the constructionof the community'simage.The differencesamong communitieswould then lie in the distinguishing featuresascribedto them. For example,the image of a universityembracesattributessuch as classrooms,libraries,and a concernwith academic studies,while the image of a familyincludesattributessuch as love, intimacy,and ties of blood and marriage.In constructingthe image of a nation,we referto yet anotherset of attributes,which includes culture, language, history, and national consciousness,and which all its memberssharein common.But this argumentamounts to saying no more than that communitiesare distinguishedby their which is essentiallya tautology. distinguishingcharacteristics, This definitioncouldbe mademoremeaningfulif substantialdifferenceswerepointedout in the natureof the distinguishingcharacteristics attributedto the differentcommunities.For example,distinguishing featuresmaybe dividedinto those that areindependentof the feelings and perceptionsof the agents-age, gender,race,income, or place of birth-and those that are not. The characteristicfeaturesof groups that, for example,consist of all individualsborn on July 4, or all who graduatedBalliol College, Oxford,in the summerof 1986, or all Israelicitizens,belongto the firstcategory.On the otherhand,the characteristicfeaturesof a coupleof loversor groupof friendsbelongto the second.3If we follow this categorization,it will becomeevidentthat a nationmore closelyresemblesa groupof friendsthan a groupof citizens. Its existencecannotbe deducedfrom certainobjectivefeatures, but ratherfromthe feelingsof communionamongits members,as well as from the existenceof a sharednationalconsciousness.Hence, an outsideobserverwould not be able to dividethe world accuratelyinto nations,nor could he or she explain,without referringto the agents' feelings,why Ethiopian,Russian,and IsraeliJews belong to the same IA group of friends can only be identifiedby the feelings sharedamong them. Some types of behaviormight indeed indicate that some individualsare friends,but these individualsmay only be pretending to be friendswithout reallybearingaffectionatefeelings for one another.The opposite is also possible: individualswho feel friendly toward one another may agree to disguise their friendship. Hence, an externalobservercan never be sure that two individualsare friends unless he or she has a way to learn about their feelings.

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

423

nation, whereas Palestinian, Jordanian, and Syrian Arabs belong to different ones. According to this interpretation, a community is defined as imagined not because of its size or because of the likelihood of face-to-face contact among its members. It is imagined because its existence is contingent on its members' sustaining a certain image of it that is based on their perceptions and feelings. If we adopt this interpretation we would, indeed, define a nation as an imagined community. The term imaginedinevitably raises questions. Are there communities which are not imagined? It might be the case that the difference among groups and communities lies exactly in the sphere of characteristic features, and consequently that all communities are, by definition, imagined. Are imagined communities less real than groups? A comprehensive discussion of the ontological status of communities is far beyond the scope of this review; however, one brief comment regarding the use of the term real in this context is necessary.If real is taken to mean "existing as a fact" then, as every realist in international relations will attest, the existence of imagined communities is a social fact. The term imagined communities is therefore not to be used synonymously with imaginaryones. But should a nation be defined as an imaginary community when the images and feelings that hold the nation together draw on inventions? If the existence of an imagined community depends on the perceptions and feelings shared by members, then such a community can only be seen as imaginary if claims concerning its existence depend on a fallacious description of these feelings and perceptions. If, however, the members' image of their nation, as well as their collective consciousness, their memories, and their feelings of fraternityrest on mistaken or invented grounds, the community exists and is in no way imaginary.4

Since the existence of an imagined community depends on shared images and feelings, the community's boundaries are defined by the range of these attributes.Why does a person share communal feelings with some individuals rather than with others? In a case of friendship or love, the range of feelings may be determined by a set of personal characteristics:tastes, desires, preferences, affinities, and the like. But with nationhood, the process of demarcation is far more complicated. 4The feelings of individuals toward others may often rest in a misguided perception of social events or of the feelings of these particularothers, and these misunderstandingsmay sometimes cause offense and personal grief. But these unfortunateresults merely reflect the fact that these feelings, even though nurturedon erroneousgrounds,aregenuine.

424

WORLD POLITICS

The boundariesof nationalconsciousnessare not definedby personal attributes,and personaltastesarenot a criterionof membership.How, then, do individualsdefine the boundariesof the nation they belong to? How do they constructits image? The booksreviewedhere cite manyexamplesshowingthat, in constructingan imageof a nation,a largeset of variablesplaysa role:religion, language,law, geographicalisolation,economic considerations, bureaucratic decisions,colonialpolicies,andthe like. Do imagesof nations createdunderradicallydifferentcircumstances,and on the basis of differentvariables,sharecommon features?This is an interesting question. If these images share no common ground, they perhaps shouldnot be placedin the samecategorywhile, if they do, the definition of nationought to emphasizethis commondenominator. The paramountcommon denominatorof all nations is a national consciousnessfosteringfeelings of belongingnessand nationalfraternity.This common denominator,ratherthan the specificconditions that led to its emergence,shouldthus be placedat the centerof the definitionof nation.Lookingat the definitionof anotherimaginedcommunity,that of friends,mayhelp clarifythis claim. TheOxfordEnglish Dictionarydefines a friend as "onejoined to anotherin intimacyand mutual benevolence."This definition does not mention the causes leadingindividualsto developfeelingsof intimacyand mutualbenevolence, and merelydescribesthe outcome.Similarly,the reasonsleading individualsto sharefeelingsof fraternityand exclusivityand a beliefin a commonancestryshouldnot be partof the definitionof nation.Both casesshow thatwhen the reasonsfor the emergenceof feelingscharacteristic of these relationshipsare mistaken for the typical features themselves,an inadequatedefinitionresults. A nation,arguesSmith, is a "namedhumanpopulationsharingan historic territory,common myths and historical memories, a mass publicculture,a commoneconomyand commonlegal rights and duties for all members"(p. 14). In this definition,Smith mixes together reasonsfor the emergenceof a nation (a sharedhistoric territory,a commoneconomy,anda commonlegal system)with the results,(sharing a myth and historicalmemories). These conditionscan, but do not necessarily,give rise to national feelings.Individualsmay sharea territoryand even historicalmemories without seeing themselvesas membersof the same nation, as is usuallytrue for nationscompetingfor the samepiece of land.The Israeli-Palestinian conflictclearlyshowsthat a sharedterritoryand common historicalmemoriescan be divisiveratherthan unifying.Living

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

425

togetherin the sameterritoryandunderthe samegovernment,or even sharingeconomicand legal systems,may fail to blend differentcommunitiesinto one nation,as attestedby the politicalrealityin Canada, Belgium,the formerYugoslavia,and Czechoslovakia.Foreverycasein which one of these featuresled to the emergenceof a nation,we could point to anotherwhere the same featureswere presentbut no nation emerged.Clearlythen, the definitionof nation cannot be contingent on these featuresbut must depend only on their possible outcomes. Hence, a definitionof nation shouldnot specifythe causesleadingto the emergenceof nationsbut should stressthose featurescommonto communitiesthat fall under the definitionof nation and distinguish them fromotherimaginedcommunities. A nation, then, may be defined as a communitywhose members sharefeelingsof fraternity,substantialdistinctiveness,and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common ancestryand a continuousgenealogy. Members of such a communityare awarenot only that they share these feelings and beliefs but that they have an activeinterestin the preservationandwell-beingof theircommunity.They thus seek to securefor themselvesa publicspherewherethey can expresstheiridentity,practicetheirculture,and educatetheiryoung. The firstaspectof nationhoodis thatindividualssee themselvesaffiliated with and committedto other members.But fraternity,unlike is not basedon intimaterelafriendship,love, or politicalcamaraderie, tions, personal tastes, or a community of particular values.5 It is

groundedin a view of the nationas a communityof commondescent andfate.Membersof sucha communitysee themselvessharinga common destinyandview theirindividualsuccessandwell-beingas closely dependenton the prosperityof the groupas a whole.They relatetheir self-esteemand their accomplishmentsto the achievementsof other groupmembersand takepridein the group'sdistinctivecontributions. Consequently,they developfeelingsof caringand dutytowardone another.These feelingsareexclusiveand applyto membersonly. Yet feelingsof fraternitymay also be sharedby women, homosexuals,vegetarians,Freemasons,membersof a university,membersof the kibbutzmovement,or inhabitantsof a local community,not one of which is commonly considereda nation. While these groups share

I

Members of some nations may conceive of the uniquenessof their nation in terms of the valuesit fosters.The nationalculturewill be seen as an expressionof these values, the nationalhistorywill be describedas a struggleto ensure their protection and spread,and national educationwill be couched in their terms. Individualswho defy these values would seem to betraythe nation-as the history of the term non-American testifies.

426

WORLD POLITICS

some featuresincludedin the definitionof nation, they lack one or more of the other componentsof the definition.This indicatesthat each componentof the definitionis a necessarybut not a sufficient conditionof nationhood. Women and homosexualsare not nations becausetheir persistent historicalpresenceis not a continuityof kinship,norcan it be, whereas nationalcontinuityembodiesa strongsenseof genealogy.Namelythey can assurecontinuityof theirgrouponly by what might be called"intermarriage"-byproducingchildrentogetherwith membersof other groupswho are of the oppositegender. Vegetariansand membersof the kibbutzmovementare not nationsbecauseboth these groupsuphold an ideology that they considerappropriateto the whole of humanity;their exclusivityis thereforecontingent.National exclusivity, on the otherhand,is categorical;the fact that the particularfeaturesof a group do not applyto the whole of humanityis not seen as either contingent or undesirable.National featuresare supposedto be restrictedin scope and should not applyto nonmembers.Membersof most nationsdo not believethat their culture,their language,or their traditionsareappropriateto the whole of humanity.6In fact,they may view the restrictedscope of national characteristicsas a reason for prideratherthan concern. Freemasonsor a universityare not nationsbecausetheir exclusivity is elitist and a functionof individualattainments,whereasnationalexclusivityand fraternityarepopulisticand basedon membershiprather than achievement.Neither group believes that its membersshare a commonancestry. The exclusionof local communities,to which all criteriaof the definition of nation can be applied,is more complicated.A nation is a communitywhose memberssharefeelings of distinctivenessand exclusivity,but a local communitycan also share these features.The Frenchthink that they share such features,but so do the Parisians. Why do Parisiansnot constitutea nation?Two answersare possible. First, Parisianswill be part of the Frenchnation for as long as they sharewith other membersof that nationfeelingsof fraternity,a belief in a common ancestry,and a continuousgenealogy.As long as such feelingspersist,membersof nationalsubgroupswill see themselvesas membersof the same nation. Second, their nationalidentitywill be Frenchratherthan Parisianas long as the formeridentityprovidesa 6 In the era of colonialismsome nations (mostly Francebut also England and Spain) did see their culture in missionaryterms-as a good that had universalvalue and whose benefits should be extended to the rest of the world.

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

427

better,more informativedescriptionof their personalidentity.This is the essenceof nationalcharacter,a conceptmuch dislikedat present, which assumes that those featurescharacteristicof a nation-language,history,culture,religion,geography-are amongthe most substantivecomponentsof individualidentity.If some featureof the local identity,say local dialect or culture,becomes a more substantialelement of personalidentitythan the analogousnationalfeature,national identityis endangered.If, for example,the Parisiandialecteverdiffers from other Frenchdialectsas much as it differsfrom Italianor Spanish, then such a divergencein languagemight encouragethe development of a new,separateParisianidentity. The last questionis: Do statesfallwithin the boundariesof my definition of nation? The answeris simple-they do not. Any definition of the conceptstatemust referto the institutionalsphereand,in principle, need not alludeat all to the feelingsand beliefs of its members. Statesthat appearto fit my definitionof nationdo so becausethey are nation-states,and what accordswith my definition are the national ratherthan the stateelementsin the combination.7 In Nationalism:Five Roadsto Modernity,Greenfeldclaimsthat the term nation has developedin a zigzag pattern.At each stage, the meaningof the termcarriescertainsemanticbaggagethat evolvesout of its usagein a particularsituation.When circumstanceschange, aspects of the new situation, which were absent in the situation in which the conventional concept evolved, become cognitively associated with it, resulting in a duality of meaning. The meaning of the original concept is gradually obscured, and the new one emerges as conventional. When the word is used again in a new situation, it is likely to be used in this new meaning, as so on and so forth. (p. 5)

Greenfeldspecifiesnine stagesin the developmentof the term nation. The term comes from the Latin word natio, meaning"somethingis born,"and it is first used to refer to a group of foreigners.It then comesto indicatecommunitiesof studentsfromgeographicallyor linguisticallyrelatedregions.Owing to the particularstructureof university life in the Middle Ages, such communitiesfunctionedas support groupsor unions,andtheirmembersdevelopedcommonopinionsand took the same side in scholasticdebates.Nation thus acquireda new meaning,referringto a communityof opinionandpurpose.Sinceuniversitiesusedto sendrepresentatives to adjudicateseriousecclesiastical 7I discuss the differencesbetween the terms state and nation ratherextensivelyin YaelTamir,LiberalNationalism (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993).

428

WORLD POLITICS

debatesin churchcouncils,when the termenteredits thirdstageit was applied to various parties in the "ecclesiasticalrepublic." Spokespersonsfor these approacheswerepartof the religiouselite, andnation of culturalandpothus cameto be identifiedwith "therepresentatives liticalauthorityor a political,culturaland then socialelite"(p. 5). In Englandat the beginningof the sixteenthcentury,the term enteredits fifth stage,in which it startedto applynot only to the elite but also to the populationat large,thus becomingsynonymouswith the Greenfeldargues,signaled wordpeople.This semantictransformation, the emergenceof the firstnation,in the sense that we understandand use the termtoday,andlaunchedthe eraof nationalism.The termthen enteredits next stagewhereit referredto the massesat largethus elevatingthem to the positionof an elite. As it beganto referto the populaceandthe country,the term nationcameto be understoodas "asovereignpeople."Finally,in the last two stages of its development,the term was associatedfirst with other populationsand countries,and then with a "uniquesovereignpeople." Greenfeldsupportsher analysiswith a detailedand absorbingdiscussionof five test cases-England, France,Russia,Germany,and the United States.Nevertheless,I arguethat her findingscould be interpreted differentlyto show that, notwithstandingthe vast social and political changes the world has undergone,the term nationhas retaineda stable,unchangingcore meaning.Greenfeld'snotion that the word nationfirst appearsin referenceto a groupof foreignersimplies that the originof the wordis closelyrelatedto the need to distinguish "us"(locals) from "them"(aliens). Accordingto The OxfordEnglish Dictionary,the termforeignermeans"aliento or from;dissimilar;introduced from the outside."In a world where all individualsare similar andinsiders,termslike foreignerand nationmaythusbe useless.From its inception,then, the term nationwas used to distinguishbetween distinctandfinitegroups. Hence, it is not surprisingthat, at the second stage, nation distinguished among communitiesof students coming from distinct geographicandlinguisticregions.Had all the studentscomefromthe same area,or had there been no significantdifferencesamong individuals from these variousregions,this distinctionwould have been pointless. In the next two stages,the termis firstidentifiedwith a communityof opinion and then with the representativesof a culturalor political group.Nation thus becameidentifiedwith an elite-not with a general,unidentifiedelite, but with that of a particularcommunity. The next step was almost obvious:the term nationturnedfrom a

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

429

definitionof the delegatesof a specificgroupinto a definitionof the group itself. The fact that such disparategroups establishednationstatesof their own-first in Englandand Franceand then in the rest of Europe, South America, Africa, and Asia-created a close link amongmodernstatesand nations.The term thus came to be applied to everyuniquepeople,as well as to stateswhose politicalcultureand of these groups.8 institutionsreflectedthe distinctivecharacteristics A comparisonbetween the first stage, when nation applied to a unique group of foreigners,and the last stage, when it appliesto a uniquepeople,shows that its meaningis surprisinglystable.Thus the variousstagesof the term'sdevelopmentdifferin the applicationof the term,not in its content:whereasin the firststagenationis used by insidersto defineoutsiders,in the last one it is used by a communityto defineitself as well as others.These changesin applicationcouldbe ascribed to the fact that, under conditions of restrictedmobility,less awarenessof the existenceof other communitiesmight be expected, and a term such as nation could thus seem superfluous.Immigration and travelbring home the awarenessof other communities,shedding new light on the identityof individuals,who come to see themselvesas membersof a particularcommunity.In a world characterizedby the free flow of informationand by massivewaves of immigration,all groupsareforcedto recognizetheirown particularity. The mid-twentiethcentury marksthe emergenceof yet another stageof the term'sevolution,in which nationalgroupsbegin to recognize their own inner diversity.Hyphenated designations,such as African-Americansor Italian-Americans,emerge for the purposeof differentiatingthese groupsfrom one another.At present,the dominant groupof white Protestantsdoes not need a name to distinguish itselffromothergroupswho maybe viewedas exceptions(namely,foreigners),and need particularnames. An increasinguse of the term would clearlyindicate that this group sees itself as white-Americans havingthe samestatusas everyother,andthatwe no longerhaverules, only exceptions. We can thus concludethat all along the zigzag path sketchedby Greenfeldthe term has retaineda core meaning-that of an exclusive and limited communitywhose memberssharesome unique,defining characteristics,and are connected by feelings of fraternity.Hence, Greenfeld'sclaim that "a nation coextensivewith humanityis in no 8 For an analysisof the sourcesof confusionbetween nationand state see YaelTamir,"The Right to National Self-Determination,"SocialResearch58, no. 3 (1991).

430

WORLD POLITICS

way a contradictionin terms"is, in light of her own data,unfounded (p. 7). No nation, arguesAnderson,"imaginesitself continuouswith mankind,"and all nations see themselvesas having some distinctive features(p. 7). Inherentin nationalismis a recognitionof the existence of others.It is the way in which the nationalgrouptreatsthese others that distinguishespolycentricnationalism,which respectsthe other and sees each nationas enrichinga commoncivilization,from ethnocentricnationalism,which sees one'sown nationas superiorto all others and seeksdomination.9 The definitionof nation I suggest fits all the stages describedby Greenfeld,as well as all the groupsAndersonand Smith identify as nations.It pointsto the heartof the nationalexperience-the presence of sharedfeelings and perceptions,and a shareddesireto collectively protectandfosterthe nationalidentity-and is independentof contingent reasonsfosteringthe emergenceof particularnations.Furthermore, this definitiontouches the sourceof nationalism'sexceptional power-the view of the nationas a continuouscommunitythat influences one'sperceptionof oneself,as well as of one'spastandfuture. THE POWER OF NATIONALISM

The definitionof nationI havebeen consideringsuggeststhat nationalism plays a centralrole in the shapingof individualconsciousness, beliefs, and self-perception.But is nationalidentity more significant than othertypes of socialidentity?Liberalismand socialisminviteindividualsto see themselvesas partof humanityat large;Marxismtells them that class membershipshould overshadowall others;feminism urgesthem to give priorityto gender-basedidentity;while nationalism encouragesthem to see themselvesas contextualized,as membersof a particularcontinuouscommunity.Is this self-image more appealing thanall others?In an attemptto answerthis question,Smith'sNational Identity makes a significant contributionto our understandingof nationalism.

The powerof nationalism,arguesSmith,shouldbe attributedto the fact that membershipin a nationprovides"apowerfulmeansof defining and locating individualselves in the world throughthe prism of the collectivepersonalityand its distinctiveculture"(p. 17). Although his statementcapturesthe importanceof nationalidentity,it does not 9 Note that even the term ethnocentric-puttingone's ethnic group at the center-implies an acknowledgmentthat other groupsexist on the periphery.

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

431

supportthe claimthat this is the most importantcollectiveidentity.To do so, Smithwouldhaveto point out the advantagesof a nationalidentity overall others.Genderidentityis as entangledin our self-imageas nationalmembership,classsolidarityinfluencesour self-perceptionno less than nationalfraternity,and culturaland regionalaffiliationsare often as distinctiveas nationalones. All these identitiesarecharacterized by particularattributesthat distinguishmembersfrom outsiders and allow individualsto locate themselveswithin a definedcollective context.Why are the identitiesthey generateless effectivethan national identity?In an attempt to explainthe supremacyof national identity,Smith points out the qualitiesthat makeit the best candidate for providingindividualsa place in the world, enablingthem to contend with the changesand uncertaintiescharacteristic of modernexistence. His argument,however,is not entirelyconvincingand leaves severalquestionsunanswered. Nationalidentityis more powerfulthan gender,Smith argues,because members of the same gender are geographicallyseparated, dividedby class,and ethnicallyfragmented.They must therefore"ally themselvesto other,morecohesiveidentities,if they areto inspirecollectiveconsciousnessand action"(p. 10). This argument,however,can easilybe reversed:membersof the same nationmaybe geographically concentrated,but they are scatteredin differentregions, divided by class and gender,and, at times, also by religion,race, and even language.Hence, it is not clearwhy nationalidentity,unlikegender,need not ally with other identities when attemptingto inspire collective consciousnessand action. Local or regionalidentities,arguesSmith,cannotcompetewith national identity becausethey are not stable."Regionscan easily fragment into localities,and localitiesmayeasilydisintegrateinto separate segments"(p. 10). But Smith'sown studies,as well as manyother recent works on nationalism,demonstratethat nationalidentities can also be unstable.In fact,in the last century,manyindividualschanged theirnationalidentityat leasttwicewhile livingin the samegeographical region-from Lombardiansto Italians,from Walloons to Belgians,from Latvians,Ukrainians,and Uzbeks to Soviet citizens,from Serbsand Croatiansto Yugoslavians,and then back to their original identity.On whatgroundscanwe claimthat,as a rule,localaffiliations are less effectivethan nationalones in promotinga stable identity? Moreover, larger regional identities-European, Asian, African, American-are clearlymorestablethanboth nationalandlocalidentities. So, why shouldthey be less importantthan nationalones?

432

WORLD POLITICS

Smithalso considersclassidentityineffectivebecauseeconomicfactorsfluctuaterapidlyovertime, thus limitingthe chancesof preserving differenteconomicgroupswithin a class-basedcommunity.Moreover, given its limited emotionalimpact and its culturalshallowness,class identityseemsto Smith an inadequatebasisfor an enduringcollective identity.Althoughit seems truethat in modern,mobilesocieties,class identitymay be less stablethan nationalidentity,we can still wonder whether,for instance,proletariansbelongingto differentnationsshare more intereststhan membersof differentclasseswho belong to the samenation.If they do, why shouldthey subordinatethe intereststhey sharewith membersof the working class to the intereststhey share with membersof theirown nationwho arenow exploitingthem? Smith'sansweragainalludesto the continuous,stablenatureof the nationalgroup.Nationalidentity,he argues,is more meaningfulthan all other identitiesbecauseit is more stable.Note, however,that the term stablemight be slightlyconfusing,as it fails to capturethe emotional dimension embeddedin notions such as continuity,common descent,and shareddestiny. Andersonalso attributesthe strengthof nationalismto the perception of the nation as a communityof sharedfate. Dying for one'snation, he argues,assumesa moralgrandeurthat dying for the Labour Party,the AmericanMedical Association,or even Amnesty Internationalcannotrival.Unlike the nation,"theseareall bodiesone canjoin or leaveat easywill"(p. 144).10 Membershipin a nation, unlike membershipin a gender,class, or region,thus enablesan individualto find a placenot only in the world in which he or she lives, but also in an uninterruptedchain of being. Nationhood promotes fraternityboth among fellow members and acrossgenerations.It endows humanactionwith a meaningthat enduresovertime, thus carryinga promiseof immortality.These features are desperatelyneededin an ever-changing,urban,technologicalage. In this sense, I would argue,nationalismis not the pathologyof the modernage but an answerto its malaise-to the neurosis,alienation, of moderntimes.The powerof naand meaninglessnesscharacteristic tionalismcan thus be attributedto the followingfour features,all of which are variationson one theme, namely,transgenerational,genealogicalcontinuity. 10I acceptAnderson'sclaim that it is the perceptionof the nation as a communityof fate that generates the readinessto die for one's country.I contest, however,his claim that voluntaryassociations cannot musterthis type of devotion. For a more detailed analysisof this issue, see YaelTamir,"Reflections on Patriotism,"in E. Staub, ed., Patriotism:Its Roleand Manifestationsin Individualand Group Life (Chicago:Nelson Hall, 1995).

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

433

1. Membershipin a nation promisesindividuals redemptionfrom personal oblivion. In a secular era, Smith argues, identification with the nation is "the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality" (p. 160). Anderson makes a similar point when he argues that the effectiveness of nationalism stems from its transcendence of contingency, shifting finite human actions to the realm of the eternal. As long as the nation endures, it will show gratitude to all who struggle and sacrifice their lives for its survival. It will turn them into heroes, perhaps canonize them, even if they come from vile or ignoble background. In this sense nationalism is an egalitarian ideology, as is best illustrated by the uniformity of military cemeteries, where rich and poor, educated and illiterate, all lie below identical tombstones in a paragon of equality and fraternity. King Henry's famous speech in Shakespeare'sHenry V conveys this notion well. On the verge of their almost certain death in a battle fought on Saint Crispin's day, King Henry promises his men immortality. Even the base and evil among them are offered a path to redemption, a chance to attain glory by entering the national pantheon. ... CrispinCrispianshallne'ergo by, Fromthis dayto the endingof the world, But we in it shallbe remembered; We few,we happyfew,we bandof brothers. (HenryK,act 4, scene3)

This promise is only meaningful because King Henry and his men are convinced that England will go on until "the ending of the world," or else the memory of this glorious battle, and with it the promise of immortality,would surelywither away. 2. Identfficationwith a nation gives individuals hope of personal renewal through national regeneration.The notion of national identity clearly shows that the personal status and self-esteem of individuals reflect the condition of their nation. When a nation is in decay,its members' pride suffers with it, and when it flourishes, they prosper too. This is a central theme in Rousseau'sAddressto the PolishNation (1772) and in Johann Fichte's Addressto the GermanNation (1807), as in many other nationalist texts. National indignation was the prevalent mood when Fichte delivered his address.The Germans, he argued, could persist in their destructive search for self-satisfaction and thereby continue to suffer deprivation, humiliation, the scorn of their conqueror, and the evil of serfdom; or they could bestir themselves and strive to regain Germany's unity and

434

WORLD

POLITICS

honor.This was their duty to their ancestorsas well as to their future generations. There comes a solemn appealto you fromyour descendantsyet unborn."You they cry to you, "andlink yourselveswith prideto a boast of yourforefathers," noble line. Take carethat the chaindoes not breakoff with you;see to it that we, too, mayboastof you anduse you as an unsulliedlink to connectourselves with the sameillustriousline.""

Although this generationis now abased,arguesFichte, it can live to see the Germannamereestablishitself as "themost gloriousamongall and re-creatorof people,"and the Germannation as the "regenerator present as only one dim and desperate the the world.""2 By presenting link in a long chain of events,as a transientphasealong a triumphant path,Fichte offershis contemporariesthe prospectof hope and pride. All the despairand humiliation,as well as all the hope and glory enfolded in the nationalistexperience,are expressedin these words. Hence the continuousexistenceof the nationprovidesindividualswith a gloriouspast they can admireand a no less gloriousfuturethey can aspireto share.Pride in the past and hope for the futuregive them powerto cope with theirpresenthumiliationand fight for the nation's redemption. 3. Membership in a nationoffersrescue from alienation,solitude,and anonymity.By fosteringthe idealof fraternity,nationalismgrantsindividualsthe feeling that they are not alone,that they arecaredfor, and no less significantly,that they have someoneto carefor.This caringis not basedon personalliking or achievementsbut on membership,on the fact that we areall a part,an organicpart,of a naturalsocialentity that has no beginning or end. Membershipin a nation is seen as a partnershiptranscendingthe life span of individuals,thus promising the membersof each generationthat their descendantswill care for them as they,in turn,caredfor theirforefathers. 4. National membership assuresindividualsthat, qua members,they enjoyequalstatus.Greenfeldrightlyarguesthat, when the term nation cameto referto the populaceat largeratherthanto the elite only,it allowed each memberof the people to feel that he or she partookof a superiorelite quality.Nationhood thus had an elevatingeffect that membershipin a genderor classcouldnot have.Consequently,Greenfeld argues,class and status differencesbecame superficial,and the stratifiednationalpopulacewas perceivedas essentiallyhomogeneous. " Fichte, Addressto the GermanNation (New York:HarperTorchbooks,1968), 226-28. Ibid., 215.

12

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

435

Greenfeldgoes on to state that the allocationof sovereigntyto the people and the recognitionthat varioussocial strataare, fundamentally,politicalequalsarebasic tenets of both nationalismand democracy.Democracywas thus born with the sense of nationality,the two are inherentlylinked, and neither can be fullyunderstoodapartfromthis connection.Nationalismwas the form in which democracyappearedin the world,containedin the idea of the nation as a butterflyin a cocoon.(p. 10)

This claim,however,is somewhatmisleading.The equalitythat membershipin a nationaccordsis not a democraticone. Nationhoodgrants individualsa feeling of belongingand a sense of mutuality,but it does not eliminatedivisionsof class,gender,and status,and in this sense,it is similarto membershipin a family.Belongingto a familygrantsall membersequalstandingqua members,but most familiesremainhierarchical,as attestedby the term headsoffamilies(appliedto agentsas differentas philosophersandrevenueofficers).Children,youngadults, the elderly,and often women all have a differentstatus.Although all areequalmembers,this equality,unfortunately, is not translatedeither conceptuallyor practicallyinto other aspectsof familylife. Greenfeld thus movesfar too quicklyfrom nationalto liberaldemocraticbeliefs. Moreover,she overlooksthe fact that the convictionregardingthe equalityof all human beings rests, first and foremost,on a religious ratherthan a nationalset of beliefs. This is evident from Locke's SecondTreatiseon Civil Government (1690), which establishes the equality of man on the following grounds: The state of Naturehas a law of natureto governit, which obligeseveryone, and reason,which is that law teachesall mankindwho will but consultit, that being all equal and independent,no one ought to harm anotherin his life, health,libertyor possession;for men beingall the workmanship of one omnipotent andinfinitelywiseMaker;all the servantsof one sovereignMaster,sentinto the world by His orderand aboutHis business;they are His property,whose workmanshipthey aremadeto last duringHis, not one another'spleasure.'3

Surely,these arenot nationalistbeliefs. A more accurateand less sentimentaldescriptionof the relations among nationalismand democracyis providedby Niran,who claims thatthe arrivalof nationalism,in a distinctivelymodernsense,was tied to the politicalbaptismof the lowerclasses. 13 John Locke, The SecondTreatiseon Civil Government(1690; reprint, London: Prometheus Books, 1986), 9-10.

436

WORLD POLITICS

Although sometimeshostile to democracy,nationalistmovementshave been invariablypopulistin outlookand soughtto inducelowerclassesinto political life. In its most typicalversion,this assumedthe shapeof restlessmiddle-class and intellectualleadershiptryingto set up and channelpopularclass energies into supportfor the new states.14

Nationalismmay be part and parcelof the humanisttradition,but I see no virtue in equatingor conflatingit with a democraticor liberal set of principles.Although I would be the last to claim that a liberal democraticversionof nationalismis not possible,turningit into the only possibleversionseemsboth inaccurateand misleading. The kind of equalitythat nationalismgrantsfellow nationalsis not necessarilypoliticalbut communal.Long afterthe birthof Englishnationalism,which Greenfelddates to the mid-sixteenthcentury,English philosopherssuch as Locke and Mill did not believe that the metaphysicalequalityof men, or theirequalstandingas fellow nationals, ought to carryegalitarianpoliticalimplications,namely,that every human being should have equal political rights. If nationalismwas necessaryfor the developmentof democracy,it was not because it establishedpoliticalequalitybut becauseit gave a rationalefor the division of the world into distinct political units in which democratic principlescouldbe implemented. Greenfeld'stendencyto conflatedemocracyand nationalismresults from confusingthe subtle differencesbetween nationalistvalues and nationalvalues, that is, between values fundamentalto a nationalist way of thinkingandvaluessharedby membersof a nation. The belief in liberaldemocraticvaluesmaybe constitutiveof the nationalculture of some nations-of the English and Americannationalcultures,for example-yet these values are not nationalistvalues in that they are not inherentto the nationalway of thinking. Greenfeld'ssignificantcontributionis not the joiningof nationalism and democracy,but ratherher sensitivityto the potentialof nationhood to elevateeverymemberof the communitythat it made sovereign. Her claim goes to the heartof the nationalistphenomenonand points to the origins of its power. She rightly arguesthat national identityis fundamentally"amatterof dignity.It givespeoplereasonto be proud"(p. 487). The belief that a nation is chosen and its land is holy strengthens this sense of nationaldignity.Not surprisingly, then, nationalistsfrom all the followingnationsexplicitlyreferto their people as chosen and 14 T. Niran, TheBreak-upof Britain (London: NLB, 1977), 41. Note that Anderson questions the universalvalidityof Niran'sclaims (pp. 47-49).

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

437

to theirland as the promisedone: Egypt, England,France,Germany, Iran,Ireland,Israel,Poland,Russia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,and, especiallyand insistently,the United States, where this theme was takenup by both whites and blacks."5 The tendencyto sanctifyone's nationalludesto the kindof dignitythat nationalmembershipbestows uponits members,one that aspiresto transcendhumanactionandvoluntarysocialcontractsand move on to the transcendental realm. England'sdominationof eighteenth-centuryEuropeandthe West's influencein the worldas a whole "madenationalitythe canon.... Societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societalsystem of which the West was the centrehadin fact no choicebut to becomenations"(p. 14). Everygroupof individualsthus had to organizewithin a nationalframework,namely,to presentitself as a continuouscommunity with a gloriouspast and a no less promisingfuture.Andersonoffersmanyexamplesof these efforts.One of the most interestingis that of PresidentSukarno,who spoke with completesincerityof the 350 yearsof colonialismthat "his'Indonesia'had endured,despitethe fact that the very conceptof 'Indonesia'is a twentiethcenturyinvention" (p. 11). To reinforcethe notion of the antiquityof his nation,Sukarno adoptedthe nineteenth-century JavanesePrinceDiponegoroas a nationalhero,as the liberatorof Java.The princehimself,however,as his memoirsshow,had no intentionof liberatingthe land or expellingthe Dutch; indeed, he had no concept of the Dutch as a collectivitybut wantedto conquerJavaand ruleoverit. The nationalists'proclivityto invent a past for their nationsattests to the importanceof the notion of continuityfor ourunderstandingof nationalism's power.Indeed,the proliferationof nationalismcanbe explainedby referenceto otherfactors,especiallyto the functionalrole it has playedin the emergenceof the modernstate:it allowedthe mobilizationof the masses,justifiedgeneralconscription,taxation,andeducation. Nationalismcreatedmarketsthat allowedprint-capitalismto flourishand providedstatus and opportunitiesfor the intelligentsia. These functionalroles,however,assumea parasiticrelationshipto the role playedby nationalismat the personallevel. Nationalismacquired its mobilizingpowerand could play a functionalrole in modernpolitics only becauseindividualsinternalizedthe view of the nation as a special communityexhibiting historicalcontinuity and a collective destiny,as a sourceof personaland collectivepride,and as a shelterof 15

29.

ConorC. O'Brien,"Nationalist andDemocrats," TimesLiterarySupplement(August15, 1991),

438

WORLD POLITICS

careand supportin an alienatingmodernand secularworld. The booksreviewedherepoint to the contrastbetweenthe antiquity and continuityof nationsin the eyes of nationalistsand their evident modernityandinstabilityin the eyes of sociologistsandhistorians.It is trulyironic that the powerof nationalismdependspreciselyon those aspectsof the nation'simageleastsupportedby researchevidence. THE TRUTH-CONTENT

OF NATIONAL BELIEFS

Nationaliststend to createtheir own narrativesto interprethistorical events in ways that fit their needs, to renew languagesartificially,to mimic other nations, and to appropriateforeign traditionsas their own. Motivatedby a desireto connecttheirnationto a remoteandillustriouspast, nationalistsdo not hesitate,whenevernecessary,to invent such links.ModernIraqthus claimsto find its roots in Babylon, Egyptianssee the pharaohsas their genealogicalforefathers,Greeks tracea directline to Hellenic culture,andMexicanspoint to theirlink with the Aztecs. Although the accuracyof these claimsis often questionable,their functionalrole remainsintact. Nationalistshave long understood, Smith argues, that the criterion of national dignity "is the felt antiquity of a community's ethno-history, irrespective of its truthcontent' (p. 161). This is the bar at which they must make their appeal for national assertion. The truth-content of unearthed memories is less important culturally and politically than their abundance, variety and drama (their aesthetic qualities) or their example of loyalty, nobility and self-sacrifice (their moral qualities) that inspire emulation and bind the present generation to the "glorious dead." (p. 164)

Smith is not the first to argue that truth is of minor importance in national claims. In his famous essay "What Is a Nation?" Ernest Renan claims that a nation is a group of individuals who cherish and retain their shared history but remember it selectively,ready to forget some of its less pleasant episodes.16Hence, French citizens should forget "la Saint-Barthelemy" or "les massacres du Midi au XIIIieme siecle." As Anderson rightly notes, Renan sees no need to describe these episodes in French history assuming that his readersrememberwhat they ought to have forgotten. Why this conscious attempt first to remember and then to forget these events? They ought to be remembered because 16 See Ernest Renan,"Qu'est-ceque c'est q'une nation?"in Oeuvrescomplets(Paris:Colmann Levy, 1947).

ENIGMA OF NATIONALISM

439

these religiousconflictswere importantturningpoints, and ought to be forgottenbecausethese were wars among fellow Frenchmen.As Andersonremindsus, this attitudeis not typicallyFrenchin anyway. The Americaneducationalsystemencouragesa view of the 1861-65 armedconflictbetweenthe Union andthe ConfederateStatesas a civil warwithin one stateand not between,"asthey brieflywere,two sovereign states"(p. 201). Similarly,English-historytextbooksintentionally obscurethe answerto the disquietingquestionwhat or whom did William the Conquerorconquer? The only intelligiblemodernanswerwould be "Conquerorof the English," whichwouldturnthe old Normanpredatorinto a moresuccessfulprecursorof Napoleonand Hitler.Hence "theConqueror" operatesas the samekind of ellipsisas "laSaintBarthelemy" to remindone of somethingwhich one is immediatelyobligatedto forget.NormanWilliam and SaxonHaroldthus meet on the battlefieldof Hastings,if not as dancingpartners,at least as brothers.(p. 201)

Deliberateforgetfulnessand misrepresentation of historicalfacts thus seem to constitutean important,and perhapsindispensable,featureof nation building. Nevertheless,although Anderson and Smith offer ampleevidenceof the fact that nationalidentityis often basedon false or,worse still, intentionallymisleadingbeliefs,they do not discussthe implicationsof these findings. One of the very few referencesto this issue is found in an essayby David Miller who exploresthe relationshipbetweenthe truth of national beliefs and the natureof nationalobligations.He does agree with Smith and Andersonthat the existenceof a nation dependson "whetherits membershavethe rightbeliefs;it is not partof the definition that the beliefsshouldin factbe true.""7 Forindividualsto be able to cultivatenationalfeelings,it is importantthat the storythe nation tells itself aboutits pastshouldbe generallybelieved,but it need not be historicallyaccurate. But why must nationalfeelingsrelyon the nation'sfelt antiquityor continuity?Why do nationalistsfind such difficultyin concedingthat "thoseentities that we unthinkinglyexperienceas 'natural'are in fact madeby us, not given to us,"and forcethemselvesto invent 'cultural'; for theirnationa historyeven at the cost of self-deception?8 Communitiesareno less valuablebecausethey area humancreation whose endurancecannotbe guaranteed.The desirefor guaranteesthat our communityis eternaland securein some objectivehavenmay be 17 18

Miller,"The Ethical Significanceof Nationalism,"Ethics 98 (1988), 648. L. Hutcheson,ThePoliticsofPostmodernism (London:Routledge,1989),2.

440

WORLD

POLITICS

no morethan a cravingfor the certaintiesof childhoodor the absolute values of our primitivepast. Paraphrasingthe closing sentences of "TwoConceptsof Liberty,"one may arguethat to realizethe contingency of one's communityand yet stand for it unflinchinglyis what "Todemandmorethan distinguishescivilizedpeoplefrombarbarians: this is perhapsa deep and incurablemetaphysicalneed;but to allowit to determineone'spracticeis a symptomof an equallydeep and more dangerous,moralandpoliticalimmaturity.""9 A more self-conscioustype of nationalismwill be less riddledwith inconsistenciesand dilemmasand is thereforewarranted.But will this type of nationalismbe ableto playthe samesocialrolefilledby its predecessor?The answerto this question,as yet undisclosed,goes to the heartof the nationalexperience.

19Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"in Four Essays on Liberty (New York Oxford University Press, 1969), 172.