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Answers to 2016 Bar Exams Questions Saturday, March 11th, 2017

Answers to 2016 Bar Exams Questions

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MCLE Seminar 2016 Tuesday, January 26th, 2016

The Faculty of Civil Law in cooperation with Divina Law announces its MCLE Seminar. Below are the following schedule.

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Bar Exams Q & A for Departmental Exams Friday, October 30th, 2015

Below are the following BAR EXAMS Q & A for Departmental Exams (kindly double – click the title to view the pdf file)

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1. Political and Public International Law 2. Labor Law Bar 3. Civil Law 4. Taxation Law 5. Criminal Law 6. Remedial Law Bar 7. Mercantile Law Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

LAW ON TAXATION Thursday, October 29th, 2015

TAX I

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Paseo Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119286, October 13, 2004 Taxation is described as a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the support of the government. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) The power to tax is inherent in the State, such power being inherently legislative, based on the principle that taxes are a grant of the people who are taxed, and the grant must be made by the immediate representative of the people, and where the people have laid the power, there it must remain and be exercised. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667 (1996) As an incident of sovereignty, the power to tax has been described as unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008 It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is plenary. Comprehensive and supreme, the principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., 613 SCRA 774 (2010) The power to tax is sometimes called the power to destroy. Therefore, it should be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of the taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kills the ‘hen that lays the golden egg.’ MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF THE DSWD, G.R. No. 175356 (2013).

The 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police power of the State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. The discount is intended to improve the welfare of the senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing commodities. As to its nature an effects, although the regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The State can employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability of business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided, the regulation does not go too far as to amount to “taking.” SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005 The motivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin between rich and poor; the so-called “sin taxes” on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help dissuade the consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful products. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses. RENATO V. DIAZ and AURORA MA. F. TIMBOL v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 193007, July 19, 2011 A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public expenditures; toll fees, on the other hand, are collected by private tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the construction, maintenance and operation of the tollways. Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership. PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. Nos. 147036-37 April 10, 2012 The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. GEROCHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 527 SCRA 696 (2007 The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity, without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well being of the people. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28896, February 17, 1988 Despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one’s hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ROSEMARIE ACOSTA G.R. No. 154068 August 3, 2007

As well said in a prior case, revenue laws are not intended to be liberally construed. Considering that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and in Holmes’s memorable metaphor, the price we pay for civilization, tax laws must be faithfully and strictly implemented. SWEDISH MATCH PHILIPPINES INC. v. THE TREASURER OF THE CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013 Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. There is indeed double taxation if a taxpayer is subjected to the taxes under both Section 14 (Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and other Processors) and Section 21 (Tax on Business Subject to the Excise, Value-Added or Percentage Taxes under the NIRC) of the Tax Ordinance No. 7794. SERAFICA v. CITY TREASURER OF ORMOC, G.R. No. L- 24813, April 28, 1968 Regulation and taxation are two different things, the first being an exercise of police power, whereas the latter involves the exercise of the power of taxation. While R.A. 2264 provides that no city may impose taxes on forest products and although lumber is a forest product, the tax in question is imposed not on the lumber but upon its sale; thus, there is no double taxation and even if there was, it is not prohibited. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC. G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999 In negotiating tax treaties, the underlying rationale for reducing the tax rate is that the Philippines will give up a part of the tax in the expectation that the tax given up for this particular investment is not taxed by the other country. Thus, if the rates of tax are lowered by the state of source, in this case, by the Philippines, there should be a concomitant commitment on the part of the state of residence to grant some form of tax relief, whether this be in the form of a tax credit or exemption. DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013

Tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. A corporation who has paid 15% Branch Profit Remittance Tax (BPRT) has the right to avail (by way of refund ) of the benefit of a preferential tax rate of 10% BPRT in accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty despite non-compliance with an application with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction for the lower rate. Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the requirements for the application for availment of tax treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. CBK Power Company Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue/Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CBK Power Company Limited, G.R. No. 193383-84/G.R. No. 193407-08 (January 14, 2015). The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of law. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 in requiring the application for treaty relief with the ITAD before a party’s availment of the preferential rate under a tax treaty is to avert the consequences of any erroneous interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as claims for refund/credit for overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment. However, the underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases – where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from the non-availment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. CBK Power could not have applied for a tax treaty relief 15 days prior to its payment of the final withholding tax on the interest paid to its lenders precisely because it erroneously paid said tax on the basis of the regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC, and not on the preferential tax rate provided under the different treaties. The prior application requirement under RMO No. 1-2000 is not only illogical, but is also an imposition that is not found at all in the applicable tax treaties. BIR should not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements, especially since said tax treaties do not provide for any prerequisite at all for the availment of the benefits under said agreements. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188497, February 19, 2014 Section 135(a) should be construed as prohibiting the shifting of the burden of the excise tax to the international carriers who buy petroleum products from the local manufacturers. Said international carriers are thus allowed to purchase the petroleum products without the excise tax component which otherwise would have been added to the cost or price fixed by the local manufacturers or distributors/sellers. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. THE ESTATE OF BENIGNO P. TODA, JR. G.R. No. 147188 September 14, 2004 Tax evasion connotes the integration of three factors: (1) the end to be achieved, i.e., the payment of less than that known by the taxpayer to be legally due, or the non-payment of tax when it is shown that a tax is due; (2) an accompanying state of mind which is described as being “evil,” in “bad faith,” “willfull,” or “deliberate and not accidental”; and (3) a course of action or failure of action which is unlawful. (FELS ENERGY, INC. v. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, 516 SCRA 186 (2007)) Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION BATANGAS CITY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 152675, April 28, 2004 This Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifically, we stressed that Section 193 of the LGC, an express and general repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes, withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by the NPC under its Charter. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995 Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative; indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. MCIAA v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 612 SCRA 665 (2010) Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the Government and the taxpayers are not creditors and debtors of each other, debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. DOMINGO v. GARLITOS, 8 SCRA 443 (1963) However, if the obligation to pay taxes and the taxpayer’s claim against the government are both overdue, demandable, as well as fully liquidated, compensation takes place by operation of law and both obligations are extinguished to their concurrent amounts. ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 179115 September 26, 2012 A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored or presumed in law. The grant of a tax amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012 While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. Hence, in case of discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. 613 SCRA 774 (2010) Revenue Memorandum Circulars (RMCs) must not override, supplant, or modify the law, but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (Formerly MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION) v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 197760, January 13, 2014 BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it is a response to a query made, not by a particular taxpayer, but by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008) It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the funds generated for a private purpose. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of “public purpose.” ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005 The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law – complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable – and to determine the expediency of its enactment. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF CABANATUAN G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003 Taxation assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. QUEZON CITY, et al. v. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006 Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units’ delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place, the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, “the power to tax is [still] primarily vested in the Congress.” SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005 Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA [Safeguard Measure Act] by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue as cited in COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. JULIANE BAIER-NICKEL, G.R. No. 153793, August 29, 2006 The reinsurance premiums remitted to appellants by virtue of the reinsurance contracts, accordingly, had for their source the undertaking to indemnify Commonwealth Insurance Co. against liability. Said undertaking is the activity that produced the reinsurance premiums, and the same took place in the Philippines. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. JAPAN AIR LINES, INC., G.R. No. 60714, March 6, 1991 For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived from activities within this country regardless of the absence of flight operations within Philippine territory. Indeed, the sale of tickets is the very lifeblood of the airline business, the generation of sales being the paramount objective. CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012 Since it partakes of the nature of an excise tax, the situs of taxation is the place where the privilege is exercised, in this case in the City of Iriga, where CASURECO III has its principal office and from where it operates, regardless of the place where its services or products are delivered. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v.AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (PHILIPPINE BRANCH), G.R. No. 152609, June 29, 2005 As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed; thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed. PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (PFDA) v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, G.R. No. 178030, December 15, 2010 As property of public dominion, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC. v. HON. BIENVENIDO TAN, G.R. No. 81311, June 30, 1988 Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. G.R. No. 195909 September 26, 2012 Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC requires that an institution be “operated exclusively” for charitable or social welfare purposes to be completely exempt from income tax. An institution under Section 30(E) or (G) does not lose its tax exemption if it earns income from its for-profit activities. Such income from for-profit activities, under the last paragraph of Section 30, is merely subject to income tax, previously at the ordinary corporate rate but now at the preferential 10% rate pursuant to Section 27(B). JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, et al. v. VICTOR LIM, et al., G. R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003 The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution’s imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MARUBENI CORPORATION, G.R. No. 137377, December 18, 2001 A contractor’s tax is generally in the nature of an excise tax on the exercise of a privilege of selling services or labor rather than a sale on products; and is directly collectible from the person exercising the privilege. Being an excise tax, it can be levied by the taxing authority only when the acts, privileges or business are done or performed within the jurisdiction of said authority. CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012 A franchise tax is a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state. It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the government. ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 179115 September 26, 2012 Indirect taxes, like VAT and excise tax, are different from withholding taxes: To distinguish, in indirect taxes, the incidence of taxation falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. On the other hand, in case of withholding taxes, the incidence and burden of taxation fall on the same entity, the statutory taxpayer. The burden of taxation is not shifted to the withholding agent who merely collects, by withholding, the tax due from income payments to entities arising from certain transactions and remits the same to the government. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995 The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive since what it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.” CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 175108 (2013). The 20% final tax withheld on a bank’s passive income should be included in the computation of the Gross Receipts Tax (GRT). Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) has consistently ruled that the term gross receipts do not admit of any deduction. It emphasized that interest earned by banks, even if subject to the final tax and excluded from taxable gross income, forms part of its gross receipt for GRT purposes. The interest earned refers to the gross interest without deduction, since the regulations do not provide for any deduction. Absent a statutory definition of the term, the BIR had consistently applied it in its ordinary meaning, i.e., without deduction. TAN v. DEL ROSARIO, JR. 237 SCRA 324 Global treatment is a system where the tax treatment views indifferently the tax base and generally treats in common all categories of taxable income of the taxpayer. Schedular approach is a system employed where the income tax treatment varies and made to depend on the kind or category of taxable income of the taxpayer. CIR vs Isabela Cultural Corp., GR 172231, February 12, 2007 The accrual method relies upon the taxpayer’s right to receive amounts or its obligation to pay them, in opposition to actual receipt or payment, which characterizes the cash method of accounting. Amounts of income accrue where the right to receive them become fixed, where there is created an enforceable liability. Similarly, liabilities are accrued when fixed and determinable in amount, without regard to indeterminacy merely of time of payment. For a taxpayer using the accrual method, the determinative question is, when do the facts present themselves in such a manner that the taxpayer must recognize income or expense? The accrual of income and expense is permitted when the all-events test has been met. This test requires: (1) fixing of a right to income or liability to pay; and (2) the availability of the reasonable accurate determination of such income or liability. Tomas Calasanz, et al. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., G.R. No. L-26284, October 9, 1986 The proceeds from the inherited land of petitioners, which they subdivided into small lots and in the process converted into a residential subdivision and given the name Don Mariano Subdivision, is taxable as ordinary income. Property initially classified as a capital asset may thereafter be treated as an ordinary asset if a combination of the factors indubitably tend to show that the activity was in furtherance of or in the course of the taxpayer’s trade or business; thus, a sale of inherited real property usually gives capital gain or loss even though the property has to be subdivided or improved or both to make it salable–however, if the inherited property is substantially improved or very actively sold or both it may be treated as held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the heir’s business. CIR vs CA, G.R. No. 108576 January 20, 1999 Stock dividends, strictly speaking, represent capital and do not constitute income to its recipient. So that the mere issuance thereof is not yet subject to income tax as they are nothing but an enrichment through increase in value of capital investment. However, the redemption or cancellation of stock dividends, depending on the time and manner it was made, is essentially equivalent to a distribution of taxable dividends, making the proceeds thereof taxable income to the extent it represents profits. The exception was designed to prevent the issuance and cancellation or redemption of stock dividends, which is fundamentally not taxable, from being made use of as a device for the actual distribution of cash dividends, which is taxable. Ma. Isabel T. Santos vs. Servier Phil., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 166377, November 28, 2008 Respondent terminated petitioner’s services due to her illness, rendering her incapable of continuing to work, and gave her retirement benefits but withheld the tax due thereon. The retirements benefits are taxable because the petitioner was only 41 yrs old at the time of retirement and had rendered only 8 years of service; for these benefits to be exempt from tax, the following requisites must concur: (1) a reasonable private benefit plan is maintained by the employer; (2) the retiring official or employee has been in the service of the same employer for at least ten (10) years; (3) the retiring official or employee is not less than fifty (50) years of age at the time of his retirement; and (4) the benefit had been availed of only once. 1. M. Hoskins & Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-24059, November 28, 1969 Payment by the taxpayer-corporation to its controlling stockholder (Hoskins) of 50% of its supervision fees (paid by a client of the corporation for the latter’s services as managing agent of a subdivision project) or the amount of P99,977.91 is not a deductible ordinary and necessary expense because it does not pass the test of reasonable compensation. If independently, a one-time P100,000.00-fee to plan and lay down the rules for supervision of a subdivision project were to be paid to an experienced realtor such as Hoskins, its fairness and deductibility by the taxpayer could be conceded; however, the fee paid to Hoskins continued every year since 1955 up to 1963 and for as long as its contract with the subdivision owner subsisted, regardless of whether services were actually rendered by Hoskins. Philippine Refining Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118794, May 8, 1996 In claiming deductions for bad debts, the only evidentiary support given by PRC was the explanation posited by its accountant, whose allegations were not supported by any documentary evidence. One of the requisites to qualify as “bad debt” is that the debt must be actually ascertained to be worthless and uncollectible during the taxable year, and the taxpayer must prove that he exerted diligent efforts to collect the debts by (1) sending of statement of accounts; (2) sending of collection letters; (3) giving the account to a lawyer for collection; and (4) filing a collection case in court. Consolidated Mines, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-18843 & 18844, August 29, 1974 Both depletion and depreciation are predicated on the same basic promise of avoiding a tax on capital. The allowance for depletion is based on the theory that the extraction of minerals gradually exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit. The purpose of the depiction deduction is to permit the owner of a capital interest in mineral in place to make a tax-free recovery of that depleting capital asset. A depletion is based upon the concept of the exhaustion of a natural resource whereas depreciation is based upon the concept of the exhaustion of the property, not otherwise a natural resource, used in a trade or business or held for the production of income. Thus, depletion and depreciation are made applicable to different types of assets. And a taxpayer may not deduct that which the Code allows as of another. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), G.R. No. 179259 (2013). A corporation like the Philippine Airlines who has a franchise of its own cannot be subject to the minimum corporate income tax. The reason being- as provided in PD 1590, Section 13 of PAL’s franchise, its taxation shall be strictly governed by two fundamental rules, to wit: (1) respondent shall pay the Government either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower; and (2) the tax paid by respondent, under either of these alternatives, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges, except only real property tax. Manila Banking Corp. v. CIR, 499 SCRA 782 The intent of Congress relative to the MCIT is to grant a 4 year suspension of tax payment to newly formed corporations. Corporations still starting have to stabilize their venture in order to obtain stronghold in the industry. It is not a surprise when many corporations reported losses in their initial years of operations. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998 YMCA, a non-stock non-profit corporation with charitable objectives, claimed exemption from payment of income tax by invoking the NIRC and the Constitution. While the income received by the organizations enumerated in Section 26 of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax “in respect to income received by them as such,” the exemption does not apply to income derived “from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income”; Moreover, charitable institutions under Art. VI, sec. 28 of the Constitution are only exempted from property taxes, and YMCA is not an educational institution under Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Citytrust Investment Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 139786 & 140857, September 27, 2006 Citytrust and Asianbank are domestic corporations which paid gross receipts tax and claimed a refund on the basis of a CTA ruling that the 20% FWT on a bank’s passive income does not form part of the taxable gross receipts. The 20% FWT on a bank’s interest income forms part of the taxable gross receipts because “gross receipts” means “the entire receipts without any deduction”; moreover, the imposition of the 20% FWT and 5% GRT does not constitute double taxation because GRT is a percentage tax while FWT is an income tax, and the two concepts are different from each other. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS CORPORATION, G.R. No. 185728 (2013). For a taxpayer to be entitled to a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax, the following requisites must be complied with: First, The claim must be filed with the CIR within the twoyear period from the date of payment of the tax; Second, It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received was declared as part of the gross income; and Third, The fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld. TAX II GONZALO VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES FROILAN, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011 Post-mortem dispositions typically – (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee; [4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa; [5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is “to take effect at the death of the donor” are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor; and (6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. ROMARICO G. VITUG vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990 The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. In this case, the monies subject of savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds. In the case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings. RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. 140944, April 30, 2008 As held in Propstra v. U.S., where a lien claimed against the estate was certain and enforceable on the date of the decedent’s death, the fact that the claimant subsequently settled for lesser amount did not preclude the estate from deducting the entire amount of the claim for estate tax purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the general principle that post-death developments are not material in determining the amount of the deduction. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123206, March 22, 2000 Administration expenses, as an allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for purposes of arriving at the value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of the United States to include all expenses “essential to the collection of the assets, payment of debts or the distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it.” In other words, the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the estate and expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not deductible. SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000 The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee which is a mark of a donation inter vivos; second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties; third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land; lastly, the donee accepted the donation. The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company vs. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 210987 (November 24, 2014). The absence of donative intent does not exempt the sales of stock transaction from donor’s tax since Sec. 100 of the NIRC categorically states that the amount by which the fair market value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift. Thus, even if there is no actual donation, the difference in price is considered a donation by fiction of law. Moreover, Sec. 7(c.2.2) of RR 06-08 does not alter Sec. 100 of the NIRC but merely sets the parameters for determining the “fair market value” of a sale of stocks. Lastly, RMC 25-11, even if issued after the sale, was not being applied retroactively since it merely called for the strict application of Sec. 100, which was already in force the moment the NIRC was enacted. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SONY PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 178697, November 17, 2010 Thus, there must be a sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties before any VAT may be levied. Certainly, there was no such sale, barter or exchange in the subsidy given by SIS to Sony; it was but a dole out by SIS and not in payment for goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged by Sony. MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 193301, March 11, 2013 Mindanao II’s sale of the Nissan Patrol is said to be an isolated transaction. However, it does not follow that an isolated transaction cannot be an incidental transaction for purposes of VAT liability. Indeed, a reading of Section 105 of the 1997 Tax Code would show that a transaction “in the course of trade or business” includes “transactions incidental thereto.” CIR v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and First Asia Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 183505, February 26, 2010 Among those included in the enumeration is the “lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs.” This, however, is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motion pictures or films. The legislative intent is not to impose VAT on persons already covered by the amusement tax and this holds true even in the case of cinema/theater operators taxed under the LGC of 1991 precisely because the VAT law was intended to replace the percentage tax on certain services. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007 According to the Destination Principle, goods and services are taxed only in the country where these are consumed. In connection with the said principle, the Cross Border Doctrine mandates that no VAT shall be imposed to form part of the cost of the goods destined for consumption outside the territorial border of the taxing authority. Hence, actual export of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country must be free of VAT, while those destined for use or consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed with 10% VAT. CIR v. Seksui Jushi Phils, Inc. G.R. No. 149671, July 21, 2006 While an ecozone is geographically within the Philippines, it is deemed a separate customs territory and is regulated in laws as foreign soul. Sales by supplies outside the borders of ecozone to this separate customs territory are deemed exports and treated as export sales. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) vs. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011 The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for in P.D. 1869 and the extension of such exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations are best elucidated from the 1987 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc., where the absolute tax exemption of the World Health Organization (WHO) upon an international agreement was upheld. We held in said case that the exemption of contractee WHO should be implemented to mean that the entity or person exempt is the contractor itself who constructed the building owned by contractee WHO, and such does not violate the rule that tax exemptions are personal because the manifest intention of the agreement is to exempt the contractor so that no contractor’s tax may be shifted to the contractee WHO. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 188260 (2013).

Even though the sale of electricity by a power generation company is subject to zero-rated VAT, its claim for refund or tax credit cannot be granted where no VAT official receipts and VAT returns have been presented to prove that it actually made zero-rated sales of electricity. An entity claiming for refund or tax credit carries with it the burden of proving that not only is it entitled under the substantive law to the allowance of its claim for refund or tax credit but also that it met all the requirements for evidentiary substantiation of its claim before the administrative official concerned. CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 198729-30 (2014). Under Section 112(A) of the NIRC, for VAT-registered persons whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated, a claim for the refund or credit of creditable input tax that is due or paid, and that is attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales, must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sale or transactions were made, regardless of when the input VAT was paid. Also, in the filing of judicial claims, the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is dependent on the 120-day period, compliance with both periods is jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. MINDANAO II PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No. 191498 (2014). Section 112(D) speaks of two periods: the period of 120 days, which serves as a waiting period to give time for the CIR to act on the administrative claim for refund or credit, and the period of 30 days, which refers to the period for interposing an appeal with the CTA. The 30-day period applies not only to instances of actual denial by the CIR of the claim for refund or tax credit, but to cases of inaction by the CIR as well. Therefore, notwithstanding the timely filing of administrative claims, the CTA does not have jurisdiction over the case where the taxpayer’s judicial claim was filed beyond the 30 day period, the nature of such time requirement being mandatory. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Silicon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Intel Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.), G.R. No. 169778 (March 12, 2014). Prior to seeking judicial recourse before the CTA, a VAT–registered person may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax attributable to zero–rated or effectively zero–rated sales within two (2) years after the close of taxable quarter when the sales or purchases were made. Additionally, under paragraph (D) of Section 112, Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is given a 120–day period, from submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to act on claims for refund/applications for issuance of the tax credit certificate. Upon denial of the claim or application, or upon expiration of the 120–day period, the taxpayer only has 30 days within which to appeal said adverse decision or unacted claim before the CTA. Taganito Mining Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 197591 (June 18, 2014). The 2010 Aichi case instructs that once the administrative claim is filed within the prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a 30day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period. Taganito Mining Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 201195 (November 26, 2014). The 2-year period under Section 229 does not apply to appeals before the CTA in relation to claims for a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable input VAT. Section 229 pertains to the recovery of taxes erroneously, illegally, or excessively collected. Input VAT is not ‘excessively’ collected as understood under Section 229 because, at the time the input VAT is collected, the amount paid is correct and proper. It is, therefore, Section 112 which applies specifically with regard to claiming a refund or tax credit for unutilized creditable input VAT. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 173425, January 22, 2013 Prior payment of taxes is not necessary before a taxpayer could avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit: first, it was never mentioned in Section 105 of the old NIRC [now Sec. 111] that prior payment of taxes is a requirement; second, since the law (Section 105 of the NIRC) does not provide for prior payment of taxes, to require it now would be tantamount to judicial legislation which, to state the obvious, is not allowed; third, a transitional input tax credit is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit; fourth, if the intent of the law were to limit the input tax to cases where actual VAT was paid, it could have simply said that the tax base shall be the actual value-added tax paid; and fifth, this Court had already declared that prior payment of taxes is not required in order to avail of a tax credit. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), G.R. No. 153866, February 11, 2005 Having determined that respondent’s purchase transactions are subject to a zero VAT rate, the tax refund or credit is in order. To repeat, the VAT is a tax imposed on consumption, not on business. Although respondent as an entity is exempt, the transactions it enters into are not necessarily so. The VAT payments made in excess of the zero rate that is imposable may certainly be refunded or credited. CIR vs Pascor Realty and Development Corp., GR no. 128315, June 29, 1999

An assessment contains not only a computation of tax liabilities, but also a demand for payment within a prescribed period. It also signals the time when penalties and protests begin to accrue against the taxpayer. To enable the taxpayer to determine his remedies thereon, due process requires that it must be served on and received by the taxpayer. Accordingly, an affidavit, which was executed by revenue officers stating the tax liabilities of a taxpayer and attached to a criminal complaint for tax evasion, cannot be deemed an assessment that can be questioned before the Court of Tax Appeals. SMI-ED Philippine Technology, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175410 (November 12, 2014) The power and duty to assess national internal revenue taxes are lodged with the BIR. The Court of Tax Appeals has no power to make an assessment at the first instance. On matters such as tax collection, tax refund, and others related to the national internal revenue taxes, the Court of Tax Appeals’ jurisdiction is appellate in nature. However, because Republic Act No. 1125 also vests the Court of Tax Appeals with jurisdiction over the BIR’s inaction on a taxpayer’s refund claim, there may be instances when the Court of Tax Appeals has to take cognizance of cases that have nothing to do with the BIR’s assessments or decisions. If the BIR fails to act on the request for refund, the taxpayer may bring the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals. Samar-I Electric Cooperative vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193100 (December 10, 2014). Our stand that the law should be interpreted to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return, fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is strengthened immeasurably by the last portion of the provision which segregates the situations into three different classes, namely “falsity,” “fraud” and “omission.” That there is a difference between “false return” and “fraudulent return” cannot be denied. While the first merely implies deviation from the truth, whether intentional or not, the second implies intentional or deceitful entry with intent to evade the taxes due. CIR vs Hantex Trading Co., GR no. 136975, March 31, 2005 The rule is that in the absence of the accounting records of a taxpayer, his tax liability may be determined by estimation. The petitioner is not required to compute such tax liabilities with mathematical exactness. Approximation in the calculation of the taxes due is justified. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that skillful concealment is an invincible barrier to proof. However, the rule does not apply where the estimation is arrived at arbitrarily and capriciously. In fine, then, the petitioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on and giving weight to the machine copies of the Consumption Entries in fixing the tax deficiency assessments against the respondent. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 198759 (2013). Section 204(c) of the NIRC provides that it is the statutory taxpayer which has the legal personality to file a claim for refund. Accordingly, in cases involving excise tax exemptions on petroleum products under Section 135, the Court has consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer who is entitled to claim a tax refund based thereon and not the party who merely bears its economic burden. However, the abovementioned rule should not apply to instances where the law clearly grants the party to which the economic burden of the tax is shifted an exemption from both direct and indirect taxes. In which case, the latter must be allowed to claim a tax refund even if it is not considered as the statutory taxpayer under the law. In this case, PAL’s franchise grants it an exemption from both direct and indirect taxes on its purchase of petroleum products. Hence, PAL has the legal personality to file the claim for refund for the passed on excise taxes because of its franchise. CIR vs Primetown Property Group Inc., GR 162155, August 28, 2007 Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. CIR vs Phoenix Assurance Co., L-19127, May 20, 1965 Considering that the deficiency assessment was based on the amended return which, as aforestated, is substantially different from the original return, the period of limitation of the right to issue the same should be counted from the filing of the amended income tax return. We believe that to hold otherwise, we would be paving the way for taxpayers to evade the payment of taxes by simply reporting in their original return heavy losses and amending the same more than five years later when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has lost his authority to assess the proper tax thereunder. The object of the Tax Code is to impose taxes for the needs of the Government, not to enhance tax avoidance to its prejudice. CIR v. Metro Star Superama, Inc. 637 SCRA 633 Sec. 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer must be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes through the sending of a Preliminary Assessment Notice. The sending of a PAN to the taxpayer is to inform him of the assessment made is but part of due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment, the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment made by the tax authorities. CIR v. Enron Subic Power Corp. 575 SCRA 212 A taxpayer must be informed in writing of the legal and factual bases of the tax assessment made against him. This is a mandatory requirement. The advice of a tax deficiency given by the CIR to an employee of Enron as well as the preliminary 5-day letter notice, were not valid substitutes for the mandatory notice in writing of the legal and factual bases of the assessment. Sec. 228 of the NIRC requires that the legal and factual bases be stated in the formal letter of demand and assessment notice. Otherwise the law and RR 12-99 would be rendered nugatory. In view of the absence of a fair opportunity for Enron to be informed of the bases of the assessment, the assessment was void. This is a requirement of due process. CIR vs First Express Pawnshop Company, GR 172045-46, June 16, 2009 Petitioner cannot insist on the submission of proof of DST payment because such document does not exist as respondent claims that it is not liable to pay, and has not paid, the DST on the deposit on subscription. The term “relevant supporting documents” should be understood as those documents necessary to support the legal basis in disputing a tax assessment as determined by the taxpayer. The BIR can only inform the taxpayer to submit additional documents. The BIR cannot demand what type of supporting documents should be submitted. Otherwise, a taxpayer will be at the mercy of the BIR, which may require the production of documents that a taxpayer cannot submit. Allied Banking Corporation vs CIR, G.R. No. 175097, February 5, 2010 Records show that petitioner disputed the PAN but not the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices. Nevertheless, we cannot blame petitioner for not filing a protest against the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices since the language used and the tenor of the demand letter indicate that it is the final decision of the respondent on the matter. We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate, in a clear and unequivocal language, whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final determination thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the tax court accrues. Viewed in the light of the foregoing, respondent is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a final decision. CIR vs Union Shipping Corporation, GR L-66160, May 21, 1990 The request for reinvestigation and reconsideration was in effect considered denied by petitioner when the latter filed a civil suit for collection of deficiency income. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not having clearly signified his final action on the disputed assessment, legally the period to appeal has not commenced to run. Thus, it was only when private respondent received the summons on the civil suit for collection of deficiency income on December 28, 1978 that the period to appeal commenced to run. CIR vs Kudos Metal Corp., GR 178087, May 5, 2010 While we may agree with the Court of Tax Appeals that a mere request for reexamination or reinvestigation may not have the effect of suspending the running of the period of limitation for in such case there is need of a written agreement to extend the period between the Collector and the taxpayer, there are cases however where a taxpayer may be prevented from setting up the defense of prescription even if he has not previously waived it in writing as when by his repeated requests or positive acts the Government has been, for good reasons, persuaded to postpone collection to make him feel that the demand was not unreasonable or that no harassment or injustice is meant by the Government. CIR vs Philippine Global Communication, GR 167146, October 31, 2006

The running of the prescription period where the acts of the taxpayer did not prevent the government from collecting the tax. Partial payment would not prevent the government from suing the taxpayer. Because, by such act of payment, the government is not thereby “persuaded to postpone collection to make him feel that the demand was not unreasonable or that no harassment or injustice is meant.” Bank of Philippine Islands (Formerly Far East Bank and Trust Company) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 174942, March 7, 2008 The law prescribing a limitation of actions for the collection of the income tax is beneficial both to the Government and to its citizens; to the Government because tax officers would be obliged to act promptly in the making of assessment, and to citizens because after the lapse of the period of prescription citizens would have a feeling of security against unscrupulous tax agents who will always find an excuse to inspect the books of taxpayers, not to determine the latter’s real liability, but to take advantage of every opportunity to molest peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Without such a legal defense taxpayers would furthermore be under obligation to always keep their books and keep them open for inspection subject to harassment by unscrupulous tax agents. Republic vs Enriquez, GR 78391, October 21, 1988 It is settled that the claim of the government predicated on a tax lien is superior to the claim of a private litigant predicated on a judgment. The tax lien attaches not only from the service of the warrant of distraint of personal property but from the time the tax became due and payable. Besides, the distraint on the subject properties of Maritime Company of the Philippines as well as the notice of their seizure were made by petitioner, through the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, long before the writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 181459 (June 9, 2014). The claim for tax refund in the aggregate amount must fail since the same has already prescribed under Section 229 of the Tax Code. The prescriptive period of two (2) years commences to run from the time that the refund is ascertained, the propriety thereof is determined by law (in this case, from the date of payment of tax), and not upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes. The issuance by the BIR of the Ruling declaring the tax-exempt status of NORD/LB, if at all, is merely confirmatory in nature. BIR Ruling No. DA342-2003 is not the operative act from which an entitlement of refund is determined. Systra Philippines vs CIR, GR 176290, September 21, 2007 A corporation entitled to a tax credit or refund of the excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid has two options: (1) to carry over the excess credit or (2) to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or to claim a cash refund. If the option to carry over the excess credit is exercised, the same shall be irrevocable for that taxable period. This is known as the irrevocability rule and is embodied in the last sentence of Section 76 of the Tax Code. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs CIR, GR 141973, June 28, 2005 In cases before tax courts, Rules of Court applies only by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Since it is not disputed that petitioner is entitled to tax exemption, it should not be precluded from presenting evidence to substantiate the amount of refund it is claiming on mere technicality especially in this case, where the failure to present invoices at the first instance was adequately explained by petitioner. ACCRA Investments vs CA, G.R. No. 96322, December 20, 1991 For corporations, the two-year prescriptive period within which to claim a refund commences to run, at the earliest, on the date of the filing of the adjusted final tax return. The rationale in computing the two-year prescriptive period with respect to the petitioner corporation’s claim for refund from the time it filed its final adjustment return is the fact that it was only then that ACCRAIN could ascertain whether it made profits or incurred losses in its business operations. Silkair vs CIR, G.R. Nos. 171383 & 172379, November 14, 2008 The proper party to question, or seek a refund of an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another. Even if Petron Corporation passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the additional amount billed to Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the price which Silkair had to pay as a purchaser. Angeles City vs. Angeles City Electric Corp., GR 166134, June 29, 2010 The National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. The situation, however, is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there is no express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. Such statutory lapse or intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58. PNOC vs CA, G.R. No. 109976, April 26, 2005 Compromise may be the favored method to settle disputes, but when it involves taxes, it may be subject to closer scrutiny by the courts. A compromise agreement involving taxes would affect not just the taxpayer and the BIR, but also the whole nation, the ultimate beneficiary of the tax revenues collected. People vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152532, August 16, 2005 The BIR may therefore abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability, inclusive of increments, if its assessment is excessive or erroneous; or if the administration costs involved do not justify the collection of the amount due. No mutual concessions need be made, because an excessive or erroneous tax is not compromised; it is abated or canceled. Only correct taxes should be paid. PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, G.R. No. 183137 (2013). Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. Provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. Section 140 of the LGC expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement. Theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other places of amusement’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues “where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances” or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes. National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, April 09, 2003

As commonly used, a franchise tax is “a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state.” To determine whether the petitioner is covered by franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a “franchise” in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Sta. Romana, G.R. No. L-30159, March 31, 1987 Under the Local Tax Code. there is no question that the authority to impose the license fees collected from the hauling of sand and gravel excavated properly belongs to the province concerned and not to the municipality where they are found which is specifically prohibited under Section 22 of the same Code “from levying taxes, fees and charges that the province or city is authorized to levy in this Code.” Province of Cagayan v. Lara, G.R. No. 188500, July 24, 2013 In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138 (2) of RA 7160 requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 04, 2009 When a municipality or city has already imposed a business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143 (a) of the LGC, said municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc. to a business tax under Section 143 (h) of the same Code. Section 143 (h) may be imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT, or percentage tax under the NIRC, and that are “not otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs“. Ericsson Telecoms vs. City of Pasig. G.R. NO. 176667, November 22, 2007 Tax should be computed based on gross receipts; the right to receive income, and not the actual receipt, determines when to include the amount in gross income. The imposition of local business tax based on petitioner’s gross revenue will inevitably result in the constitutionally proscribed double taxation – taxing of the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing – inasmuch as petitioner’s revenue or income for a taxable year will definitely include its gross receipts already reported during the previous year and for which local business tax has already been paid. Palma Development Corp. v. Municipality of Malangas, G.R. No. 152492, October 16, 2003 Section 133(e) of RA No. 7160 prohibits the imposition, in the guise of wharfage, of fees — as well as all other taxes or charges in any form whatsoever — on goods or merchandise. It is therefore irrelevant if the fees imposed are actually for police surveillance on the goods, because any other form of imposition on goods passing through the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is clearly prohibited by Section 133(e). Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers Inc. v. Aliposa, G.R. No. 118900, February 27, 2003 As a general precept, a taxpayer may file a complaint assailing the validity of the ordinance and praying for a refund of its perceived overpayments without first filing a protest to the payment of taxes due under the ordinance. Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. CFI of Isabela, Branch II, G.R. No. L-49529, March 31, 1989 Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such Statutory lapse or intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58. Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006 Under Section 234(a), real property owned by the Republic is exempt from real estate tax except when the government gives the beneficial use of the real property to a taxable entity. The justification for the exception to the exemption is that the real property, although owned by the Republic, is not devoted to public use or public service but devoted to the private gain of a taxable person. Allied Banking Corporation, etc., v. Quezon City Government, et al., G. R. No. 154126, October 11, 2005 Real properties shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated and classified for assessment purposes on the basis of its actual use. Heirs of Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26677, March 27, 1981 It is `the duty of each person’ acquiring real estate in the city to make a new declaration thereof, with the advertence that failure to do so shall make the assessment in the name of the previous owner ‘valid and binding on all persons interested, and for all purposes, as though the same had been assessed in the name of its actual owner.’ Spouses Hu v. Spouses Unico, G.R. No. 146534, September 18, 2009

With regard to determining to whom the notice of sale should have been sent, settled is the rule that, for purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Thus, in identifying the real delinquent taxpayer, a local treasurer cannot rely solely on the tax declaration but must verify with the Register of Deeds who the registered owner of the particular property is. Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 01, 1995 The protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to “first pay the tax” under protest; otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. Davao Oriental Electric Coop vs. Prov. Dvo. of Oriental, 576 SCRA 645 Under then Sec. 30 of PD 464 [now under Sec. 226, LGC], having failed to appeal the real property assessments to the LBAA, taxpayer now cannot assail the validity of the tax assessment before the courts. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the assessment became final. Under Sec. 64 of PD 464 [now under Sec. 252, LGC), the taxpayer must first pay under protest and then assail the validity of the assessment. Fels Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 168557, 170628, February 16, 2007 Under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160, the last action of the local assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice of assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedure likewise does not permit the property owner the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134114, July 06, 2001 Customs duties” is “the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country. Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, May 31, 1991 Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation and “intent,” being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally. Jardeleza v. People, G.R. No. 165265, February 06, 2006 Smuggling is committed by any person who: (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines any article contrary to law; (2) assists in so doing any article contrary to law; or (3) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law. Carrara Marble Phil., Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 129680, September 01, 1999 The Tariff and Customs law subjects to forfeiture any article which is removed contrary to law from any public or private warehouse under customs supervision, or released irregularly from Customs custody. Before forfeiture proceedings are instituted the law requires the presence of probable cause; once established, the burden of proof is shifted to the claimant. People v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.R. No. L-41686, November 17, 1980 It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010 Regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104604, 111223, October 06, 1995 Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of the seizure should properly be ventilated before the Collector of Customs. Transglobe International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126634, January 25, 1999 A forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is in legal contemplation the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner. Commr. v. Hambretch & Quist Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 169225, November 17, 2010 The appellate jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited to cases which involve decisions of the CIR on matters relating to assessments or refunds. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125 covers other cases that arise out of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) or related laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Duty Free Philippines vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 197228 (October 8, 2014).

This Court has had a long-standing rule that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. In this regard, petitioner’s direct appeal to this Court is fatal to its claim. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA reiterates the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en banc relative to the review of the court divisions’ decisions or resolutions on motion for reconsideration or new trial in cases arising from administrative agencies such as the BIR. Clearly, this Court is without jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by a division of the CTA, exclusive appellate jurisdiction over which is vested in the CTA en banc. Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 84111, December 22, 1989 Without the automatic review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector in any of our country’s far-flung ports, would have absolute and unbridled discretion to determine whether goods seized by him are locally produced, hence, not dutiable, or of foreign origin, and therefore subject to payment of customs duties and taxes. His decision, unless appealed by the aggrieved party (the owner of the goods), would become final with no one the wiser except himself and the owner of the goods. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Commr., G.R. No. 168498, June 16, 2006 If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

REMEDIAL LAW Thursday, October 29th, 2015

CIVIL PROCEDURE

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Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012) Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal. SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of Manila, Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22, 2012 In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case. Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006 Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves the action of a higher court. Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007 The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical or intricate matters of fact. Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987 Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the happening of subsequent events even of such character which should have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. “The rule of adherence of jurisdiction (exists) until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated”. Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon. Judge Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855. October 15, 2012 It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968 A party may be barred from raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction or jurisdiction may be waived on the ground of estoppel by laches. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007 In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of, or for cancellation of title, to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve “title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.” Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014 The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action. Flores v. Mallare-Philips, L-66620, September 24, 1986 Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or against two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3 SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO. G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013 Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions “may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.” Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO. 187973, January 20, 2014 By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank Of The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J. King & Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012

Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012 The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013.

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporation’s building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case. HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013 The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012 The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. El Hogar Filipino v. Seva, No. 36627, November 19, 1932 Where said parcels are the objects of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court where ANY of the provinces (places) where a parcel of land is situated. Mijares, et al. v. Piccio, et al., L-10458 April 22,1957 If parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct transactions where there is no common venue, separate actions should be laid in the court of the province where each parcel of land is situated Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, 1969 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. only, solely, exclusively in this court, in no other court save, particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in the rules Calo v. Ajax, L-20865, March 13, 1968 A counterclaim, even if otherwise compulsory, but the amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court, will only be considered permissive. Hence, the fact that it is not set-up in the inferior court will not bar plaintiff from instituting a separate action to prosecute it. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014 Non-payment of docket fees on one’s counterclaim is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims. Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012 Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991 Ultimate Facts are those important and substantial facts which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiff and which make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They are the principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989 Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment Sps. Go v. Tong, G.R. 151942, Nov. 27, 2003 Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, nonpayment of which at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case for as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From Payment of All Court And Sheriff’s Fees of Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act No. 9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Cooperative Code Of 2008, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13, 2012 With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, 11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 26 February 2010), it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. Rosario v. Carangdang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955 If the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court then the court cannot admit the amended complaint. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No. L-45543, May 17, 1939 The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced. OAMINAL v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003 The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief — to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration — are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot — after failing to obtain the relief prayed for — repudiate the very same authority they have invoked REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013. The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that “the period of extension” in such a case “is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period.” The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that “any extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.” SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014 Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service. Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September 2012 In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 193650, October 8, 2014 The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as made by the respondent to the petitioners, is a mode not provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB’s notice of appeal. Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014

Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Go v. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1983 What causes the loss by a plaintiff of the right to effect dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant’s answer with the court but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Where the plaintiff filed the notice of dismissal of his action in the court after the filing of defendant’s answer but before service thereof, the plaintiff’s notice to that effect ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the pending action without need of any order from the trial court VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014 Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged that the dismissal of the main action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Court ruled that as the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary support. Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No. 178789. November 14, 2012 Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the required answer can give rise to default. 1. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013 Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its concomitant dismissal. Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012 While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001 Deposition is a written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination or in response to written interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination. EAGLE RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014 Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 10, 2013 decision. Cameron Granville posited that the motion for production was filed out of time and that the rule on parole evidence is applicable. However, the Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a showing of due cause.” Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done. TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015 Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper. Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And Construction Supply Inc., Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012 A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 15 November 2010 A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable sepearately from the judgment in the entire case, unless allowed by the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. “Bogarts,” G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014 The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of “bar by prior judgment” or by “conclusiveness of judgment.” Here, Salvador’s defense was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Contrary to Salvador’s contention , however, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014 All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005 The aggrieved party has a “fresh period” of 15 days from the denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial within which to file his appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45. Yu v. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011 While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS, vs. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015 It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals. The “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L. MARKETING vs. HERCULES AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS MILK G.R. No. 183239, June 02, 2014 The CA correctly ordered that De Leon’s appellant’s brief be stricken off the records. De Leon’s motion for time praying for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial reconsideration is validly denied by the RTC, since such motion is a transgression of the mandatory prohibition on the filing of a motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. Doctrinallyentrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No. 158239 “The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.” Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002 A dismissal for forum-shopping under Sec. 5 Rule 7 is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the dismissal order. Under Sec. 1 Rule 41, no appeal lies from an order dismissing a case without prejudice and hence a party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014 The present rule is that a government party is a “party adversely affected” for purposes of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals “by the respondent” were allowed on “the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees.” Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision. Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004 Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are no longer appealable to the SC but to the CA via a petition for review (Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998). However, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision or order of the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the SC. JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014 A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence. Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012 A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A. Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013 While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011 The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal), this is what is referred to as the final judgment for purposes of appeal. Ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’ MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014 Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership. Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015 Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000 In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered by the trial court, albeit on different grounds, we are guided by the rule that execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances. Here, with the alleged collapse of petitioner’s business operations rendered doubtful, we find no good reason to order execution pending appeal. INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24 AUGUST 2007 If the action affects title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, the action for revival must be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the place where the real property or any portion thereof is situated. Otherwise, the action for revival of judgment is a personal action wherein the venue lies with the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the option of the plaintiff. VILLARIN VS MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008 Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such payment either in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. CALUAG VS PECSON, October 29, 1948, G.R. No. L-1403 Judgment for Specific acts pertains to a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or in some other way provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated by the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party himself. SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY 2006 It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. CHING vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004) Upon application of the third person through a motion to set aside the levy on attachment, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The court may order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the application, the court cannot pass upon the question of title to the property with any character of finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS as represented by NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014 Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015 In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court has limited review over the decision rendered by the foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the merits of the case pursuant to the incorporation clause of the Constitution, unless there is proof of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, March 30, 1946 The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property, provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which parties litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and granted. Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343 A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012 A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor. Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013 It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right “clearly founded in or granted by law.” Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them. FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL. v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013 Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014 A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004 A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013. Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 102 The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an “action in rem,” the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008 The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. Under Section 6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no less than 5 days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond. Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005 Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. Wack-Wack Golf v. Won 70 SCRA 165 It must be noted that a stockholder should use reasonable diligence, that is, by filing the interpleader suit within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, 542 SCRA 470

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. The court took cognizance on the case, despite the fact that a separate action was pending in another court because in the instant case no breach was committed. Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. Lokin v. COMELEC, 621 SCA 385 Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in approving the withdrawal of his nomination. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Vergara v. Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 25, 1977 The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997 Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013 A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011 A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013. Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014 The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755 The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008 The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” under Section 253 of the OEC, petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003 This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer. Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010 In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L- 33213 June 29, 1979 There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominatedaccion interdictal under the former law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First Instance. Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000 The action for unlawful detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate was not necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the terms of the lease. There being no need for any demand or notice, there was likewise no necessity to wait for five (5) days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful detainer may be filed. CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014 As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession to restore them to their possession of the subject property. The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect to who has title to the land in question. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013 At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013 Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr. 458 SCRA 48 It is only the judge, who orders the confinement of a person for contempt of court, who can issue the order of release. CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015 A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Montañer vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009 A special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,” has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014 There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Uriarte vs CFI Of Negros, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970 The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012 In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012 In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; (2) to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; (3) the recognition of a natural child; (4) the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. Pereira vs CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989 When a person dies leaving property, the same should be JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. Neri, at al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012 Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity. Nufable vs Nufable, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999 As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Ajerovs.CA, G.R.No.106720 September 15, 1994 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012 The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983 The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons to enable the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration. Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962 The word “claims” as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006 Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation and only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor as these claims are not actually extinguished. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. De Bautista v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-28298, November 25, 1983 The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor’s asset is under Sec. 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court. The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributes, such is not the situation in the case at bar. Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001 Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it, form there, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and it is only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Solivio vs. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 As a general rule, the better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action. Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011 It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012 Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested. Repubic vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012 A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut- Piala vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005 Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Suarez vs.. Republic, L-20914 December 24, 1965 The adoptee may use the surname of the adopter. The minor cannot bear adopter’s surname as a married woman, for her husband has not joined in the petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage and to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter (where the husband had not), would mislead the public into believing that she (adoptee) has also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN. UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014 Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled. Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000 Consequently, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No. L-16799, March 30, 1991 Peremptory writ of habeas corpus, is one which unconditionally commands the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation or one which merely requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. Velasco vs.CA G.R.No.118644 July 7,1995 It must be kept in mind that in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and “reaches the body but not the record,” while the latter assails directly the judgment and “reaches the record but not the body.”

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008 The writ applies to extralegal/extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof while a search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008 The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs. Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf in representation of Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012 For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. x x x IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name “HARRY,” ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, G.R. No. 191805 The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court. x x x In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012 Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. “Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence. 1. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014 A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is not supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014 While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. Silverio vs. CA G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. People vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001 Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. What is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013 If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013 The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011. It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case. LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013 Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment – it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. 1. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014 Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended complaint which changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments. People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014 It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271 In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013 A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. While the information clearly states that the crime was committed by appellant’s insertion of his penis inside AAA’s vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus, appellant’s conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding. Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623 In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; and (2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013 An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013 The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013 It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014 The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012 There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: “(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.” On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause against the respondents. Hence, as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned the finding of probable cause against the respondents. Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013 Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012 The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case, the Supreme Court found no error in the public prosecutor’s determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal complaint. Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013 The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274 The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment and to object to the continuation of further proceedings based on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads without objection, he cannot raise the issue on appeal. Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006 A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A “preliminary investigation” is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. “An inquest” is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause.” Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013 Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified because of the accused’s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis’ order requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010. An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused- appellants – who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended – is valid. People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013 Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. LEVISTE v. CA A finding that none of the bail negating circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the appellate court determines the existence of any of the bail negating circumstances, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed TRINIDAD LACHICA v. JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office. Yap v. CA and the People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001) Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’s right to bail. People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 (2003) An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014 Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes the accused’s right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012 Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.” RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014 Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges” are authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.” The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this case. As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC. FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015 Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013 The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused. People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003 In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014 Accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013. A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecution’s presentation of the testimonies of the apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the confidential informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007) Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal. Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012 Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.” There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced. People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012 At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo, providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review. DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014 A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. CHAN v. HONDA MOTORS The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 686 The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them. Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012 It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. EVIDENCE El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188, December 4, 2008 It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law. People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57) The forwarder, who discovered “leaves” from a box sent to it by Marti, sent a request to the NBI to subject the leaves to a laboratory testing which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. The Court held that there was no violation of constitutional rights because the rights granted by the Constitution are protection from arbitrary exercise of power by the government, and not by third parties, in this case, the forwarder. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 Ortanez presented three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between his wife and unidentified persons. The Court held that the cassette tapes are not admissible since absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012 The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant. Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 664 SCRA 110 In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is substantial evidence which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005 Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an exception is when reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties. People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000 In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central Colleges of the Philippines, 666 SCRA 540 It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it. CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March 2012 CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the Tax Credit Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a stipulation of facts at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission. NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD. G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014 It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quo to relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the same however was not accompanied by the required attestation and certification. ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014 Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime. People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014 It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA. In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005 An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. The presence of the victim’s ravished body in a deep ravine with handcuffs on her wrist is a physical evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness. People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192 A rape-slay case of a 9-year old girl, admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found in the bloodstained garments of the accused. Vaginal swabs taken from the victim were also admitted and were found to show the DNA profile of the accused who was subsequently convicted. People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012 Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. People vs. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others. Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009 Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court held that the photocopy is admissible as evidence since an exception to the best evidence rule is when the document sought to be presented is in the possession of the person against whom it is to be offered and such party fails to present it even after reasonable notice. National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007 The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the photocopies were not equivalent to the original documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007 The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence. Thus, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209 The parol evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. A receipt is not such a document as it merely attests to the receipt of money and it is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640 Serrano introduced parol evidence to prove that he was merely acting as an agent without any consideration. The Court held that Serrano can introduce such parole evidence because the case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing. Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)

The ancient document rule applies to the two Spanish documents and should thus be admitted without the need for evidence on its authenticity and execution. They meet the 3 requisites of the ancient document rule, namely: (1) be at least thirty (30) years old (2) found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion and (3) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines’ does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25. People vs. Burgos, 200 SCRA 67 (1991) The Order disallowing the printing of the material encoded in the diskettes is void. There was neither testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes that might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives. People vs. Solomon, 229 SCRA 402 The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. The testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the use of leading questions. People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18 Paul, a five-year-old boy, testified that Rolando boxed his wife then burned her. The testimony of Paul shows that he is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving responsive answers, of recalling events, and of relating his recollections. For a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication. Ordono vs. Saquigan, 62 SCRA 270 When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. Using the criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim’s mother). People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived all his objections to the testimony of his wife. It is to be expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal for his wife to rebut the allegation. APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013. Under the Dead Man’s Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same. Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporation, therefore, are not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person. People vs. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925) Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. Uy Chico vs. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff’s attorney with a third person. A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the client, the attorney being merely an agent. People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997) The period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. in other words, If the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on a document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition. Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. Dela Paz vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 65 (1987) The mere fact that the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony from the record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross- examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the witness. The right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by Petitioners through their repeated absence and motions to postpone the cross- examination. People vs. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require; and We believe that it was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under the circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court proceedings. Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176(1972) The testimony and the public document are declarations adverse to the interest of the Costelos which is admissible in evidence. The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and ay be received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his successors in interest but also against 3rd persons. People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. People vs. Alegre, 94 Phil. 109 (1979) As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955) The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co-accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against the declarant’s own guilt. People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996) The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the “exclusionary rule” because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The accused cannot be made to affix their signatures on evidence without complying with the Bill of Rights. By affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused are in effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These signatures amount to uncounseled extrajudicial confession prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible as evidence. People vs. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937) While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957) While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder through TREACHERY or EVIDENT PREMEDITATION (remember that the character of the wounds show that the deceased was killed in a lying position). The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. U.S. Vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

Generally, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing: 1. that he has made contradictory statements; or2. by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980) A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is merely offered for proving the fact that the statement was made, and not as a means of proving the truth of the fact asserted therein. Implied assertions, which are inferences that can be drawn from the conduct of persons, are not covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry. (Ex. Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line up) Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA (2001) The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of statements that are independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1. Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind; Statement of a person showing his physical condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another person; Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show a lack of credibility of a witness. People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985) The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, “at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.” It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014 Res gestae means the “things done.” It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.” There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997) Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. Fuentes vs. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996) To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not be able to testify due to death, mental incapacity or physical incompetence rather than mere absence from the courts;; (b) the declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant;; (c) the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify exists. People vs. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993) Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. They are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated since they would be incomplete or inaccurate. THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014 As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. People v. Lee, 382 SCRA 596 The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally offered, and not when the particular document is marked is identified and marked as an exhibit. Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995) Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013 The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Aniceta’s testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredo’s death. Aniceta’s testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Aniceta’s testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013. Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014 Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the records of the case. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Thursday, October 29th, 2015

POLITICAL LAW

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HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994 The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations.” In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City. The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of “sovereignty” must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states. In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an “international state”. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014 We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, now DPWH, was created under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public Highways and transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works of Highways. MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al. G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. However, a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997 Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional provision on people’s initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII § 2) required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people’s initiatives and such lack could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so under law. LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via people’s initiative. However, his petition did not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to the petition. TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997 By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993 Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II § 16 of the Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing. ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the historical background, nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny of these cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of interpretation – separation and benevolent neutrality – the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation. IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013 Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991 Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer. BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008 RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4). BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009 The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats. Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes” can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be “marginalized and underrepresented” will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the “marginalized and underrepresented” the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the “marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those “marginalized and underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as “wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests. JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966 The expression “speeches or debates herein” in Art. VI § 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not connected with the discharge of their office. Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, being appointed to other government posts, does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where “(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . .” The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. “. . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941).” Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. — State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445). AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960 Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House’s power to hold a member responsible “for words spoken in debate.” ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The criteria for valid delegation are that: (1) Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008 It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of “publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines” (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every Senate. BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991 Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator Enrile’s privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court. SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on whom the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For § 1, the requirement for Presidential consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary. Although some executive officials hold information covered by “executive privilege”, there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007 The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008 Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967 The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title. Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to read a bill’s entire text during deliberations. BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013 The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015 If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it stated that savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial determination. Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with. ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were present, namely: 1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening to Pimentel’s advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.) As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008 Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers. AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical. MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999 Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale; under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005 Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014 The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such being the case, the designation of Duque was unconstitutional. MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015 The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then President Estrada of the grant of additional allowances and benefits. MIA failed to prove its existence. The alleged approval of the President was contained in a mere photocopy of the memorandum… The original was not presented during the proceedings. A copy of the document is not in the Malacañang Records Office. Further, “the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double compensation proscribed by Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.” DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts. GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015 Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term. IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000 Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the President’s wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion. SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004 Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law. DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989 Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and abode. The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the President’s residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President’s residual power is for protecting people’s general welfare, preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare. YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to “review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,” final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999 A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the constitution were 1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of government. Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013 A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. – In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination. A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority vote” required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term “integrity” as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that “integrity” as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness. ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008 The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013 The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies. BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990 Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yorac’s appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence of ConCom from the executive department. DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989 The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDP’s reorganization was not permanent and stable. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political alignments of its members. AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004 Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013 Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into residential and industrial areas). WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied. REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974 The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession with a permanent character when the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 – 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters. This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The expropriator must enter a private property For more than a momentary period Under warrant or color of legal authority The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012 Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just compensation, the law on stock distribution option acknowledges that landowners can require payment for the shares of stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital stock of the corporation. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB) G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due process, the petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA. In order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. In the case at bar, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. Thus, the petitioners could not argue that Cadet Cudia was not afforded due process. ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940 The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939 It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the PTC’s investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal protection. The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to overcome that presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a preliminary step to selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has sorely failed in discharging that burden. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973 As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005 A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a contentbased restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELEC’s breach of the petitioners’ fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election. Thus, the COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidates therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the petitioner’s advocacy against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit to free speech of candidates during elections but do not limit the rights of broadcasters to comment on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners, as the petitioners are private individuals who have lost their right to give commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the tarpaulins is fundamentally part of protected speech, as it is important to convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the electorate. More importantly, every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party or party-list group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the tarpaulins and their messages are not religious speech, as they do not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995 Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar — than which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order. SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001 SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997 Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The government’s goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not to any church. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayor’s permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent. EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993 Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. As Jehovah’s Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to free education. Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996) The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCB’s power to regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of Post’s power to check as to whether or not publications are of a libelous character. RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919 The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power. CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public order. STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a “violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS “NOY”, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014 The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused during custodial investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its definition to “include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.” This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015 The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies – when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. The rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair analogy, Marieta may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014 The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is “to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.” It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014 A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a drug test can only be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. Moreover, “a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.” THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk”. “Stop and frisk” searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006 The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007 If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014 Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel; likewise with RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775. RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015 David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” It provides that those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002 A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The person may only be said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he repatriates or by an act of Congress, but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the residency requirement for elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant visa and has waived his status as a non-resident. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013 A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928 Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his cancellation of voter’s registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the mails on time. In ruling in Abano’s favor, the Court explained that the registration of a voter does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013 A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply. OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014 The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The Court emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC once more gravely abused its discretion. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014 Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to “Qualifications for elective office” (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate. GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011 We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing “Section 78” petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections explains that “the ‘procedure hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x.”), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing “sec. 78” petitions under the oec is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of COCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing “Section 78” petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC “may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.” SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013 The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly substituted. RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013 When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR “EGAY” S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014 San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the disqualification petition. In the said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito was distributing an “Orange Card” with the intent to entice voters to vote for him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable amount for campaign funds. Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have been conducted prior to the decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate’s disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation. PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009 Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014 As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014 It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is disqualified to serve another term a Sangguniang Member. Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person. JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015 Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due process for being considered a nuisance candidate even before a clarificatory was even conducted. The SC ruled that nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.” To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an opportunity to be heard.” Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already declared petitioner a nuisance candidate even before the clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard. GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014 There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement. FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998 It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits. REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002 The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation, thus, they did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in accordance with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative act that gives rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required before laws can take effect. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011 The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was no need to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines, “interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public” need not be filed with the center. PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No. 170599, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010

the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty. OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006 A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933) Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order to compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will be just and reasonable. Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on the land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans’ petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014 Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public service. SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007 All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this case, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES’ UNION (CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE, et al., G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014 Apropos then is the Court’s ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Barin, to wit: however, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Based on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence of any bad faith, we rule that the ATO employees’ right to security of tenure was not violated. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014 Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The defense of respondent Cortes that her appointment was made by the Commission En Banc and that his father, a member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his appointment did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014 The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a highly urbanized citys should be participated by the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija not of Cabanatuan City only. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase implies, “substantial alteration of boundaries” involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase “boundaries” should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be “substantial” for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014 Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own “organizational structure and staffing pattern” also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time. However, the assailed decision by respondent Commission on Audit was anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4968, which proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for government employees. NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011 Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area requirement – when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands – is expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for the creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of the exemption in the case of provinces was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true legislative intent. This will also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units in order to achieve the desired results. MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000 The MMDA’s power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector. LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011 The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed that Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources). AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province. Records of the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not the sole determinant of the creation of a legislative district. SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008 Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only Congress may create provinces and cities. ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an autonomous region; otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive and legislative powers over the same area. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994 The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality) that point to the state’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, which states that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office” at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the legality of EO 353 only thirty years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision should be timely raised. SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009 The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this automatic realease of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending its release to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in court as to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA. PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012 There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations Act, even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services involved in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National Government, which it may designate to implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment of local government units into ministates, as what is involved in local autonomy is decentralization of administration and not of power. GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011 Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police power, but the methods and means used in exercising such power to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance in question is valid as the city’s primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since these arcardes were intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for pedestrians. SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014 The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city”116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional. PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006 The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or hospital, and not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations and gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there was no due process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance (Parayno’s gasoline filling station) without proper judicial proceedings. CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919

Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a particular property is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is private but the second condition (public purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the street was necessary and its extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as other lots have been offered to the city free of charge. JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005 The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; b) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no offer because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineer’s office only proved its intent to acquire the property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer. ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009 The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing. QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006 Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local Government Code which provides that “a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property…not hereinafter specifically exempted,” the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase “exclusive of this franchise” in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayante’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power all of the franchisee’s properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006 MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local government’s exercise of the power to tax. Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed strictly against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008 While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. In this case, the “in lieu of other taxes” provision does not expressly provide in clear and unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon City’s franchise tax. SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16, 2008 Smart is liable to pay Davao’s franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The “in lieu of all taxes” clause in Smart’s legislative franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988 The Mayor’s act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority. CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968 The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to “defective streets”, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street where Teotico was injured was a national highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which responsibility is placed. It is enough that the said province, city or municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road. TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978 The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003 Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since one party is an independent component city. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to hear and resolve the dispute in the case at bar. SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall election as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on serving for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008 Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and he must have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an interruption in Potencioso’s second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by operation of law and does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully served his second term and as such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor. MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003 The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to stop him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTC’s decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the election was stayed and the status quo – or when Laxina was occupying the office of Barangay Captain – was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality, because through the stay of the MTC’s decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office. VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000 Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term ‘dual citizenship’ as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the loss of citizenship. MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 Manzano should not be disqualified because the “dual citizenship” meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to “dual allegiance”. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. Manzano‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his election of Philippine citizenship. MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955 The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before the Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner, there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case. TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012 Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void. The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race, one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation or denial of due course of the person’s certificate, with the said person not treated as a candidate at all – as if she never filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore cannot be substituted by another person. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011 Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice. The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. As a general principle – and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007 Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005 In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003) Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the civilian population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980) This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging Pena-Irala, then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The Court held that deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary international law, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

MERCANTILE LAW Thursday, October 29th, 2015

Letters of Credit

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Reliance Commodities, Inc. Vs. Daewoo Industrial Co. Ltd., 228 SCRA 545 (1993) Where there was a meeting of the minds between the buyer and the seller regarding the sale of foundry pig iron to be paid for under a letter of credit, the failure of the buyer to open the letter of credit did not prevent the perfection of the contract and neither did such failure extinguish the contract. The opening of the letter of credit was not a condition precedent for the birth of obligation of the buyer to purchase the foundry pig iron from the seller. Where the buyer fails to open the letter of credit, as stipulated, the seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach. Damages for failure to open the letter of credit may include the loss of profit which the seller would have reasonably made had the transaction been carried out Rodzssen Supply Company, Inc. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, 357 SCRA 618 (2001) An issuing bank which paid the beneficiary of an expired letter of credit can recover payment from the applicant which obtained the goods from the beneficiary to prevent unjust enrichment. Transfield Philippines, Inc. vs. Luzon Hydro Corp. 443 SCRA 307 (2004) Where the applicant entered into a Turnkey contract whereby it undertook to construct, on a turnkey basis, a seventy (70)-Megawatt hydro-electric power station, the performance of which is secured by a standby letter of credit, the resort to arbitration by the applicant/ contractor to arbitration to determine if the latter is guilty of delay does not preclude the beneficiary to draw on the letter of credit upon its issuance of a certification of default because whether or not the issuance of certification of default amounted to fraud was not raised in the lower court and the parties did not stipulate that all dispute regarding delay should first be settled through arbitration before the beneficiary would be allowed to call upon the letter of credit. If the drawing upon the letter of credit was wrongful due to the non-existence of the fact of default, the right of the applicant to seek indemnification for damages it suffered would not normally be foreclosed pursuant to general principle of law. MWSS vs. Hon. Daway, 432 SCRA 559 (2004) The stay order issued by the rehabilitation court pursuant to the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation does not apply to the beneficiary of the letter of credit against the banks that issued it because the prohibition on the enforcement of claims against the debtor, guarantors or sureties of the debtors does not extend to the claims against the issuing bank in a letter of credit. Letters of credit are primary obligations and not accessory contracts and while they are security arrangements, they are not thereby converted into contracts of guaranty. Metrobank v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 185590, December 03, 2014 The legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank’s evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the Bank’s cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action against LCDC. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc. 35 SCRA 253 (1970) A buyer who applied for a letter of credit to pay for imported dyestuffs must reimburse the issuing bank which paid the beneficiary, even if the shipment contained colored chalks. Banks are not required to investigate if the contract underlying the letter of credit has been fulfilled or not because in a transaction involving letter of credit, banks deal only with documents and not with goods. Bank of America vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 357 (1993) When the notifying bank entered into a discounting arrangement with the beneficiary, it acts independently as a negotiating bank. As such, the negotiating bank has a right to recourse against the issuer bank and until reimbursement is obtained, the beneficiary, as the drawer of the draft, continues to assume a contingent liability thereon. LBP vs. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corp., 452 SCRA 173 (2005) The issuing bank is not liable for damages even if the shipment did not conform to the specifications of the applicant. Under the “independence principle”, the obligation of the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary arises once the latter is able to submit the stipulated documents under the letter of credit. Hence, the bank is not liable for damages even if the shipment did not conform to the specifications of the applicant. Philippine National Bank vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 186063, January 15, 2014. Where the trial court rendered a decision finding the buyer solely liable to pay the seller and omitted by inadvertence to insert in its decision the phrase “without prejudice to the decision that will be made against the issuing bank,“ the bank can not evade responsibility based on this ground. The seller which is entitled to draw on the credit line of the buyer from a bank against the presentation of sales invoices and official receipts of the purchases and which obtained a court judgment solely against the buyer even though the suit is against the bank and the buyer may still enforce the liability of the same bank under a letter of credit issued to secure the credit line. The so-called “independence principle” in a letter of credit assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Transfield Philippines, Inc. vs. Luzon Hydro Corp. 443 SCRA 307 (2004) The “fraud exception principle” is an exception to the independence principle. The untruthfulness of a certificate accompanying a demand for payment under a standby letter of credit may qualify as fraud sufficient to support an injunction against payment. The remedy for fraudulent abuse is an injunction. However, injunction should not be granted unless: (a) there is a clear proof of fraud; (b) the fraud constitutes fraudulent abuse of the independent purpose of the letter of credit and not only fraud under the main agreement; and (c) irreparable injury might follow if injunction is not granted or the recovery of damages would be seriously damaged. Feati Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 576 (1991) When the letter of credit required the submission of a certification that the applicant/buyer has approved the goods prior to shipment, the unjust refusal of the applicant/buyer to issue said certification is not sufficient to compel the bank to pay the beneficiary thereof. Under the doctrine of strict compliance, the documents tendered must strictly conform to the terms of the letter of credit, otherwise, the bank which accepts a faulty tender, acts on its own risks and may not be able to recover from the applicant/buyer. Trust Receipts Law Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254 (2000) Compensation shall not be proper when one of the debts consists in civil liability arising from a penal offense; moreover, any compromise relating to the civil liability does not automatically extinguish the criminal liability of the accused. The mere failure of the entrustee to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest. Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 375 SCRA 579 (2002) A trust receipt is a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral of the merchandise imported or purchased. Under a letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement, a bank extends a loan covered by a letter of credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan; hence, the transaction involves a loan feature represented by a letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the covering trust receipt which secures an indebtedness. Colinares vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 609 (2000) The transaction is a simple loan when the goods subject of the agreement had been purchased and delivered to the supposed entrustee prior to the execution of the trust receipt agreement. The acquisition of ownership over the goods before the execution of the trust receipt agreement makes the contract a simple loan, regardless of the denomination of the contract. Consolidated Bank & Trust Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 671 (2001) Respondent Corporation is not an importer which acquired the bunker fuel oil for re-sale; it needed the oil for its own operations. More importantly, at no time did title over the oil pass to petitioner bank, but directly to respondent Corporation to which the oil was directly delivered long before the trust receipt was executed; thus, the contract executed by the parties is a simple loan and not a trust receipt agreement. Prudential Bank vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 412 (1995) The security interest of the entruster pursuant to the written terms of a trust receipt shall be valid as against all creditors of the entrustee for the duration of the trust receipt agreement, including among others, the laborers of the entrustee. The only exception to the rule is when the properties are in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. Pilipinas Bank vs. Ong, 387 SCRA 37 (2002) Failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt to the entruster or to return the goods, if they were not disposed of, shall constitute the crime of estafa. However, what is being punished by law is the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner. No dishonesty nor abuse of confidence can be attributed to the entrustee if the latter failed to comply with its obligation upon maturity of the trust receipt due to serious liquidity problems and after it was placed under the control of the management committee created by SEC which took custody of the entrustee’s assets, including lumbers subject of the trust receipt. Clearly, it was the management committee which could settle the entrustee’s obligations. The mala prohibita nature of the offense notwithstanding, the entrustee’s intent to misuse or misappropriate the goods or their proceeds has not been established based on the circumstances. Also, the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties did not only reschedule the entrustee’s debts, but more importantly, it provided principal conditions which are incompatible with the trust agreement. Hence, the MOA novated and effectively extinguished the entrustee’s obligation under the trust receipt agreement. Anthony L. Ng vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23, 2010 When the goods subject of the transaction, such as chemicals and metal plates, were not intended for sale or resale but for use in the fabrication of steel communication towers, the agreement cannot be considered a trust receipt transaction but a simple loan. P.D. No. 115 punishes the entrustee for his failure to deliver the price of the sale, or if the goods are not sold, to return them to the entruster, which, in the present case, is absent and could not have been complied with; therefore, the liability of the entrustee is only civil in nature. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez, G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012 Under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. When both parties know that the entrustee could not have complied with the obligations under the trust receipt without his fault, as when the goods subject of the agreement were not intended for sale or resale, the transaction cannot be considered a trust receipt but a simple loan, where the liability is limited to the payment of the purchase price. Hur Tin Yang vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013 When both parties entered into an agreement knowing fully well that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Sec. 13 of PD 115 in relation to Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, as the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 150 SCRA 140 (1987) A trust receipt transaction is a security agreement, pursuant to which the entruster acquires a security interest in the goods, which are released to the possession of the entrustee who binds himself to hold the goods in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods or to return them in case of non-sale. The return of the goods to the entruster however, does not relieve the entrustee of the obligation to pay the loan because the entruster is not the factual owner of the goods and merely holds them as owner in the artificial concept for the purpose of giving stronger security for the loan. Rosario Textile Mills Corp. vs. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company, 462 SCRA 88 (2005) Where the entrustee tendered the return of the articles to the entrustee because they did not meet its manufacturing requirements but the latter refused to accept and as a consequence, the entruster stored them in its warehouse which was, however, gutted by fire, the entrustee’s obligation was not extinguished despite the tender and its invocation of the principle of res perit domino. Under the Trust Receipts law, the loss of the goods under trust receipt regardless of the cause and the period or time it occurred, does not extinguish the civil obligation of the entrustee. A trust receipt has two features, the loan and security features. The loan is brought about by the fact that the entruster financed the importation or purchase of the goods under TR. Until and unless this loan is paid, the obligation to pay subsists. The principle of res perit domino will not apply if under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an artificial expedient, more of legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose of the goods in any manner that it wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with the purpose of the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the bank as the true owner from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof. Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 649 (2003) Recognizing the impossibility of imposing the penalty of imprisonment on a corporation, it was provided that if the entrustee is a corporation, the penalty shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons responsible for the offense. However, the person signing the trust receipt for the corporation is not solidarily liable with the entrusteecorporation for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense unless he personally bound himself under a separate contract of surety or guaranty. Alfredo Ching vs. Secretary of Justice, 481 SCRA 609 (2006) The fact that the officer who signed the trust receipt on behalf of the entrustee-corporation signed in his official capacity without receiving the goods as he had never taken possession of such nor committing dishonesty and abuse of confidence in transacting with the entrustor, is immaterial. The law specifically makes the director, officer, employee or any person responsible criminally liable precisely for the reason that a corporation, being a juridical entity, cannot be the subject of the penalty of imprisonment. South City Homes, Inc. vs. BA Finance Corporation, 371 SCRA 603 (2001) When the entrustee defaults on his obligation, the entruster has the discretion to avail of remedies which it deems best to protect its right. The law uses the word “may” in granting to the entruster the right to cancel the trust and take possession of the goods; hence, the option is given to the entruster. Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 394 SCRA 315 (2002) A civil case filed by the entruster against the entrustees based on the failure of the latter to comply with their obligation under the Trust Receipt agreement is proper because this breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods released under the trust receipts. Being based on an obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against the entrustees regardless of the result of the latter. Landl & Company vs. Metropolitan Bank, 435 SCRA 639 (2004) As provided under Section 7, P.D. No. 115, in the event of default of the entrustee, the entruster may cancel the trust and take possession of the goods subject of the trust or of the proceeds realized therefrom at any time; the entruster may, not less than five days after serving or sending of notice of intention to sell, proceed with the sale of the goods at public or private sale where the entrustee shall receive any surplus but shall be liable to the entruster for any deficiency. This is by reason of the fact that the initial repossession by the bank of the goods subject of the trust receipt did not result in the full satisfaction of the entrustee’s loan obligation. Banking Laws Teodoro Bañas vs. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 128703, October 18, 2000 Transactions involving purchase of receivables at a discount, well within the purview of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities, which as investment company is authorized to perform, does not constitute a violation of the General Banking Act. In this case, the funds supposedly lent have not been shown to have been obtained from the public by way of deposits, hence, it cannot be said that the investment company was engaged in banking. PNB v. Sps. Tajonera, G.R. No. 195889, 24 September 2014 Being a banking institution, PNB owes it to the respondents to observe the high standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions because its business is imbued with public interest. The high standards are also necessary to ensure public confidence in the banking system, for, according to Philippine National Bank v. Pike, “[t]he stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks.” Thus, PNB was duty bound to comply with the terms and stipulations under its credit agreements with the respondents, specifically the release of the amount of the additional loan in its entirety, lest it erodes public confidence. Yet, PNB failed in this regard. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003

Banks must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers should know that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. By the teller giving the passbook to the wrong person, thereby facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person, and for failing to return the passbook to the authorized representative of the depositor, the Bank presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. However, the Bank’s liability is mitigated by the depositor’s contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Citibank, N.A. vs. Spouses Luis & Carmelita Cabamongan, G.R. No. 146918, May 2, 2006 Allowing the pretermination of the account despite noticing discrepancies in the signature and photograph of the person claiming to be the depositor, accompanied by the failure to surrender the original certificate of time deposit, amounted to negligence on the part of the bank. A bank that fails to exercise the degree of diligence required of it becomes liable for damages. Comsavings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo and Estrella Capistrano, G.R. No. 170942, August 28, 2013 A banking institution serving as an originating bank for the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) of the Government owes a duty to observe the highest degree of diligence and a high standard of integrity and performance in all its transactions with its clients because its business is imbued with public interest. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Emmanuel Oñate, G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014 As a business affected with public interest and by reason of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. A bank that mismanages the trust accounts of its client cannot benefit from the inaccuracies of the reports resulting therefrom; it cannot impute the consequence of its negligence to the client which resulted to miscrediting of funds. Ileana Macalinao vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009 When the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon; hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, which would depend on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, the fact that petitioner made partial payments makes the stipulated penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per annum, in addition to regular interests, iniquitous and unconscionable. Heirs of Estelita Burgos-Lipat namely: Alan B. Lipat and Alfredo B. Lipat, Jr. vs. Heirs of Eugenio D. Trinidad namely: Asuncion R. Trinidad, et. al., G.R. No. 185644, March 2, 2010 Section 78 of the General Banking Act requires payment of the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage contract, which shall be applied for the one-year period reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Nonetheless, when the period to exercise the right of redemption was effectively extended beyond one year, it is only fair and just to require the payment of 12% interest per annum beyond the one-year period up to the date of consignment of the redemption price with the RTC. Advocates for Truth in Lending vs. BSP, G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013 The CB Circular No. 905 merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law, thereby allowing the parties to freely stipulate on the rate of interest. Nonetheless, the lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest. Jose C. Go vs. BSP, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009 The law on DOSRI transactions imposes three restrictions: a) the approval requirement, which refers to the written approval of the majority of the bank’s board of directors, excluding the director concerned; b) the reportorial requirement, which mandates that the approval should be entered upon the records of the corporation, and a copy of the entry be transmitted to the appropriate supervising department; and c) the ceiling requirement, which limits the amount of credit accommodations to an amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital contribution in the bank. Failure to observe the three requirements constitutes commission of three separate and different offenses. Hilario P. Soriano vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010 The rule on DOSRI transactions covers loans by a bank director or officer which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. The bank officer’s act of indirectly securing a fraudulent loan application by using the name of an unsuspecting person and without prior compliance with the requirements of the law would make the officer liable not only for violation of the law on DOSRI transactions but also for estafa through falsification of commercial documents The New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653) Ana Maria Koruga vs. Teodoro Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 168332/ G.R. No. 169053, June 19, 2009 The Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve a probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the BSP or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities. When the complaint filed by a stockholder of the bank pertains to the alleged unsafe and unsound banking practices, the authority to determine the existence of such is with the Monetary Board. BSP Monetary Board vs. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R. No. 184778, October 2, 2009 The actions of the Monetary Board under Sec. 29 and 30 of RA 7653, which pertain to the power to appoint a conservator or a receiver for a bank, may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted interference with the powers of the Monetary Board. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992 The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: 1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; 2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and 3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996 The authority of the conservator under the Central Bank Law is limited to acts of administration; the conservator merely takes the place of the bank’s board of directors and as such, the former cannot perform acts the latter cannot do. Hence, the conservator cannot revoke a contract of sale of a property acquired by the bank entered into by a bank officer even though the price agreed upon is no longer reflective of the fair market value of the property by reason of its appreciation of value over time. Rural Bank of San Miguel vs. Monetary Board, G.R. No. 150886, February 16, 2007 Under R.A. No. 265, an examination is required to be made before the Monetary Board could issue a closure order; however, under R.A. No. 7653, prior notice and hearing are no longer required and a report made by the head of the supervising and examining department suffices for a bank to be closed and placed under receivership. The purpose of the law is to make the closure of the bank summary and expeditious for the protection of the public interest Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. vs. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 162270, April 06, 2005 When a bank is placed under receivership, the appointed receiver is tasked to take charge of the bank’s assets and properties and the scope of the receiver’s power is limited to acts of administration. The receiver’s act of approving the exclusive option to purchase granted by the bank’s president is beyond the authority of the former and as such, it cannot be considered a valid approval. Alfeo D. Vivas, vs. Monetary Board and PDIC, G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013 The Monetary Board may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing it the MB finds that a bank: (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution. ]Jerry Ong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112830, February 1, 1996 The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. Hence, all claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding and it is not necessary that a claim be initially disputed in a court or agency before it is filed with the liquidation court. Domingo Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141297, October 8, 2001 The rule that all claims against a bank must be filed in the liquidation proceedings does not apply to actions filed by the bank itself for the preservation of its assets and protection of its property, such as a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession instituted by the bank itself. Moreover, a bank ordered closed by the Monetary Board retains its personality which can sue and be sued through its liquidator. Leticia G. Miranda vs. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 169334, September 8, 2006 As a rule, bank deposits are not preferred credits. However, when the deposits covered by a cashier’s check were purchased from a bank at the time when it was already insolvent, the purchase is entitled to preference in the assets of the bank upon its liquidation by reason of the fraud in the transaction. Oñate vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 107303, February 23, 1995 In a case where the money paid by an insurance company for treasury bills was deposited in a bank account, the examination of the said bank account is prohibited under R.A. No. 1405 by reason of the fact that the subject matter of the action filed by the insurance company against the seller of the treasury bills is the failure to deliver the treasury bills, not the money deposited. Intengan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128996, February 15, 2002 When the account subject of the complaint is in the foreign currency, such complaint filed for violation of R.A. No. 1405 did not toll the running of the prescriptive period to file the appropriate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 6426. The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. No. 1405) covers deposits under the Philippine Currency; a separate and distinct law governs deposits under the foreign currency (R.A. No. 6426). Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006 The “deposits” covered by the law on secrecy of bank deposits should not be limited to those creating a creditor-debtor relationship; the law must be broad enough to include “deposits of whatever nature” which banks may use for authorized loans to third persons. R.A. No. 1405 extends to funds invested such as those placed in a trust account which the bank may use for loans and similar transactions. Mellon Bank, N.A. vs. Magsino, G.R. No. 71479, October 18, 1990 One of the exceptions under R.A. No. 1405 is when a court order is issued for the disclosure of bank deposits in a case where the money deposited is the subject matter of litigation. When the subject matter is the money the bank transmitted by mistake, an inquiry to the whereabouts of the amount extends to whatever concealed by being held or recorded in the name of the persons other than the one responsible for the illegal acquisition. Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001 In a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Ombudsman can only examine bank accounts upon compliance with the following requisites: there is a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction; the account must be clearly identified, and the inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case; the bank personnel and the account holder must be informed of the examination; and such examination must be limited to the account identified in the pending case. If there is no pending case yet but only an investigation by the Ombudsman, any order for the examination of the bank account is premature. PCIB vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84526, January 28, 1991) The law on secrecy of bank deposits cannot be used to preclude the bank deposits from being garnished for the satisfaction of a judgment. There is no violation of R.A. No. 1405 because the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process and it was not the intention of the legislature to place bank deposits beyond the reach of the judgment creditor. Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997) A foreign transient who raped a minor, escaped and was made liable for damages to the victim cannot invoke the exemption from court process of foreign currency deposits under R.A. No. 6426. The garnishment of his foreign currency deposit should be allowed by reason of equity and to prevent injustice; moreover, the purpose of the law is to encourage foreign currency deposits and not to benefit a wrongdoer. Republic of the Philippines vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008 Since the account of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were satisfied. A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. A finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture. Republic of the Philippines vs. Cabrini Green & Ross, Inc., G.R. No. 154522, May 5, 2006 The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the extension of freeze orders. It is solely the CA which has the authority to issue a freeze order as well as to extend its effectivity; it also has the exclusive jurisdiction to extend existing freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis-à-vis accounts and deposits related to money-laundering activities Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot, et. al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013 The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The effectivity of the freeze order was limited to a period not exceeding six months, which may be extended by the CA should it become completely necessary. Nonetheless, when the Republic has not offered any explanation why it took six years before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, it can only be concluded that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period violated the party’s right to due process. Negotiable Instruments Law Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Security Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992 When the documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor, such instrument is negotiable because it is payable to the “bearer.” The documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts deposited are repayable specifically to him, but the amounts are to be repayable to the bearer of the documents or, for that matter, whosoever may be the bearer at the time of presentment. Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 93397, March 3, 1997 The language of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit instrument is its freedom to circulate as a substitute for money. The freedom of negotiability is the touchstone relating to the protection of holders in due course and is the foundation for the protection which the law thrown around a holder in due course. This freedom in negotiability is totally absent in a certificate of indebtedness which merely acknowledges to pay a sum of money to a specified persons or entity. Since a certificate of indebtedness which is not payable to order or bearer but is payable to a specific person is not negotiable, the assignee takes it subject to the defect in the title of the assignor. Thus, when the person who signed the deed of assignment was not authorized by the board of directors, the assignor had no title to convey to the assignee. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. CIR, G.R. Nos. 166018 & 167728, 04 June 2014 The electronic messages are not signed by the investor-clients as supposed drawers of a bill of exchange; they do not contain an unconditional order to pay a sum certain in money as the payment is supposed to come from a specific fund or account of the investor-clients; and, they are not payable to order or bearer but to a specifically designated third party. Thus, the electronic messages are not bills of exchange. As there was no bill of exchange or order for the payment drawn abroad and made payable here in the Philippines, there could have been no acceptance or payment that will trigger the imposition of the DST under Section 181 of the Tax Code. Philippine National Bank vs. Erlando T. Rodriguez and Norma Rodriguez, G.R. No. 170325, September 26, 2008 Under the fictitious payee rule, a check made expressly payable to a non-fictitious and existing person is not necessarily an order instrument if the payee is not the intended recipient of the proceeds of the check. There is, however, a commercial bad faith exception to this rule which provides that a showing of commercial bad faith on the part of the drawee bank, or any transferee of the check for that matter, will work to strip it of this defense. People Of The Philippines Vs. Gilbert Reyes Wagas. G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013 Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check made payable to cash is payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. However, the drawer of the post-dated check cannot be liable for estafa to the person who did not acquire the instrument directly from drawer but through negotiation of another by mere delivery. This is because the drawer did not use the check to defraud the holder/private complainant. Prudential Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) G.R. No. 180390, July 27, 2011 A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgement by a bank of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank promise to pay to the depositor or the order of the depositor or to some other person or his order whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. A document to be considered a certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form. Thus, a passbook of an interest-earning deposit account issued by a bank is a certificate of deposit drawing interest because it is considered a written acknowledgment by a bank that it has accepted a deposit of a sum of money from a depositor. Thus, it is subject to documentary stamp tax. Ting Ting Pua vs. Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng, G.R. No. 198660, October 23, 2013 The 17 original checks, completed and delivered to petitioner, are sufficient by themselves to prove the existence of the loan obligation of the respondents to petitioner. Sec. 16 of the NIL provides that when an instrument is no longer in the possession of the person who signed it and it is complete in its terms “a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. Patrimonio v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 187769, 04 June 2014 While under the law, the one in possession had a prima facie authority to complete the check, such prima facie authority does not extend to its use (i.e., subsequent transfer or negotiation) once the check is completed. In other words, only the authority to complete the check is presumed. Further, the law used the term “prima facie” to underscore the fact that the authority which the law accords to a holder is a presumption juris tantum only; hence, subject to contrary proof. Thus, evidence that there was no authority or that the authority granted has been exceeded may be presented by the maker in order to avoid liability under the instrument. In the present case, no evidence is on record that the one to whom the check was delivered ever secured prior approval from the petitioner to fill up the blank or to use the check. In his testimony, petitioner asserted that he never authorized nor approved the filling up of the blank checks. San Miguel Corporation vs. Puzon, Jr. G.R. No. 167567, 22 September 2010 If the post-dated check was given to the payee in payment of an obligation, the purpose of giving effect to the instrument is evident, thus title or ownership the check was transferred to the payee. However, if the PDC was not given as payment, then there was no intent to give effect to the instrument and ownership was not transferred. The evidence proves that the check was accepted, not as payment, but in accordance with the policy of the payee to cover the transaction (purchase of beer products) and in the meantime the drawer was to pay for the transaction by some other means other than the check. This being so, title to the check did not transfer to the payee; it remained with the drawer. The second element of the felony of theft was therefore not established. Hence, there is no probable cause for theft. Equitable Banking Corporation vs Special Steel Products, June 13, 2012 The fact that a person, other than the named payee of the crossed check, was presenting it for deposit should have put the bank on guard. It should have verified if the payee authorized the holder to present the same in its behalf or indorsed it to him. The bank’s reliance on the holder’s assurance that he had good title to the three checks constitutes gross negligence even though the holder was related to the majority stockholder of the payee. While the check was not delivered to the payee, the suit may still prosper because the payee did not assert a right based on the undelivered check but on quasi-delict. Westmont Bank (formerly Associated Banking Corp.) vs. Eugene Ong, G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002 As a general rule, a bank or corporation who has obtained possession of a check upon an unauthorized or forged indorsement of the payee’s signature and who collects the amount of the check from the drawee, is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee or other owner, notwithstanding that the amount has been paid to the person from whom the check was obtained. The theory of the rule is that the possession of the check on the forged or unauthorized indorsement is wrongful and when the money had been collected on the check, the proceeds are held for the rightful owners who may recover them. The payee ought to be allowed to recover directly from the collecting bank, regardless of whether the check was delivered to the payee or not. Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139130, November 27, 2002 It is a rule that when a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the check is wholly inoperative and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party, can be acquired through or under such signature. However, the rule does provide for an exception, namely: “unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.” In the instant case, it is the exception that applies as the petitioner is precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting to his secretary his credit cards and checkbook including the verification of his statements of account. Philippine National Bank vs. FF Cruz and Company, G.R. No. 173259, July 25, 2011 As between a bank and its depositor, where the bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the greater proportion of the loss shall be borne by the bank. The bank was negligent because it did not properly verify the genuineness of the signatures in the applications for manager’s checks while the depositor was negligent because it clothed its accountant/bookkeeper with apparent authority to transact business with the Bank and it did not examine its monthly statement of account and report the discrepancy to the Bank. The court allocated the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio. Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Balmaceda,G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011 While its manager forged the signature of the authorized signatories of clients in the application for manager’s checks and forged the signatures of the payees thereof, the drawee bank also failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence required of banks in the case at bar. It allowed its manager to encash the Manager’s checks that were plainly crossed checks. A crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn across its face or across its corner. Based on jurisprudence, the crossing of a check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once — to the one who has an account with the bank; and (c) the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose and he must inquire if he received the check pursuant to this purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due course. In other words, the crossing of a check is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the payee. When a check is crossed, it is the duty of the collecting bank to ascertain that the check is only deposited to the payee’s account. Town Saving and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 459, 1993 When a married couple signed a promissory note in favor of a bank to enable the sister of the husband to obtain a loan, they are considered as accommodation parties who are liable for the payment of said loan. Gonzales vs Phillippine Commercial and International Bank, GR No. 180257, February 23, 2011 While a maker who signed a promissory note for the benefit of his co-maker (who received the loan proceeds) is considered an accommodation party, he is, nevertheless, entitled to a written notice on the default and the outstanding obligation of the party accommodated. There being no such written notice, the Bank is grossly negligent in terminating the credit line of the accommodation party for the unpaid interest dues from the loans of the party accommodated and in dishonoring a check drawn against such credit line. Juanita Salas vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and First Finance & Leasing Corporation, G.R. No. 76788 January 22, 1990 A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof. This being so, petitioner cannot set up against respondent the defense of nullity of the contract of sale between her and VMS. Atrium Management Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 109491, February 28, 2001 Where cashier’s checks were issued merely as financial assistance to the payee with instruction that the checks were strictly endorsed for payee’s account only and not to be further negotiated, the party in whose favor the checks were negotiated could not qualify as a holder in due course. However, it does not follow as a legal proposition that simply because the holder was not a holder in due course for having taken the checks with notice that the same were for deposit only to the account of another that it was altogether precluded from recovering on the instrument. The Negotiable Instruments Law does not provide that a holder not in due course cannot recover on the instrument. The disadvantage of the holder in not being a holder in due course is that the instrument is subject to defense as if it were non-negotiable. One such defense is absence or failure of consideration (the defense raised by the drawer since the checks had no consideration and was issued merely as a form of financial assistance to the payee). Samsung Construction Company Philippines, Inc. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company and Court Of Appeals, G.R. NO. 129015, August 13, 2004 If a bank pays a forged check, it must be considered as paying out of its funds and cannot charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor. A bank is liable, irrespective of its good faith, in paying a forged check. Maria Tuazon vs. Heirs of Bartolome Ramos, 463 SCRA 408, 2005 After an instrument is dishonored by non-payment, indorsers cease to be merely secondarily liable; they become principal debtors whose liability becomes identical to that of the original obligor.The holder of the negotiable instrument need not even proceed against the drawer before suing the indorser. Allied Banking Corporation vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, GR. 188363, February 27, 2013 The collecting bank which accepted a post-dated check for deposit and sent it for clearing and the drawee bank which cleared and honored the check are both liable to the drawer for the entire face value of the check. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 641 (2000) In depositing the check in his name, the depositor did not become the out-right owner of the amount stated therein. By depositing the check with the bank, the depositor was, in a way, merely designating the bank as the collecting bank. This is in consonance with the rule that a negotiable instrument, such as a check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not legal tender. As such, after receiving the deposit, under its own rules, the bank shall credit the amount to the depositor’s account or infuse value thereon only after the drawee bank shall have paid the amount of the check or the check has been cleared for deposit. The depositor’s contention that after the lapse of the 35-day period the amount of a deposited check could be withdrawn even in the absence of a clearance thereon, otherwise it could take a long time before a depositor could make a withdrawal is untenable. Said practice amounts to a disregard of the clearance requirement of the banking system. Anamer Salazar vs. JY Brothers Marketing Corporation, GR no. 171998, October 20, 2010 While Section 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Law in relation to Article 1231 of the Civil Code provides that one of the modes of discharging a negotiable instrument is by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money, such as novation, the acceptance by the holder of another check which replaced the dishonored bank check did not result to novation. There are only two ways which indicate the presence of novation and thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. First, novation must be explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms as novation is never presumed. Secondly, the old and the new obligations must be incompatible on every point. In the instant case, there was no express agreement that the holder’s acceptance of the replacement check will discharge the drawer and endorser from liability. Neither is there incompatibility because both checks were given precisely to terminate a single obligation arising from the same transaction. The International Corporate Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank, G.R. NO. 129910, September 5, 2006 Alterations of the serial numbers do not constitute material alterations on the checks. Since there were no material alterations on the checks, respondent as drawee bank has no right to dishonor them and return them to petitioner, the collecting bank. Insurance Law Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009

One test in order to determine whether one is engaged in insurance business is whether the assumption of risk and indemnification of loss (which are elements of an insurance business) are the principal object and purpose of the organization or whether they are merely incidental to its business. If these are the principal objectives, the business is that of insurance. But if they are merely incidental and service is the principal purpose, then the business is not insurance. In this case, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are not insurance business Fortune Medicare Inc. vs Amorin. G.R. No. 195872, March 12, 2014 For purposes of determining the liability of a health care provider to its members, a health care agreement is in the nature of non-life insurance, which is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the member incurs hospital, medical or any other expense arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingent, the health care provider must pay for the same to the extent agreed upon under the contract. Limitations as to liability must be distinctly specified and clearly reflected in the extent of coverage which the company voluntary assume, otherwise, any ambiguity arising therein shall be construed in favor of the member. Being a contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly against the party which prepared the contract – the insurer. This is equally applicable to Health Care Agreements. The phraseology used in medical or hospital service contracts, such as “standard charges“ must be liberally construed in favor of the subscriber, and if doubtful or reasonably susceptible of two interpretations the construction conferring coverage is to be adopted, and exclusionary clauses of doubtful import should be strictly construed against the provider. Thus, if the member, while on vacation, underwent a procedure in the USA, the standard charges referred to in the contract should mean standard charges in USA and not the cost had the procedure been conducted in the Philippines. Philamcare Health System vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 356, 2002 Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health of: 1.) Himself, or his spouse and of his children; 2.) Any person: (a) on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or in whom he has a pecuniary interest; (b) under legal obligation to him for the payment of money, respecting property or service, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance; and (c) upon whom whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends. Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. vs. Castor, GR No. 198174, September 2, 2013 Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Accordingly, in interpreting the exclusions in an insurance contract, the terms used specifying the excluded classes therein are to be given their meaning as understood in common speech. A contract of insurance is a contract of adhesion. So, when the terms of the insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. Heirs Of Loreto c. Maramag vs. Eva Verna De Guzman Maramag, et al., G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009 The only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of heirs. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Antonio Lagman, G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011 Section 177 of the Insurance Code states that the surety is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the contract of suretyship or bond is perfected and delivered to the obligor. No contract of suretyship or bonding shall be valid and binding unless and until the premium therefor has been paid, except where the obligee has accepted the bond, in which case the bond becomes valid and enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by the obligor to the surety. A continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the Insurance Commissioner, and by the court. By law and by the specific contract involved in this case, the effectivity of the bond required for the obtention of a license to engage in the business of receiving rice for storage is determined not alone by the payment of premiums but principally by the Administrator of the NFA. First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance Corporation vs Chevron Philippines, GR No. 177839, January 18, 2012 The extent of the surety’s liability is determined by the language of the suretyship contract or bond itself. It can not be extended by implications beyond the terms of the contract. Having accepted the bond, the creditor is bound by the recital in the surety bond that the terms and conditions of its distributorship contract be reduced in writing or at the very least communicated in writing to the surety. Such non-compliance by the creditor impacts not on the validity or legality of the surety contract but on the creditor’s right to demand performance. The Heirs of George Y. Poe vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009 The liability of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code; while that of the insurer arises from contract, particularly, the insurance policy. The third-party liability of the insurer is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and that required by law; and it cannot be held solidarily liable for anything beyond that amount. Jewel Villacorta vs. The Insurance Commission, et al., G.R. No. 54171. October 28, 1980 The main purpose of the “authorized driver” clause is that a person other than the insured owner, who drives the car on the insured’s order, such as his regular driver, or with his permission, such as a friend or member of the family or the employees of a car service or repair shop must be duly licensed drivers and have no disqualification to drive a motor vehicle. The mere happenstance that the employee(s) of the shop owner diverts the use of the car to his own illicit or unauthorized purpose in violation of the trust reposed in the shop by the insured car owner does not mean that the “authorized driver” clause has been violated such as to bar recovery, provided that such employee is duly qualified to drive under a valid driver’s license. It is the theft clause, not the “authorized driver” clause that applies. Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch III, et al., G.R. No. L-49699, August 8, 1988 From a reading Section 378, the following rules on claims under the “no fault indemnity” provision, where proof of fault or negligence is not necessary for payment of any claim for death or injury to a passenger or a third party, are established: 1.) A claim may be made against one motor vehicle only. 2.) If the victim is an occupant of a vehicle, the claim shall lie against the insurer of the vehicle in which he is riding, mounting or dismounting from. 3.) In any other case (i.e. if the victim is not an occupant of a vehicle), the claim shall lie against the insurer of the directly offending vehicle. 4.) In all cases, the right of the party paying the claim to recover against the owner of the vehicle responsible for the accident shall be maintained. Lalican vs. Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd, 597 SCRA 159, 2009) The existence of an insurance interest gives a person the legal right to insure the subject matter of the policy of insurance. Section 19 of the Insurance Code states that an interest in the life or health of a person insured must exist when the insurance takes effect, but need not exist thereafter or when the loss occurs. Spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy Cha vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124520. August 18, 1997 A non-life insurance policy such as the fire insurance policy taken by spouses Cha over their merchandise is primarily a contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the property insured must exist at the time the insurance takes effect and at the time the loss occurs. The basis of such requirement of insurable interest in property insured is based on sound public policy: to prevent a person from taking out an insurance policy on property upon which he has no insurable interest and collecting the proceeds of said policy in case of loss of the property. In such a case, the contract of insurance is a mere wager which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code. Malayan Insurance Company vs. PAP Co. (PHIL. BRANCH). G.R. No. 200784, August 07, 2013 With the transfer of the location of the subject properties, without notice and without the insurer’s consent, after the renewal of the policy, the insured clearly committed concealment, misrepresentation and a breach of a material warranty. Section 26 of the Insurance Code provides that a neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate, is called a concealment. Under Section 27 of the Insurance Code, “a concealment entitles the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance.” Moreover, under Section 168 of the Insurance Code, the insurer is entitled to rescind the insurance contract in case of an alteration in the use or condition of the thing insured. Section 168 of the Insurance Code provides, as follows: An alteration in the use or condition of a thing insured from that to which it is limited by the policy made without the consent of the insurer, by means within the control of the insured, and increasing the risks, entitles an insurer to rescind a contract of fire insurance.

Armando Geagonia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 114427, February 6, 1995 A double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect of the same subject and interest. Since, the insurable interests of a mortgagor and a mortgagee on the mortgaged property are distinct and separate, the two policies of the PFIC do not cover the same interest as that covered by the policy of the private respondent, no double insurance exists. Great Pacific Life vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 677, 1999 Where a mortgagor pays insurance premium under group insurance policy (Mortgage Redemption Insurance), making loss payable to mortgagee, the insurance is on mortgagor’s interest, and mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make mortgagee a party to the contract Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc. and Reputable Forwarder Services, Inc., G.R. No. 184300, July 11, 2012 By the express provision of Section 93 of the Insurance Code, double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect to the same subject and interest. The requisites in order for double insurance to arise are as follows: 1.) The person insured is the same; 2.) Two or more insurers insuring separately; 3.) There is identity of subject matter; 4.) There is identity of interest insured; and 5.) There is identity of the risk or peril insured against. In the present case, even though the two insurance policies were issued over the same goods and cover the same risk, there arises no double insurance since they were issued to two different persons/entities having distinct insurable interests. Necessarily, over insurance by double insurance cannot likewise exist. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Gregoria Cruz Arnaldo, in her capacity as the Insurance Commissioner, et al., G.R. No. L-67835, October 12, 1987 For a valid cancellation of the policy, the following requisites must concur: 1) There must be prior notice of cancellation to the insured; 2) The notice must be based on the occurrence, after the effective date of the policy, of one or more of the grounds mentioned; 3) The notice must be (a) in writing, (b) mailed, or delivered to the named insured, (c) at the address shown in the policy; 4) It must state (a) which of the grounds mentioned in Section 64 is relied upon and (b) that upon written request of the insured, the insurer will furnish the facts on which the cancellation is based. MICO claims it cancelled the policy in question for non-payment of premium. However, there is no proof that the notice, assuming it complied with the other requisites, was actually mailed to and received by Pinca. Pacific Timber Export Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-38613, February 25, 1982 The non-payment of premium on the cover note is no cause for Pacific to lose what is due it as if there had been payment of premium, for non-payment by it was not chargeable against its fault. Had all the logs been lost during the loading operations, but after the issuance of the cover note, liability on the note would have already arisen even before payment of premium. This is how the cover note as a “binder” should legally operate otherwise, it would serve no practical purpose in the realm of commerce, and is supported by the doctrine that where a policy is delivered without requiring payment of the premium, the presumption is that a credit was intended and policy is valid. American Homes Assurance vs. Antonio Chua, G.R. 130421, June 28, 1999 Section 78 of the Insurance Code explicitly provides that an acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment, so far as to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein that it shall not be binding until the premium is actually paid. This Section establishes a legal fiction of payment and should be interpreted as an exception to Section 77. Ucpb General Insurance Co. Inc., vs. Masagana Telemart, Inc., G.R. No. 137172, April 4, 2001 Section 77 of the Insurance Code of 1978 provides that an insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against. The first exception is provided by Section 77 itself, and that is, in case of a life or industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies. The second is that covered by Section 78 of the Insurance Code, which provides that any acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment, so far as to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein that it shall not be binding until premium is actually paid. A third exception was laid down in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court ruled that Section 77 may not apply if the parties have agreed to the payment in installments of the premium and partial payment has been made at the time of loss. Tuscany has also provided a fourth exception, namely, that the insurer may grant credit extension for the payment of the premium. This simply means that if the insurer has granted the insured a credit term for the payment of the premium and loss occurs before the expiration of the term, recovery on the policy should be allowed even though the premium is paid after the loss but within the credit term. Moreover, as a fifth exception, estoppel bars it from taking refuge under said Section, since Masagana relied in good faith on such practice. Jose Marques and Maxilite Technologies, Inc., vs. Far East Bank And Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 171379, January 10, 2011 FEBTC is estopped from claiming that the insurance premium has been unpaid. FEBTC induced Maxilite and Marques to believe that the insurance premium has in fact been debited from Maxilite’s account. However, FEBTC failed to do so. FEBTC’s conduct clearly constitutes gross negligence in handling Maxilite’s and Marques’ accounts. As a consequence, FEBTC must be held liable for damages pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. South Sea Surety and Insurance Company Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 102253 June 2, 1995 An insurer which delivers to an insurance agent or insurance broker an insurance policy shall be deemed to have authorized such agent to receive on its behalf payment of any premium which is due on such policy. Great Pacific Life Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-57308, April 23, 1990 Great Pacific should have informed Cortez of the deadline for paying the first premium before or at least upon delivery of the policy to him, so he could have complied with what was needful and would not have been misled into believing that his life and his family were protected by the policy, when actually they were not. And, if the premium paid by Cortez was unacceptable for being late, it was the company’s duty to return it. By accepting his premiums without giving him the corresponding protection, Great Pacific acted in bad faith and since his policy was in fact inoperative or ineffectual from the beginning, the company was never at risk, hence, it is not entitled to keep the premium. Ng Gan Zee vs. Asian Crusader Life Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. L-30685, May 30, 1983 Concealment exists where the assured had knowledge of a fact material to the risk, and honesty, good faith, and fair dealing requires that he should communicate it to the assurer, but he designedly and intentionally withholds the same. In the absence of evidence that the insured had sufficient medical knowledge as to enable him to distinguish between “peptic ulcer” and “a tumor”, his statement that said tumor was “associated with ulcer of the stomach, ” should be construed as an expression made in good faith of his belief as to the nature of his ailment and operation. Sunlife Assurance Company of Canada vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 105135, June 22, 1995 Where the insured is specifically required to disclose to the insurer matters relating to his health, the insured’s failure to disclose the fact that he was hospitalized for two weeks prior to filing his application for insurance, raises grave doubts about his bona fides. Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making his inquiries. Emilio Tan vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48049. June 29, 1989 By virtue of the “incontestability clause,” the insurer has two years from the date of issuance of the insurance contract or of its last reinstatement within which to contest the policy, whether or not, the insured still lives within such period. After two years, the defenses of concealment or misrepresentation, no matter how patent or well founded, no longer lie. Considering that the insured died before the two-year period had lapsed, Phil-Am Insurance is not, therefore, barred from proving that the policy is void ab initio by reason of the insured’s fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation vs. Cresencia p. Aban, G.R. No. 175666, July 29, 2013 The “Incontestability Clause” under Section 48 of the Insurance Code provides that an insurer is given two years – from the effectivity of a life insurance contract and while the insured is alive – to discover or prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. After the two-year period lapses, or when the insured dies within the period, the insurer must make good on the policy, even though the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. Florendo vs. Philam Plans, GR. No 186983, February 22, 2012 The incontestability clause precludes the insurer from disowning liability under the policy it issued on the ground of concealment or misrepresentation regarding the health of the insured after a year of its issuance. Since insured died on the 11th month following the issuance of his plan, the incontestability period has not yet set in. Consequently, the insurer was not barred from questioning the beneficiary’s entitlement to the benefits of the pension plan. Summit Guaranty And Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose C. De Guzman, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch III, CFI of Tarlac, et al., G.R. No. L- 50997, June 30, 1987 There is absolutely nothing in the law which mandates that the two periods prescribed in Section 384 of the Insurance Code—that is, the six-month period for filing the notice of claim and the one-year period for bringing an action or suit must always concur. On the contrary, it is very clear that the one-year period is only required “in proper cases.” The one-year period should instead be counted from the date of rejection by the insurer as this is the time when the cause of action accrues. Since in the case at hand, there has yet been no accrual of cause of action, prescription has not yet set in. This is because, before such final rejection, there was no real necessity for bringing suit. H.H. Hollero v. GSIS, G.R. No. 152334, 24 September 2014 The prescriptive period for the insured’s action for indemnity should be reckoned from the “final rejection” of the claim. “Final rejection” simply means denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured’s motion or request for reconsideration. A perusal of the letter dated April 26, 1990 shows that the GSIS denied Hollero Construction’s indemnity claims. The same conclusion obtains for the letter dated June 21, 1990 denying Hollero Construction’s indemnity claim. Holler’s causes of action for indemnity respectively accrued from its receipt of the letters dated April 26, 1990 and June 21, 1990, or the date the GSIS rejected its claims in the first instance. Consequently, given that it allowed more than twelve (12) months to lapse before filing the necessary complaint before the RTC on September 27, 1991, its causes of action had already prescribed. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Rodelio Alberto, et al., G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012 The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. When it is not disputed that the insurance company indeed paid, then there is valid subrogation in its favor. Loadstar Shipping Company v. Malayan Insurance Company, G.R. No. 185565, November 26, 2014 Under the Code of Commerce, if the goods are delivered but arrived at the destination in damaged condition, the remedies to be pursued by the consignee depend on the extent of damage on the goods. If the effect of damage on the goods consisted merely of diminution in value, the carrier is bound to pay only the difference between its price on that day and its depreciated value as provided under Article 364. Malayan, as the insurer of PASAR, neither stated nor proved that the goods are rendered useless or unfit for the purpose intended by PASAR due to contamination with seawater. Hence, there is no basis for the goods’ rejection under Article 365 of the Code of Commerce. Clearly, it is erroneous for Malayan to reimburse PASAR as though the latter suffered from total loss of goods in the absence of proof that PASAR sustained such kind of loss. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 174116, September 11, 2009 The insurer, upon happening of the risk “insured” against and after payment to the insured, is subrogated to the rights and cause of action of the latter. As such, the insurer has the right to seek reimbursement for all the expenses paid. However, in a contract of carriage involving the shipment of knock-down auto parts of Nissan motor vehicles which were allegedly lost and destroyed, the insurer was not properly subrogated because of the non-presentation of any marine insurance policy. The submission of a marine risk note instead of the insurance policy doesn’t satisfy the requirement for subrogation. The marine risk note is not an insurance policy. It is only an acknowledgment or declaration of the insurer confirming the specific shipment covered by its marine open policy, the evaluation of the cargo and the chargeable premium. Asian Terminals Inc. vs. First Lepanto Taisho Corporation, G.R. No. 185964, 16 June 2014 The shipment received by the ATI from the vessel of COCSCO was found to have sustained loss and damages. An arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. It must prove that the losses were not due to its negligence or to that of its employees. The Court held that ATI failed to discharge its burden of proof. ATI blamed COSCO but when the damages were discovered, the goods were already in ATI’s custody for two weeks. Witnesses also testified that the shipment was left in an open area exposed to the elements, thieves and vandals. Transportation Laws Pedro De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-47822, 22 December 1988 Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom as “a sideline”). It also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. Philippine American General Insurance Company vs. Pks Shipping Company, G.R. No. 149038, 9 April 2003 Much of the distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or special carrier” lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation providing such service could very well be just a private carrier. Spouses Perena vs Spouses Nicolas, GR No. 157917, August 29, 2012 Persons engaged in the business of transporting students from their respective residences to their school and back are considered common carrier. Despite catering to a limited clientele, they operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee. Unsworth Transport International (Phils.) vs. Court of Appeals ,G.R. No. 166250, 26 July 2010 A freight forwarder’s liability is limited to damages arising from its own negligence, including negligence in choosing the carrier; however, where the forwarder contracts to deliver goods to their destination instead of merely arranging for their transportation, it becomes liable as a common carrier for loss or damage to goods. A freight forwarder assumes the responsibility of a carrier, which actually executes the transport, even though the forwarder does not carry the merchandise itself. Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation, GR No. 179446, January 10, 2011 A customs broker whose services were engaged for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and their subsequent delivery to the consignee’s warehouse and the owner of the delivery truck whom the customs broker contracted to transport the cargoes to the warehouse are both common carriers. The latter is considered a common carrier in the absence of indication that it solely and exclusively rendered services to the customs broker. Thus, when the truck failed to deliver one of the cargoes, both the broker and owner of the truck are liable. Being both common carriers, they are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Westwind Shipping Corporation vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., GR no. 2002289, November 25, 2013

The arrastre operator is likewise liable. The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. While it is true that an arrastre operator and a carrier may not be held solidarily liable at all times, the facts of these cases show that apart from the stevedores of the arrastre operator being directly in charge of the physical unloading of the cargo, its foreman picked the cable sling that was used to hoist the packages for transfer to the dock. Moreover, the fact that the packages were unloaded with the same sling unharmed is telling of the inadequate care with which the stevedore handled and discharged the cargo. Unknown Owner Of The Vessel M/V China Joy vs. Asian Terminals Inc. G.R. No. 195661, 11 March 2015 The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. The legal relationship between an arrastre operator and a consignee is akin to that between a warehouseman and a depositor. As to both the nature of the functions and the place of their performance, an arrastre operator’s services are clearly not maritime in character. In Insurance Company of North America v. Asian Terminals, Inc., the Court explained that the liabilities of the arrastre operator for losses and damages are set forth in the contract for cargo handling services it had executed with the PPA. Corollarily then, the rights of an arrastre operator to be paid for damages it sustains from handling cargoes do not likewise spring from contracts of carriage. However, in the instant petition, the contending parties make no references at all to any provisions in the contract for cargo handling services ATI had executed with the PPA. Notwithstanding the above, the petitioners cannot evade liability for the damage caused to ATI’s unloader in view of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. R Transport Corporation vs. Pante, GR No. 162104, September 15, 2009 When a bus hit a tree and house due to the fast and reckless driving of the bus driver resulting in injury to one of its passengers, the bus owner is liable and such liability does not cease even upon proof that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Asian Terminals, Inc vs. Simon Enterprises, Inc. GR No. 177116, February 27, 2013 Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must still, before the burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage. This can only be done if the weight of the shipment at the port of origin and its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, and it can be seen that the former weight is considerably greater than the latter weight, taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom et al., G.R. No. 143360, 5 September 2002 In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the sale — while valid and binding between the parties — does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the said transport equipment. William Tiu, doing business under the name and style of “D’ Rough Riders,” vs. Pedro A. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September 2004 The principle of last clear chance only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Spouses Cesar & Suthira Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993 When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., vs. Spouses Daniel Vazquez And Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez, G.R. No. 150843, March 14, 2003 Spouses Vazquez had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with Spouses Vazquez. Heirs of Josemaria Ochoa vs. G&S Transport Corporation, March 19,2011 as affirmed in the July 16, 2012 decision In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. Unfortunately, the common carrier miserably failed to overcome this presumption as the accident which led to the passenger’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of its driver. Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Rosalito Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004 A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. Antonia Maranan vs. Pascual Perez, et al, G.R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967

The basis of the carrier’s liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee’s duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders.The carrier’s liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant’s violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the former’s confiding in the servant’s hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Jose Pilapil vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52159, 22 December 1989 A tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Alberta Yobido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113003, 17 October 1997 A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days’ use. Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, 18 March 1999 Despite the report of Philippine Constabulary agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, Fortune took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the Fortune was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability. Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131621, 28 September 1999 Loadstar was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any event, it did not sink because of any storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the wind condition in the area where it sank was determined to be moderate. Since it was remiss in the performance of its duties, Loadstar cannot hide behind the “limited liability” doctrine to escape responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo. Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation vs. Catalino Borja, G.R. No. 143008. June 10, 2002 Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. Petitioner’s vessel was carrying chemical cargo—alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent. Aniceto Saludo, Jr. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992 The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part of the carrier to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts. Virgines Calvo doing business under the name and style Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Ucpb General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 148496, 19 March 2002 The rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, Calvo accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of Calvo to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds. Provident Insurance Corp., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118030, January 15, 2004 The bill of lading defines the rights and liabilities of the parties in reference to the contract of carriage. Stipulations therein are valid and binding in the absence of any showing that the same are contrary to law, morals, customs, public order and public policy. Where the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control. In light of the foregoing, there can be no question about the validity and enforceability of Stipulation No. 7 in the bill of lading. The twenty-four hour requirement under the said stipulation is, by agreement of the contracting parties, a sine qua non for the accrual of the right of action to recover damages against the carrier. Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257, 1998 A bill of lading serves two functions: First, it is a receipt for the goods shipped. Second, it is a contract by which three parties, namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations. A bill of lading delivered and accepted constitutes the contract of carriage even though not signed, because the acceptance of a paper containing the terms of a proposed contract generally constitutes an acceptance of the contract and of all its terms and conditions of which the acceptor has actual or constructive notice. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 168402, August 6, 2008 Under the Code of Commerce, the notice of claim must be made within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of the cargo if the damage is not apparent from the outside of the package. For damages that are visible from the outside of the package, the claim must be made immediately. Provisions specifying a time to give notice of damage to common carriers are ordinarily to be given a reasonable and practical, rather than a strict construction. Understandably, when the goods were delivered, the necessary clearance had to be made before the package was opened. Upon opening and discovery of the damaged condition of the goods, a report to this effect had to pass through the proper channels before it could be finalized and endorsed by the institution to the claims department of the shipping company. The call to Aboitiz was made two days from delivery, a reasonable period considering that the goods could not have corroded instantly overnight such that it could only have sustained the damage during transit. Moreover, Aboitiz was able to immediately inspect the damage while the matter was still fresh. In so doing, the main objective of the prescribed time period was fulfilled. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the notice requirement in this case. Ucpb General Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 168433, February 10, 2009 The Court has construed the 24-hour claim requirement as a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to, the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. Otherwise, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the shipper or consignee. Philam Insurance Company vs. Heung A Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 187701 &G.R. No. 187812, 23 July 2014

Common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence. As the carrier of the subject shipment, HEUNG-A was bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in conveying the same and its slot charter agreement with DONGNAMA did not divest it of such characterization nor relieve it of any accountability for the shipment. However, the liability of HEUNG-A is limited to $500 per package or pallet because in case of the shipper’s failure to declare the value of the goods in the bill of lading, Section 4, paragraph 5 of the COGSA provides that neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package. Oceaneering Contractrors (Phils), Inc. v. Nestor Barreto, doing business as NNB Lighterage , GR No. 184215, February 9, 2011 Where the agreement executed by the parties was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by the owner, the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him. The sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which the barge owner failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for the charterer lost cargo despite the latter’s failure to insure the same. Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 131166, September 30, 1999

A charter party is a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment is one by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. A contract of affreightment may be either time charter, wherein the leased vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the ship’s store, pay for the wages of the master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship. Under a demise or bareboat charter on the other hand, the charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in effect, the owner for the voyage or service stipulated, subject to liability for damages caused by negligence. If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner in possession of the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Chua Yek Hong vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74811, 30 September 1988 The term “ship agent” as used in the foregoing provision is broad enough to include the ship owner. Pursuant to said provision, therefore, both the ship owner and ship agent are civilly and directly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons, which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of goods transported, as well as for the safety of passengers transported. However, under the same Article, this direct liability is moderated and limited by the ship agent’s or ship owner’s right of abandonment of the vessel and earned freight. The most fundamental effect of abandonment is the cessation of the responsibility of the ship agent/owner. The ship owner’s or agent’s liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. “No vessel, no liability” expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens as there is no longer any res to which it can attach. Dela Torre vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 160088, July 13, 2011 The LIMITED LIABILITY RULE cannot be availed of by the charterers/sub-charterer in order to escape from their liability. The Code of Commerce is clear on which indemnities may be confined or restricted to the value of the vessel and these are the – “indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel.” Thus, what is contemplated is the liability to third persons who may have dealt with the SHIPOWNER, the AGENT or even the CHARTERER in case of demise or bareboat charter. The Charterer cannot use the said Rule because it does not completely and absolutely step into the shoes of the shipowner or even the ship agent because there remains conflicting rights between the former and the real shipowner as derived from their charter agreement. Therefore, even if the contract is for a bareboat or demise charter where possession, free administration and even navigation are temporarily surrendered to the charterer, dominion over the vessel remains with the shipowner. Ergo, the charterer or the sub-charterer, whose rights cannot rise above that of the former, can never set up the Limited Liability Rule against the very owner of the vessel. National Development Company vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49469, August 19, 1988 The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil Code. Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131621 September 28, 1999 Inasmuch as neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) — which provides for a oneyear period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit — may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the insurer of the goods. Wallem Philippines Shipping vs SR Farms, GR No. 161849, July 9, 2010 Under Section 3 (6) of the COGSA, notice of loss or damages must be filed within three days of delivery. Under the same provision, however, a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if a suit is nonetheless filed within one year from delivery of the goods or from the date when the goods should have been delivered. The filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original. It is true that, as an exception, an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time after the service of the amended complaint. In this case, petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in the original complaint filed on March 11, 1993. It was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint, impleading petitioner as defendant, was filed. Considering this circumstances, clearly, the suit against the petitioner was filed beyond the prescriptive period of the filing of claims as provided in the COGSA. Asian Terminals Inc., v. Philam Insurance Co. G.R. NO. 181262 , July 24, 2013 In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered: Provided, That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119571, March 11, 1998 The one-year period of limitation is designed to meet the exigencies of maritime hazards. In a case where the goods shipped were neither lost nor damaged in transit but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to someone who claimed to be entitled thereto, the situation is different, and the special need for the short period of limitation in cases of loss or damage caused by maritime perils does not obtain. New World International Development Corporation vs NYK-FilJapan Shipping Corporation, GR No. 171468, August 24, 2011 Notwithstanding the fact that the case was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period provided under the COGSA, the suit (against the insurer) will not be dismissed if the delay was not due to the claimant’s fault. Had the insurer processed and examined the claim promptly, the claimant or the insurer itself, as subrogee, could have taken the judicial action on time. By making an unreasonable demand for an itemized list of damages which caused delay, the insurer should bear the loss with interest, Insurance Company of North America vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. GR No. 180784, February 15, 2012 The term “ carriage of goods “ covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded to the time when they are discharged from the ship; thus, it can be inferred that the period of time when the goods have been discharged from the ship and given to the custody of the arrastre operator is not covered by the COGSA. Under the COGSA, the carrier and the ship may put up the defense of prescription if the action for damages is not brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. However, the COGSA does not mention than an arrastre operator may invoke the prescriptive period; hence, it does not cover the arrastre operator. The arrastre operator’s responsibility and liability for losses and damages are set forth in the contract for cargo handling services executed between the Philippine Ports Authority and Marina Port Services. Lhuillier vs British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010 Under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: 1) the court where carrier is domiciled; 2) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3) the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or 4) the court of the place of destination. In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. Thus, the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner even though it was based on tort and not on breach of contract. Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119706, March 14, 1996 While the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the Philippines, being a treaty commitment by the government and as a signatory thereto, the same does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances when a carrier shall be liable for breach of contract or as an absolute limit of the extent of liability, nor does it preclude the operation of the Civil Code or other pertinent laws. The acceptance in due course by PAL of Mejia’s cargo as packed and its advice against the need for declaration of its actual value operated as an assurance to Mejia that in fact there was no need for such a declaration. Mejia can hardly be faulted for relying on the representations of PAL’s own personnel. In other words, Mejia could and would have complied with the conditions stated in the air waybill, i.e., declaration of a higher value and payment of supplemental transportation charges, entitling her to recovery of damages beyond the stipulated limit of US$20 per kilogram of cargo in the event of loss or damage, had she not been effectively prevented from doing so upon the advice of PAL’s personnel for reasons best known to themselves. Even if the claim for damages was conditioned on the timely filing of a formal claim, under Article 1186 of the Civil Code that condition was deemed fulfilled, considering that the collective action of PAL’s personnel in tossing around the claim and leaving it unresolved for an indefinite period of time was tantamount to “voluntarily preventing its fulfillment.” On grounds of equity, the filing of the baggage freight claim, which sufficiently informed PAL of the damage sustained by private respondent’s cargo, constituted substantial compliance with the requirement in the contract for the filing of a formal claim. Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. Hon. Adriano Savillo, et. al., G.R. No. 149547, July 4, 2008 Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier for “damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods.” Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.” Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already lapsed. Nevertheless, the Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight. The Court finds that the present case is substantially similar to cases in which the damages sought were considered to be outside the coverage of the Warsaw Convention. Corporation Law Benny Hung vs BPI Finance Corporation . G.R. No. 182398, 20 July 2010 When the corporation (BB Sportswear, Inc.) which the plaintiff erroneously impleaded in a collection case was not the party to the actionable agreement and turned out to be not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the judgment may still be enforced against the corporation (BB Footwear, Inc.) which filed the answer and participated in the proceedings, as well as its controlling shareholder who signed the actionable agreement in his personal capacity and as a single proprietorship doing business under the trade name and style of BB Sportswear Enterprises. Sappari K. Sawadjaanvs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission and Al-amanah Investment Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 141735, June 8, 2005 By its failure to submit its by-laws on time, the AIIBP may be considered a de facto corporation whose right to exercise corporate powers may not be inquired into collaterally in any private suit to which such corporation may be a party. A corporation which has failed to file its by-laws within the prescribed period does not ipso facto lose its powers as such. The SEC Rules on Suspension/Revocation of the Certificate of Registration of Corporations, details the procedures and remedies that may be availed of before an order of revocation can be issued. There is no showing that such a procedure has been initiated in this case. Reynaldo M. Lozano vs. Hon. Eliezer R. De los Santos, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 58, Angeles City; and Antonio Anda, G.R. No. 125221, June 19, 1997 The plan of the parties to consolidate their respective jeepney drivers’ and operators’ associations into a single common association, if not yet approved by the SEC, neither had its officers and members submitted their articles of consolidation in accordance with Sections 78 and 79 of the Corporation Code, is a mere proposal to form a unified association. Any dispute arising out of the election of officers of said unified association is therefore not an intra-corporate dispute. Lim Tong Lim vs. Philippine Fishing Gear Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 136448, 3 November 1999 Under the law on estoppel, those acting on behalf of a corporation and those benefited by it, knowing it to be without valid existence, are held liable as general partners. Technically, it is true that petitioner did not directly act on behalf of the corporation. However, having reaped the benefits of the contract entered into by persons with whom he previously had an existing relationship, he is deemed to be part of said association and is covered by the scope of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. International Express Travel & Tour Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Henri Kahn, Philippine Football Federation, G.R. No. 119002, October 19, 2000 When the petitioner is not trying to escape liability from the contract but rather the one claiming from the contract, the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is not applicable. This doctrine applies to a third party only when he tries to escape liability on a contract from which he has benefited on the irrelevant ground of defective incorporation. Macasaet vs. Francisco, GR No. 156759, June 5, 2013 Corporation by estoppel results when a corporation represented itself to the public as such despite its not being incorporated. A corporation by estoppel may be impleaded as a party defendant considering that it possesses attributes of a juridical person, otherwise, it cannot be held liable for damages and injuries it may inflict to other persons. Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, in his capacity as General Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), Tacloban City vs. Commission on Audit, Chairman CELSO D. GANGAN, Commissioners Raul C. Flores and Emmanuel M. Dalman, and Regional Director of COA Region VIII, G.R. No. 147402, 14 January 2004 Congress can not enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M. Viari vs. Richard J. Gordon, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

Although the Philippine National Red Cross was created by a special charter, it can not be considered a government-owned and controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status or political affiliation. This does not mean however that the charter of PNRC is unconstitutional. PNRC has a sui generis status. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, so much so that Gordon was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. The PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. Antonio M. Carandang vs. Honorable Aniano A. Desierto, Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 153161, January 12, 2011 A government–owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature and owned by the government through its instrumentalities either wholly or where applicable as in the case of stock corporation to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. When a stockholder ceded to the government shares representing 72.4 % of the voting stock of the corporation but subsequently clarified that it should be reduced to 32.4%, the corporation shall not be considered government-owned and controlled until the quantification of shares is resolved with finality. Marissa R. Unchuan vs. Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009 A corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least 60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines, is considered a Philippine National. As such, the corporation may acquire disposable lands in the Philippines. Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Inc., G.R. No. 195580, 28 January 2015 A corporation that complies with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can be considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as to who has the “beneficial ownership” and “control” of the corporation. In this case, a further investigation as to the nationality of the personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee corporations is necessary. “Doubt” refers to various indicia that the “beneficial ownership” and “control” of the corporation do not in fact reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders. Even if at first glance the petitioners comply with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio, doubt exists in the present case that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the Filipino shareholders do not actually have the requisite number of control and beneficial ownership in petitioners Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur. Hence, the Court is correct in using the Grandfather Rule in determining the nationality of the petitioners. Rolando DS. Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 184520, March 13, 2013 A corporation has its own legal personality separate and distinct from those of its stockholders, directors or officers. Hence, absent any evidence that they have exceeded their authority, corporate officers are not personally liable for their official acts. Corporate directors and officers may be held solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment only if done with malice or in bad faith. Mercy Vda. de Roxas, represented by Arlene C. Roxas-Cruz, in her capacity as substitute appellant- petitioner vs. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc. G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013 In order for the Court to hold the officer of the corporation personally liable alone for the debts of the corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the Court has required that the bad faith of the officer must first be established clearly and convincingly. Petitioner, however, has failed to include any submission pertaining to any wrongdoing of the general manager. Necessarily, it would be unjust to hold the latter personally liable. Moreso, if the general manager was never impleaded as a party to the case. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation, GR. No. 167603, March 13, 2013 The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In this connection, case law lays down a three-pronged test to determine the application of the alter ego theory, which is also known as the instrumentality theory, namely: Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal right; and; The aforesaid control and breach of duty must have proximately caused the injury or unjust loss complained of. The first prong is the “instrumentality” or “control” test. This test requires that the subsidiary be completely under the control and domination of the parent. It inquires whether a subsidiary corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality or agent of the parent corporation such that its separate existence as a distinct corporate entity will be ignored. In addition, the control must be shown to have been exercised at the time the acts complained of took place. The second prong is the “fraud” test. This test requires that the parent corporation’s conduct in using the subsidiary corporation be unjust, fraudulent or wrongful. It examines the relationship of the plaintiff to the corporation. It recognizes that piercing is appropriate only if the parent corporation uses the subsidiary in a way that harms the plaintiff creditor. As such, it requires a showing of “an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.” The third prong is the “harm” test. This test requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s control, exerted in a fraudulent, illegal or otherwise unfair manner toward it, caused the harm suffered. A causal connection between the fraudulent conduct committed through the instrumentality of the subsidiary and the injury suffered or the damage incurred by the plaintiff should be established. The plaintiff must prove that, unless the corporate veil is pierced, it will have been treated unjustly by the defendant’s exercise of control and improper use of the corporate form and, thereby, suffer damages. Gregorio Singian, Jr. vs. the Honorable Sandiganbayan and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 160577-94, December 16, 2005 The powers to increase capitalization and to offer or give collateral to secure indebtedness are lodged with the corporation’s board of directors. However, this does not mean that the officers of the corporation other than the board of directors cannot be made criminally liable for their criminal acts if it can be proven that they participated therein. Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs. AGO Medical And Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine, (AMEC-BCCM) and Angelita F. Ago, G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005 A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code which expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. Manila Electric Company vs. T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation, Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific Corporation; and Ultra Electronics Instruments, Inc., G.R. No. 131723, December 13, 2007 As a rule, a corporation is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or sentiments like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is when the corporation has a reputation that is debased, resulting in its humiliation in the business realm. But in such a case, it is essential to prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to petitioner’s acts. Thus, where the records are bereft of evidence that the name or reputation of the corporation has been debased as a result of Meralco’s act (which in this case is the disconnection without written notice of the disconnection of the electricity supply to the building of the corporation due to alleged meter tampering), the corporation is not entitled to moral damages. Kukan International Corporation vs. Hon. Judge Amor Reyes, G.R. No. 182729, 29 September 2010 The court must first acquire jurisdiction over the corporation or corporations involved before its or their separate personalities are disregarded; and the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity can only be raised during a full-blown trial over a cause of action duly commenced involving parties duly brought under the authority of the court by way of service of summons or what passes as such service. Gold Line Tours vs. Heirs of Maria Concepcion Lacsa, GR No. 159108, 18 June 2012

However, in another case involving an action for breach of contract of carriage resulting to the death of one of the passengers , Supreme Court ruled that if the RTC had sufficient factual basis to conclude that the two corporations are one and the same entity as when they have the same President and controlling shareholder and it is generally known in the place where they do business that both transportation companies are one, the third party claim filed by the other corporation was set aside and the levy on its property held valid even though the latter was not made a party to the case . The judgment may be enforced against the other corporation to prevent multiplicity of suits and save the parties unnecessary expenses and delay. Prince Transport, Inc. vs. Garcia, GR No. 167291, January 12, 2011 The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is applicable not only to corporations but also to a single proprietorship as when the corporation transferred its employees to the company owned by the controlling stockholder of the corporation and yet despite the transfer, the employees’ daily time records, reports, daily income remittances and schedule of work were all made, performed, filed and kept in the corporation. The corporation is clearly hiding behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of the company. As such, the corporation and the company should be solidarily liable for the claims of the illegally dismissed employees. Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 199687, March 24, 2014 Where the court rendered judgment against a stock brokerage firm directing the latter to return shares of stock which it sold without authority, but the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, an alias writ of execution could not be enforced against its parent company because the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the latter and while the parent company owns and controls the brokerage firm, there is no showing that the control was used to violate the rights of the plaintiff. Arco Pulp & Paper Co. Inc. v. Lim, G.R. No. 206806, 25 June 2014 The corporate existence may be disregarded where the entity is formed or used for non-legitimate purposes, such as to evade a just and due obligation, or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud or to carry out similar or inequitable considerations, other unjustifiable aims or intentions, in which case, the fiction will be disregarded and the individuals composing it and the two corporations will be treated as identical. In the case at bar, when petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation to Lim became due and demandable, she not only issued an unfunded check but also contracted with a third party in an effort to shift petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s liability. She unjustifiably refused to honor petitioner corporation’s obligations to respondent. These acts clearly amount to bad faith. In this instance, the corporate veil may be pierced, and petitioner Santos may be held solidarily liable with petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper. Livesey vs. Binswanger Philippines, GR No. 177493, March 19, 2014 Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted when a corporation ceased to exist only in name as it re-emerged in the person of another corporation, for the purpose of evading its unfulfilled financial obligation under a compromise agreement. Thus, if the judgment for money claim could not be enforced against the employer corporation, an alias writ may be obtained against the other corporation considering the indubitable link between the closure of the first corporation and incorporation of the other. WPM International Trading Inc. v. Labayen, G.R. No. 182770, 17 September 2014 When an officer owns almost all of the stocks of a corporation, it does not ipso facto warrant the application of the principle of piercing the corporate veil unless it is proven that the officer has complete dominion over the corporation. Heirs of Fe Tan Uy, represented by her heir, Mauling Uy Lim vs. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 166282 & 83, February 13, 2013 Under a variation of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or one and the same. While the conditions for the disregard of the juridical entity may vary, the following are some probative factors of identity that will justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as laid down in Concept Builders, Inc.,v NLRC: (1) Stock ownership by one or common ownership of both corporations; (2) Identity of directors and officers; (3) The manner of keeping corporate books and records, and (4) Methods of conducting the business. Mariano A. Albert vs. University Publishing Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-19118, January 30, 1965 When the President of a non-existent principal entered into a contract and failed to pay its obligation, he shall be the one liable to the aggrieved party. A person acting as a representative of a non-existent principal is the real party to the contract sued upon, being the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it. Samahang Optometrists saPilipinas, Ilocos Sur- Abra Chapter, et al. vs. Acebedo International Corporation and the Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117097, 21 March 1997 A corporation created and organized for the purpose of conducting the business of selling optical lenses or eyeglasses is not engaged in the practice of optometry because the determination of the proper lenses to sell to private respondent’s clients entails the employment of optometrists who have been precisely trained for that purpose. Private respondent’s business, rather, is the buying and importing of eyeglasses and lenses and other similar or allied instruments from suppliers thereof and selling the same to consumers. P.C. Javier & Sons, Inc., et al. vs.Paic Savings & Mortgage Bank, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 129552, June 29, 2005 A change in the corporate name does not make a new corporation, whether effected by a special act or under a general law. It has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities because the corporation upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new corporation, nor the successor of the original corporation. Zuellig Freight and Cargo Systemsvs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 157900, July 22, 2013 The mere change in the corporate name is not considered under the law as the creation of a new corporation; hence, the renamed corporation remains liable for the illegal dismissal of its employee separated under that guise. Verily, the amendments of the articles of incorporation of Zeta to change the corporate name to Zuellig Freight and Cargo Systems, Inc., did not produce the dissolution of the former as a corporation. Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012 Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting control of the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore imperative that such requirement applies uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation. Since a specific class of shares may have rights and privileges or restrictions different from the rest of the shares in a corporation, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution must apply not only to shares with voting rights but also to shares without voting rights. Alicia E. Gala, et al.vs. Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 156819, December 11, 2003

The best proof of the purpose of a corporation is its articles of incorporation and by-laws, and in the case at bar, a perusal of the Articles of Incorporation of Ellice and Margo shows no sign of the allegedly illegal purposes that petitioners are complaining of. It is well to note that, if a corporation’s purpose, as stated in the Articles of Incorporation, is lawful, then the SEC has no authority to inquire whether the corporation has purposes other than those stated, and mandamus will lie to compel it to issue the certificate of incorporation. Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation vs. Goldstar Elevators Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 161026, October 24, 2005 The venue in this case was improperly laid because the principal office of Hyatt as stated in the Articles of Incorporation is in Makati but the case was filed in Mandaluyong where Hyatt transferred its operations. Since the principal place of business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile, then the place indicated in petitioner’s articles of incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for the filing of a case. John Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-45911, April 11, 1979 Every corporation has the inherent power to adopt by-laws ‘for its internal government, and to regulate the conduct and prescribe the rights and duties of its members towards itself and among themselves in reference to the management of its affairs. Under Section 21 of the Corporation Law, a corporation may prescribe in its by-laws the qualifications, duties and compensation of directors, officers and employees. Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Home Insurance And Guaranty Corporation, Emden Encarnacion and Horatio Aycardo, G.R. No. 117188, August 7, 1997 Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under Section 6(I) of PD 902-A, the SEC is empowered to ‘suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of a corporation’ on the ground inter alia of ‘failure to file by-laws within the required period. Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation, et al. vs. Ricardo R. Coros, G.R. No. 157802, October 13, 2010 Conformably with Section 25 of the Corporation Code, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office. Grace Christian High Schoolvs.the Court Of Appeals, Grace Village Association, Inc., Alejandro G. Beltran, and Ernesto L. Go, G.R. No. 108905, 23 October 1997

A provision in the by-laws of the corporation stating that of the 15 members of its Board of Directors, only 14 members would be elected while the remaining member would be the representative of an educational institution located in the village of the homeowners, is invalid for being contrary to law. The fact that for fifteen years it has not been questioned or challenged but, on the contrary, appears to have been implemented by the members of the association cannot forestall a later challenge to its validity because, if it is contrary to law, it is beyond the power of the members of the association to waive its invalidity. Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo F. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008 When an amendment to a provision in the Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form for proprietory membership, and what was printed thereon was the original provision which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member, the Board of Directors committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s application under Article 31 of the Corporation Code. The explanation given by the petitioner that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons is flimsy and unconvincing because such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. Mid Pasig Land and Development Corporation v. Tablante, G.R. No. 162924, February 4, 2010 These officers are in the position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Esguerra vs. Holcim Philippines G.R. No. 182571, September 2, 2013 The general rule is that a corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is exercised by the board of directors. The physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board. Absent the said board resolution, a petition may not be given due course. Spouses Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. G.R. No. 185145, February 05, 2014 In a complaint for nullification of mortgage and foreclosure with damages against the mortgagee-bank, the plaintiff can not compel the officers of the bank to appear and testify as plaintiff’s initial witnesses unless written interrogatories are first served upon the bank officers. This is in line with the Rules of Court provision that calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is because the officers of a corporation are considered adverse parties as well in a case against the corporation itself based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents. Islamic Directorate of the Philippines, Manuel F. Perea and Securities & Exchange Commission,vs. Court of Appeals And Iglesia Ni Cristo, G.R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997 Where an asset constitutes the only property of the corporation, its sale to a third-party is a sale or disposition of all the corporate property and assets of said corporation falling squarely within the contemplation of Section 40 of the Corporation Code. Hence, for the sale to be valid, the majority vote of the legitimate Board of Trustees, concurred in by the vote of at least 2/3 of the bona fide members of the corporation should have been obtained. Republic Planters Bank vs. Hon. Enrique A. Agana, Sr., as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation and Adalia F. Robes, G.R. No. 51765, March 3, 1997

Dividends cannot be declared for preferred shares which were guaranteed a quarterly dividend if there are no unrestricted retained earnings. “Interest bearing stocks,” on which the corporation agrees absolutely to pay interest before dividends are paid to common stockholders, is legal only when construed as requiring payment of interest as dividends from net earnings or surplus only. Lopez Realty Inc. v. Spouses Tanjangco, G.R. No. 154291, November 12, 2014 The general rule is that a corporation, through its board of directors, should act in the manner and within the formalities, if any, prescribed by its charter or by the general law. Directors must act as a body in a meeting called pursuant to the law or the corporation’s by-laws, otherwise, any action taken therein may be questioned by any objecting director or shareholder; but an action of the board of directors during a meeting, which was illegal for lack of notice, may be ratified either expressly, by the action of the directors in subsequent legal meeting, or impliedly, by the corporation’s subsequent course of conduct. Atrium Management Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 109491, February 28, 2001 The act of issuing the checks was well within the ambit of a valid corporate act, for it was for securing a loan to finance the activities of the corporation, hence, not an ultra vires act. Megan Sugar Corporation vs. RTC of Ilo-ilo Br. 68, GR no. 170352, June 1, 2011 A corporation cannot deny the authority of lawyer when they clothed him with apparent authority to act in their behalf such as when he entered his appearance accompanied by the corporation’s general manager and the corporation never questioned his acts and even took time and effort to forward all the court documents to him. The lawyer may not have been armed with a board resolution but the doctrine of apparent authority imposes liability not as a result of contractual relationship but rather because of the actions of the principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public that the relationship or the authority exists. Advance Paper Corporation vs Arma Traders Corporation , G.R. No 176897, December 11, 2013. The doctrine of apparent authority provides that a corporation will be estopped from denying the agent’s authority if it knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, and it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts. Apparent authority is derived not merely from practice. Its existence may be ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other words the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers. It is not the quantity of similar acts which establishes apparent authority, but the vesting of a corporate officer with the power to bind the corporation. When the sole management of the corporation was entrusted to two of its officers/incorporators with the other officers never had dealings with the corporation for 14 years and that the board and the stockholders never had its meeting, the corporation is now estopped from denying the officers’ authority to obtain loan from the lender on behalf of the corporation under the doctrine of apparent authority. Ong Yong, et al. vs. David S. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 144476 & G.R. No. 144629, 8 April 2003 In the instant case, the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement will effectively result in the unauthorized distribution of the capital assets and property of the corporation, thereby violating the Trust Fund Doctrine and the Corporation Code, since rescission of a subscription agreement is not one of the instances when distribution of capital assets and property of the corporation is allowed. The Trust Fund Doctrine provides that subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation constitute a fund to which the creditors have a right to look for the satisfaction of their claims. Filipinas Port Services, Inc., represented by stockholders, Eliodoro C. Cruz and Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services, Inc. vs. Victoriano S. Go, et al., G.R. No. 161886, March 16, 2007 The determination of the necessity for additional offices and/or positions in a corporation is a management prerogative which courts are not wont to review in the absence of any proof that such prerogative was exercised in bad faith or with malice.Indeed, it would be an improper judicial intrusion into the internal affairs of Filport for the Court to determine the propriety or impropriety of the creation of offices therein and the grant of salary increases to officers thereof. United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Planters Products, Inc., Janet Layson and Gregory Grey, G.R. No. 179015, June 13, 2012 The execution of a document by a bank manager called “pagares” which guaranteed purchases on credit by a client is contrary to the General Banking Law which prohibits bank officers from guaranteeing loans of bank clients. In this case, it is plain from the guarantee Grey executed that he was acting for himself, not in representation of UCPB; hence, UCPB cannot be bound by Grey’s above undertaking since he appears to have made it in his personal capacity. Mercy Vda. de Roxas vs. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013 To hold the general manager personally liable alone for the debts of the corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, it is required that the bad faith of the officer be established clearly and convincingly. Petitioner, however, has failed to include any submission pertaining to any wrongdoing of the general manager. Necessarily, it would be unjust to hold the latter personally liable. Polymer Rubber Corporation vs. Ang, G.R. No. 185160. July 24, 2013 Obligations incurred as a result of the directors’ and officers’ acts as corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. As a rule, they are only solidarily liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with malice or bad faith. To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith. The fact that the corporation ceased its operations the day after the promulgation of the SC resolution finding the corporation liable does not prove bad faith on the part of the incorporator of the corporation. Elizabeth M. Gagui vs. Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo, G.R. No. 196036, October 23, 2013 Although joint and solidary liability for money claims and damages against a corporation attaches to its corporate directors and officers under R.A. 8042, it is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of the corporation, resulting in the conduct of illegal activities. Absent any findings regarding the same, the corporate directors and officers cannot be held liable for the obligation of the corporation against the judgment debtor. Rosita Peña vs. the Court of Appeals, Spouses Rising T. Yap and Catalina Yap, Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., Jesus Domingo, Joaquin Briones, Salvador Bernardez, Marcelino Enriquez and Edgardo A. Zabat, G.R. No. 91478, February 7, 1991 Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation may fix a greater number than the majority of the number of board members to constitute the quorum necessary for the valid transaction of business. When only three (3) out of five (5) members of the board of directors of PAMBUSCO convened on November 19, 1974 by virtue of a prior notice of a special meeting,there was no quorum to validly transact business since, under Section 4 of the amended by-laws hereinabove reproduced, at least four (4) members must be present to constitute a quorum in a special meeting of the board of directors of PAMBUSCO. SEC vs. CA, G.R. No. 187702, October 22, 2014 The power of the SEC to investigate violations of its rules on proxy solicitation is unquestioned when proxies are obtained to vote on matters unrelated to the cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. However, when proxies are solicited in relation to the election of corporate directors, the resulting controversy, even if it ostensibly raised the violation of the SEC rules on proxy solicitation, should be properly seen as an election controversy within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts by virtue of Section 5.2 of the SRC in relation to Section 5 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A Indeed, the validation of proxies in this case relates to the determination of the existence of a quorum. Nonetheless, it is a quorum for the election of the directors, and, as such, which requires the presence – in person or by proxy – of the owners of the majority of the outstanding capital stock of Omico. Also, the fact that there was no actual voting did not make the election any less so, especially since Astra had never denied that an election of directors took place. Tam Wing Tak vs. Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar, G.R. No. 122452, January 29, 2001 Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23, it is clear that where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. In this case, the petitioner failed to show any proof that he was authorized or deputized or granted specific powers by the corporation’s board of director to sue Victor AngSiong for and on behalf of the firm, and therefore he had no such power or authority to sue on Concord’s behalf. Villamor v Umale, G.R. Nos. 172843 & 172881, 24 September 2014 The Court has recognized that a stockholder’s right to institute a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of the Corporation Code, or even the Securities Regulation Code, but is impliedly recognized when the said laws make corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties. In effect, the suit is an action for specific performance of an obligation, owed by the corporation to the stockholders, to assist its rights of action when the corporation has been put in default by the wrongful refusal of the directors or management to adopt suitable measures for its protection. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., vs. Muer G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012 Petitioners seek the nullification of the election of the Board of Directors composed of herein respondents, who pushed through with the election even if petitioners had adjourned the meeting allegedly due to lack of quorum. Petitioners are the injured party, whose rights to vote and to be voted upon were directly affected by the election of the new set of board of directors. The party-in-interest are the petitioners as stockholders, who wield such right to vote. The cause of action devolves on petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint for nullification of the election is a direct action by petitioners, who were the members of the Board of Directors of the corporation before the election, against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of Directors. Under the circumstances, the derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation is improper. Majority of Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation vs Lim, GR No. 165887, June 6, 2011 A stock corporation is expressly granted the power to issue or sell stocks. The power to issue stocks is lodged with the Board of Directors and no stockholders meeting is required to consider it because additional issuances of stock (unlike increase in capital stock) does not need approval of the stockholders. What is only required is the board resolution approving the additional issuance of shares. The corporation shall also file the necessary application with the SEC to exempt these from the registration requirements under the SRC. Africa vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 172222/G.R. No. 174493/ G.R. No. 184636, November 11, 2013 Under the two-tiered test, the government, thru PCGG, may vote sequestered shares if there is a prima facie evidence that the shares are ill-gotten and there is imminent danger of dissipation of assets while the case is pending. However, the two- tiered test contemplates a situation where the registered stockholders were in control and had been dissipating company assets and the PCGG wanted to vote the sequestered shares to save the company. It does not apply when the PCGG had voted the shares and is in control of the sequestered corporation Marsh Thomson vs. Court of Appeals and the American Champer of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc,, G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998 The authority granted to a corporation to regulate the transfer of its stock does not empower it to restrict the right of a stockholder to transfer his shares, but merely authorizes the adoption of regulations as to the formalities and procedure to be followed in effecting transfer. Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Vda. De Caram, 585 SCRA 218 (2009)

The arrangement provided for in the by-laws of the Corporation whereby a lien is constituted on the membership share to answer for subsequent obligations to the corporation finds applicable parallels under the Civil Code. Membership shares are considered as movable or personal property, and they can be constituted as security to secure a principal obligation, such as the dues and fees. There are at least two contractual modes under the Civil Code by which personal property can be used to secure a principal obligation. The first is through a contract of pledge, while the second is through a chattel mortgage. If the stockholder had not signed any document that manifests his agreement to constitute his Golf Share as security in favor of the Corporation to answer for his obligations to the club and there is no document that it is substantially compliant with the form of chattel mortgages, the by-laws could not suffice for that purpose since it is not designed as a bilateral contract between the stockholder and the Corporation or a vehicle by which the stockholder expressed his consent to constitute his Share as security for his account with the Corporation. The Rural Bank of Lipa City, Inc., et al.vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124535, September 28, 2001 For a valid transfer of stocks, there must be strict compliance with the mode of transfer prescribed by law. The requirements are: (a) There must be delivery of the stock certificate; (b) The certificate must be endorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and (c) To be valid against third parties, the transfer must be recorded in the books of the corporation. A deed of assignment of shares without endorsement and delivery is binding only on the parties and does not necessarily make the transfer effective as against the corporation. Vicente C. Ponce vs. Alsons Cement Corporation, and Francisco M. Giron, Jr., G.R. No. 139802, December 10, 2002 Without such recording, the transferee may not be regarded by the corporation as one among its stockholders and the corporation may legally refuse the issuance of stock certificates in the name of the transferee even when there has been compliance with the requirements of Section 64 of the Corporation Code. The situation would be different if the petitioner was himself the registered owner of the stock which he sought to transfer to a third party, for then he would be entitled to the remedy of mandamus. Fil-Estate Golf and Development vs. Vertex Sales and Trading Inc., G.R. No. 202079, June 10, 2013 Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. The failure of the stockholder to deliver the stock certificate to the buyer within a reasonable time the shares covered by the stock certificate should have been delivered is a substantial breach that entitles the buyer to rescind the sale under Article 1191 of the Corporation Code. It is not entirely correct to say the sale had already been consummated as the buyer already enjoyed the rights a shareholder can exercise. The enjoyment of these rights will not suffice where the law, by its express terms, requires a specific form to transfer ownership. Yujuico v. Quaiambao, G.R. No. 180416, 02 June 2014 A criminal action based on the violation of a stockholder’s right to examine or inspect the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of a corporation under the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 of the Corporation Code can only he maintained against corporate officers or any other persons acting on behalf of such corporation. The complaint and the evidence Quiambao and Sumbilla submitted during preliminary investigation do not establish that Quiambao and Pilapil were acting on behalf of STRADEC. Violations of Section 74 contemplates a situation wherein a corporation, acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies the right of any of its stockholders to inspect the records, minutes and the stock and transfer book of such corporation. Thus, the dismissal is valid. SME BANK INC, vs. GASPAR, G.R. No. 186641, October 8, 2013 In this case, the corporate officers and directors who induced the employees to resign with the assurance that they would be rehired by the new management are personally liable to the employees who were not actually rehired. However, the officer who did not participate in the termination of employment and persons who participated in the unlawful termination of employment but are not directors and officers of the corporation are not personally liable. Bank of Commerce v Radio Philippines Network, G.R. No. 195615, 21 April 2014 Indubitably, it is clear that no merger took place between Bancommerce and TRB as the requirements and procedures for a merger were absent. A merger does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the constituent corporations. All the requirements specified in the law must be complied with in order for merger to take effect. Here, Bancommerce and TRB remained separate corporations with distinct corporate personalities. What happened is that TRB sold and Bancommerce purchased identified recorded assets of TRB in consideration of Bancommerce’s assumption of identified recorded liabilities of TRB including booked contingent accounts. There is no law that prohibits this kind of transaction especially when it is done openly and with appropriate government approval. Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc., represented by its Liquidator, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Edward Willkom; Gilda Go; RemediosUy; MalayoBantuas, in his capacity as the Deputy Sheriff of Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Iligan City; and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City, G.R. No. 178618, October 11, 2010 The issuance of the certificate of merger is crucial because not only does it bear out SEC’s approval but it also marks the moment when the consequences of a merger take place. By operation of law, upon the effectivity of the merger, the absorbed corporation ceases to exist but its rights and properties, as well as liabilities, shall be taken and deemed transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union- Davao Chapter-Federation Of Unions In Bpi Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, October 19, 2011 It is more in keeping with the dictates of social justice and the State policy of according full protection to labor to deem employment contracts as automatically assumed by the surviving corporation in a merger, even in the absence of an express stipulation in the articles of merger or the merger plan. By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporation’s existing employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the status of their various benefits which were among the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues. Bank of Philippine Islands v. Lee, G.R. No. 190144, August 1, 2012 Citytrust, therefore, upon service of the notice of garnishment and its acknowledgment that it was in possession of defendants’ deposit accounts became a “virtual party” to or a “forced intervenor” in the civil case. As such, it became bound by the orders and processes issued by the trial court despite not having been properly impleaded therein. Consequently, by virtue of its merger with BPI, the latter, as the surviving corporation, effectively became the garnishee, thus the “virtual party” to the civil case. Aguirre vs. FQB +7, Inc, GR No. 170770, January 9 2013 An action to correct entries in the General Information Sheet of the Corporation; to be recognized as a stockholder and to inspect corporate documents is an intra-corporate dispute which does not constitute a continuation of corporate business. As such, pursuant to Section 145 of the Corporation Code, this action is not affected by the subsequent dissolution of the corporation. The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However, despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the subsequent dissolution of the corporation. Rene Knecht and Knecht, Inc. vs. United Cigarette Corp., represented by Encarnacion Gonzales Wong, and Eduardo Bolima, Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig City, G.R. No. 139370, July 4, 2002 The trustee (of a dissolved corporation) may commence a suit which can proceed to final judgment even beyond the three-year period of liquidation. No reason can be conceived why a suit already commenced by the corporation itself during its existence, not by a mere trustee who, by fiction, merely continues the legal personality of the dissolved corporation, should not be accorded similar treatment – to proceed to final judgment and execution thereof. Indeed, the rights of a corporation that has been dissolved pending litigation are accorded protection by Section 145 of the Corporation Code which provides “no right or remedy in favor of or against any corporation, its stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor any liability incurred by any such corporation, stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, shall be removed or impaired either by the subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of this Code or of any part thereof.” Lucia Barramedavda. de Ballesteros vs. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., represented by its liquidator, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010 To allow a creditor’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of the distressed corporation would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well. The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. Alabang Corporation Development vs. Alabang Hills Village Association, G.R. No. 187456, 02 June 2014 ADC filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. To allow ADC to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation. Vigilla vs. Philippine College of Criminology, GR No. 200094, June 10, 2013 The executed releases, waivers and quitclaims are valid and binding upon the parties notwithstanding the fact that these documents were signed six years after the Corporation’s revocation of the Certificate of Incorporation. These documents are thus proof that the employees had received their claims from their employer-corporation in whose favor the release and quitclaim were issued. The revocation of the corporation does not mean the termination of its liabilities to these employees. Section 122 of the Corporation Code provides for a three-year winding up period for a corporation whose charter is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise to continue as a body corporate for the purpose, among others, of settling and closing its affairs. As such, these liabilities are obligations of the dissolved corporation and not of the corporation who contracted the services of the dissolved corporation. Sergio F. Naguiat, doing business under the name and style Sergio F. NaguiatEnt., Inc., & Clark Field Taxi, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), National Organization Of Workingmen and its members, Leonardo T. Galang, et al., G.R. No. 116123, 13 March 1997 To the extent that the stockholders are actively engaged in the management or operation of the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. PetroniloJ. Barayuga vs. Adventist University of the Philippines, through its Board of Trustees, represented by its Chairman, Nestor D. Dayson, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011 The second paragraph of Section 108 of the Corporation Code, although setting the term of the members of the Board of Trustees at five years, contains a proviso expressly subjecting the duration to what is otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the educational corporation. In AUP’s case, its amended By-Laws provided that members of the Board of Trustees were to serve a term of office of only two years; and the officers, who included the President, were to be elected from among the members of the Board of Trustees during their organizational meeting, which was held during the election of the Board of Trustees every two years. Naturally, the officers, including the President, were to exercise the powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of only two years, not five years. Rev. Luis Ao-as, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128464, June 20, 2006 Section 89 of the Corporation Code pertaining to non-stock corporations which provides that “the right of the members of any class or classes (of a non-stock corporation) to vote may be limited, broadened or denied to the extent specified in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws,” is an exception to Section 6 of the same code where it is provided that “no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as ‘preferred’ or ‘redeemable’ shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code.” The stipulation in the By-Laws providing for the election of the Board of Directors by districts is a form of limitation on the voting rights of the members of a non-stock corporation as recognized under the aforesaid Section 89. Cargill, Inc. vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 168266, March 15, 2010 A foreign company that merely imports goods from a Philippine exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines, is not doing business in the Philippines. Since the contract between petitioner and NMC involved the purchase of molasses by petitioner from NMC, it was NMC, the domestic corporation, which derived income from the transaction and not petitioner. To constitute “doing business,” the activity undertaken in the Philippines should involve profit-making. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limitedvs.Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, International Container Terminal Services Inc., Royal Port Services, Inc. and the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000 There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes “doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light its peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business. Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in business here. Steelcase, Inc. vs. Design International Selections, Inc., G.R. No. 171995, April 18, 2012

The appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute “doing business” unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. If the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines. MR Holdings, Ltd.vs. Sheriff Carlos P. Bajar, Sheriff Ferdinand M. Jandusay, Solidbank Corporation, and Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 138104, April 11, 2002 Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs. Surecomp Software, B.V., G.R. No. 173463, October 13, 2010 A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. Securities Regulation Code Betty Gabionza and Isabelita Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161057, September 12, 2008 The issuance of checks for the purpose of securing a loan to finance the activities of the corporation is well within the ambit of a valid corporate act. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Prosperity.Com, Inc., G.R. No. 164197, January 25, 2012 For an investment contract to exist, the following elements, referred to as the Howey test must concur: (1)a contract, transaction, or scheme; (2)an investment of money; (3)investment is made in a common enterprise; (4) expectation of profits; and (5)profits arising primarily from the efforts of others. Network marketing, a scheme adopted by companies for getting people to buy their products where the buyer can become a down-line seller, who earns commissions from purchases made by new buyers whom he refers to the person who sold the product to him, is not an investment contract. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Oudine Santos, G.R. No. 195542, March 19, 2014 A person is liable for violation of Section 28 of the SRC where, acting as a broker, dealer or salesman is in the employ of a corporation which sold or offered for sale unregistered securities in the Philippines. The transaction initiated by the investment consultant of a corporation is an investment contract or participation in a profit sharing agreement that falls within the definition of law—an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 The term “insiders” now includes persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave them access to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, and one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the duty to disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Callangan, in her capacity Director of the Corporation Finance Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or the Securities and Ex-change Commission, G.R. No. 191995, August 3, 2011 A “public company,” as contemplated by the SRC is not limited to a company whose shares of stock are publicly listed; even companies whose shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered a public company, provided they fall under Subsec. 17.2 of the SRC, which provides: “any corporation with a class of equity securities listed on an Exchange or with assets of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and having two hundred (200) or more holders, at least two hundred (200) of which are holding at least one hundred (100) shares of a class of its equity securities.” Philippine Veterans Bank meets the requirements and as such, is subject to the reportorial requirements for the benefit of its shareholders. Cemco Holdings, Inc. vs. National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007 A tender offer is an offer by the acquiring person to stockholders of a public company for them to tender their shares; it gives the minority shareholders the chance to exit the company under reasonable terms, giving them the opportunity to sell their shares at the same price as those of the majority shareholders. The mandatory tender offer is still applicable even if the acquisition, direct or indirect, is less than 35% when the purchase would result in ownership of over 51% of the total outstanding equity securities of the public company. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 Section 27 (SRC) penalizes an insider’s misuse of material and non-public information about the issuer, for the purpose of protecting public investors; Section 26 widens the coverage of punishable acts, which intend to defraud public investors through various devices, misinformation and omissions. Section 23 imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer’s securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof. Jose U. Pua vs. Citibank, N. A. G.R. No. 180064, September 16, 2013 Civil suits falling under the SRC (like liability for selling unregistered securities) are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Inc. vs. Shoemart, Inc., G.R. No. 148222, August 15, 2003 A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods; a trade name refers to the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. On the other hand, patentable inventions refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. Jessie Ching vs. William Salinas, et. al., G.R. No. 161295, June 29, 2005 A utility model is a technical solution to a problem in any field of human activity which is new and industrially applicable; it may be, or may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the aforesaid. Being plain automotive spare parts that must conform to the original structural design of the components they seek to replace, the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not ornamental; they lack the decorative quality or value that must characterize authentic works of applied art and in actuality, they are utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or value. Smith Kline Beckman Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126627, August 14, 2003 When the language of its claims is clear and distinct, the patentee is bound thereby and may not claim anything beyond them. the language of Letter Patent No. 14561 fails to yield anything at all regarding Albendazole and no extrinsic evidence had been adduced to prove that Albendazole inheres in petitioner’s patent in spite of its omission therefrom or that the meaning of the claims of the patent embraces the same. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010 A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent. The patentee’s exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent, hence, after the cut-off date, the exclusive rights no longer exist and the temporary restraining order can no longer be issued in its favor. Pascual Godines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97343, September 13, 1993 To determine whether the particular item falls within the literal meaning of the patent claims, the court must juxtapose the claims of the patent and the accused product within the overall context of the claims and specifications, to determine whether there is exact identity of all material elements. Viewed from any perspective or angle, the power tiller of the defendant is identical and similar to that of the turtle power tiller of plaintiff in form, configuration, design, appearance, and even in the manner of operation. Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Kunnan Enterprises Ltd. and Sports Concept & Distributor, Inc., G.R. No. 169974, April 20, 2010 The cancellation of registration of a trademark has the effect of depriving the registrant of protection from infringement from the moment the judgment or order of cancellation has become final. Accordingly, a distributor has no right to the registration of the disputed trademarks since the right to register a trademark is based on ownership. An exclusive distributor who employs the trademark of the manufacturer does not acquire proprietary rights of the manufacturer, and a registration of the trademark by the distributor as such belongs to the manufacturer, provided the fiduciary relationship does not terminate before application for registration is filed. Birkenstock Orthopaedie Gmbh and Co. Kg vs. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013 It is not the application or registration of a trademark that vests ownership thereof, but it is the ownership of a trademark that confers the right to register the same. Registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the trademark, and of the exclusive right to the use thereof; it is rebuttable, thus, it must give way to evidence to the contrary. Ecole De Cuisine Manille (Cordon Bleu of the Philippines), Inc. vs. Renaus Cointreau & Cie and Le Cordon Bleu Int’l, B.V., G.R. No. 185830, June 5, 2013) Under the Paris Convention to which the Philippines is a signatory, a trade name of a national of a State that is a party to the Paris Convention, whether or not the trade name forms part of a trademark, is protected without the obligation of filing or registration. It follows then that the applicant for registration of trademark is not the lawful owner thereof and is not entitled to registration if the trademark has been in prior use by a national of a country which is a signatory to the Paris Convention. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. vs. Court of Appeals and CFC Corporation, G.R. No. 112012, April 4, 2001 The word MASTER, the dominant feature of the opposer’s mark, is neither generic nor descriptive and as such, it cannot be invalidated as a trademark. When the term “MASTER” has acquired a certain connotation to mean the coffee products MASTER ROAST and MASTER BLEND produced by Nestle, the use by the CFC of the term “MASTER” in the trademark for its coffee product FLAVOR MASTER is likely to cause confusion or mistake or even deception of the ordinary purchasers. Prosource International, Inc. vs. Horphag Research Management SA, G.R. No. 180073, November 25, 2009 Both the words PYCNOGENOL and PCO-GENOLS have the same suffix “GENOL” which appears to be merely descriptive and furnish no indication of the origin of the article and hence, open for trademark registration by the plaintiff thru combination with another word or phrase such as PYCNOGENOL. Although there were dissimilarities in the trademark due to the type of letters used as well as the size, color and design employed on their individual packages/bottles, still the close relationship of the competing products’ name in sounds as they were pronounced, clearly indicates that purchasers could be misled into believing that they are the same and/or originates from a common source and manufacturer. Sketchers USA vs. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation, GR No. 164321, March 28, 2011 The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Respondent’s use of the stylized “S” in its Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark of the petitioner as it is the dominant feature of the latter’s trademark; the likelihood of confusion is present as purchasers may associate the respondent’s product as connected with petitioner’s business. Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995 In applying the holistic test, petitioner’s trademark, “STYLISTIC MR. LEE,” which pertains to jeans, should be considered as a whole. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. When the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious in his purchase, as in this case where the products concerned are not inexpensive, the likelihood of confusion is absent. Philip Morris, Inc. vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 158589, June 27, 2006 The application of the holistic test entails a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. Although the perceived offending word “MARK” is itself prominent in petitioner’s trademarks “MARK VII” and “MARK TEN,” the entire marking system should be considered as a whole and not dissected, because a discerning eye would focus not only on the predominant word but also on the other features appearing in the labels; only then would such discerning observer draw his conclusion whether one mark would be confusingly similar to the other and whether or not sufficient differences existed between the marks. Victorio Diaz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180677, February 18, 2013 The gravamen of the offense of infringement of a registered trademark is the likelihood of confusion. In applying the Holistic Test, confusion was remote because the jeans made and sold by Levi’s Philippines were not only very popular but also quite expensive, as opposed to Diaz’s tailored jeans which were acquired on a “made-to-order” basis; moreover, since the jeans are expensive, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase. Taiwan Kolin Corp. v. Kolin Electronics Co., G.R. No. 209843, 25 March 2015 In trademark registration, while both competing marks refer to the word “KOLIN” written in upper case letters and in bold font, but one is italicized and colored black while the other is white in pantone red color background and there are differing features between the two, registration of the said mark could be granted. It is hornbook doctrine that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a different kind. Mighty Corporation and La Campana Fabrica De Tabaco, Inc. vs. E. & J. Gallo Winery and the Andresons Group, Inc., G.R. No. 154342, July 14, 2004 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property does not automatically exclude all countries of the world which have signed it from using a tradename which happens to be used in one country. “GALLO” cannot be considered a “well-known” mark within the contemplation and protection of the Paris Convention in this case since GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes are neither the same, identical, similar nor related goods. Fredco Manufacturing Corporation vs. President and Fellows of Harvard College, GR No. 185917, June 1, 2011 The essential requirement under the Paris Convention (and the Intellectual Property Code) is that the trademark to be protected must be “well-known” in the country where protection is sought and the power to determine whether a trademark is well-known lies in the competent authority of the country of registration or use. “Harvard” is a well-known name and mark not only in the United States but also internationally, including the Philippines; as such, even before Harvard University applied for registration of the mark “Harvard” in the Philippines, the mark was already protected under the Paris Convention. Del Monte Corporation and Philippine Packing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78325, January 25, 1990 The question is not whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. It is not difficult to see that the Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte trademark; the predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green and red-orange, the same with Sunshine; the word “catsup” in both bottles is printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the same; and although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato. Coffee Partners vs. San Francisco Coffee and Roastery, Inc., G.R. No. 169504, 3 March 2010 A trade name previously used in trade or commerce in the Philippines need not be registered with the IPO before an infringement suit may be filed by its owner against the owner of an infringing trademark. Nonetheless, respondent does not have the right to the exclusive use of the geographic word “San Francisco” or the generic word “coffee.” It is only the combination of the words “SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE,” which is respondent’s trade name in its coffee business, that is protected against infringement on matters related to the coffee business to avoid confusing or deceiving the public. Ong vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 169440, November 23, 2011 The trademark “Marlboro” is not only valid for being neither generic nor descriptive, it was also exclusively owned by PMPI, as evidenced by the certificate of registration issued by the Intellectual Property Office. Infringement of trademark clearly lies since the counterfeit cigarettes not only bore PMPI’s trademark, but they were also packaged almost exactly as PMPI’s products. Republic Gas Corporation (REGASCO), et. al. vs. Petron Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013 The mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion among the buyers or consumers can be considered as trademark infringement. Petitioners’ act of refilling, without the respondents’ consent, the LPG containers bearing the registered marks of the respondents will inevitably confuse the consuming public, who may also be led to believe that the petitioners were authorized refillers and distributors of respondent’s LPG products. McDonald’s Corporation vs. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., G.R. No. 143993, August 18, 2004 The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. In this case, the intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the fact that there was actually no notice (on their plastic wrappers) to the public that the “Big Mak” hamburgers are products of “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” Coca- Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant vs. Quintin Gomez, et, al., G.R. No. 154491, November 14, 2008 Hoarding does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently “passing off” their products or services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition’s sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use for these sales Manly Sportwear Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center, G.R. No. 165306, September 20, 2005 At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the Supreme Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do not confer any right or title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work under the protective mantle of the copyright law; it is not a conclusive proof of copyright ownership. Hence, when there is sufficient proof that the copyrighted products are not original creations but are readily available in the market under various brands, as in this case, validity and originality will not be presumed. Francisco Joaquin, Jr. vs. Franklin Drilon, et. al., G.R. No. 108946, January 28, 1999 The format or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of protected works in Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 49, which is substantially the same as Sec. 172 of the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No, 8293). For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009 Under Sec. 184.1 (h), the use made of a work by or under the direction or control of the Government, by the National Library or by educational, scientific or professional institutions where such use is in the public interest and is compatible with fair use will not constitute copyright infringement. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the must-carry rule is under the direction and control of the government through the NTC. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible. Pacita Habana, et. al. vs. Felicidad Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 131522, July 19, 1999 To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied; if so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy. The injury is sustained when respondent lifted from petitioners’ book materials that were the result of the latter’s research work and compilation and misrepresented them as her own, even circulating the book DEP for commercial use without acknowledging petitioners as her source. NBI-Microsoft Corporation vs. Judy Hwang, et. al., G.R. No. 147043, June 21, 2005 The gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized “manufacturing” of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the rights exclusively granted to the copyright owner. Hence, any person who performs any of such acts without obtaining the copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

LABOR LAW Thursday, October 29th, 2015

LABOR STANDARDS

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Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippine Duplicators, Inc, G.R. No. 154628 December 6, 2006 The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when the law is clearly on its side. People of the Philippines vs. Teresita “Tessie” Laogo. G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011 Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. When the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC. v. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Company vs. Carol De Raedt. G.R. No. 161366; June 16, 2009 To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The so-called “control test” is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Manila Water Company, Inc. vs. Jose J. Dalumpines. G.R. No. 175501; October 4, 2010 It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the power. Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation. G.R. No. 204406; February 26, 2014 The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. KASAMMA-CCO v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 159828; April 19, 2006 A casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of time that gives him a regular status. Jose Y. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 138051, June 10, 2004 Television-radio talent is not an employee. Relationship of a big name talent and a television-radio broadcasting company is one of an independent contracting arrangement. ABS-CBN engaged Sonza’s services specifically to co-host the “Mel & Jay” programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to Sonza. To perform his work, Sonza only needed his skills and talent. How Sonza delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control. Sonza did not have to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement required Sonza to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of Sonza’s script. Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013) Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The Court has consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of their job, and not because of the length of time they have worked. This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may not be considered regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are free to contract their services with other farm owners, then the former are not regular employees. For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard used is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade or business of the employer. FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. (SKILLEX), et al. v. Jovert Seva, et al., G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014 For an employee to be validly categorized as a project employee, it is necessary that the specific project or undertaking had been identified and its period and completion date determined and made known to the employee at the time of his engagement. This provision ensures that the employee is completely apprised of the terms of his hiring and the corresponding rights and obligations arising from his undertaking. Notably, the petitioner’s service contract with Robinsons was from January 1 to December 31, 2008. The respondents were only asked to sign their employment contracts for their deployment with Robinsons halfway through 2008, when the petitioner’s service contract was about to expire. Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the consent of a party was vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, are voidable or annullable. The petitioner’s threat of nonpayment of the respondents’ salaries clearly amounted to intimidation. Under this situation, and the suspect timing when these contracts were executed, we rule that these employment contracts were voidable and were effectively questioned when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal complaint. Respondents are thus regular employees. Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 (2013) Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without specifying duration. While for first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was assigned to several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys security of tenure. Alcatel Phils. vs Relos, G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009 However, a project or work pool employee who has been continuously rehired by the same employer for the same tasks that are necessary to the usual business of the employer must be deemed a regular employee. Fuji Television Network, Inc. v Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45, 03 December 2014 An employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. The law does not preclude the possibility that a regular employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract for valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as long as it was the employee who requested, or bargained, that the contract have a “definite date of termination,” or that the fixed-term contract be freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then the validity of the fixed-term contract will be upheld. GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419 (2013) Petitioner’s allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch-hitters (which means that they were employed to take the place of regular employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave) does not change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered projects within the purview of the law. Every industry, even public offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. Such tasks, whether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be considered separate and distinct from the other undertakings of the company. While it is management’s prerogative to device a method to deal with this issue, such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of tenure. Avelino Lambo vs NLRC. G.R. No. 111042 October 26, 1999

There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondents although they were paid not on the basis of time spent on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work produced by them. There are two categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer. (Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the work is to be performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here, the employer’s control is over the result of the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.) Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company premises, while payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as in sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees. PCL Shipping Philippine, Inc. and U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation, vs NLRC. G.R. No. 153031,December 14, 2006

With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day. Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 151309 October 15, 2008 D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme, thus:The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism, among others. Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week; savings on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional 52 off-days a year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a week from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace, travel time spent, exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek of six (6) days is shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from Monday to Friday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime premium compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on weekdays, in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees. Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace. Rosario A. Gaa vs CA G.R. No. L-44169 Dec. 3, 1985 The term “wages” differs from the term “salary.” Wages apply to compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times and measured by the day, week, month or season; while salary denotes a higher grade of employment or a superior grade of services and implies a position or office. By contrast, the term “wages” indicates a considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment, while “salary” is suggestive of a larger and more important service The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa vs CA was only for the purpose of Art. 1708 of the Civil Code which provides that “the laborers’ wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance. Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Alexander Parian, et al., G.R. No. 204651, 06 August 2014 The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers’ basic wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by SLL for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while they were working at their respective projects. Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the benefit but on the purpose why it was given by the employer. If it is primarily for the employee’s gain, then the benefit is a facility; if its provision is mainly for the employer’s advantage, then it is a supplement. Again, this is to ensure that employees are protected in circumstances where the employer designates a benefit as deductible from the wages even though it clearly works to the employer’s greater convenience or advantage. Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be given to the nature of the employer’s business in relation to the character or type of work performed by the employees involved. Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v Glyza Esteban, G.R. No. 192582, 7 April 2014 The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides: SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. – Where the employer is engaged in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of making deductions or requiring deposits is recognized to answer for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer to the employee, the employer may make wage deductions or require the employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject to the following conditions: (a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss or damage; (b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why deduction should not be made; (c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and (d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not exceed 20 percent of the employee’s wages in a week. Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to 2006 and that Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause why the deduction from her last salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the petitioner’s statement that it is the practice in the retail industry to deduct variances from an employee’s salary, without more. Lilia P. Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy. G.R. No. 172295 December 23, 2008 Respecting petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that petitioner failed to prove that she actually worked during specific holidays. Article 94 of the Labor Code provides, however, that(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate.The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is required to work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on holidays applies even if he does not work. BPI Employees union-Davao City-FUBU v Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 174912 (2013) Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. BPI’s policy of contracting out cashiering and bookkeeping services was considered as a valid exercise of management prerogative which is further authorized by the Central Bank in CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 199. Central Azucarera De Tarlac vs. Central Azucarera De Tarlac Labor Union-NLU. G.R. No. 188949, July 26, 2010 Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule, mandates that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the employment contract, written or unwritten. The rule against diminution of benefits applies if it is shown that the grant of the benefit is based on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time and that the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the rule will not apply if the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be shown that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error. Netlink Computer Incorporated v Eric Delmo, G.R. No. 160827, 18 June 2014 With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been observed to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. In Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six years. In Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, the employer, for three years and nine months, approved the commutation to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980, or three years and four months. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, the employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at least two years. With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a company practice, there is no way that the commissions due to Delmo were to be paid in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to Delmo. Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions vs NLRC. G.R. No. 140689 February 17, 2004 Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and the newly hired employees, to Our mind said gap is not significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentional quantitative differences in the salary rates between the employee group. As already stated, the classification under the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee, not on seniority. For this reason, ,wage distortion does not appear to exist. Rogelio Reyes vs NLRC. G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007 Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary: 5. a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instruction No. 174;b) Profit sharing payments;c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975. Producers Bank v. NLRC. G.R. No. 100701. March 28, 2001 Bonus is not demandable as a matter of right. It is a management prerogative, given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient. Philipiine Telegraph vs. Laplana. G.R. No. 76645; July 23, 1991 It is the employers’ prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees’ qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. When an employee’s transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal. UE v. PEPANIO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013 The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 125792; November 9, 1998 In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractor’s employees only for the proper payment of wages. But in labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relation is created by law between the principal and the labor-only contractor’s employees, such that the former is responsible to such employees, as if he or she had directly employed them Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc., G.R. No. 200094 (2013) In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the employees’ wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. On the other hand, in labor-only contracting, the principal employer becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. In this case, the releases, waivers and quitclaims executed by employees in favor of the labor-only contractor redounded to the benefit of the principal. San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC Integrated Systems. G.R. No. 144672; July 10, 2003 The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to the employees of the contractor for a more comprehensive purpose (wages, monetary claims, and all other benefits in the Labor Code such as SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor is deemed merely an agent. A finding that a contractor is a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an ER-EE relationship between the principal and the employees of the “labor-only” contractor. Cheryll Santos Leus v St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, et al., G.R. No. 187226, 28 January 2015 That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. Duncan vs. Glaxo Wellcome. G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004 Prohibition of marriage or existing or future relationships between employees of competing companies is not violative of the equal protection clause. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 200575 (2014) Cabiles’ contention that his employment with Intel HK is a continuation of his service with Intel Phil alleging that it was but an assignment by his principal employer, similar to his assignments to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu is untenable. Eugene Arabit, et al. v Jardine Pacific Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 181719, 21 April 2014 It is illogical for Jardine to terminate the petitioners’ employment and replace them with contractual employees. The replacement effectively belies Jardine’s claim that the petitioners’ positions were abolished due to superfluity. Redundancy could have been justified if the functions of the petitioners were transferred to other existing employees of the company. To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractual employees as replacements necessarily give rise to the sound conclusion that the petitioners’ services have not really become in excess of what Jardine’s business requires. To replace the petitioners who were all regular employees with contractual ones would amount to a violation of their right to security of tenure. Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811; April 24, 2007 Although fighting within company premises may constitute serious misconduct (possible ground for disciplinary actions), not every fight with in company premises in which an employee is involved automatically warrant dismissal from service. Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies. G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007 Halloween invitation sent out by employee for office trick-or-treating without clearance from higher management is considered misbehavior. The circumstances in the case were differentiated from Samson vs. NLRC where the offensive remarks were verbally made during informal Christmas gathering. Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Virginia E. Pacia, March 2011 Petitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare checks for payment of petitioner’s obligations. Respondent did not immediately comply with the instruction since petitioner employer had no sufficient funds to cover the checks. Petitioner employer dismissed respondent employee for willful disobedience. The Court held that respondent employee was illegally dismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioner employer to prepare checks in payment of petitioner’s obligations, respondent employee’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks, although seemingly disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting the petitioner employer from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority. The Court took into consideration that respondent employee, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she was tasked to do it. Gonzales vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 131653; March 26, 2001 The act constituting the breach must be “work-related” such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Jardine Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 106915; August 31, 1993 For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517 (2013) While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees were not coerced into resignation, this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they intelligently, freely and voluntarily resigned. To rule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by themselves, conclusive proof that the employees intended to relinquish their posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse. In order to withstand the test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment. Therefore, in order to determine whether the employees truly intended to resign from their respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation letters, but must take into consideration the totality of circumstances in each particular case. Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 187214 (2013) A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would severely affect the continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly addressed. Sanoh asserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out of the Wire Condenser Department, which triggered retrenchment. Sanoh presented the letters of cancellation given by Matsushita and Sanyo as evidence of cancelled orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely established the connection between the cancelled orders and the projected business losses that may be incurred by Sanoh. Hocheng Philippines Corporation v Antonio M. Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, 18 March 2015 Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v Janrie C. Dailig, G.R. No. 204761, 2 April 2014 A floating status of a security guard for more than six months constitutes constructive dismissal. The temporary inactivity or “floating status” of security guards should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive dismissal. Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation and/or Ma. Teresa Marcelo v Armando D. Serrano, G.R. No. 198538, 29 September 2014 It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive dismissal, without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the security guard’s failure to assume another post. This is especially true in the present case where the security guard’s own refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the six-month period. The security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable for constructive dismissal. Philippine Sheet Metal Workers’ Union vs. CIR. G.R. No. L-2028; April 28, 1949 Reduction of the number of workers in a company’s factory made necessary by the introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products is justified. There can be no question as to the right of the manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a view to effecting more economy and efficiency in its method of production. Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corp. vs. Fuentes. G.R. No. 151818. October 14, 2005 Standards to Justify Retrenchment: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. It be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses; The alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.

BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION DAVAO, G.R. No. 164301, October 19, 2011 By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporation’s existing employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the status of their various benefits which were among the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the right of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to existing contractual obligations. In this manner, Justice Brion’s theory of automatic assumption may be reconciled with the majority’s concerns with the successor employer’s prerogative to choose its employees and the prohibition against involuntary servitude. King of Kings Transport vs. Mamac. G.R. No. 166208. June 29, 2007 In order to intelligently prepare the employees for their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge against the employee – a general description of the change will not suffice. Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club. G.R. No. 173012. June 13, 2012 The law does not require that an intention to terminate one’s employment should be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention to terminate one’s employment should be explicitly stated Lavador vs. “J” Marketing Corporation and Soyao. G.R. No. 157757; June 28, 2005 A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. AGABON v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004 The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot. G.R. No. 151378.March 28, 2005 If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee. On the other hand, if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180636 (2013) Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. It is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working. Reyes, et al. v RP Guardian’s Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No 193756 (2013) Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in order to alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employee’s dismissal. “Reinstatement is a restoration to a state from which one has been removed or separated” while “the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal.” Therefore, the award of one does not bar the other. Crisanto F. Castro, Jr. vs Ateneo De Naga University, et al., G.R. No. 175293, 23 July 2014 The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot and academic. He remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA’s order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. In Islriz Trading v. Capada, we even clarified that the employee could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was without the fault of the employer. Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002, and that their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e., September 3, 2001) until his reinstatement in November 2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to exercise their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of reinstatement was immediately executory. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Reynaldo V. Paz, G.R. No. 192924, 26 November 2014 The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in reinstating the respondent was not due to the unjustified refusal of PAL to abide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. The inopportune event of PAL’s entering rehabilitation receivership justifies the delay or failure to comply with the reinstatement order of the LA. In light of the fact that PAL’s failure to comply with the reinstatement order was justified by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the respondent may no longer claim salaries which he should have received during the period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it was overturned by the NLRC. Globe Mackay v. NLRC. G.R. No. 82511; March 3, 1992 When the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice-versa, or there were imputations of bad faith to each other, reinstatement could not effectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions which require trust and confidence. Wenphil Corporation vs. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, 7 April 2014 Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the “refund doctrine” easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency. Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013) As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the transgressions were serious offenses that warranted employees’ dismissal from employment. Hence, employee is not entitled to separation pay. Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Corp. et al vs. Jueber P. Siazar, G.R. No. 177970 August 25, 2010 In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service reckoned from the first day of employment until the finality of the decision. Payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. And if separation pay is awarded instead of reinstatement, backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Zenaida Paz v Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 199554, 18 February 2015

The award of financial assistance to an employee who rendered almost three decades of dedicated service to an employer without a single transgression or malfeasance of any company rule or regulation, coupled with her old age and infirmity which now weaken her chances of employment is justified and allowed under special circumstances. These circumstances indubitably merit equitable concessions, via the principle of “compassionate justice” for the working class. Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative Inc. vs NLRC. G.R. No. 163561, July 24, 2007 Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. Conrado A. Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 201483, 04 August 2014 No essential change is being made (in a final judgment) by a recomputation because such is a necessary consequence which flows from the nature of the illegality of the dismissal. To reiterate, a recomputation, or an original computation, if no previous computation was made, as in the present case, is a part of the law that is read into the decision, namely, Article 279 of the Labor Code and established jurisprudence. Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of full backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified only by jurisprudence when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, where the finality of the illegal dismissal decision instead becomes the reckoning point. The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages continue to add on until full satisfaction. The computation required to reflect full satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. Thus, in the present case, a computation of backwages until actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. Zuellig Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO. 173587 (2013) In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions which effectively bar the availment of retirement benefits once the employees have chosen separation pay or vice versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly states that any payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against separation pay. Clearly, respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay, as selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. To illustrate the mechanics of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery, if the employees choose to retire, whatever amount they will receive as retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they would have received had their separation from employment been for a cause which would entitle them to severance pay. These causes are enumerated in Section 3, Article XIV of the CBA (i.e., retrenchment, closure of business, merger, redundancy, or installation of labor-saving device). However, if the cause of the termination of their employment was any of the causes enumerated in said Section 3, they could no longer claim retirement gratuity as the fund from which the same would be taken had already been used in paying their separation pay. Put differently, employees who were separated from the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay as there is only one fund from which said benefits would be taken. Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV effectively disallows recovery of both separation pay and retirement gratuity. Consequently, respondents are entitled only to one. Since they have already chosen and accepted redundancy pay and have executed the corresponding Release and Quitclaim, they are now barred from claiming retirement gratuity. Grace Christian High School, represented by its Principal, Dr. James Tan v Filipinas A. Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, 20 August 2014 RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that “an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less than those provided” under the same – that is, at least one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that “[u]nless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (½) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.” The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided. The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., has recently affirmed that “one-half (½) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for [SIL].” The Court sees no reason to depart from this interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that the 5 days SIL should be likewise prorated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail. Noriel R. Montierro v Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015 When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on them. Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., et al. v Arnel G. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 214132, 18 February 2015 For the purpose of determining “temporary total disability”, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. LABOR RELATIONS Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009 Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as “any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration. T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation, et al. v T&H Shopfitters Corporation Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union, et al., G.R. No. 191714 (2014) The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that the anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009 A bargaining unit is a “group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.” The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);(2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);(3) prior collective bargaining history; and(4) similarity of employment status. Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc., vs DOLE. G.R. No. 157117,November 20, 2006 Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because of potential conflicts of interest. Further, to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rankand-file or where the supervisors’ labor union would represent conflicting interests, a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of unions of rankand-file employees where that federation actively participates in the union activity within the company. Thus, the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-andfile union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union. G.R. No. 146206. August 1, 2011 The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively. Holy Child Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 179146 (2013) A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all therein. Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. NUWHRAIN MPHC v. SLE. G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009 It is wellsettled that under the “double majority rule” for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted and the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Following the ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory Ees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase. Under Art. 256 of the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Worker’s UnionPAFLU. G.R. No. L24711, April 1968 The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract with their Er by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified CB agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings of the former agentlike the “no strike clause” in the CBA executed by the latter. Takata Philippines Corporation vs Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 196276, 4 June 2014 For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free workers vs. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515. June 6, 2011 A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rules. Such disaffiliation, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. In the present case, whether the FFW went against the will of its principal (the memberemployees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent employer to determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship. Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the union or a rival labor organization, but not the employer as in this case. Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda. G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011 The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining, and that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the union’s registration because at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order cancelling its registration. The legitimacy of the legal personality of respondent cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it. The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 170007, 7 April 2014 The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any concession. While the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employee’s union resulting in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel one. For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form ManufacturingUnited Workers of the Phils v. NLRC. G.R. No. 113856, Sept. 7, 1998 There is no perfect test of good faith (GF) in bargaining. The GF or BF is an inference to be drawn from the facts and is largely a matter for the NLRC’s expertise. The charge of BF should be raised while the bargaining is in progress. With the execution of the CBA, BF can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards CB because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is good enough that private respondent exerted “reasonable effort of GF bargaining. FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) Vs. Sama-samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organization (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO. G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009

While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five y ears, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc., v. Confessor. G.R. No. 111809, May 5, 1997 The signing of the CBA does not determine whether the agreement was entered into within the 6 month period from the date of expiration of the old CBA. In the present case, there was already a meeting of the minds between the company and the union prior to the end of the 6 month period after the expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such meeting of the mind is sufficient to conclude that an agreement has been reached within the 6 month period as provided under Art. 253A of the LC. Teodoro S. Miranda, Jr. vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009 A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union, and not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or particular department. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A judgment of reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop Steward would have no practical legal effect since it cannot be enforced. Based on the requirements imposed by law and the APCWU-ATI CBA, and in the nature of things, the subsequent separation of the petitioner from employment with respondent ATI has made his reinstatement to union Shop Steward incapable of being enforced. Herminigildo Inguillom, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009 “Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union’s decision to expel the employee from the union or company. Standard Chartered Bank v. Confessor. G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004 Whether or not the union is engaged in bluesky bargaining is determined by the evidence presented by the union as to its economic demands. Thus, if the union requires exaggerated or unreasonable economic demands, then it is guilty of ULP. In order to be considered as unfair labor practice, there must be proof that the demands made by the union were exaggerated or unreasonable. In the minutes of the meeting show that the union based its economic proposals on data of rank-and-file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the bank in the Asian region. Hence, it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ULP for bluesky bargaining. General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-Tupas vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 178647. Feb. 13, 2007 Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices. Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139940, September 19, 2006 To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof. Evidently, the University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of Union members. Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L22456, Sep. 27, 1967 Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership and a closed shop applicants provision will not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership without any reasonable ground thereof. Phil. Can Co. v. CIR. G.R. No. L3021, July 13, 1950 A coercive measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their demands. The idea behind a strike is that a company engaged in a profitable business cannot afford to have its production or activities interrupted, much less, paralyzed. Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., etc. vs. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant, etc., G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009 The requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP;(b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R. No. 168406, January 2015 The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states the company’s counter-proposal shall be attached to the notice of strike “as far as practicable.” In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the company’s counter-proposal which it did not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike. NSFW vs. Ovejera. G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982 The coolingoff period in Art. 264(c) and the 7day strike ban after the strikevote report prescribed in Art. 264 (f) were meant to be mandatory. The law provides that “the labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the filing of the notice”, this clearly implies that the union may not strike before the lapse of the coolingoff period. The coolingoff period is for the Ministry of Labor and Employment to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. The mandatory character of the 7day strike ban is manifest in the provision that “in every case” the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting “at least 7 days before the intended strike.” This period is to give time to verify that a strike vote was actually held. In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the coolingoff period, the 7day requirement shall be counted from the day following the expiration of the coolingoff period. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos. G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000 A no strike/lockout clause is legal, but it is applicable only to economic strikes, not ULP strikes. As a provision in the CBA, it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer (Er) only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the Er that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on ULP. Interphil Laboratories Ees UnionFFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001 The concept of a slowdown is a “strike on the installment plan.” It is a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer (Er), in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands. Such a slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees (Ees) “continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them,” they at the same time “select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the Er’s damage, to do other work;” in other words, they “work on their own terms. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al. vs. Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, et al./Triumph International (phils.), Inc. vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al., G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010

The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor Secretary under Article 263(g) is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 7527173, June 27, 1988

Where the return to work order is issued pending the determination of the legality of the strike, it is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if illegal. Precisely, the purpose of the return to work order is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Manila Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE, G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16, 2004 Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the SLE in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its Dismissed Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010 Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike. In the present case, there is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration. Jackbilt Industries, Inc. Vs. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-Naflu-KMU, G.R. No. 171618-19, March 13, 2009 Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the employer’s premises. Since respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s compound, respondent’s officers and employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike. The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary. Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey Foods Corporation v. Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW, et al., G.R. No. 178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011 A distinction exists between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Moreover, the participating union officers have to be properly identified. In the present case, with respect to those union officers whose identity and participation in the strike having been properly established, the termination was legal. Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No. 86000, Sep. 21, 1990 No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. As for the union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief. MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA, G.R. 128632, Aug. 5, 1999 The innocent by stander must show: Compliance with the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and That it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. Victor Meteoro, et al. v. Creative Creatures, Inc. G.R No. 171275, July 13, 2009 In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. Hence, the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Considering, however, that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship was also raised, the CA correctly ruled that such endorsement was no longer necessary. Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical Specialist and Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 204142, 19 November 2014 The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. The University of the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011 Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. As an exception, under Article 262 the Voluntary Arbitrator, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. For the exception to apply, there must be agreement between the parties clearly conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on record showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration. Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162385 (2013) The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this, respondent’s cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper. Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. vs. Estanislao Surio, et al. G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012 Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such workers. The NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers. People’s Broadcasting Service vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment. G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012 If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime Corporation and/or Western Shipping Agencies. G.R. No. 175209. January 16, 2013 There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure when the respondents PAL Maritime Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. filed, albeit belatedly, the Joint Declaration Under Oath, which is required when an employer appeals from the Labor Arbiter’s decision granting a monetary award and posts a surety bond. Under the NLRC rules, the following requisites are required to perfect the employer’s appeal: (1) it must be filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be under oath, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond; and (3) it must be accompanied by typewritten or printed copies of the memorandum of appeal, stating the grounds relied upon, the supporting arguments, the reliefs prayed for, and a statement of the date of receipt of the appealed decision, with proof of service on the other party of said appeal. If the employer posts a surety bond, the NLRC rules further require the submission by the employer, his or her counsel, and the bonding company of a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until the final disposition of the case. In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond equivalent to the monetary award and filed the notice of appeal and the appeal memorandum within the reglementary period. When the NLRC subsequently directed the filing of a Joint Declaration Under Oath, the respondents immediately complied with the said order. There was only a late submission of the Joint Declaration. Considering that there was substantial compliance with the rules, the same may be liberally construed. The application of technical rules may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demands of substantial justice. Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013) While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period. AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid vs. Melanio B. Yuag. G.R. No. 195033, October 12, 2011 On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for Certiorari despite the prescribed Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, the SC found that the CA committed error when it entertained the petition for certiorari and explained that when respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC’s 30 November 2006 Resolution within the reglementary period, the Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by the Court of Appeals. Untimeliness in filing motions or petitions is not a mere technical or procedural defect, as leniency regarding this requirement will impinge on the right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from the laying to rest of the controversy. 1. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Manila Pavilion Hotel, etc. vs. Henry Delada. G.R. No. 189947, January 25, 2011 In Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin, the Supreme Court ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority – subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. It was also held in that case that the failure of the parties to specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over the related issue. In Ludo & Luym Corporation v. Saornido, the Supreme Court recognized that voluntary arbitrators are generally expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement; that, nevertheless, they can assume that they have the necessary power to make a final settlement on the related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the specific issue brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the question of “whether an employee was discharged for just cause,” they could reasonably assume that their powers extended beyond the determination thereof to include the power to reinstate the employee or to grant back wages. In the same vein, if the specific issue brought before the arbitrators referred to the date of regularization of the employee, law and jurisprudence gave them enough leeway as well as adequate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the employees to higher benefits in accordance with the finding of regularization. Indeed, to require the parties to file another action for payment of those benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy labor justice. Philippine Electric Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168612, 10 December 2014 The rule is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed “within the period for taking an appeal. People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) v. Secretary of Labor, et al. GR No. 179652, May 8, 2009 It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause “in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists” in Art. 128(b). Thus, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE , and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer- employee relationship, the jurisdiction is purely with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Manolito Barles, et al. v. Hon. Benedicto Bitonio, et al. GR No. 120270, June 16, 1999 The BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. As already held by the Court in La Tondena Workers Union v. Secretary of Labor, intra-union conflicts such as examinations of accoutns are under the jurisdiction of the BLR. However, the Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration purpose and expressly separated or distinguished examinations of union accounts from the genus of intra-union conflict and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same. Original jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the Regional Director and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with the BLR. This is apparent from Sections 3 and 4 of the Med-Arbitration Rules as already mentioned. Contrast these two sections from Section 2 and Section 56 of the same rules. Section 2 expressly vests upon Med-Arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide inter alia “all other inter-union or internal union disputes.” Section 5 states that the decisions of the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the DOLE Secretary. Without a doubt, the rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration did not amend or supplant substantive law but implemented and filled in details of procedure left vacuous or ambiguous by the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194169 (2013) The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be unjustly enriched. Virgilio Anabe v. Asian Construction. GR No. 183233, December 23, 2009 To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is essential to ascertain the time when the third element of a cause of action transpired. Stated differently, in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers’ right to the benefits being claimed was committed. For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in accordance with Article 291. George A. Arriola v Pilipino Star .Ngayon, Inc. and/or Miguel G. Belmont, G.R. No. 175689, 13 August 2014 This court ruled that Callanta’s complaint for illegal dismissal had not yet prescribed. Although illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, it is not the “offense” contemplated in Article 290. Article 290 refers to illegal acts penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts, unfair labor practices, and illegal recruitment activities. The three-year prescriptive period under Article 290, therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal. Instead, “by way of supplement,” Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines governs complaints for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1146, an action based upon an injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within four years. This court explained: . . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim “by reason of its practical effect.” Legally, however, an award of backwages “is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render inhis favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer.” Though it results “in the enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.” Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.” Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore, governs these actions. SOCIAL LEGISLATION SSS v. Aguas. G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006 A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be “dependent for support” upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. Bernardina P. Bartolome v Social Security System, et al., G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014 Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. The phrase “dependent parents” should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. Hacienda Cataywa, et al. v Rosario Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015) To be exempted from the coverage of SSS Law on the basis of casual employment, the services must not merely be irregular, temporary or intermittent, but the same must not also be in connection with the business or occupation of the employer. The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. GSIS vs. De Leon. G.R. No. 186560; November 17, 2010 Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. GSIS vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128524; April 20, 1999 The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. ECC. G.R. No. L-26341. Nov. 27, 1968 When the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of the employer, the injury is compensable. Enao v. ECC G.R. No. L-46046; April 5, 1985 The company which provides the means of transportation in going to, or coming from the place of work, is liable to the injury sustained by the employees while on board said means of transportation. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS Thursday, October 29th, 2015

Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

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Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service which, device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1, A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978 The practice of law is not a natural, property or constitutional right but a mere privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation. Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979 A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association for such particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or of holding property. In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963 An applicant who has not completed his pre-legal education or completed the same only after he began his study of law will not be qualified to take the bar examinations, and if by concealment of that fact he is able to take and pass the bar examinations and thereafter is admitted to the bar, his passing the bar examinations will not validate his admission to practice, taking the prescribed course of legal study in the regular manner being as essential as the other requirements for membership in the bar. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971 A layman should confine his work to non adversary contentions. He should not undertake purely legal work such as the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the presentation of evidence. Ui vs. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000 Immoral conduct connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. vs. FASGI Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000 A lawyer cannot compromise the case of his client without the latter’s consent even if he believes that the compromise is for the better interest of the client. In re: Atty. Renerio G. Paas, A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, April 4, 2003 A lawyer who uses as his office address the office of his wife who is a judge was found guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading and deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which the cases are lodged, or his clients that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary. Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie, A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985 Filipino lawyers cannot practice law under the name of a foreign law firm, as the latter cannot practice law in the Philippines and the use of the foreign law firm’s name is unethical. Zualo vs. CFI of Cebu, CA-G.R. No. 27718-R, July 7, 1961 Attorneys should familiarize themselves with the rules and comply with their requirements. They also are chargeable with notice of changes in the rules which have been held as including not only express reglementary provisions but also a regular practice under the Rules of Court. Jose vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38581, March 31, 1976 A public prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer. He is the “representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. General Bank and Trust Co. vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000 Where the “matter” referred to in Rule 6.03, in which the lawyer intervened as a government official in a case is different from the “matter” or case in which he intervenes either as incumbent government official or as a former or retired public officer, there is no violation of Rule 6.03 nor he will be taking inconsistent positions nor will there be representation of conflict of interests, nor violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law. In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 686 SCRA 791 (2012) Election through ‘rotation by exclusion’ is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion. In re: Edillion, A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. In re: Atty. Jose Principe, Bar Matter No. 543, 20 September 20, 1990 There is no such thing as retirement in the IBP as understood in labor law. A lawyer, however, may terminate his bar membership after filing the required verified notice of termination with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar. In re: Ramon Galang, A.C. No. 1163, August 29, 1975 When the applicant concealed a charge of a crime against him but which crime does not involve moral turpitude, this concealment nevertheless will be taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer. When he made a concealment he perpetrated perjury. Royong vs. Oblena, G.R. No. 376, April 30, 1963 It is not necessary that there be prior conviction for the offense before a lawyer can be disciplined for gross immorality; it is enough that the act charged, in the language of the law, constitutes a crime. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971 In citing the Supreme Court’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of the courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word for word and punctuation mark by punctuation mark. There is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal’s decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants take their bearings. Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of the other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970 A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. Arangco vs. Baloso, G.R. No. L-28617, January 31, 1973 If a lawyer is honestly convinced of the futility of an appeal he should not hesitate to inform his client. He should temper his client’s desire to seek appellate review of such decision for it will only increase the burden on appellate tribunals, prolong litigation, and expose his client to useless expenses of suit. Sarenas vs. Ocampos, A.C. No. 4401, January 29, 2004 Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. It bears emphasis that a client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30, 2004 A party’s engagement of his counsel in another capacity concurrent with the practice of law is not prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed by such counsel is made clear to the client. The only reason for this clarification requirement is that certain ethical considerations operative in one profession may not be so in the other. Espiritu vs. Cabredo IV, A.C. 5831, January 23, 2003 The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Daria, A.C. No. 2736, May 27, 1991 An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. It is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. vs. De Dios Transportation Co., Inc and De Dios Marikina Transit Corp., G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003 Notice of withdrawal without conformity of client is a mere scrap of paper. The lawyer remains bound to the case of the client. De Jesus- Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439 (1961) Double jeopardy cannot be availed of in disbarment proceedings against an attorney. Disbarment does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Thus a lawyer who was found guilty of falsification of public documents cannot put up the defense of double jeopardy in the disbarment proceeding filed against him which is based on the same facts as the criminal case. Sps Arcing v. Atty. Cefra (2013) The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence, shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable and in addition, to keep the client informed of the status of his case. A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical showing lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer and warrants disciplinary sanction. Cuenco v. Fernan, 158 SCRA 29 (1988) Complaints for disbarment may not lie against impeachable officers of the government during their tenure. They may only be removed from office by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses. Siao Aba et al v. Atty. De Guzman Jr et al (2011) The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The evidence required in the suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the defendant. Uy v. Mercado (1987) Res Ipsa Loquitor applies to both judges and lawyers. Judges had been dismissed form the service without the need of a formal investigation because based on the records, the gross misconduct or inefficacy of the judges clearly appears Benigno Reas v. Carlos Relacion, (2011) 1. The Court’s disciplinary authority is not dependent on or cannot be frustrated by the private arrangements entered into by the parties; otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, will be undermined. (2) Public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of the officials and employees of the Judiciary. (3) The Court’s interest in the affairs of the Judiciary is a paramount concern that bows to no limits. Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727 , August 31, 1964 Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant’s participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. Baylon v. Almo, (2008) Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public. Sicat v. Arriola, (2005) The act of a lawyer notarizing a Special Power of Attorney knowing that the person who allegedly executed it is dead is a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1. Sales v. CA, 211 SCRA 858,865 (1992) Notary may Notarize Instruments which refer to properties located outside his territorial jurisdiction. “What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction.” Jandoquile v. Revilla, A.C. No. 9514, 10 April 2013 If the notary public personally knows the affiant, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of “jurat” under Sec. 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Gahol vs. Riodigue, 64 SCRA 494 If the decision rendered by the judge is still on appeal, the judge cannot be disqualified on the ground of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong Vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013 It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to “rendering knowingly unjust judgment” refer to an individual judge who does so “in any case submitted to him for decision” and has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as the Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is “unjust” cannot prosper. Tan vs. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ In this case, the Court ruled that “[r]espondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench.” Salud vs. Alumbres, A.M. No. RTJ-00-159, June 23, 2003 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary. Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting judge. Anonymous Vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, MIsamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013 It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. Armi M. Flordeliza, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625, September 18, 2009 Those who don the judicial robe must observe judicial decorum which requires magistrate to be at all times temperate in their language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to language of vilification. The respondent’s use of vulgar language has no place in the court. The frequent nocturnal gimmicks also impair the respect due to her as a Judge. Furthermore, borrowing money from her staff is not illegal per se but this is an unbecoming conduct of a judge because she exerted moral ascendancy over her staff. Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008 An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. In the case, the judge questions the capability and credibility of the complainant just because he was not a graduate from UP Law School. The Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court. Pimentel vs. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967 A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. Aleria, Jr. vs. Velez, G.R. No. 127400 November 16, 1998 The bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than the evidence presented. Oktubre vs. Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444, July 20, 2004 A municipal judge who filed complaints in his own court for robbery and malicious mischief against a party for the purpose of protecting the property interests of the judge’s co-heirs, and then issued warrants of arrest against the party, was found guilty of serious misconduct and ordered dismissed from the bench before he was able to recuse himself. The Supreme Court held that “his subsequent inhibition from the cases which he filed in his own court does not detract from his culpability for he should have not taken cognizance of the cases in the first place – the evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process.” DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May 21, 2001 The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge. The failure of respondent judge to inhibit himself in the case of his uncle constitutes an abuse of his authority and undermines public confidence in the impartiality of judges. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Paderanga A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25 2005 A judge is commanded at all times to be mindful of the high calling of a dispassionate and impartial arbiter expected at all times to be a “cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.” Judges should refrain from inviting counsel for one side into their chambers after or prior to sessions in court without disclosing to the other counsel the reason for such meetings, being aggressive in demeanor towards a lawyer appearing before them, and making public comments, or allowing court staff to make comments, on pending cases. Manansala III vs. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10 2005 A judge was found liable for gross misconduct when he made phone calls to the station commander on behalf of a family friend who had been detained, and asked her bailiff to look into the status of the car that had been left in the parking lot when the friend had been arrested. Venancio Inonog vs. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009 Respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his superior’s vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. A magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. Respondent judge should not have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste valuable court time and resources on a trivial matter. J. King & Sons Company, Inc. vs. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004 The Court reiterates the common sense rule that once retired, judges may no longer decide cases. Neither may they, or even their successors, promulgate decisions written while they were still in office. In short, once retired, they can no longer write or promulgate decisions, orders or other actions proper only to incumbents. Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu vs. Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., A.M. RTJ-03-1793, February 5, 2004 A judge’s duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to lawyers. The said duty also includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses. Respondent’s conduct towards Consuelo Aznar leaves a lot to be desired. As stated in the complaint, respondent ordered Consuelo Aznar to go back to her house to get the original documents in five minutes or he would dismiss the case. Respondent did not offer any explanation to this charge against him. Respondent’s act in this instance smacks of judicial tyranny. Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004 Judges should organize their courts to ensure the prompt and convenient dispatch of business and should not tolerate misconduct by clerks, sheriffs and other assistants who are sometimes prone to expect favors or special treatment due to their professional relationship with the judge. All personnel involved in the dispensation of justice should conduct themselves with a high degree of responsibility. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. Vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013

In this case, respondent judge was found guilty of gross inefficiency for having failed to resolve the ejectment case within the prescribed 30-day period after the filing of the parties’ respective Position Papers, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The Supreme Court took into consideration the judge’s candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine and also took into account his age and frail health, although these factors did not in any way absolve him from liability or excuse him from diligently fulfilling his duties. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013 Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Epifania M. Neri vs. Judge Barulio L. Hurtado, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1584, February 18, 2004 Judge Hurtado’s failure to return the money he received from Neri while he was still a clerk a court constitutes simple misconduct. Anonymous Vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, MIsamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013 Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense. GERMAN WENCESLAO CRUZ, JR. vs. JUDGE DANIEL C. JOVEN, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1270 January 23, 2001 Neither is the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, ‘for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the court. Anna Liza Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335 (2013) The following procedural requisites must be complied with before petitioner may be punished for indirect contempt: First, there must be an order requiring the petitioner to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Second, the petitioner must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against her. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider petitioner’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will petitioner be punished accordingly. What is most essential in indirect contempt cases, however, is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. Plainly, respondent Judge’s obstinate disregard of established rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure, since he disregarded the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge. Carmen P. Edano v. Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala and Stenographer Myrla del Pilar Nicandro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 (2013) The personal letters written by the respondent seeking for the mercy of the Supreme Court in order to lighten the penalties imposed upon her were treated as Motions for Reconsideration. Filing of multiple Motions for Reconsideration in the guise of personal letters to whoever sits as the Chief Magistrate of the Court, is trifling with the judicial processes to evade a final judgment. Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena v. Judge Nilo Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 (2013) Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The act of a judge coaching her daughter who is the counsel of the respondent during a hearing is considered as engaging in private practice of law. A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in such practice, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. The judge’s act of doing so renders him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Office of the Court Administrator v. Lorenza M. Martinez, A.M. No. P-06-2223 (2013) A Clerk of Court is the court’s accountable officer. It was not the cash clerk. It was her duty to supervise and monitor her subordinate to ensure that the proper procedures were followed in the collection of the court’s funds. Being the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises, she was liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. Time and again, the Court reminds that “those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should be made accountable to all those whom he serves. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish, or even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the Judiciary.” Development Bank of the Philippines v. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-10-2789 (2013) A sheriff’s failure to fully implement the writ should not be taken entirely against him. He could not fulfill his task solely by verbally telling the occupants to vacate the property as he encountered resistance from the informal settlers on the property who had built permanent structures thereon and refused to leave. He, however, cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The submission of the return and of periodic reports by the sheriff is a duty that cannot be taken lightly. It serves to update the court on the status of the execution and the reasons for the failure to satisfy its judgment. The periodic reporting also provides the court insights on how efficient court processes are after a judgment’s promulgation. Its overall purpose is to ensure speedy execution of decisions. A sheriff’s failure to make a return and to submit a return within the required period constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties; it is conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952 (2013) A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. The Court must thwart any and every effort of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to see to it that attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and lawful fees. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359 (2013) The Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three hours. The acts of the respondent judge were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. RE: Unauthorized Travel Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional trial Court Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC (2013) OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized. Furthermore, Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased), Substituted by their Heirs v. Atty. Victorino T. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188 (2014) Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period. The doctrine of maintenance was directed against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse. Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler. Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation. In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law. The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause. ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA; A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200; 2 April 2014 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers. Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation.11 Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ALAMINOS CITY, PANGASINAN, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, (Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC), April 7, 2014) A judge is responsible, not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions, he should know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, especially those pending for more than 90 days. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith. ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA VS. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA; A.C. No. 9881; 04 June 2014 The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows: An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case. The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence. 1. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL, SARANGANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38; A.M. No. P-13-3132; 4 June 2014 That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. ARGEL D. HERNANDEZ vs. JUDGE VICTOR C. GELLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, CLARINCE B. JINTALAN, LEGAL RESEARCHER, and ROWENA B. JINTALAN, SHERIFF IV, ALL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, SORSOGON CITY; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356; 9 June 2014 The filing of administrative complaints or just the threats of the filing of such complaints do subvert and undermine the independence of the Judiciary and its Judges. Thus, the Court does not tolerate unwarranted administrative charges brought against sitting magistrates in respect of their judicial actions. Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer justice are function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted. It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others. EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO; A.C. No. 6677, 10 June 2014 To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA; A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388; 10 June 2014

The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence. Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high. Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint. Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel. In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife — above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation. Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA vs. ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION; B.M. No. 2713; 10 June 2014 The rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws actually consists of two underlying directives. First is the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule. The rule mandates that the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region. This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG. Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule. This exception would allow a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. HENRY SAMONTE vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA; A.C. No. 3452; 23 June 2014 In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client’s case, were unmitigated. HENRY SAMONTE vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA; A.C. No. 3452; 23 June 2014 In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client’s case, were unmitigated. ALMIRA C. FORONDA, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.; A.C. No. 9976; 25 June 2014 The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against him. The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client. MERCEDITA DE JESUS vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT; A.C. No. 6470; 8 July 2014 Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 23 and 1.02 24 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN vs. JUDGE SIBANAH E. USMAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, Samar; A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390; 13 August 2014 It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. As settled, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Bare allegation would not suffice to hold respondent liable. In the absence of showing direct and convincing evidence to prove the alleged bribery, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of said charge. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, as in this case, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. GEORGE T. CHUA vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA; A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394; 1 September 2014. A trial judge is not accountable for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. Indeed, the judge’s office and duty to render and administer justice, being functions of sovereignty, should not be simply taken for granted. No administrative charge for manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law should be brought against him for the orders issued in the due course of judicial proceedings. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY, vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA; A.C. No. 7474; 9 September 2014 Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. IMELDA CATO GADDI VS. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO; A.C. No. 8637; 15 September 2014 Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and routinary act. It converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory’s free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete. MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL VS. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA; A.C. No. 9925; 17 September 2014 On complainant’s affidavit of desistance, its execution cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings against respondent in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Renta violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED VS. NICOLAS C. TORRES; A.C. No. 10438; 23 September 2014 The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. This is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. Respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is duty-bound to protect. They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG; A.M. No. SB-14-21-J; 23 September 2014 Respondent’s act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. Respondent’s acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum. Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER vs. JUDGE CORAZON D. SOLUREN, PRESIDING JUDGE, and RABINDRANATH A. TUZON, LEGAL RESEARCHER II, both of BRANCH 91, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BALER, AURORA; A.M. No. P-14-3217; 8 October 2014 Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not authorized to receive any settlement money from party-litigants. Neither was it shown that Judge Soluren instructed him to receive the same. Having kept the money in his possession and exercised control over it, Tuzon evidently overstepped his authority and, thus, committed a form of misconduct. Considering the absence of any proof that Tuzon’s actions were tainted with corruption, or with a clear intent to violate the law, or would constitute a flagrant disregard of an established rule — say for instance, by the actual misappropriation of any amount which came to his possession — Tuzon cannot be held liable for Grave Misconduct but only for Simple Misconduct Court employees like Tuzon would do well to constantly keep in mind that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects its honor and dignity and the people’s confidence in it. CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR; A.C. No. 7054; 11 November 2014 The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. While the Court sympathizes with the respondent’s unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. ADARIA O. DAGING VS. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS; A.C. No. 9395, 12 November 2014 Respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. A lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent’s argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer. DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO vs. JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360; 19 November 2014 SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3, Part I of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice. In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. Respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in another. ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ VS. ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., A.C. No. 10240; 25 November 2014.

In CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres, the Supreme Court had already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In view of the foregoing, the Court can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or disbarment against Atty. Torres, considering that he has already been previously disbarred. We do not have double or multiple disbarments in our laws or jurisprudence. Nevertheless, considering that the issues and the infraction committed are different from his previous infraction, the Court deem it proper to resolve the instant case and give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in respondent’s personal file in the Bar Confidant’s Office. Atty. Torres is found guilty of gross misconduct and of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended for 2 years from the practice of law. However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed. SPOUSES NICASIO AND DONELITA SAN PEDRO VS. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA; A.C. No. 5440, 26 November 2014 Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the following elements: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment. Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties. Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client. When there is a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR. VS. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY; A.C. No. 8103; 03 December 2014 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint. Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded. ERLINDA FOSTER VS. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG; A.C. No. 10579, 10 December 2014

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, AND MARIVEL B. ISON vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE OCCIDENTAL MINDORO; A.M. No. RTJ15-2405; 12 January 2015 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary. Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality.

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN; A.C. No. 10576; 14 January 2015 Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. In allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR. THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (BOTH DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR HEIRS, NAMELY: HERMINIA, PASTORA, HEIRS OF FRUCTUOSA, HEIRS OF RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., AND ARMANDO, ALL SURNAMED CADAVEDO VS. VICTORINO T. LACAYA, MARRIED TO ROSA LEGADOS; G.R. No. 173188, 15 January 2014 While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.

AUGUSTO M. AQUINO VS. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, AS PRESIDING JUDGE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH 33 AND MA. ALA F. DOMINGO AND MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO, SUBSTITUTING HEIRS OF THE DECEASED ANGEL T. DOMINGO; G.R. No. 191470, 26 January 2015 A claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. AMELVYN G. GARCIA VS. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO; A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457; 03 February 2015 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

JILL M. TORMIS vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366; 04 February 2015 The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. BENITO B. NATE vs. JUDGE LELU P. CONTRERAS, BRANCH 43, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, VIRAC, CATANDUANES (THEN CLERK OF COURT, RTC-IRIGA CITY); A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406; 18 February 2015 Nevertheless, we recognize that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees does allow for limited exceptions. Section 7(b) thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1(c) of its implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court to “represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the case.” Considering, however, that the documents notarized by respondent Contreras do not involve a private or commercial undertaking, and that this is the first time that she has been charged, the penalty of reprimand is imposed.

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807; OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J; 17 March 2015 Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. The delay in the case could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned it to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted. Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

CRIMINAL LAW Thursday, October 29th, 2015

I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

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1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992 Under the utilitarian theory, the “protective theory” in criminal law, “affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers.” It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11) Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that “criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment,” (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo’s view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the “actual and potential wrongdoers.” In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner’s four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual “account or credit for value” as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner’s stead the “potential wrongdoer”, whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner. Mala In se and Mala Prohibita 2. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006 Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Proximate Cause 3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011 Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Impossible Crimes 4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119 Intod fired at Palangpangan’s room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 5. Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009 In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Herein petitioner’s case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Stages of Execution 6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12, 2015 There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; c) The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance. 7. Rait v. People, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008 Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. 8. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006 In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions. That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder. 9. Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007 Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. 10. Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009 Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, we declare the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide. 11. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012 Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the “touching” of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. Conspiracy and proposal 12. People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011 In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation. As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. 13. People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011 Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop. 14. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014 Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation. 15. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007 Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the second argument attempts to establish animplied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his father – hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other – the third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally guilty as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder. 16. Fernan v. People G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007 It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. 17. Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989 Under the Sandiganbayan’s decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. Continuing Crime 18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974 Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft. 19. Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993 The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called “single larceny” doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the “separate larceny doctrine,” under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414). The American courts following the “single larceny” rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same “transaction” or as done on the same “occasion” (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539). 20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994 The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated ondifferent occasions, and caused injury to different parties. Compound Crime/Complex Crime 21. Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, March 31, 1958 There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, appellant’s participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document 22. People v. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997 In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries. 23. People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012 Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty. 24. People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002 Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x. 25. People v. Villaflores, R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012 There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information. II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY Justifying Circumstances – Self-Defense 26. Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012 Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. 27. People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011 An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and Francisco Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had an encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeowas not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who confronted Danny. Resultantly, Danny failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable element of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. 28. People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011 Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. 29. People v. Patotoy, G.R. No. 102058, August 26, 1996 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. There must exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense.[18] This element, in the case before us, is sorely wanting. No veritable physical force on the part of Manuel has been shown that could have really endangered appellant’s life. Manuel’s alleged act of drawing “something” from his waist certainly is not the “unlawful aggression” meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike at the victim with such lightning-speed as appellant has delivered. In fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person of Manuel, is shown to have been found. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance. 30. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012 The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense. In other words, no self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel. In People v. Dolorido, we held that unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury upon the accused. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the x x x intent to cause injury. 31. People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013 As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, “it is surprising that the latter did not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the latter’s neck.” – State of Necessity 32. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004 Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills. -Fulfillment of Duty 33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005 Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his duty. In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger. – Obedience to a lawful order of a superior 34. Tabuena v. People, G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997 This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. Battered Woman Syndrome 35. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children’s bedroom — and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm — then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life “would amount to sentencing her to ‘murder by installment.'” Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense — complete or incomplete — on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances. 36. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.” Exempting Circumstances – Insanity 37. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. – Minority 38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness. In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody. 39. Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009 As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. 40. People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009 The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. 41. People v. Mantalaba, R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011 Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. – Accident 42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004 It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. 43. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007 Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. Mitigating Circumstances -Praeter Intentionem 44. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011 In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear. -Immediate vindication of a grave offense 45. People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011 As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accusedappellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant. – Sufficient Provocation 46. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009 Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner. – Passion/Obfuscation 47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003 The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off. 48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18, 2015 To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 49. Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004 But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances. -Voluntary Surrender 50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001 The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities 51. People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004 In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Aggravating Circumstances 52. People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001 As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. “Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender’s immunity from identification or capture.” In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity. “The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance.” Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder. As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man. – Recidivism 53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000 On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly appreciated the same though not alleged in the information. Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as “one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.” To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such aggravating circumstance credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism. -Reiteracion 54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000 The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case. – Treachery 55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. 56. People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999 Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists. 57. People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004 In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently establish that the method of execution gave the latter no opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and consciously adopted by the former without danger to himself. 58. People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997 The Revised Penal Code provides that “(t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” In the case at bench, the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing to murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the stabbing of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to raise any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have expected, while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and fatally assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was defenseless during the attack as his hands were restrained by the accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other perpetrators. It is well-settled that “(a)n unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack, constitutes alevosia.” Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden. – Ignominy 59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990 The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on the victim’s private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter’s asseveration that the accused “plastered” (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim’s private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca’s testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on Rebecca’s private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court’s finding that the offense was aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word “cruelty” used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of “plastering” mud on the victim’s vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and properly described as “ignominy” rather than “cruelty or ignominy.” Alternative Circumstances 60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010 Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accused-appellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight bottles of gin prior to the rape incident. III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE Principal 61. People v. Janjalani et. al. R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011 Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized. Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The same finding must be applied to the case at bar. 62. People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012 Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter’s services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. While this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act Accomplice 63. People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas consent. Accessories 64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994 Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that “there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties” and that “such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties,” P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to “impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.” Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. Anti Fencing Law 65. Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012 The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. IV. PENALTIES 66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007 It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the commutation of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. 67. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006 Henceforth, “death,” as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor. There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of “death,” as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of “reclusion perpetua to death,” as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both “reclusion perpetua” and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, “[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.” Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than “reclusion perpetua to death” isprision mayor. 68. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987 Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of “service” of sentence, “duration” of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted”. Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the “imposition of penalty”. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years. 69. People v. Temporada, R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by the dissent. In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated general rule. 70. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. – Subsidiary Imprisonment 71. Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004 This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001 that there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine. This should finally dispel the petitioners’ importunate claim that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper. – Indeterminate Sentence Law 72. Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997 The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted. 73. Romero v. People, R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011 In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit: x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases: Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115). Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117). Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122). Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5). Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November 19, 1982). Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359). Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year. Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962). Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. 74. People v. Mantalaba, R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011 Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. 75. People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014 Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. “It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended’.” – Probation Law 76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008 The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 77. Almero v. People, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014 Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 78. Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011 One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence. This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months. Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law. 79. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006 Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification. 80. Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990 The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence,” but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final judgment but an “interlocutory judgment” in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated.” – Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability 81. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, R. No. L-28841, June 24, 1983 The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes. 82. Romualdez v Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006 Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 83. People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. 84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013 Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. 85. People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753 To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim’s retraction or pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action (People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The present case was filed on February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1, 1988. 86. People v. Bacang, July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512 While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994. 87. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010 In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: x x x x By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. Article 344 of the same Code also provides ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x. On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of rape as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony. BOOK II Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123) – Treason 88. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. 89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314 7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his “commandeering” of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. – Piracy 90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997 Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State – Arbitrary Detention 91. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001 Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants. Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention. 92. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. 93. Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003 Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999. – Expulsion 94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his residence. – Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained 95. Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized. Crimes Against Public Order -Rebellion 96. People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995 If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice. 97. People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936 Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. – Sedition 98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686 The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition. -Inciting to Sedition 99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951 A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (“dirty”) infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his criticism to the “free trade of ideas” but such criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Illegal Possession of Firearms 100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007 When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’ etat and conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law. R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty. If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat. If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense. – Direct Assault 101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453 The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. 102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639 When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority. 103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010 The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. WhenLydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma. – Evasion of Service of Sentence 104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005 Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, “escape” in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. Crimes Against Public Interest -Falsification 105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011 In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power. Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) 106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97 If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse’s name to the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouse’s last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such crime. 107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120 If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the province for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse. 108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are “used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.” Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein. -Usurpation 109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013 We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR. But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs 110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011 While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is established by showing its chain of custody. The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657 The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. 112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012 While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. 113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011 The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the main reason that under R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs. In the present case, petitioner was charged under two Informations, one for illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the other for illegal possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing shabu weighing more or less 0.327 gram. 114. People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012 As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong Pango could have been different persons, the established fact remains that it was accused-appellant who was caught in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-bust operation. 115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011 The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court. 116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011 Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accusedappellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest. 117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013 It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that “marking” of the seized items “immediately after seizure and confiscation” may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011 PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Crimes Against Public Morals – Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits 119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751 To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. -AntiTrafficking Persons Act 120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011 The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208. Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking. Crimes Committed by Public Officers – Malversation 121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011 Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense. 122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011 This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily explain. In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount. 123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415 When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her work to another without the former being the one to misappropriate a government fund or property malversation may still be at hand. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of them. -Technical Malversation 124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991 In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. 125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005 The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. -Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) 126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party. 127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011 Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five (45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a resolution authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction, terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions remain vague as to the parameters of the project, which the Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it can do as it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any way whatsoever. True enough, when API failed to execute the construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality found itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance security that API likewise failed to submit. 128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013 As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery – an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality. 129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013 In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established. The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the canal’s construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste disposal site. 130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007 As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009 In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions. Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. 132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508 An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. -Anti-Plunder Act 133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001 The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. 134. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009 Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer. Crimes Against Persons Parricide 135. People v. Sales, R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011 Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate was also presented in evidence. 136. People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683 In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife. Death under Exceptional Circumstances 137. People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987 There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred. Murder 138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013 To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. 139. Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013 Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder – namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide– are, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupon’s case. As to the first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetet’s killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetet’s killing can neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to Dangupon. 140. People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013 Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the other proven circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were “riding in tandem” hatched the means on how to carry out and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative of cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is duly proved. Homicide 141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013 In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 142. Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013 The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit. Anti-Hazing Law 143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing. The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Unintentional Abortion 144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988 The Solicitor General’s brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant’s intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. Mutilation 145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code. Less serious physical injuries 146. Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010 Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that “(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.” Rape 147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008 For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed. 148. People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009 The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration. 149. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009 Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary. 150. De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14, 2007 Petitioner insists that a “finger” does not constitute an object or instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of one’s finger into the genital of another constitutes “rape through sexual assault”. Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. 151. People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013 In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative. 152. People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011 In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated.Neither did the appellant expressly admit AAAs age. This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state. Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua 153. People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011 As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. 154. People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011 In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. 155. People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013 A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any physical force or intimidation because in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. Anti Child Abuse Law 156. Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011 In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.

The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her. 157. Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013 Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. “[T]he law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security Kidnapping 158. People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008 The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. 159. People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013 If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011 Appellant’s arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence. 161. People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011 The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home. 162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011 Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape. Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor 163. People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011 It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied. As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case. Grave Threats 164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009 In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person which constituted grave threat. Grave Coercion 165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011 We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners. There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents. 166. People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997 This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant’s apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant’s plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila’s group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lockup.” Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any. 167. Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009 The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion: The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking. Unjust Vexation 168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006 Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997. Anti-Wire Tapping Act 169. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995 Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)” 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Crimes Against Property Robbery with Homicide 171. People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004 The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who take part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them. 172. People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004 There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion. 173. People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word “homicide” is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. 174. People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013 In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established, accused should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide. Robbery with Rape 175. People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011 For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery. 176. People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990 If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery. 177. People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002 Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Theft 178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008 There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract. Qualified theft 179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18 All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials. 180. Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013 Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS. Anti-Carnapping Law 181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain. 182. People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011 The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. 183. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003 The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter’s will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender. 184. People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013 To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” Estafa 185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013 When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information and not the caption of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. 186. Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012 the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with. 187. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013 Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share. Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project. 188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013 Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. “Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.” The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage. 189. People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013 In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa. 190. Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012 In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation. BP 22 191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004 It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by appellant. With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 192. Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004 Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. 193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005 A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution. The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the check has not been paid. 194. Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012 What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 195. Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001 The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.” By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner’s insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent court’s affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. 196. Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200 The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the check in question was Payment StoppedFunded at the same time DAUD meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22. 197. Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11, 2013 A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment. – Other Deceits 198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005 For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment. -Arson 199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006 In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson. 200. Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013 Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the “ghost” purchases. Their participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the government. 201. Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal. – Malicious Mischief 202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011 Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner’s version that it was private complainant’s CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant. In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief. Crimes Against Chastity -Qualified Seduction 203. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968 While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced is “constitutive” of the crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin. 204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29, 1988 There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. – Acts of Lasciviousness 205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009 In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint, what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was subjected to such atrocity. 206. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002

Petitioner’s acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. 207. People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011 Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault. -Forcible Abduction 208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001 The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age. All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim. 209. People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012 The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction. 210. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002 There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. – Anti Sexual Harassment Act 211. Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008 The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court. 212. Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007 Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being the person who recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim. Crimes Against Civil Status -Bigamy 213. Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011 The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 214. Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004 The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. 215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. Crimes Against Honor – Libel 216. Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007 The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed. 217. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011 An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence. 218. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007 The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article. The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to show that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person. 219. Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in the publication of the offending article is not required. 220. Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008 Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company. As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication. 221. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010 If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. – Slander 222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006 Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner “to express anger or displeasure” at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari. 223. Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989 Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, “kayabang,” “tunaw na utak,” “swapang,” and “estapador”, which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libellous per se. – Intriguing Against Honor 224. Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475 Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines “intriguing against honor” as any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls under the coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having been defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good morals.” Criminal Negligence 225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010 Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments » « Older Entries

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