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Home > Vol 19, No 3 (1994) > Collins

Trading in Culture: The Role of Language Richard Collins (British Film Institute) Abstract: This chapter considers why the imperatives of cultural development and economy are often perceived to be contradictory; the fundamental ambiguity of meaning of the category "culture"; the conflict between socially established understandings of the category "culture" and the patterns of cultural practice created by contemporary circumstances (notably the industrialization/popularization of culture and globalization of economic activity). It examines the importance of language as a factor in explaining the structure of important cultural markets and considers the distinctive position of "new societies" in the global cultural economy and the possibilities offered by Canada's linguistic endowment.

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Résumé: Cet article considère: pourquoi l'on perçoit souvent les besoins de développement culturel et les besoins économiques comme étant contradictoires; l'ambiguïté fondamentale du sens du mot "culture"; le conflit entre les perceptions conventionnelles de la "culture" et les pratiques culturelles produites dans les circonstances actuelles (notamment l'industrialisation de la culture et sa popularisation, et la globalisation des activités économiques). L'article examine l'importance de la langue comme élément structural des marchés culturels importants, et considère la position distincte de "sociétés nouvelles" dans l'économie culturelle globale et les possibilités que la richesse linguistique du Canada peuvent offrir.

INTRODUCTION Understanding the relationship between economic organization and culture is not straightforward, not least because the economic characteristics of cultural productions conform imperfectly to those which have formed the normative basis of neo-classical economics (see, inter alia, Hoskins' study in this series; Baumol & Bowen, 1966; Collins, Garnham, & Locksley, 1988; Sturgess, 1992). Moreover, there is often a significant disjuncture between the meanings attributed to the terms used to discuss such matters by scholars on one hand and in popular speech and by politicians and policy-makers on the other. Williams (1976) has noted how difficult it is to define culture (and thus cultural development). So too are there difficulties in defining an open economy. Whereas in popular usage (and in the public policy agenda which preceded Canada's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council's commissioning of a "State of the Art Review of Cultural Development in an Open Economy") an open economy is often seen as a free trade economy characterized by weak national control over economic activity, for scholars an open economy is simply one in which cross-border flows of traded and non-traded goods and services are significant in comparison to the domestic circulation of goods and services. However, it is clear that cultural development in an open economy is perceived by many to be an oxymoron, for trading patterns in an open economy entail an international division of labour which in the cultural domain means that cultural production comes to be located in some locations at the expense of others. This locational specialization is perceived to be problematic for three reasons.

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First, culture is becoming increasingly important as a tradeable commodity. The growing importance of trading in information is one dimension of the supposed global transition of developed societies from manufacturing to information-based economies (Bell, 1976). Thus, the balance in cultural trade becomes as important for governments as the trade in manufactures or primary products. This may sound a hyperbolical claim but Marcel Masse, when Minister of Communications, claimed that the "cultural sector is practically as important as the entire agricultural sector in Canada in terms of GNP" (Cinema Canada, May 1985, No. 118, p. 118).

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Second, there is a strongly held presumption that culture is a vital social glue and that without a common culture shared by citizens, states and the political authorities which govern them will lack legitimacy and robustness. As CBC/Radio Canada put it in its evidence to the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy: "At the very heart of our sovereignty is our culture. There can be no political sovereignty without cultural sovereignty" (CBC, 1985, p. 9).

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Third, cultural markets (or, in a moderate version of this thesis, some important cultural markets, notably broadcasting) are perceived to have failed, in two senses: in the technical sense that they do not conform to economists' definition of a well-functioning competitive market but also in the sense that they may not deliver the outcomes desired by society as a whole. Economists regard cultural markets as failed markets because cultural goods are non-rival and non-excludable. Consumers lack adequate means to signal their demand, and the intensity of their demand, to suppliers, and thus supply does not correspond to demand. Moreover, a market in culture is believed not to capture all the potential benefits of cultural production. Society as a whole may benefit from the production and distribution of culture, whereas individual consumers and producers have no interest in procuring benefits for society as a whole (see, inter alia, Applebaum & Hébert, 1982; Hoskins & Mirus, 1988; Peacock, 1986). Thus, the development of an open economy, and cultural free trade, can be, and more often are perceived to be, economically and socially damaging in that they threaten the prosperity of information producers, the cultural level of the population, and the cohesion of society itself. However, there are strong countervailing presumptions in favour of an open economy and cultural free trade. The dominant international trade regime, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), is based on the premise that aggregate wealth is increased through free trade (although services, and thus communications and culture, are not yet integrated into the GATT regime). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations and other major international agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights enshrine freedom of access to information (and thus to culture) across political boundaries. Such international agreements are based on the general presumption that economic and social welfare is maximized by free access to information and culture. Moreover, if markets are unable to value cultural goods satisfactorily (because they cannot recognize the value of cultural goods to future generations of users) then cultural markets are not alone in failing in this way. Scientific research, military defence, education, and a host of other goods and services are similarly likely to be undervalued by the market in an open economy. And whereas nationalism, the ideology that "the boundaries of state and those of nation [must] coincide" (Minogue, 1967, p. 12) if societies were to be robust and legitimate, was for long the "foremost ideology of the modern world" (Minogue, 1967, p. 8), latterly postmodern social theories have been advanced which suggest that it "no longer matters, for the effectiveness of state power, and for the reproduction of political domination in general, whether the social area under domination is culturally unified and uniform" (Bauman, 1992, p. 97).

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Yet to cast the argument in these terms is to beg a number of questions. What is cultural development (and, not least, what is culture)? If the premises of the pervasive belief that cultural markets are necessarily failed markets (and that therefore the maximization of welfare requires political intervention) are granted, then an open economy will amplify the economic dynamics which have caused market failure. Thus, any discussion of cultural development in an open economy must consider the relationships between the cultural and economic domains and the political institutions, notably the state (political authority) which mediates between them and which is often given the role of compensating for the failure of cultural markets.

CULTURE What is culture? The British scholar Raymond Williams referred to "culture" as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams, 1976, p. 76). Williams (1976) distinguishes three principal meanings: that drawn from husbandry and horticulture signifying rearing or fostered growth; an anthropological notion signifying the ensemble of practices and assumptions that distinguish one society from others; and that referring to the articulation of systems of symbols such that aesthetic responses are elicited in consumption. Culture in its anthropological sense is a bundle of attributes that differentiate human social groups from each other. Hardin (1974, p. 12) has identified three central distinguishing characteristics for Canada: English against French, Canada against the United States, and the regions against the centre. Lipset's study (Lipset, 1990) supports Hardin in its eloquent documentation of differences in values between English- and French-speaking Canadians and Americans on a vast range of issues from parenting to crime. National cultures may, or may not, closely correspond to political demarcations. There are undoubtedly politically sovereign states which are possessed of strongly marked national cultures. In Western Europe national cultures have been produced by a long history in which political authorities have successfully (if such a brutal process can be graced with the honorific term "success") constructed monoglot communities with a single dominant religion and shared ethnicity within stable and geographically distinct boundaries. These nation states have, it is often claimed, distinct national cultures, but even here a host of exceptions and qualifications spring to mind: not least a long-established international high culture for which "timeless" and "universal" qualities are claimed. Here the second of the two pertinent meanings of culture identified by Williams becomes significant where culture is not a descriptive but an evaluative term ranking systems of moral values and human capabilities. If culture is the "harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature" (Arnold, 1963, p. 48) or the "best that has been thought and known in the world" (Arnold, 1963, p. 70) as Arnold variously described it, then all anthropological cultures are not equal. It is widely agreed that high culture is part of the common patrimony of humankind, even though there may be disagreement on what precisely counts as "good enough" to be recognized as part of humankind's common patrimony. Certain characteristics (in advanced Western societies at least) are customarily present in objects designated as being culturally valuable: age, handmade, single authorship (all of which make for scarcity), and complexity (see, inter alia, Benjamin, 1970, 1973). The symbol system articulated, the language of the work, is one which requires skill and an educated consumer to read or decode. Cultivation is required in order to understand a painting by Poussin but not to understand the television series Dallas. For the conventions used in Dallas are widely generalized in the representations we have been educated to decode since infancy. Poussin is now remote (and therefore difficult), requiring expertise the acquisition of which cannot be the prerogative of all, for not all of us have the leisure and opportunity to familiarize ourselves with Poussin's work and to learn how to unpack its signifying system. The social division of labour that produced the leisure necessary for producers to acquire the skills for physical command over the factors of artistic production (whether painting in oils, playing a musical instrument or sculpting, that is, for coding the symbols articulated in artistic productions), and for consumers to acquire decoding skills, constituted "culture" as a minority prerogative. To be sure there was, and in some societies still is, "popular culture"--for example, oral literature, song, and decoration of everyday objects--in societies which did not sharply differentiate producers and consumers of culture nor constitute culture as a commodity. But this popular culture was and is customarily designated as inferior to "high" culture, which was, necessarily, the property of elites who had the time and wealth necessary to produce, acquire, and consume it. Films and television programmes have few of the time-honoured markers of cultural value. They produce no unique products (no videotape or film print has a superior status as the original over others), have no single authors to whom creative responsibility can exclusively be assigned (though there are divisions of labour in production that privilege the inputs of one, or a few, individuals), and their products are characteristically marketed and are readily intelligible to large numbers of people. To understand prime time television requires no special cultivation available only to a few. And the technologies on which the audio-visual industries are based have deskilled production and have removed the aura from their producers and from the works themselves. There is a mismatch between the cultural assumptions and definitions of the past (which owe their origin to an era in which the leisure available for cultural production and consumption was available only to a few) and contemporary culture based on mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1970) and mass consumption. In advanced Western societies, leisure is now universal, electronic and mechanical reproduction have reduced the cost of culture and consumption of symbolic goods, and thus cultural consumption is a major activity of the mass of people. Mass and high culture are different in that few consume high culture and many popular culture. They are similar in that both mass and high culture separate producers and consumers and commoditize symbolic culture, whereas in popular culture those who produce and consume culture are the same. However, although mass culture and popular culture are socially pervasive, mass culture is pervasive within a much larger community or communities than is popular culture. The long-established international character of high culture is now a property of mass culture.

THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE The transnationalization of culture, for long the property only of elites, is now pervasive throughout advanced societies. This is the "cultural crisis" which presents both threats and opportunities. Formerly, national cultures were formed from a repertoire of symbols that were shared by members of the national community and not by others outside it. These national repertoires of symbols were not disseminated outside the national community and therefore distinguished one nation from others. But an international character has long been evident in the culture of national elites. It is not accidental that the most honoured forms of international high culture are music and easel painting, which do not require of their consumers knowledge of a particular natural language. Much binds advanced societies in a common transnational culture: their family structures, agnosticism, industrial technologies, disciplines of labour, structure of the working day, and a shared repertoire of symbols of mass culture. Moreover, many advanced societies contain populations whose cultural identity is formed in several matrices; for example, that of the country of residence (and often the country of citizenship) of their members and also that of the country of their origin. The crisis for national cultures extends through the anthropological and symbolic; there is a pervasive and growing absence of fit between the cultures and the political institutions of modern states. The relationships between the two types of culture are complicated and difficult to demonstrate. There are generally admitted problems of demonstrating the effects of the media on receivers' attitudes and behaviour (see Cumberbatch & Howitt, 1989, for a useful overview). If there are difficulties in demonstrating the effect on viewers of viewing a representation of violent (or indecent) behaviour, then how much more difficult is it to demonstrate the effect (or absence of effect) of consumption of exogenous or endogenous, high or popular culture on the individual and collective identities of cultural consumers? On one hand culture is evidently synthetic, adaptive, and protean, and it crosses communities. On the other it is a major bearer and indicator of collective identity, and thus as culture changes so does collective identity. Or does it? The unities embraced by collective identities and which define communities have grown over historical time as markets have extended through space, as literacy has regularized and reduced linguistic and cultural variation. These unities, collective identities, and markets are in constant flux. Yet this flux is not unprecedented. Cultural exchange and trade in cultural goods has prevailed since Gutenberg's era and before (see, inter alia, Steinberg, 1969). Nor are contemporary policy-makers' and commentators' preoccupations about collective identity, cultural development, and cultural trade novel. What, however, is new is the pace of change and the consequences of an accelerating "dematerialization" of cultural commodities. The "Gutenberg Galaxy" was one in which most cultural commodities had a physical existence. However, the characteristic materiality of cultural commodities in the Gutenberg Galaxy has changed to the characteristic immateriality of cultural commodities in the "Marconi Galaxy." The Marconi Galaxy is distinguished by an absence of the previous customary isomorphism between common culture and collective identity and political identities and institutions. This disjuncture is in one sense a version of the antinomy between the different forms of social solidarity discussed under the headings of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and organic and mechanical solidarity by the founding fathers of the social sciences (notably by Toennies, 1957, and Durkheim, 1984). If there is no collective identity or common culture which binds together individuals then social cohesion becomes a matter of rational, voluntaristic assent to a society based on an inclusive but atomistic universalism. Whereas in a society where members of a political community are also bound together by membership of a shared culture and collective identity social cohesion is more powerfully communitarian, such a society also must necessarily be both rigorously exclusive (those who do not share the cultural character of the community cannot be admitted to the full rights of members) and diligent about policing the boundaries which differentiate one society from another. Thus the post-Gutenberg, post-Marconi accelerations in the rate of cultural exchange and adulteration are profoundly troubling to societies based (as all must, to some extent, be) on common cultures and collective identities, and the reverse to societies based (as all must, to some extent, be) on universalistic and rational principles (see, inter alia, Alter, 1989; Gellner, 1983; Hall & Jarvie, 1992).

CULTURE AND POLITICS The isomorphism of state and culture and the notion of a universalistic high cultural canon are both challenged by: 1. Fourth-world communities living in first-world states. 2. Accelerating migration of populations and establishment of multicultural and multilingual societies. 3. Globalization of culture and internationalization of cultural industries. 4. Self-conscious creation of multilingual political entities. The European Union is the best contemporary example, but other examples (whether successful or unsuccessful), such as India, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union show that the European Union is not unique. Cultural and collective identities are, of course, not singular. No Gemeinschaft is formed around only one collective identity, nor do the members of any Gemeinschaft have only one vector of collective identity. However, the rise in the relative importance attributed to collective cultural identity as a Gemeinschaft binding collective identity, or social glue, can be dated from the beginning of the modern period. Formerly, in pre-modern times (let us say before the two major revolutions of the enlightenment--the American Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789), the principal locus of Gemeinschaft binding collective identity was religion. States were organized on confessional lines. Many contemporary states, of course, still assert the importance of the congruence between religious confession and political structures. The unsatisfied demands for states based on Islamic law suggest that such confessional/political demands are powerful and lively, and existing theocratic societies such as Israel, Iran, and Pakistan testify to the consequences of such demands for isomorphism between religion and polity and to the characteristics of contemporary theocracies. Yet the United States established that a state could exist and thrive on the basis of religious tolerance and the separation of church and state. However, if religion is absent as a social glue, how is the enduring human hunger for Gemeinschaft to be satisfied? Cultural Gemeinschaft is the obvious answer, and it is notable how strongly normative cultural (and linguistic) policy has been in the secular post-Jacobin state of France. Peasants had, Braudel (1988) believed, to become Frenchmen if the state was to endure. Further, it became widely believed that the state had the role of raising the cultural level of the population, a role not dissimilar to its role in promoting national education and health policies. However, an official fostering of high culture engenders both cultural adulteration as exogenous and endogenous cultures mix and cultural (and therefore social) stratification as groups within the Gemeinschaft are distinguished from each other on the basis of their cultural consumption and practices. The only way these contradictions can be resolved is to intensify attempts to reconcile high and mass cultures. Mass culture, and particularly a mass culture which has a synthetic and international character, therefore becomes a problem. It is feared as an enemy of social cohesion or of cultural standards or of both. Thus, the two cultural roles of the state, engendering cultural and thus social cohesion and raising cultural standards, may be threatened by an open economy. Or, alternatively, those plebian internationalists whose values are attached more to the values of Gesellschaft and to libertarian modernism may see no problem arising from citizens' free access to information and the impossibility of effective state censorship. Formerly the main issue that international circulation of culture posed was freedom of information, but now there are very important issues of economic interest and the desire of communities to affirm their distinctiveness and difference from other collectivities at stake. Resolution of these and related issues such as the reconciliation of community and individual rights, including the "right" to a distinctive language and culture, are intractable problems. For these are not "soluble" problems; there are genuine contradictions and mutual incompatibilities in the different positions espoused. Religious freedom can be seen as an unproblematic civil liberty, but the rights of one or other collectivity must be abridged if a confessional group espouses beliefs which conflict with the beliefs of another. The rights to diversity and to universality conflict, and public policy concerned with "Cultural Development in an Open Economy" cannot evade the choice between these values in many concrete instances. But, however incompatible the principles of universality and diversity are in strict logic, different societies reconcile these contradictory imperatives in very different ways. There are striking differences in the way these contradictory principles are mediated and reconciled in "old" and "new" societies. Many, but not all, of the "New Societies" (or settler societies as they are also sometimes called) of the European diaspora (notably North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand, but also Pacific, African, and Asian societies) including Canada demonstrate a more successful acceptance of cultural and linguistic difference than do the "old" societies of the core European nation states. Success is a relative term and a difficult one, for it is not easy to weigh in the balance the "success" of different societies. But however troubling are the recent travails of "new societies" which have experienced riots occasioned by the acquittal of police in Los Angeles accused of beating a black driver Rodney King in 1991, window breaking on Yonge Street, or the Oka confrontation in 1990, they must be set against the experience of "old societies" (notably European societies) which have spawned the two major twentieth-century forms of totalitarianism and two world wars. Are the evident problems of social cohesion (in Canada and elsewhere) attributable to too much or too little cultural diversity? Is there too much or too little Gemeinschaft in contemporary societies? These matters may seem abstract and irrelevant, but if we are to assess the role of cultural development in an open economy we must consider them--even if only to reject them. Culture and its preservation and development is increasingly being defined as a policy goal. We therefore need to know what is meant by "culture," the relationship of the factor of culture to other social factors, and the overall goals of society before we can judge the appropriateness of cultural policies.

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY What, then, are the factors which make for long-term success of cultural and information industries and which should be taken into account in formulating policies for cultural development in an open economy? First, it is important to recognize that the rate of cultural and information exchange and integration between societies has accelerated rapidly under the influence of technological innovation. New communication technologies and the restructuring of information markets which they make possible present both threats and promises. The policy decisions of governments will determine the extent to which threats or promises are most realized. Contemporary discussion of communication policy is suffused with metaphors of integration, such as the globalization of communications, the convergence of different media, and the erosion of the tyranny of distance. These metaphors have been spawned by an accelerating development of electronic technologies which have reduced the tyranny of both spatial and temporal distance during the twentieth century. They signify a perception that information and communication markets (and the social relations that follow from them) are rapidly being changed. Harold Innis (1951) described different communications media as having time- and space-binding properties. The space-binding properties of writing, Innis believed, enabled the creation and maintenance of empires over great geographical spaces. Its time-binding properties enabled current and future generations to receive communications from the past. These tendencies were amplified by printing and were extended by photography and cinematography (which permitted the capture and preservation of images) and by sound on film and sound on disc recording. The perishability of cultural and information commodities was dramatically reduced. Such technologies permitted the temporal extension of communications and provided powerful incentives for information production by enabling producers to amortize costs and accrue profits over time. Developments after the Second World War, which made possible the electronic encoding of information (whether of sound, image, or alphanumeric characters) and the storage of information in electronically encoded form (audio and video tape and on disc), significantly amplified the binding effects of new communication technologies. But however important the metaphors and processes of integration and binding have been, they have been attended by contrary processes of differentiation and specialization. The world's markets for cultural products have not become completely integrated; they remain differentiated temporally and spatially. Although new communication technologies have reduced the costs of transmitting and distributing information over distance (space binding), distinct information markets remain; here the most important differentiating factors are those of language and culture. These contradictory forces of integration and differentiation have always structured information markets. However, it has become both more important to understand these contradictory forces, because information has grown in importance as a traded commodity, and more difficult, because new technologies are rapidly changing the relative power of the forces of integration and differentiation. The simultaneous, but changing, processes of integration and differentiation present both threats and opportunities for communication policy-makers, businesses, and citizens.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY As the world economy has become more integrated and interdependent, so the international division of labour has increased. Production of commodities is more and more location-specific. Such specialization is very evident in the tradeable information sector, which has become a paradigm of globalization (see, for example, "Economic and Industrial Patterns" in UNESCO, 1989, pp. 79-108). In 1986, total world turnover in the information and communication industries was estimated to be U.S. $1,185 billion (the information and communication sector itself was estimated to account for perhaps 8 or 9% of total world output) of which the information content sector (press, publishing, recording, radio, television, and cinema) accounted for U.S. $315 billion annually. The European Economic Community (now the European Union), Japan, and the United States of America accounted for approximately 87% of world turnover in information goods and services. (Their share of the global information content sector is comparable to their share of the total global market in information goods and services.) This compares with their share of global GDP of 70% (derived from UNESCO, 1989, p. 83). These three entities are therefore even more globally dominant in the information sector than they are in other economic sectors; their development seems to epitomize the transition to a post-industrial, knowledge-based, information society proposed by Daniel Bell (1976). English-speaking states and enterprises are particularly strongly represented in the global information content sector, although governments across the world have fostered the information sector in their own economies in order to accelerate a desired transition to a post-industrial (or "information society") status. Of the world's 50 largest enterprises ranked by total media turnover (press and publishing, television, radio, and cinema) 34 are Anglophone. These Anglophone enterprises account for about 66% of the media turnover of the top 50 enterprises. Twenty-five of the Anglophone members of the world's top 50 media enterprises are domiciled in the United States, six are United Kingdom-domiciled enterprises, three are Canadian (International Thomson, Southam, CBC/Radio Canada), and one (News Corporation, which ranks fourth in size of all world media enterprises) is domiciled in Australia. MacLean Hunter and Torstar are the next highest rated Canadian enterprises at 67th and 76th positions respectively (see UNESCO, 1989, pp. 104-108). Internationally traded information pre-eminently originates from the Anglophone world and from the United States and United Kingdom in particular. In the internationally traded sector of the world television programme market the OECD (1986) estimated that of a total 1980 world-traded volume of U.S. $400 million, the United States' television programme exports accounted for U.S. $350 million, and the U.K. (second to the United States) accounted for U.S. $22 million (see Miles, 1990, and Moore & Steele, 1991, for accounts of the U.K.'s information economy; also Cultural Trends passim). The U.S. is even more emphatically the leading exporter of cinema films followed by France (OECD, 1986). The President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, reported to the United States Congress that the United States had a positive trade balance of U.S. $1 billion for the audio-visual sector in 1987 (Valenti, 1988, p. 20). The surplus on overseas trade for the United States' entertainment industry as a whole has been estimated at $4.9 billion in 1986 (Brummer cited in Hoskins & Mirus, 1988). Why have the United States and United Kingdom been able to dominate the internationally traded sections of global information content markets? Several explanations have been advanced, each of which has force, but none of which seem wholly satisfactory. I consider here three explanations, two advanced by scholars from the United States and one by Canadian scholars. Schiller (1969, 1981) and others of the "media imperialism" school argue that the domination of world information flows by the media imperialists, and notably by the United States, is both consequence and course of the overall dominance of such states in world affairs. Yet, as a Canadian commentator, Ravault (1980), points out, this is not a satisfactory explanation, for the postwar period, which has seen a significant augmentation of the share of the international information market of the U.K. and U.S., has been a period when the military, political, and economic power of these states has declined. Others, such as Guback (1969), point to the early capture of a commanding position in international information markets by the U.S. (a similar argument could be made--in respect of products such as printed books and news agency services--for the U.K.) giving the U.S. a decisive advantage. The decisive shift, it is customarily argued, took place during the First World War when the film industries of the European belligerents (which had hitherto accounted for the majority of world film trade) closed their markets to each other and reduced overall film production. The United States was able to maintain (and increase) production and trade in the markets of all belligerents (except for the relatively short periods from 1917-18 and 1941-45 when it was itself a belligerent). The United States consolidated its position in the inter-war period through technological innovation (e.g., sound, sensitive film stocks, etc.) and, during and after World War Two, by filling the vacuum in European film production which was one of the consequences of the war. An alternative explanation emphasizes the importance of home market size, and Hoskins & Mirus (1988) have given a particularly persuasive account of the importance of this factor. Although their emphasis on the importance of home market size explains many phenomena in the global information content industry, it does not account for all. It does not account for the relative positions of individual information economies which can be derived from UNESCO's data (UNESCO, 1989): notably the U.K.'s fourth place (very close to that of West Germany); Australia's superior position to that of Italy; or Canada's superior position to France's. Nor does it explain the U.K.'s superior export performance in international information content markets to that of Japan and West Germany. Home market size is undoubtedly among the factors which contribute to the success or failure of information content producers in international markets, but the relevant unit of analysis seems not to be the size of a single national market (or strictly the size of the market of a state) as has usually been argued hitherto, but rather the size (and wealth) of the whole language community within which a media enterprise, or enterprises, is located. The distinctive economic characteristics of information make market size a particularly important factor in contributing to the success or failure of enterprises trading in information.

LANGUAGE AND COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE Clearly a particular language community will, all other things being equal, tend to prefer information content encoded in its own language. But all other things are seldom equal. And as we will see, although preference for own language explains some features of international information trades, it does not explain all). For example, Austria's importation of more television programming from West Germany than from other European sources in 1987 is probably satisfactorily explained by a combination of the factors of preference for programming in own language and the tendency for television programming importers to acquire programming from suppliers enjoying a large domestic market where high production costs can be amortized and where, consequently, high-quality productions may be made. A similar pattern is evident in Swiss television's programme imports in 1987. The Swiss German-language channel imported a higher proportion of programmes from West Germany than it did from any other single source (except the United States). The Swiss French-language channel imported more programming from France than from any other single source (except the United States). Reverse flows from Austria to Germany, Switzerland to France, from small to large markets, did not complement and balance the flows from large to small. Thus the factor of shared language is insufficient alone to explain these television programme flows. Rather, a combination of the factors of market size and language seem to be at work. (Data from UNESCO, 1989, pp. 151-152). The evident importance of both market size and language in accounting for information flows suggest that a multivariate analysis which recognizes the importance of the character of linguistic markets as well as national markets may be superior to a single factor analysis. (See Collins, 1989, for discussion of language and European satellite television.) Of course, within a single world language community composed of several distinct national, or state, markets the factor of national market size remains significant. Within the Anglophone world the United States is advantaged relative to the U.K., the U.K. relative to Ireland, and among German-language communities West Germany is advantaged relative to Switzerland. But some language communities are more permeable to exogenous information products than are others. Varis's work (see Varis, 1985) on international flows of television programming is deservedly well known: it reveals strikingly less penetration of non-English-language programming into English-speaking markets than of Englishlanguage origin programming into non-English-speaking markets. The membrane separating Anglophone information markets from others is semi-permeable. Anglophone producers and exporters of information content seem to enjoy a comparative advantage compared to producers and exporters of other language communities. The source of their advantage is their membership in the world's largest and wealthiest language community. This point is well made by Wildman & Siwek, who state: "The strength of American films and television programs in world markets can therefore be explained by the fact that the English-speaking market for video products has much greater spending power than do markets comprised of other linguistic populations" (Wildman & Siwek, 1988, p. 8). They graphically demonstrate the potential advantages of Anglophone producers with a comparison of the size and wealth of different world language communities (see Table 1). Note: This table includes only market economies and thus excludes both the Russian- and Chinese-language communities. Anglophone information producers have the potential to benefit from the comparative advantage of participation in the world's wealthiest language market in two ways. First, they are potentially able to amortize high "first copy" costs in both the world's largest national and the world's largest language market. Anglophone producers are therefore able to produce high-quality works (for example, high production budgets make possible extensive rehearsals and retakes in film and television programme production) and works which exhibit high "production values." Moreover, Anglophone producers benefit from the status of English as the world's preferred second language. Not only does this mean that works in English are intelligible to more non-native speakers of English than are works in, say, German, Urdu, or Bengali to non-native speakers of those languages, but also that Englishlanguage works are likely to be easier and cheaper to dub, subtitle, or translate into other languages than are works not made in English. It is easier to sell an English-language work into the German- and Spanish-language markets than it is to sell a Spanish work into the German and English markets or a German work into the Spanish and English markets.

Table 1 A Comparison of Linguistic Markets Language

Native speakers 1981 GNP (millions)

(U.S. $ millions)

English

409

4,230,375

Hindi/Urdu

352

209,023

Spanish

265

653,958

Arabic

163

328,547

Bengali

160

12,692

Portuguese

157

303,465

Malay/Indonesian 122

237,715

Japanese

121

1,185,861

French

110

812,179

German

101

1,017,528

Punjabi

69

29,575

Italian

62

502,306

Sources: The World Almanac and Book of Facts (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1984); World Bank, World Tables, 3rd ed., Vol. 1 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). Adapted from citation in Wildman & Siwek, 1988, p. 85).

THE PERFORMANCE OF INFORMATION PRODUCERS IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE UNESCO (see UNESCO, 1989, pp. 104-108) has divided the world's information and communication economy into three sections of roughly equivalent size: the media (press and publishing, television, radio, and cinema), services (information and telecommunications), and equipment (telecommunications and electronics). In all these categories enterprises from the United States figure prominently (for example, the U.S. has the first-ranked enterprise in the media and equipment areas and the second-ranked in services). However, it is only in the equipment area that a significant number of non-Anglophone enterprises are ranked highly. Seven of the top ten equipment enterprises are non-Anglophone (five Japanese, one Dutch, one German), four of the service providers are non-Anglophone (one each of Japanese, German, French, Italian), whereas only two of the top 10 media enterprises are non-Anglophone (German and Japanese). Not only are Anglophone enterprises better represented in the media area than in the equipment and services areas but also Anglophone enterprises from Anglophone states other than the U.S. are represented. In the first two of these categories, media and services, Australia has enterprises occupying high positions relative to overseas enterprises (fourth in the media category and twentieth in services), while in the category of equipment none of the 148 largest enterprises listed are Australian; the U.K. has six enterprises in the top 50 of the media category (21st, 24th, 35th, 36th, 40th, and 44th), three in the top 50 of the services category (5th, 39th, and 40th), and two in the top 50 of the equipment category. Canada, as previously noted, has three in the top 50 of the media category (41st, 49th, and 50th), one in the top 50 of the services category, and one in the top 50 of the equipment category. If, instead of taking enterprises as the unit of analysis, we take a specific information product, printed books, as the unit of analysis, we find similar phenomena. UNESCO's data on the translation of printed books enables us to test the extent to which information products which emanate from one language market are saleable in other markets and the extent to which producers in one language community enjoy advantages relative to producers of comparable products in other language communities. In 1982, 3,557 English-language books were translated into Spanish, but only 816 German-language books were translated into Spanish. Some 5,795 English-language books and 160 Spanish books were translated into German in the same year. And only 108 Spanish books and 873 German books were translated into English in 1982 (UNESCO, 1989, p. 336). These data suggest, as do UNESCO data on information-producing enterprises, that there are powerful advantages for Anglophone producers. What of French-language producers? There are striking disparities between the status of English and French in international cultural markets. In 1982, 1,525 books were translated from French into Spanish (less than half the number of books translated from English into Spanish) and 60 from Spanish into French; 1,294 books were translated from French into German (less than a quarter of the number of books translated from English into German); and 628 books were translated from French into English (less than half the number of books that were translated from English into French). France has two enterprises in the top 50 of the media category (26th and 37th), one in the top 50 of the services category (4th), and three in the top 50 of the equipment category (11th, 18th, and 44th). However, although French was considerably less important a language of origin and destination than was English for the translation of books in 1982, French was the second most important language as a language of origin for translation after English. In 1982, 5,033 books were translated from French into other languages, 18,311 books from English into other languages, 3,596 books from German into other languages, 2,961 books from Russian into other languages, and 533 books from Spanish into other languages (all figures derived from UNESCO, 1989, pp. 336-337). France is the third largest world market for printed books (publishers' net sales). Although considerably less well endowed with linguistic advantage than are English-language producers, as the ninth largest (and fourth wealthiest) language community French-language producers seem to be less disadvantaged than are producers in any languages other than English. But French-language producers may be vulnerable to displacement from their position as second most important language group of international information providers by German and/or Japanese and possibly by Spanish-language information producers. Japanese information producers enjoy a larger and wealthier language market than do Francophone producers (although Japanese is almost certainly a "harder" language than French and thus less likely to be learned as a second language); German producers have a smaller, but wealthier, language market than do Francophone producers; and Spanish-language producers have a considerably larger, but poorer, market than do Francophone producers. Moreover, the relative advantages of English-language production seem to be so compelling that even co-ventures between French native-speaking partners (for example, Franco-Canadian film and television co-productions) are increasingly producing English-language works for exploitation in international markets. English-language information producers (and, to a significantly lesser degree, French-language information producers) therefore seem to experience less reduction in the value of their products due to "cultural discount" (to employ Hoskins & Mirus's, 1988, useful neologism) than do information producers working in other languages. They are able to sell high-cost productions at marginal cost (after "first copy" costs have been recouped in their home-language home markets) in foreign language markets which, all other things being equal, will be preferred to the lower-cost productions originating in other language communities (and may often be preferred to those of domestic producers). Note that these advantages are only potential advantages: they may be insufficient in practice to surmount the "cultural screens" which separate distinct linguistic and cultural communities. The factor of comparative advantage offered by the English language enables us to account for the disparity in information flows between Anglophone and other states, and the success of Anglophone information exporters in international markets--a record of success which is at odds with the persistent deficits experienced by major Anglophone states on their overall international trade balances. But comparative advantage has not always been sufficient to enable Anglophone producers to penetrate the cultural and linguistic screens which surround information markets.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA Drawing conclusions about the place of English- (and French-) language works in international tradeable information markets should be done with caution. Too often one runs the risks of drawing false conclusions because one has compared apples with pears. There are significant gaps and incommensurabilities in the data I have used which point to the need for further research. However, the marked dominance of Anglophone producers in world information markets suggests that these producers do enjoy an advantage over producers in other language communities and that, since the positive balance on the tradeable information account of the major Anglophone states is not representative of their overall overseas trading performance, these states do enjoy some significant advantage which can, provisionally, be attributed to the factor of language. The strong performance of the U.K. and, probably, Australia suggests that although home market size is likely to be a factor which significantly influences the likelihood of success of information producers in overseas markets the home linguistic market within which producers operate is also significant. The size and wealth of the Englishlanguage community means, first, that higher production ("first copy") costs can be incurred in the global Englishlanguage market than in other language markets and that consequently information goods produced in the English-speaking market are likely to be more attractive to third-market customers than are products which emanate from other language communities. Although European television viewers customarily prefer own country programming, their usual second choice is programming from the Anglophone world. And, second, because of the status of English as the world's preferred second language, Anglophones have opportunities to create international media products which are denied to members of other language communities. The advantages of English are, of course, disadvantages for other languages including French. France itself has a substantial deficit in trade with the U.S. on audio-visual products (estimated at $2 billion by Sturgess, 1992). Moreover, the potential advantages of English language (and, in relation to other non-English-language producers, of French-language producers) cannot be actualized unless the products which the exporting tradeable information sector produce and market are well adapted to the needs, tastes, and interests (the "culture") of the overseas market(s) on which they are targeted. The successes of the information sectors of small Anglophone countries (notably Australia) seem to have derived from successful niche marketing rather than direct challenge to the United States on the terrain of high-budget film and television drama in which it excels. Prima facie there seem to be niches (at least in audio-visual markets) which Canada could exploit successfully. Representatives of the BBC's sales organization, BBC Enterprises, testify to an undersupply of "strong documentaries" and "live action children's programming" on international television markets. Both these programme forms are ones in which Canada has a notable record. Moreover, the success of Japan (Ito, 1990) in overcoming its linguistic disadvantages in a successful exploitation of animation film suggest that Canada's expertise in animation may serve it well. Moreover, given the continuing escalation in costs of audio-visual drama production and an increasing, consequential recourse to international joint ventures to spread costs and risk, Canada's multicultural and multilinguistic society offers it an unique "laboratory" in which the skills of joint venturing can be fostered, learned, and disseminated. The linguistic and cultural characteristics of software--information content--are central factors which have determined, and will continue to determine, the economic success or failure of new communications technologies. For policy-makers the economic success (or otherwise) of new communication technologies is but one factor to be taken into consideration. Others include the integrity of national culture and diversity of media content and ownership. There are obvious trade-offs entailed between concentrating resources and specializing in particular niches of the global tradeable information market, which a policy seeking to maximize financial returns in global information trading may well entail, and the achievement of national content over a full range of information products. The Canadian case is indeed interesting yet underresearched. Canada is a subordinate and peripheral actor in the world's richest and most important information markets. Its varied social composition gives it links to other language communities and markets and constitutes it as a microcosm of the world community. These characteristics have customarily been seen as disadvantageous to Canada, making it vulnerable to import penetration, particularly in its information sector, and to loss of social cohesion. However, there are important counter-indications which suggest that this conventional wisdom requires reassessment. The benefits which accrue from Canada's linguistic and cultural links to other world communities are evident. A recent, if paradoxical, example comes in France's recent designation of Franco-Canadian film and television co-productions made in English as European works, thus qualifying such works as European for French and European Community quota requirements (see Media Policy Review, No. 5, September 1992, p. 1). Canada's two official languages are the languages which appear to offer most advantages to information producers who wish to exploit their products on international markets. Canada is the domicile of successful international media content enterprises (albeit Anglophone), and Canadian society has a very varied social, ethnic, and linguistic composition. It may be that "new societies" such as Canada possess social structures and habits better fitted to the brokering roles increasingly required in an increasingly interdependent and internationalized world economy than do old-style nation states. This general observation has a specific relevance to the Canadian tradeable information sector: co-productions are becoming more and more important forms through which resources are concentrated and markets secured for high-cost media productions. For coproductions to be successful not only do workers of different backgrounds, work practices, and values have to successfully collaborate but also the product has to be acceptable to consumers who may be widely separated linguistically and culturally. Prima facie an Anglophone "new society" seems well suited to make a success of co-production. However, the advantages of English can easily be seen as disadvantages for French. Although French-language productions seem to be more likely to succeed in international and transnational information markets than productions in any language other than English, there can be no doubt that English-language productions are, all other things being equal, more likely to succeed than French-language productions. The different status of Canada's two official languages vis-à-vis international information markets suggests that different strategies will be required to optimize benefits to Canada's two language communities and their distinct cultural industries. Speculations such as those above can, thus far, be no more than that. The research to test such propositions (and the host of other research questions concerned with the organization and structure of Canada's tradeable information sector and of the firms in it) has yet to be conducted. Researchers have a vital role in identifying the long-term structural characteristics which are shaping Canada's and the world's information markets and in clarifying the issues and consequences which relate to shorter term policy decisions. The continuing convergence and interdependence of media of content and carriage suggests that software characteristics, notably language and culture, will become more and more important foci for communications policy. Those such as lawyers, economists, and experts in technology assessment who have long held sway in policy analysis will increasingly find themselves rubbing shoulders with scholars from the fields of media, cultural, and communication studies.

RECOMMENDATIONS 1. A fuller mapping and measuring of the Canadian information economy and its place in the global information economy. In particular: (a) Data to capture what small- and medium-sized enterprises are doing. (b) Research on the cultural characteristics of successful (and unsuccessful) products. For example, what are the regularities in (inter alia) narrative structure, iconography, subject matter, etc., which make for success (and failure)? (c) On the level of production, what are the linkages between different forms of commoditization of intellectual property (a film of a book, etc.). 2. Comparative study and evaluation of measures taken in other jurisdictions to rectify perceived market failure in the cultural industries, such as in the European Union and Australia. 3. Support for Canadian researchers in establishing enduring working relationships with researchers overseas with whom they can jointly develop research projects and programmes. 4. Need for multidisciplinary research teams to successfully undertake this research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Earlier versions of parts of this paper were published in my Language, Culture and Information Markets, CIRCIT Policy Research Paper No. 5 (Melbourne: CIRCIT, 1990). I am grateful to members of the research team on Cultural Development in an Open Economy for their comments on an earlier draft and to Philip Schlesinger for his guidance.

NOTES 1 The terms "culture" and "information" are difficult to define and to differentiate from each other. I have used the term "information" chiefly to signify an economic resource of knowledge which can be, and is, commoditized, traded, bought, and sold. Culture is not only one form of information (and is commoditized and traded) but also constitutes a characteristic of information commodities (and of information consumers and producers) which forms an important boundary of information markets. 2 2 Not all did; before Edison there were no means of recording sounds. 3 Though dated, UNESCO's data remains the most comprehensive and up-to-date set available in the public domain. 4 Note that these conclusions are based on available data which is incomplete and imperfectly commensurable. For example, my conclusions could be falsified were France found to have more smaller media enterprises than has Canada. This hypothetically greater number of smaller enterprises might have a greater overall output than the fewer but larger Canadian enterprises. However, data to compare export performance with domestic market size for all major information content sectors by country is lacking. Conclusions are therefore provisional and indicative. 5 In 1990 the United States was largest with an annual publishers' net sales total of $7.9 billion, Germany second with $5.1 billion, France third with $2.83 billion, Italy fourth with $2.81 billion, the U.K. fifth with $2.35 billion, and Spain sixth with $2.15 billion (Euromonitor survey, 1992, cited in the Financial Times Review of Business Books, September 29, 1992, p. 12). 6 If we take the book translation index, supplemented by our knowledge that the French film industry is second only to that of the U.S. in its export performance (see OECD, 1986), as a reliable measure. 7 More research is required to validate, or falsify, this proposition. We lack anything other than impressionistic and anecdotal information on the character of the products successfully sold overseas by the U.K. and Australia--still less do we have information on the apparent successes of the South East Asian Anglophone information producers of Hong Kong and Singapore.

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