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The Moral Obligations of the Gifted George W. Ferree And Scott R. Vaughn Michigan State University Our primary concern in this paper is with the question of whether the gifted, qua gifted--that is, by reason of their giftedness--have special moral obligations that ordinary folk do not have. We do not propose here to give any special attention to who the gifted are, as important as that question surely is. We have in mind at the very least young people of unusual intellectual prowess who have high intelligence quotients, who score extremely well on tests like the SAT and ACT, who are in the upper percentile rankings in their high school classes, and who often become honors students in the college and universities they attend. Our argument applies equally well, it will be seen, to those who have remarkable artistic or athletic capabilities. In fact, the character of our argument is such that it applies to the gifted however they are identified. Thus we do not here especially consider who the gifted are. By "obligations" we mean things to do or to be which are not merely permitted but positively required upon rational reflection. As a preliminary to our principal inquiry we wish to call attention to the sorts of moral obligations that all persons, gifted or otherwise, may reasonably be said to possess. We offer no fullblown argument in support of these moral obligations but rather posit (some) such obligations that, on our view, can be strongly defended (and, indeed, which have been defended elsewhere). 1. Every person has a moral obligation to pursue his own well-being insofar as possible in a manner that avoids harming others; that is, if one has multiple options each of which contribute equally to his own well being but some of which hurt others, he ought to choose those that do no harm 2. Every person has a moral obligation to pursue his own well-being insofar as possible in a manner that positively helps others; that is, if one has multiple options each of which equally contributes to his own well being but some of which aid others, he ought to choose those that provide help. 3. Every person has a moral obligation to make personal sacrifices of a relatively minor sort in the interest of what is quite central to the well being of others. There are convincing reasons, on our view, why all persons should treat one another in accordance with these three rules. Such treatment is at least part of what is involved in showing respect for other persons. Respect for others, as we have identified it, is a matter of positive obligation even in those contexts in which there are no palpably direct consequences for other persons. Thus a person living alone on a desert island is not devoid of moral obligations. It is ever possible--logically possible--that some person(s) of whom one is unaware, in the enormity of space-time, will be affected by what one does. Thus in living one's life, even by oneself, one is obliged to abide by the three rules cited above. If, for example, the well-being of a lone survivor on a desert island could be served equally well, on the one hand, by his whiling away his days or, on the other, by his writing an account of his survival experience (that could, say, prove useful to others, should they ever find it), he has a moral obligation, as we see it, to choose the latter course. And so on. We should emphasize that we are not saying that a person is always under obligation to sacrifice his own well-being in those circumstances in which what is good for him is in conflict with what is good for others. The obligation rather is to treat all persons, including oneself, with respect. As Bertrand Russell once put it, "The idea which is needed is that of justice, not selfsacrifice." A person's obligation is to be as reasonable as he can be in promoting the well being of all the persons with whom he is associated, including himself. Surely on some occasions a respect for persons requires one not to give up his own well-being but positively to assert it (because he is a person, too, as we are wont to say). Even if no other person is touched by what one does--an extremely rare circumstance--one has an obligation to treat oneself, qua person, with respect--which is to say, minimally, to treat oneself reasonably and with serious concern. A person is thus obliged to give considered attention to the sort of life he will live. Even alone on a desert island one ought to make decisions about what he will do and/or be by reference to their consequences, short term and long range, for the total gestalt of his life. To do anything less would be to give up one's self-regard. It would amount to abandoning one's personhood. One final preliminary word. The answer to the question "What are the obligations of the gifted?" we believe will be found in the context of the more general question "What are the obligations of everyman?" By "the obligations of everyman" we mean those obligations which attach themselves to all persons qua persons as contrasted with those obligations which are specifically role related (e.g., the responsibilities of doctor to patient; parent to child; teacher to student; public official to constituents; and so on). These role-related obligations are more or less contractual in character and are describable in terms of the tasks constituting the role under consideration (e.g., the tasks of medicine identify [constitute] the role of the physician and determine those obligations which attach to that role). I Do the gifted have special moral obligations that others do not have? The received position in response to this question in American society is decidedly affirmative. We call this the received position because it is widespread in our culture, is rarely if ever challenged, and grows out of some of the major sources of our tradition: the Judeo-Christian heritage, Platonic philosophy, Jeffersonian political thought, and (some) American capitalist ideology. The parable of the talents in the New Testament is a classic version of the received position. In that story Jesus tells of a lord who metes out talents to his three servants, five to the first, two to a second, and one to a third. In the lord's absence--he goes away on a trip--two of the servants put their talents to work and double them, whereas the third does nothing with his, burying it in the ground. When the lord returns, he commends and rewards the servants who have put to use their talents, but the servant who has failed to multiply his is excoriated and cast out. Interpretations of this parable--whether from gowned theologians or from pious parents--have typically maintained that it teaches us that God has put in our trust whatever abilities we have. We are His stewards, and we have a moral obligation to use His endowments to the fullest. Some day, we are told, like the servants in the parable we will have to give an account of our stewardship. Those to whom much has been entrusted--the gifted--thus have a special responsibility. They must not waste their God-given abilities. Another version of the received position is in evidence in one of the stock interpretations of Plato's Republic. On this reading Plato weaves together several arguments which lead to the conclusion that those who possess certain special talents are obliged to use them and to use them for the common good. His position has several components--a view defending the desirability of specialization, a stance on the origin and character of individual differences, and an analysis of the nature of justice. A full account of Plato's views on these topics is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief summary of several points will illustrate that the received position is a part of one well-known reading of the Republic. Plato holds that in the ideal city-state the key functions of economic production, defense, and political rule would be performed by specialists--specialists whose tasks would be defined directly by the function they have to perform. Furthermore he holds that all men are suited by nature to perform one and only one of those functions--some are born to produce, others to defend, and still others to rule. This view is graphically stated in Socrates' myth of the metals: All of you in the city are certainly brothers…but the god, in fashioning those of you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in at their birth; this is why they are most honored; in auxiliaries, silver; and iron and bronze in the farmers and craftsmen. The educational scheme prescribed for this ideal city-state includes a lengthy and rigorous training in theoretical pursuits for those competent to rule. In fact, for Plato, having knowledge--as contrasted with right opinion--and being competent to rule amount to one and the same thing. He has his mouthpiece Socrates affirm that "…those who are without education and experience of truth would never be adequate stewards of a city…" and that those who would found a fully just political community must "…compel the best natures to go to the study which we were saying before is the greatest…" In short, those who have special gifts are obliged to use them for the good of the community. The Jeffersonian version of the received position resembles the forgoing interpretation of Plato. In his educational plan for the state of Virginia Jefferson explicitly recognizes that boys of exceptional talent--he does not consider girls--may be found within the ranks of the masses, of the poor. His educational scheme is designed to identify those of genius (Jefferson's word) and to make it possible for at least some of them to receive a complete liberal education, along with moneyed youngsters. These educated young men of special talent, Jefferson supposes, would then assume positions of leadership in Virginia. Clearly he hoped to create an aristocracy of talent that would supplant an aristocracy of wealth and birth. Thus in a letter to John Adams recalling his efforts to establish public schools, he said: "Worth and genius would thus have been sought out from every condition of life, and completely prepared by education for defeating the competition of wealth and birth for public trust." (Emphasis added.) The gifted--at least gifted males--in Jefferson's scheme of things clearly have a special obligation to use their abilities in positions of leadership. It is their natural destiny (not an unexpected conviction of an exemplar of the Enlightenment world view with its commitment to natural law and to natural rights and obligations). Still another variant of the received position is found in some well-known statements of capitalist ideology. Andrew Carnegie, for example, argues in The Gospel of Wealth that economic competition is desirable because it "…insures the survival of the fittest [the most talented] in every department." (Emphasis added.) He says that We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race. Having accepted these, it follows that there must be great scope for the exercise of special ability in the merchant and in the manufacturer who has to conduct affairs upon a great scale. That this talent for organization and management is rare among men is proved by the fact that it invariably secures enormous rewards for its possessor, no matter where or under what laws or conditions. (Emphasis added.) But the economic rewards of competition, Carnegie stresses, carry with them obligations, specifically the obligations of stewardship. This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of wealth: To set an example of modest, unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for the legitimate wants of those dependent upon him; and, after doing so, to consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to administer, and strictly bound as a matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community--the man of wealth thus becoming the mere trustee and agent for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience and ability to administer, doing for them better than they would or could do for themselves. (Emphasis added.) II The received position, several versions of which we have described, is a general stance regarding the development of all the talents, not just those which are academic in character. With respect to academic talents, the received position usually appears as one of two arguments which we are calling (1) the "living up to one's potential" version and (2) the "wasted talent" version. Both are specific variants of the view that possessing some academic talent obliges on to develop that talent to the fullest. The first version reveals itself in comments of the following sort, doubtless familiar to us all: "Jane is such a capable mathematician. It is too bad that she isn't going to college. She really ought to make the most of her extraordinary mathematical ability." "What a marvelous cellist John is, with musical talent way beyond anyone else's in my acquaintance. How sad that he has decided to major in business administration. Of course he may well make a good living but there's no way he can ever achieve there what he could in music." And so on. The central thrust of these comments then, is that anyone who possesses any talent ought to develop it to the fullest. The second version of the received position is illustrated by the following types of comment: "Bob has a real talent for teaching, and there is a pressing need today for capable teachers in mathematics and science. He really ought to go into teaching instead of accounting." "Betty has remarkable talent in the life sciences, and there is a pressing social need to break the malesonly barrier in the medical profession. She really ought to go into medicine." And so on. The central thrust of these comments clearly is that anyone who has an unusual capacity for social service has a special obligation to develop and use that potential. Both of these versions of the received position, on our view, are flawed. They either (1) fail to take into account the fact of multiple talents, (2) confuse the notions of interest and ability, or (3) obscure important moral issues by ignoring the differences between the commendable and the obligatory. Multiple Talents Those of us who work with Honors students are poignantly aware that the academically talented frequently have multiple talents, not just some one or two. Many of our students have the potential to become first-rate physicians, lawyers, college professors of history, poets, musicians, or any number of other things. Consider, for example, a student we know. She is an accomplished dancer and could quite likely perform in a professional company; she has completed enough sophisticated work in mathematics and science to show that she readily complete a degree in computer science or go on to medical school (both of which she has considered); but she has declared her academic major in philosophy and English literature. If we were to accept the received position and use it as a basis for counseling this young woman, we would find ourselves driven to one of the following lines of reasoning. 1. (Version One) Since she has the capacity for accomplished performance in ballet, she is obliged to develop that capacity to the fullest. But since she has the capacity to become a physician, she is also obliged to become a physician. Moreover, since she has the capacity to become a computer engineer (and a professor of philosophy, and so on) she is further obliged to develop those capacities as well. 2. (Version Two) Even though she has the capacity to achieve in several areas, she is obliged to develop only that one which provides the greatest service to society. Should we adopt the first of these lines of reasoning, we would clearly be committed to requiring our charge to do things that are, in fact, not possible for her to do. One and the same person cannot develop the talent for brain surgery and the talent for ballet to their fullest since either is so demanding that a commitment to one excludes the possibility of a full commitment to the other. To insist that she become both a fully accomplished physician and a fully accomplished ballerina (not to mention a fully accomplished computer scientist, philosopher and literary critic) is morally perverse since it violates the generally accepted--and defensible--moral dictum that we can require of people only those things which it is possible for them to achieve. The line of reasoning of the second version with its emphasis upon maximizing social utility also leads to unacceptable conclusions. Were we to adopt it, questions of the following sort would have to be answered: Would she be more accomplished as a dancer or as a physician? Do physicians or ballerinas contribute more to the common good? Questions of this sort are exceedingly difficult to answer, in part because it is not immediately evident what would count as an answer to them, and in part because to the extent that we can make sense of the questions, the answers require information largely inaccessible to us. The logical problem becomes more apparent when we reformulate the question in specific terms; e.g., How did her latest performance in Swan Lake stack up against her latest job of heart surgery? Formulated in this way it is apparent that the question is rooted in a "category mistake" which treats the question of the relative value of different activities in the same fashion as the question of the value of different actions of the same type. Even if it were clear what these questions mean, it is certainly not clear how one would go about determining answers to them. Who among us would claim to be privy to the full range of information required to make such decisions? Most of us would give no advice at all if this type of knowledge were required to advise young people. INTEREST AND ABILITY The received position gains an initial plausibility from its assumption that one's interests always follow hard on the heels of one's abilities. It is not hard to suppose that people will be interested in doing those things for which they have some special facility. Unfortunately those of us who have advised, taught or otherwise worked with gifted young people for any length of time recognize that some of them with high levels of some specific ability (whether measured by standardized test scores or performance) have little or no genuine interest in pursuing that ability. We also recognize that engagement in an activity--that is engagement of the most fundamental sort--requires more than ability; it involves a palpable abiding interest in the thing to be done. Remove the gratuitous assumption that interests and abilities always coincide, and the received position loses a great deal of its initial plausibility and force. OBLIGATION AND SUPEREROGATION Finally, we believe that the received position fails to make an intelligible and reasonable distinction between those actions which are morally obligatory and those which though not required are nonetheless morally commendable. The received position asserts a positive obligation (in the wasted talents version) to develop those talents which have social utility, regardless of the desires, inclinations and interests of the agent. Quite apart from the questionable assumption that social utility provides the ultimate moral canon, this version takes self sacrifice to an absurd extreme. If everybody always sacrificed his own well-being for the well-being of others, the result would be a chaotic state in which no person's well-being would be served in any fundamental and enduring way. Russell, whom we have already quoted on this matter, makes the following point: The idea which is needed is that of justice, not self sacrifice. Every person has a right to a certain amount of room in the world, and should not be made to feel wicked in standing up for what is due him. When self-sacrifice is taught, the idea seems to be that it will not be fully practiced, and that the practical result will be about right. But in fact people either fail to learn the lesson, or feel sinful when they demand mere justice, or carry self-sacrifice to ridiculous extremes. III We are extremely dubious that a convincing case can be made for the view that the gifted simply by reason of their giftedness have special moral obligations that others, the nongifted do not have. Nonetheless highly talented people do have moral obligations, the same obligations every person has, gifted or not. As we said at the outset, with respect to others everyone has a moral obligation 1. to pursue his own well-being insofar as possible in a manner that avoids harming others; that is, if one has multiple options each of which contributes to his own well-being but some hurt others he ought to choose those that do no harm; 2. to pursue his own well-being insofar as possible in a manner that positively helps others; that is, if one has multiple options each of which equally contributes to his own wellbeing but some of which aid others, he ought to choose those that provide help; and 3. to make personal sacrifices of a relatively minor sort in the interest of what is quite central to the well-being of others. In simple illustration of Rule 3, imagine two people, John and Jane, who are vying for the one remaining ticket to a theatrical production. John has genuine albeit only moderate interest in the drama being staged--it will afford him a pleasant evening--whereas for Jane the play in question is exceedingly important, something she has yearned to see for a long time, and which, for various reasons, is central to her well-being. In such circumstances, John has a moral obligation to defer to Jane. He is morally reprehensible if he does not. The foregoing rules do not call for a person always to be self-sacrificing. Rather they require one to pursue his own basic well-being in a manner that is sensitive to the same pursuit on the part of others and in a manner that attempts to prevent or to minimize basic conflicts insofar as possible. A person has moral obligations not only with respect to others but also to himself. He is under moral obligation to pursue his own well-being in a manner that gives serious, reflective attention to life's options; that is, everyone is obliged to come to know himself insofar as practically possible with respect to the sorts of things he can do and be in life. Only when one has such knowledge can he put together the configuration of things to do and to be from among all the possible configurations which will bring him fundamental continuing personal fulfillment. Not to achieve and act upon such knowledge is to leave the quality of one's life to sheer dumb chance. It is to give oneself over to an utterly capricious, unthinking existence. And a person--any person, gifted or otherwise--is worth more than that. Not to give some reflective attention and effort to one's life is obliquely to discommend oneself. It is to say, as it were, I am not worth the attention and effort. It follows that cynicism and a lack of concern about how one will live his life are morally reprehensible states. A person is under obligation, then, to live his life intelligently, mindfully, in precisely the senses Dewey identifies in the following passage: …acting with an aim is all one with acting intelligently. To foresee a terminus of an act is to have a basis upon which to observe, to select, and to order objects and our own capacities. To do these things means to have a mind--for mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationship to one another. To have a mind to do a thing is to foresee a future possibility; it is to have a plan for its accomplishment; it is to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and the obstructions in the way,--or, if it is really a mind to do the thing and not a vague aspiration--it is to have a plan which takes account of resources and difficulties. Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future consequences to present conditions. And these traits are just what is meant by having an aim or a purpose. A man is stupid or blind or unintelligent--lacking in mind--just in the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is about, namely, the probable consequences of his acts. A man is imperfectly intelligent when he contents himself with looser guesses about the outcome than is needful, just taking a chance with his luck, or when he forms plans apart from study of the actual conditions, including his own capacities. Such relative absence of mind means to make our feelings the measure of what is to happen. To be intelligent we must "stop, look, listen" in making the plan of an activity. A person is acting morally, then, when he gives studied, reflective attention to life's possibilities and makes choices for himself that are not counterproductive--that is to say, choices that are not at variance with the sorts of desires which upon careful and informed reflection he would be committed to and would seek to realize. In effect we are saying that a person has a moral obligation to be "true to himself" with respect to life's options and to organize and implement a life plan rooted in such knowledge. Consider, for example--and this case is by no means unusual--a gifted young high school graduate, Betty, whose measured I.Q. is in the 140 to 160 range. Her SAT scores in general are excellent, 1350 overall, and especially high in mathematics, 750. She is a freshman in college, pondering what course of study to pursue. Her high school teachers and counselors, her parents, and a number of her parents' friends have encouraged her to pursue mathematics, one of the mathematically related sciences, or engineering. Her counselor has called her attention to what a marvelous role model she could be for other women if she becomes a successful engineer, historically a man's occupation. She has been reminded of how much our country needs capable scientists, of how far we are behind other nations in the crucial scientific-technological fields. Her minister has told her that she has been blessed with exceptional talent and that she must not misuse it. And so on. Now it happens, not at all unpredictably, that Betty is exceedingly interested in the mathematical and related inquiries in which she has such marked abilities, and she has not been altogether dismayed or upset by the sort of advice with which she has regularly been plied. But it also happens (again, somewhat predictably) that Betty is a better-than-average musician, both a pianist and a flutist, who loves her instruments and music in general, classical and popular. She recognizes that she probably lacks the brilliance to become a concert performer, a soloist, but that by hard work she might just become proficient enough for the ranks of symphonic orchestra musicians or, certainly, of popular musicians--and these possibilities are highly attractive to her. Moreover, at this stage she enjoys music enough to suppose that even if she did not achieve professional success as a performer, a life of teaching music and performing nonprofessionally might nonetheless be highly satisfying. Beyond these thoughts Betty also has entertained seriously the possibility that someday she might want to become a wife and mother. She is currently dating and highly attracted to a young man who plans to become a physician and who has more than hinted that he hopes someday they will marry and have a family. Now what is Betty to do? Pretty clearly the received position says that Betty has an obligation not "to hide her talent under a bushel," that she has been entrusted with unusual gifts, and that accordingly she has a special obligation, a moral obligation, to make the most of these gifts in the service of others. Certainly some versions of the received position would require Betty to become a mathematician, an engineer, or something of that sort, whatever else she did. On the stance we are taking it is not immediately patent that Betty ought to pursue higher mathematics in some form or another. Rather, Betty's obligation at this stage--and, incidentally, the chief task of schools at this point is to aid her in this inquiry--is to make intensive and representative samples not only of the options she has been entertaining but also of whatever additional genuinely feasible options she may uncover for a fulfilling life. By a representative sample here we emphatically do not mean a superficial, dilettantish dabbling but rather an intensive exploration and mastery of those key elements essential to understanding just what the option is. How can Betty reasonably decide whether she wants to go on into higher mathematics or related fields unless she has explored these options sufficiently to know "what she is getting into"? One must have sufficient experience and understanding of an option to know oneself with respect to that option. Unhappily there are many persons who have rejected a life option in the same way a child sometimes rejects a food--without ever having tasted it or having tasted it only hastily and superficially so as not to know what he has declined. Betty's task, then, with respect to mathematics and mathematically related vocations is to get to know them and the sorts of life styles they afford. She must come to know herself--both her abilities and abiding interests--with respect to these options so that she can decide whether and in what ways to pursue them further. Similar observations can be made about her obligation with respect to music, marriage, and whatever other options she can discover that show promise for her. Needless to say, various combinations of options are also possibilities to explore. Doubtless there are various ways to configure mathematics, music, marriage, and the various other elements that could give content to a particular life. Ideally a given person will discover in time the configuration of things (from among the permutations and combinations of possibles) that is most enduringly fulfilling for that person. Suppose Betty is fortunate enough to have the sort of education, formal and informal, that allows her to be knowledgeable about options realistically available to and pursuable by her. After careful reflection Betty decides that what will bring her the most basic and enduring satisfaction, all things considered, is a life in which she combines music teaching and marriage, a life in which higher mathematics will have little or no part. Is she morally reprehensible for giving short shrift to the sphere in which she demonstrably is so talented? Not on our view. Indeed, given the fact that that her decision has not been made hastily or haphazardly but rather has been as fully informed as possible, we hold that her choice cannot reasonably be discommended. Surely what she is doing is morally acceptable. We would make the same commentary has she--after full, intensive representative sampling--given greater priority to some other life plan. What anyone is morally obliged to do insofar as practically possible is to come to know oneself with respect to life's options and to select a way of life that squares with one's reflectively identified basic interests, and thus is not alien to him. Even if a person has an extraordinary ability to pursue higher mathematics, it does not necessarily that that person will find his greatest well-being in the exercise of that ability. He may. One might even hypothesize that more often than not it is the case. But suppose some young person who could become, who really has what it takes to be, a mathematician, a brain surgeon, a diplomat, or any of a number of intellectually challenging and socially useful roles, decides to devote his life largely to combing the beaches. Is not a person like that morally reprehensible? He is, on our view, if he makes his decision blindly, capriciously, unthinkingly. He is also reprehensible, as we see it, if his choice flies in the face of what he really knows to be the truth. If he chooses to become a beachcomber simply as a line of least resistance even though he realizes that some other sort of life would really be more fundamentally rewarding to him, then he is acting wrongly. Of course our advice to the highly talented would-be beachcomber would be not to act hastily or irrevocably but to spend some time sampling--directly or vicariously--all the options that show some reasonable promise for him. A one or two year sampling of a beach bum's life juxtaposed with a really representative in-depth sampling of various intellectually stimulating and challenging fields assuredly would lead many to abandon the beach as an enduring way of life. But suppose in some case it did not? Suppose some remarkably talented young person after a period of some years of careful exploration in both academic and other settings decided quite studiedly that for him the most fulfilling, basically satisfying life had to involve in a substantial way living on the sea coast and doing things like working on a shrimp trawler. Would his decision fly in the face of his basic moral obligations? Not on our view. Our stance is that he is not at all obliged to select a vocation and life style basically onerous and alien to him, however capable he might be of doing the activity and however socially useful that activity might happen to be. Our view, we think, turns out to be a kind of latter-day Platonism but one quite different from the version of Plato found in the received position. We maintain that every person is so constituted and the character of the world is such that some offices and activities are for a given person far more fulfilling than others. In principle, by careful exploration--by what we have called "representative sampling" of life's options--one can discover a way of life instrumental to his own well-being, a way of life congruent with what he is. The ideal society--is this not Platonism?--is one in which every person is doing that which is compatible with, which grows out of, his given psycho-physical constitution. The ideal society is certainly not one in which people, given what they are, are doing things that are distasteful to them or are far less fulfilling than other things would be. Even if a society at a given time seems to have a great need, say, for more mathematicians, scientists, and sophisticated technologists, it does not automatically follow that the gifted, those capable of excellence in these fields, should at once be shunted into them in an omnibus way. A saner approach, we submit, would heed the logic of this paper.

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