The status of stigma - Iowa Research Online - University of Iowa [PDF]

University of Iowa Masthead Logo

Iowa Research Online

Theses and Dissertations

Summer 2011

The status of stigma Layana Charisse Navarre-Jackson University of Iowa

Copyright 2011 Layana C. Navarre-Jackson This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1250 Recommended Citation Navarre-Jackson, Layana Charisse. "The status of stigma." PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2011. https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.ozxmmq3i

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd Part of the Sociology Commons

THE STATUS OF STIGMA

by Layana Charisse Navarre-Jackson

An Abstract Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa July 2011 Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Alison J. Bianchi

1

ABSTRACT Even before 9/11, there has been a long history of attitudes and public policies that were biased against people of Middle East descent in the United States—regardless of whether or not they are Muslim. This research uses Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) and stigma theory to examine whether there is low status or stigma associated with the Muslim religion and Middle Eastern ethnicity in the United States. By doing so, the research expands upon previous studies of stigma to explore the social psychological processes involved during interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized. This study used experimental data, survey data and qualitative data collected from samples of undergraduate students using designs conceptualized specifically for this research. I conducted an experiment and a Web vignette-survey using undergraduate students from a Midwestern university. The findings of the experiment showed that that European American subjects paired with the Middle Eastern female partner not wearing a hijab and the Muslim Middle Eastern female partner wearing a hijab were influenced more and held more positive perceptions of their partners than did the subjects paired with the European American female partner. In contrast, the results of the Web vignettesurvey indicate that the European American target applicant is more likely to be selected for the leadership position than either of the Middle Eastern target applicants (with or without hijab). Furthermore, the results of the social distance measures indicate that knowing someone from the Middle East (e.g. previous contact with a Middle Easterner) decreased the likelihood of social distance from the Middle Eastern target with hijab and without hijab across the vignette conditions. This suggests that there might be less of a tendency for individuals who have had personal contact and interacted with people from

2 the Middle East to take the “us versus them” perspective, which is necessary in order to carry out the process of stigmatization.

Abstract Approved:

_ __________________________________ Thesis Supervisor ___________________________________ Title, Department ___________________________________ Date

THE STATUS OF STIGMA

by Layana Charisse Navarre-Jackson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa July 2011 Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Alison Bianchi

Copyright by LAYANA CHARISSE NAVARRE-JACKSON 2011 All Rights Reserved

Graduate College The University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL ______________________________________________ PH.D. THESIS _______________ This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of Layana Charisse Navarre-Jackson has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology at the July 2011 graduation. Thesis Committee: _ __________________________________ Alison J. Bianchi, Thesis Supervisor ___________________________________ Mary E. Campbell ___________________________________ Michael J. Lovaglia ___________________________________ Michael Sauder ___________________________________ Richard B. Turner

In the memory of Ethel Mae Brooks and Lorraine Navarre—who always believed in me when I did not believe in myself.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are so many people that I must thank for their time, assistance, and encouragement that I scarcely know where to begin. First of all, thank you to Alison Bianchi, who gave me guidance, encouragement, constructive criticism, unending patience, and great understanding. This task was daunting enough to make me forget myself, and you truly helped me in more ways than I can count. Thank you for being my advisor, my mentor, my informal counselor, and my friend. I also have to thank Michael Lovaglia, who has provided me with guidance and encouragement, in addition to his being the Director for the Center for the Study of Group Processes, which was where I gained all of my hands-on experimental experience. Thank you to all of my other committee members, from whom I have received invaluable guidance and time. Specifically, Mary Campbell, who pointed me in the right direction with regard to race, ethnicity, and panethnicity for this project. Thanks to Michael Sauder, who guided me on the design of the qualitative semi-structured interview that I will be conducting in the future as an extension of this research. Moreover, thank you to Richard B. Turner, who guided me with regard to the history of Muslims and Middle Easterners in America. Thank you to Tina McCarty, my stellar URA who helped me in the lab, my dear friends Rengin Firat and Sreeya Bhattachryya, who helped me with the modeling/acting aspect when no one else volunteered—and both of whom truly enlightened me, and Ben Earnhart, who was always there to help with equipment in the lab rooms. Finally, a special thanks to Jeffrey W. Lucas for his assistance. Thanks to my family, especially my mother, whose encouragement years ago made me believe that I could even dream of obtaining a Ph.D., and my father, whose support meant a great deal to me during my studies as a Ph.D. candidate. Also, thank you to my spouse for sticking by me during this laborious journey.

iii

Lastly, I would like to thank my son, Jaye, for being such a patient and understanding teenager when there were days that I would stay in my room to write, and he could not get any time or attention from me. Jaye, I hope that I make you proud, and that—by aiming for the highest level of education possible—I set a standard for you to one day surpass.

iv

ABSTRACT Even before 9/11, there has been a long history of attitudes and public policies that were biased against people of Middle East descent in the United States—regardless of whether or not they are Muslim. This research uses Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) and stigma theory to examine whether there is low status or stigma associated with the Muslim religion and Middle Eastern ethnicity in the United States. By doing so, the research expands upon previous studies of stigma to explore the social psychological processes involved during interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized. This study used experimental data, survey data and qualitative data collected from samples of undergraduate students using designs conceptualized specifically for this research. I conducted an experiment and a Web vignette-survey using undergraduate students from a Midwestern university. The findings of the experiment showed that that European American subjects paired with the Middle Eastern female partner not wearing a hijab and the Muslim Middle Eastern female partner wearing a hijab were influenced more and held more positive perceptions of their partners than did the subjects paired with the European American female partner. In contrast, the results of the Web vignettesurvey indicate that the European American target applicant is more likely to be selected for the leadership position than either of the Middle Eastern target applicants (with or without hijab). Furthermore, the results of the social distance measures indicate that knowing someone from the Middle East (e.g. previous contact with a Middle Easterner) decreased the likelihood of social distance from the Middle Eastern target with hijab and without hijab across the vignette conditions. This suggests that there might be less of a tendency for individuals who have had personal contact and interacted with people from

v

the Middle East to take the “us versus them” perspective, which is necessary in order to carry out the process of stigmatization.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................x LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1  

Current Theoretical Development of Stigma versus Status ..............................6  CHAPTER 2 MIDDLE EASTERNERS AND MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. ........................11  

History of Middle Easterners in America .......................................................11  History of Muslims in America ......................................................................14  Who Are Middle Easterners?..........................................................................18  An Overview of Race and Ethnicity ...............................................................20  The Construction of Panethnicity in the U.S. .................................................24  Race and Ethnicity for Middle Easterners ......................................................27  Future Panethnicity of Middle Easterners?.....................................................31  Ethnic Profiling of Middle Easterners and Muslims ......................................33  Finding Meaning .............................................................................................35  CHAPTER 3 SOCIAL STIGMA.......................................................................................39  

Typologies of Stigma ......................................................................................42  Stigma as Social Psychological Process .........................................................44  Conceptualization of Stigma...........................................................................48  Tribal Stigma ..................................................................................................51  Tribal Stigma-Related Stereotyping ...............................................................51  Racial and Ethnic Stigma in the U.S. .............................................................53  Religious Stigma in the U.S............................................................................56  State-Sanctioned Stigma in the U.S. ...............................................................59  CHAPTER 4 STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY ...............................................62  

Status Characteristics ......................................................................................62  Status Defined .................................................................................................63  Status Characteristics Theory .........................................................................63  Status Characteristics and Expectations .........................................................64  Status Cues......................................................................................................65  Status Generalization ......................................................................................67  Status and Affect.............................................................................................71  Status, Cues, and Affect in Stigma Research .................................................73  CHAPTER 5 STIGMA, STATUS, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION ...............................74  

Disruption of Social Interactions ....................................................................74  Stigma as Evaluation Cue ...............................................................................78  Stigma and Sentiment .....................................................................................79  CHAPTER 6 EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THEORY .....................................................81  

vii

Experimental Method .....................................................................................85  Design ......................................................................................................86  Results .....................................................................................................89  CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................96  

Discussion of Experimental Results ...............................................................96  CHAPTER 8 VIGNETTE-SURVEY TEST OF THEORY ............................................105  

Vignette-Survey Method ..............................................................................105  Design ....................................................................................................106  Sample Information ......................................................................................111  Dependent Variables .....................................................................................112  Leader Selection ....................................................................................112  Impression of Applicants .......................................................................112  Social Distance ......................................................................................113  Independent Variables ..................................................................................113  Results...........................................................................................................114  Vignette Sets ..........................................................................................114  Analysis Strategy for Sets .....................................................................115  Set #1 Results ........................................................................................117  Set #2 Results ........................................................................................121  Set #3 Results ........................................................................................124  Set #4 Results ........................................................................................134  Conclusion ....................................................................................................158  CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................161  

Synopsis ........................................................................................................161  Theoretical Stigma ........................................................................................166  Fighting the Power of Stigma .......................................................................167  Implicit Expectations of Leaders ..................................................................169  Contributions of Study ..................................................................................174  Future Directions ..........................................................................................179  APPENDIX A NON-METHODOLOGICAL TABLES & FIGURES ...........................184  APPENDIX B EXPERIMENTAL METHOD PROTOCOL AND MATERIALS.........190  APPENDIX C EXPERIMENTAL METHOD: CONTRAST SENSITIVITY PANEL FIGURES & QUESTIONS GIVEN DURING COMPUTER SESSION ......................................................................................................213  APPENDIX D VIGNETTE-SURVEY MATERIALS ....................................................222  

Vignette 1......................................................................................................223  Vignette 2......................................................................................................228  Vignette 3......................................................................................................233  Vignette 4......................................................................................................238  Vignette 5......................................................................................................246  Vignette 6......................................................................................................254  Vignette 7......................................................................................................262  Vignette 8......................................................................................................271  viii

Vignette 9......................................................................................................282  Vignette 10....................................................................................................293  APPENDIX E TABLES AND FIGURES FOR EXPERIMENT ....................................304  APPENDIX F TABLES AND FIGURES FOR VIGNETTE-SURVEYS ......................310  REFERENCES ................................................................................................................381 

ix

LIST OF TABLES Table A1. Social Stigma ..................................................................................................185 Table E1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Independent Sample T-Tests for Significant Differences between Averages of Post-Experiment Questionnaire Responses between Conditions 1 & 2 (N=46) ........................................................306 Table E2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Independent Sample T-Tests for Significant Differences between Averages of Post-Experiment Questionnaire Responses between Conditions 2 & 3 (N=46) ........................................................307 Table E3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Independent Sample T-Tests for Significant Differences between Averages of Post-Experiment Questionnaire Responses between Conditions 1 & 3 (N=46). .......................................................308 Table E4. Statistics Testing the Relationship Between Sentiments and Influence Sentiment Questionnaire Responses for Conditions 1, 2 & 3 (N=69) ....................309 Table F1. Vignette Versions. ...........................................................................................311 Table F2. Characteristics of Respondents for Vignette-Surveys (N=956) ......................312 Table F3. Group Orientation Measures for Vignette-Surveys (N=956) ..........................313 Table F4. Subjects’ Willingness to Select Target as Chairperson of the Youth Leadership Training Committee According to Number of Targets Selected by Each Subject in Each Survey (N=956) ...................................................................314 Table F5. Vignettes #4, 5, and 6: Results of Logistic Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics .....................315 Table F6. Subjects’ Impressions of the Target as Potential Leader of the Youth Leadership Training Committee for Vignettes 1-3 (N=285) ..................................316 Table F7. Subjects’ Beliefs About How Other Selection Committee Members Will Evaluate Target as Potential Leader of the Youth Leadership Training Committee for Vignettes 1-3 (N=285) ...................................................................317 Table F8. Subjects’ Impressions of Which Target Is the Best Potential Leader of the Youth Leadership Training Committee for Vignettes 4-10 (N=671) ...............318 Table F9. Subjects’ Impressions of Which Target Is the Worst Potential Leader of the Youth Leadership Training Committee for Vignettes 4-10 (N=671) ...............319 Table F10. Subjects’ Beliefs About How Other Selection Committee Members Will Evaluate Target as Potential Leader of the Youth Leadership Training Committee for Vignettes 4-10 (N=671). ................................................................320 Table F11. Vignette #7: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=92) ........321

x

Table F12. Vignette #7: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=92) ........322 Table F13. Vignette #7: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=92) ........323 Table F14. Vignette #8: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=90) ........324 Table F15. Vignette #8: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=90) ........325 Table F16. Vignette #8: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=92) ........326 Table F17. Vignette #9: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=88) ........327 Table F18. Vignette #9: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=88) ........328 Table F19. Vignette #9: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=88) ........329 Table F20. Vignette #10: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=94) ........330 Table F21. Vignette #10: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=94) ........331 Table F22. Vignette #10: Results of Multinomial Regression Analyses for Respondents’ Selection Regressed on Respondents’ Characteristics (N=94) ........332 Table F23. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ......................................333 Table F24. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ......................................334 Table F25. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ......................................335 Table F26. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ......................................336 Table F27. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ......................................337 Table F28. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Gender.....................................................................................................................338 Table F29. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Gender.....................................................................................................................339

xi

Table F30. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Gender.....................................................................................................................340 Table F31. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Gender.....................................................................................................................341 Table F32. Multinomial Odds in Percentages for Vignettes 7-10 According to Gender.....................................................................................................................342 Table F33. Vignettes #1, 2, and 3: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) .............343 Table F34. Vignette #4: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=102) .........344 Table F35. Vignette #5: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=84). ..........345 Table F36. Vignette #6: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=121). ........346 Table F37. Vignette #7: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=92) ...........347 Table F38. Vignette #8: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=90). ..........348 Table F39. Vignette #9: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=88). ..........349 Table F40. Vignette #10: Measures of Central Tendency, Reliability, and Factor Loadings for Dependent Variables (Measures of Social Distance) (N=94) ...........350 Table F41. Social Distance Measures for Vignette-Surveys ...........................................351 Table F42. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #1, 2, and 3 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East..........................................................................................................................352 Table F43. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #1, 2, and 3 According to Participant’s Age .................................................................353 Table F44. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #4, 5, and 6 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East..........................................................................................................................354 Table F45. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #4, 5, and 6 According to Participant’s Age .................................................................355 Table F46. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #710 According to Whether Participant Knows Someone From Middle East ...........356 Table F47. Regression Coefficients for Social Distance Variables of Vignettes #710 According to Participant’s Age..........................................................................357 xii

LIST OF FIGURES Figure A1. Political anti-Irish cartoon by Thomas Nast published in Harper’s Weekly in 1871 .......................................................................................................186 Figure A2. Anti-Catholic cartoon by Thomas Nast .........................................................187 Figure A3. Political anti-Muslim cartoon ........................................................................188 Figure A4. Political cartoon on the cover of the New Yorker by Barry Blitt. ..................189 Figure C1. Contrast Sensitivity Panel for Subject’s Practice Trial..................................214 Figure C2. Contrast Sensitivity Panels for Dyad Task Group Trial ................................215 Figure E1. Average P(s) Score by Condition (ANOVA F(1,2)=4.07, p=.012) ...............296 Figure F1. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignettes 1 (Choose a European American Candidate Only), Vignette 2 (Choose a Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab), and Vignette 3 (Choose a Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab). ..........................................................................................................358 Figure F2. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 4 with a Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab. ...........359 Figure F3. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 4 with a Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab. ...........360 Figure F4. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 5 with a European American Candidate and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab. ........................................361 Figure F5. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 5 with a European American Candidate and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab. ........................................362 Figure F6. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 6 with a European American Candidate and Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab. ................................363 Figure F7. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 6 with a European American Candidate and Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab. ................................364 Figure F8. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 7 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab. ..........................................................................................365 Figure F9. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 7 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, and Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab ...........................................................................................366 Figure F10. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 8 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and a European American Business Major Candidate. ...............................................................................................................367 xiii

Figure F11. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 8 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and a European American Business Major Candidate. ...............................................................................................................368 Figure F12. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 9 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and a Computer Science Major European American Candidate. ..............................................................................................369 Figure F13. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 9 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and a Computer Science Major European American Candidate. ..............................................................................................370 Figure F14. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 10 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and an Education Major European American Candidate. ...............................................................................................................371 Figure F15. Graph of Candidate Selection for Vignette 10 with a European American Candidate, Middle Eastern Candidate WITHOUT Hijab, Middle Eastern Candidate WITH Hijab, and an Education Major European American Candidate. ...............................................................................................................372 Figure F16. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignettes #1, 2, & 3 ................................................................................373 Figure F17. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #4 ..............................................................................................374 Figure F18. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #5 ..............................................................................................375 Figure F19. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #6 ..............................................................................................376 Figure F20. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #7 ..............................................................................................377 Figure F21. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #8 ..............................................................................................378 Figure F22. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #9 ..............................................................................................379 Figure F23. Graph of Measures of Central Tendency for Social Distance Scale Items for Vignette #10 ............................................................................................380

xiv

1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Ah, but,' interposed, more softly, a young wife, holding a child by the hand, 'let her cover the mark as she will, the pang of it will always be in her heart. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter Almost everyone has experienced the exclusion, rejection, and alienation that is associated with being different and devalued in society; and almost everyone has avoided, excluded and rejected people who are denigrated by members of society. A stigma—in simple terms—is a characteristic that makes an individual different and less desirable. Specifically, a stigma can refer to a physical characteristic, group membership, or deviant behavior that serves to disqualify the stigmatized person from membership within groups or even full membership in society. Most importantly, the stigma prevents the individual from having typical social interactions in that those with stigma tend to have disrupted and awkward social relations (Goffman 1963). In fact, individuals with stigma are often avoided during social interactions and experience greater social distance from others, resulting in feelings of isolation. Stigma is communicated by markers that can be discerned by interactants. During social interactions, especially those involving persons not familiar with each other, the actors use markers that signal the possession of particular attributes (Berger and colleagues 1986). Actors perceive meanings for attributes, such as gender, age, and cognitive ability, to organize behavior within groups. Oftentimes, these markers signal associated stereotypes. For instance, a person‘s skin color, dialect and language usage, gender, and occupation might prompt others to connect attitudes with those attributes that have nothing to do with the markers in question. In other words, the markers may trigger the perceiver to think of negative stereotypes that stigmatize the individuals who possess them. The bearer of the mark might become linked to undesirable meanings, and

2

experiences status loss as a result of being placed into a category that separates that person from the perceiver (Link & Phelan 2001). Stigma and negative stereotypes are extremely similar with regard to the social construction of the ―mark‖ and the social recognition of the ―mark‖ (i.e. characteristic) signifying membership in a particular social category. In addition, stigma and stereotypes can both lead to prejudice and discrimination as social consequences. Nevertheless, what stigma and stereotypes have in common does not make the concepts interchangeable. Stigma refers to a characteristic, or attribute, that makes an individual different and less desirable, whereas a stereotype is a description of a social group that is constructed through faulty and overly rigid beliefs about the group members (Heatherton et al. 2000). In other words, stigma can be understood as the ―mark‖ that links an individual to undesirable attributes and—in many cases—stereotypes. The processes of stigmatization and stereotyping are separate although they are also related. Specifically, stereotypes play a key role in the devaluation of stigmatized individuals, and pose an obvious threat to the psychological and social well-being of the stigmatized (Dovidio et al. 2000). For instance, persons with mental illness are the targets of stereotypes that paint them as dangerous, unpredictable and violent (Link et al. 1997; Sartorius 2002). Even if the individual with mental illness does not display dangerous, unpredictable behavior, the stereotypic perspectives will persist. The unrelenting negative attributions and beliefs associated with mental illness cause concern for those persons who have mental illness and lead to a significant number of people who need psychological treatment to refuse to seek it (Corrigan 2005; Link et al. 1997; Sartorius 2002). Social psychologists have studied the many facets of stigma. I present here an introductory explanation of the many aspects of stigma to acquaint the reader with this multifaceted subject.

3

In his classic examination of the concept, Goffman developed a definition of stigma that laid the foundation for understanding its effects. He defined stigma as being a ―mark‖ or sign that disqualifies individuals from full acceptance of—and participation in—society (1963: 3). Upon the groundwork laid by Goffman, Jones et al. (1984) adopted the view of stigma as a mark that links a person to characteristics that are culturally devalued. Goffman (1963) originally classified stigma into three types: ―abominations of the body,‖ ―blemishes of individual character,‖ and ―tribal identities.‖ Using this foundation, Jones et al. (1984) expanded the classification system to include the categories of concealability, ―course of the mark,‖ disruptiveness, aesthetics, origin of the mark, and peril. More recent researchers, such as Fife and Wright (2000) and Link and Phelan (2001), have continued to categorize aspects of stigma in an effort to understand and ultimately address the negative outcomes associated with it. Categorizing the types of stigma is an important method to help understand its mechanisms and consequences. However, other facets of stigma, such as historical context, social organizations based on power and statuses, and concealability, also shape our understanding of the concept. Although stigma is as old as discernable differences, a characteristic that is stigmatizing at one moment in history may not be stigmatizing in another. For instance, during the early years of Irish immigration to America, the Irish were viewed by society as a devalued group, almost as low and degraded as were blacks. During the nineteenth century, the Irish in the United States lived in the urban slums, such as those in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago (Lee & Casey 2006). Those people of Irish descent living in destitution faced conditions of chronic unemployment, alcoholism, and disease. The Irish were portrayed as being savage and inferior to Anglo-Saxons (Lee & Casey 2006). Irish Americans were dehumanized by descriptions as ape-like in physical characteristics and described as being violent and

4

prone to alcoholism. The Irish were even depicted with ape-like faces in media illustrations (see Figure A1) (Dolan 2008; Lee & Casey 2006; Sowell 2000). However, the Irish are now integrated into American society and there is no stigma associated with being Irish in the wider culture (Blum 2002). Some stigmatized characteristics are devalued socially only in particular contexts. In other words, possession of a characteristic might result in stigma within one context, but not in another. In this way, stigma is not actually linked to the stigmatized characteristic or to the individual who bears it, but rather it is the possession of that attribute within a particular social context that results in devaluation. For instance, being of Middle Eastern descent might be stigmatized in the context of airports or train stations, but not in a mosque or in the midst of similar others. Understanding these contextual factors is crucial for understanding the process of stigma, but they are far from the only important considerations in relation to stigma. While the social context in which attributes are devalued is key, the visibility of those attributes is even more so. The visual cue alerting the participants of social interaction to the stigma determines the initial reaction to the person bearing the stigmatized attribute. Those individuals who have visible stigmas are unable to hide their attributes; this is important because the stigma provides the first characteristic upon which others base their assumptions and expectations about the individual (Goffman 1963; Jones et al. 1984). In other words, people who have visible stigma are already ―discredited‖ and devalued even before the social interaction has begun (Goffman 1963). In contrast, individuals with concealable stigma, such as religion or sexual orientation, are able to interact with others without the negative association of stigma tainting the expectations and fluidity of the social interaction. Nevertheless, people who possess concealable stigma are cognizant of the fact that the stigmatized characteristic they possess would result in their being stigmatized if it is ever discovered. Those individuals are what

5

Goffman (1963:4) termed ―discreditable,‖ as they are in danger of being devalued if their stigma is known. Which groups are stigmatized often depends upon the function that stigmatization serves for the dominant group. Stigma can serve to enhance one‘s self-esteem through downward comparison (e.g. by comparing oneself to those who are less fortunate, one can increase one‘s own self-esteem), enhancing self-esteem by intergroup comparisons that favor the non-stigmatized group member. Stigma can also arouse anxiety and feelings of threat, which may motivate one to reinforce one‘s world view and cultural norms (this is an example of stigma as a social control mechanism), and serve to rationalize the status quo within society (Crocker & Major 1993; Crocker et al. 1998). Individuals who have visible marks of stigma, such as persons with facial deformities or other physical disabilities, can arouse within others anxiety related to the reminder of one‘s own mortality (Crocker et al. 1998). There is, however, a differing view and emotional reaction to stigma related to what Goffman termed ―tribal stigma‖ and ―blemishes of character.‖ Stigmas related to ―abominations of the body‖ are tied to stronger affective reactions and are not necessarily as strongly associated with specific consensual beliefs and stereotypes (Goffman 1936: 4). Stigma can also function as a means of social control as those persons who deviate from the social norms are punished by not being allowed to participate in society fully. The stigmatized individual might be blamed for their own fate in an effort to maintain a belief in a just world (Lerner 1980). For instance, people who are extremely overweight and obese are seen as being responsible for their own condition and are, therefore, deserving of rejection and exclusion instead of compassion or help (Crocker & Major 1993). An important criterion of stigma is that meanings about the characteristic must be shared among the members of a particular group. For instance, blond hair might be preferred by some people in society and disliked by others, but it is not a stigma unless

6

the characteristic is accepted as such by many members of society. Nevertheless, there are certain types of stigma that are similar across cultures (Archer 1985). Specifically, facial disfigurement, mental illness and homosexuality are stigmatized in many cultures. For instance, there has been a pervasive stigmatization of people with mental and physical disabilities as being less than fully human throughout history and across cultures (Campbell 1994; Wright et al. 2007). In fact, the negative social perceptions of people with mental illness have persisted despite legislative support, more advanced medical understanding of the origins of those disabilities, and improved care. Besides the economic consequences of stigma associated with mental illness, there is also potential for a negative social and psychological impact that can often prevent individuals from either seeking treatment or reducing compliance with treatment (Howarth 2006). Social stigma acts as a barrier that disrupts social interaction by reducing the status and influence of the person with the stigma. Moreover, stigma denies the humanity of individuals, thereby casting them out of the everyday interactions within society as a whole. While prior social psychological research on stigma has acknowledged the notion that stigma is socially and collectively constructed, with the exception of Houser (1997), there has not been an attempt to understand the relation of stigma and processes regarding social status. Specifically, the social psychological research on stigma has focused on stigmatized individuals as the targets, or objects, of stigma with regard to social interactions, rather than examining them as active agents in social interaction (Crocker, Major & Steele 1998; Crocker & Major 1989; Jones et al. 1984; Link & Phelan 2001). Current Theoretical Development of Stigma versus Status The conceptualization of stigma has not been defined in a comprehensive or consistent manner, but rather there have been varying definitions of stigma in reference to a broad range of studies (from social deviance to social identity and even personality).

7

There is also no commonly accepted theoretical perspective on stigma that agrees on the types of stigma and the mechanisms involved in the process of stigmatization (Link & Phelan 2001). In fact, many of the theories developed to address stigma agree on little other than the notion that stigma is associated with possessing devalued characteristics or relations. Additionally, the process by which stigma contaminates other relevant status information about the individual—stigma spread—is also not very well defined across the differing versions of stigma theory. Essentially, the process by which stigma spread occurs is not a matter of consensus. The current theoretical perspectives of stigma seem to overlap with regard to the disadvantage resulting from the process, although they do not exactly detail the mechanism of status loss or whether there is an extent to which it differs according to the type of stigma involved. The definition of the term ―status‖ differs very slightly depending upon the area of study to which it is being applied. For instance, within sociological social psychology‘s study of group processes, status is defined as an individual‘s relative position in a group‘s system of ranking according to how valuable that person is perceived to be in the group (Lovaglia et al. 2003). Meanwhile, research in the arena of Weber‘s theoretical framework would describe status as the likelihood that a person‘s life chances may be determined by their position of honor or prestige in society (Weber [1948]1998). This lack of an overall, comprehensive definition does not hinder research, however, as there is concurrence on the notion of status being relative and of there being inequality (e.g., advantage and disadvantage) involved. In addition to the varying definitions of the term status, there are also a divergent number of theoretical perspectives that attempt to explain the status processes. Some of these theories and theoretical frameworks are more developed than others, but there is not an accepted theory that has yet been developed that might be considered comprehensive

8

and could provide a standardized set of measurement tools. Nevertheless, there is a theoretical frame that is more well-developed than others—Expectation States Theory (EST)—which explains the process by which status (and status characteristics) contribute to group interactions and contribute to the structures of inequality (Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway & Johnson 1990; Sell 2004). As status characteristics are one of the key concepts in the EST program, it seems reasonable to select a branch of the EST program—Status Characteristics Theory (SCT)—that is focused on the status-organizing processes to use in this research exploring whether it is stigma or status processes at work with regard to the discrimination against persons of Middle Eastern descent (Muslim and non-Muslim). The situation of persons of Middle Easterners in America is unique in that persons from that region have a relatively high socioeconomic status, high levels of education, and high status occupations as compared to other minority groups, but appear to be stigmatized in some contexts even ten years after 9/11. This phenomenon of social group members who are usually of a relatively high social status being stigmatized seems to be one of a complexity that has not yet been examined by stigma research although there is a great deal that may be contributed to the area by doing so. A successful minority group that has a high socioeconomic status in the United States and high education attainment levels (graduating from college at rate higher than all other ethnicities) has received national attention recently because—despite their high-status in academics and performance—they still have difficulty moving up into the higher executive positions of the corporate world (Adams 2011; Yang 2011). For example, according to one study, there are only nine Asian CEOs among the top 500 companies, although Asian Americans comprise approximately 5% of the population in the United States (Adams 2011). Another example of a high-status group that appears to be stigmatized in certain contexts is the top-level Wall Street bank executives who received assistance from the U.S. government through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was provided to

9

prevent an economic collapse. The reason for the stigma of this group of high-status people, however, could be attributed to the fact that many of them received six and seven-figure bonuses soon after receiving government bailout money (Story & Dash 2009). There are also cases of low-status persons who are not stigmatized, of course. For instance, farmers have low-status in many societal contexts as they do not necessarily have high levels of education nor high median incomes, but there is not stigma attached to being a farmer. Additionally, nannies may have low-status in American society, but they are not stigmatized (at least female nannies are not). This complexity of the process is part of the reason for the lack of a comprehensive theory of stigma that can be used to explain the devaluation, discrimination, and disadvantages of certain groups. The context of the situation seems to be a key factor in determining when stigma is enacted for social groups that usually enjoy a position of advantage. This illustrates the complexity of the stigmatization process and makes a standardized theory difficult to develop as it is not necessarily a ―master status‖ as Goffman‘s theory posited. The processes of stigma and status-organization are related in that the characteristics, which are the basis of both stigma and status hierarchical formation, may vary and are essential in the production of inequality within social interactions (Lucas & Phelan n.d.). The status and stigma processes are dissimilar in their explanations for the nature of social interactions. Specifically, the stigma theories argue that the possession of a stigmatizing attribute would lead to the exclusion and possible rejection of the stigmatized person, whereas status-organizing processes involve structuring the social hierarchies within small groups so that each included individual occupies a position. In other words, low status persons are not excluded from groups, they are just not allowed to be substantial contributors. The purpose of this study is to determine a better understanding of the social psychological process involving stigma. Specifically, I conduct this study using status

10

characteristics theory to ascertain whether being Middle Eastern and/or Muslim is associated with lower status as compared to being European American. I also wish to examine mechanisms of the status generalization process to explain stigmatization and better understand particular stigmatized categories. Lastly, I conduct a vignette-survey study to examine the preferences for and perceptions of people belonging to stigmatized racial/ethnic (and/or religious) categories in terms of leadership positions. This portion of the study was done to determine whether or not people with low status are stigmatized and are not appointed leaders.

11

CHAPTER 2 MIDDLE EASTERNERS AND MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. Middle Easterners and Muslims have been a part of the American landscape for hundreds of years. In fact, the first Muslims came to the Americas as slaves from the western regions of Africa, and the first Middle Easterners immigrated to the United States in the late 1800s (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). Middle Easterners have assimilated into the dominant U.S. culture more than many minority groups as they are less segregated in housing, are well-educated, and occupy a wide-range of professions than do AfricanAmericans and Latinos (Aguirre Jr. & Turner 2009). Nevertheless, the perceptions of Middle Easterners and Muslims have been inextricably tied to the political climate and the association of both the Middle East and Islam with terrorism in the minds of Americans. For instance, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on 9/11 were blamed on Islamic extremists, but became an impetus for a dramatic increase in profiling and targeting Middle Easterners and Muslims for discrimination and hate crimes (Aguirre Jr. & Turner 2009; Rubenstein 2004). While less than half of Middle Easterners in the U.S. are Muslims and very few of these Muslims are religious radicals, they are, nonetheless, held accountable for the actions of Islamic terrorists (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). Even non-Middle Eastern individuals who simply ―looked Middle Eastern‖ (such as Indians, Latinos, and even Italians who fit the stereotypical physical profile) were the targets of hate crimes directed against Middle Easterners following 9/11 (Aguirre Jr. & Turner 2009). History of Middle Easterners in America Individuals from the Middle East (a geographical region ranging from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south, and from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Persian Gulf countries in the east) began to immigrate to the United States in large

12

numbers in the 1880s. Most of these persons came from what is today called Lebanon and Syria; the vast majority was Christian villagers who were not highly educated, although they did possess basic education (Naff 1983; Saliba 1983). These émigrés left their homelands for the riches to be made in America, not for political or religious reasons that drove the later Middle Eastern immigrants (Naff 1983; Saliba 1983). The first wave of Middle Eastern immigrants consisted mainly of Christians from Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria who journeyed to the U.S. both in search of personal advancement and due to economic difficulties in Mount Lebanon (Naber 2008). Many of these Lebanese and Syrians planned to remain in the U.S. only long enough to make their fortune to send money back to their families in their countries of origin (Naff 1994; Saliba 1983). However, immigration laws and policies isolated them in the U.S., forcing many who had intended to set up temporary residences to settle permanently and become citizens. Some of those early Middle Eastern immigrants became small entrepreneurs and middleman minorities1 in both urban and rural areas in the U.S. Others moved into the industrial labor force of the expanding automobile industry. Those immigrants had resources (i.e., money in their possession when they arrived in the U.S.), skills, literacy, and usually a basic education (Aguirre, Jr. & Turner 2007; Kayyali 2006a; Marvasti & McKinney 2004). In 1921, the U.S. Congress established a quota system so that the number of immigrants of any nationality admitted to the U.S. each year could not exceed three percent of the number of foreign-born residents of that nationality living in the U.S. in 1910. Then, in 1924, the National Origins Act further reduced the quota for immigrants deemed to be ―less desirable.‖ For instance, there was a strong preference shown for

1 Middleman minorities are ethnic groups that occupy the middle positions within the social hierarchy rather than the lowest positions in society, which is where many ethnic minorities are often located (Bonacich 1973).

13

individuals from the Western countries, whereas those from the Eastern countries were given fewer visas. This restrictive policy, in addition to World War I itself, resulted in the isolation and relative lack of contact between newcomers from the Middle East and their home countries (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). In other words, as there were fewer immigrants from the Middle East, a vacuum was created between the Middle East and those immigrants in the United States. Because the ties to the countries of origin became loosened when they settled in the U.S., many Middle Easterners assimilated into mainstream America by downplaying their ethnic backgrounds (Aguirre, Jr. & Turner 2007; Marvasti & McKinney 2004). The second major wave of Middle Eastern immigration began after World War II, although the restrictive immigration act of 1924 was not overturned until the 1960s. Specifically, the Immigration Act of 1965 abolished the quota system that was established in 1921. With this new policy, the restriction for admissions according to an individual‘s national origins was no longer an impediment for immigrants from the Middle East. The immigrants in that second wave were more likely to be Muslim and had more educational and occupational skills as compared to the individuals from the first wave (Aguirre, Jr. & Turner 2007; Marvasti & McKinney 2004). The Middle Eastern immigrants at this time were mainly educated professionals who wanted to further their education, improve their financial benefits, and avoid the political conflicts in their countries of origin. That period marked the beginning of what may be called a ―brain drain‖ from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and North African Arab countries, as well-educated professionals fled to the U.S. This wave created concentrated Middle Eastern neighborhoods, such as that in Dearborn, Michigan, in which the immigrants attempted to duplicate the lifestyle of their countries of origin (Marvasti & McKinney 2004; Orfalea 2005). The third wave of Middle Eastern immigration, which began primarily during 1965, also consisted of well-educated professionals. This wave of Middle Eastern

14

immigrants (many from Palestine) was three times larger than the second wave from that region (Orfalea 2005). Unlike the economic impetus of past waves, the unstable and dangerous political climate of the Middle East prompted these persons to leave their homelands. In addition to the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis, there was also intra-Arab warfare and increased Islamic fundamentalism. The last wave of Middle Eastern immigrants to arrive in the U.S. as a national group were Iraqis fleeing both the Iraqi-Iranian war in the 1980s and the Gulf War in the mid-1990s (Marvasti & McKinney 2004; Orfalea 2005). In comparison with the persons from past waves of Middle Eastern immigrants, this group is the most ethnically conscious and politically vocal in the U.S. (Kayyali 2006a). In addition, the majority of these immigrants was the ―educated elite‖ in their country and had received education abroad. History of Muslims in America Although many Americans confuse the labels of ―Middle Eastern‖ and ―Muslim,‖ there are Muslims not of Middle Eastern origin. The largest number of Muslims in one society resides in Indonesia, and the regions in northern Africa and southern Asia are also home to many Muslims. Therefore, while the Middle East is predominately Muslim, other religious groups, such as Jews and Christians, have lived in that region for thousands of years (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). Similar to Christianity and Judaism, Islam consists of several branches. The two major groups are Sunni Muslims, who constitute about 85 percent of all Muslims, and Shia (or Shiite) Muslims, who account for 15 percent of the world's Islamic population. The differences between the two major branches of Islam stem not so much from differing interpretations of the Qur‘an (the book of divine revelations according to the prophet Muhammad) and the Sunna (the body of Islamic practice that is based on the Hadith, or sayings and deeds of Muhammad), but from disagreements about the

15

leadership after the death of the prophet Muhammad. Some Muslims argued that the companions of the prophet should lead the faith after the death of Muhammad, while others insisted that only his family (specifically, his cousin and son-in-law, Ali) could lead the Muslim community. Although both Sunni and Shiite Muslims adhere to the teachings of the Qur‘an and the Sunna, they do have different devotions and religious practices. Even within the Shiite branch of Islam, there are several traditions that are practiced (Kayyali 2006a:17). Within the United States, all Islamic groups are represented among the six million Muslims in the country, along with some new movements that have been cultivated on American soil (Esposito 1998; Marvasti & McKinney 2004). Among the total number of Muslims in the United States, African Americans (or Black Muslims) comprise 42 percent, followed by individuals from South Asia, Arab regions (such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, etc.), Africa, Iran, Turkey, Southeast Asia, and European Whites (Marvasti & McKinney 2004: 26). Muslims have been part of U.S. history since pre-Columbian times. Some religious and African American scholars estimate that 10 to 20 percent of the slaves brought over from Africa were Muslims (Austin 1997). Moreover, Diouf (1998) asserts that some slave owners even rewarded their Muslim slaves (who were literate), although they did everything within their power to prevent the religion of Islam from passing on to the next generation. The attempts of the slave owners were apparently successful as the religion of Islam disappeared from the slave population in America by the 1860s (Diouf 1998:48). After Reconstruction and the Great Migration, the Moorish Science Temple and the Nation of Islam sought to fill the need of African Americans who were searching for hope and spirituality during a particularly turbulent time. To fulfill that need, the Moorish Science Temple was founded in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali, who stated that African

16

Americans were actually descendants of Moroccans, and the empowerment of the Moorish people could be found by accepting Islam (Turner [1997]2003). Noble Drew Ali introduced followers to his ―Holy Koran,‖ which included elements of the Qur‘an, as well as some esoteric texts. The Moorish Science Temple membership began to decrease following Noble Drew Ali‘s murder in 1929 (Turner [1997]2003). The Nation of Islam was later founded in 1930 by Wallace D. Fard Muhammad whose origins were a mystery, although he was believed to be divine. W.D. Fard Muhammad stated that African Americans were the descendants of the ―Tribe of Shabazz,‖ and had lost their original religion of Islam. W.D. Fard Muhammad-and later Elijah Muhammad-led the Nation of Islam and taught some of the practices of Islam, in addition to a theology that White people were created by a mad scientist. By the 1950s, the Nation of Islam had spread widely in the U.S. and built businesses and schools in African American communities. In fact, it was through the Nation of Islam that Malcolm X gained attention before he embraced Sunni Islam (Turner [1997]2003). Another Islamic group that made an impact in the United States was the Ahmadiyya Movement. Its origins were the Punjab province of India during the 1880s; it arrived in America from a global missionary outreach in 1920. As part of their goal to build a multi-racial Muslim community, the Ahmadiyya published the first English interpretation of the Qur‘an for the U.S., and supplied most of the Islamic literature for the African American Muslim community. As the Ahmadiyya movement gained followers, it became predominately African American with African American leaders (Turner [1997]2003). However, the Ahmadiyya were considered heretical by many other Muslims and the legitimacy of the Ahmadiyya Movement as true Muslims was attacked by the Muslim immigrants who arrived to the U.S. from other countries. The first wave of Muslim immigration to the U.S. began after the Civil War when people from the Ottoman Empire arrived, following the path laid before them by the earlier Middle Eastern Christian immigrants (Curtis 2009; Nyang 1999). Muslims from

17

Syria represented the largest number of immigrants during the first wave, but there was also a significant influx of Muslim immigrants from Yemen, Eastern Europe, Anatolia, and the Punjab in northern India (GhaneaBassiri 2010). Specifically, the Turkish and Kurdish Muslims from Anatolia began a mass immigration during the first part of the twentieth century, and the immigrants from Eastern Europe (i.e. Poland, Russia, and Lithuania) began to arrive at the turn of the twentieth century (2010:144). In addition, Muslims from Bosnia began to immigrate to the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century to find work, and—like the Turks and Kurds—they were mostly illiterate, peasant men who planned to earn money in America and then return home to their country of origin (GhaneaBassiri 2010). Similar to the Muslims from Yemen and Eastern Europe, great numbers of Albanian Muslims began to immigrate to the U.S. in 1912 during the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. In addition, Indian Muslims from the Punjab province immigrated during the first decades of the twentieth century (GhaneaBassiri 2010). In fact, it is these individuals from the Punjab province that fueled the Ahmadiyya movement. This wave of immigration lasted until about 1924. During this time, thousands of Muslims immigrated to the U.S., and most of those first Islamic immigrants were Arabs from what was, then, known as Greater Syria (Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon) under the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese migrants were laborers with low levels of education who came seeking greater economic stability. Many of those Muslim immigrants returned to their homeland, and those who stayed suffered isolation, although some of the immigrants managed to establish Islamic communities. By 1920, Arab Muslim immigrants worshiped in a rented hall in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and they built a mosque of their own fifteen years later (the ―Mother Mosque of America‖) (Curtis IV 2009). Another of the earliest Muslim communities in the U.S. was documented to be in North Dakota. Although most of the immigrants from Lebanon and Syria who arrived in

18

the U.S. before World War I were Christian, about one-third of those persons who settled in North Dakota during the early 1900s were Muslim (Curtis IV 2009). In the town of Ross, Muslims gathered together for prayers, established a Muslim cemetery, and built a mosque in 1929 or 1930 (Curtis IV 2009). However, the number of Muslims declined in North Dakota declined by the 1930s and 1940s. Whether the decline was due to immigrants moving away or converting to Christianity, the mosque that was built in Ross was abandoned by the members of the Lebanese-Syrian community that had settled in the town (Curtis IV 2009). Lebanese-Syrian communities also built mosques in Dearborn, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Michigan City, Indiana (Muhammad 2001; Nyang 1999). The first wave of Muslim immigration ended in 1924, when the Asian Exclusion Act and the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act allowed only a trickle of ―Asians,‖ as Arabs were designated at that time, to enter the nation (Marvasti & McKinney 2004; Nyang 1999). Palestinian refugees arrived after the creation of Israel in 1948. More important for the history of American Islam, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 relaxed the quota system established in 1924, thereby allowing greater Muslim immigration. Then, the 1965 revisions of the immigration law allowed even more Muslims to immigrate to the U.S. Since then, Muslim migrants have fled oppressive regimes in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria; and Muslims of South Asia (e.g. Pakistan) to also seek economic opportunity. By the 1990s, Muslims had established more than six hundred mosques and centers across the United States (Marvasti & McKinney 2004; Muhammad 2001; Nyang 1999). Who Are Middle Easterners? The label ―Middle Eastern‖ does not have a universal meaning; the boundaries have been under dispute ever since the term was coined. The term carries with it ideas of geographic, phenotypic, religious, and linguistics particular to the region. Americans tend

19

to conflate being Middle Eastern and being Muslim, although there are important differences between such labels. In fact, the term ―Middle Easterner‖ can mean different things to different people, depending upon the context and the target to whom it is applied. To determine who is included in the U.S. government‘s ―catch-all‖ term ―Middle Eastern,‖ one must first define the Middle East2. According to the most recent definition of the ―Middle East‖ by the U.S. government, the Middle East is the region that spans southwest Asia, southeastern Europe and North Africa (Bolle 2006). The countries included in the Middle Eastern region have traditionally been Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emerites, the West Bank, Yemen; however, the Bush administration defined the region more broadly as the countries associated with the Islamic region of the world in southwest Asia and North Africa. This includes the addition of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Libya among others to the aforementioned list (Gelvin 2007). Despite the detailed formal description of the Middle East by the U.S. government, many Americans do not readily comprehend the racial, ethnic, and cultural differences that exist among the people of those many different countries. Therefore, while non-Middle Eastern Americans think of the typical Middle Easterner as a person with dark hair and eyes and darker skin than European Americans, as well as distinct facial features, individuals whose backgrounds are Middle Eastern identify with their country of origin (i.e. Lebanese American, Turkish American, Iranian American, etc.), as

2 ―Middle East‖ is a Eurocentric term that signifies Europe‘s conquest of the East (Cainkar 2008). I do not support Eurocentrism, but use the terms ―Middle East‖ and ―Middle Easterner‖ in this work because they are terms that are most frequently used and generally understood by both Americans and persons from the region that spans southwest Asia, southeastern Europe and North Africa.

20

well as identifying as Arab or non-Arab (such as individuals from Iran who identify as Persian) (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). The confusion that exists regarding which race and ethnicity Middle Easterners belong to may contribute to the general lack of understanding about which individuals can be labeled Middle Eastern. Even among those persons from the Middle East, there is much debate as to which race category should be checked off on federal forms or how one presents one‘s racial origin to others in the U.S.. Although the first wave of Middle Eastern immigrants fought to be designated as White, there is much debate among contemporary Middle Eastern leaders, activists, and scholars about whether Middle Easterners (many of whom cannot pass as White and are treated as people of color) should be officially classified as ―White‖ (Kayyali 2006b). In the remainder of this chapter, I will give an overview of race and ethnicity— two concepts that are as difficult to define for academics as they are for the average person. I will, then, demonstrate how discussion of the fluidity of race and ethnicity relates to the conceptualization of panethnicity in the U.S. In addition, I discuss how the U.S. Census has changed over time with regard to race and ethnicity, and how that, specifically, relates to the status of Middle Easterners in America. An Overview of Race and Ethnicity Although most people who encounter the terms ―ethnicity‖ and ―race‖ believe that they know what they mean, the concepts are, in fact, difficult to define. Race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably (and sometimes people use the same label for both), although the two concepts are connotatively different. The term race is based upon the premise of biological and physical differences. This concept of race includes the categorization of groups of individuals based upon different phenotypes, such as skin color, hair texture and other physical attributes (Foner & Frederickson 2004; Lee & Bean 2004; Schaefer 2006). The racial categories used in

21

the U.S. have undergone several transitions. In the 18th century, biological theories began to replace the use of religion as the basis of racial thinking and the creation of a racial hierarchy (Baker 1998). The racial categorizations that developed by the U.S. government Census Bureau have always been ductile, and change according to the historical and political context (Rodriguez 2000). For instance, prior to the 19th century, an individual did not have to prove any degree of ―blood‖ ancestry to claim membership in a Native American tribe, but in the nineteenth century, people had to have a minimum of ―blood quantum‖ (i.e. degree of tribal ancestry) to be classified as Native American. Such classification made it more difficult for an individual to claim membership as a Native American and, thereby, facilitated the ability of the federal government to deny claims to indigenous ancestral land (Shyrock 2008). In contrast, African Americans were classified according to a rule of hypo-descent, or the ―one-drop rule‖, such that individuals with mixed parentage would be assigned the status of the subordinate group. In other words, it would not matter whether a person has seven White great-grandparents and only one Black greatgrandparent in terms of racial classification because that person would be considered ―Black‖, or African American, according to the ―one-drop rule‖ (Martin 2005). The historical context for the use of a rule of hypo-descent to classify people with any African ancestry is inherently linked to the treatment of African descendants as property to be bought and sold. Thus, the supply of slaves would not be diminished but replenished by the racial miscegenation that frequently occurred at that time. The first U.S. Census in 1790 classified races according to free whites, other free persons, and slaves (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a). The racial categories recognized by the U.S. Census changed over time to suit the political, economic and social needs of the country with the only constant being White and Black/Negro. For example, in 1890-a hundred years after the census began-the racial categories expanded to include ―White, Black, Mulatto, Quadroon, Octoroon, Chinese, Japanese, or Indian‖ (U.S. Census Bureau

22

2010b). And in the 1970s, the federal government recognized the races as White, Black, Asian or Pacific Islander, and American Indian or Alaskan Native (Office of Management and Budget 1997). By 2000, the U.S. government recognized races as ―White; Black or African American; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian, including Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and other Asian; Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, Samoan and other Pacific Islander‖ (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). This demonstrates the difficulty of defining something as subjective as race and determining racial categories. There have been many attempts at defining race biologically in the past, but those have been proven to be faulty as all human beings are actually 99.9% genetically identical and most of the variation present is that of unique personal traits (Duster 2005; Epstein 2007). Despite this lack of scientific evidence for constructing racial classifications based upon phenotypic characteristics (such as skin color, facial features, hair type, etc.), the claims of racial categorization based upon popular pseudo-science have been used to uphold the notions of racial differences and inherent superiority, thereby justifying the domination of certain races over others. In the United States, race is often perceived as being comprised of surface manifestations of deeper, underlying differences in intelligence, sexuality, temperament, and athletic ability (Jackson & Weidman 2006; Unander 2000). Therefore, while race may have no biological basis with respect to human differences, it does have an extremely important social meaning, especially in the U.S. Unlike race, ethnicity is a concept that refers to more than the identification of common physical characteristics among individuals (Cornell & Hartmann 2006). There is a wide range of definitions for ethnicity in the field of sociology alone. For example, Bulmer refers to ethnicity as ―a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group‘s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared

23

territory, nationality or physical appearance‖ (1986:54). Another definition, which focuses more on culture and origin, states that an ethnic group is ―a group socially distinguished or set apart, by others or by itself, primarily on the basis of cultural or national-origin characteristics‖ (Feagin & Feagin 2003:8). What these and the many other definitions of ethnicity/ethnic group have in common is they assert that ethnicity refers to a particular social group being seen by other groups in society as having different language, culture, religion, and ancestry, the social group perceiving themselves as different from the others in society, and the persons in the social group participating in activities that are associated with their (actual or mythical) common origin and culture (Cornell and Hartmann 2006). The most commonly recognized ethnic groups in the United States include Native American tribes (e.g. Cherokee, Navajo, Hopi, etc.), African Americans, Latinos, Italian Americans, Jewish Americans, etc. In many cases, an ethnic group is distinct in cultural background relative to the dominant groups in society. However, many different ethnic groups may be considered racially identical. For instance, a woman from Senegal and an African American woman raised in Queens, New York, might both share African ancestry and are considered ―Black,‖ but they likely do not speak the same language or share any other significant cultural patterns because they were raised in different societies. Essentially, the African American woman raised in Queens would be more culturally similar to an Italian American woman raised in Queens than to the woman from Senegal. However, the African American woman raised in Queens and the woman from Senegal would be perceived to have common ancestry, whereas that would not be something presumably shared by the Italian American woman in Queens. The above example illustrates the complex nature of ethnicity and race, which frequently overlap. A group may meet the criteria to be both a racial group and an ethnic group. An example of a group that fits the race and ethnicity definition simultaneously is African Americans who are frequently identified by skin color and other phenotypical characteristics (which

24

meets the criteria for race), and are ―a self-conscious population that defines itself partly in terms of common descent (Africa as homeland), a distinctive history (slavery in particular), and a broad set of cultural symbols (from language to expressive culture) that are held to capture much of the essence of their peoplehood‖ (which meet the criteria for ethnicity) (Cornell & Hartmann 2006:34). It is clear that the racial and ethnic identities present within the U.S. are the products of social construction. Specifically, the racial and ethnic groups are based upon social and historical constructs. Nevertheless, although race is not based upon biological phenomena, it does exist because it is real in its consequences (W.I. Thomas 1928). The Construction of Panethnicity in the U.S. In the United States, panethnicity as a concept has recently become a topic of interest within sociological research. For the panethnic group, there is a great deal of cultural diversity and the boundaries expand beyond national origins to encompass a wide range of groups that are believed to share some cultural traits (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Yinger 1994). Numerous scholars have worked to clarify the concepts of ethnicity, race and panethnicity (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Yinger 1994). The term ―ethnic‖ has, partly, been used to denote having a common ancestry, whereas the label ―panethnic‖ refers to a generalization of solidarity among diverse ethnic and racial groups that are typically associated with phenotype, language, or region. This type of categorization consists of lumping diverse social groups together in a single, broad ―panethnic‖ framework. The recognized panethnic groups in the United States include European Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos/Hispanics, and Native Americans (Aguirre & Turner 2009). While these panethnic labels may seem to mirror the racial categories used in the U.S. Census, the two concepts are not the same. Race is imposed upon a group, whereas a panethnic identity may be adopted in an

25

attempt to gain a political benefit by aggregating smaller ethnic groups into a larger collectivity (Aoki & Takeda 2009:28). The individuals who are categorized in terms of panethnicity may have nothing at all in common except for the panethnic category to which they are assigned or assert. For instance, populations of people from Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Latin America are of varying races and cultures, yet they have been treated as a unitary group by the larger society (Moore and Pachon 1985). Another example, which is frequently overlooked, is that of African Americans whose panethnic label was forced upon people who originated from different countries and a variety of ethnic groups. The enslaved African peoples were forbidden to engage in the customs and speak the languages of their ethnic groups, thus forcing them to subsume their diverse ethnic identities to survive slavery (Singleton 1999:25). The presence of overlapping cultures (including shared linguistic heritage, religion, or other unifying symbols of identity), shared structural position and institutional practices all contribute to establishing panethnic boundaries (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Trottier 1981). For many individuals within panethnic categories, that identity is imposed upon them and does not actually reflect the strength of individual affiliation with it (Kibria 1998). Panethnic identities have been institutionalized in the U.S. through policies and administrative practices shaped by political or socioeconomic divisions (Yanow 2002). The political mobilization in the 1960s of Asian immigrants and their descendants is an example of the development of panethnic identity development. The structural factors that were instrumental in developing an Asian panethnicity included targeted violence against persons of Asian descent, the perception of outgroup members that individuals of Asian ethnicity are ―foreigners‖ (Espiritu 1992; Tuan 1999), racial lumping (the result of the government‘s classification of Asians as a minority population) (Min 2005:29), and desire for entitlement to affirmative action and other programs (Espiritu 1992). The

26

collection of racial and panethnic information by the state also elevates the panethnic social groupings into the public consciousness and contributes to promoting the perception of natural demarcations along racial and ethnic lines. Those beliefs about natural boundaries, then, become legitimized within the institutions and among individuals in the United States (Espiritu 1992). A large category was created from smaller groups, which included the Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Filipino immigrants, among others (Espiritu 1992). Nevertheless, depending upon the context and circumstances, it is possible that individuals may choose to emphasize their national origin over panethnic identities (Espiritu 1992). For instance, Espiritu (1992) observed that Asian American panethnicity is often used in the context of creating a coalition of ethnic groups to advance their political, social, and economic interests, thereby giving way to smaller, nationally-based Asian ethnic identities with which individuals are more likely to identify on a regular basis. While there are some advantages to the use of panethnic labels, such as the consolidation of diverse oppressed groups to facilitate organization for social or political change, there are also disadvantages in the manner that the various ethnic cultures and customs become subsumed under the ―umbrella‖ of a new panethnic label. The panethnic category—like racial categories—allows people to make quick generalizations and apply stereotypes when thinking about certain groups instead of considering the wide variety of cultures within those panethnic categories. For instance, one may become familiar with the ―Native American‖ panethnic label and come to mistakenly believe that there is a ―Native American culture‖ rather than a large number of cultures associated with each tribe included under the panethnic category of ―Native American.‖ Ironically, panethnicity gives diverse ethnic groups greater political voice by uniting them, but it can also threaten to muffle the voices of the diverse cultures that are subsumed to construct the panethnic label.

27

Race and Ethnicity for Middle Easterners There is no box to check next to the words ―Middle Eastern American‖ or ―Arab American‖ on the U.S. Census form, and if an Arab-American were to mark ―Other‖ as his racial classification and write in ―Arab,‖ the Census officials would still count him among the white population. The official racial classification of Middle Easterners in the United States is unique and can be better understood with a brief historical overview. Persons from countries of the Middle East had the privileges associated with being white until 1909. In fact, those immigrants in the first wave were allowed to obtain citizenship, hold political office, and own property (Kayyali 2006a:48). The classification of Syrians and Palestinians as whites was reconsidered because there was a change in the Census and immigration categories. Specifically, ―the location of the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire in Asia‖ led to the Syrians and Palestinians being included in the racial classification of Asians (Kayyali 2006a:48). This reclassification potentially had dire consequences because only ―free white persons‖ could become citizens of the United States (Kayyali 2006a:47). Therefore, the Middle Easterners went to the courts to determine their social status as whites, which would allow them the right to become citizens, vote, and own land. The U.S. courts ruled that Syrians were ―‗white persons‘ in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 and 1914. However, by 1924, Syrians were officially classified as white‖ (Kayyali 2006a:49). The federal government‘s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission currently divides racial identification into six categories: ―White, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander‖ (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2000). In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations defines a person who is ―White, not of Hispanic Origin‖ as a ―person having origins in any of the original people of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East‖ (Code of Federal Regulations).

28

At first blush, it defies logic that a White male would be summarily stopped and searched at airports, confronted by law enforcement officials at border checks, or that he would have a high likelihood of being the victim of a hate crime; however, that is the quandary in which people of Middle Eastern descent find themselves. Although someone from Saudi Arabia might have light brown skin, he is categorized as White by the U.S. government. The racial classification of ―Middle Easterners‖ is rather ambiguous and presents a problem for social policies that seek to fight against racial discrimination. People of Middle Eastern descent are stuck in a catch-22 as the government has a uniform classification of all individuals of Middle Eastern descent as White. Therefore, while ―Middle Easterners‖ appear to be no different (in terms of the federal definition of White) than blond-haired, blue-eyed Swedish Americans, they are not afforded the privileges of Whites in many arenas. Essentially, Middle Easterners are considered to be racially White by the U.S. government and yet not quite White at the same time. The type of attribution made after the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrates the fact that Middle Easterners are not truly considered to be a part of the White race except for census purposes. Specifically, people from the Middle East (Arab and non-Arab) were held collectively responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. (Cainkar 2008: 51). In fact, the U.S. government itself executed a number of policies which were specifically targeted towards Middle Easterners and Muslims (Cainkar 2008). Those policies included ―mass arrests, secret and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of ‘material witnesses,‘ closed hearings, secret evidence, government eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations, FBI interviews, wiretapping, seizures of property, removals of aliens with technical visa violations, and mandatory special registration‖ (Cainkar 2008:53). In addition to the policies implemented by the executive branch of the federal government, Middle Easterners and Muslims were also profiled in U.S. airports and selectively removed from airplanes (Cainkar 2008:53).

29

Despite being classified as ―White,‖ the stereotypes against people from the Middle East have similarities with those of other minority groups but they also have distinct roots in American society that are fueled by foreign policies and the attitudes in the current environment, which continue to conflate ―Middle Easterners‖ (Arab and nonArab) with ―Muslims.‖ Even before the attacks on 9/11 occurred, Middle Easterners and Muslims were portrayed as violent terrorists, oil sheiks, and fanatics (Cainkar 2008). That stereotyping of Middle Easterners and Muslims contributed to the discrimination, harassment, and hate crimes that increased after the Persian Gulf War and, especially, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Al-Deen 2003; Cainkar 2008). Contrary to the accepted popular view in the U.S. that Middle Easterners are a homogenous group, they do not all share a single ethnicity, race, language or culture. The cultures associated with the Middle East (especially Arab culture) have been associated with Islam in the American media and, therefore, resulted in a perceived cultural disconnect between the Middle East and the Judeo-Christian foundations of the United States. Within popular discourse in the U.S., there is believed to be an opposition between the values of Middle Easterners/Muslims and those of mainstream America (Jamal 2008:119). This view of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans as supporting beliefs that are counter to the morals held by the rest of Americans further confuses the issue of race with regard to the assigned ―Whiteness‖ of Middle Easterners in the U.S. The original racial classification of Middle Easterners had to be negotiated by Middle Eastern immigrants to gain their civil rights in America because specific portions of the 1790 Naturalization Act and the Immigration Act of 1917 dictated that only Whites could become citizens (Love 2010). In fact, there was even confusion in the legal arena, leading to a number of court cases with conflicting results in which some judges ruled that individuals of Middle Eastern descent were White and could be granted citizenship, and other judges ruled that Middle Eastern immigrants were racially non-White (Love 2010:196).

30

The prior racial classification of Arab Americans as White has had an impact on current racial categorizations because it set up a status quo and caused a distancing between Middle Eastern Americans and other people of color in the United States. Whereas in the early twentieth century, it was beneficial to identify as White to secure the rights of U.S. citizenship, in present day, Middle Eastern Americans argue that they are not treated as White and identify more closely to being people of color. This basically makes ―Middle Eastern‖ Americans an invisible group because they are denied recognition as a minority and, yet, are identified as a group that does not fit into the categories of race that have been constructed in the U.S. (Snipp 2003). Similar to previous decennial censuses, the 2000 U.S. Census had a short form (sent to most households) and a long form (sent to one-sixth of the households). Unlike the short form of the census, the long form includes a question that asks the household about ancestry or ethnic origin (Kayyali 2006a:57). Therefore, the long form allowed for some information to be acquired on the ethnic breakdown of the Arab American population in the U.S., and that information was used in reports drafted by the U.S. Census Bureau. For instance, in two of the 2000 Census reports, there were breakdowns of ethnicity according to ―detailed group‖: Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian, Palestinian, Jordanian, Moroccan, Iraqi, ―Arab‖ or ―Arabic‖ and ―Other Arab‖ (Brittingham & de la Cruz 2005:1). In the Census 2000 Brief, the U.S. Census Bureau identified the population of ―Arab‖ or ―Arabic‖ as those individuals who self-identified as Arab, Arabic, Middle Eastern, or North African. The ―Other Arab‖ category reported identifications that included Yemeni, Kurdish, Algerian, Saudi Arabian, Tunisian, Kuwaiti, Libyan, Berber and ―Other specific Arab ancestry‖ (Brittingham & de la Cruz 2005:1; Kayyali 2006b:3). Even when individuals specified a non-Arab ethnic affiliation that is located in the Middle East, they were still classified as ―of Arab ancestry‖ in the U.S. Census reports. Moreover, some people who may self-identify as Arabs were excluded. Specifically, ―Some groups such as Mauritanian, Somalian, Djiboutian, Sudanese, and Comoros

31

Islander who may consider themselves Arab were not included, again for consistency‖ with the 1990 and 2000 Census data (Brittingham & de la Cruz 2005:1; Kayyali 2006b:3). Before September 11th there was discussion of adding a new ―Arab‖ category to the U.S. Census. However, in the post-9/11 atmosphere, it is likely that people from the Middle Eastern American community may be more reluctant to self-identify as Middle Eastern or even Arab American in future censuses. For that reason, there was not a push by the Middle Easterners in the U.S. for inclusion as an ethnic or racial group in the 2010 Census (Cornell & Hartman 2006). Unfortunately, the 2010 U.S. Census form also deviated from the previous censuses in its departure from using the long form, which included the question about ancestry. Without the information gathered on ancestry, Middle Easterners will, once again, become imperceptible on paper in the government statistics and reports, although they are all but invisible in reality and U.S. society. Future Panethnicity of Middle Easterners? Middle Eastern Americans come from many different countries and are split between Christian and Muslim religious affiliations, but the aftermath of 9/11 exposed quiet suspicion by the American public toward Middle Easterners, in general, and Arab Muslims in particular. International events and terrorism have made the public‘s concerns more explicit, often to the point of prompting hate crimes and informal discrimination. Prejudices appear to have codified into a set of beliefs that justify, at least for some, discrimination against Arab Americans. In the face of this obvious hostility, some Middle Easterners as well as Muslims from other parts of the globe, such as those from Pakistan and Indonesia, are in the midst of creating a new kind of ethnicity based on shared experiences and traditions—whether a common language, history, or religion. For the most part, immigrants from the Middle East identify themselves mainly by their country of origin and religious affiliation. Although there was a pan-Arab

32

movement in the Middle East, it had little impact on Middle Easterners in the United States because they had basically assimilated into the American mainstream culture by World War II (Kayyali 2006a). After the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961 and the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, the pan-Arab movement (i.e., ideology that all Arabs are one nation and that the boundaries between Arab countries were imposed by colonial powers to divide the Arab population) declined in the Middle East, but, interestingly, increased in the U.S. (Kayyali 2006a). The sense of community that grew from the pan-Arab movement in the U.S. provided a type of framework for a panethnic identity, which allows a remedy for discrimination. Although Arab Americans are considered to be racially ―White,‖ they do have the right to file a claim of ethnic or religious discrimination in a court of law. This was decided ―in a 1987 appeal when the U.S. Supreme Court found that Arab Americans and Jewish Americans had demonstrated discriminatory behavior against them, and the Supreme Court expanded the definition of protected classes of people to include national origin and religious groups under federal law‖ (Samhan 1999:220). Given the discrimination and violence directed towards Americans of Middle Eastern descent, the Middle Easterners in the U.S. may decide to express grievances on behalf of the collective, pan-national group as a whole. As a consequence of those collective efforts, there may be a shifting of panethnicity due to external factors, and the ethnic identities of Middle Eastern Americans may become layered. Specifically, there may be several possible affiliations and identities that a person of Middle Eastern origin can claim (e.g. Arab, Middle Easterner, Egyptian, Muslim, or Sunni) that may be directed towards local, state, or federal government. Hence, the layering of ethnicity may expand the current ethnic boundaries of Middle Easterners in the U.S.

33

Ethnic Profiling of Middle Easterners and Muslims The government initiatives that were enacted prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 helped set the stage for the seemingly state-sanctioned erosion of civil rights for Middle Easterners, especially those who are also Muslim. One such policy was President Bill Clinton‘s 1994 counterterrorism bill that called for the government‘s deportation of noncitizens based on secret evidence that is known only to the federal government (Cainkar 2008:37). Two years later, President Clinton signed the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which gave the federal government the power to designate any entity a terrorist organization and allowed the use of secret evidence in detention hearings and trials (Suleiman 1999). The majority of cases for which this law has been used have been against Middle Eastern organizations and individuals (Elaasar 2004). Following the attacks on 9/11, the federal government implemented several policies to address national security, and many of those government policies contributed to the legal discrimination experienced by Middle Easterners in the United States. President Bush‘s USA Patriot Act of 2001 gave the federal government the power to carry out ―mass arrests, secret and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of ―material witnesses,‖ closed hearings and use of secret evidence, government eavesdropping on attorney-client [sic] conversations, FBI home and work visits, wiretapping, seizures of property, removals of aliens with technical visa violations, and mandatory special registration‖ (Cainkar 2008:53). The federal government detained 1,200 individuals (mostly Arab and/or Muslim men) following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. During the detention of those individuals under the USA Patriot Act, the government refused to adhere to the Freedom of Information Act and did not allow the persons detained the basic civil rights protections granted by the U.S. Constitution (Kayyali 2006a).

34

On August 12, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the beginning of a ―special registration program requiring tens of thousands of foreign visitors from Arab and Muslim countries to be fingerprinted, photographed, and registered‖ (Cainkar 2008:55). This Special Registration required foreign male visitors (including students and those with valid visas) who were aged sixteen to sixty-four from twenty- six countries (most of them Muslim and Middle Eastern) to go to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices to be fingerprinted, photographed, interviewed, and register within a specified time frame (Cainkar 2008; Hagopian 2004). When some of the individuals appeared for special registration, they were arrested and detained for visa violations. Yet, after assuring the Middle Eastern community for months that they were not being targeted and that the Special Registration program would be applied to all foreign visitors, the federal government announced in May 2003 that it was phasing out the program (Cainkar 2008:56). It was also in 2003 that the USA Patriot Act‘s impact on foreign students was seen when the Department of Homeland Security began a program called the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). This program of SEVIS ―required all schools to enter information about foreign students into a central electronic database that had to be regularly updated to reflect information on each of the foreign students‖ (Kayyali 2006a:147). As a result of SEVIS, fewer Middle Eastern students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities because they feared the increased scrutiny from the federal government (Kayyali 2006a). In addition to ethnic profiling facilitated by government policies, Middle Easterners and Muslims have also experienced discrimination at the hands of the local law enforcement and security personnel in public places and at airports. For example, Republican Congressman Darrell Issa of California, an assimilated person of Lebanese descent was not allowed on a plane because of his Arabic last name and one-way ticket to Saudi-Arabia (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr 2009).

35

The prejudice and discrimination against Middle Easterners and Muslims existed prior to the tragic events of 9/11, but the civil rights of immigrants and U.S.-born persons of Middle Eastern descent are perceived as a legitimate target when the federal government itself gives the impression that the Middle Easterners and Muslims are threatening and dangerous groups that do not deserve to have the same civil and constitutional rights as the rest of those in U.S. society. Finding Meaning For the purpose of this project, the concept of ―Middle Eastern‖ will bear a certain meaning because of the participant audience to whom the questions will be posed. Specifically, while Middle Easterners have been designated as both racially white and nonwhite by the U.S. government in the past, their current racial classification is white, despite the stark realities of their treatment as targets of discrimination. Since persons of Middle Eastern descent are excluded from the racial designations of nonwhite, ―Middle Easterner‖ has a meaning that acknowledges exclusion from the social benefits that are associated with racial classification of whiteness and lack of recognition as nonwhites by the federal government. The meaning of ―Middle Eastern‖ within the confines of the theoretical frameworks being used in this project draw from the historical racial and ethnic classification of Middle Easterners. This macro-level belief system shaped by the history of Middle Easterners in the United States informs the world views of individuals, as well as the categories of social structure related to the standing of Middle Easterners in society. Specifically, the history of the mainstream U.S. citizens viewing people from the Middle East and Muslims as ―exotic,‖ violent, and ―backward‖ contributed to the Western orientalist view that was used to justify legislation restricting entry for immigrants from certain non-Western countries (Little 2008). There may be a further linkage between the macro-level historical belief system and the micro-level status

36

characteristics, which indicate individuals‘ positions within the social structure (Lawler, Ridgeway & Markovsky 1993). From the vantage point of status characteristics theory (SCT), ―Middle Eastern‖ refers to the individual who, although officially categorized as ―white‖ on the U.S. Census forms, is not perceived or treated as white in U.S. society. In this sense, ―Middle Eastern‖ may be viewed as a type of panethnic category that acts to differentiate the individual from white group members because it is a salient status characteristic (Berger et al. 1977). Given the negative attitudes and beliefs that have historically been associated with Middle Easterners, it seems reasonable to assert that the ―Middle Easterner‖ state of the ethnic status characteristic will be less desirable than the ―European American‖ state of that status characteristic, and the lower expectations associated with those low-status individuals will translate into lower ranking on the status hierarchy (Berger et al. 1977). Similarly, the meaning of ―Middle Easterner‖ for stigma theory will refer to the person who, despite being legally classified as ―white,‖ is treated as ―nonwhite,‖ especially with regard to ethnic profiling and discrimination. As this distinction must be generalized to competence, I view it as a diffuse status characteristic. The following path model demonstrates when being a Middle Eastern may become salient:

p

European American (race/ethnicity+)

o

Middle Eastern (race/ethnicity-)

Γ+

Γ-

C*+

C*-

T+

T-

Where p (for person) refers to the respondent and o (for other) indicates the target. +

/- indicates the presence or absence of a generalized expectation of competency, C*+/-

37

the presence or absence of the requisite task ability and T+/- refers to success or failure at the task. As Middle Easterners have lower social esteem than European Americans in U.S. society, I believe that they will also be viewed as being less competent, in general. For Muslims, this path model is the same as Muslims have lower social esteem than European Americans in U.S. society, I believe that they will also be viewed as being less competent, in general. The concept of ―Middle Easterner‖ also has particular meaning in terms of the research methods and participants involved. The experimental method will include participants who are Midwestern European American females. They may have stereotypes about the representative ―Middle Easterner‖ look: dark hair, tan or darker skin, and eyes who has a particular set of facial features that are typical to those persons from regions in and near the Middle East. Often—for Americans who are not of Middle Eastern origin—the term ―Middle Easterner‖ is also conflated with ―Muslim,‖ and a person who is Middle Eastern may be expected to also wear traditional Muslim garb, such as an abaya, hijab, shawl, ashraf, or turban. Therefore, the target Middle Easterner with whom the participants will interact will meet the appearance expectations that the dominant Midwestern European American culture would expect when presented with a Middle Easterner or a Middle Eastern Muslim. Although the vignette survey will be presented to a larger population than the experimental method of this study, the population targeted is still that predominately European American Midwestern university. Therefore, I expect that the majority of the students will reflect the dominant views of American beliefs regarding the appearance of ―Middle Easterners.‖ For this reason, the target ―Middle Easterner‖ presented in the vignette survey will be a woman with dark hair, dark eyes, tan skin, and facial features resembling those of persons from the Middle Eastern region.

38

This dissertation research will examine the social psychological processes that impact individuals‘ outcomes, in particular with regard to status processes and status loss. Status characteristics theory and stigma theory are of particular use with regard to investigating the processes involved in the belief system and social climate towards Middle Easterners and Muslims within the United States. The next chapter will introduce the topic of stigma, which is associated with status loss in a different manner than SCT (which will be introduced in Chapter 4).

39

CHAPTER 3 SOCIAL STIGMA There are a variety of definitions and conceptualizations of social stigma. A brief outline of the key stigma researchers and their contributions to the literature are included in Table A1. The classic social psychological definition of stigma was put forth by Erving Goffman (1963). To him, stigma is a negative attribute that devalues an individual within a particular context or culture. In other words, Goffman defined stigma as a particular sign, or mark, which is perceived as disqualifying individuals who possess that mark from everyday interactions. Goffman proposed that stigma is first conceived of as a relational concept. In other words, it is only during interaction between two individuals that stigma can have an impact. Indeed, Goffman viewed stigma as a result of societal norms and discrepancies between one‘s virtual and actual compliance to the norms (Goffman 1963). Those discrepancies between the virtual and actual dimensions of a person‘s social identity are the basis of what Goffman argued was the difference between the stigmatized and nonstigmatized, or ―normals‖ (Goffman 1963: 2). According to Goffman (1963), the virtual social identity is based upon the appearance of a single social cue. When an individual‘s virtual and actual social identities conflict based upon an attribute or stigma, then his identity is ―spoiled‖ and discounted because there is incongruity of expectations between the perceived attributes associated with the social category to which the individual was assumed to belong (Goffman 1963: 2). For instance, an individual who has HIV possesses a stigma that is not immediately apparent. The individual‘s virtual identity is the characterization of what others feel he should be--healthy and normal. If it becomes known that the person‘s actual social identity includes disease, then there is a significant discrepancy between the virtual and actual identities and the individual is viewed as less than the virtual social identity

40

(Goffman 1963). In sum, the virtual self consists of a social identity constructed by society with identity values that the individual must emulate to be regarded as normal, and the actual self is composed of the accumulated biographical information that is specific to that person. Although the individual with HIV might be a son, a brother, and a volunteer who attended college and plays the violin (actual identity), the HIV status is discrepant from the virtual identity that was originally imputed upon him before his social identity was ―spoiled‖ by the stigma of HIV. The inconsistency between those identities makes social interaction difficult with individuals who are healthy and do not have HIV. Goffman further stated that stigma is ―deeply discrediting‖ and that the stigmatized individual is reduced ―from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one‖ (1963: 3). The stigma of the person calls into question his very humanity in the eyes of those with whom he interacts socially. For instance, colleagues in a workplace might view an individual as normal and may invite him to socialize outside of work until they discover that the person has schizophrenia. The stigma of mental illness, especially one as severe as schizophrenia, would result in the individual being seen as less than the virtual identity of a normal, healthy person. As a consequence of the stigma associated with schizophrenia, the colleagues might refuse to socialize with him and may even ignore him completely when they encounter him outside of the workplace. Furthermore, in this case, the stigma of schizophrenia would lead to the devaluation of many aspects of the individual, such as his intelligence and competence in a wide variety of contexts. The devaluing process of stigma is that of stigma spread, which is the notion that the actual or perceived presence of stigma contaminates other relevant status information. People tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the stigma because the stigma conjures up stereotyped images of what the stigmatized person is like, in addition to diminished expectations for that individual. In other words, stigma spread involves the stigma taking the place of the person‘s individuality and encourages

41

observers to define the person by the stigmatized characteristic (Goffman 1963; Wright 1983; Harper 1999). Stigma spread is the broader devaluation of the stigmatized person in that others view the stigmatized person through a lens of the stigma and, consequently, do not look beyond the stigmatized label at the individual. The stereotypes associated with being mentally ill devalue almost all aspects of a person and include being less socially acceptable, less intelligent, more unpredictable, mentally disorganized, dangerous and dirty (Levin & Van Laar 2006). In other words, the stigma is more broadly devaluing for some types of stigma—calling into question the basic competency of the individual (Levin & Van Laar 2006). For example, a form of stigma spread is speaking about a person with mental illness as if he or she is not present. The process of stigma spread should not be confused with the notion of master status in this research. Master status is a term used in previous research that implies that the individual‘s status overshadows the social identity and social standing of that person in all contexts. A social category or group membership would be a master status if it dominates all of the individual‘s other statuses and is an overriding factor in determining that person‘s social position (Houser 1997). Unlike stigma, which is always negative, a master status may be either positive or negative (Healey & O‘Brien 2007). Another difference between the concepts of stigma and master status is that a master status is one that taints all of an individual‘s statuses and identities. The master status overpowers all of the other dimensions of a person‘s identity. In the case of a negative master status, others impute a more global range of imperfections solely on the basis of the original one (Goffman 1963). While stigma is not interchangeable with the term master status, any stigma has the potential to become a master status. According to Goffman (1963), and later Jones et al.(1984), an individual‘s stigmatized condition can become their master status in that the stigma is the first and only thing that others acknowledge despite whatever else that person may accomplish. Goffman argued that stigma takes on a master status when all

42

other aspects of the person are overlooked or are interpreted to confirm the beliefs attached to that status (1963). Furthermore, the master status is the primary focus of the individual‘s identity in all contexts (Stryker 1989). For instance, a person with schizophrenia will perceive the master status of mental illness as being the primary focus of his identity in his interactions with family, instructors, co-workers, and psychiatrists. In sum, stigma spread is the devaluing process of stigma by which the stigma and its associated perceptions taint a wide range of the individual‘s aspects. The pervasiveness of stigma spread may differ according to the stigma itself so that it has the possibility of becoming more central to the individual‘s identity in all contexts (e.g. master status). However, not all stigmas are—or become—master statuses, and not all master statuses are stigmas. Stigmas are always negative and impact the social interactions of the stigmatized individual in certain contexts, but not necessarily in all contexts. In addition, the stigma produces beliefs and attributions that discredit the bearer of the stigma (Jones et al. 1984; Wright 1983). However, stigma may not become a central part of the individual‘s identity. Stigma, as conceptualized in this research, is contextual in that what is stigmatizing in one social context may not be in another. In other words, stigma is a process for which context is important in such a way that belonging to a category that is stigmatized within larger society is not necessarily the most important status that the individual occupies. Typologies of Stigma In addition to the overarching definition of stigma, Goffman (1963) proposed definitions for the different dimensions of stigma. Specifically, Goffman discussed the difference between those persons who are discredited (i.e. their stigma is known to others) and discreditable (i.e. their stigma is concealed) within the three main categories

43

of stigma—abominations of the body (e.g. various physical deformities), blemishes of moral character (e.g. weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, or dishonesty), and tribal affiliations (e.g. affiliations through lineages that equally contaminate all members of a family). Following the work of Goffman, Jones and colleagues (1984) suggested six new dimensions of stigma: (1) visibility/concealability, or the extent to which others can see the stigma; (2) origin/responsibility for the stigmatized condition, or whether the stigma is present at birth, accidental, or is deliberate; (3) disruptiveness, or the degree to which the stigma will get in the way of social interactions and the flow of interpersonal interactions; (4) course of the mark, or whether the stigma may become more salient or debilitating over time; (5) aesthetics, or the subjective reactions of others to the unattractiveness of the stigma; and (6) peril, or the perceived danger of the stigmatizing condition to others. Jones et al. (1984) specifically focused on the contextual nature of stigma in that the condition that is labeled as stigmatizing might be viewed as benign by another. Similarly, Crocker, Major and Steele (1998) stated that the stigmatized possess attributes or features that convey ―a social identity that is devalued in some particular social context‖ (505). Social identity is socially constructed by defining who belongs to a particular social group and whether a certain characteristic will result in a devalued social identity in a specific context. Similar to Goffman, Crocker, Major and Steele (1998), and Jones et al. (1984: 124) argue that stigma is a ―devaluing social identity‖ that resides both within the stigmatized person and in a social context that defines an attribute as devalued. Later researchers, such as Deaux and colleagues (1995), utilized empirical evidence to identify the dimensions of stigma and found that the dimensions that are central to the process of stigma are (1) peril or the perceived danger of the stigma; (2) concealability, or the visibility of the stigma; and (3) origin of the mark, or the

44

individual‘s responsibility for the existence of the stigma (e.g. having cancer versus being obese). Stigma as Social Psychological Process Stigma is a social and subjective process in that it exists both inside and outside of the individual. As Goffman and later social psychological theorists have noted, stigma is relational and occurs between people by use of words, gestures, and meanings. In fact, the process of stigma begins with the initial motivation for stigmatizing an other. The initial cause of stigma may be avoidance of a threat to oneself (Heatherton et al. 2000). The threat can be either realistic or symbolic, but it leads to the negotiation of a shared understanding. After a person perceives a threat, that information is shared with other members of society such that the process of stigmatizing becomes part of the society (Jones et al. 1984). For instance, one might view individuals with different value systems as being a moral threat to society; and if such a person were to come into contact with an exotic dancer, the socially-constructed stigma and related stereotypes would greatly impact the course of social interaction. Stigma spoils the identity of one of the actors engaged in social interaction as the stigma disqualifies the stigmatized person from being fully socially accepted. In other words, stigma makes the person bearing that stigma an outsider—a target of stereotypes, disapproval, and discrimination. The stigmas serve as evaluation cues that affect individuals in social interactions as the cues elicit certain reactions to stigmatized individuals. Specifically, the stigma may act as an indirect, or distal, cue that evokes a reaction from the non-stigmatized actors and that response may be a proximal cue to a stigmatized individual. For instance, a person with severe scoliosis (the distal cue) may notice the look of disgust (the proximal cue) from the non-stigmatized person with whom he is interacting.

45

In addition to the shared meanings of socially-constructed stigma, it is also important to acknowledge the significance of structure and social construction with regard to stigma, as some types of stigma—existential stigma—are based upon inherent characteristics that people cannot change (e.g. mental illness, physical disability, etc.). Meanwhile, other types of stigma—achieved stigma—are acquired by individuals based upon their conduct in that they are either completely responsible or at least largely responsible for their stigmatized condition (e.g. criminal activity, exotic dancing profession, etc.) (Falk 2001). This classification of stigma is similar to the origin dimension of stigma proposed by Jones et al. (1984). The origin, and controllability, of the stigma involves the individual‘s responsibility for having the stigma. The perception of whether the stigma is attributable to the stigmatized person‘s actions can influence the reactions of others. Specifically, the non-stigmatized may experience feelings of anxiety, discomfort, fear, and aversion to stigmatized individuals (Dovidio et al. 2001). Those feelings might, then, prompt nonstigmatized individuals to avoid interacting with the stigmatized to avoid experiencing the discomfort and anxiety. Both stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals experience anxiety when they are met with ―mixed interactions‖ (i.e. social interactions between the stigmatized and ―normals‖ (Goffman 1963). The reasons behind the uncomfortable feelings aroused by ―mixed interactions‖ vary according to the context of the situation and the type of stigma that is the object of scrutiny. The non-stigmatized social interactants might experience fear due to a lack of knowledge about the stigma, misinterpretation of one‘s actions, violations of expectations by the stigmatized, prejudiced beliefs, and feelings of ambivalence towards the stigmatized individual. Meanwhile, the stigmatized interactants might feel like they cannot avoid being judged on the basis of the stigma, feel the threat of stereotyping and the pressure of rejection, and may misinterpret the actions of the nonstigmatized. All of the feelings, violated expectations, and misunderstandings combine to

46

create the anxiety and fear that is experienced by the social interactants in ―mixed interactions‖ (Heatherton et al. 2000). Because of the awkwardness of social interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized, the individuals involved find ways of coping with the presence of stigma. The research on stigma indicates that avoidance is a method of coping that is frequently used by non-stigmatized persons (Dovidio et al. 2001). Non-stigmatized individuals may be inclined to arrange their lives to minimize or completely avoid contact with stigmatized persons. An example of this might manifest in the residential segregation, for example, that is seen within American society wherein whites move when the number of black residents increases to a level with which they are not comfortable. This avoidance of mixed interactions between stigmatized and nonstigmatized persons has several consequences that negatively impact the stigmatized. Moreover, those persons who are stigmatized might experience anxiety or anger, and respond with avoidance or disengagement, when in social interactions with nonstigmatized others (Levin & van Laar 2006). Just as the stigmatizers wish to avoid the awkwardness of social interaction with the stigmatized, so too do the stigmatized feel anxiety at the thought of mixed interactions. For this reason, some stigmatized individuals also avoid such interactions because they fear exposure to prejudice and rejection. Dovidio and colleagues (2000) went beyond simply examining stigma in terms of key structural elements or functions to a model that focuses on the larger context of social psychological processes. Specifically, Dovidio et al. (2000) proposed three dimensions in their model. The first dimension is the perceiver-target dimension, which is related to understanding the different perspectives of those who are stigmatized and those who participate in stigmatizing. The second dimension, the personal—group-based identity dimension, involves the distinction between an individual‘s personal and social identity. Specifically, Dovidio et al. (2000) argue that people form impressions of others through

47

processes that involve a continuum from category-based membership without much attention to individual attributes to individual characteristics not including group membership. Finally, the third dimension of the model is the affective—cognitive— behavioral dimension, which entails the interrelated processes associated with stigma and the reactions to stigma. In sum, Dovidio et al. (2000) examined the larger social psychological picture of stigma by focusing on understanding the perspectives of the actors involved, the impression formation aspects of stigma, and the reactions to stigma. Link and Phelan (2001) drew upon the definition advanced by Goffman to further develop a definition of stigma that describes it as existing when certain elements of labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination occur together in a situation characterized by power differences. According to Link and Phelan (2001), the first component of stigma suggests that most human differences are overlooked and do not matter socially, but some differences are identified and are salient. This process requires a significant level of oversimplification of categories and reflects the dominant values and power structures in the society. The second component—stereotyping—involves the linking of negative attributes with the identified characteristic, thereby making it easy to view the labeled individuals as fundamentally different from the rest of society. And the third component—separation of ―us from them‖—allows people to assign negative attributes to those who are labeled, set them apart as not fully human, and treat them inhumanely without remorse. One way in which stigmatized individuals are separated is by referring to them by their label and, thereby de-humanizing them (e.g. referring to a person with bipolar disorder as ―a manicdepressive‖). Finally, the fourth component of stigma—status loss and discrimination— results when people are labeled and given negative attributes. With regard to discrimination, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that the types of discrimination associated with stigma are direct discrimination, structural discrimination,

48

and internalized discrimination. Link and Phelan (2001) also argue that stigma exists as a matter of degree and that the extent of status loss and discrimination can vary. Moreover, they contribute to the study of stigma by focusing on the power relations involved in the examination of stigma. Specifically, Link and Phelan (2001) propose that the existence of power is crucial to the stigma process, which is entirely dependent upon social, economic, and political power necessary to impose discriminatory experiences on the stigmatized. More recently, Lucas and Phelan (n.d.) examine the processes of stigma and status with respect to educational attainment, mental illness, and physical disability. The authors set out to study the ways in which stigma and status processes overlap given that both create inequalities based upon characteristics within social interactions (Lucas and Phelan n.d.). Lucas and Phelan (n.d.) went beyond the previous research on stigma by focusing on the social interactions themselves to determine whether the stigma and status processes are distinct and produce divergent outcomes. The results of their study indicate that the status and stigma processes are, in fact, distinct for the characteristics of low educational attainment and mental illness. The findings of Lucas and Phelan (n.d.) suggest that research on stigma would do well to investigate the characteristics of race and ethnicity that are known to lead to both stigmatization and low status within status processes. The present research will address this issue because it is imperative to understand fully the social interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized if more effective interventions are to be constructed. Conceptualization of Stigma In this research, stigma is defined as a phenomenon that occurs when individuals who possess particular attributes are labeled in terms of being members of devalued categories (who hold less power in the society in which they are devalued), which results in status loss and the behavior associated with such loss by the non-stigmatized social

49

actors. One of the key elements of this conceptualization of stigma includes the importance of context as stigma is socially constructed. In other words, the specific attributes and memberships that are devalued in one context within society may not be devalued in another (Crocker, Major & Steele 1998; Jones et al. 1984). The meaning of the mark itself may vary according to situations in that it might entail negative perceptions and evaluation in some contexts but not within others. For instance, Marvasti (2006) noted that in some situations being Middle Eastern is not associated with stigma but in other circumstances there is stigma (and the associated negative perceptions) associated with being from the Middle East. Another key element is the power differential involved in the stigma process (Link & Phelan 2001). By labeling the devalued individuals, the non-stigmatized within society relegate them to the realm of outsiders and separate them from that society. Essentially, the stigmatized individuals are made outcasts and experience status loss to such a degree as to not be seen as part of society nor be allowed to participate as a member of society. This working conceptual definition of stigma is based upon the work of Jones et al. (1984) and Link and Phelan (2001). In addition to a devalued category that is occupied by the stigmatized individuals, the process of stigma involves spread whereby there is a broad devaluation of individuals on the basis of the stigmatized characteristic they possess and membership in a devalued group. Moreover, stigma by its very nature involves more than the social structure associated with its construction but rather includes the internal psychological facet that makes it a part of the individual‘s identity. The mark of which Goffman (1963) spoke is not merely the visible or even the invisible attributes and categorical memberships possessed by a person, but rather it includes the deeper, internal brand, or mark, of devalued and degraded status as an outsider within society—in a sense, a lesser form of humanity in the eyes of others. The

50

stigmatized is socially isolated and, although constantly in social situations involving the dominant group, the stigmatized person is not considered by the group as one of their own. Although researchers such as Goffman (1963) and Jones et al. (1984) suggested that there are a variety of different types and dimensions of stigma, I am presently examining that associated with two particular tribal stigmas—religious and ethnic. Specifically, the focal point of this research is the stigma related to being Muslim and/or of Middle Eastern ethnicity in the United States. The reason for the narrow focus of the present research is not due to a lack of concern with respect to the stigma related to what Goffman (1963) termed bodily stigma and blemishes of character, but rather the constraints of time and resources. Moreover, the current political climate within the United States--especially since September 11, 2001--has been one in which the stigma for Muslims and even non-Muslim, Middle-Easterners is obvious and frequently results in discriminatory actions on both the societal and the individual levels. The types of stigma that are not examined herein are, nonetheless, of importance and will be the focus of my research in the future. Much like Houser (1997) and Lucas and Phelan (n.d.), this research expands upon previous stigma studies to explore the social psychological processes involved in the interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized. This goes beyond focusing on the separate individuals involved in ―mixed interactions‖ and takes a closer look at the processes within those social interactions. In addition, this research is conducted to better understand the processes of stigma and status that create and maintain inequalities. By obtaining a clear comprehension of those social psychological processes, interventions can be developed to address stigma just as status interventions are developed by examining results of expectation states research. While it might be unrealistic to believe that stigma can be eliminated from society altogether, prior research suggests that there are intervention strategies that can help

51

reduce stigma. The current research seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the stigma process in relation to the status process involved in social group interactions. Specifically, the current research focuses on the mechanisms within the process of stigma due to the understanding that stigma must be addressed at both the collective and individual levels if interventions are to have a significant impact. Tribal Stigma The third category of stigma that was noted by Goffman is that of tribal stigma, which is the grouping of individuals who share a common undesirable trait or characteristic (1963). The examples of tribal stigma include the stigma of race, nation, and religion. Goffman asserted that tribal stigma is transmitted through lineages and equally contaminates all of the members of a family (1963:4). Like other visible categories of stigma, tribal stigmas involve the social categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups on the basis of readily available physical characteristics. This chapter will examine the stigma associated with ethnicity and religion, specifically, with regard to the major negative impact of stigma on social outcomes. Tribal Stigma-Related Stereotyping One of the processes that is mainly associated with the tribal stigma category noted by Goffman is that of stereotyping. Stereotypes consist of overgeneralizations and inordinate rigidity aimed at a particular group (Devine 1989). In other words, stereotypes refer to the content of an assumed set of attributes associated with a particular social group or type of individual. With regard to stigma, stereotypes are associated with stigma insofar as the response of the non-stigmatized perceiver to a stigmatized target is negative. The non-stigmatized assume this negativity to be held by people sharing the stigma in question.

52

Stigma and stereotyping both involve the recognition of a ―mark‖ that signifies membership in a particular social group or category, and the meaning of that mark is shaped by social processes at the individual and collective level. Moreover, stereotyping can play a major role in the construction and maintenance of stigma. Stereotypes, themselves, are comprised of a set of beliefs that guide information processing and offer explanations that justify overt and covert discriminatory treatment during micro-level social interactions, as well as more macro-level institutional policies that contribute to discrimination. Although stigma and stereotyping are similar in the recognition of social categorization and the treatment associated with membership in certain social groups, the two processes are not always associated. Stereotypes can exist without stigmas and some stigmas exist without having particular stereotypes associated with them. One notable difference between the two is that there are stereotypes that are positive, such as those stereotypes associated with physical attractiveness, whereas stigma is negative. In brief, the manner in which stereotypes work is by influencing information processing, affect, and behavior directed towards the members of stigmatized groups. For instance, prior research found that whites have a knowledge of stereotypes about blacks that is activated spontaneously by either the actual or symbolic presence of a member of that group (Devine 1989). Moreover, the exposure to black targets actually increased the accessibility of stereotypic and negative thoughts automatically (Dovidio, Evans & Tyler; Fazio et al. 1995). The particular stereotypes associated with stigmatized groups can greatly impact the course of social interaction because they influence how information is interpreted by the non-stigmatized perceiver. For instance, Sagar and Schofield (1980) found that both white children and adults tend to interpret ambiguously aggressive behavior as being more threatening when performed by a black person than when performed by a white person. These interpretations and perceptions that are colored by stereotypes might

53

translate into differing interpretations of the stigmatized target‘s actions (Devine & Elliot 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner 1998). A key factor in the origination of stereotyping is the ―us‖ versus ―them‖ distinction, which makes the stigma process possible. Specifically, the social structure creates the boundaries that define which individuals are ―insiders‖ and which are ―outsiders‖ in society (Hinshaw 2007). The boundaries created are based on differences that can be either real or merely socially constructed, and stigma becomes involved if the observed difference is believed to convey negative information about the targeted individuals. A great deal of generalization is necessary to create the categories around which the boundaries are formed, and people who are identified as being members of a particular social category are placed in that group regardless of how well they actually fit into that group. Those socially-constructed boundaries essentially set the stigmatized individuals apart in a distinct category that separates ―us‖ (the non-stigmatized) from ―them‖ (the stigmatized). Racial and Ethnic Stigma in the U.S. Within the United States, there have been many racial and ethnic groups that have experienced stigmatization despite the fact that most of the people in the country are descendants of immigrants from other countries. The stigmatization has virtually always included the use of negative racial and ethnic stereotypes, which were used to justify oppression and exploitation of less powerful social groups by the powerful, dominant social group in the United States—Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Much of the division within the United States is based upon the categories of race and ethnicity. Race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably, although they have very different meanings. Race is the term used to refer to shared biological (i.e. phenotypic) traits, whereas ethnicity refers to cultural background (Healey 2006). For example, an

54

individual might be born in India to Indian parents and as an infant she might be adopted by a French family in France. Ethnically, she is French because she shares the French culture, eats French food, and speaks French. The present research focuses on the stigma associated with ethnicity rather than race per se. I present here an overview of the stereotypes associated with a few of the previously- and presently-stigmatized ethnic groups within the United States. In the United States, there has always been a standard on which people, especially immigrants, are judged, and that standard is based upon a status continuum, whereby the individuals who are closest to white are deemed more civilized than those who are darker (Feagin 2001). Nevertheless, there was a time early in America‘s history when even those social groups that are now considered ―white‖ were stigmatized and excluded from society. The Irish Americans are one such ethnic group that experienced prejudice and discrimination in the United States upon their arrival. The dominant social group of Anglo-Saxon Protestants considered the Irish to be an entirely separate race of people when they first arrived in the United States, and they treated them accordingly. Irish Americans were stereotyped as lazy, violent, alcoholics, unintelligent, promiscuous, and immoral (many of the same stereotypes that are applied to other ethnic groups today) (Aguirre & Turner 2004; Lee & Casey 2006). The patterns of poverty that the Irish experienced in the United States went hand-in-hand with the patterns of drunkenness and fighting, which led to frequent arrests. In fact, the people arrested were so often Irish that police vans became known as ―Paddy wagons‖ (Sowell 1981). Irish Americans were frequently denied jobs based upon stereotypes (Dolan 2008). They were denied access to white collar occupations and were overrepresented in domestic service, factory work, and railroad building (Sowell 1981). The Irish Americans were, in fact, viewed as an inferior ―race‖ not much better than blacks, and this was made clear by the caricatures and dehumanizing depictions of the Irish as ape-like, such as the

55

cartoon in Figure A1 (Lee & Casey 2006; Dolan 2008; Sowell 2000). Unlike people of color, the Irish Americans were able to become ―white‖ within a few generations and—as time and social boundaries changed—their ethnic group was no longer stigmatized in the United States. Another European ethnic group that met with stigmatization and similar discrimination in the United States was Italian Americans (Sowell 1981). Italian Americans were stereotyped as melodramatic, superstitious, violent, aggressive, hotblooded, ignorant, and prone to criminal activity (Jacobson 1999). In addition, there were particular stereotypes of working class Italian men as the ―Guido‖ stereotype portraying them as overly macho thugs (Jacobson 1999). Italian Americans were, in fact, the targets of ethnic jokes and parodies, in addition to the degrading and dehumanizing images of Italian Americans that accompanied their ethnic stigma (Jacobson 1999). Italian Americans were not only subjected to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, but also violence in the 1800s and early 1900s. They were considered non-white because they were not Anglo-Saxons and, therefore, were often the victims of lynching, second only to blacks (Gambino 1977). One such example of a mass lynching of Italian Americans occurred in 1891 and involved the lynching of eleven Italians who were believed to have killed the police chief in New Orleans (Gambino 1977). Within generations, however, Italian Americans were able to become ―white‖ through a process of identifying with the elite whites rather than with people of color (Roediger 2006). The first non-European ethnic group to voluntarily immigrate to the United States in large numbers was the Chinese. Chinese Americans immigrated in large numbers to work in mining and on the transcontinental railroad (Sowell 1981). Their ethnic group was stigmatized immediately and faced stereotyping as savage, immoral, and childlike (Chang 2004). When the economy faltered, the European immigrants used the Chinese as scapegoats and blamed them for the loss of jobs, so in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed to restrict Chinese immigration (Chang 2004). The stigma of the Chinese

56

was so dehumanizing that laws prevented them from testifying against white men in court until 1874 (Sowell 1984). Moreover, the Chinese Americans—like other stigmatized ethnic groups—were targets of physical violence. In fact, the entire Chinese population in one California community was forced to leave because of the threat of mob violence in 1885 (Pfaelzer 2007). Presently, Middle Eastern Americans are stigmatized in the United States. While Middle Eastern Americans come from a variety of linguistic, religious, geographical, and even racial backgrounds, they are considered a distinct ethnic category in the United States (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). The prevailing stereotypes of Middle Eastern people portray them as savage, irrational, barbaric, cruel, and deceitful (Abdo 2007). Epithets that accompany being a stigmatized group also apply to Middle Eastern Americans who face derogatory terms, such as ―camel jockey‖ and ―raghead‖ (Marvasti & McKinney 2004). The discrimination that is faced by Middle Eastern Americans is apparent in workplaces, schools, medical settings, and in public; this has only increased since 9/11. Similar to the scrutiny experienced by African Americans and Latinos in travel settings, Middle Eastern Americans have increasingly been singled out at airports and on airplanes (Abdo 2007; Marvasti & McKinney 2004). Middle Eastern Americans face a similar challenge that is experienced by many of the less powerful, ethnic groups in the United States—fear of ―them‖ and the stigma that relegates their group to social exclusion in many areas of society. Religious Stigma in the U.S. While the role of stereotyping and social exclusion for religious stigma is similar to that of ethnic stigma, there is a difference between those types of tribal stigma because one cannot often ascertain a person‘s religion simply by physical characteristics. Individuals can conceal their religious membership, whereas members of certain ethnic

57

groups may not be able to do so. The differences in levels of concealability for religious membership are higher for members of some religious sects than for others. For instance, wearing a crucifix, a headscarf, or yarmulke will more readily cue beliefs and stereotypes associated with specific religions that perceivers can make prior to entering into social interaction with the wearer. Those visible cues work in a fashion similar to that of skin color and phenotype with regard to allowing actors to quickly draw perceptions and develop expectations for the individual. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the freedom of religion, but certain religions have been stigmatized in the United States. Although at first blush it might seem illogical for society to view religion, which is normally an institution of social control, as a stigmatized category, the social construction of stigma linked to specific religions is ultimately a result of the perception of threat to society. For instance, the tangible and symbolic threat of Islam for the United States peaked following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. I present here a brief overview of the stigma associated with two religious groups in the United States. Catholics are members of a religion that was stigmatized long before they began immigrating to the United States. The negative stereotypes associated with the Catholic faith included the beliefs that it is superstitious, corrupt, and decidedly ―un-American‖ (Massa 2003). The derogatory words used to describe the Catholic Church included the ―Whore of Babylon‖, and the hatred of Catholics was evident in the dehumanizing depictions of Catholics in cartoons and jokes (see Figure A2.) (Jenkins 2003; Massa 2003). During the height of anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century, there was violence aimed at Catholic property and Catholics themselves (Jenkins 2003). The Catholic European immigrants, such as the Irish, faced a tremendous amount of discrimination and blame for violence, crime and disease in the United States (Jenkins

58

2003; Lee & Casey 2006). The discrimination against Catholics peaked with the Know Nothing Movement, which was a political movement in the 1850s that was driven by fear that the United States was being overwhelmed by Irish Catholics (Jenkins 2003). The Know Nothing movement was an attempt to exclude Catholics from public office, and while the attempt did not succeed, the stigma of Catholicism remained prevalent and continues to exist in certain contexts within the United States. Muslims in the United States have been stigmatized for some time but the most recent acts of discrimination have resulted as a backlash to acts of terrorism committed by radical Muslims from the Middle East. As a result of the terrorist attacks being linked to an Islamic (albeit radical) faction, the public sentiment and reaction in the United States has been one of anxiety and fear leading to a backlash towards Muslims in America (Abdo 2007; Rowland 2004; Siddiqui 2008). Specifically, the stereotypes associated with Muslims in the United States include those of viewing them as terrorists (see Figure A3) and terrorist sympathizers (Abdo 2007; Siddiqui 2008). This perception of Muslims has influenced the affect and resulting behavior of many non-Muslim perceivers that includes such things as verbal and physical attacks, in addition to discrimination (Rowland 2004). An example of the consequences of religious stereotyping is the incidence of US Airways removing six Muslim imams (religious teachers) after a passenger raised concerns about them (Associated Press 2006). Muslims in America are stigmatized to the extent that they are constantly viewed as the outsiders (the infamous ―them‖) despite being citizens of the United States. Regardless of the promise of freedom of religion in the United States, the stigmatized religions--and the experiences of their members--are evidence that some religions, and people, are still viewed as being less than others.

59

State-Sanctioned Stigma in the U.S. For as long as the United States has had stigmatized social groups in its midst, there have been laws sanctioning the stigma and the perceptions of those unfortunate individuals belonging to the ―marked‖ groups. The most evident example of this government-sanctioned stigma is that of the institution of slavery, which relegated African Americans to the position of less than human. Even free African Americans were not allowed to vote, were not issued passports by the federal government, and could not testify in court against European Americans (Hine, Hine & Harrold 2007). More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in the Dred Scott case that blacks could never be citizens of the United States (Hine, Hine & Harrold 2007). Following the emancipation of slaves and the Civil War, the U.S. government gave its support to segregation, thereby demonstrating that African Americans were still perceived as less than the powerful, dominant racial group. In addition to the segregation experienced by African Americans in the North and South, Hispanics and Asians also faced segregation in the West during the 19th and 20th centuries (Menchaca 1995; Van Nuys 2002). When the practice of segregation was called into question, the U.S. Supreme Court once again upheld the constitutionality of separate railroad cars for blacks and whites in Plessy v. Ferguson (Brown & Webb 2007; Hine, Hine & Harrold 2007). The government-sanctioned practice of segregation continued in the Southern United States throughout the first half of the 20th century (Brown & Webb 2007; Hine, Hine & Harrold 2007). Federal laws upholding stigma were also directed towards Asian groups through the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and other laws that stated no Asians could be citizens of the United States or own land; and towards Hispanic groups through the 1862 Homestead Act (land speculators acquired land owned by Mexican Americans by using squatters to

60

claim the land illegally) and the 1889 Taylor Grazing Act (eliminating the sheep industry in Concho, Arizona where sheep herders were primarily Spanish-speaking) (Pitt 1999). The more recent federal laws and policies that have raised the possibility of stigma for Muslims and Middle Eastern Americans are those passed after 9/11. The USA Patriot Act is one such form of legislation. The stated purpose of the USA Patriot Act is to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and to enhance law enforcement tools to investigate and prevent terrorism. The Patriot Act allows the government to withhold the identity of detainees in connection with terror investigation, allows wiretaps without court orders for up to 15 days, allows the government to deny the right to fair deportation hearings to immigrants, and allows law enforcement to spy on religious and political activities by repealing court limits (Ewing 2005) . In sum, the USA Patriot Act allows for an American citizen who is suspected of being involved in a terrorist conspiracy to be detained by federal investigators without anyone being notified for an indefinite length of time. Despite the fact that millions of Middle Easterners and Muslim organizations condemning the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the stereotype of the ―Muslim terrorist‖ and the myth that all Muslims and Middle Easterners support terrorism continues to be used as justification for the discrimination and exclusion that Americans who are Muslim and Middle Eastern face. In the United States, all Middle Eastern Americans are stigmatized and held accountable for the threat of Islamic terrorism, and they are treated as if their ethnic membership precludes them from being a true American—one of ―us‖. In fact, being a Muslim or Middle Eastern American has become so stigmatized within the United States that the words ―Muslim‖, ―Middle-Eastern‖, and ―Arab‖ seem to have become epithets since 9/11. An illustration of this occurred during the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. Specifically, Barack Obama was rumored to secretly be a Muslim, and he was even confronted with the allegations that he was secretly a Muslim running for president during a Democratic debate in Las Vegas. Even more indicative of the anti-

61

Muslim bias that was present during the presidential campaign, the New Yorker‘s July 2008 edition featured a cartoon depicting Obama, dressed in Muslim garb, and his wife as fist-bumping terrorists (see Figure A4). This division of ―us‖ versus ―them‖ that is being played out in the spotlight of the United States with Middle Eastern Americans is reminiscent of the government-imposed exclusion faced by Japanese Americans after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese (Weglyn & Michener 1996). The Japanese Americans were also considered to be the outgroup despite being American citizens, and the tribal stigma associated with being of Japanese descent was strong enough to lead to President Roosevelt to sign an executive order that placed 120,000 people of Japanese descent into internment camps (Weglyn & Michener 1996). The tragedy of 9/11 was the impetus for the ―war on terrorism‖ but the war also seems to have intensified the mistrust for Middle Eastern Americans who are perceived as outsiders in their own country, in many contexts. Since the ―day that changed everything,‖ Middle Eastern Americans have been faced with battling unwelcoming attitudes and discrimination in the United States. The stereotypes associated with their ethnic and (for those who are Muslim) religious stigmas banish them to the status of the ―un-American‖ in American society.

62

CHAPTER 4 STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY Status characteristics theory (SCT) is a branch of the expectation states theoretical research program that examines how task groups form and maintain the expectations for group members (Berger et al. 1972). In particular, SCT focuses on the impact of task group members‘ external social status on their rates of participation and influence within the group. Two key concepts that must be defined to understand SCT fully are status and status characteristics. Status Characteristics Status characteristics are defined as recognized social attributes, which have at least two differentially evaluated categories and are ―marked‖ by widely-shared cultural beliefs that are specific to those social attributes (Bianchi & Lancianese 2007:8). The widely-held beliefs associated with status characteristics may or may not be true; however, the actors in a social interaction will act as if the beliefs are true. For instance, if people expect that a girl is unable to play basketball on a team with boys, then those people may behave as if the girl is actually incapable of playing basketball using actions which can be demoralizing as they isolate the girl from participating in games as a full member of the team. Status characteristics of an actor are important because they influence his or her own and others‘ evaluation and beliefs (Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al. 1980). Those persons who possess one state, or category, of a status characteristic are viewed as being more socially valued and competent than those individuals possessing the complementary states of said status characteristic (Berger, Cohen & Zelditch 1966; Bianchi & Lancianese 2007; Correll & Ridgeway 2003).

63

Status Defined Status is defined as an individual‘s relative position in a group‘s system of ranking according to how valuable that person is considered to be in the group. People have status when they possess characteristics that are valued by the society in which they live – referred to as status characteristics. In fact, the more desirable characteristics they possess, the higher the status that individual is perceived to have; and group members are more likely to respect and follow the advice of individuals who have high status (Lovaglia et al. 2003). Status Characteristics Theory Status characteristics theory (SCT) proposes that characteristics of participants in groups can affect beliefs about competence, and how those beliefs affect the status, or prestige, hierarchy in the groups (Berger et al. 1977). When individuals in groups interact, they use status characteristics to develop expectations and beliefs about each other based upon the little information that they have, which is often observed characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, age, education and gender (Berger et al. 1977). Those characteristics are associated with specific beliefs about worth, and are used to distinguish between actors in a group (Berger et al. 2002). For instance, being male is a state of the gender status characteristic that is accorded more esteem than being female. SCT gives an account of the process by which individuals associate status characteristics with performance expectations for themselves and for others. To comprehend the framework of SCT, performance expectations must be clearly defined in that they are the dynamics of the power and prestige order that arise out of group members‘ expectations for their own and others‘ contribution (Berger et al 1977). Specifically, SCT proposes that status hierarchies arise when it is believed that certain characteristics give those who possess them the potential to make valuable contributions

64

to a task (Berger et al. 1977). In other words, an individual‘s value to a group is assessed by the group members on the basis of the possession of desirable characteristics and that assessment serves as the basis of the social status that is awarded to that individual (Berger et al. 1977). Moreover, performance expectations influence behaviors within the group, including the likelihood of accepting or rejecting influence. Status Characteristics and Expectations Status beliefs are consensual in that people in both the advantaged and disadvantaged groups agree that people who possess particular characteristics are more competent than others (Ridgeway et al. 1998). The beliefs about these status characteristics are shared by both those who benefit from the beliefs and those who are disadvantaged by them (Correll & Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway & Berger 1986; Ridgeway et al. 1998). Status characteristics can be either diffuse or specific. Diffuse characteristics are those attributes that are used to indicate a person‘s level of ability for a broad range of unspecified tasks in addition to specific tasks (Correll & Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway et al. 1985). These characteristics are used in evaluating status regardless of their relevance to the task-at-hand (Correll & Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway et al. 1985). General expectations for competence are associated with diffuse status characteristics (Correll & Ridgeway 2003). For example, men are expected to be more competent than women at most tasks in addition to the assumptions that men are better at specific tasks, such as changing car tires. Specific status characteristics, on the other hand, are those attributes that carry expectations for competence on a limited, well-defined range of tasks, and are directly related to a person‘s level of ability on that range of tasks (Berger et al. 1977; Correll & Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway et al. 1985). For instance, computer ability is a status characteristic that has two states: one either has computer ability or one does not. In the

65

case of an individual having computer ability, a computer expert would be expected to perform well on tasks that involve computer skills but perhaps not on other tasks (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway et al. 1985). In group settings, people evaluate and develop expectations of others based on both their specific status characteristics and their diffuse status characteristics. Status characteristics theory proposes that status characteristics, which are salient in a heterogeneous group, shape group members‘ behavior and rank in the status hierarchy of the group (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 2002; McLeod & Lively 2003). Status Cues While status characteristics are attributes associated with beliefs about competence and worth, status cues are signals that directly reflect task competence and indicate the status characteristics an individual possesses (Berger et al. 1986; Riches & Foddy 1989; Ridgeway et al. 1985). Berger and colleagues (1977, 1986) classify status cues on two dimensions: (1) how the status information is transmitted, and (2) what status information is transmitted by status cues. Specifically, indicative cues suggest that an individual has a particular status, such as a diploma from Harvard Law School indicating that the person is a lawyer; and expressive cues are those that provide more indirect status information, such as a person from Mexico having a distinct accent. Status cues are used to assign states of status characteristics to actors in social interaction (Berger & Zelditch 1985). Cues can provide an identification of a status characteristic state of an actor in social interaction by labeling the actor or identifying that person‘s state of a status characteristic (Berger & Zelditch 1985). For instance, an individual‘s appearance and ethnic accent can signal that a person is of a particular ethnic group. There is a distinction between task cues and categorical cues in status characteristics theory. Task cues are nonverbal or para-verbal behaviors that give

66

information about an individual‘s performance taking place in the context of the immediate group interaction (Berger et al. 1986; Riches & Foddy 1989; Ridgeway et al. 1985). Some examples of task cues are body posture, gestures, eye gaze and loudness (Berger et al. 1986; Ridgeway et al. 1985). When individuals differ in terms of task cues, there is a corresponding differentiation in prestige and the evaluation of that individual‘s competence with regard to task abilities (Berger & Zelditch 1985). Moreover, when individuals are differentiated by status characteristics, the differentiation in terms of task cues coincide with that status differentiation (Berger & Zelditch 1985). Categorical cues are those that give information about an individual‘s status positions outside of the group (Berger et al. 1986; Ridgeway et al. 1985). For instance, a person‘s accent, skin color, and dress are examples of categorical cues. Categorical cues signal a person‘s diffuse and specific status characteristics, thereby allowing observers to make inferences about that person‘s status positions in the larger society. The effects of categorical cues, such as accent, are well-documented by past research (Riches & Foddy 1989; Ridgeway et al. 1985). Both task cues and categorical cues make specific and diffuse status characteristics significant in social interaction (Berger & Zelditch 1985). Because of that salience of status characteristics, status characteristics have a great impact on an individual‘s behavior as well as his or her position in the prestige hierarchy (Berger et al. 1986). Furthermore, if a person who is awarded lower relative social status possesses some hidden valued characteristics, such as functional expertise and creativity, then that can force the group to reassess the person‘s value to the group. For instance, female, minority, or disabled group members might work overtime to increase their value to the group by generating better ideas and—by doing so—they could hope to improve their low status position. Early studies showed that group members with higher social status outside of the task group had more influence over group decisions than members of the task group with

67

lower external social status. For instance, Moore (1968) found that junior college students were more likely to be influenced by a partner who they believed attended a private university than by a partner they believed was in high school. Whenever a status characteristic becomes salient and either is associated with the group‘s task or differentiates group members, that characteristic will be utilized to derive expectations of group members‘ relative ability unless it is explicitly dissociated from the task. In other words, the generalization that occurs as a consequence of status cues impacts expectations in a particular fashion in that highly-valued task cues and categorical cues lead to high expectations for those persons who display them (Berger et al. 1986). Status Generalization The specific process through which social status affects one‘s influence in task groups is status generalization. In this process, social status in one domain generalizes to influence in other domains that are unrelated. In other words, the process of status generalization is grounded in the transference of external status to determine the power and prestige hierarchies in small group interactions. According to SCT, status beliefs (i.e. the widely-shared evaluations that one state of a characteristic is more highly valued and desirable than other state of that characteristic) ultimately lead to process of status generalization in which actors attribute a specific ability or overall competence to themselves and other actors based upon the possession of particular status characteristics (Berger et al. 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Webster & Driskell 1978). Status generalization is, specifically, the process in which group members‘ status characteristics impact the group‘s structure and social interaction. In other words, social characteristics are associated with expectations about generalized competency (Berger, Cohen & Zelditch 1972). Status generalization begins with one individual, Person A, observing the status characteristics of another, Person B. Person B‘s observable status characteristics lead Person A to form expectations about Person B‘s abilities, and those

68

expectations are evident in behavioral outcomes. As a consequence, individuals within a group are likely to assign low-status positions in the group to individuals with characteristics that are viewed negatively in larger society, and assign high-status positions to individuals who possess characteristics that are evaluated positively in society (Webster & Foschi 1988). As a result of status generalization, social status affords individuals with favored status characteristics a wide range of advantages—one of which is influence—even when those advantages are not necessarily deserved. For instance, individuals who possess high status are able to influence others in a broad range of domains because status characteristics, such as race and gender, are associated with expectations for competence that generalize to a wide range of tasks (Berger et al. 1977). In this way, social status in one domain generalizes to an individual‘s influence in other unrelated domains. Status generalization occurs within social situations that are defined by certain scope conditions (e.g. independent variables held constant to limit the generalizability of the theory to a specific, well-defined domain, thereby, maximizing comparability across studies) (Foschi 1997). According to SCT‘s scope conditions, the actors must be goaloriented and collectively oriented. Goal orientation refers to the actors placing value on the task and desiring to achieve the correct outcome (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Collective orientation indicates that the actors consider it to be important to take the views of other group members into account to achieve a successful outcome (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980; Foschi 1997). Social actors who are collectively oriented are engaged in a collectively valued task and this means that all of the actors are invested in the group‘s success and the behavior of those actors is geared towards producing an outcome to which all group members contribute (Szmatka, Lovaglia & Wysienska 2002).

69

Additionally, social group membership plays an important role in status generalization by acting as a type of cue that generates higher expectations for ingroup members relative to outgroup members. The role of one‘s group membership impacts status generalization because group membership information is used for status organization (Kalkoff & Barnum 2000; Oldmeadow 2007; Oldmeadow et al. 2003). The more positive evaluations of ingroup members in relation to outgroup members‘ results in different expectations for competence for the ingroup and outgroup members, thereby making the ingroup members more influential. Previous research by Kalkhoff and Barnum (2000) examined the influence of ingroup members in relation to outgroup members who possessed higher or lower status than participants with regard to education. The researchers found that ingroup members had more influence for both the higher status and lower status partners, although outgroup membership did not appear to increase or decrease the partner‘s status (Kalkhoff & Barnum 2000). Similarly, a later study by Oldmeadow et al. (2003) indicated that the higher status ingroup partner was more influential than the lower status ingroup partner, whereas the higher and lower status outgroup partners were equally influential. In addition to the condition of collective orientation, status generalization is depicted by SCT‘s five assumptions. Those assumptions are as follows: (1) Salience assumption: If a status characteristic differentiates the actors from one another or is perceived as relevant to the task, then it will be salient and activate status generalization. For example, gender is not a distinguishing characteristic for a group of men working on a sewing task, but gender is salient in that situation because it is related to the task (Bianchi, 2009). (2) Burden of Proof assumption: If a status characteristic is salient, then actors will view it as being relevant to the situation. Unless that status characteristic has been disassociated from the task, then the actors form expectations that are consistent with the status characteristic. Therefore, the burden of proof for whether a status characteristic is

70

pertinent to the task lies with the person who can demonstrate its impertinence (Bianchi, 2009). (3) Sequencing assumption: If actors in a group enter or exit during an ongoing task performance, then performance expectations that are produced by status information in one encounter are preserved. In addition, if actors in the group become aware of new information regarding a status characteristic, then that new information is added to the original status ordering. Moreover, the restructuring that results from the new information still adheres to the rules proposed by the salience and burden of proof assumptions (Bianchi, 2009). (4) Combining assumption: If actors have multiple similarly-evaluated status characteristics, then they combine those to form aggregated expectation sets. In other words, actors ―combine all of the information that is conveyed by salient status characteristics‖ (Bianchi, 2009). Specifically, all of the status information from positive states of status characteristics is ―combined into one group and assigned a positive score‖ and all negative information from negative states of status characteristics is ―combined into another grouping and assigned a negative score‖ (Bianchi, 2009). Moreover, there are weighting schemes for the combining process in that each additional piece of information has a decreasing proportional effect on the overall grouping score, and the effects of specific status characteristics are greater than those of diffuse status characteristics (Berger et al. 1977; Bianchi, 2009). Finally, the positive and negative grouping scores are added and the computation (e.g. the principle of organized subsets) produces a performance expectation profile that is compared to the other group members‘ profiles. The group‘s rank order of the ―expectation profiles represents the theoretical power and prestige order of the group, the status hierarchy‖ (Bianchi, 2009). (5) Basic expectation assumption: If an actor uses expectations to infer task competence, then the greater an individual‘s perceived competence, the higher that individual‘s position in the group‘s theoretical power and prestige order. Moreover, the

71

power and prestige order will translate into the group members displaying behavioral inequalities (Bianchi, 2009). For instance, if person A has a higher performance expectation profile (i.e. more status in the hierarchy) than person B, then person A will receive more opportunities to participate in the task, acquire higher performance evaluations, and have more influence than person B (Bianchi, 2009). The strength of the assumptions depicting status generalization clarifies the importance of that process within SCT. Specifically, status generalization facilitates the understanding of why certain statuses afford individuals advantages and influence even when there is no proven association between the status characteristic and task performance. Status and Affect Although status characteristics are key in SCT, prior research examining the influence of affect (e.g. emotions) and sentiment structures (e.g. liking and disliking among group members) on status in task groups indicates that affect influences group members‘ expectations for competence (Lovaglia & Houser 1996) and that sentiment acts as a moderator for expectations and status relations (Bianchi 2004; Bianchi & Lancianese 2007). While the previous studies on status characteristics focused on the production of emotions by group interactions (Ridgeway & Johnson 1990) and the production of specific types of emotions based upon status rank within the group (Kemper 1991), later research sought to investigate the nature of influence posed by affect and sentiment with regard to processes concerning status characteristics. In a study examining how emotions affect the status process in groups, Lovaglia and Houser (1996) found that participants‘ status-compatible emotions directly impacted their resistance to influence in that positive emotions decreased resistance to influence while negative emotions increased participants‘ resistance to influence. Moreover, the results of the study supported status characteristics theory‘s aggregate assumption, which

72

states that status rank is a function of aggregated performance expectations that are based upon the combined information of all status cues in creating the status hierarchy within the group (Berger et al. 1992). Although the impact of emotions upon status processes is extremely important with regard to influence in groups, it is also essential to understand the sentiments in relation to status. Prior research showed that high-status individuals‘ influence is decreased by disliking among other group members and that those group members who were liked were give more opportunities to participate and positive evaluations (Bales 1953; Shelly 1993). In more recent research, Bianchi (2004) focused on the role of sentiment in status processes. Specifically, she examined the particular mechanism involved in the effect of sentiments on behavior in groups and found that sentiment acts as a moderator for expectations in that there was no main effect for sentiment in the conditions for which the team members had full responsibility for the outcome, while sentiment did have an impact in the conditions where the team members were not responsible for the team outcome (Bianchi 2004). It is imperative that researchers understand the mechanisms involved in status processes with regard to affect and sentiment as the social interactions that are involved with task-oriented groups are complex in nature. Specifically, groups are composed of people who are likely to have disagreements and differences of opinion, in addition to developing sentiment attachments with respect to other group members, at some point in the process of social interaction. Given this complex nature of human interactions, it is especially crucial to have a grasp on the mechanisms involved in normal social interactions to better understand the differences found within the mixed social interactions of stigmatized individuals and those who are not stigmatized.

73

Status, Cues, and Affect in Stigma Research Status characteristics theory provides an excellent theoretical framework with which one can examine and understand stigmatized individuals as active agents within social interaction. In fact, the components of the status process explained by status characteristics theory share a number of similarities with that of stigmatization with regard to status generalization, the importance of characteristics as cues, and the role of affect. For instance, both processes involve characteristics that are used to discern information about actors and convey the possession of attributes. In addition, the expectations and meanings that are inferred by using those characteristics, or markers, affect the behaviors displayed within the social interaction. The use of status characteristics theory in this stigma research allows for the exploration of the processes involved in the social interactions between actors who possess characteristics that are stigmatizing and those who do not bear such marks. The strong propositions within SCT, concerning collective orientation and status generalization, provide the point of departure for the similarities between the status process and that of stigma. Specifically, stigma involves social exclusion rather than the collective orientation seen in the status process described by SCT. The literature covering status cues and affect with regard to status characteristics also sheds light on the status process, which appears to be closely related to the process of stigma. Specifically, the literature explains the role of status cues within the status process, as well as the influence of sentiment on performance expectations. Those performance expectations, in turn, impact the behaviors within the group and the likelihood of group members accepting or rejecting influence. The mechanisms of cues and affect seen in the status process are similarly reflected in the stigma literature, which reveals the construction of stigmas as evaluative cues and the affective components within the stigma process.

74

CHAPTER 5 STIGMA, STATUS, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION Stigma and status are social processes that arise within social interactions, yet are viewed as distinct within the literature on stigma and status characteristics theory. The processes of stigma and status organization are related in that the characteristics, which are the basis of stigma and status hierarchical formation, may vary according to the context of time and place, and are essential in the production of unequal outcomes within social interactions (Lucas & Phelan n.d.). Despite the similarities between status and stigma processes, however, the explanations that they offer are different in that stigma processes involve the disruption of social interactions and lead to the rejection of the stigmatized individual as a member of the group, whereas status processes are involved in organizing the social hierarchies within small groups so that each individual occupies a position within the group. Disruption of Social Interactions An important feature of stigma is the extent to which it disrupts the flow of social interaction. There are awkward moments involving strain and difficult social exchanges between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized social actors. Specifically, there is a great deal of anxiety present in the interactions between stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals and that anxiety may be associated with feelings of discomfort and strain within those social interactions (Blascovich et al. 2001). The reasons for the anxiety experienced even prior to social interaction between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized actors may include expectations of a negative social interaction (Blascovich et al. 2001). Nevertheless, it should be noted that some types of stigma may have less of an impact on the disruption of social interaction (through awkward moments) than others (Heatherton et al. 2000).

75

Although general social categorizations and the particular features of stigma might help perceivers to have a handy cognitive framework, those same categorizations are slightly arbitrary and misleading with respect to making specific predictions about social interactions and their outcomes. Both the stigmatizers and stigmatized targets bring stereotypes and prejudices with them into social interactions. In fact, the individuals within mixed social interactions have additional attitudes and beliefs that arise as a result of the interaction in that the behaviors displayed within the social interaction may influence the individuals with respect to evaluating themselves and each other (Blair, Ma & Lenton 2001; Hebl & Dovidio 2005). The members of stigmatized groups possess a shared understanding of the view of their status in larger society as they are exposed to the dominant culture (Crocker 1999; Steele 1997). Specifically, the stigmatized are keenly aware of the dominant stereotypes of their stigmatized identity and their devaluation in the esteem of others (Crocker et al. 1998). They are also cognizant of the dominant ideologies in society that explain why different social groups occupy certain status positions (Crocker 1999; Crocker et al. 1998; Steele 1997). Because of this knowledge, stigmatized individuals may also view the stigmas that they possess negatively, thereby increasing their anxiety levels when approaching a mixed social interaction (Heatherton et al. 2000). The presence of negative ideologies and stereotypes form the basis for the discomfort of social interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized. Nonstigmatized individuals approach social interactions with expectations and situational ―blueprints‖ for how the social interactions will proceed (Heatherton et al. 2000). Specifically, a non-stigmatized individual expects that other social interactants will also be non-stigmatized, and when the individuals with whom they interact meet their expectations, the social interaction flows smoothly. However, when an individual with whom the non-stigmatized individual interacts is stigmatized, the social interaction does

76

not proceed smoothly because the non-stigmatized person‘s expectations are violated and there is no longer predictability for the interaction (Heatherton et al. 2000). In mixed social interactions, the non-stigmatized individual may find himself anxious because the interaction is no longer routine and he no longer knows what to expect or how to act. As a result of being without a ―script‖ for behavior within the mixed social interaction, the non-stigmatized individual may worry that he will say or do the wrong thing, and will, therefore, try to avoid introducing the stigma as a topic or even thinking about the stereotypes that are associated with possession of the stigma (Heatherton et al. 2000). The non-stigmatized individual may also attempt to avoid introducing certain topics because they assume that the stigmatized individual will be sensitive or easily offended by topics that are directly or indirectly related to their stigma (Heatherton et al. 2000). For example, a European American Christian who is involved in a social interaction with an Iranian American Muslim person might avoid the topic of the national security guidelines, the U.S. Patriot Act, or the U.S. policy toward MiddleEastern countries, in general. The anxiety and tension experienced by non-stigmatized individuals may also lead to the awkwardness of mixed social interactions because of the emotions associated with the stereotypes about stigmatized persons. In other words, a non-stigmatized person may fear the stigmatized because of stereotypes (e.g. stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists) or the threat of contagion (as with the stigma of AIDS). The non-stigmatized individual may even feel hostility and antipathy towards the stigmatized (Heatherton et al. 2000). Those emotions and resulting behaviors of the non-stigmatized social interactant influence the social interaction just as the beliefs and anxieties of the stigmatized do. Like many non-stigmatized others, individuals who are stigmatized worry about being rejected (Heatherton et al. 2000). Stigmatized individuals desire acceptance by non-stigmatized others, and may experience anxiety within mixed social interactions because rejection is a potential threat to their self-esteem. In addition, stigmatized persons

77

experience heightened self-consciousness, in part due to being reduced to the stigma rather than a person with a stigmatizing characteristic (Goffman 1963; Heatherton et al. 2000; Wright 1983). For example, a person with a mental illness, such as major depression, is viewed within society as being ―crazy‖ rather than being a person who has a mental illness. More importantly, any difficulty that the stigmatized person has is attributed to that person‘s possession of a stigma, regardless of whether the stigma is relevant to the particular difficulty. For instance, the person with major depressive disorder who makes a poor decision will be believed to have made that decision because he has a mental illness and not because of situational factors or his personality (Heatherton et al. 2000). The resulting anxiety and tension, then, lead to the awkwardness within mixed social interactions (Heatherton et al. 2000). Given the departure of the stigma process from the scope conditions of collective orientation and status generalization within status characteristics theory, the first two hypotheses of my dissertation research are as follows: Hypothesis 1: In dyadic goal and collectively oriented groups, European American participants will reject influence more from Middle Eastern and Muslim partners than from European American partners. Hypothesis 2: In dyadic groups, European American participants will take into consideration their Middle Eastern partners‘ task contributions if the partners are not wearing a hijab less than their European American partners. They will take into consideration their Middle Eastern partners‘ task contribution less if their partners are wearing a hijab than if their partners are not wearing a hijab.

78

Stigma as Evaluation Cue While status characteristics are attributes associated with beliefs about competence and worth, status cues are signals that directly reflect task competence and indicate the status characteristics an individual possesses (Berger et al. 1986; Riches & Foddy 1989; Ridgeway et al. 1985). One of the ways that stigma impacts social interaction is as evaluation cues, which is information derived from a situation that may trigger cognitive or affective responses to the stigmatized target (Blaskovich et al. 2001). Evaluation cues can take the form of sensory cues (e.g. visual cues such as skin color or auditory cues such as a foreign accent) or more explicit information tied to symbolic meaning that is associated with the stigmatized individual (Blaskovich et al. 2001). The process of stigma with regard to racial, ethnic, or religious stigma involves the cueing of certain evaluation associated with that particular known stigma and the associated expectations of such that serve to elicit responses based upon those expectations. For instance, in certain educational situations, the sensory cues of brown skin, curly dark hair, wide nose, and full lips may cue stereotypes (e.g. athletic, violent, unintelligent, and so on) that are associated with the stigma of being African American and—as a consequence—the non-stigmatized actor with which the stigmatized person is interacting might discount his potential as a student and have low expectations with respect to his academic ability. The important consequences of stigma are not only relevant to the social interactions that are on an individual level but also for the broader social implications tied to institutional discrimination and the social ideologies that support such beliefs. The keyword here is power. The meaning of stigma with respect to the social relations between those who are stigmatized and those who are not is that of the power relationship

79

(e.g. the belief that one social group is so inferior as to be dismissed out of hand and the other group is superior in relation) (Coleman 1986: 221). Although the previous stigma research suggests that stigma is a process linked to social status in that there is status loss, researchers simultaneously argue that stigma places the individual in the position of outsider (Houser, 1997; Lucas & Phelan n.d.). This particular process of isolation and social distance related to stigma is contradictory to the notion of stigma as part of the status process itself, according to status characteristics theory. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine a better understanding of the social psychological process involving stigma in relation to the status process of status characteristics theory. Stigma and Sentiment In addition to the feelings of anxiety and tension during mixed social interactions, there are affective responses to stigma that result from the cognitive categorization that occurs in the presence of mixed interactions between the stigmatized and stigmatizers. Specifically, the stigmatizing characteristic elicits associated stereotypes in the form of words and images in the non-stigmatized person‘s mind, and that impacts the affect and emotions toward the stigmatized person (Harper 1999; Jones et al. 1984). The emotional responses that are associated with the images elicited by the stigma, then, motivate behavioral reactions on the part of the non-stigmatized person (Jones et al. 1984; Dovidio et al. 2000). For instance, a slender individual who encounters an obese person and holds negative images and beliefs about obese people will experience negative feelings towards the obese person and be motivated to avoid her. The negative feelings associated with many of the stereotypes and affect-laden images of stigmatized categories become associated with individuals who bear the characteristics that convey their membership in those categories. In this way, the stigmatized individual is affectively evaluated on the basis of his or her stigma

80

possession, and sentiment, in particular, is impacted negatively on that basis alone (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002). In terms of this study, I propose that the greater the negative sentiment associated with being of Middle Eastern and Muslim status, the less influence the person will have because affect, especially sentiment, can have a mediating effect. Hypothesis 3: The greater the negative sentiment associated with Middle Eastern and Muslim status, the less influence the target will have.

81

CHAPTER 6 EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THEORY To test the hypotheses, I used an experimental design. An experiment is useful specifically for testing whether the mechanisms of status characteristics theory (SCT) or stigma are at work in the social interactions within the laboratory settings. SCT is a branch of the expectation states theoretical research program that examines how task groups form and maintain the expectations for group members (Berger et al. 1972). In particular, SCT focuses on the impact of task group members‘ social status on their rates of participation and influence within the group. Researchers who use SCT typically use experimental methodology. Status characteristics theory (SCT) proposes that characteristics of subjects in groups can affect beliefs about competence, and how those beliefs impact the status, or prestige, hierarchy in the groups (Berger et al. 1977). When individuals within task groups interact, they use status characteristics to develop expectations and beliefs about each other based upon the little information that they have, which is often observed social attributes, such as race, ethnicity, age, education and gender (Berger et al. 1977). Those characteristics are associated with specific beliefs about worth, and are used to distinguish between actors within a group (Berger et al. 2002). For instance, being male is a state of the gender status characteristic that is accorded more esteem than being female, on average. SCT gives an account of the process by which individuals associate status characteristics with performance expectations for themselves and for others. To comprehend the framework of SCT, performance expectations must be clearly defined in that they are the dynamics of the power and prestige order that arise out of group members‘ expectations for their own and others‘ contribution (Berger et al 1977). Specifically, SCT proposes that status hierarchies arise when it is believed that certain

82

characteristics give those who possess them the potential to make valuable contributions to a task more than others. In other words, an individual‘s value to a group is assessed by the group members on the basis of the possession of desirable characteristics. Moreover, performance expectations affect behaviors within the group, including the likelihood of accepting or rejecting influence (Berger et al. 1977). The specific process through which social status affects one‘s influence within task groups is status generalization. In this process, social status from one domain generalizes to influence in other domains that are unrelated. In other words, the process of status generalization is grounded in the transference of social status to determine the power and prestige hierarchies in small group interactions. According to SCT, status beliefs (i.e. the widely-shared evaluations that one state of a characteristic is more valued socially and desirable than another state of that characteristic) ultimately lead to the process of status generalization in which actors attribute a specific ability or overall competence to themselves and other actors based upon the possession of particular states of status characteristics (Berger et al. 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Webster & Driskell 1978). Status generalization occurs within social situations that meet certain scope conditions (e.g. initial circumstances that are present to limit the generalizability of the theory to a specific, well-defined domain, thereby, maximizing comparability across studies) (Foschi 1997). According to SCT‘s scope conditions, the actors must be goaloriented and collectively oriented. Goal-orientation refers to the actors placing value on the task and desiring to achieve the correct outcome (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Collective orientation indicates that the actors consider it to be important to take the views of other group members into account to achieve a successful outcome (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980; Foschi 1997). Social actors who are collectively oriented find it necessary and proper to take other group members‘ opinions, behaviors,

83

and other input into consideration when completing the task (Szmatka, Lovaglia & Wysienska 2002). Unlike status processes, which are involved in organizing the social hierarchies within small groups so that each individual occupies a position within the group, stigma processes involve the disruption of social interactions and lead to the rejection of the stigmatized individual as a member of the group (Lucas & Phelan n.d.). By labeling the devalued individuals, the non-stigmatized within society relegate them to the realm of outsiders and separate them from that society. Essentially, the stigmatized individuals are made outcasts and experience status loss to such a degree as to not be seen as part of society nor be allowed to participate as a member of society (this working conceptual definition of stigma is based upon the work of Jones et al. (1984) and Link and Phelan (2001)). Specifically, in this research, stigma is defined as a phenomenon that occurs when individuals who possess particular attributes are labeled in terms of being members of devalued categories, which results in status loss and the behavior associated with such loss by the non-stigmatized social actors. Since they are not perceived as being members of the group, groups with stigmatized individuals will not meet the scope condition of collective orientation. Given that departure of the stigma process from the scope condition of collective orientation, the major hypotheses of my study are as follows: Hypothesis 1: In dyadic goal and collectively oriented groups, European American participants will reject influence more from Middle Eastern and Muslim partners than from European American partners. Hypothesis 2: In dyadic groups, European American participants will take into consideration their Middle Eastern partners‘ task contributions if the partners are not wearing a hijab less than their European American partners. They will take into consideration their Middle Eastern partners‘ task

84

contribution less if their partners are wearing a hijab than if their partners are not wearing a hijab. Another element that has been linked to both status and stigma processes in prior research is sentiment. Sentiment structure is the pattern of liking and disliking among group members which may influence group members‘ expectations for competence (Lovaglia & Houser 1996), mediate behaviors that result from expectations (Shelly et al. 2001), or act as a moderator for expectations and status relations (Bianchi 2004; Bianchi & Lancianese 2007). Previous research has provided support for the role of sentiment as a status organizer according to the constituent model (which asserts that sentiment and status independently influence group members‘ expectations for competence), the mediation model (which asserts that sentiment mediates behaviors that are an outcome of expectations formed as an effect of status), and the moderator model (which asserts that sentiment modifies how heavily group members rely strictly upon performance expectations in bestowing influence) (Ridgeway 2006; Shelly et al. 2001). Affect and sentiment are also related to the stigma process during the cognitive categorization that occurs in the midst of mixed social interactions between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized. This cognitive categorization consists of the stigmatizing characteristic eliciting stereotypes that are typically associated with that particular stigma in the non-stigmatized person‘s mind, which then influences the affect and emotional responses toward the stigmatized person (Harper 1999; Jones et al. 1984). Accordingly, the stigmatized person is affectively evaluated based on the possession of his or her stigma, and sentiment is affected negatively as a result (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002). Finally, the emotional responses resulting from the stereotypical images elicited by stigma proceed to motivate behavioral responses on the part of the non-stigmatized person toward the stigmatized person (Jones et al. 1984; Dovidio et al. 2000).

85

In this study, I propose that the greater the negative sentiment associated with being of Middle Eastern and Muslim status, the less influence the person will have because affect, especially sentiment, can have a mediating effect. Hypothesis 3: The greater the negative sentiment associated with Middle Eastern and Muslim status, the less influence the target will have. Experimental Method I wish to determine whether being Muslim and of Middle Eastern ethnicity acts as a state of the diffuse status characteristic ethnicity or as a breaker of collective orientation, thus creating a stigmatizing process. The use of an experimental study design is necessary to establish a relationship between the target‘s ethnic and religious memberships and the expectation formations and evaluations for the targeted individual. The experimental design seeks to isolate causal relationships by manipulating the proposed causal variable (Aronson et al. 1985; Webster & Sell 2007; Willer & Walker 2007). For the purposes of this study, the experimental design has important advantages. First, it allows me to examine the influence of Muslim religion and Middle Eastern ethnicity on the expectation formation and status evaluations. Because the subjects are randomly assigned to conditions, the differences in responses to the three experimental conditions should be attributed to variations in the stimulus rather than to variations in respondents‘ characteristics (Webster & Sell 2007; Willer & Walker 2007). The use of a standard, controlled environment in a laboratory setting allows for me to control for extraneous variables that are present in natural settings. The experimental setting allows me to create identical conditions for all of the subjects with the exception of the partner with whom they interact, and those subjects within a condition experience identical partners, thereby controlling for all other characteristics that might influence the subjects‘ responses.

86

Although the use of an experimental design does not allow me to draw conclusions about the prevalence of attitudes toward Middle Eastern Muslims throughout the United States, that is not the purpose of the experimental method of study because experiments are meant to test theory and not to allow for generalization to populations. The use of other methods that test theory will complement the data collected in the laboratory setting and allow for some generalizations to be made. Design The experiment has three conditions: Condition 1—Control: The partner is European-American. Condition 2—Middle-Eastern ethnicity in American dress: The partner is of Middle Eastern ethnicity and is dressed in jeans and tee-shirt with no hijab or other Muslim apparel. Condition 3—Middle Eastern ethnicity in Muslim dress: The partner is of Middle Eastern ethnicity and is dressed in the traditional Muslim garb including hijab, shayla, and abaya (robe-like dress with long sleeves). Subjects were eighty-three European American undergraduate females at The University of Iowa who participated in the study for monetary compensation during the 2009-2010 academic year. The females were assigned randomly to one of three conditions. After arriving at the laboratory, the subjects were greeted by a research assistant and led to an isolation room containing a small desk, two chairs, and a computer with a Webcam. The subjects were shown an introductory video (pre-recorded) by Dr. Gordon, who is reputed to be the researcher. The subjects were told that they would be briefly interacting with a partner via the Webcam. The subjects viewed an introductory statement given by the confederate partner. On all three videos, the partner provided information that she currently lives in Iowa, and about her hobbies (the age and year in school are not provided via video

87

because I wanted those characteristics to match those of the subject—in that way, there is no status difference based on age or year in school). The subject was led to believe that the person seen on the Webcam video was her partner in a group decision-making task. Control Condition—The partner states that she lives in Iowa, likes to listen to music, read biographies, and go to the mall with friends. This partner is dressed in an Iowa tee-shirt and jeans. Experimental Condition 1—The partner states that she lives in Iowa but she and her parents immigrated to the U.S. from Iran; she also states that she likes to listen to music, read biographies, and go to the mall with friends. This partner is dressed in an Iowa tee-shirt and jeans. Experimental Condition 2—The partner states that she lives in Iowa but she and her parents immigrated to the U.S. from Iran; she also states that she likes to listen to music, read biographies, and go to the mall with friends. This partner is wearing the hijab and covering. After watching the confederate‘s introductory video, the subjects were instructed to look into the Webcam and state their hometown, club memberships, and hobbies. The subjects then began the standardized computer status expectations protocol of the Contrast Sensitivity task. The ―Team Contrast Sensitivity‖ task is a standard status expectations protocol (Berger, Cohen & Zelditch 1972; Moore 1965, 1968). In the Contrast Sensitivity task, subjects identify which of two shaded rectangles had more white area. Each rectangle that subjects judge is actually 52% black and 48% white. Instructions informed the subjects that the task involves twenty-three Contrast Sensitivity problems. For each trial, the subjects make an initial selection, see their partner‘s initial selection, and then make a final selection. The instructions note that a group score would be tabulated based on the total number of correct final answers provided by the subject and partner. For 20 of the 23 trials, the ―partners‖ disagree with the subjects‘ initial choices.

88

I measure influence by the number of times in these 20 opportunities that subjects stayed with their answers even after disagreeing with the partners‘ initial choice. Specifically, the subjects receive one point for each stay response, meaning that they are less susceptible to influence and, therefore, are higher status. The point totals are summed up and divided by twenty to produce the subject‘s proportion of stay responses (the P(s)). The average of the P(s) by condition is then calculated for analyses of support or rejection of the hypotheses (Bianchi 2004). After the subjects complete the second task, a computer screen informs them that the session of the study is complete. The computer then administers a survey that collects data on the subjects‘ emotional reactions to the partner, the subjects‘ impressions of the partner, the subjects‘ social distance from the partner, and their reaction to the Contrast Sensitivity task. The research assistant conducts a face-to-face post-session interview to test for manipulation checks, goal- and collective orientation. The subjects are also fully debriefed about the deceptions of the study. According to the first hypothesis, the categorical differences in ethnicity and religion will lead to status generalization such that the subjects in the Control Condition will have a lower average P(s) score than subjects in Experimental Condition 1, and the subjects in Experimental Condition 1 will have a lower average P(s) score than subjects in Experimental Condition 2. Thus, Hypothesis 1 can be restated as: H1: P1 < P2< P3 The second hypothesis states that the more cues that are present indicating belonging to the category of Middle Easterner and Muslim, the more stigmatized the target possessing those cues will be. And the more stigmatizing the characteristics possessed by the target, the greater the possibility that collective orientation will be broken. Thus, Hypothesis 2 can be restated as: H2: CO1 ≤ CO2 < CO3 … where CO equals the average measure of collective orientation by condition.

89

Finally, the third hypothesis states that the greater the negative sentiment associated with being Middle Eastern and Muslim, the less influence the target will have. H3: S1 < S2 < S3 S=average measure of negative sentiment per condition Results On the basis of information from the questionnaire and exit interview, 14 women out of a total of 83 were excluded from the analysis – an attrition rate of 17%. These subjects were not deceived, and in this case, deception was needed to obtain natural responses from the subjects and to avoid experimental effects. The risk of subjects not being deceived is the possibility that they would not take the research task seriously, and would, therefore, not respond as if they were working with a human partner, which is essential to the study.3 Results were analyzed using a t-test of independent samples and are presented in Figure E1. For the subjects paired with the European American partner, average P(s) was .74; for subjects paired with the Middle Eastern partner not wearing a hijab, average P(s) was .63; and for subjects paired with the Muslim Middle Eastern partner wearing a hijab, average P(s) was .60. Therefore, support for Hypothesis 1 was not found in that subjects paired with the Middle Eastern partner not wearing a hijab were more likely to be influenced by their partner than were the subjects paired with the European American partner (two-tailed t-test, t=2.32, p