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UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I LIBRARY

ISLAM, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION : THE CASE OF MUHAMMADIY AH AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAW Al'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AUGUST 2008

By Pramono Ubaid Tanthowi

Thesis Committee: Ehito Kimura, Chairperson Manfred Henningsen Benedict J. Kerkv liet

We certifY that we have read this thesis and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art in Political Science.

Thesis Committee:

Chairperson: Ehito Kimura

Member: Manfred Henningsen

Member: Benedict J. Kerkvliet

ABSTRACT

Mnhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Long active as both religious and political organizations during 1950s and 1960s, they withdrew from formal political arena and declared their disengagement from any political parties in the 1970s and 1980s that enabled them to survive under the repressive Suharto regime and consequently develop nascent civil society movements. This thesis examines the relation between those Muslim civil society organizations and democratization in the post-Suharto Indonesia: how they defend their positions as autonomous entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in political arena. It also studies their roles in the process of democratization. The study reveals a great deal ahout their participation in the political system, where they are now an important part of the political leadership and their interests are now well represented. However, the problem is that, in reality, there is a significant degree of overlap between civil society and political society as well as between civil society and the state. This study also shows the role of those Muslim civil society organizations in the democratization process. These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be consequential in all stages of democratization: they sought to broaden the free public sphere and combined their efforts, along with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating and bringing the authoritarian Suharto regime down. They also join forces in encouraging political participation, monitoring the elections, forcing the government to be more accountable and transparent, and spreading the ideas of religious tolerance.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis is the product of two years of study and research on the dynamic relationship between Islam, civil society, and democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also flows from over a decade of my personal involvement both in discourse and activism with Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. There are so many people who have helped me along the completion in one way or another; they encouraged me, provided guidance, and never lost faith that I would complete this effort. The warmth and generosity of all of those who helped me during my two years of research and writing continually amazed me, and I apologize to anyone I fail to mention here. While I cannot list all those that I am grateful to, several deserve special recognition. I would like to thank first of all the member of my wonderfully supportive committee: Ehito Kimura, Manfred Henningsen, and Ben Kerkvliet. They always gave me valuable comments, challenged me with provoking insights, provided unique perspectives on my research, and went above and beyond the call of duty to accommodate me in their bnsy schedules. Their meticulons readings of my thesis also saved me from many errors (any remaining ones are my own responsibility). I have greatly enjoyed my interactions with my committee, and am honored to have had the opportunity to work with them. My study in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, including my Graduate Certificate in International Cultural Studies, was made possible by the East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowship. I was fortunate to receive financial support during my years of graduate study from the East-West Center, which was also greatly instrumental to my fieldworks in Indonesia. In the East-West Center, lowe thanks to Charles

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Morison, Terry Bigalke, Mendl Djunaidy, and Stella Kolinski for their supports. My graduate study was also supported by some other institutions and individuals. In the Asia Foundation which provided me with additional funding during my first year lowe thanks to Douglas Ramage and Robin Bush. During the second year I received additional financial support from the American Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). I was also fortunate to receive valuable financial supports from the Central Board ofMuhammadiyah, Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradahan (pSAP), Kak Din Syamsuddin, Mas Jerne Geovannie, and Mas Rizal Sukma. Special thanks also to all who gave me their time and shared their insights in interviews and other conversations throughout my fieldworks in Indonesia. They not only infonned me about the political and social activities of the NU and Muhammadiyah in recent years but also provided me with many of the crucial perspectives and interpretatious ofIslam and civil society relations in Indonesia on which this study is based. Among those to whom I owe particular tbanks are Buya Syafii Maarif, Kak Din Syamsuddin, Kyai Hasyim Muzadi, Mas Haedar Nashlr, Kyai Masdar Mas'udi, A.S. Hikam, Mas Rizal Sukma, Eunsook Jung, Sukidi, Izzul Muslimin, Gunawan Hidayat, Ahmad Rofiq, Raja Jull Anthoni, Syaiful Bahri Anshori, Ahmad Suaedy, Syafiq Hasyim, Adung Abdurrahman, Zuhairi Misrawi, Muhamad Ali,

Achmad Ubaedillah, Saiful Umam, and Lance Nolde. Above all, I want to thank my parents who always supported me with their advices and prayers. Finally, and the most importantly, an enonnous thank you to my wife Herawaty and my son Risyad Mahdavi Tanthowi who made immense gifts oflove throughout the years I had been leaving them and simultaneously brought me happiness on even the hardest days. It is to my wife and my son that I dedicate this work.

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GLOSSARY

Anshor

The youth wing ofNU.

Bughat

A tenn in Islamic law referring to rebellion against a legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence.

DPR

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives).

Fatwa

Religious edict.

Golkar

Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), the political vehicle of the New Order Regime which was established in 1973 and survives the reform era.

HMI

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (The Islamic Student Association), the Masyumi-inspired stodent organization.

Jjtihad

Vigorous inquiry. The term is then adopted in Islamic law referring to legal reasoning in response to the newlyemerged problems.

IMM

Ikatan Mahasiswa Mubammadiyah (The Muhanunadiyah

Stodent Association). IRM

Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (The Muhammadiyah Adolescence Association).

Istoghotsah

A public prayer gathering which is mostly held by the NU organization.

JPPR

Jaringan Pendidikan Pernilih untuk Rakyat (the People's Voter Education Networks).

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KAMMI

Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (The United Action of the Indonesian Muslim Student), the newly PKS student wing.

Khittah

Original guideline.

Kyai

Traditional Islamic scholar which is mostly found in the

NU community. Masyumi

Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), the largest Islamic party in 1950s which was established in 1945 and forced to dismiss in 1960 by Sukamo.

MPR

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (people Consultative Assembly)

Mill

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Indonesian Council of Ulemas).

Muktamar

National Congress which is held in the NU and Mubammadiyah organizations once in every five years.

PAN

Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), the party of Amien Rais which draws many of its members from the modernist Muslim camp.

Parmusi

Partai Muslimin Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslim Party).

PBB

Partai Bulan Bintang (The Crescent and Star Party).

PBR

Partai Bintang Reformasi (The Reform Star Party)

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PD

Partai Demokrat (The Democrat Party)

PDI-P

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle).

Pesantren

Islamic boarding school which is mostly run and owned by kyai ofNU.

PKB

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party), the party of Abdurrahman Wahid which draws many of its members from the traditionalist Islam camp.

PKl

Partai Komunis Indonesia (The Indonesian Communist Party).

PKS

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party).

PMII

Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Islamic Student Union), The NU-affiliated student organization.

PPP

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The Unity and Development Party).

Tanwir

Annual meeting in the Muhammadiyah organization.

Wali

Protege of God, saint.

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Politics says: A is a friend Bisafoe

Dakwah rectifies:

A is a friend B is a companion

Politics tends to break up and divide

Dakwah tends to invite and unite (Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 2006, p. 335)

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Muslim Civil Society and Democratization: The Case of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Chapter I

Chapter II

Introduction

1

Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization

8

Literature Review

18

Methodology

20

Structure of the Thesis

22

NU, Mnhammadiyah, and the Origin of Civility Introduction

24

The Origins ofMuhammadiyah and NU

25

The Involvement ofMuhammadiyah and NU in Politics

29

Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement

39

Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses

44

Conclusion

47

Chapter ill Muslim Civil Society and Political Change: Political Development 1998-2007 Introduction

49

Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 election

50

The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid

60

Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election

78

National Congress and Leadership Change

99

Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election

114

Conclusion

127

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Chapter IV Muslim Civil Society and Democratization

Chapter V

Introduction

129

The Construction of Free Public Sphere

130

The Election Monitoring

155

The Corruption Eradication

162

The Last Bastion of Civic Pluralism

169

Foreign Donor and State Capacity

189

Conclusion

196

Concluding Remarks

198 207

Bibliography Biographical Sketch

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A.

Introduction For a long time numerous observers and experts of Indonesian affairs seemed to

believe that Islam was peripheral importance in modern Indonesian life. They were convinced that state and society of Indonesia were thoroughly dominated by nominal Muslims (or

abangan) of Javanese ethnicity. The impression was reinforced by the relative scarcity of academic studies of Islam in Indonesia.! Compared with other Muslim countries, Islam in Indonesia has been little studied. However, since the last decade of the 20th century, it is no longer tenable to hold such a view. Most observers now agree that a significant change in the Indonesian Muslim society has been undergoing. 2 They now believe that since that decade Indonesia has been experiencing a historically unprecendented Islamic political revival. 3 Not only do many Indonesia's most influential Islamic leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, once occupied the highest positions in Indonesia's political system, but Islamic parties also playa significant role in the political affairs. Equally important is the significant roles played by Indonesian Muslims in the process of democratization. The political development in Indonesia since the 1990s has been witnessing that the Islamic revival and democratization have marched hand in hand under, among others, the leadership of Muslim democrats. Recent development in Indonesia offers an even more striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. In the final years of the

Hefner, "Introduction", 1997, p. 8. 2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994, Ch. 7, "Islam: Coming from the Cold?"; Yatikiotis, lndonesilln Politics Under Suharto, 1994, Ch. Y, ''Toward an Islamic Identity?" 3 Tanthowi, Kebangldtan Politik Kawn Santri, 2005. !

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Suharto dictatorship (1996-98), a powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took shape. In alliance with secular Muslims and non-Muslims, the movement succeeded in May 1998 in toppling the long ruling Suharto. No less remarkable, Muslims participants in the democracy campaign dedicated themselves to devising religious argnments in support of pluralism, democracy, women's right, and civil society.4 Unfortunately, the general debate now concerning Muslim communities in Indonesia has been predominantly shaped by studies on development of Islamic radicalization and political violence.s This is largely because the glaring process of democratization was soon blurred by a rash of sectarian violence. For instance, from 1999 to 2002, battles between Christians and Muslims in Maluku took some eight thousand lives. 6 During roughly the same period, the central highlands on the nearby island of Sulawesi saw bloody skirmishes between Muslim and Christian gangs, causing a thousand deaths. 7 Equally alarming, in the months following Suharto's fall, radical Islamic groups sprang up in cities across Indonesia. While political scientists and anthropologists have been much concerned with the developing some radical Islamic movements, they have paid little attention fur the mainstream moderate ones, as if they have lost their standing in the Indonesian Muslim community. Although these extremist groups have been very vocal and active, however, this concern is not relevant, because they are small and have very little influence. Admittedly, set against the succession of weak governments that Indonesia has had since the fall ofSuharto, these groups look very menacing. The fact remains, however, they are insignificant in number and, without support from 4 See Refuer, Civil Islam, 2000; Barton, ''The Origin ofIs1amic Liberalism," 1997; Ramage, Politics in

Indonesia, 1995. S Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 2007; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 2006; Eliraz, Islam In Indonesia, 2004; Barton, Indonesia's Struggle, 2004; Side!, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, 2006; Yunanto at aI., Militant Islamic Movements, 2003; Marika and Wright-Neville, Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia, 2005. 6 van Klinken, ''The Maluku War," 2001, p. 1-26. 7 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso," 2001, p. 44-79.

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certain element in the army, they will not be able to go very far with their threats. Therefore, rather than studying certain groups of Indonesian Muslim which are considered as anti-democratic forces

- threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals, this thesis nonetheless examines other groups which are adopts a positive outlook about the role of Islam in Indonesian

society instead. By analyzing the broader phenomenon within Indonesian Muslim community, this study indicates that the growing religiosity among Indonesia's Muslim will not lead to significant change in their political attitudes: vast majority of them are personally tolerant and moderate in their outlook and very few Indonesian Muslim are attracted to Islamism in the democratic election of 1999 and 2004. In studying Indonesian politics, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are important for some reasons. They are two largest Indonesia's Islamic organizations, with approximately 25 and 35 million members respectively. Both organizations represent very different segments of the Indonesian Muslim population - from a sociological, theological, socio-economic, and political perspective. In fact, the cleavage between them represents the primary cleavage in Indonesian Islam, although not mutually exclusive. With a little simplification, it is said that the NU represents traditional Islamic stream, which is mainly active in the rura1 areas. Meanwhile, the Mubammadiyah represents modernist Islamic stream, which plays their roles in urban areas. Given their strong and overarching organizational structures, the NU and Mubammadiyah have been playing their important roles in society, but they do focus primarily on their own constituencies. The significant of the NU and Muhammadiyah also lies in their political role since their early developments. Both organizations playa significant role in developing a sense of

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nationalism among native peoples; they also played their role as political forces during the liberal democratic era in the 1950s: the NU once became a political party when it divorced from the Islamic Masyumi party in 1952 (until 1984), within which the Muhammadiyah remained one of (and subsequently became the dominant one among) its special organizational members from 1945-1959; they also played a crucial role during the political crisis in 19651967; and finally both played a significant role in the political change that ended the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998. In sum, the Muhammadiyah and NU organization have been, and remain, important participants in Indonesia's political affairs. Equally surprising, in studies of civil society in Indonesia during the 1990s and early 20oos, little attention has been shown to these associations. In the growing volume of studies on Islam and civil society, they may be mentioned in passing but seldom appear to be thought of as part of civil society themselves, unlike say students' associations, ICMl and issue-oriented NGOs. Although there are quite a few recent studies ofMubammadiyah and especially ofNU, most of these focus on their religious discourse, system of religious education, their national leaders, or their role in national politics. There has hardly been any comprehensive inquiry on the specific role these associations play in the intermediary entity, standing between state and society as a whole, or their roles in the process of democratization. This thesis presents a study of the Muhammadiyah and NU movements during the political reform in Indonesia. To begin with, I am going to present a more thorough account on their roles in "practical politics": how they keep their relationships with political parties, particularly the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), two parties which not only were established by the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders respectively, but also whose mass bases largely come from both organizations. It seems to me that both

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organizations sought to steadfastly assert their independence from both parties, at least formally. Although both parties incorporated non-Muhammadiyah and non-NU as well as nonMuslim figures into their leaderships, many people, however, see both political parties are invariably inseparable from both organizations. It is also important to study how they played their roles in the 1999 and 2004 elections

as well as the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organizations. For example, prior to and during the 2004 presidential election, NU and Mnharnmadiyah played similarly significant roles. Out of five pairs running for presidential election, two president candidates, Amien Rais and Harn71lh Haz, came from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds respectively, and two vice-president candidates, Hasyim Muzadi and Shalahuddin Wahid, came from NU organizations. Ahead of the election, not only did both organizations provide a remarkably large number of votes whose loyalty is relatively guaranteed, they also formed a tacit alliance with political parties during the election campaign. This further reflected their ambiguity between retreat from ''practical politics" and keep equal distance to all political parties. Beside their roles during the political reform, the second aspect I would like to study is the contribution of these organizations in the process of democratization, a highly overlooked subject in scholarly works of Indonesian politics. In a society where religion plays an important role in public life, as in Indonesia, the role of religion, of religious institutions, and of social movements that either had a religious identity or were influenced by religion was prominent since the early democratization process. Despite the coercive and strict control of the Suharto regime, for example, since early in the 1990s Mnhammadiyah and NU are not predicated on the privatization of Islam and the secularization of society, but rather on the self-organization of an autonomous Muslim public

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civil society, able to counteract and countervail state power and willing to promote and defend a public culture of pluralism, political participation, and social justice.8 Both also played a predominant role in the pro-democracy movement that forced President Suharto to step down in May 1998. While they provided a large number of students and members in mass protests, their leaders, along with secular and non-Muslim leaders, were especially crucial in mobilizing them for peaceful protests and demands for democratization. After the fall of Suharto, both organizations also function to support the development of political parties by stimulating political participation and increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizenship. Moreover, their young generations worked in concert, along with other NGOs, in the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) not only in monitoring the 1999 and 2004 general and presidential elections in order to ensure their fairness, but also in promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship by carrying out a massive civic education program.

In a new democracy, both organizations widen their functions to promote the more substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and accountability of government. From 2003 to 2006 both worked hand in hand to carry out anti-corruption programs. As social-religious organizations, however, they do not focus on investigation and advocacy. They systematically addressed corruption issues by emphasizing their moral persuasion; developing theological interpretations ofQur'an and Smmah concerning anticorruption verses; media campaigning; drafting integrity pacts for candidates running in regional elections; increasing the awareness of regional members of parliament in pro-poor budgeting; as well as establishing corruption watch dogs in regional level.

8 See Hefuer, "A Muslim Civil Society," 1998.

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The most important one, both organizations have been working in maintaining the pluralistic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Many studies affirmed that Indonesia's largest Muslim social organizations are significant obstacles to the further growth of Islamism. 9 Not only are their leaders' tolerant and pluralistic views, but their broader memberships also seemed immune to Islamism's allure. These organizations have grown from the same soil as Indonesian Islamism, but their roots run considerably deeper, and they have in turn been enormously successful in entrenching political moderation in Indonesia. Their strength is one of the great causes for hope in Indonesian democracy. There are two questions I would like to answer from this thesis. Firstly, how the Mllhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama organizations maintain their positions as autonomous entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in politics. Secondly, what role have these two organizations been playing in the democratization process. By ''politics'', I refer in the course of this thesis both to political society and state, that are political parties, election campaign, and government. By democratization, I refer to the process of political change took place in Indonesia which comprises of three major phases: liberalization, transition, and consolidation. This thesis is an in-depth case study ofMuhammadiyah and NU, and their relations with

political society and state in Indonesia. This is not a study about the theological discourse within the Mllhammadiyah and NU communities. Instead, it is all about the behavior, choices, policies, and strategies adopted by the Mllhammadiyah and NU organizations in their interactions with political society and state over a period of post-Suharto era. Therefore, this thesis offers a political-historical-

9 See Mujani and Liddle,

"Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion," 2004.

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anthropologiCal perspective on the Muhammadiyah and NU movements: their relations with politiCal parties and state during the reform era. Nor is this thesis a comparative study between them; I am not going to compare the differences and similarities between Muharnmadiyah and NU in their dealing with politics. Instead, I am going to put them together in this study: how both have been cooperating and

competing each other, how they have been going through their tensions and fraternities, and how they have been both dealing and instigating their rivalries and cordialities. B.

Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization

Central to this thesis are some conceptual frameworks regarding the concept of civil society, democratization, the relation between civil society and democratization, of Islam and civil society, as well as of religious organization and democratization. In doing so, I may not propose new definitions and understandings; I am rather going to borrow them from able theorists and political scientists whose works are prevalent in the field of political science. There are several ways in which political scientists use and define "civil society" since the concept is rather ambiguous and means different things to different people. As Lehmbruch puts it, "Quite often, when 'civil society' is used in the politiCal literature or the media, it is no longer clear what exactly the respective author has in mind. The denotations of "civil society" have undergone significant changes over time and in different contexts. As a consequence, the meaning in the contemporary discourse is franght with considerable ambiguity". 10 Despite its long intellectual and political history, in this thesis I am largely following Larry Diamond and his colleagues in defining and distinguishing the concept of civil society. In

his seminal article published more than a decade ago, Diamond defines the concept as ''the

10 Lehmbruch, "Gennany", 2001, p. 230.

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realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and

autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. "II In a similar vein, according to Linz and Stepan, civil society is "arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests."12 According to Diamond, civil society is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange infonnation, to achieve collective goals, to make demand on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.!3 Similarly, it is also important to distinct civil society from political society. According to Linz and Stepan, "political society" is an "arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus."14 Therefore, according to Diamond, civil society is distinct from political society, which encompasses all those organized actors whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at least some positions for themselves within it. 15 Organizations in civil society, according to Diamond, may indeed form alliances with parties, but if they become captured by parties, or hegemonic within them, they move their primary locns of activity to political society and lose much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions. 16 After defining the concept of civil society, it is important to understand the concept of

democratization. In this study several terms are used in similar ways: democratization, political II Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17.

12 Linz and Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33. 13 Diamond,

Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221.

14 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33. 15 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221. 16 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221. 9

change, and political reform. While many will take issue with the impreciseness of using these terms interchangeably, what I am interested in here is the process of political change toward a more open, accountable, fair political system, and to me this is the essence of democratization. There are many scholarly works on democratization. The literature that has the most relevance to this thesis are works that came out in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars offered explanations of the wave of countries undergoing democratization. 17 While terminology often differs, there are some common elements in much of this work. In a simplest way, the democratization process involves three processes: liberalization, transition, and consolidation. By liberalization, I refer to measures which entail a significant opening of the previous anthoritarian regime. This process could result from either split in the authoritarian regime or popular mobilization, or could be a result of an interaction between them. Meanwhile, by transition, O'Donnell and Schmitter define it as "the interval between one political regime and another. "18 They go on to explain that transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some forms of democracy, the return to some forms of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. Finally, consolidation, according to Diamond, is ''the process by which democracy becomes so broadly aud profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down."19 In a similar vein, Linz and Stepan note that consolidated democracy is a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, ''the only game in town."20 It involves behavioral and

17 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule, 1986; Huntington, The Third Wave, 1991; and Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 1991. 18 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986, p. 6. 19 Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17. 20 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33. 10

institutional changes that nonnalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This nonnalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening ofleadership recruitment and training, and the like.

It is important to note that there does not seem to be any logical sequence to these processes. Democracy activists do admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation. Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward along the path. Of the nearly 100 countries considered as "transitional" in recent years, even only a relatively small number-probably fewer than 20-are clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization.21 Most of the ''transitional countries," however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered what Carothers calls "a political gray zone."22 Keeping these definitions of civil society and democratization in mind, the next theoretical task is to understand the relation between both concepts. Needless to say, theories of democratization seek to understand the factors influencing the emergence and success of the formal properties of modem democracy in particular society. Many scholars come to a conclnsion that the dynamics of the democratization are not just a matter of political elite. Such theories are increasingly inclined to attribute a role in democratization to civil society,23 and this trend is discernible in many part of the world.24 However, this does not mean that civil

21 See Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 1996, p. 20-37. 22 Carothers, "The End of the Transition PIII8digm," 2002. 23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 48-56; and Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 218-260. 24 Alagappa, Civil Society, 2004; and Feinberg alai. (eds), Civil Society, 2006.

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society alone can produce democracy. Thus, what seems to be important is a balance between civil society, political society, economic society, and the state, especially on the development of cultures of social trust and respect for the rule oflaw. Civil society, then, is just one factor in the process of democratization. Schmitter and Diamond theorize the role of associations in society as contributing to or articulating the demands and interest of various sectors of the population.2s In such a position, civil society is poised to advance democracy in two generic ways: by helping to generate a transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy and by deepening and consolidating democracy once it is established.

In fact, Diamond outlines the ten democratic functions of civil society: (1), providing the basis for the limitation of state power; (2), supplementing the role of political parties in stimulating political participation; (3), serving as a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints; (4), creating channels for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests; (5), generating a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict; (6), recruiting and training new political leaders; (7), monitoring elections: deterring fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the legitimacy of the result, or demonstrating an opposition victory despite gove=ent fraud; (8), disseminating information and aiding citizens in the colIective pursuit and defense of their interests and values; (9), supporting economic reform; and (10), strengthening the democratic state by giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it.26

1997; and Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994. 26 Diamond, ''Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 7-11. 2S Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West,"

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Given these theories of civil society, democratization, and the relation between them, thus, what kind of cultural variation can be accommodated within the scope of civil society and democratization? Is Islam uniquely different in its resistance to the conditions of civil society and democratization? Islam is perhaps the prime example of a religious tradition that is widely considered in the West to be in tension if not outright conflict with the normative tradition of civil society,27 and contemporary perceptions are now further shaped by the events of September 11, 2001. In his influential book, Ernest Gellner concludes that Islam is incompatible with civil society, both normatively and empirically, since Islam is fundamentally unsecularized. 28 Gellner understands secularization as the declining social significance of religion. He says that in industrial or industrializing societies religion loses much of its erstwhile hold over men and society. Where religion remains socially important, argues Gellner, the development of individual autonomy is constrained. This in turn constrains the development of civil society because, as Ozda1ga explains, ''individuals, who are not able to act independently of the community of believers, cannot become the building-stones of the kind of intermediary organizations on which civil society is built."29

In the same token, the eminent Turkish Scholar, Serif Mardin, begins by answering ''the question of whether the ideals of democracy and civil society are genera1isable to the Muslim world," with the response that "civil society is a Western Dream, a historical aspiration," and as such, "does not translate into Islamic terms."30 Therefore, in spite of the appearing of aspects of pluricentric social organization that undexpinned the historic development of civil society in the West elsewhere in the world, including in Muslim societies, as part of the modernization process, 27 Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, 1996. 28 Gellner, The Condition ofLiberty, 1994, p. 15. 29 Ozdalga, "Civil Society and its Enemies," 1997, p. 74. 30 Mardin, ''Civil Society and Islam," 1995, p. 278-279. 13

Mardin warns that Westem and Muslim "dreams" have not converged, because Muslim societies have inherited a "collective memory of a total culture which once provided a 'civilized' life of a tone different from that of the West.''3! There are empirical as well as conceptual reasons to believe that those arguments are grounded in dubious assumptions. It is interesting to put here the three most relevant of four challenges to Gellner's arguments proposed by David Herbert in his comprehensive study,32

Firstly, Herbert argues that Muslim have generated a wide range of responses to the discourses of democracy and civil society. Indeed, normatively, Muslims have taken up a full range of positions on the compatibility or incompatibility of the relationship between Islam and both democracy and civil society. Each position seeks to justify itself in relation to the primary sources of Islamic law: the Qur'an and Sunnah. This reality contradicts the simplistic integraJist position-the view that Islam insists that all aspects of life should directly governed by its unchanging precepts-that Gellner attributes to Islam.

Secondly, Herbert argues that the historical model on which Gellner bases his argument applies only to a minority of historic Muslim societies and that the historically predominant model of Muslim society has been characterized by institutional differentiation. It is important to note that what is generally conceived of as the Islamic or Muslim countries in the Arabian Peninsula is in fact home to a small minority of the ummah. Out of the more 1.3 billion Muslim population in the world today, the majority inhabit South and Southeast Asian regions. There are also a significant number of Muslim populations in Central Asia, West and North Africa, and, surprisingly, Europe.

3! Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam,» 1995, p. 290. 32 Herbert, Religion and Civil Society, 2003, p. 76-79.

14

Political scientists and journalists sometimes misleadingly equate Islam with Arab culture. They then assert correctly that there are no democracies in the Islamic countries of the Arab world, leaving the false impression there are no Muslims living under democratic

regimes. In fact, as Stepan points out, a case can be made that about half of all the world's Muslims, over 600 million, live in democracies, near-democracies, or intermittent democracies. 33 It seems that Gellner bases his generalization on his studies of Muslim countries in North Africa. AI; a matter of fact, what he claims about that region cannot necessarily be generaIized to all Muslim countries. FilUllly, Herbert argues that in practice in many parts of the Muslim world today Islam

has proven itself capable of mobiIization as a public discourse without stifling but rather

contributing to democratic pluralism. Religion, as Esposito points out, has been a significant factor in the reassertion of civil society in many Muslim societies.34 He argues that Islamic history provides examples of many non-state actors, institutions, and organizations that served as intermediaries between the ruler/gove=ent and the people. Meanwhile, in the contemporary Muslim world, NGOs, professional associations, social welfare agencies, as well as educational and financial institutions have proliferated not only in the most populous Muslim region of Southeast Asia,35 but also across the Muslim world. 36 The last theoretical task necessary to this thesis is to understand the relationship between religious organization and democratization. The literature of democratization mostly focuses on the role of the middle class, labor unions, election monitoring groups, and other

33 stepan, ''Religion, Democracy," 2000. 34 Esposito, "Islam and Civil Society," 2003, p. 70. 35 Nakamura, at al. (eds.), Islam and Civil Society In Southeast Asia, 2001. 36 Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World, 2002; Kubba, "Arab and Democracy, 2000.

15

NGO institutions in the regime change. However, little attention has been paid to how religious organizations are affecting democratization.

In his provocative book, Huntington gives primacy of place to Christianity as the distinctive positive influence in the making of Western civilization: ''Westem Christianity, first Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important characteristic of Westem civilization."37 For Huntington, Westem culture's key contribution has been the separation of church and state, something that he sees as foreign to the world's other major religious systems (Confucianism and Islam).

In this regard, Stepan and Casanova warn us not to be trapped in major misinterpretations. 38 Such a point of view is based on the assumption ofunivocality. We, as Stepan notes, should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally prodemocratic or antidemocratic. Westem Christianity has certainly been multivocal concerning democracy and the twin tolerations. At certain times in its history, Catholic doctrine has been marshalled to oppose liberalism, the nation-state, tolerance, and democracy. Secondly, such a perception falls into the fallacy of ' 'unique founding conditions." This fallacy involves the assumption that the unique constellation of specific conditions that were present at the birth of such phenomena as electoral democracy, a relatively independent civil society, or the spirit of capitalism must be present in all cases if they are to thrive. To put it differently, one can hardly make the argument that Catholicism is intrinsically, that is, "essentially", democratic or has elective affinities with democracy or with civil society. Finally, Catholicism was not the only religion that played a positive role in civil society formation and democratization throughout the third wave. Other religious groups 37 Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations, 1996, p. 70. 38 Stepan, "Religion, Democracy," p. 44; Casanova, ''Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p. 1042-1043.

16

played equally positive roles in various places: Lutherans in East Gennany, Protestants as well as Catholics in South Korea, Episcopalians and various other churches in South Africa, and in Romania, a Hungarian Unitarian minister, who triggered that country's revolution. Casanova argues that religions have potential roles in civil society fonnation. He proposes a three-step reconstruction of the transfonnation of religions that make possible their roles in democratization.39 Firstly, religion in general can serve as autonomous public spaces and as a countervailing power to state power. Secondly, religions have to give up their monopolistic claims and recognize religious freedom and freedom of conscience as universal and inviolable human rights. Thirdly, not only should religions voluntarily disestablish themselves from the state, but they also should disengage from political society proper. This does not necessarily mean the privatization of religions. Contrarily, this relocation is the very condition for the possibility of a modem public religion. As shown by Cheng and Brown, some religious organizations have played a decisive role in democratic transition in Asia, while others have been donnant, and still others have acted in alliances with conservative politicians and business interests to block democratic development.40 They contend that religious doctrines do not predetermine the involvement of a religious organization in the politics of democratization. Doctrines may constrain or inspire, but they do not preclude or determine. They go on to say that most religions are multivioced; their doctrines could be and have been interpreted in ways that permit, if not encourage, political action for the cause of democracy.

39 Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p.1045-1047. 40 Cheng and Brown, "Introductioo," 2006. p. 3.

17

As far as religious organizatious' involvement in the process of democratization is

concerned, according to Cheng and Brown, it is shaped and influenced by three key factors. 41 Firstly are their ties to preexisting regimes. Secondly are their ties to political opposition. And finally is how they define (or redefine) their role in civil society. In this seuse, religious doctrines do not explain the variations on the calculations of religious organizations about whether to directly engage themselves in the democratization process.

c.

Literature Review

Although many authors have studied political Islam and the state in Indonesia, not much attention has been given to specific Muslim civil society organizations, namely Mllbammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and their interplay with politics and their role in the process of democratization. Douglas Ramage gives an emphasis on the centrality of the Pancasila ideology and the contrasting views of it in four political groupings: Abdurrabman Wahid and NU, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the armed forces, and secular nationaIists.42 Other authors have emphasized the centrality of the transformation of political ideas and practices within Muslim communities during New Order,43 the Subarto regime's specific strategies to structure state-Islamic relations,44 the emergence of civil pro-democratic Muslim in the process of democratization in Indonesia,45 and the compatibility of Islam and democratic values in Indonesian Muslim community in the reform era.46 A large number of scholars have studied in detail particular major Islamic organizations, including their relationship with larger political structure of the state. While studies by van 41 Cheng and Brown, "Introduction," 2006, p. 14-17. 42 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995. 43 Effendy, Islam and the State, 2002. 44 Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002. 45 Hefiter, Civil Islam, 2000. 46 Mujani, Rellglaus Democrats, 2003.

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Bruinessen, Fei1lard, FeaI1y, Kadir, and Bush emphasize the centrality of the NU on their studies,47 some other authors, such as AIfian, Nakamura, Peacock, and Syamsuddin emphasize the centrality of the Muhammadiyah in their inquiries.48 Among these scholarly wOIks, Kadir and Bush's dissertations as well as Bruinessen and Fei1lard's books have some similarities with my own thesis, particularly in term of their approaches to studying NU. So does Syamsuddin's dissertation on Mnharnmadiyah. Their studies, by and large, provide extensive discussions of particular NU or Mnbammadiyah' s political activities dIning the New Order and aftermath (Bush's Dissertation), despite their formal disengagements with political parties and their foci on non-political (cultural and social) activities since the 1970s and 1980s. They, to large extent, give their works an emphasis on elite discourse, with a special attention to their relationships with the New Order regime (Bruinessen, Kadir, and Syarnsuddin), the army (Feillard), and the Habibie and Wabid's presidencies (Bush). The first distinction between my thesis and these scholarly works is that none of them studying both the Mnharnmadiyah and NU. fuamining both organizations altogether, I will present a more comprehensive picture of Indonesian Mnslims and underscore that, despite several different, even rival, varieties of political expression within Muslim co=unity, they have been working in concert to support the democratic change in Indonesia. While one organization seems to be more willing to submit to the state control than the other, broader picture will show us that neither is less democratic than the other. Secondly, some of these scholarly works already deal with the roles played by the Islamic community and the NU particularly in the incipient process of political IIbera1ization (Kadir) and in 47 van Bruinessen, NU. 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999; Featy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia, 1998; Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society, 1999; Bush, Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia, 2002. 48 Alfian, Muhammadiyah, 1989; Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Peacock, Purifying the Faith, 1978; Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam, 1991. 19

the long process of political transition in Indonesia (Refuer and Bush). However, their studies by and large give their emphasis on the relationship between Muslim civil society and the state. While I am also studying the relationship between the Muslim civil society organization and the state, however, I expand my inquiry into their further contribution, as civil society movements and as religious organizations, in the process of democratization. Finally, as most of their time-period coverage is the New Order era, except Bush's dissertation which extends to 2002, there was no a comprehensive account of the involvements of both NU and Mllbammadiyah during the democratization era until the SBY's presidency. The extension of the time-period coverage will in turn lead to the further interpretation of the significance ofMllbammadiyah and NU's political activities for the full-fledge democratization, not simply in the state-civil society relations during the liberalization and transition era. D.

Methodology

To address this topic, I will conduct a qualitative study. I am going to employ ethnographic methods to explore conceptions and practices of two Muslim civil society associations in Indonesia: Muharnmadiyah and NU. Therefore, the first sources of data collection are semi-structured interviews, discussions, and participant observation. I have a close relation with both institutions. I was born into a NU family. My father is still an important figure ofNU in my sub-district. When I studied my Islamic senior high school in Jogjakarta, I was also involved in the NU Students Association (IPNU).When I moved to Jakarta to continue my undergraduate study in the State Institute of Islamic Studies (lAIN, currently urN) in Jakarta, I was involved in the Muharnmadiyah Students Association (IMM). I was a vice president of that organization in 1999-2001 and 2001-2003. I have also been the Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Civi1ization, a research center under the

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Central Board ofMuhammadiyah in 2001-2006. This center is incorporated in the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR), a consortium of numerous youth wings ofMuhammadiyah and NU and other NGOs working in civic education and election monitoring. Finally, when Muhammadiyah and NU launched anti-corruption programs in 2003, I was also appointed to lead the Muhammadiyah Institute for Good Governance Program, the Muhammadiyah's task force of the program. All these activities enabled me to have a close relationship with almost all leaders ofNU and Muhammadiyah. Such a personal background has SP3!ked my interest in studying both Mllbammadiyah and NU, and has enabled me to have a closer look into the "soul" and inner feeling of these organizations. My fieldwork of study was effectively carried out during summer 2007. I was primarily based in Jakarta, where the NU and (one of) Muharnmadiyah headquarter is located. However, I was also able to attend numerous discussions held by both Mllbammadiyah and NU organizations. Beside this fieldwork, I had another fieldwork in Indonesia during December 2007-January 2008 to carry out a more detailed and extensive interviews with leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU. These interviews ask resource persons not only the facts they knew, but also their interpretations of those facts. In addition, sources of data include documents, reports, resolutions, speeches, magazines, internal publications, and other Mllbammadiyah and NU materials not available outside Indonesia or, in many instances, not available outside both organizations. I also make extensive use oflocal Indonesian newspapers and magazines. Finally, I use secondary sources. In addition to the more genera1literature concerning state-civil society relations and on religion and politics, this thesis draws on writings focusing on the dynamic interplay between state and Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia.

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The analyses of the Indonesian state are quite extensive. So do the analyses of political Islam in Indonesia. The existing writings on the relations between Muslim civil organizations and the state provide a general but important background of both organizations. Finally, existing studies of the Muhammadiyah and NU are heavily referred to throughout the thesis as a means to provide additional historical data othexwise unavailable in the primary documentations.

E.

Structure of the Thesis This thesis is organized into five chapters but is not rigidly set out in a chronological

order. My first task is to establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study. Therefore, this chapter not only reviews the discourse of Islam, civil society, and democratizations, but it explains the significance of this study as well. Chapter II is an overview of the relationship between political Islam and the state during roughly fifty years of Indonesian independence in which Mnbammadiyah and Nahdlatul illarua (NU) had been transforming from political to civil. Chapter ill deals with the political roles played by these two organizations during the transition period. First of all, it presents a comprehensive account on how they keep their relationships with political parties. This chapter also deals with the roles played by the Muhammadiyah and NU in the 1999 and 2004 legislative and presidential elections as well as the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organiz.ations. It also analyzes the leadership changes within both organizations in 2004 and 2005 respectively and their implication for both organizations in the near future political and societal affairs. Finally, it examines the possible roles played by Indonesian Muslim civil society organizations and their leaders in the 2009 election.

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Chapter IV examines the contribution of both organizations to the democratization process. It looks first at their roles to sustain their position as independent civil organizations during the last decade of the New Order regime and subsequently transform themselves into movements clamoring demands for democratization. It also studies how their young members worked in concert, not only in the election monitoring but also in a massive civic education program. Equally important, it deals with how both organizations widen their functions to promote the more substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and accountability of govermnent. It also studies how both organizations have been working to maintain the plura1istic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Finally, this chapter studies not only the interconnection between intemational funding received by most Islamic NGOs and the internal democratization, but the state-society relation in post-Suharto period as well. The final part of the study, at one level deals with the questions of Muslim civil society organizations and democratization as well as Muslim civil society and the state in Indonesia. More genera11y, the chapter will reflect upon larger question about the relationship between Islam and civil society in the Muslim world.

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CHAPTER II MUHAMMADIYAH, NU, AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVILITY

A. Introduction Indonesia is a home to the world's largest Muslim population of approximately 200 million people. However Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Nor Indonesia is a secular state. It is not an Islamic state in a sense that the 1945 Constitution rejects the superiority of any religion over the other. It is also not a secular state in the conventional sense of relegating religion to the private sphere, and enforcing a strict separation between religion and state. The philosophical basis of the state, Pancasila (five principles) begius with a declaration of the beliefin one God, and the state recognizes six major religions. AIl a matter of fact, religion in Indonesia occupies an important, and also ambiguous, position in the public affairs. This ambiguity has in part been the result of the position of Islam in Indonesian history and society. Having aware of their overwhelming majority, organized Muslims have been unwilling to limit their activities to the nonpolitical realm. This refusal sterns not only from adherence to doctrinal principle-there is no separation between religion and politics in Islam-but also from fear of being marginalized from political arena. Unfortunately, within a numerical majority, political Islam in Indonesia is an active minority. Therefore, political organizations committed to explicitly Islamic goals have never been able to garner sufficient mass support to control the goverument and establish a state based on Islamic principles. This chapter will first present a historical overview of the origin of the ideological pluralism within Indonesian Islam, of which political Islam has become a minority within a numerical majority. Secondly, this chapter will present an overview of several critical moments

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in the political development of Indonesian Islam during the roughly fifty years of the independence period in which Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had been playing a significant role. This is purported to explore the organizational precedents for non-state social associations for civil society in the majority Mnslim nation of Indonesia.

B. The Origins of Muhammadiyah and NU Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. Nearly 88 percent of its approximately 220 million people identify themselves as Muslims. This country, along with other Southeast Asian countries, has long been at the center of Asian maritime trade networks. Hence, the global connection of religious and cultural systems to Indonesia existed long before the present stage of globalization. Since the coming of Islam to Southeast Asia, Islamic worldwide models for religious life have combined with distinctive local Indonesian patterns, supporting the development of vibrant regional Muslim CUltures.! Today, these cultures continually shape and are shaped by the changing conditions of life in contemporary Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic nation, spanning all or parts of five large and thousands of smaller inhahited islands, each one ecologically and ethno-linguistically distinct.2 Within these diverse "indigenous" ethnic groups, there is a small (around 3 percent of the population) Chinese population widely seen as non-indigenous (non-pribumi), and resented by many because of its disproportionate ownership of middle and large-scale private enterprise, thank to the Dutch colonial policy. In addition to its Muslim majority, there is a substantial number of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and tribal animists. Complicating matters even further, as Hefuer says, despite its Sunni majority in theological orientation, these Muslims have been deeply divided along ethnic, regional, and I

2

See Hefuer, "Religion: Evolving Pluralism," 1999, pp. 205-236. See Cn'bb, ''Nation,'' 1999, pp. 3-38; Emmerson, "What Is Indonesia?" 2005, pp. 7-73.

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ideologicallines.3 The fissures are of two main inextricably linked kinds, so far as their political effect is concerned: one is based on the extent to which the religion itself is regarded as a valid motive force, and the other on the division between the "modernist" and "traditionalist" interpretation of it. The spread of Islam in the archipelago, particularly in Java was uneven. The religion went from the coast to the interior. Its spread reflected trading networks, the rivalry between coastal and interior states, and the competition of different cultural groups. In some other islands, the religion penetrated smoothly. Examples include Sumatera and South Sulawesi. In there places, the spread of Islam did not contend with the cultural legacies of animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Historically, therefore, many Muslims from the nation's largest ethnic group, the Javanese, have been of syncretic or nominal Islamic persuasion (abangan), as opposed to strict Muslim (santri), and thus resistant to the demands of Islamic orthodoxy.4 In the social structure of Indonesian Islam there is also an historical fault line between two relatively distinct (though also in some ways blurry and now fading) religious-socialeconomic-political orientatious, namely the "modernist" and "traditionalist". The modernist (or reformist) movements,S which had their inspirations from the Islamic reform in the Middle East during the second half of the nineteenth century, were both backward and forward-looking in that it aimed to cleanse Islam of allegedly non-Islamic accretions acquired during the centuries since the age of the Prophet Muhammad and, at the same time, sought to demonstrate that the Muslim faith was based on rationality and thus not in conflict with the scientific spirit of the modern world. The influence of reformist ideas spread in Indonesia as more and more

Hefiler, "A Muslim Civil Society?" 1998, p. 290. The variants of Javanese Islam and their social significance are descnoed in Geertz, The Religion of Java, 1960; and Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, 1963. S The standard accowrt on the modernist movemeots in the late colonial Indonesia, see Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, 1973. 3

4

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Indonesians visited the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as pilgrims or students and returned as bearers of the new approach. 6 By the beginning of the twentieth century, several modernist organizations were established, the most influential of which was the Muhammadiyah (the followers of Muhammad).? Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Java, the Muhammadiyah soon established itself at the forefront of the movement to reorient Islam and society. Its main principles are derived from the Koranic dictum, "arnar rna 'ru! nahy rnunkar" (calling to do good and refrain from evil deeds). The main impetus for its establishment was to challenge what they perceived as the two main weaknesses in Javanese society: on the one hand they regarded traditional Islamic education as backward and incapable of coping with the challenge of the modem world, and on the other, they rejected the non-Islamic accretions to Islamic practice and urged a return to the basic purity of Islam as found in the Koran and Hadith. 8 Similarly, they observed with bitterness and resentment how the Dutch had ruled over the country and had built a colonial educational system dedicated almost entirely to the preparation of people to work as colonial administrators and clerks. 9 Facing these real challenges, The Muhammadiyah thus concentrated its energies mainly on education, health services, and care for the poor, and eschewed fonnal politics. For example, in contrast to traditional Islamic education, Mnhammadiyah schools combined the model of European school and Islamic education, and thus taught science, math, history and geography along with traditional Islamic subjects. 6 On the origin of Islamic refornrism in the Middle East and its impact on Sontheast Asian Islam, see Azra, The Transmission ofIslamic Reformism to Indonesia, 1992. On the comparative study between the Mubammadiyah and Abduh's ideas, see Lubis, Pemikiran Muhamnuuliyah don Muhammad Abduh, 1993. 1 See Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Pescock, PurifYing the Faith, 1984;

A1fian, Muhammadiyah, 1989. 8 On the Mubammadiyah's theology and ideology, see Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse, 2001; Federspiel, "The Mubammadiyah," 1970, pp. 57-79; Nakamnra, "The Reformist Ideology of Mubammadiyah," 1980, pp. 273-286. 9 On the encounter between Mubammadiyah and Christian mission, see Shihab, The Muhammadiyah

Movements, 1995.

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In response of the proliferation of the modernist, reformist organizations, more traditionally uIama organized themselves into the Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Islamic scholars-NU) in East Java in 1926. 10 Challenging the modernist's emphasis on self-study and individual responsibility, the traditionalists defended the privileged role of religious scholars by pointing out that religious scholars (ulama) were heirs of the Prophets (al-ulama waratsatul

anbiya) in that they were part of the chain ofIslamic knowledge leading back to the Prophet Muhammad. Given their anthority on Islamic law and its classical commentaries they served, through their pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), as centers for the dissemination of Islamic knowledge in the interior, rura1 area of Javanese society. While the Muhammadiyah tended to be more successful in attracting better-educated followers from urban areas, the NU generally retained the loyalty of the network of these religious scholars (ulama) who, through their

pesantren, had great influence among the students and ordinary people of the peasantry.!! As far as the organizational style is concerned, the NU also emphasized on these relatively autonomous and dispersed charismatic religious scholars, in contrast to the Muhammadiyah which developed organizations with rule-governed bureaucracies and open election. Although the NU and Muhammadiyah have grown closer together, the tension between these two orientations has remained a key feature of Indonesian politics and society to this day. Despite their rivalry, however, both organizations have experienced the similar tendencies, being a large organization. While the NU established strong roots in East and Central Java and South Kalimantan, the Mubammadiyah gradually became more of a

10 On the standard account for the NU, see Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama1985; van Bruinessen, NU, 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999. II Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition, 1999.

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nationwide organization, spread out in cities throughout the country derived its support largely from Sumatera, South Sulawesi, West Java and the north coast of Java Ai; illustrated above, there was a ubiquitous precedence of autonomous and

independent institutions during the late colonial period. Furthermore, there was also a deep tradition of pluralism and diversity within Indonesian society, not only between Muslims and non-Muslim, but also between devout and nominal Muslim as well as between the modernist and traditional Islam. The next part will examine tension and cooperation among and between these diverse groups in the course of 50 years of Indonesian independence.

c.

The Involvement of the Muhammadiyah and NU in Politics The proclamation of Indonesian Independence in 1945 was soon followed by the

establishment of a provisional parliament and the commencement of political activities by a large number of competing parties. Among these parties-religious, secular, and even communist-Masyumi was one of the most significant. 12 The Masyumi (Majelis Syuro

Muslimin Indonesia-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was created in the Japanese period and transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945 in a Mubammadiyah's boarding scbool in Yogyakarta 13 This party was comprised not only of individual members but of corporate ones as well, namely, Muslim political, religious, social, and educational organizations, as what so-called "special members", that are NU, Muhammadiyah, and some other smaller and regional organizations. Therefore, Muslim politicians have had powerful positions since the early days of the Independence period. The Masyumi was a leading member of most coalition governments

See Noer, Partai Islam dalam Pentas Nasional, 1987. comprehensive account on the political relation between the Masyumi and Muhammadiyah, see SyaifuIIah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, 1997. 12

13 A

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during the Parliamentary Democracy period (1949-1956) and on several occasions had led the governing coalitions. 14 Early in the revolution, in exchange for giving up their claim to an Islamically defined state, which would have alienated Christian and other religions minorities, Islamic groups were granted their demand for a ministry of religion. From this base, largely controlled by the NU but shared by a contingent ofMuhammadiyah educators, the Islamic bureaucracy was expanded outwards throughout the archipelago. But these gains coopted and divided political Islam. The Ministry became not a salient but an enclave, while political competitions among Muslims, particularly between the modernists and traditionalists, reinforced theological differences. The Masyumi, as has been mentioned, was a federation of many organizations, each one with its own policies. Soon the strain began to show. First, in 1948, the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesian (pSI!) withdrew, to

campaign in its own right and under its own emblem. Then, in 1952, the NU broke away also to campaign under its own emblem. IS This left the Masyumi to become the political vehicle of the reformist movement, which took over the name virtually by default. Throughout the 1950s, when political struggle was profoundly colored by ideological battie,16 the Islamic parties and organizations, including the NU and Mubammadiyah, favored the creation of a state based upon Islamic law. They believed in the holistic nature ofIslam as Islam constitutes more than theological or ritual systems. Moreover, they argued, Islam does not recognize the separation between the spiritual and temporal; rather it governs all aspects oflife. 14 On the rise and fall of the governments during this period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1962. " There were two reasons for the NU to withdraw. Firstly, as the reformists continued their efforts to dominate the federation, the NU sought to get a greater role by establishing its own party. Secondly, there was a dispute between Mnbammadiyah and NU as to which organization would control the Ministry of Religion in the next Masyumi-Ied coalition. For a comprehensive account for the political activities of the NU during this period, see Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia, 1998. 16 Feith concluded that there were five major political streams involved in the political battle during this period: Islamic traditionalism, Islamic modernism, socialism, oonmumism, and mdical nationalism. See Feith, "Introduction", in Feith and Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1970, p. 1-24.

30

They also argued that Islam was the first basis on which Indonesia established a modern political organization which attracted mass support. In this regard, they contended that Islam was the one which first paved the way for political actions aiming at independence and which first planted the seed of Indonesian unity. As a matter of fact, many of the Muslim leaders believed that Indonesia's nationalism should be Islamic in nature. 17 Meanwhile, nationalist and non-Islamic parties supported the retention ofPancasila and found the concept of an Islamic state distasteful. Only Pancasila, they affirmed, could appeal to the varied, ethnic, regional, and religious groups that comprised Indonesia. They contended that Islam, insofar as it entered politics qua Islam, was

a divisive element. 1S Ideologically and intellectua11y, this tension was paralyzing for Islam so long as it was directly engaged politically. In the first general election of 1955, six parties campaigned under the barmer of Islam. They expected to win an outright electoral majority and subsequently go on to establish an Islamic state. To the surprise of almost everyone, however, six Islamic parties took at best 43.9% of the vote for parliament, indicating clearly enough that a large number ofMus1ims had opted for non-Islamic parties. From an electoral field of more than thirty parties, the Sukarnoled Indonesian National Party (PNI) won 22.3 percent of the vote; Masyumi, 20.9 percent; NU, 18, 4 percent; and the Indonesian Communist Party (PIG), 16.4 percent. 19 After the 1955 elections, when Sukarno started to promote his idea of Guided Democracy, power moved to the presidency, the army, and the PKI.20 Other political parties steadily lost strength, and therefore the ideological rivalries were increasing. Sukarno sought to 17 On the competing discourses between the Islamic group and nationalist group concerning the nature of Indonesian nationalism and the place of Islam during this period, see Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2005, Cha,pter 2. 1 On the dynamics of political Islam during this period, see Boland, The Struggle ofIslam in Modem Indonesia, 1982. 19 Feith, The Indonesian Electians of 1955, 1957, pp. 58-59. 20 See Feith, "President Sukamo, the Army and the Communists," 1964, pp. 969-980.

31

submerge these ideological differences in a single national belief. He called it Nasakom (NasionaIisme, Agama [religion], Komunisme). Unfortunately, this new country could not be simultaneously Marxist, Islamic, and developmentaIist, except perhaps in the mind of Sukamo. As the Guided Democracy period came in 1959, the distinct political attitudes of Islamic parties were discernible, to some extent reflecting differences in regional-cultural backgrounds. 21 The NU, culturally closer to the Javanese value system of the ruling elite and following a long tradition of Sunni political conservatism, was always accommodative towards the government of the day. To the NU, any government that allowed (and preferably facilitated) its citizens the exercise of their religious obligations was acceptable. Its chief concrete objective seemed to be to secure as much patronage from the government as possible. 22 Meanwhile, the Masyumi, culturally closer to the Outer islands' value system of egalitarianism did not shy away from open confrontation with Sukamo. The Masyumi never formulated ideas about a specifically Islamic political system; it basically demanded western-style parliamentary democracy with a greater say for committed Muslims in matters of government policy.

In political terms, this meant on the part of the NU a readiness to legitimize Sukamo's presidency, to tolerate Sukamo's increasingly radical nationalism and left-wing sympathies, and to participate in successive coalition governments that shared his views. 23 By doing so, of course, they ensured that they were in position of strength vis-a.-vis the reformists. The Masyumi, on the other hand, would not compromise. It refused, on principle, to have any association with a government that included Communist fellow travelers, and it resented Sukamo's broad religious sympathies, his policies, and his personal lifestyles.

van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam?," 1996, p. 22. interpretation of the NO's political behavior during this period, see Haedar, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indanesia, 1994; Fea1y, "Rowing in a Typhoon," 1994. 23 See Federspiel, ''Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists," 1976. 21

22 For religio-political

32

The Masyumi's political power started to wane since the outbreak of the PRRI rebellion in 1958. Masyumi did not officially support the rebellion but three of its top leaders joined them. Given its ambivalent attitude toward the rebellions, it was labeled the party of separatism and revolt. 24 The Masyumi was forced to dissolve in 1960 for its supposed complicity in the rebellion and its continuing opposition with Sukamo. Its leaders were placed under political arrest; their supporters either joined NU or other small Islamic parties, i=ersed themselves in religious or cultural activities, or remained silent. Prior to the dissolution, Muha=adiyah dismantled its special membership to Masyumi in 1959 and devoted itseifto educational, social, and religious activities. 25 Islamic political activity during the Guided Democracy period was therefore essentially dominated by the NU, whose freedom of action was also circumscribed. 26 Like all other parties, the NU was forced to give uncritical support to Sukamo while hoping his goodwill would protect its interests. The failed Communist coup of 1965 was a watershed in modern Indonesian history. It brought about the fall ofSukamo and his Guided Democracy idea, and in its wake caused terrible bloodshed. 27 The PKI, the largest Communist party outside the Communist countries, and its sympathizers were eliminated and the Suharto-Ied New Order regime came to power. Both Muha=adiyah and particularly NU followers took active parts in the suppression of the

Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1966, p. 185. It was during that time that Mubammadiyah formulated "Kepnoadian Muhammadiyah (The Character ofMuharomadiyah)", which declared its identity as "an Islantic movement whose activities revolves around Islantic propagation (dakwah) both within Muslim community and society as a whole." This concept began to be deliberated in the 1956 Muhammadiyah Congress in PaIembang, South Swnatera, and was formaIly ratified in the 35th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1962 in Jakarta. The objective of this concept was that the Mubammadiyah sought to clear itself from any complicity in the Masyumi's political rivalry with the Sukarno, and therefore avoided any ensuing consequent of the Masyumi's dissolntion. 26 On political Islam during the Guided Democracy period, see Maarif; Islam dan Politil< di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1988. 27 There is no reliable figures exist for the number of people who were killed. A scholarly consensus has settled on a figure of 400-500,000, but the correct figure could be half or twice as much. See, Cnob (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, 1990; Cnbb, "Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966," 2001. 24 25

33

PKI (Le. in killing thousands of alleged members and activists), particularly in strongly Muslim areas such as East Java and Aceh. As reward for their assistance in forcing Sukarno from power and liquidating the PKI, Muslim leaders at first expected to be welcomed into the new regime or, at very least, allowed to

play an active political role. Gradually Islamic political leaders began to feel that Islam was

the most important civil force in society, as its major antagonist, the PKI and Sukarno, had been eliminated. Members of the Masyumi had high expectations that their party would be rehabilitated, on the assumption that they were the very people who had adamantly resisted Sukamo's regime. 28 As early as December 1965, a "Coordinating Body of Muslim Activities" (Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) was formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations which worked toward a rehabilitation of the Masyumi. From June 1966 onwards, many of them, and in the first place the Muhammadiyah, openly began to advocate the return of the Masyumi. The political rewards they expected never materialized. The impression in the Suharto and military regime was that, with the Communists destroyed and the nationalists discredited, the Muslim's political opportunity would be simultaneously obstructed. Early in 1967 Suharto made it clear that the army would not countenance the revival of the Masyumi party. The Suharto regime did allow a formation of a Masyumi successor by the name ofParmusi (partai Muslimin Indonesia) while refusing to allow Masyumi senior leaders to playa leadership role in this party.29 The party at first rejected this condition but eventually gave in and obtained legal recognition in February 1968. Led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo (Chairman) and Lukman Harun (General Secretary), moderate Muhammadiyah leaders, the party executive contained many Muhammadiyah figures as well as some other representatives of various Islamic groups. 28

2'J

Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1968, p. 1004. See Ward, The Fowulation ofthe Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 1970.

34

The Parmusi ran into next trouble with the army when it held its first party congress early in November 1968 in Malang, East Java. 30 At this congress Parmusi elected Muhammad Roem, a very senior Masyumi leader who in the 1950s had served as Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister but had not participated in the PRRI revolt, as the new party chainnan. However, the government could not agree to the newly-selected leadership of the Pannusi. Relations became increasingly tense in the two years after the congress. Despite a series of meetings held between fonner Masyumi leaders and the anny leaders, in order for the later to give consent, however, Suharto maintained his refusal. Moreover, the government sought to prevent former Masyumi leaders to participate in the election planned for July 1971. It was in response to this growing tension that in October 1970 Djaelani Naro and Imron Kadir, members of the executive party who was considered close to Suharto's right-hand man, Ali Murtopo, announced that they had unilaterally taken over the leadership of the party.31 This coup allowed Suharto to intervene, as he announced that he was changing the Parmusi leadership and appointing Mintaredja and Sulastomo as party chairman and general secretary, a decision which met with approval from Naro group and caused extreme chagrin among Masyumi loyalties. Mintaredja was a member of the cabinet and was identified with Muhanunadiyah although he was unpopular with the rank and file ofMuhammadiyah membership because of his lack of commitment to the Masyumi ideal. By launching these policies, the government sought to make the Pannusi always lacked credibility as a Muslim party and was never able to mobilize popular support in elections.

30 On the tension between the army and the supporters of the Masyumi, see Samson, "Army and Islam in Indonesia,» 1971-1972, pp. 545-565. 3J CrOIWb, "Indonesia,» 1981, p. 202.

35

A series of political turbulences during 1965-1971 created a confusion and internal conflict within the NU leaders. 32 Although the NU had given the anny vigorous support in the extermination of the PKI, its senior leaders initially hesitated to join the anny leaders in their moves against Sukarno, while its young generation rallied in streets demanding Sukamo's fall. Many of the NU leaders were personally close to Sukamo and had benefited at the expense of their Masyumi rivals during the Guided Democracy period. It was only in early 1967 when it was clear that Sukarno was about to be deposed that the NU leaders reversed their position and began to call not only for Sukarno's dismissal but also his arrest and trial. Clearly, the initiative was in the hands of junior NU leaders while senior leaders were at first wary of making the wrong steps in a confused political situation. Swinging its support behind the Suharto, the NU leader, Idham Chalid., retained his post in the cabinet and the party continued to control the Department of Religion, its main source of patronage to its supporters throughout the nation. These undemocratic tendencies since the inception of the Suharto regime exacerbated the very conflict between senior and junior leaders of the NU. 33 While the former sought to ingratiate themselves with the military leaders rather than confront them in the style of the modernist, there was much frustration within the younger leaders, and the later began to be the most outspoken opponents of the new regime. The open conflict between the anny and the radical wing of the NU took place during the 1971 election, when finally violence erupted between them. In the coercive and fraudulent election, the government political vehicle, Golkar (Golongan Karya-Functional Groups), succeeded in attracting a few ulama to its camp, while the NU proved to be the most formidable rival. The young and controversial leader Subchan Z.E. set the tone for a campaign in which 32 33

See FeiIIard, ''Tmditiona1ist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order," 1996, pp. 42-67. vanBruinessen, "Indonesia's UIama and Politics," 1990, p. 55.

36

the party was uncharacteristically confrontative. The dirty methods wielded by the regime during this election had forced the NU to playa role it had previously always avoided: the role of an opposition. But there was another, rival tone. The senior leaders, seeking to sustain their cordial relationship with the new regime, appealed to NU sympathizers to increase participation and cooperation with government agencies and to make the election "a success". The 1971 election were contested by eleven political parties. The vast majority of votes (62.8 percent) went to Golkar. The Pannusi, after a series of government interferences, polled only 5.3 percent of the vote. The NU maintainoo its previous strength and won 18.7 percent - slightly more than its gain in 1955. The total Muslim vote amounted to only 27 percent. 34 The result was acceptOO distressfully by the NU particularly. The next blow came when the only major source of patronage, the Ministry of Religion, was taken away from the NU, and the government appointed Mukti Ali, a modernist Muslim scholar. These consecutive disappointments were deernoo by many senior NU leaders as results of the fierce opposition of the NU young leaders. Early in January 1972 Subchan was dismissed from the party's executive board, paving the way for the senior NU leaders to reestablish cordial relationship with the new regime. The govermnent's next step toward the further political demise of ideology consisted in the "simplification" of the party system; all the parties (except Golkar) succumbed to government pressure to merge into two new parties, one (pOI-the Indonesian Democratic Party) for nationalists and Christian parties, and another, the Unity and Development Party (PPP) for four existing Muslim parties. The PPP, whose name neither denoted nor connoted Islam, was deliberately designed by the regime to weaken it by exploiting internal conflicts and rivalries, and it was quite successful in this respect.

34 See

Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia, 1974.

37

During the 1970s, the NU was numerically the largest component within the PPP, but it was not given a corresponding proportion of the party's parliament seats, thanks to the continuing government interference in favor of the handpicked party leader, Naro. Prior to the 1982 election, Naro unilaterally drew up his own list of candidates without consulting the NU leaders, aimed at blocking the NU's most vocal spokesmen from reelection. Depite NU's protest, the government approved Naro's list ofPPP candidates. The last, but not least, strategy used by the regime to tame potential opposition was the compulsion for all political and mass-based organizations to adopt the state ideology Pancasila into their constitutions as the "sole basic principle". This was no problem at all for the PPP while initial difficulties were quickly resolved by the NU, but the Mubammadiyab and other modemist-refonnist organizations offered strong resistance and ouly succumbed when it became clear that they would lose their legal existence if they failed to conform. 3s The series of restriction ofIslam under the New Order reflected, on the one hand, the proclivities of state leaders influenced by both technocratic and pre-Islamic ideas and fearful of any institutions they do not control. They also, however, continued the experience of Indonesian Islam over a far longer time: politically, the religion has characteristically been on the defensive, and since the independence it has fought for an ever-narrowing range of claims on the state. Therefore, Ruth McVey has rightly noted that the history ofIslamic struggle in Indonesian politics seemed to be a "faith as the outsider". 36

3S The Masyumi ideologically-related student union, HMl (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) split into two organizations, as one group strongly resisted the bill and the other one complied. Meanwhile the Masyumi affiliated high-school students' union PIT (pelajar Islam Indonesia) lost its existence for its fierce resistance. See Karim, HMI MFO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia, 1997; Sitompu!, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Pancasila, 1989; Harun, Muhammdiyah dan Asas Pancasila, 1986. 36 McVey, "Faith as the Outsider," 1983, pp. 199-225.

38

Despite these restrictions, however, there was not only one-way traffic. As seen in the next part, politically restrained, Islam broke out saliently in remarkable ways, surprising any whose views of it were formed in the parliamentary and Guided Democracy periods, and the most important one was that the Muhammadiyah and NU retreated from "practical politics".

D. Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement It became clear that in the course of its first twenty years period, the New Order gradually capable of limiting the influences of both political and mass-based Islamic organizations in Indonesian politics. On the other side, however, it is difficult to ascertain the convergence response from the Muslim society.37 Different responses and divergent interests revolved around disagreement within Muslim society over the appropriate way they should go in defending their interests and fearing a political backlash. Different approaches have been taken by the Islamic groups to respond to such a challenge. They varied widely, ranging from open opposition to accommodationist moves toward the regime. Five major trends can be seen in this respect. The first trend was accommodative to the regime. Certain wings within the Parmusi, PPP, and NU were out-andout collaborators and they were successfully maneuvered into key positions within those parties, thank to their close relationship with the military and the regime. The second trend was intra-parliamentary opposition. In this regard, some other Muslim leaders within those political parties inclined to be confi:ontative, and they responded the state policies both by nuanced criticism and by attempts to exert pressure through their membership in the parliament. 38

37 On the awkward relationslrip between Islam and the New Order regime, see Raillon, "The New Order and Islam," 1994, pp. 197-217; Liong, ''Indonesian Muslim and the State," 1988, pp. 869-896. 38 On these first two groups, see Samson, ''Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemponii)' Indonesian Islam," 1978, pp. 196-226; Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," 1973, pp. 116-142.

39

The third one was extra-parliamentary radical confrontation. A small number of radical Islamist groups kept on voicing their criticism toward Suharto's policies on Muslim community. In many cases, however, open oppositions from Islamic groups were relentlessly repressed by the state apparatus, whose prominent example was the killing of hundreds of Muslim demonstrators in Jakarta's port ofTanjung Priok, in 1984.39 Not all responses to the state policies, however, were negative. There was evidence of vigorous discussions among young Muslim intellectua1s on religious matters as well as attempts to rethink the position of Islam in a pluralistic state, abandoning the triumpha1ist ambitions of the past. This is thefourth trend, which is sometimes called intellectual and social transformative approach. 40 Some of the most prominent young intellectua1s were individuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Dawam Rahardjo. Tantamount to the mushrooming of young Muslim intellectuals, there was another, and for the purpose of this thesis the most, significant trend within the Indonesian Muslim communities, which sought to reevaluate their strategy within the new, authoritarian political system. This last trend was adopted by the Muhannnadiyah in 1971 and the NU in 1984, when both organizations retreated from "practical politics". As indicated in the previous part, by the late 1960s it was obvious that Islamic hopes

in the New Order were misplaced, and that political Islam had little opportunity. It became clear as well that the regime would intervene at will in the affairs of Islam if seen necessary for the sake of stability, development, and purposes of state, all to be defined by the regime itself.

"Enemy Others and Violence in Jakarta," 1996, pp. 357-380. See Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2003; Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, 1995; Ali and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam, 1986; Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia, 1980. 3. See Kolstad, 40

40

The modernist Muslims came first to realize such challenges. They saw that all parties have been SUbjugated to restrictions, manipulations, and pressures, but the modernist Muslims have been the most greatly affected. They came to a conclusion that political parties were highly susceptible of state control, and therefore, no longer deemed as effective means to pursue their political interests. In other words, one way of confronting the vulnerability of political parties is, of course, eschewing them. Therefore, one result of the restriction of political Islam has been to turn Muslim leaders away from formal political activities. There were many roads taken, however. A small group of refurmists/modernists around Muhammad Natsir founded the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDI-Islamic Missions Council) in 1967. Natsir was one of the most prominent Indonesian modernist Muslim intellectual and politician in the twentieth century.41 Their turn from politics to dakwah was probably not simply due to the only available alternative, but was also inspired by political experiences. They seemed to come to realize that many, ifnot most Indonesian Muslims were not interested in Islamic political parties and their agendas. It must have seemed an obvious conclusion that the way to change lay not in parliament but in a change in attitude and awareness of the Muslim community, which could be brought about by interISive dakwah. Meanwhile, the larger part of the modernists, of course, continued to be active within the Muhammadiyah which in the 38 th Congress in Makassar, North Sulawesi in 1971 officially stated that the organization is, "an Islamic dakwah movement devoting itselfto working in the entire aspects of human and societailives, and has not any organizational affiliation with

41 See Uddle, "Media Dakwah ScripturaJism," 1996, pp. 323-356. In the colonial period Natsir engaged in a tiunous debate about the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state with the secu1ar nationa1ist leader Sukamo. He bad been prime minister in 1950-1951 and remained chairman of the Masyumi in the succeeding years. Under his leadership the Masyumi increasingly enunciated a policy of opposition to wbat it felt was the attempt of President Sukamo to bypass constitutional democracy. In the late 1950s be supported the PRRI rebellion, for which he was arrested and imprisoned unti11966.

41

particular political parties or organizations." Since 1971 on, the Mubammadiyah have been focusing their energies on the ideas of social welfare and education programs. In response to its members' demands that the Mubammadiyah be more politically active, it advises them to join or not join any of the existing political parties on an individual basis. The Muhammadiyah's decision to halt its political engagement preceded by thirteen years the same decision made by the NU in 1983. In its national deliberation ofulama in Situbondo, East Java in 1983, the NU decided to return to its "original guideline" (khittah) stated by its founders in 1926. This decision was then ratified in the following year in its 27th congress in the same place.42 Of the many resolutions passed during the congress, as the consequence of the Khittah 1926, was that ''the NU as an organization (jam 'iyah) is independent from any political and societal organizations.'043 The other decision passed was, among other things, the acceptance ofPancasiia as the sole foundation of the NU. The decisions, made by the Muhammadiyah and NU to move in this similar direction, have been largely prompted by the political impasse for the supporters of the Muhammadiyah and NU. For the supporters ofMuhammadiyah, the regime's objection to revive the Masyumi was not too disappointing them. Nor was the regime's objection to the return of the senior Masyumi leaders to the Parmusi's leadership. It was the unilateral action taken by Naro and Kadir, thanks to the regime's backing, to the Parmusi's leadership, whose both the chairman and the general secretary were the Muhammadiyah's prominent figures, that rendered the Muhammadiyah to realize that there was no longer opportunity in the political realm. The Mubammadiyah's leaders once considered to transform itseifto a political party. But they realize as well that it would have met the similar restrictions and manipulations. Nakamura, "NU's Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 198080" 1996, pp. 94-109. See PBNU, Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama Ire 27 Situhondo, 1986, p. 107.

42 See 43

42

Similarly, the series of the state's political manipulations directed toward the NU had been gradually increasing their resentment. The NU lost its post in the ministry of religion; it suffered from state's coercion during the elections; and its intra-parliamentary opposition to the state's issuance of several bills supposedly offending the Islamic sensitivity was paid offby its under-representativeness in the PPP's parliamentary seats. As a result, the NU's major sources of patronage gradually dried up and they came to realize that there was no longer benefit in further participation in parliamentary politics. Although there were a small number of the NU leaders who fought to keep the NU inside the PPP, however, its vast majority leaders took the line not only of withdrawing from the PPP but from politics altogether and returning to its original guideline of 1926, becoming once again a socio-religions organization with no longer interest in active political affairs.44 To those leaders who decided to remain in the PPP in order to keep their seats in national and local parliaments, the NU forced them to resign from the NU. The messages behind their disengagements from political parties were clear. On the one hand, the Ml1hamm adiyah, the largest component within the Parmusi, no longer supported it

Compounded with the rejection of such Masjumi elder statesmen as Natsir and Roem, who still commanded widespread respect and affection, to the Parmusi' s claim to be the heir to their old (Masyumi) party, the Muhammadiyah's decision was fatal for the Parmusi's perfonnance in the 1971 election. The Parmusi, no longer representing any readily identifiable constituency, polled only 5.3 percent of the vote--a quarter of the Masyumi's strength in 1955. On the other hand, the NU, comprising the largest component within the PPP, departed from it. While in previous elections the NU leaders had issued fatwas obliging their followers to vote for the PPP, in the 1987

44 See, Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik, 1984; Karim, Metanwrfosis NU dan Politisasi Islam Indonesia, 1995; Jones. "The Contraction and Expansion of the ·Umat·... 1984. pp. 1-20; Ida, Anatomi Konjlik NU. Elit Islam dan Negara. 1996.

43

the NU explicitly told its members that any political party would do. As a result, the PPP's electoral showing drastically declined. While in the 1977 and 1982 elections it had received 29 percent and 28 percent of the vote, respectively, it was reduced to 16 percent in the 1987 election. The lost votes of the Parmusi in the 1971 election and of the PPP in the 1987 election surprisingly went to the regime's political machine, Golkar. This decline was in part because of military's intimidation, coercion, and cooptation prior to and during the election, and in the other part because many voters had been lured away by various forms of persuasions: subsidies for mosques and schools, free tickets to Mecca for locally influential Muslims, promises of local development funds and other forms of patronage. While the ministry of religion, as major source of patronage for Muslim society, was totally under the state's control, its projects and funds would be easily available to Muslim leaders who had gone over to Golkar. For them,

pragmatically, there were no longer incentives to be out of the mainstream. The retreat of political Islam during this period has not really meant depolitization, rather removal of Muslim political activity from the vulnerable and by now pointless arena of party politics to the more salient one of broad social action. An able Indonesian expert, Donald Emmerson, once noted that although the Indonesian Muslims had been experiencing a "political impasse", however, they finally found a "cultural opportunity',.45 The further implication of the political disengagement decided by the Muhammadiyab and NU for the rejuvenation of cultural Islam will be detailed below. E. Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses

Another important motivation behind the withdrawal of the Muhammadiyah and NU from party politics was that they began to realize that their long-decade involvements in

45

See E=erson, "Islam in Modem Indonesia,» 1981, pp. 159-168.

44

practical politics had prevented them from devoting sufficient attention to their religious and social functions. Many Muslim leaders felt that the political struggle had diverted too much attention from what they saw as the real tasks of both organizations: the spiritual guidance and education of the Muslim community. It was felt also that the Muhammadiyab and NU had got off the right track a long time ago and that they should attempt to regain their original purity by reemphasizing their identity as religious organizations. This political retreat was a hallmark epitomizing their effort to abandon their propensity to enforce piety from the ''top-down'' and a milestone of their endeavors to make a cultural virtue of the necessity of political retreat by strengthening, from the "bottom up", the piety of the base on which their long-run political strength must rest. By doing so, the Muhammadiyah and NU incrementally changed their foci from the political arena to the civil one. Their retreat from the political arena led them to pay more attention to cultural movements, such as education, societal empowerment, community services, intellectual discourse, and religious inquiries. While there was a consensus between the Muhammadiyah and NU that their nature, instead in the political realm, was in the society, they disagreed on the mode of relationships between state and society in Indonesia. The role of religion and religious groupings in relation to the state was then highly debated.46 In discussing and analyzing the contested nature of the concept of civil society and the plurality of its empirical manifestations, we should keep in mind that their different motivations and approaches led in turn to different models.47 The retreat ofMuhammadiyah from party politics, compounded with the upsurge of the new Muslim intellectuals since 1970s, was eventually not only capable of reducing political 46

Schulte Nordholt, "Introduction," 2002. ''Mnbammadiyah dan NO dalam Kompetisi Makna Civil Society," 2001.

47 Tanthowi,

45

hostility between Islam and the regime, but it also made the regime accommodate some (modernist) Muslim's political and economic interests. The modernists' motivation, to be accommodated in the development process during the New Order period, unwittingly prompted them to adopt a Hegelian approach of civil society, in which they give an emphasis on: first, their supplementary and complementary function to the state. Therefore, the Muhammadiyab has been concentrating primarily on educational program, health services, social cares, services the state supposedly deliver. Second is the necessary of the middle class, of course, which were more or less dependent to the state. Under this Hegelian approach, the civil society model constructed by the Muhammadiyab resulted in: first, independency in various aspects, particularly in the fields of education, social and health services.48 For example, up until 2000, the Muhammadiyab run more than 9.000 schools, 190 universities and colleges, 241 hospitals and clinics, and 322 social service institutions. Second is middle class who flourished largely because of educational ladder, instead of their roles in economics and business. They have been mostly working in the fields of education and bureancracy. Therefore, most of the Muhammadiyab supporters are school teachers, university professors, state employees and state bureaucrats. Slightly different from the Muhammadiyab which adopted the Hegelian approach, the NU seemed to prefer the Tocquevillian model of civil society. According to the NU, civil society should function as countervailing forces to the political monopoly of the state, by nurturing independent institutions in society and cultivating civic culture in order to develop democratic civility.49 The motivation behind this approach is that the NU had been supposedly marginalized in the development process during the last decade of the New Order regime. This

48

49

See Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia,» 2002, pp. 133-163. See van Bruinessen, "KonjlDlgtur Sosial Politik di Jagat NU Paska Khittah 1926," 1994, pp. 61-86.

46

marginalization was because the state only accommodated Islamic community who appeared to support the modernization process, and the one of course come from the modernist camp. The traditional Islam was even further perceived by the state as obstacles to the Indonesia's development and modernization. Prompted by such motivation, from the late 1980s the NU's activities were directed to broaden free public sphere by empowering grassroots institutious, advocacy for lower class society, and strengthening various types ofNGO. They contended that civil society can be developed inasmuch as the society has self-reliance in its ultimate meaning and free from state intervention and cooptation. The fina1 result of civil society constructed by the NU was the mushrooming of new activists within NU since the mid 1990's, whose professions are mostly NGO activists, independent intellectuals (non-university), and journa1ists. For the NU, they are believed in capable of performing their ultimate function: agents of change.

F. Conclusion As the above discussions illustrate, there was a powerful organizational precedent for extra-state, society reinforcing, and power dispersive associations in the course of the Indonesian history. The emergence of the Mllhammadiyah and NU epitomized this precedent, which were characterized by a self-regulating associationallife and a countervailing balance of power. Hefner once said that although "a vigorous tradition of non-state social associations is not sufficient to generate encompassingly civil values,',so there were indeed invaluable seeds of self-regulating and autonomous organizations within Indonesian Islamic society. Similarly, there has been also a long tradition of diversity and pluralism, between Muslims and non-Muslims, between devout and nominal Muslims, and between modernist and traditionalist groups. This fragmented setting

so Hefner, "A Muslim Civil Society?" p. 298-9.

47

has thwarted the hopes for ideological unifonnity across space and for consistency of belief and behavior overtime, and finally proved that Indonesian Muslim politics is not monolithic. We have a conclusion, however, that in the course of the roughly fifty years of Indonesian independence, Islam and Muslims had been playing significant roles in politics and society alike. Founded in the period of awakening of Indonesian nationalism as nonpolitical organizations, the Muhammadiyah and NU had been intensely involved in varying degree in party politics during the late 1940s until the early 1980s. Under the ultimate authoritarian period of the Suharto regime, both organizations swiftly return from political realm to their original mandate as social religious organizations. This political impasse, surprisingly enough, was a blessing in disguise, as they have been able to preserve their independency and provide social capital for Indonesian Muslim at the end of the last century. No end is in sight. Yet it is probably true that any real hope for fundamental political change in Indonesia depends in part on the mobilization of Islamic support. The question now is how to mobilize such support, around which claims, and with what moral direction. There is no obvious answer to this question, largely because Indonesian Islam, to repeat, is hardly united, but asking it opens up a number of issues worth pondering. Under what conditions will Indonesian Islam mobilize and for what purposes? What are the strategies that these competing religious organizations resort to in dealing with one another? Are there distinctions among the major groups with respect to their propensities for political action? These are among some questions that I would like to discuss in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER III MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1998-2008

A. Introdnction With the fall of the New Order regime, there were changes in Indonesian politics and society alike. Considerable change occurred also in the Muslim associations. The Muhammadiyah, the NU, and other associations akin to them, have become more energized in political affairs with their cadre and members actively recruited for the newly formed political parties-nearly all having some sort of Islamic identity. In this respect we find a repoliticization-returning these associations to the role that they enjoyed prior to their political disengagement, when they were politically active. Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, Indonesian Islamic groups are now enjoying space granted them by democratic freedom. Since the early days after Suharto's overthrow, a diverse range of parties and organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah and NU. are debating what role Islam should play in governance: is Islam always a means to achieve political ends? Or can the relationship function the other way around? And how should they combine their political activism and their commitment to stay away from practical politics? They are also debating whether the diverging approaches to the state adopted by the Muhammadiyah and NU during the New Order era (between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian frameworks) remain suitable after the fall of Suharto. Those puzzles of where Islam fits into politics and vice versa are among some necessary questions I would like to answer in the following discussions.

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B. Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 Election One of the phenomena punctuated the Indonesian transition-or so-called the Reformasi era-was the mushrooming ofIslamic or Muslim-based parties. Their emergence was largely helped by the political freedom proclaimed by President Habibie in August 1998, which gave impetus to the birth of new political parties in general. The lifting of the ban on Islam as the foundation for political party meant the green light for Islamic or Muslim-based parties. Their emergence is thus without doubt a distinctive feature of political reform. Among 141 new political parties in the early Reformasi era, 42 were Islamic, defined here as parties that either explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw support mostly from Islamic organizations. This total later declined, since only 20 Islamic parties (out of 48 parties) qualified to compete in the 1999 election.! As far as Islamic political parties are concerned, many observers believed that the mushrooming of so many Islamic parties has been motivated more by the lust for power of the Muslim leaders than by genuinely religious motives. 2 If the Muslim leaders were more concerned about religious interests, of course, they would have established fewer Islamic parties-preferably only one for each the traditionalist and the modernist camp. Unfortunately, the contest for power among Muslim leaders led in tum to a wider fragmentation ofIslamic-oriented political grouping. This is discernible in the division among the supporters of both traditionalist and modernist Islam. The NU and Muharnmadiyah did not transform themselves into political parties, but in spite of calls from various sides not to weaken the Islamic community by the establishment of too many parties, Islamic leaders could not resist the temptation to found numerous of

Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 672. Azra, ''The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 311. See also Haris, "Politicization of Religion," 2004, p. 61-76. I

2

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parties. Among the NU circles, the most important initiative was the establishment of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB-The National Awakening Party), which was proclaimed in Abdurrahrnan Wahid's house on July 23.1998. During the process of the PKB's establishment, the role of the NU organization was decisive. As many NU politicians within PPP and senior kyai across regions began to clamor for NU to form a party, on June 6, 1998, around seventy NU senior leaders and politicians met at a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Rembang, Central Java, to deliberate these growing demands. During the meeting. the NU leaders undoubtedly lamented the marginal position of the NU in Indonesian politics during the New Order regime. One NU leader expressed his frustration that "it is now the time for NU to 'break the fast' after been fasting for more than 32 years." Another leader noted that for more than 30 years the NU members had been dispersed everywhere. "Regretfully, they had always been marginalized in their respective places." The meeting decided to form an eleven-member team comprising senior NU leaders, which was charged to formulate the next-party's vision, mission, platform, and charter, whose results would be submitted to the central board ofNU (pBNU).3 Responding to the mounting demands, two weeks later PBNU formed its own team comprising five members assisted by a nine-member team, whose task was preparing necessary steps to form a new party. They were drawn mainly from members ofthe PBNU.4 When the new party was declared, the PKB was chaired by former PPP General Secretary, Matori Abdul Djalil. The party had also Muhaimin Iskandar. Abdurrahrnan's nephew as its general secretary, and Imam Churrnain, a former GoIkar leader, as its treasurer. Meanwhile, Ma'ruf Arnin was

3 The

subjects of the discussion during the meeting and the members of the team of eleven, see Choirie,

PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, 2002, p. 173-182. 4

On the detailed tasks of both teams, see Asmawi, PKB Jendela Politik Gus Dur, 1999, p. 24-25.

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appointed as the chair of the advisory council (Dewan Syuro). Abdurrahman held no executive position, since he sustained his chainnanship of the PBNU. However, this did not impede him to command the central authority within the PKB, as almost all decisions within the party should be based upon his initiative or consent. For instance, not only did Abdurrahman succeed in installing Matori as the PKB's chainnan despite disagreement from numerous NU leaders, but he was also the one who created the entire line-up of PKB leadership prior to its declaration. s In order to draw the line between the NU and PKB, Abdurrahman in his remarks during the PKB declaration pointed out that the NU officials who had dual leadership in the PKB should step down from the NU leadership. While the PKB expected to garner its votes from the strong NU community and its leadership was drawn largely from NU activists, the PKB was presented as a party sensitive to the interests of all Indonesians. Hence the party used the word 'nation' and not, for instance,

'ummat' (Islamic community). The party aimed, in fashionable political jargon, at being an inclusive party, not an exclusive one. It was presented as a nationalist, 'red and white' party, not a 'green' Islamic one. Although it had no official counection with the NU, the PKB was without doubt the brainchild ofa few keyNU leaders from the organization's central board. 6 The introduction of the PKB party platfonn plausibly emphasizes its NU identity referring to two most basic NU treaties, and its constitution stated explicitly that the party originated from the "womb of the NU" and that it represented the aspirations of the NU community. PKB was the party officially endorsed by the PBNU, but this by no means that NU's leadership was unifonn in its political outlook. Several NU leaders openly opposed Abdurra1unan and established their own parties. The most important ones were Partai 5 6

Bush, Islam and Civil Society, 2002, p. 219. Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 320.

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Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) which was led by Abdurrahman's uncle, YusufHasyim; Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU) which was led by Syukron Makmun and Idham Chalid; and Partai Solidaritas Nasional Indonesia (partai SUNI) with Abu Hasan as its chainnan. The birth of these rival parties was triggered by two main factors. First was the political orientation of the new party.7 Many senior NU leaders opposed the adoption ofPancasila, instead ofIslam, as the basis for the PKB. Secondly, some ofthe leaders of the rival parties had long been Abdurrahman's bitter rivals for control over NU leadership during the past period. While Idham Chalid had been the chainnan ofNU until 1984 when Abdurrahman took the NU leadership, Abu Hasan was his rival in the bitter battle of the 1994 NU congress. While the role ofNU in the establishment ofPKB was decisive, the role of Muhammadiyah in the establishment ofPartai Amanat National (pAN-the National Mandate Party) was less instrumental. Various groups contributed to the establishment of the PAN. They worked separately to prepare any necessary steps to establish a new political party. First was MARA (Majelis Amanat Rakyat - Council of People's Mandate), a broad based cabinet watchdog organization founded on May 14, 1998 by Amien Rais and other intellectuals and prominent figures. Second was Tebet Group which was comprised of some Muslim intellectuals and NGO activists. Third was PPSK (Pusat Pengkajian Strategi dan Kebijakan Center for Strategic and Policy Studies), a research center under the University of Gadjah Mada at Yogyakarta, of which Amien Rais had been the director. At last, on August 5,1998 those groups held a meeting in Wisma Tempo, Simagalih, West Java, to formulate the party's platform and form a nine-member team whose chainnan was Amien Rais. 8

7 Mietzner, ''Nationalism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p. 177. • Najib, Melawan Arus, 1999, p. 147.

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Despite the efforts of these diverse groups, the role of Muhammadiyah was not insignificant. A month before, on July 5-7, 1998 the Muhammadiyah held an annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Semarang, Central Java whose participants were members of the central board (PP) ofMuhammadiyah and four delegates from each its provincial board. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the participants demanded to form a new political party, the final, official resolution stated that neither the Muhammadiyah transform itself into a political party nor it facilitate (membidani) the establishment of a new party. The Tanwir, however, delegated an authority to the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad (vigorous inquiry) to form a new political party. Since Tanwir is the second most authoritative decision-making forum within the Muhammadiyah organization next to congress, any form of the new party resulted from the political ijtihad would be considered legitimate by the Muhammadiyah members. During this period, Amien Rais had been taking ambiguous stances. 9 In the closing ceremony of the Tanwir, Amien mentioned the possibility of the establishment of a new party which would be chaired by his close companion and the vice chairman of the Muhammadiyah Syafii Maarif. In the subsequent days, various political groups were trying to woo Amien to lead their parties. Amien once gave a signal to accept the bid offered by some PPP leaders to be the next chairman of the PPP. He was also said to agree to lead a new party which was prepared by various groups representing the spirit of the Masyumi. Meanwhile, he also went on to let the MARA, Tebet Group, and PPSK respectively prepare the establishment of a new party. It was also reported that in a PP Muhammadiyah meeting he would like to devote himself to the Muhammadiyah, instead of continuing his political career. However, almost all other members of the PP Muhammadiyah did not agree; they rather endorsed his endeavor to form a new

• Rais, Putra Nusantara. Son oflhe Indonesian Archipelago, 2003, p. 105.

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political party. After much speculation, Amien admitted that he was keen to be part of a new political movement that could bring together the various elements of reform movements. Eventually, the new party PAN was proclaimed during a mass meeting at the Senayan Stadium on August 23, 1998. A day before the PAN declaration, during the meeting in the Muhammadiyah headquarter which was attended by thirteen members of PP Muhammadiyah and the chairman of all provincial board ofMuhammadiyah all over Indonesia, Amien decided to step down from the Muhammadiyah leadership, concentrated on his duties in the next-day new party and he was replaced by Syafii Maarif. In order to further keep the Muhammadiyah away from politics, at the end of September 1998 the central board ofMuhammadiyah issued a resolution no. 480/1998 which prohibited dual leadership between the Muhammadiyah and political party and

the use ofMuhammadiyah facilities for political activities. Amien took great pains to stress that PAN was a nationalistic organization, and did not cater exclusively to Muhammadiyah or Masyumi circles or to the wider Islamic community. He described PAN as a ''miniature Indonesia", aiming at as many segments of Indonesian society as possible. An able scholar whose interest is mostly on Indonesian Islam and particularly NU testifies that, the PAN's platform "showed greater sophistication and understanding than found in any other party. The party's directions were unambiguously reformist and democratic. It opposed sectarianism and championed the development of a modem secular state that was home to all people, groups, and faiths."l0 As a consequence of its secular, nationalistic platform, the PAN could not maintain the modernist community as a united front. Some other parties also emerged from the

10

Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 253.

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modernist camp, and, by and large, they exerted the Islamic identity of their party. On July 17, 1998 various group, which claimed representing the spirit of Masyumi founded the Partai Bulan Bintang (pBB--Crescent and Star Party) with Yusril Ihza Mahendra as its chairman. In this regard, one should also add the Partai Ummat Islam (pUI-Islamic Community Party) which was led by a notable political scientist Deliar Noer; and the Partai Keadilan (pK-Justice Party) which was led by Nur Mahmudi Ismail. Based on the aforementioned explanation, the central board ofNU showed its more immediate reactions, compared to Amien's long ambiguous reaction, to the demands both from regions and from its senior leaders which called the establishment of a new NU-based political party. With the formation of a party connected to the official structure ofNU, the NU figures opposing it were left behind. Three rival NU-based parties were established, but they lacked the momentum that central board had seized. On the other hand, Amien failed to react in a similar way. Amien had obtained a more nationalist profile for his roles during the economic and political crisis leading to Suharto's downfall. Riding on the wave of public sympathy, Amien had provided the very intellectual leadership that the highly diversified student movement and middle-class pro-democracy movement so desperately needed. Thus during the ensuing liberalization era, Amien faced a dilemma: ifhe chose the establishment of an explicitly modernist Islamic party, he would have almost certainly emerged as the sole leader of the camp, but at the same time he would have lost the support of the secular reform groups with which he had worked in concert during the anti-Suharto movement. On the other hand, the formation of a nationalist party would have allowed him to develop the moderate image appropriate for his emergence in national politics, but would also have alienated him from his

56

modernist constituency. In contrast to the traditionalist camp, Amien seemed highly unlikely to succeed in maintaining a certain extent of homogeneity within the modernist groups. I I It seemed that in the traditionalist camp both senior leaders and the PBNU were directly involved in the formation of the PKB. It was apparent in the formation of several teams, whose members were mostly senior leaders and activists of the NU, which were charged to take necessary steps to prepare the establishment of the new party. On the other hand, the PP Muhammadiyah other than Amien himself was almost absent in the PAN formation. The Muhammadiyah's attachment to the PAN was simply because the 1998 Semarang Tanwir recommended the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad, which was finally left to Amien himself, and the fact that Amien once headed the Muhammadiyah during the reform movement, of which the Muhammadiyah members and leaders alike so proud. 12 These different involvements would in tum lead to different connections between both sides in the near future. Although during the 1998-1999 more than 150 political parties were founded, much attention focused on President Habibie's Golkar party and the parties of the three most respected opposition figures of that day: Abdurrahman, Amien, and Megawati ostensibly receiving more public acclaim than Habibie. The three represented respectively the traditionalist Muslims with their bulwarks in Central and East Java; the modernist Muslims, many living in non-Javanese regions and in urban centers; and the secular nationalist camp in and outside Java. Bali was also Megawati territory. During the election campaign, politicians, in order to attract voters to their parties, are waging an ideological battle for the soul of the nation, much of it over the fault line of religion-

II On the comparison between the traditionalist and modernist camps in forming new parties, see Mietzner, "NationaIism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p.173-199. 12 Maarif, "Hubungan Mllbammadiyah dengan Amien Rais dan PAN," 2000, p. 14.

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to be precise, the extent to which Islam will guide the affairs of the country, how it would do so, and which Muslims will do the guidance. I3 During the campaign period, the NU and Muhammadiyah respectively played a different role in their relations to the PKB and PAN. Abdurrahman, while sustaining his leadership in the PBNU, had come to fully embrace the PKB "as his own". 14 He, along with other senior NU leaders, campaigned for votes in the traditional NU strongholds of Java and Madura. This was a clear message that the PKB was the political arm of the NU, while three other NU-affiliated parties had a tough time competing against the organizational advantages enjoyed by the PKB. In contrast, the PP Muhammadiyah hardly worked in the election campaign for the PAN. Instead, it insisted to apply its resolution no. 480/1998 while stressing that the Muhammadiyah members, according to the resolution of the 1971 Makassar congress, were free to votes any political parties they wished.

Table 1 The 1999 Legislature Election Result PartL PDI-P Golkar Party PKB PPP PAN PBB PK

Percentage 33.7 22.5 12.7 10.7 7.1 1.9

1.3

No. of Seats 153 120 51 58 34 13 7

During the last days of the election campaign, both Abdurrahman and Amien.like other political party leaders, had optimistic poll expectations since their massive rallies in the campaign. IS While Abdurrahman told journalists that he expected the PKB would get more than 30 % of the national votes, Amien spoke confidently of getting 90 % of all modernist

Zenzie,'1ndonesia's New Political Spectrum," 1999, p. 246. Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 328. 15 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 272. 13

14

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votes and maybe as much as 30 to 40 % of the total. Unfortunately, this extravagant optimism has not been translated into votes. In June 1999, when Indonesia held its democratic election, seven parties out of 48 participants won significant percentages of the vote. The most successful parties were Megawati's secular Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), with 33.7 % of the vote and Golkar, the former president Suharto's political vehicle, with 22.5 %. Five others are Islamic or Muslim-based: the PPP, with 10.7 %; the PKB, with 12.7 %; the

PAN, with 7.1 %; the PBB, with 1.8 %; and the Justice Party (PK), withjust 1.3 %.16 Beside the good performance of the PDI-P, to which many Islamic leaders during the election campaign had been pointing out as the party that did not clearly commit to Islam, the poor result of Islamic parties in the 1999 election "worried many Muslims, who believed that it marked the end of political Islam" in Indonesia. 17 Worse still, the high hope of the PKB and PAN did not come true as they gained only nearly one third of their expectation. The small share gained by these two parties was a result of manifold factors. First is the fragmentation of Muslim voters into twenty Islamic parties compared to ten parties in the 1955 election. Even worse is the fragmentation within the traditionalist and modernist communities into several parties, something that did not happen in the past. However small shares were gained by those tiny splinter parties, the total was more than fifteen percent of the votes. Second is the relative strong showing of the old PPP party, which was previously predicted by many to be uprooted in the Islamic community after the establishment of the PKB and PAN. Due to its experience of serving for twenty five years as the only party representing Muslims' interests, the PPP was able to maintain its loyalists both within traditionalist and

16 On the detail result of and discussion on the 1999 election, see Suryadinata, Election and Politics in Indonesia, 2002; and Blackburn, Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, 1999. 17 Azra, "Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," 2004, p. 142. On the sorrows bemoaned by Islamic community, see Basyaib and Abidin (eds.), Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?, 1999.

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modernist communities. Similarly, the Golkar survival in the second place also contributed to the defeat of the Islamic parties, particularly the PAN and PKB. Since its extraordinary congress in July 1998, the Golkar party was demonstrating some movement toward Islam by appointing many Islamic figures, mostly from modernist camp, to its central leadership.I8

Third, closely related to the first one, were the new experimentations of Abdurrahman and Amien respectively to design the PKB and particularly PANas inclnsive parties. The PAN did worse than many had expected, given that its leader was often portrayed as the "locomotive" of the reform movement. The time limit since their establishments to the election -less than one year- was insufficient for Abdurrahman and Amien to convince the public to rely on their parties. An Indonesian expert notes that Amien's message "was in many ways a new one, both for Indonesia and indeed for Amien Rais" himself. I9 Finally, different policies adopted by the PBNU and PP Muhammadiyah in dealing with the PKB and PAN have led to the different results for both parties. Despite the aforementioned three factors above, the full supports of the PBNU and its senior leaders have defended the PKB from its worse showing. In contrast, the PAN lacked similar support from the PP Muhammadiyah during the election. The poor result of Islamic parties, particularly the PKB and PAN, prompted many Islamic leaders to look for another opportunity in order to sustain their existence in the political arena. The next part will examine the rise and fall of President Abdurrahman and its ensuing volatile relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah.

C. The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid

18 See Nakamura, "Prospect for Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 90; Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 674-678. 19 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnwn," 2000, p. 22.

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Ahead of the presidential election, with so many parties and none having decisive majority, it was highly likely that a coalition needed to be formed to create a majority in the MPR in order to elect a new president and vice-president. 2o The election results apparently showed that the most likely frontrunners were either the PDI-P candidate Megawati or the Goikar candidate Habibie. For Megawati, the PAN and particularly PKB seemed to be her natural partners, as she, Abdurrabman, and Amien have agreed three weeks before the election to form a common front among their three parties, which was known as the "Paso communique", to work together to overcome Goikar. Habibie, on the other hand, seemed highly likely to draw enormous supports from his party Golkar, the military, and the functional representatives whose appointment were in his authority. Megawati was understandably thrilled with the PDI-P showing in the polls and began to feel as if she was destined to win the presidency. Despite the clear message sent by the election result, however, Megawati stubbornly refused to build a broad-based alliance to win a clear majority in the presidential election. It was partly because of her political inability, and partly because of her overconfidence, she refused to respond to Abdurrabman and Amien's offers to initiate the coalition. Abdurrabman was stunned when, after requesting four cabinet positions for PKB and NU, Megawati offered him only one, no more than that.21 Amien was similarly disappointed when he urged Megawati to take necessary steps to form a stable

20 The MPR consisted of the entire 500 members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and 200 other representatives. The 500 DPR members consisted of 462 elected members and 38 appointed members for the military and police forces. The other 200 members consisted of 135 regional representatives who were elected by the provincial-level parliament and 65 functional group representatives who were elected by the president. 21 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275. Despite this disappointment, Abdurrahman continuously stated that he and his PKB would support Megawati for the post.

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coalition among the signatories of the Paso communique, she saw no urgency to make arrangement with the parties that could help her to gain an absolute majority in the MPR.22 There were so many pro-reform Indonesians who ardently hoped for a united antiGoIkar front comprising Megawati, Abdurrahman, and Amien. These hopes were fading, however. The presidential election was not simply about division between pro-reform and antireform groupings. It was also about religion. Since the election campaign, many Islamic leaders had been campaigning to disqualifY Megawati because of her gender. They stated that Islam did not allow a woman to be a head of state, despite the fact that this subject is still debated in Islamic discourse.23 The tension between both sides was getting worse. Megawati's supporters were deadly serious in their resolve to ensure her election by every possible means. They began to put a thumbprint in blood on large cloths. The practice, which had started in East Java, spread and was immediately copied elsewhere. They also put their signatures on huge banners carrying texts such as 'Megawati or revolution'. They flocked to do so in the thousands. 24 Amien began to look for an alternative presidential candidate to avoid an outright choice between Megawati and Habibie. Without a third candidate who was acceptable to both sides, he contended. a dangerous situation began to cast a long shadow over future stability. The chance was great that whatever the outcome of the presidential election, violent protests would be the result. Amien announced on July 20, 1999 that he and the leaders ofthe PPP, PBB, and PK parties agreed to form a central axis (paras tengah).25 This agreement originated to the "Kartika Chandra communique" signed by Amien, the PPP leader Hamzah Haz, and the

Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 42. See Platzdasch, "Islamic Reaction to a Female President," 2000; Van Dorn-Harder, "The Indonesian Islamic Debate on a Woman President," 2002. 24 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, 2001, p. 446. 25 See Suharsono, Cemerlangnya Poros Tengah, Jakarta: Perenial Press, 1999. 22

23

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PK leader Nurmahmudi several days after the Paso communique signing. Amidst the growing tension between the Megawati and Habibie supporters, the central axis appeared to offer the potential of drawing those Islamic parties away from an otherwise inevitable coalition with Golkar. 26 The logic was that with a combined total of nearly 200 seats in the MPR, they could match Golkar or PDI-P and therefore be in position either to put their own candidate in the palace or at least to avoid an outcome in which Muslims became minor political players. 27 However, the central axis was unable to find a single viable presidential candidate to unite them. Amien rated his own chance too little because ofPAN's poor showing in the legislature election. Other Islamic party leaders, such as Harnzah or Yusril, had even narrower bases of support. Faced with a dearth of candidates, Amien surprised many people and the central axis alike by blurting out the possibility of supporting a candidacy by, of all people, his arch-rival: Abdurrahman Wahid. 28 But few took Amien seriously. As Mietzner points out, there were three major problems. 29 First, many politicians in the PPP and PBB either openly or tacitly backed Habibie for another term in office. Second, Abdurrahman had maneuvered the PKB into Megawati's camp. Now that he was about to change the strategy, the party was reluctant to follow this policy shift. Third, even if the first two problems were overcome, the alliance would still have been far away from an absolute majority in the MPR. Many people still wondered about the future of this alliance. Other Islamic party leaders immediately dismissed Amien's suggestion as a "personal opinion" which they did notand would not--support. On the other hand, Amien's suggestion to nominate Abdurrahman brought the latter into serious conflict with his own party, which had earlier decided early in Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275. Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 23. 28 O'Rourke, Reformasi, 2002, p. 251. 29 Mie1Zner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43.

2. 27

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August 1999 to support Megawati. Mietzner goes on to note that Amien was well aware that the only way to convince Abdurrahman and the PKB to join the central axis was offering the nomination to the NU chainnan. He correctly assumed that the nomination would be an irresistible temptation for Abdurrahman. Amien also realized that PKB delegates in the MPR would have tum their back on Megawati if their patron ran against her. 3o To cement the new-found bond between Amien and Abdurrahman, a rally joining Muhammadiyah and NU leaders and supporters alike was held in the front yard of the Muhammadiyah headquarter on September 26, 1999 in Jakarta. It was the first of its kind ever held. The central axis and the cooperation between both organizations were greeted as a newfound unity within the Islamic community. Some even hailed it as an indication that Indonesian Muslims had re-found its strength. This new cordiality between NU and Muharnmadiyah was also bolstered mostly by a growing friendship between their youth organizational wings: Ansor ofNU and Muhammadiyah Youth Movement. During this critical period, Ansor leader SyaifuIIah Yusuf (Abdurrahman's nephew) and Muhammadiyah youth leader Imam Addaruqudni arranged many public gatherings, public seminars, and meetings. Their cooperation revealed a sense that the modernist and traditionalist camps could work together. Mostly because of their vigorous endeavor, personal relations between Amien and Abdurrahman were steadily becoming more intimate and warm. 31 When the new MPR convened on October 2,1999, however, no convincing prediction on how the rival groups would mobilize supports in the presidential vote. It was clear that three broad groupings would compete in the assembly: PDI-P whose support was assured, Golkar

30 31

Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43. Barton, Abdurrahman Wah/d, 2002, p. 268.

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which suffered a deep internal division, and the central axis whose solidity was widely questionable. The central axis, compared to two other groupings, was the most unlikely winner. The political balance of those three groupings was soon swinging, when the MPR members, before deciding on who would become president and vice-president, elected two important positions in the Indonesian political structure: chairpersons ofMPR and DPR. Amien was elected chairperson of the MPR on October 3, 1999. He defeated the PKB chairman Matori by a small margin of26 votes. It was surprising that Amien's nomination was also backed by the Islamic modernist wing of Golkar, while Matori's nomination was backed by PDI-P. In the second round, the Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung, once headed the Masyumi-affiliated Islamic student organization (HMI), was elected as the DPR chairperson. He received an overwhelming 411 of the 491 votes.32 PDI-P supported his nomination, but afterwards it became clear that PDI-P got nothing in return for its support. In the presidential vote, the political strength and fortune of the central axis were more apparent. Habibie's accountability speech was rejected by the MPR members by 355 to 322 in a vote on October 19,1999 amidst massive demonstrations outside the MPR. With this blow, Habibie withdrew his candidacy in the early morning of October 20, 1999. The real drama, the presidential election was due to commence only nine hours later. While reportedly Megawati, following the rejection of Habibie's speech, went home to sleep, all other party leaders commenced a frantic, marathon session oflobbying and politicking. Kingsbury describes it eloquently that, "there was a flurry of political activity as promises were made and broken, deals were done, and political dreams were shattered and, in one case, realized.,,33

32

33

Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 144. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 287.

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After he withdrew his candidacy, Habibie recommended nominating the PBB chairman Yusril, the PPP chairman Hamzah, the military commander Wiranto, and the Golkar chairman Akbar. One by one, these possible candidates declined to run against Megawati. Eventually, the President and several central axis leaders decided to support Amien into the race. Habibie thought that, whatever commitment Amien had made to Abdurrahman, in the final analysis most of the central axis would give their support to him rather than the physical infirm Abdurrahman. 34 Amien firmly rejected, however. He explained that he would lose his credibility and ruin the newly established NU-Muhammadiyah relationship should he accept the bid. Syafii Maarif, current Muhammadiyah chairman, was on hand to help Amien. He argued that the NU-Muhammadiyah relationship had improved since Amien supported Abdurrahman, but to withdraw that support might trigger unrest. Go1kar had eventually no other alternative than supporting Abdurrahman. Abdurrahman defeated Megawati in the vote for the presidency on October 20, 1999. He received 373 votes, Megawati 313. Megawati was humiliated by her defeat. Even worse were her supporters. Almost immediately riots broke out in Jakarta and several other cities. Largely because of these uncontrollable unrests, Abdurrahman and many party leaders agreed to offer Megawati the vice-presidency. In the vice-presidential election on October 21, 1999, Megawati defeated Harnzah by 396 votes to 284. 35 Her election restored peace, but mutual distrust remained among political leaders. It seemed as if the sophisticated and complicated election was a climax, but in fact the more deadly game was just only beginning.

34

35

Crouch, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 119. Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 148-150.

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Relief,jubilation, and renewed optimism accompanied Abdurrahman's election to the presidency. For years Indonesians had been clamoring for reform, and now nothing seemed to stand in this way. Cronies notwithstanding, public generally regarded the AbdurrahmanMegawati pair as the ideal outcome to the prolonged transition. Ideologically speaking, the executive branch included the immensely popular nationalist, secular leader Megawati, but the presidency itself went to a figure regarded as a respected Muslim scholar, Abdurrahman. The high optimism was further fueled by the formation of the National Unity Cabinet comprising 35 ministers. As expected, as an inclusive government, it incorporated not only representatives from the parties which had made his own election possible (PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, PK, Golkar), but the PDI-P and military obtained several influential seats as well. Having long espoused pluralism, Abdurrahman included representatives from each official religion and most major regional and ethnic groups. Looking at the other posts, the cabinet also included one minister from the NU (Minister of Religion) and Muharnmadiyab (Minister of National Education) respectively.36 Given its number and diversity, unfortunately, this rainbow cabinet "was also disunited, often with little ability or experience, reflecting its origius as a political compromise.,,37 The Abdurrahman govermnent enjoyed a broad popular mandate. The question was whether it can use that window of opportunity to take measures to overcome the crisis, restore public trust in the political system and get Indonesia back to a new pattern of political stability and economic growth. Despite its popular mandate, however, the new govermnent was unfortunately overwhelmed by numerous challenges. They were, among other things, economic

36 From this cabinet on, a new pattern of relation between the government and these Islamic civil society organizations was set up, as at least one ministry position has been each allocated for the NU and Mnba1l111ladiyah, apart from seats allocated for the PKB and PAN. 37 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 290.

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recovery, national integration, law supremacy, and military refonn. 38 But very early in his presidential career, both supporters and opponents began to view Abdurrahman's progress with dismay. Within his twenty-one months of holding power, Abdurrahman had to face a fonnidable host of antagonists and hostile actions. On July 23, 2001, the MPR in tum impeached and sacked him, and elected Megawati to be the new leader. It was widely contended that his impeachment resulted from long-deadly political

conflict among elite politicians in Jakarta. The political conflict was not apparently provoked by his failure to address the problems. Rather, his failure to address the problem was largely caused by the very intra-elite political conflict. As far as Abdurrahman progresses are concerned, the analysis of political developments during his administration suggested that while he had enjoyed modest success in certain areas, such as military reform, freedom of the press, and separatist movernents,39 there was little progress made in the institutional modernization of the political and legal frameworks, the basis of which was laid by the reforms of the Habibie administration. According to Mietzner, "the high level of political conflict among the elite has prevented significant progress in the major sectors of institutional, legal and military refonn.'.40 His commitment to address fundamental issues of constitutional changes seemed to be subordinated to the main focus of the intra-elite power struggle-the political survival of his own presidency. If the political conflict was not triggered by elite disappointment of his progress, what

went wrong? Why did Abdurrahman lose support from elite politicians so soon? There are three interrelated explanations. First the Indonesian constitution (DUD 1945), before being amended during the Megawati presidency, provided insufficient explanation for inter-institutional relations Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 200 I, p. 29-44. See also Gorjao, "Abdurrainnan Wahid's 2003, p. 13-43. 3 See Barton, "A Fair Measure," 2001, p. 33-46. 40 Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 2001, p. 43. 38

Presidenc~,"

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between the president, DPR, and MPR, leaving it unclear whether Indonesia adhered to a presidential or parliamentary system, or a chaotic mixture of them. Based on the constitution, the Indonesian system gave both the DPR and MPR unspecified powers to demand the president's accountability and removed him ifhe was deemed guilty of violations of the constitution, the law, or the state policy guidelines. Second is related to his dearth of political support within the DPR and MPR. While his election was supported by numerons parties, however, his real political backing was only PKB. Its minority seats in the DPR (12 %) and MPR (8 %) rendered Abdurrahman position in a susceptible to any political opposition. While these two factors were instrumental to Abdurrahman's impeachment, however, emphasizing simply on both factors is misreading. Had both factors become the most crucial factors to intra-elite conflict, Megawati would have faced similar political opposition. Megawati sustained her presidency until the end of her term in 2004 without major political opposition from both the DPR and MPR. Megawati surely inherited a similar constitution granted the parliament sufficient power to sack her. However, the constitution was successfully amended during her presidency, thanks mostly to the vigorous efforts of the MPR under Amien's leadership. Similarly, while PDI-P controlled slightly more seats in the DPR and DPR than PKB did, PDI-P was still a minority. However, Megawati succeeded to maintain support from political parties needed to sustain her presidency. If the constitution and political balance were insufficient to explain the Abdurrahman impeachment, what did matter?

An able scholar on Middle East politics Daniel Brumberg offers an interesting but misleading explanation. In his comparative study on Iranian and Indonesian politics, he points out that the intra-elite Indonesian conflict exemplified "multipolar competition between and within competing Islamic and secular groups." He goes on to note that the competition was

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between the moderate, secular vision ofIslam embodied in Abdurrabman and his PKB and the Islamist groups within the central axiS.41 Indeed, there were competing visions on Indonesian Islam among moderate and Islamist groups. But taking this division into account as the sole explanation for the elite conflict was too bold. Did not those Islamic PPP, PBB, and PK parties, putting aside their theological differences with the traditionalist PKB/NU, voluntarily support Abdurrahman in a time when the PKB had formed a political alliance with the PDI-P to support Megawati? Did not also both groups eventually work in concert to help Abdurrahman's win in the presidential election against the nationalist candidate Megawati? Many interpretations also deduced that the fall of Abdurrabman represented a return to political authoritarianism. However, according to Edward Aspinall, this drew heavily on the views of Abdurrahman and his supporters. Therefore, Aspinall goes on to argue, it is important not to exaggerate this argument. 42 A third reason, and the most important one, as to why Abdurrahman faced unbearable political opposition was related to his behavior and leadership style. ''He had been always unpredictable and erratic," says one observer.43 Not only did his eccentric style frequently damage his credibility,44 but democratic transformation, on which so many had pinned their hopes, was also stymied by his own eccentric, unpredictable, and autocratic behavior.''''5 This ran in tandem with other negative reports on his capacity as president, including reneging on political deals, sacking cabinet ministers for unspecified reasons, promising and then refusing to devolve authority to the vice-president, having

Bromberg, "Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia," 2001, p. 381-411. Aspinall, "The Downfall of President Abdurrahman Wahid," 2002, p. 30-31. 43 GOljao, "Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidency," 2003, p. 14. 44 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 300. 45 Conceicao, Indonesia's Six Years ofLiving Dangerously, 2005, p. 44. 41

42

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considerable shifts of outlook from day-to-day, and his heavy reliance on a small and shrinking coterie of confidants whose political or administrative ability was questionable.46 He frequently spoke or joked before fully considering the implications of what he was about to say. His constant jokes about his political opponents also did not help to mend fences, and sometimes offended people, which for instance happened during his speech in the parliament meeting on the closure of Information Ministry and Social Affairs Ministry. At the meeting, members of parliament criticized his policy which they thought was taken without a proper consideration and review. Abdurrahman defended his policy and made a strong comment, "I guess my explanation was not really understood by you all since there was no difference between talking to you and talking to kindergarten kids.'.47 Such unnecessary statements, combined with accusations of corruption and scandals, had become quite common during Abdurrahman administration.48 His methods of doing business, deciding issues, and bestowing favors all reflected more Abdurrahman's penchant fortraditional-NU style ofpatrimonialism than the formal decision making and management processes of state policies.49 For his fanatic followers, as Fealy says, Abdurrahman was not just a kyai (traditional Islamic scholar) but a venerated wali (protege of God, saint). The actions of wali often fall outside normal social conventions, but because wali are

seen as a divinely gifted, they are above human criticism. The fact that he was nearly blind and that his party only controlled 8 % of the MPR seats, but he finally could become president, has strengthened the belief among his followers that he possessed a somewhat super-human power. Kingsbury, The Politics ojlndonesia, 2005, p. 302-303. Dwidjowijoto, Can He Manage? 2000, p. 102. 4S On the detailed accusations of corruption and scandals agaInst Abdurrahrnan, see Budiman, "Indonesia," 2001, p. 146. 4' On the comprehensive account of his traditional leadership style, see Fealy, "Abdurrahman Wahid and the al-Khidr Question," 2001, p. 5-14; Budiman, "Will Gus Dur Survive?" 2001, p. 47-51. 46

41

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Although his followers were also often surprised and confused by his actions, they sought to understand what he stood for. Even if they did not know what he sought to achieve, because he never gave any explanation, they simply believed that it was because they did not yet understand his goal, and therefore it was still admirable and deserving support. Abdurrabrnan as president, sadly, has behaved much as he did before he was elected. Just like any kyai, he simply makes decisions without firstly asking approval from others, particularly his followers, who will automatically obey his decisions. In addition, he is accustomed to a culture where it is not necessary for him to explain what he did. Unfortunately, he also led the nation this way. His ineffectiveness is the fact that he did not transform himself into a real president. Complicated even matters, having understood his minority support from the DPR and MPR, Abdurrabrnan "has been unwilling to act like a politician in a democracy, that is, to build a broad base of support and adopt a set of policies responsive to the interests of this constituency," says a veteran Indonesian observer William Liddle. 5o He fired numerous ministers from PPP, Golkar and PDI-P without consultation with their original parties. It should not be surprising that his cabinet, whose members were not sure whether they will retain their positions next month, had not worked as it should. 51 In August 2000, he crated a new cabinet that seemed to be "all the president's men" rather than representing political parties in the DPR. 52 Moreover, despite the growing criticism, he seemed to be insensitive to the Muslim concerns. He proposed an idea of opening trade relation with Israel, which in his mind would be a shortcut to revive the national economy. This idea was strongly opposed by many of Muslim leaders, because it contradicted the constitution, which was clearly against any form of

Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000," 2001, p. 208. " Shiraishi, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 138. 52 "All the Wahid's Men," Tempo, August 28-September 3,2000.

'0

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foreign invasion and because of their solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Palestine which is invaded by Israel. He also proposed an idea to lift the ban on communism, based on his long idea of pluralism and democracy. This idea was even more controversial and provoked stronger opposition from his political enemies from Islamic community, nationalist parties and the military. As Abdurrahman became more erratic and unpredictable, his popularity plummeted and whatever sense oflegitimacy he had gained through the election process quickly diruiuish. Those parties that had supported him, let alone his rival, in the 1999 presidential election now turned against him, and eventually he was unseated after twenty-one months at the office. The intra-elite political conflict, particularly between the parliament and the President bore awkward relationship between the NU and the President. S3 Although there was a small number of young NU-affiliated NGO activists debating an appropriate way to balance between loyalty and criticism of Abdurrahman's presidency, the moves to unseat Abdurrahman created a profound shock within the NU leaders. They deemed such efforts as a political conspiracy by a majority of the MPs whose interests were only in power and in serving their own interest. S4 On the eve of Abdurrahman's dismissal, the feeling in the NU community was that he had been

maltreated (didzaliml), an Arabic tenn with a profound religious connotation.

In a more spontaneous response, pro-Abdurrahman demonstrations flourished in November 2000, but intensified in February 2001 when the first memorandum would be issued against the President. All the eleven parliamentary factions but the PKB voted against him. In response, Abdurrahman' s supporters staged their own protests, cutting down all the trees in streets, including the sacking of regional Golkar offices in some cities of East Java, the

53 See Van Bruinessen, ''Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 15-46; FeiUard, ''Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 117-144. 54 Anam, Seandainya Aku Jadi Malon, 2002, p. 63.

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heartland ofNU. They also staged attacks on schools and buildings linked to Muhammadiyah. It seemed that they could not distinguish between the political conflict between the parliament and the President with the conflict between the DPR chairperson who became the Golkar chainnan and the MPR chairperson who once headed the Muhammadiyah. While there was a concern about such a violent response, the real threat seemed to come from an extreme (but loosely affiliated) wing of the NU known as Pasukan Berani Mati (pBM-the Ready-to-Die Forces), new militias set up in East Java with men who vowed to die for Abdurrahman. Members of this group undertook special training in several cities of East Java. 55 Three months later, when the DPR issued the second memorandum against the President, the situation continued to worsen. Unfortunately, the NU followers felt that Amien was the man behind the drive to shake up Abdurrahnlan in the parliament. The Abdurrahman supporters not only resumed to attack Golkar and Muhammadiyah buildings but also to spread terror to the Muhammadiyah activists by painting their houses with X-red signs. This has reminded people of events surrounding the 1965 communist coup. At the time, the red lines on the door signaled death for its inhabitants. The sign had made it easier for the NU-paramilitary force Banser to kidnap allegedly members of the PKI and massacre them. 56 The political violence between the first and second memorandum in East Java, according to Muhammadiyah, damaged 5 universities, 12 schools, 5 clinics, 4 mosques, 9 local offices linked to Muhammadiyah, and the houses of at least 18 Muhammadiyah localleaders. All this political violence was detailed in a white book compiled by the Muhammadiyah provincial board which simultaneously refused any financial compensation offered by the NU. 57

"Into the Valley of Death," Tempo, April 16,2001, p. 14-16. "Terror Politics," Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 20-21. "Sopbiaan, Tase\an, Hamid, Muhammadiyah Korban Kekerasan Politik, 2002. 55 56

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Tantamount to this spontaneous, violent response, there was a debate within the NU leaders on what should be done. All appeared to feel that the efforts to unseat Abdurrahman also concerned themselves. A veteran NU observer describes the growing resentment: "It was not only President Gus Dut who was being humiliated; it was the NU and its subculture,

it was the kyais, it was the entire, relatively backward segment of the population represented by the NU who were being humiliated. With Abdurrahman's election to the presidency, the NU had for the first time known itself to be a fully accepted element of the nation, as worthy of leading it as any other. His imminent ousting was a blow to self-respect."" Several NU kyai held a religious meeting (Bahtsul Masail) in Sukabumi, West Java on April 2, 2001 discussing whether moves to oust a democratically elected president should be fought with forces as being"bughaf', a term in Islamic law referring to insurgents against a legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence. 59 The meeting unanimously decided that opponents of the President were definitely guilty of bughat if two conditions were met: they are Muslims and they have the mass mobilization capacity to oppose the government. This resolution however was not backed by the PBNU which decided to avoid using any violent means to defend the president. Rather, the PBNU, in a meeting held in Cilegon, Banten, stated that the PBNU will not tolerate any physical violent action by anyone, because violence is forbidden by religion and also brings damage to the nation. This decision was a relief since many began to feel that there seemed to be an imminent clash between the pro-Abdurrahman militia (including the PBM) and the anti-Abdurrahman militias coming from various hard-liner Islamic groups. Worse still, religious arguments were used by both groups in almost different ways. In the eve of the second memorandum, the PBNU organized a massive istighotsah, a

public prayer gathering, on April 29, 2001 in Jakarta which was attended by more than twenty

5. 59

Van Bruinessen, "Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 38. "Flexibility", Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 19.

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thousand NU members. This event was purported as another political tool of the President and the NU in the ongoing power struggle against their adversaries. While many people feared the outbreak clash between the pro and anti-President, however, the event proceeded peacefully, and eventually the attendants also dispersed peacefully. The elite political conflict also exacerbated conflict among student organizations. While they were relatively united during the long protest against Suharto, those student organizations were divided by the dismissal of the President Abdurrahman. The Masyumiinspired student organization HMI (Hirnpunan Mahasiswa Islam), the newly Partai Keadilan student wing, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), the Muhammadiyah student organization (!MM), and most students from universities marched in streets demanding the Abdurrahman dismissal. Meanwhile, the NU-affiliated student organization PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), along with some smaller leftist organizations, did not directly defend Abdurrahman's presidency, they rather demanded the dismantling of the heir of the New Order regime, the Golkar party. In addition to the defense strategy based on religious and streets fronts, the NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi also made another effort to defend the Abdurrahman presidency. He toured many political figures to call for a political compromise instead of conflict. His objective was to gamer political support from political leaders. 6O He first of all visited President Abdurrahman to convey the message from several NU kyais from East and Central Java pleading him to calm down. Hasyim then visited Vice-President Megawati and the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif separately. Hasyim told them his concern about the imminent conflict in grassroots level and the urgency to take necessary actions to subside the 60

"Tak Cukup Bersafari," Gatra, 25 November 2000, p. 74-75.

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tension. Hasyim also visited some political party leaders such as Harnzah Haz ofPPP and Ahmad Sumargono ofPBB. While the NU have made many efforts to defend Abdurrahman's presidency, the Muharnmadiyah's response was not insignificant. During the outbreak of terror and threat against Muhammadiyah figureheads in some towns of East Java, the Muharnmadiyah leaders and members have not made any move. Since early March 2001, however, the Muhammadiyah leaders had sent clear messages that they supported the impeachment of President Abdurrahman. In the inaugural speech of his professorship, the deputy chairman of Muharnmadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, also pointed out that in Islamic political thought there is a possibility to impeach a president during his tenn, had he deviated from justice, lost one of his five-senses or vital organs, or engaged in a sexual affair; the cases that had allegedly happened in Abdurrahman's presidency and personality.61 Two days later the Muhammadiyah leaders made a clearer statement when they met with Vice President Megawati. The PP Muharnmadiyah stated that the national leadership had lost all moral and social legitimacy, and this indicated that the president should resign. They went on to state that wisdom, sincerity and statesmanship were necessary to save the national leadership in a constitutional manner. They also appealed to Megawati to prevent national disintegration and to conduct measures to save the nationalleadership.62 The Muhammadiyah's support to the dismissal of Abdurrahman had inevitably exacerbated the worse relationship between the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their supporters. The NU had made vigorous extra-parliamentary efforts to defend Abdurrahman's presidency. However, they could not prevent his dismissal when the MPR held an extraordinary 61

62

Syamsuddin, "Antara yang Berkuasa dan yang Dikuasai," 2005, p. 85-112. "Opportunity Knocks," Tempo, March 12, 2001.

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session on July 23, 2001 impeaching him and electing Megawati as the new president. But the NU did not lose everything. The MPR also elected Hamzah Haz, the PPP Chairman, as the new vice-president (hirnselfthe NU background, but has not shared Abdurrahman's political views). The ministry of religion was also granted to an NU academician, Said Agil Munawwar (meanwhile, Muhammadiyah kept the ministry of education). After the NU lost the Abdurrahman's presidency, at least the lesser gains remained. The next part wiII examine the roles played by the Muhammadiyah and NU in the 2004 presidential election. D. Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election

The ascension of Megawati to the presidency was welcomed with relief because the drama and chaos of21-months under President Abdurrahman had eventually come to an end. Many people hoped at least that Megawati would preside over period of stability that would enable her ministers to tackle the massive challenges that had largely been neglected during Abdurrahman presidency.63 Inheriting a state tom by a long constitutional crisis, indeed, this hope was met during her presidency as the political turbulence had subsided and the government had been stable. Unlike her predecessor, she aptly avoided provoking the anger of her political rivalries and maintained cordial relationship with all major political parties. While many considered Megawati a failed president in term of providing an effective leadership,64 however, a major break from the past representing an attempt to foster a more mature democracy occurred during her term. For example, under Amien's leadership, the MPR in November 2001 amended the constitution requiring for the first time direct election of all members of the DPR and the Regional Representative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan DaerahDPD), as well as the president and vice-president. According to the MPR consensus, the new 63

64

Crouch, "Political Update 2002," 2003, p. 15. See Lanti, "Indonesia: The Year of Continuing Turbulence," 2002, p. 111-129.

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system would encompass a number of new features. First, all 550 seats of the DPR would be filled by election. Neither military nor police would have any longer appointed representation as in the previous DPR. Second, all 128 DPD members would also be directly elected. Each of the country's 32 provinces has four seats in the DPD, which replace the appointed representatives of regional and functional groups. Third, the DPR together with the DPD formed a bicameral MPR. Fourth, as the presidential election would be held after the legislature election, a political party or

a coalition of political parties which won a threshold either 3% of the DPR seats or 5% of the nationwide vote could nominate the pairing candidate. Furthennore, unless a pairing candidate won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes (50 + 1%), a second round will be held between the two leading pairs to decide the winner.65 While this period was punctuated by political stability as no major conflict occurred among elite political leaders, however, some Islamic political parties were inflicted with deep internal division. The PKB was divided into two parties. This was an ensuing conflict of the previous political chaos, where the PKB chairman Matori and his supporters eventually voted for Abdurra1unan's impeachment in order to secure his own seat in Megawati's cabinet as the Minister of Defense. In 2002 attempts to reconcile Matori's rebel faction with Abdurra1unan failed, and since both factions operated as two entities with the same emblem. However, the PKB-led by Matori was fading out when Matori suffered an acute stroke in 2003 and his party was then disqualified by the election commission to contest for the 2004 election. The PPP experienced a similar internal conflict. Some young PPP politicians, mostly from the modernist camp, led by a renowned Islamic preacher Zainuddin M.Z., had demanded to speed up the PPP congress before the 2004 election in order to accelerate the political regeneration within the " See Enunerson, "A Year of Voting Dangerously," 2004, p. 104; Smith, "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's Way," 2003, p. 101.

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party. Meanwhile, some others PPP politicians under vice-president Hamzah adamantly defended the congress to be held after the 2004 election. This was deemed by the former as a trick for the later to secure their tickets in the 2004 legislature and presidential elections. AB no consensus was reached, the young group split and formed the new PPP Reformasi, and later on participated in the 2004 election as the Partai Bintang Reformasi (pBR, Reform Star Party). In the meantime, during the period between the two year-long political turbulence and

ahead of the 2004 election, the relationship between the Muslim civil society organizations and political parties was ambiguous. This was partly because of the remnants from difficult political relationship during the Abdurrahman's presidency, where the NU leaders strived to defend him in his palace. On the other hand, this was also because of political competition for the presidential election among leaders of political parties and Muslim civil society organizations. More than 200 political parties registered to take part in the 2004 elections but only 24 parties were qualified to contest, including 5 leading parties which had taken part in the 1999 election: the PDI-P of President Megawati; the Golkar Party, the former party of the Suharto regime; the PKB of Abdurrahman; the PPP of Vice-President Hamzah Haz; and the PAN of Amien. Out ofthe 24 parties running for legislative seats, 7 Islamic parties participated in this second democratic election during the reform era. 66 In this election, only seven parties emerged as meaningful vote getters. Leading the field was GoIkar with 2 1.6 % of the vote, followed closely by the PDI-P with 18.5 %. The PKB ran a distant third with 10.6 %, while the PPP tallied 8.5 %, the new Democrat Party took 7.5 %, a freshly renamed Islarnist formation called the PKS took 7.3 %, and the PAN took seventh place with a 6.4 % showing. 67

66 On the prevalence of political aliran during this election, see Lanti, "Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004," 2004. • 7 Qodari, "Indonesia's Quest," 2005, p. 78.

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Table 2 Results of the Parliamentary Elections (1999 and 2004) Election 1999 2004

PDI-P 33.7% 18.5%

Golkar 22.5% 21.6%

PKB 12.7% 10.6%

PPP 10.7% 8.2%

PAN 7.1% 6.4%

PBB 1.9% 2.6%

PKJPKS 1.4% 7.3%

PD

7.5%

In fact, support declined for all five major vote-getter of 1999, a decline no doubt attributable to the fact that both Abdurrahman's and Megawati's post-1999 governments had been based on grand coalitions of all the major parties. The people have apparently shown their displeasure with these ruling parties which had not done much for the people.

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Indonesia's

economic malaise had entered its seventh year, but economic growth remained too low to absorb the growing labor force. 69 Such political disillusionment is common in countries experiencing a protracted democratic transition, where politics was punctuated by instability and economic reform has not yet delivered its promise of welfare. It seemed that the 2004 parliamentary election functioned well for people to punish the failed ruling parties. The main beneficiaries of the popular disillusionment were the Partai Keadilan Sejabtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) and Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party) which during the electoral campaign both aptly sought to dissociate themselves with the government of the preceding five years while they were indeed parts of them. Moreover, the PD's strong performance can be attributed solely to the popularity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) whose profile soared in the wake of his marginalization within Megawati's cabinet and subsequent resignation from his ministerial portfolio, which elicited widespread media attention and considerable public sympathy. Meanwhile, the PKS in particular shifted its strategy from direct advocacy of the syariah to the fight against corruption, collusion and

68

69

Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Elections 2004," 2004, p. 117. Aspinall, "Elections and the Normalization of Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 123.

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nepotism, issues the big parties had to struggle with as they attempted to overcome public perception of their complicities in such activities. 70 As far as the performance of Islamic political parties is concerned, if the total votes

received by all the Muslim parties are tallied excluding the PAN and the PKB, in the 2004 parliamentary election they received 23 percent of the vote, or 127 of the 550 seats in the DPR. If the PAN and the PKB are included, then they gained 42 percent or 231 seats this year. In 1999 they got 34 percent of the vote or 171 seats (out of500). From the results of this parliamentary election, it was clear that the multi-party system of 1999 remained in place. In fact, the parliament became more fragmented than in 1999 as major parties gained lower percentages in 2004. This led to the conclusion that the government would once again be formed by a coalition and power-sharing arrangements as part of concessions might be given by presidential candidates to secure office. The likely implication was that the desire for strong government might be elusive, reflecting the failure of the election to produce a decisive result thereby making the outcome for the presidential polls uncertain. When the results of the parliamentary election were announced, it became clear that only seven parties were qualified to propose their candidates. Other parties could only do so when they combined their votes. In addition, during the presidential election, candidates for both president and vice-president should be proposed as a pair. Therefore, the pairing mostly depended on the results of the parliamentary election, as it enabled the potential candidates to find their running mates or conversely other candidates prefer to serve as vice-presidential candidates in order to share power and attract more votes. However, political parties are also

70

Sebastian, "The Paradox ofIndonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 264-265.

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allowed to nominate a person who is not originally a party member. This will offer a chance to some respected non-politician figures to be presidential or vice-presidential candidates. Both religion and ethnicity played a significant role in the pairing process. All of the presidents of Indonesia, except Habibie who assumed office by default, were Javanese. This divide between Javanese and non-Javanese constituted a crucial factor in the pairing process. Thus, if the proposed president was a Javanese, then it might be prudent to have a running mate who was non-Javanese (or vice versa) in order to gamer the necessary votes from outer islands. In this regard, the new leaders would be able to project themselves as a truly "Indonesian team" rather than fueled what was increasingly perceived as a perpetuation of Javanese domination. 7l Similarly significant was the divide between Islam and nationalist political outlooks. While all of the Indonesian presidents were Muslims, however, except Abdurrahman they came from the nationalist camp. Therefore, if the proposed presidents were nationalist, they tended to look for their running mates from Islamic political parties or organizations and vice versa. In a largely Islamic populace, the winner would be one that was able to appeal to the majority of the Muslim voters. It was in this context that the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their leaders plausibly played a significant role. Since long before the parliamentary election, there were a number of presidential hopefuls. The PDI-P had nominated Megawati, the incumbent. Similarly, the PAN had also nominated Amien Rais, while the PKB had nominated Abdurrahman. Apart from these three candidates, there was also Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBy), coordinating minister of security under the Megawati government who was proposed by the PD; Akbar Tanjung (the Golkar Party Chairman and speaker of the DPR); Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (former coordinating

71

Singh, "The 2004 Presidential Elections in Iodone8ia," 2003, p. 439.

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minister of security fired by Abdurrahman in 1999); Let. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto (fonner Suharto's son in law and fonner chief of the anny special force); Nurcholish Madjid (leading Islamic scholar), Sultan Hamengku Buwono X (Sultan and governor of Jogjakarta); JusufKalla (coordinating minister for people's welfare under Megawati); Aburizal Bakrie (businessman); and Surya Paloh (Head of Metro-TV and daily newspaper Media Indonesia). While the PDI-P, PAN, PKB, and PD had openly declared their respective candidates, the Golkar party as the winner of the parliamentary election held a convention in order to select their presidential nominees. In the convention, aimed at increasing internal democratization and attracting extra-voters, the last eight aforementioned candidates vied for the Golkar ticket. 72 By the time of the Golkar convention on April 20, Wiranto extraordinarily won in the convention designed by Akbar Tanjung in the hope that he would be the main beneficiary. While Wiranto had supposedly the most effective electoral machine in Golkar, it was questionable whether he could manage full support from the Golkar voters since it was rumored that Akbar did not support Wiranto's nomination wholeheartedly,73 and the fact that JusufKaIla's nomination as SBY's vice-presidential candidate might split the Golkar voters. Similarly problematic was Arnien's nomination. After securing the PAN's support for his nomination in its Jogjakarta congress on February 2000, he began to push the Muhanunadiyah leaders to declare its fonnal support since 2002. It was also reported that there had been repeated pressure put on Muhanunadiyah leaders from PAN supporters within the organization to endorse Arnien through a fonnal declaration. However, Muhanunadiyah leaders such as the Chainnan Syafii Maarif and the Secretary General Haedar Nashir repeatedly 72 Three candidates dropped their candidacies for different reasons. Nurcholish could not afford a large sum of money needed to run up to the convention; JusufKalla accepted SBY's bid to become his running mate; and Sultan argued that it would be morally incorrect to compete with Akbar, after the later was freed by the Supreme Court from the Bulog scandai. 73 Ananta at.ai., Emerging Democracy in Indonesia, 2005, p. 79.

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refused the pressure and said that the formal support would be an inappropriate political move since Mubammadiyah was not a political party and that it would jeopardize the impartial character of the organization.74 The first collision between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah annual meeting (Tanwir) in Bali on January 2002. During the meeting, the pro-Amien faction insisted Mubammadiyah to explicitly mention Amien's name as the presidential nominee. On the other

hand, the pro-impartiality faction defended that such declaration would violate the natural nonpolitical character of the organization. Amien and his supporters were further shocked by the Mubammadiyah's invitation to President Megawati to open the Tanwir. This was deemed by Amien as Mubammadiyah leaning to support Megawati rather than himself. Worse still, in her remarks, Megawati stressed that Mubammadiyah was not a strange entity to her, since she was brought up in a Mubammadiyah family. She recalled that her father the late Sukarno, was a member of the Mubammadiyah, and once even served in the movement's executive body. Megawati's mother was also the daughter ofMubammadiyah's top executive in Bengkulu, Sumatra. "And I believe that it is for the first time in history that a woman from a Mubammadiyah family is leading this country as its president," she said, to huge applause from the participants. 75 The compromise was eventually reached, however, and the final recommendation stated that "the Mubammadiyah will support its best cadres to become the national leader," without naming who "the best cadres" are. The next political battle between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah Tanwir on June 2003 in Makassar. As the presidential election was getting closer, the demand for Mubammadiyah to declare its support for Amien had also mounted. Ahead to the Tanwir, 74

7S

See Tanthowi, "Mnhammadiyah dan Pencalonan Amien Rais," 2003. "Megawati Opens Mnhammadiyah Annual Meeting in Denpasar," The Jakarta Post, January 25, 2002.

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the national media was embellished by a dispute between Amien and Syafii concerning Muhammadiyah's appropriate standpoint on Amien's candidacy. While the Tanwir participants were discussing Muhammadiyah's stance, a meeting between members of the PP Muhammadiyah with Amien and his supporters was held in order to reach consensus. It was reported that in the meeting Amien did not conceal his anger with Syafii's open rejection to endorse his nomination. It was also reported that some Muhammadiyah leaders went out of the meeting infuriated by Amien's belligerence. The consensus was eventually reached stating: ''The Tanwir 'comprehended the participants' aspiration concerning the nomination of the Muhamrnadiyah's best cadre in the 2004 presidential election, in the framework of the refonn continuation and country's salvation...The Tanwir entrusted to the central board of the Muhamrnadiyah to follow lIP this aspiration and in a proper time issue an instruction for all Muhamrnadiyah members.,,'6 The awkward relationship between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was exacerbated by the issue heard by Amien that Syafii was on the top ofMegawati's list of vice-presidential nominees. Depite Syafii' s persistence that between two buses would not overtake each other, meaning that he would not vie for the Muhammadiyah's support,77 Amien increased his pressure on Muhammadiyah to endorse his candidacy before the parliamentary election, hoping that the endorsement will simultaneously increase the support of the Muhammadiyah members for his party. As the pressure was unstoppable, the Muhammadiyah eventually "fully endorsed Amien as the best cadre and former Muhammadiyah chairman to strive for the reform continuation and the country's salvation in the 2004 presidential election.,,78 In a political statement to conclude its plenary session on February 9-10, 2004 in Yogyakarta, 76 See Tanfidz Tanwir Muhammadiyah Tahun 1424 W2003 M, Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah, No. 04/2003'j? 21-22. Interview with A. Syafii Maarif on December 24, 2007 in J ogjakarta. In his words, he said "sesarna bus kOla tidak boleh saling rnendahului." 78 See Keputusan Sidang Pleno Pimpinan Pusat Muharnrnadiyah Bersarna Ketua-Ketua Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah tentang Kebijakan Mubarnrnadiyah Menghadapi Pernilu 2004. The open debate on the Muhammadiyah's support for Amien was detailed in Siandes, Muhammadiyah, 2004.

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Muharnmadiyah emphasized that Amien was the country's best hope and the refonnist figure who still committed to fuIIy implementing the ideals of reformasi. To the dislike of some of Amien's supporters who sought a side effect of the declaration for their party's benefit, Syafii reiterated that the endorsement had nothing to do with the PANas Muharnmadiyah members were free to choose any political party. It was widely circulated that, for Muharnmadiyah members, ''whatever their political parties, their president would invariably be Amien." Partly because of such unbinding dictum, the PAN saw its vote share dropped from 7.1 to 6.4%. During the first week after the parliamentary election, it was reported that Amien was shocked by the PAN's poor perfonnance and began rating his own chance was threatened. There had been a number of rumors circulating in Jakarta that Amien would quit the presidential race or would simply be the ruuning mate. Many Muharnmadiyah members were also nervous and demoralized. They began to realize that ''whatever their political parties, their president would invariably be Amien" fonnula at last decreased Amien's chance in the ensuing presidential election. Finally, a week after the parliamentary election, Amien announced in the Muhammadiyah office that he remained runuing for president. This particular place was not insiguificant for such announcement. According to Amien's political advisor Rizal Sukma, it would send a strong message that Amien was still the indispensable Islamic leader without having to say so. It would give also the impression that his decision was not without a clear power base. Finally, it would also send a clear reminder to those Muharnmadiyah members who did not vote for the PAN that in the presidential election they should vote for him.79 A similar awkward relationship developed between the NU and Abdurrahman during the Megawati presidency. Along with the PKB chainnan Matori who decided to join the

79

Confidentiallet!er from Rizal Sukma for Amien Rais, April 8, 2004.

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extraordinary MPR session unseating Abdurrahman, the NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi disagreed with the planned violence to defend Abdurrahman's presidency. Seeing the powerful movement toppling Abdurrabman, the NU priority, according to Hasyim, was to save what could be saved for the NU's interests. The PPP chairman Harnzah was thus elected vice-president and the ministry of religion was granted to the NU leader, Said Agil Munawwar. Hasyim's maneuver was criticized by Abdurrahman, accusing Hasyim of doing little to prevent the special session of the MPR. The rift between the NU and Abdurrahman increased after the fall of Abdurrahman, involved the attitude to be taken toward the new Megawati government. 80 While Abdurralunan refused any contact with Megawati in the months following his impeachment, Hasyim and other NU leaders have kept regular contact. The rivalry between Abdurrahman and Hasyim surprised many people, since Abdurrahman backed Hasyim's election in the 1999 NU congress. The ensuing tension intensified concerning the presidential issue. The PKB had declared its support for Abdurrahman to run in the presidential election. Many PKB leaders also stated that the party would nominate Hasyim as PKB's presidential candidate if Abdurrahman resigned from the race either for health or other reasons. Seeing this chance, early in February 2004 Hasyim called on the NU members to vote for the PKB with former president Abdurrahman as its presidential hopeful. Tantamount to the Muharnmadiyah endorsement to Amien's candidacy, Hasyim said that PKB was NU's political vehicle and NU members and supporters should fully support the party. Despite strong criticism from some NU supporters from the PPP saying that such a call could cause conflict among the grass roots, Hasyim said ''the political support will come not from the NU institution but from NU

80

Feillard, "Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 139.

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members. NU members will be obliged to cast their votes for PKB and the latter should recognize the NU membership of those who give their support to other parties. ,,81 However, Abdurrahman did not allow Hasyim diminishing his chance with pleasure. He insisted that he was the only possible PKB candidate. In mid February 2004 Abdurrahman began his campaign to unseat Hasyim from the NU's leadership through an extraordinary NU congress. Hasyim himself admitted that there had been an undeclared war between him and Gus Dur for the impeachment reason. 82 Hasyim also admitted that Abdurrahman was disappointed after he refused to support Alwi's PKB over Matori's in the PKB conflict. Hasyim argued that he did it to preserve the NU's impartiality. After it became clear for Hasyim that his prospect in the PKB was slim and Abdurrahman's assault on his NU post intensified, Hasyim began his campaign that the NU refused to support the PKB in the parliamentary election. When a number of the PKB leaders met him at the NU office to ask for the NU's support due to the fact that "the party was born from the NU's womb", Hasyim asserted that he would prevent the NU becoming involved in politics. "Both the PKB and NU must keep their own institutions healthy. Although the PKB was born from us (the NU), we are different institutions. The NU is a religious organization while the PKB is a political organization, so just don't mix them up," Hasyim said. 83 At the same time, Megawati had been seeking a prominent national figure who could revive her beleaguered image and boost her chances of winning. In an earlier meeting, PDI-P had considered a Muslim leader to complement the party's broad support from grassroots members with its nationalist/secular orientation. As mentioned above, there was a tendency for

"Mnbammadiyah Backs Amien," The Jakana Post, February II, 2004. ''Hasyim Challenges Move to Unseat Him from Post," The Jakana Post, February 28, 2004. 83 ''NU Refuses to Support PKB in 2004 Polls," The Jakana Post, March 6, 2006. 81

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nationalist leaders to team up with the Muslim leaders and vice versa. For Megawati, in particular, this was aimed at complementing her lacking Islamic credentials, as some Islamic leaders using religious arguments had been campaigning to disqualify her bid because of her gender. With this criterion, after the reluctance of the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif, the chance remained wide open for the PDI-P to pick one of the NU figures, either Hasyim Muzadi or vice-president Hamzah Haz of the PPP. Complicating the matter, Wiranto, after winning the Golkar ticket, was also eyeing his running mate from the Muslim camp. With Muhammadiyah declaring its support for Amien, a struggle ensued to secure the NU figures. However, the NU ticket was not easy to secure. On the one hand, Hasyim, fearing Wiranto's record of human rights abuses, opted instead to partner with Megawati. Wiranto keen on securing a presidential running mate from the NU and considering Abdurrahman's opposition to Hasyim's candidacy, turned his attention to Abdurrahman's younger brother Solahuddin Wahld. The latter was Hasyim's deputy chairman of the NU and was endorsed by the PKB, the main party representing the NU. Meanwhile, Harnzah, after Megawati had chosen Hasyim as her running mate, decided to run for the presidency. Actual1y, the PPP was divided about his decision to run, but in the end they relented, even though they knew his chance was slim. Worse still, Abdurrahman initially also continued his candidacy and chose Marwah Daud Ibrahim, a Golkar female leader coming from Sulawesi, as his partner. However, this pair was barred by the election commission (KPU) from taking part in the presidential election as Abdurrahman failed the medical check-up test. As far as Amien's partner was concerned, Amien was keen to take a nationalist figure

as his running mate. Amien had earlier mul1ed on running with SBY, but it turned out that the latter's party got more votes in the parliamentary election than PAN. Amien then turned his

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attention to the military commander Endriartono Sutarto, but the latter refused his offer. After weeks of uncertainty, Amien announced on early May former minister Siswono Yudo Husodo as his running mate for the July 5 presidential race. Siswono said he hoped his candidacy would create a solid and harmonious duo between Amien, "a nationalist, religious" figure and himself, a man who always "tries to be religious, and a nationalist".84 Finally, when the campaign for the presidential election began, only five pairs took part in the race: Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid (proposed by Golkar), SBY-JusufKalla (proposed by the PD), Amien Rais-Siswono (proposed by PAN), Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (proposed by the PDI-P), and Harnzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (proposed by the PPP). Looking at their ethnic backgrounds, among the presidential candidates, all but one (Hamzah) were Javanese. Among the vice-presidential candidates, three of them were Javanese (Hasyim, Solahuddin, and Agum) while the other two were non-Javanese (Siswono and Jusuf Kalla). Looking at the religious backgrounds of the candidates, it is obvious that all were Muslim. In terms of their political outlooks, however, out of all presidential candidates, three were nationalists (Megawati, Wiranto and SBy), while the rest were Islamic (Amien and Harnzah). Among the vice-presidential candidates, three were Islamic (Hasyim, Solahuddin, and JusufKa\la) while the rest were nationalists (Siswono and Agum). It was clear that in the presidential election, the Muhammadiyah support was relatively unified behind Amien's bid since there was only one candidate from the modernist camp. While the Muhammadiyah itself did not officially set up a campaign team, a number of its leaders have listed themselves in the official campaign team for Amien-Siswono. The Muhammadiyah deputy chairman Din Syamsuddin, who is not officially included in the

84

"Amien Names Siswono as Running Mate in July 5 Race," The Jakarta Post, May 10, 2004.

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Anllen-Siswono team, has also set up the Refonn-Minded People's (MPR) movement, which works to garner support for the pair. At the same token, the regional leadership of Muhammadiyah throughout the country as well as its youth and woman wings has initiated respectively to set up similar campaign teams. Relatively significant for Anllen's bid was the support from several small parties. At the end of May 2004, six minor political parties-the Marhaenisme Indonesian National Party (PNI Marhaenisme), Social Democratic Labor Party (PBSD), Freedom BuB National Party (pNBK), Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (pPDI), Indonesian Unity Party (pSI) and the Refonn Star Party (pBR)-announced their supports for the Amien-Siswono pairing. With PAN and Muhammadiyah as the main sponsors, additional votes from these parties were expected to increase the estimate votes for Anllen-Siswono to 17 millions. Somewhat problematic was the support from the PKS. Despite its good showing in the parliamentary election, the PKS did not propose any presidential candidates, nor did any presidential candidates seek their partner among the PKS leaders. Although the PKS has been weB-known for its cohesive network, meaning that the existing presidential candidates from the nationalist camp could secure this Muslim voting bloc, they were highly unlikely willing to be identified too Islamic, as the PKS had been considered to be the most conservative Muslim party, along with the PBB and PPP. Rather, they preferred Muslim leaders from a pluralist Islamic party and organizations, such as PKB, NU, or Muhammadiyah. During the campaign period, a strenuous tug-of-war between two camps within the party had prevented it to take a swift decision over whom it should endorse: Wiranto or

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Amien. 85 The official reason was their confusion about the candidate who had a greater chance of beating Megawati. Most party officials appeared to prefer Wiranto, but they had a problem with the Golkar Party which was seen as a legacy of the New Order, a regime which suppressed Muslims' political expression. However, Wiranto's strength was that he had a greater chance of beating Megawati because he was backed by the Golkar which won most votes in the April poll. As for Amien, the latter's chances of even surviving the first round was considered small. Therefore their aim of replacing Megawati would likely fail. His strength, however, was that Amien had a long record ofIslamic leadership and once regarded as a "locomotive of reform". Despite this formal reason, people had rumored that this division was based on a reason as trivial as the grooming of a head scarf ofa candidate's wife. 86 Five days before the voting, the PKS decided late in the game to throw its support behind Amien-Siswono. This late decision was seen by many as "playing it safe" and the most likely consensus reached by both camps. Despite Wiranto' better chance, supporting him might risk the PKS's pro-reform image. This decision was also aimed at debunking an allegation that they were controlled by Wiranto and his money. Therefore, rather than merely speculating on victory, it was far better to remain close to Amien, since the members of the PKS and Amien's PAN basically came from the same circles: the urban Muslim middle class, campuses and politically enlightened communities. The decision would enhance its identity as a Muslimbased party that opted to back candidate who will strive for its members' interests. However, both camps delayed endorsing Amien until the last days in order to absolve themselves from endorsing the secular candidates without having to work hard to campaign for Amien. 8S "PKS is Tom between Wiranto, Amien," The Jakarta Post, June 5, 2004. The party bas pledged not to support the incumbent president because of her failure to achieve significant progress during her administration. 86 Sukanto, ''What's Taking the PKS So Long to Make up Its Mind?" 2004. Many PKS concerned Amien's wife which bas not really covered her hair. Neither does one ofhis daughters. Meanwhile, Wiranto's wife and two daughters wear the Islamic head scarf, and another family member is a supporter of the PKS.

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Therefore, the PKSs support for Amien did not necessarily mean that the candidate would expect the votes of all of the party's members, meaning that Amien's chances have not automatically been enhanced to a significant degree. This late support left an indelible effect in the following years in the strained relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the PKS. Unlike the relatively united Muhammadiyah support for Amien, the emergence of several NU candidates divided and confused its members as they would have to choose one of the figures. The conflict among NU grassroots supporters was unavoidable as the elite tried to influence the NU members to win their votes. Some believed that the emergence of some NU candidates was wittingly orchestrated to put a foot in all pairs. 87 According to the acting NU chairman Masdar Mas 'udi, however, that was not the case. 88 The 2004 presidential election saw the open fight among NU leaders to woo the NU members' support. On the one hand, the PKB executive board unanimously decided to fully support Wiranto-Solahuddin. The decision, however, was made without a clear endorsement from Abdurrabman, as he had earlier pledged to abstain in the July 5 polls in protest over the KPU's decision to disqualify him from the race. Abdurrabman had given his blessing to Solahuddin to run as Wiranto's running mate, although it did not mean that he altogether supported the pair. 89 Intemal division was unavoidable when NU decided to let Hasyim became Megawati's running mate. Although Hasyim was less influential within the NU community than Abdurrahman, however, he was the formal NU leader who commanded the NU structures. This internal conflict was punctuated by the split among NU leaders. As a traditional Islamic community, NU members depend upon kyai not only in their religious life, but also in

Staff, "Some Lessons from the Democratization Process," 2004, p. 132. Interview with Masdar F. Mas 'udi on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta. 89 "PKB Divided over Candidate Choice," The Jakarta Post, May 14, 2004. 87 88

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social and political fields. Each time, prior to the general election, NU leaders delivered a statement that told them who to vote for. Such statement had been usually strategic and powetful, but not this time. Most kyai and bigpesantrens such as Pesantren Lirboyo Kediri, Genggong Probolinggo and Sukorejo Situbondo, were supporters ofHasyim, and the kyai delivered a statement to NU members and santri (pesantren pupils) to vote for the MegaHasyim pairing. Similarly, the Wiranto-Solahuddin pairing was supported by Abdurrahman and Abdullah Faqih, the most influential kyai of the PKB, and the leader ofPesantren Langitan Tuban. This internal conflict was not only in Jakarta. It was also the case on local levels. Each local kyai pursued their own interests and took side with one of the candidates and sought to influence their santri to vote for their candidates. Many kyai were now busy supporting one of the candidates while neglecting the educational process in pesantren. 90 In order to minimize the impact of conflict on the NU organization, the supreme (Syuriah) NU council during its meeting on May 17 in Rembang, Central Java, finally, decided that all NU candidates and their official campaign team members could not be active in the organization. The meeting was attended by numerous Syuriah members such as Fachrudin Masturo, Mustofa Bisri, Fuad Hasyim, Said Agil Siradj, Tholchah Hasan, Masdar, Manarul Hidayat, Fahri Toha and Chotibul Umam Wiranu. The syuriah also decided to appoint Masdar the acting NU chairman, replacing Hasyim, who was declared non-active by NU's Syuriah Council. Aside from Hasyim, Solahuddin had earlier resigned voluntarily from his post in NU.

In addition to these decisions, Masdar also prohibited all NU leaders, including those of affiliated bodies, from making statements on behalf of the organization supporting any presidential or vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election. The decision to suspend

.. uNU, Mubammadiyah Involvement in Politics May Weaken Them," The Jakarta Post, May 12,2004.

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Hasyim and other NU leaders who were involved in the presidential campaign was made to maintain the neutrality ofNU. 91 Masdar said the ban applied to leaders ofNU and autonomous organizations, including Ansor, Muslimat, IPNU, IPPNU, and Lakpesdam NU, from their central boards down to the grassroots level. He stressed that NU would not issue a political edict as suggested by a number ofNU leaders, saying that NU had decided not to support or reject any presidential and vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election. While some presidential candidates vying for political support from Islamic political parties and organizations alike, the support was not the only significant factor dominating the people's decision-making. It was theoretically true that the backing of a considerable party mechanism which would be able to convert the advantages of popularity into votes at the ballot booth. Here, networks and organization would be essential to concretize popular support, thus the critical role of the political party.92 Similarly insignificant was the solid platform for a presidential bid. Many people had yet to take the candidates' platform and programs into account when they went into the polls. It is important to note that the presidential election was the election of individuals rather than parties. Therefore, the 2004 presidential election proved that personal image and popularity were more important than party affiliation. 93 In the first round presidential election held in July 5, The SBY-Kalla pairing obtained 33.57% of the vote. The pair was followed by Megawati-Hasyim (26.61 %), Wiranto-Solehuddin (22.15%), AmienSiswono (14.66%), and Harnzah-Agum (3.01 %). Although during the first round candidates with major party support tended to gain some advantage, it was not that crucial. The result

''NU Leaders Banned from Taking Side," The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2004. Sebastian, "The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 274. 93 Suryadinata, "Indonesia: The Year ofa Democratic Election," 2005, p. 138. 91

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showed that popularity and personal image mattered; otherwise, Yudhoyono would have obtained only 11.33% (the PD, PBB and PKPI votes).94 The period between the first and second rounds of the presidential election was a busy time in Indonesian politics. As there were only two candidates, new alliances were formed and new strategies were set Up. Major and medium-sized political parties began to eye the likely winning pair in order to reap post-election benefits. During this period, Megawati appeared to be more active to invite partners into new alliance. The Golkar chairman Akbar drove his party to support Megawati, despite strong opposition from a number of Golkar leaders. The PPP also joined the Megawati camp. These three major political parties, supplemented by four small other political parties (the PBR, PDS, PKPB, and PNI Marhaenisme) formed the Koalisi

Kebangsaan (National Coalition) on August 19, 2004 which was chaired by Akbar. Based on their gain in the parliamentary election, they expected to gain at least 55.8% total votes. On the other hand, SBY-Kalla had also expanded their coalition. During the first round they were backed only by three political parties (pO, PBB, and PKPI). Ahead to the runoff they had received additional support from the PKS. These four parties formed the

Koalisi Kerakyatan (People's Coalition) on August 26, 2004. In total, the People's Coalition would have secured only 21.4% total votes. Meanwhile, both the PKB and PAN decided to remain neutral and advised their constituencies to decide themselves on who to be voted. 95 On a party coalition basis, Megawati had the upper hand, but the direct presidential election was based on personality, and party support was not as crucial as personal image and perceived capability by the voters. When the second round presidential election was held on

94

On the losing and winning pairs in the first round presidential election, see Ananta alai., Emerging

Democrafl, in Indonesia, 2005, p. 74-89. , Staff, "Challenges to the New Government," 2004, p. 329.

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September 20, SBY-Kalla received 60.62% votes, while Megawati-Hasyim received 39.38% votes. The second round presidential election confinned that the party machinery, upon which Megawati-Hasyim had relied, flunked the elections. The election results proved that the use of party machinery in generating party loyalties was ineffective. 96 This, however, needs further evidences from local elections and the coming 2009 presidential election. On October 20, 2004, SBY assumed office as Indonesia's sixth president. On that day, the cabinet was announced and a new administration established. There were last minute negotiations and bargaining. The cabinet was not entirely the professional cabinet that SBY promised. Rather, it was a compromise cabinet, made up of political appointees and professionals. 97 Out of36 posts, 16 ministers represented political parties. Apart from political parties backing him in the runoff (PD 2 posts, PKS 3 posts, PBB 2 posts, and PKPI 1 post), SBY also incorporated some ministers representing splinter groups from political parties which did not support him. They were included Alwi Shihab and SyaifuIIah Yusuf of the PKB, Bachtiar Chamsah of the PPP, and Aburizal Bakrie and Fahmi Idris ofthe Golkar party. He was aware of the potential opposition coming from the National Coalition had he neglected them in the cabinet line-up. By doing so, SBY sought to make the best use of the division for his own gain. While he could exploit those internal divisions, he could also enhance the inclusive image of his new administration to garner more public legitimacy. Looking at the other posts, there were some ministers representing the NU and Muharnmadiyah. The ministry of religion was granted to the Indonesian ambassador to Egypt Maftuh Basyuni, himself from NU. The PBNU had never recommended anyone for a

96 On the discussion about personality and political machinery as the key to political success in the 2004 Indonesian presidential election, see Aspinall, "Politics," 2005, 20-23. 97 On the complete cabinet line-up, see Shiraishi, ''Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 25-39.

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ministerial post, since its chainnan in tandem with Megawati were the rival ofSBY-Kalla in the run-off. The Maftuh's appointment was thus the SBY's own initiative. When SBY assigned his entourage to open contact with Hasyim in order to ensure that the path was paved for Maftuh to assume the ministry, Hasyim was more than happy that the NU was still awarded the desired ministerial post although the man had not any record in the NU leadership.98 Unlike the appointment of the ministry of religion from the NU, the Muharnmadiyah, that appeared to be neutral before the second round, began to prepare three ministerial candidates after it became clear that SBY-Kalla won the run-off. They were the ministry of defense, ministry of national education, and ministry of health. During the cabinet fonnation, the national media began to name the Muharnmadiyah candidates Rizal Sukma to assume the ministry of defense. In the final process, however, SBY-Kalla asked the Muhammadiyah to nominate a female figure for the ministry of health, while Muhammadiyah had prepared the male one. During the last hours, the Muharnmadiyah eventually offered Siti Fadilah Supari, the daughter offormer chairman of the Central Java Muharnmadiyah provincial board and a senior doctor in the Jakarta Muhammadiyah hospital, as the minister of health. While SBY government succeeded to minimize a growing opposition threatening his presidency, as all major political and social organizations have been represented in the cabinet, the major political battles after a year-long 2004 elections were among rival groups in major political and social organizations. The next part will study the leadership changes in Islamic organizations and their further relationship with political parties.

E. National Congress and Leadership Change

.. "Why Mega Stayed Away," Tempo, November 1, 2004, p. 27.

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The following months after the presidential elections saw the intensified conflict between the NU and Abdurrahrnan Wahid and to some degree between the Muharnrnadiyah and Arnien Rais, when both organizations held their congress. Surprisingly, the outcome of these conflicts was similar in term of the declining influence of both Abdurrahrnan and Arnien in those Islamic organizations where they once headed. Ahead to the NU congress scheduled to take place in Surakarta, Central Java on November 28-December 3, 2004, Abdurrahrnan sought to prevent Hasyirn's re-nomination for the NU chairman, despite Hasyirn's intention to re-nominate himself. Abdurrahrnan saw Hasyirn dragging the NU into practical politics as he politicized the NU during the presidential election when he stood as Megawati's running mate. On the other hand, Hasyirn replied that those people who accused him dragging the NU into politics were (the PKB) politicians. In fact, this conflict was the continuation of the previous rift within the NU during the presidential election. The Abdurrahrnan's camp consisted of many NU leaders and kyai who supported the Wiranto-Solahuddin pair, while Hasyim's camp consisted of those kyai who supported him and Megawati. Abdurrahrnan and his PKB supporters feared that the NU would be a political vehicle again, should Hasyim be re-elected to lead the NU, just like when he teamed up with Megawati in the 2004 presidential election. For Hasyirn and his supporters, Abdurrahrnan's efforts were simply aimed to control the NU leadership and prevent its use to support any candidate contradicting the PKB's candidate in the 2009 presidential election. The kick offhad been given during the first week after the presidential election, when Hasyirn resumed his position in the NU leadership. A number ofNU leaders supporting him during the campaign had also their suspension lifted. While officially this enabled Hasyim to

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prepare for the NU congress, it also enabled Hasyim to wield his influence as the NU chairman to re-nominate himself. Meanwhile, Abdurrahman used many ways to block Hasyim's road to the NU chairman. He nominated himself for the supreme (Syuriah) NU council,99 while persuading the current Syuriah chairman Sahal Mahfudz, himself Abdurrahman's uncle, not to accept his renomination for the post. In order to extend the support, he ordered the PKB politicians and MPs as well as mobilized a large number of senior kyai to persuade the delegates from provincial and local branches. He also tried to lobby Sahal to council Hasyim not to nominate himself again. However, Sahal did not comply. Rather, he left the decisions entirely to the congress participants. "IfI were to obstruct him from nominating again, it would mean I was declaring something haram (illegal) that is actually halal (legal) under law," he said. lOO For the candidate for the Tanjidziyah (executive) chairman, Abdurrahman cited many names. Initially he named Cecep Syarifuddin, one of the deputy NU chairman. Not long after, he changed his candidate to Tolchah Hassan, former minister of religion during his presidency. Later on, he mentioned Mustofa Bisri, a well respected kyai-cum-poet. Unfortunately, they eventually refused to contest. Finally, the Abdurrahman's camp threw its support for Masdar Mas'udi, the acting NU chairman during the presidential elections. Hasyim and his supporters did know, of course, that those entitled to vote at the congress were the executives of provincial and local branches. Since the beginning he seemed to have confidence that most provincial and local branches supported him. Hasyim was known 99 In the NU constitution, the Syuriah council holds the highest authority over the Tanfidziyah. However, since the Abdurrahrnan's Tanfidziyah leadership (1984-1999) the Syuriah had been overshadowed by the Tanfidziyah, because he is the grandson of the NU founder and his intellectual capacity exceeded anyone in the organization. In the congress, the nomination for the Tanfidziyah chainnan is possible as long as they were approved by the elected Synriah. In this regard, should Abdurrahrnan won the Synriah chairman, he could block Hasyim's renomination, or restore the Synriah position over the Tanfidziyah regardless of the elected Tanfidziyah chairman. """A Threat fromKrarnat Raya," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 14.

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for his generosity to "look after" (Javanese, ngopeni) those branches and pesantren. He frequently visited those branches and pesantren during his term and donated funds for their activities. Moreover, during the campaign for presidential election more and more branches and

pesantren received funds from Hasyirn. In terms of funds, which have been the main problem for the NU executives to run the organization, Hasyim has been well known for his craft to accumulate them. "I have no idea the source. But he obviously could mobilize it easily as long as for the NU interest," one NU branch executive from East Java said.

1ol

Having aware that Hasyim enjoyed strong support from provincial and local branches, his supporters planned to increase the criteria for support for the candidates. While the existing draft for procedural rules at the congress required the candidates for chairman of both the Syuriah and Tanfidziyah must have at least 60 local branches support, Hasyim's supporters attempted to increase the required number to 125. The compromise was then achieved in the number of99. This move indicated that the congress began to be a zero sum game. 102 On the election day, the organizing committee recorded 455 votes from 465 delegates (30 province and 435 local branches) with voting rights. In the nomination for the Syuriah chairmanship, Sahal emerged as the single candidate, as no other contenders could garner minimum support (99 votes). Abdurrahman failed to enter the race, since he secured only 75 votes, while others garnered less support. In conformity with the meeting procedures, as there was no other candidate with significant vote, the congress participants unanimously ordained Sahal as the Syuriah chairman for the 2004-2009 period. Sahal's triumph meant that Abdurrahman failed to block the reelection bid of Hasyirn. In the nomination, Hasyim received 293 votes, Masdar 103, Mustofa Bisri 35, while other contenders got less support. Under the

101 102

"Hasyim Dibendung, Hasyim Didukung," Forum Keadilan, No. 30,28 November 2004, p. 89. "Let Battle Connnence," Tempo, December 6, 2004, p. 29.

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meeting procedures, Hasyim and Masdar had won the right to take part in the second round. In the second round, however, Hasyim defeated Masdar with 346 to 99 votes. There was no doubt that Hasyim took control of the NU structurally and organizationally, thus allowing him to win the chairmanship election during the congress. Abdurrahman, meanwhile, had lost a lot of his influence in the organization he chaired for 15 years until he became the fifth president in 1999. This defeat signaled the beginning of the end of his political authority in the NU community. His ouster as president in 2001 was the turning point for his popularity. During the congress, Abdurrahman only received the backing of young intellectuals and many senior kyai, all of whom are outside the NU's structure, meaning that they did not have voting rights. Therefore, their support was not enough to defeat Hasyim. The depth of the division reflected not the cleavage between the kyai and politicians as in the 1984 NU congress. Nor did it reflect the rivalry between the opposition figure and the state-supported one as in the 1994 NU congress. It instead merely reflected the rivalry between two politicians which vied for the NU support for their political gain during the next five years. 103 This battle revealed how profound their exposure to political affairs was during the earlier five years. Both camps seemed to playa political game skillfully. Therefore, the congress was unsurprisingly surrounded by allegations of both slander and vote buying. Hasyim's triumph has shocked not only Abdurrahman but numerons senior kyai supporting him as well. They began to feel that their words, which until then "commanded obedience," seemed to be no longer heeded. 104 When it became clear that their candidates were about to fail to gamer sufficient support in the congress, some respected kyai ordered Abdurrahman to set up a rival NU organization. "We, the kyai, leave it fully to Gus Our 103

104

"Pertarungan Dua Kiai Politik," Forum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 13-14. "When Senior Kiai Are No Longer Heeded," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 20.

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(Abdurrahman) to set up a correct PBNU," one kyai red a decision signed by 29 senior kyai. It was not clear what ''to set up a correct PBNU" really meant. For Abdurrahman, this was clear enough. After his failure to assume the Syuriah post and prevent Hasyim's re-election, he had resolved to keep control of the PBNU offices. The PBNU office was built during Abdurrahman's presidency when PBNU was under Hasyim leadership. Abdurrahman did not simply seek to occupy the building, but he also warned Hasyim that he would form a contending PBNU management. Apparently, Abdurrahman was very serious about his plan to form the alternative PBNU. He said that there would be two PBNUs at the same address. Both would use the same building, facilities, and name. But the identifying numbers on their correspondence would be different. IOS Hasyim's response seemed to be caIrn. He said that contending organizations never last long. He gave the example of his experience with kyai Sahal and kyai TIyas Ruchiyat in defending Abdurrahman against the Abu Hasan camp, which had formed a rival NU organization after the 1994 NU congress at Cipasung, Sukabumi. Because they had sided with Abdurrahman, who did not have President Suharto's support, they were repeatedly summoned by police.

I06

Despite his deep disappointment, however, finally Abdurrahman did not continue

his plan. He came to realize that he would have lost much wider respect not only from the NU supporters but also from other Indonesians people should he continue his plan. While the emergence of the rival NU organization appeared to subside, the bitter rivalry between Abdurrahman and Hasyim seemed to continue, however. After Abdurrahman's defeat in the NU congress, his charisma would be put to the test again during the PKB's congress on April 16-18, 2005 in Semarang, Central Java The PKB

lOS

106

"Benang Kusnt Konflik NU," Gatra, December 18, 2004, p. 34-37. ''Kok Sekarang Gus Dur Man Bikin Tandingan," Farum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 19.

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congress saw a showdown between Abdurrahman's two rival nephews: Abdurrahman protestor Syaifullah Yusuf and his supporter Muhaimin Iskandar. On the one hand, Syaifullah, the chainnan of the NU youth wing Ansor and the State Minister for the Development of Disadvantaged Regions, received support from senior NU kyai, including those who backed Abdurrahman in the NU congress. On the other hand, Muhaimin, the deputy DPR speaker, along with two other candidates, Mahfud and AIi Masykur Musa, was backed by Abdurrahman. Abdurrahman had also rejected Syaifullah's bid. When pressure from numerous kyai had mounted for Abdurrahman to let Syaifullah vie for the PKB leadership, he then allowed Syaifullah to join the race under one condition: he had to qnit the Cabinet and relinquish his top job in the Ansor Youth Organization should he be elected PKB leader. Syaifullah, along with AIwi Shihab, was dismissed as the party's secretary-general (and chainnan respectively) after he took up a ministerial post under President SBY's Cabinet. The official reason behind this ban was that the party would ban its executives from serving as government officials to prevent conflict of interests and abuse of power. Many people believe, however, they were suspended because President SBY appointed them without Abdurrahman's approval, meaning that President SBY was deemed trespassing his authority within the PKB. Therefore, Alwi and Syaifullah were suing the party's central board over the suspensions, which they said have violated the party's statutes. They argued that the party's statutes do not say anything about executives holding dual positions. They recalled that during Abdurrahman's presidency, many senior PKB executives simultaneously served as ministers, such as Alwi, Mahfud, AS Hikam, and Khofifah. While the lawsuit was still undergoing, Syaifullah ran for the PKB chainnanship. Syai fullah' s influence within the party should not be underestimated. In an extraordinary PKB

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congress in January 2002, he looked certain to win the leadership, with a majority backing from regional branches and senior kyai. However, Abdurrahman's risky end-game strategy of threatening to quit ifhis rebellious nephew was elected paid off, and the meeting chose Abdurrahman's close aide Alwi Shihab, after senior kyai backed down from confrontation with their chief patron. However, friends are not friends forever, and on October 2004, Alwi was suspended from his post after joining SBY's Cabinet along with Syaifullah. Similar to the meeting procedures in the NU congress, the PKB standing orders also required all candidates for the party's leadership to receive approval of the elected chairman of the party's powerful board of advisor (Dewan Syuro). Therefore, Syaifullah teamed up with a little-known kyai and co-founder of the PKB Ma'ruf Amin as the candidate for Dewan Syuro chainnanship. The pair received strong support from a number of senior kyai and many delegates from the PKB strongholds ofCentrai and East Java.107 Fearing that Abdurrahman would lose face as happened in the earlier NU congress, his supporters made many efforts to guarantee his success. Abdurrahman was then elected

Dewan Syuro chainnan when the congress was still in the initial phase and without the process of nomination. When the congress was still undergoing, the meeting chair and Abdurrahman supporter, Misbach Hidayat, unilaterally pounded the gavel deciding Abdurrahman as the elected Dewan Syuro chainnan. This decision triggered protests not only from the Syaifullah and Ma'ruf pair as well as their supporters, but also from numerous senior kyai and senior party executives such as AS. Hikam, Khofifah, and the East Java PKB Chairman, Choirul Anam. After Syaifullah withdrew his candidacy, the East and Central Java regional executive boards also took leave. They

107 "Wahid's

Way," Tempo, April 25, 2005, p. 24-25.

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claimed that they were accompanied by several other regions and 256 out of 465 branches. Hikam even appealed to the congress participants to boycott the continuing congress, because "This congress has been flawed." He said, "Many congress regulations have been tinkered with to achieve personal goals."I08 While the continuing congress elected Abdurrahman loyalist nephew Muhaimin as the executive chairman without any substantial contender, AIwi and Syaifullah considered the result ofthe congress was not legitimate. They even still considered themselves the legitimate chairman and general secretary of the PKB. The following day after the Muhairnin election, numerous senior kyai asked them to convene another congress. Four months after the Semarang congress, another PKB congress was held early in October 2005 in Surabaya, East Java. On this congress, the East Java PKB chairman, Choirul Anam won the executive PKB party and senior

kyai Abdurrahman Chudori won the powerful Dewan Syuro chairman. Meanwhile, Alwi and Syaifullah seemed to have abandoned their bitter conflict, realizing that their prolonged complicity in the PKB conflict would not only jeopardize their own political career, but also backfire for the government as if they were ordered to interfere in the party conflict. The emergence of two PKBs in 2005 illustrated further decline of Abdurrahman's charisma within the NU community after his defeat in the NU congress. When he lost in the NU congress, he was still backed by numerous influential kyai. When the PKB split into two factions, however, he also lost most support from those kyai who supported him during the NU congress. Compounded with his bitter conflict with the current PBNU, it would be no wonder if the PKB will lose significant votes in the 2009 elections.

108

"Chaos Awakened," Tempo, May 2,2005, p. 29.

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While the NU and PKB congresses left indelible marks in the split within the NU community, the leadership change within the Muharnrnadiyah community was marked by less conflict. Arnien's defeat in the first round presidential election led him and his supporters in the PAN to blame the Muharnrnadiyah for its ambiguous support. He noted that it was the Muharnrnadiyah halfhearted endorsement that he could not secure the support of the whole 30 millions of its members and supporters. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders replied that it was the PAN's responsibility to have Arnien win in the race, since it was his main political vehicle, not the Muharnrnadiyah. They said that the Muharnrnadiyah was only endorsing him when the PAN perfonnance in the parliamentary election was poor. There was also a growing resentment within the Muharnrnadiyah community over the PAN. Many Muharnrnadiyah leaders, particularly the youth generation, felt that the PAN had failed to accommodate the aspiration ofMuharnrnadiyah members, despite the fact that PAN was led by fonner Muharnrnadiyah chairman Arnien. They gave some examples that prior to the 2004 parliamentary election, many Muharnrnadiyah youth cadres were put in the unlikelywinning-numbers of the PAN candidate list. They also said that the decision-making process within the PAN was dominated by a non-Muharnrnadiyah faction, meaning that they would not do any favor for the Muharnrnadiyah aspiration. The Muharnrnadiyah youth leaders began to discuss how to solve such a problem. Through a marathon discussion, they came up with three alternative steps. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders should take over the PAN leadership in its congress scheduled to take place on April 2005 in Semarang, a week before the PKB congress. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders could also endorse the likely-win faction in the congress and then share the new PAN leadership. Ifboth

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choices had failed, the Muhammadiyah leaders could initiate the establishment of new party representing the Muharnmadiyah aspiration. When the Muharnmadiyah held its national meeting (Tanwir) in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, on December 2004, a number of youth Muhammadiyah activists began to sound the plan to set up a new party. The final decision concerning this issue was that "The Tanwir could apprehend the emerging aspiration from the Muhammadiyah members, particularly the youth Muhammadiyah generation, to establish a new political party. Tanwir perceived that this idea should be reviewed carefully, since the establishment of a new political party should be based on a deep consideration, not disappointment nor merely lust for power. Therefore, Tanwir authorized the youth Muhammadiyah generation to follow up and review this idea further, while taking the Muhanunadiyah principles into account and without plunging the Muhannnadiyah into practical politicS."I09 While they began discussing the possibility to establish a new political party, in the months leading to the PAN congress, the Muhammadiyah circle concluded that the most likely possible candidate to take over the PAN leadership was the Muharnmadiyah deputy chainnan Din Syamsuddin. He matched Amien's criteria needed to lead the PAN. While Amien holds his Ph.D. from Chicago University, Din from UCLA. Both were also well known for their Islamic knowledge. Din was not only supported by the Muhammadiyah circle, but initially some provincial boards of PAN supported him as well. When the East Java PAN provincial board held a meeting to gamer support for Din, 19 out of 33 provincial boards were reported to support him. It was reported that Din agreed to run for the PAN chainnanship under two conditions: he had to be elected unanimously and Amien should invite him to run. Despite the remarkable support from 19 provincial boards, however, no one could assure him that all participants would elect him in the upcoming PAN congress, since some other contenders had

109 Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah No. 116/2004 tentang Tanfidz Keputusan Tanwir Muharnmadiyah Tahun 1425 Hl2004 M, Lampiran No.5 tentang Rekomendasi Tanwir III Muhammadiyah 2004.

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also nominated themselves such as Fuad Bawazier, an MP from the PAN; Hatta Rajasa, the minister of transportation under the SBY cabinet; and Sutrisno Bachir, a businessman. Even more complicated was the second condition: Amien's invitation. Din's relation with Amien had been up and down. Since early in the 1990s, their relation had been strained when Amien was in the forefront of opposition against the Suharto regime while Din was a high rank official of Suharto' s political vehicle Golkar. During the campaign for the 2004 presidential election, however, Din established a campaign body working to garner support for Amien from the Muhammadiyah community. Ahead to the PAN congress, Amien simply mentioned that Din would be a good candidate without explicitly inviting him to advance. Before the PAN congress started, Din retreated from the race. He seemed to unwillingly risk his chance in the PAN congress, while he was the most possible winning candidate in the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place three months later. Without Din in the race, the remaining strong candidates were Fuad, Hatta, and Sutrisno. Should these three candidates continue to run, Fuad would be likely the wiuner since he was reported to secure most support from the delegates by vote-buying. Fuad is the former Director General of Taxation and minister of finance during the Suharto era. In order to increase the support for Sutrisno, Amien was reported to ask Hatta to withdraw his candidacy warning that he "could very well call President SBY asking him to pull Hatta from the cabinet" should Hatta forge ahead. 110 Amien seemed to fear that Fuad would succeed him as the PAN Chairman. It was reported that the more adroit Fuad's maneuvers, the clearer Amien's support for Sutrisno.1t was as if Amien would not let go of PAN to be led by Fuad; it would be very disappointing should the PAN, which was established to strive for

110 "Amien's

Choice," Tempo, April 18, 2005, p. 22.

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reform and rectifY the remnants of the New Order authoritarianism, be led by a former minister during the New Order era. The PAN congress eventually elected Sutrisno the PAN Chairman, while Amien was elected chairman of the symbolic advisory board. Sutrisno's election into the PAN leadership did not abate the resentment within Muhammadiyah circles. Although Sutrisno sought to incorporate some youth Muhammadiyah activists in the PAN leadership, however, it was perceived too little. Despite Sutrisno's claims that he was born in the Muhammadiyah family, however, he was also deemed to have no record of involvement in the Muhammadiyah leadership. Therefore, some youth Muhammadiyah activists continued their efforts to establish a new political party. Ahead to the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place in Malang, East Java on July 3-8, 2005, the rift between Amien and Muhammadiyah intensified. Amien was reported trying to prevent Din's election for the Muhammadiyah chairmanship. Amien's biggest concern was that Din would use the Muhammadiyah as a political vehicle in the upcoming 2009 presidential election, and that would contradict the PAN's interest. Many believed that Amien toured several regional and local Muhammadiyah branches campaigning that those Muhammadiyah elites who were involved in the Bank Persyarikatan affairs were improper to re-nominate themselves in the congress. I I I During the congress, Amien held a number of meetings to garner support from provincial and local branches. However, the impact of his campaign was very limited, due largely to the election procedures deciding that the delegates

t t t In 2002, the Muharnmadiyah took over the Bank Swansarindo through acquisition aod then renamed it to the Bank Persyarikatao. While it has no direct link with the Bank, however, seven figures of the organization became its shareholders. Because ofits decline in the bank's solvency (its capital adequacy rstion [CAR] dropped to less thao 8 % required by the centrsl Bank Indonesia), the Bank was included by the BI in the special monitoring unit. Should it failed to solve the problem, the BI could freeze the Bank's operstion. While Muhammadiyah leaders sought to solve the problem, including through seversl political lobbies, Amien made use the affair as his weapon to prevent the re-nomination of those seven figures who was involved in the Bank affairs, including Din. See "When Muharnmadiyah Bears the Brunt," Tempo, Jaouary 3, 2005, p. 70-71.

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would elect 13 members of the executive appointment committee, instead of one figure as the chairman. The election procedures within Muhammadiyah seem to automatically delimit the possibility of blocking a certain name from the candidacy. 112 Amien's campaign had larger impact only in the Tanwir session held-one day before the congress-to select 39 names. The Tanwir was attended by 159 delegates consisting of members of the central board, 4 delegates from each provincial board, and two from each autonomous organization. At the Tanwir, Din's name came in third, just after Haedar Nashir (general secretary) and Rosyad Sholeh (one of deputy chairman). When Amien came to realize that Din's popularity was unstoppable on the local level, he turned his campaign from blocking Din's candidacy to promoting some candidates which were supposedly under his control, including the minister of education under the SBY's cabinet, Bambang Sudibyo, former minister of education under Abdurrahman's cabinet, Yahya Muhaimin, and the chairman of Central Java Muhammadiyah provincial board, Dahlan Rais, himself Amien's younger brother.

In the congress, however, Din's popularity was apparently unstoppable. In the election session, which was attended by all nearly 2000 delegates (all Tanwir delegates combined with two delegates from each district leadership board and one delegates from each sub-district leadership board), Din won the most votes with 1718, Haedar won 1374 votes, Muhammad Muqoddas 1285, Malik Fajar 1277, Yunahar Ilyas 1264, and Rosyad Sholeh 1209.

112 Unlike in the NU, the election process in the Mubamrnadiyah is under the authority of the election committee which is appointed by the central board severnl months before the congress. Its main task were (I) distnouting nomination forms to the provincial boards and all autonomous organizations. They are asked to nominate 13 candidate names. (2) The committee then review all requirements, including administmtive and substantive ones (among others are ID number, 5-year long membership). (3) The committee also presides the election session, both in the Tanwir to elect 39 names out of all candidates and in the congress to elect the 13member executive appointment committee out of39 names. Those 13 names then select the new chairman and other positions in the central board ofMubammadiyah.

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Dahlan came in seventh with 1135 votes, whereas Bambang came in eleventh with 881 votes. Meanwhile, Yahya failed to secure sufficient votes to advance in the big thirteen. The fact that Din came in third in the first round but won in the second round indicated two different things. On the one hand, the Bank Persyarikatan affairs had larger impact in a more elite circle (the Tanwir delegates were mostly from the provincial boards) whose exposures to such an affair were more profound. On the other hand, Din's popularity in grass-root level was indeed irresistible. Din is a figure with plenty of public exposure outside of Muhanunadiyah. His popularity is also a result of his frequent visits to the provincial and local boards since he had served as the chairman of the Muharnmadiyah youth movement (19891993). It was not surprising that at the 2000 Muhanunadiyah congress he already came in second in the election after the elected-chairman Syafii Maari£ This was not the end ofthe game, however. The chairman would be elected through the meeting of those 13 names, and there is no rule requiring the one with the most votes must become the chairman. Din's supporters were perplexed by the composition of those 13 people: Din secured only two votes while others were controlled by the Jogjakarta camp which was at odds with him. His supporters from Jakarta camp began fearing Din's slim chance. Therefore, they held a press conference urging the 13-member committee to choose the candidate with the most votes as the chairman. This action disappointed the members of the committee, accusing them which interfered with the committee's prerogative rights. Many Muhanunadiyah activists began to fear that the old-rivalry between the Jakarta and Jogjakarta camps, which had abated during previously five years since the 2000 congress in Jakarta, would resurface. I 13

III Since the 1980s, the Jakarta camps bad been comprised many politicians, while the Jogjakarta camp had been comprised many ideologists and administrators figures.

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This concern did not materialize, however. Rosyad Sholeh, the election committee head for the 45 th Muhammadiyah congress announced after three hours meeting that the 13member committee unanimously elected Din the new chairman of the PP Muhammadiyah for the 2005-2010 period. Rosyad divulged that Din was elected without voting. Rosyad also described the meeting as one full of smiles, good cheer, and benevolent feelings. 114 Aware of Din's remarkable popularity in grass-root level, they appeared to avoid confronting the majority's choices. It seemed that those 13 people were self-consciously unwilling to push their interests to the point of risking imminent conflict on a scale so deep as to endanger the future of their beloved organization. The fear of further rift between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was also minimized by Din himself when in his speech during the closing ceremony he unilaterally asked Amien and Syafii to sit on the newly-formed advisory council. 115 While major Islamic organizations were by far deeply involved in the political struggle, it is also important to study current political development within the Muhammadiyah and NU and how they approach the upcoming 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. F. Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election One year from the 2009 elections, some important features regarding Muslim political development are worth examining. First is the further relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah on the one hand with political parties on the other. The 2009 election will likely see the emergence of two new political parties linked to the NU and Muhammadiyah: The Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (pKNU-Ulama National Awakening Party) and the

"Mufakat di Lantai Dna," Gmra, July 16, 2005, p. 42. The composition of the advisory council for the time being has yet to be discussed by the 13-memher executive appointment committee. Din was also aware that he ought to have their approval before aonouncing his invitation. Considering the necessity of Din's move in the public eyes to minimize. the ensuing conflict, however, no objection raised from one of the 13 people. 114

II'

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Partai Matahari Bangsa (pMB-National Sun Party). While they are now stiIl undergoing verification, they are likely to be eligible for the polls. PKNU is the transfonnation of the PKB resulting from the Surabaya congress whose establishment was supported by a faction opposing the results of the PKB Semarang congress which elected Abdurrahman Wahid and his nephew Muhaimin Iskandar. After inflicted in a long, bitter fight with the PKB-Ied by Muhaimin, the conflict ended when early in the 2006 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Muhaimin-Abdurrahman camp. The loss of the Surabaya PKB-congress faction means it could not contest the 2009 elections unless it changed its name and party attributes. The newly found PKNU is now led by Choirul Anam. The PKNU establishment did not receive any specific response from the NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi. However, its estahlishment unwittingly benefited Hasyim in his rivalry with Abdurrahman, as it will likely decrease the PKB's showing in the 2009 elections and thus reduce Abdurrahman's charisma within the NU community. Responding to the existence of several political parties claiming themselves to be born by the NU, Hasyim in his speech during the commemoration of the NU 82nd anniversary in Jakarta, on February 3, 2008, said that they will not necessarily be supported by the NU members unless they pay sufficient attention to fight for the NU aspirations. During the commemoration, the PPP, PKB and PKNU seemed to vie for the NU sympathy. Hasyim pointed out that the party which wiIl likely be supported by NU members in the 2009 election is one that apparently fights for their aspirations. Hasyim also firmly rejected to drive the NU members to support certain political party. I 16 Meanwhile, the PMB was resulted from the long discussion of a number of Muhanunadiyah youth activists. The party is now headed by Imam Addaraqutni, former

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Interview with Hasyim Muzadi on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta.

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chairman of Muhammadiyah youth movement and former MP from the PAN (1999-2004). Meanwhile, Ahmad Rofiq, a former chairman ofMuhammadiyah Students Association (lMM), now serves as the general secretary. The PMB, declared in Jogjakarta on December 11,2007, was aimed to accommodate the aspirations ofMubammadiyah, which they claimed were left unheeded by the PAN under the leadership of Sutrisno Bachir. Seeing the PAN's pluralist brand was somewhat problematic for certain Muhammadiyah followers, the PMB therefore uses Islam as its ideological base. Fearing the conservative image for their new party, however, the Islam that the PMB will promote is a progressive, substantive one. While many PMB's supporters have been insisting the close relationship between this new political party with the Muhammadiyah, the Muharnmadiyah chairman Din Syarnsuddin has said that his organization has no connection with the PMB, even though it was established by its young activists. When several PMB leaders met him, Din pointed out that the Muharnmadiyah's stance as social-religious organization that eschews practical politics should be maintained. "The cadres ofMuharnmadiyah and political parties based on Muhammadiyah mass do not need to plunge the organization into politics," he warned. 117 Din's reluctance to acknowledge the PMB's claim to be the proper party for the Muhammadiyah members is understandable. The PMB's prospect in the 2009 election is palpably slim and less rewarding. The 2009 elections will see for the first time a head-to-head fight between two parties vying for a similar electorate in the modernist camp, meaning that both have to share support from the Muharnmadiyah followers. Another disincentive for the PMB is that it is supported in local level by mostly the young Muharnmadiyah activists whose political experiences and influences are limited, while the PAN has secured support from more

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"Sikap Mubammadiyah dalam PoUtik Praktis," Kompas, February 21, 2008.

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senior ones. Therefore, according to an able observer on Indonesian Islam Mitsuo Nakamura, such a party will be smaller than the present PAN in terms of the number of cadres and the scale of popular support. Moreover, "If the idea behind such a move is only to produce a political arm of the Muhammadiyah in the

sense of expressing the political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah, the attempt is likely to face an extreme difficulty. That is the impossibility of formulating an integrated program expressing political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah members. This derives from the simple fact that the Muhammadiyah is not a political organization, and there has been, is and will be a variety of political orientations within the organization. In this regard, the Muhammadiyah has been, is and is likely to be larger and more heterogeneous than the PAN or any its substitution.,,118 In this regard, Din's reluctance to welcome warmly the PMB's establishment thus is also plausible. The poor performance of the PMB will jeopardize Din's chance ifhe eyes the presidential or vice-presidential bid in the 2009 presidential election, since it will likely diminish the Muhamrnadiyab grandeur claiming to represent nearly 25 or 30 millions people. In addition to the relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah with new political parties, it is also important to examine the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah in the regional head elections. Tantamount to the direct presidential election in 2004, local head (that is, governors and mayors) direct elections have also been implemented since June 1,2005. Whereas the candidates for local head should be nominated by a political party or coalition of several political parties, however, they could nominate candidates either from within their political parties or from outside. In this regard, the local leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyab in the provincial and local boards are significant, since they are frequently recruited by political parties in the direct local head election in order to gamer extra votes. In the Muhamrnadiyah camp, a number of its cadres were reported to contest in the local head elections. However, these were not big deals for the Muhammadiyah, since they were for the time being no longer holding any executive position in the organization. During 1\8

Nakamura, "Mubammadiyah Faces the Challenge of Democracy," 2005, p. 221.

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the local head election, they already served in the political party leaderships. In the Riau province, for instance, the current vice-governor Wan Abu Bakar is fonner chainnan of Muhammadiyah youth movement provincial board ofRiau. However, he is now serving as the chainnan ofPPP provincial board. In the upcoming local head election expected to take place at the end of this year, he is reported to contest for the governor position, despite the fact that he has not yet secured both the PPP support and his running mate. Another example is current mayor in Bojonegoro district of East Java, Suyoto. He is fonner deputy chainnan of the central board ofMuhammadiyah youth movement. During the election in November 2007, however, he had been the chainnan of the PAN provincial board of East Java. Unlike the Muhammadiyah's insignificant participation, the NU's involvement in the local head election is even worth worrying. 119 A number of the NU leaders, mostly in the NU heartland of East and Central Java provinces, were nominated in the local head elections, either for vice-governor or mayor and deputy mayor. Interestingly, their bids have been different from the candidates nominated by the PKB, meaning that the old conflict between Hasyim and Abdurrahrnan as well as the NU and the PKB remained within the traditionalist community. The current local head election for govemors of East and Central Java provinces provide the strong indication for the intensifying rift between them. 120 In Central Java local head election scheduled to take place on June 22,2008, the current chainnan ofNU provincial board Mohammad Adnan accepted to be the mnning mate of the Central Java Golkar chainnan Bambang Sadono. Meanwhile, the PKB has nominated fonner Central Java military commander Agus Suyitno and current Wonosobo mayor Kholiq Arlef for the governor and vice-governor candidates. Another example is the East Java local head election scheduled to take place on July 119 120

Interview with AS. Hikamon January 10, 2008 in Jakarta. ''Makin Banyak Pengurus NU TeJjun ke Politik Praktis," Kompas, February 20, 2008.

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23, 2008. The current NU regional chainnan Ali Maschan Musa accepted to be the running mate for Golkar governor candidate, Soenmjo. Meanwhile, the PKB has also nominated the current Mojokerto mayor Achmady as the candidate for East Java governor. Complicated even matter, Abdurralunan's rebellious nephew Syaifullah was nominated by the PAN to be the running mate of the PD governor candidate Soekarwo, while the chairwoman of the central board of the Muslimat (women wing of) NU, Khofifah, was nominated by PPP to be governor candidate.

Similarly alarming conflict has been in the West Java local head election scheduled to take place on April 13, 2008. 121 The West Java NU board has declared its support for the Danny SetiawanIwan Sulanjana pair, which was nominated by the Golkar and PD, while forbidding its members from choosing other pairs. Meanwhile, the PKB has also declared its support for the Agum Gumelar-Nu'man Abdul Hakim pair, which was nominated by the PDI-P and PPP. These examples of political competition between the PKB and the NU might not only generate confusion within their mernbers in the same traditionalist community but consequentially also diminish their own chances in the local head elections. In addition to the relationship between the Muslim organizations and political parties

and the ensuing conflict between them, it is also important to foresee the key potential candidates for the 2009 presidential election and the chances of the Muharmnadiyah and NU leaders to play significant roles. While much of the presidential election will be determined by the preceding parliamentary election, there are a number of presidential hopefuls: President SBY, former President Megawati, former President Abdurrahman, Vice-President JusufKalla (the chainnan of Golkar), Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (the chainnan of new Hanura Party), Let. Gen. (ret.) Sutiyoso (former governor of Jakarta), and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X. 121 "PBNU Cerna. Terhadap Nasib NU," Kompas Online, February 18, 2008, see http://www.kompas.comlread.php?cnt=.xm1.2008.02.18.23431299&Channe!=1&rnn=l&idx=!

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President SBY, while reported to announce his re-nomination six month before the 2009 presidential election, is believed to be re-nominated by the PD. According to most opinion polls SBY by far remains the most popular candidate, despite the drastic decline compared to the early months of his presidency. The decline is largely due to the poor performance of his administration. Now that the absent of new powerful candidates in the race, SBY's chance of at least reaching the runoff highly likely remains high. Megawati was officially re-nominated by the PDI-P. While SBY's popularity is declining, according to most opinion polls, Megawati's popularity is ominously increasing, although did not yet surpass that ofSBY. Aware of her failure during the 2004 election, she has now increasingly become pro-active to garner more support for her candidacy. She was frequently reported to visit her constituents in the remote provinces and districts. She has also concurrently begun criticizing the failure of current govermnent, something which has been absent in her long political career. If Megawati keep going on this right track, it seems that we will highly likely see a rematch between her and the incumbent President SBY. Along with Megawati, Sultan is considered to be the most likely comparable contender for SBY in the 2009 presidential election. While he is now serving for the governor of Jogjakarta, his popularity is believed to reach larger segments in Indonesian society, particularly in predominant Javanese ethnicity. Unlike SBY and Megawati, his weakness is that he is not yet supported by major political party, although a number of political parties, such as the PAN and other smaller parties were reported to nominate him as the presidential candidate. Wiranto is another candidate considered to have a fair chance to contest in the 2009 presidential election. While in the 2004 presidential election he was nominated by the Go1kar party, to contest in the next presidential election he has established his own political vehicle the

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Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura, the Party of People's Conscience) on December 2006. However, according to most opinion polls, his party will gain only a small share in the 2009 parliamentary election. Without support of such strong political machinery as Golkar in the 2004 election, the chance of this man of action is predictably slim. Sutiyoso, after finishing his second term as the Jakarta governor in 2007, has been preparing to contest in the 2009 presidential election. To vie for public support, he began presenting himself as a decisive, resolute leader which contrasts SBY's hesitant and indecisive image in the public eyes. Even though he was reported to back the establishment of numerous new political parties, however, his chance in the 2009 presidential election may even be slimmer than that ofWiranto, since the chances of his newly-established political parties to qualify the 2009 parliamentary election is also predictably small. Abdurrahman also tried hard to join the presidential race. His PKB party had also declared its strong support for his candidacy. His presidential ambition, however, is placed in doubt since the election commission will likely re-issue health requirement for presidential and vice-presidential candidates requiring good eyesight. Moreover, his PKB party is now increasingly inflicted by acute internal conflict. Recently, Abdurrahman dismissed the PKB chairman Muhaimin, whose loyalty has long been unquestionable, after Muhaimin was accused of disloyalty and arranging the PKB extraordinary congress, which were strongly denied. 122

\22 Muhaimin is the third PKB chainnan fired from the post, after Matori and Alwi Shihab. Malori was dismissed because he attended an MPR plenary session impeaching Gus Dur as the fourth president In 2001. After beIng ousted from the party, Malori and his loyal supporters then established a splinter PKB faction, but did not qualify to contest In the 2004 election. Alwi, along with Syaifullah, was fired In 2004 as PKB chairman after accepting ministerial post In the SBY cabInet. After their contending PKB faction lost the case at the court, many more PKB senior figures were dismissed, such as AS. Hikam and Khofifah. In 2007, three other senior PKB executives were also dismissed. The PKB general secretary Lukman Edy was dismissed from his post In May 2007 after he was appoInted the ministerial post In the SBY cabInet replacIng Syaifu\lah Yusuf. On July 2007, two PKB deputy general secretaries Eman Hermawan and HanifDhakiri were dismissed for disloyalty reason.

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Another ambiguous presidential candidate is the Golkar chainnan and vice-president JusufKalla. Although having the seemingly best political machinery in his hand, KaIla's chance wiIl also be predictably slim. According to most opinion polls, his popularity is not comparable to Megawati, let alone SBY. Another disincentive for his chance is the fact that he comes from the outer Buginese ethnicity of South Sulawesi, not from the predominant Javanese one. He is also contained in a difficult position to nominate himself while he is currently still serving as the vice-president. Worse still, within his Golkar party, there are also many other figures eyeing the presidential bid such as current DPR speaker Agung Laksono, former Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung, the current coordinating minister of social welfare Aburizal Bakrie, and media tycoon Surya Paloh. Although many figures have emerged to contest, the Golkar party decided to abolish the convention system to select the presidential candidate. Rather, the Golkar candidate will be selected in a national coordination meeting and based on a national survey. Therefore, the outcome is even more unlikely predictable. The perennial black horse candidate, Amien Rais has also yet to signal his intension to run for presidency. He was reported to contest for presidency provided his main political vehicle the PAN could garner sufficient support for his candidacy, at least 15% in the 2009 parliamentary election and no younger candidates run for the post. In addition, his bid will also reportedly depend on "the divine guidance" (petunjuk yang di atas). This ambiguous decision is seemingly a result of his awareness that the 2009 presidential election will be an uphill battle because in terms of organization, budget, and popularity, he has never really gotten off the ground. He has an obvious political ambition. However, he is also perplexed by his doubt on the PAN performance in the 2009 parliamentary election.

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There are not too many potential vice-presidential candidates capable of attracting extra supports. The majority of those who supposedly feel themselves attracting a broad base of support usually opt to run for the presidency. Therefore, it is possible that some of the abovementioned presidential hopefuls, such as Sutiyoso and Sultan, in the last minutes, might be willing to serve as vice-presidential candidates in order to gain a ticket in the race. The pairing may depend on the results of the 2009 parliamentary election, as the larger parties will tend to nominate its leader for the presidency and figures from smaller parties will tend to be the running mates. However, the result of the 2004 presidential election, whose winner was supported by a medium-sized party beating the pair supported by a coalition of major political parties, mirrored the fact that there has been a certain degree of depreciation of the importance of political parties in the presidential election. Although political parties remain important to nominate the pairs of president and vice-president, however, personal image and popUlarity are more important than party affiliation. It is thus plausible that some senior Golkar officials have preemptively announced that the party will re-nominate the winning pair of SBY-Kalla in the 2009 presidential election, despite the fact that the Golkar will predictably gain more votes than the SBY's PD in the upcoming parliamentary election. As aforementioned above as well, there is a simple logic to presidential pairings; they are mostly combinations formed from the following: Javanese-outer province; nationalist-Islam or Islam-military. Therefore, it is highly likely that Hidayat Nur Wahid (the MPR speaker and former PKS chairman), Suryadharma Ali (the PPP Chairman), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (former PBB chairman), Hasyim Muzadi (the NU chairman), Din Syamsuddin (the Muhammadiyah chairman), and Jimly Asshiddiqie (head of the Constitution Committee) will be the favored running mates. Surprisingly, those names are considered to be the Muslim representatives. Out

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of those names considered suitable for vice-presidency, four names are worth further mentioning: Hidayat, Suryadharma, Hasyim, and Din. As the leaders of the large mass-based Islamic organizations and political parties, they are considered the most suitable partners for candidates who are backed by strong party machinery, or candidates from nationalist camp. Since the 2004 presidential election, Hidayat was fervently supported by the PKS as its presidential candidate. However, the party had earlier pledged not to nominate its candidate unless it gained more than 20% of votes. Nor did Hidayat run for vice-presidency, since no presidential candidate signaled any willingness to team up with him. Similar conditions appeared to be re-applied by the PKS in nominating its presidential candidate in the 2009 presidential election, while waiting for bids from larger political parties to forge an alliance on a nationalist-religious line. However, his weakness is his etlmicity, as most presidential hopefuls are also ethnically Javanese. Suryadharma Ali, the current Minister of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises in the SBY cabinet, has also yet to decide whether he will contest in the 2009 presidential election. He signaled his political ambition when he, along with a number of senior PPP executives, visited Megawati's residence on September 2007, a week after the PPP held a national coordination meeting. To a large extent, Suryadharma resembled his predecessor Harnzah Haz in terms of his lack of confidence and thus his leaning to place himself as a junior partner in the political bargaining to form a pair in the 2009 presidential election. In response to a question on his visit to Megawati's residence, he replied that his PPP and Megawati's PDI-P has been maintaining close ties during the New Order era and the Reform era. He went on to

say that it was not by accident that Megawati took Harnzah to be vice president between 2001 and 2004. However, he immediately dismissed the image that the PPP is merely attracted to

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forge an alliance with the PDI-P. "What we are doing now is enhancing friendship and strategic cooperation with all parties and building a common understanding on serious problems the . IS . f:' nation acmg,"he once Sal'd • 123 Many wonder whether Hasyim will run in the 2009 election either as presidential or vice-presidential candidate, since his pairing with Megawati was defeated in the 2004 runoff. Moreover, a day before the election of the NU chairman in the 2004 NU congress, he, along with his rival Masdar, has signed a contract requiring that he will not drag the NU in political activities. The contract also mentioned that he will not accept nominations for political positions, whether legislative or executive. 124 Will he comply with the contract? Anything could happen. Many instances indicated the opposite. Although the chairman of East Java NU provincial board Ali Maschan has signed a similar contract before his election, he eventIially could not help accepting to be the running mate of the Golkar governor candidate Soernujo in the 2008 local head election. So did the chairman of Central Java NU provincial board Mohanunad Adnan in the 2008 Central Java local head election. Both were simply suspended temporarily from their position during the election process. Hasyim could similarly do so, if there is an interesting bid for him. The fact that he defeated Abdurrahman's camp in the 2004 NU congress indicated that Hasyim took control of the NU structIirally and organizationally. A comparably new comer in national politics to Hidayat and Hasyim, Din Syamsuddin is considered to have a fair chance in the 2009 presidential election. His ascension in the Muhanunadiyah chairmaI1Ship in its 2005 congress despite Amien's opposition indicated his considerable popularity within the organization. The growing demands in Indonesia for regeneration of the leadership from old figures to new and younger ones seemed also to benefit

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"PPP Maintaining Decades of Close Ties with PDI-P," The Jakarta Post, September 24, 2007. ''Paper Promises," Tempo, December 13,2004, p. 16-17.

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him. Elected as chairman in the 2005 Muhammadiyah congress, Din has taken a different approach in his observation of the Muhammadiyah-political party relationship. Unlike former Mnhammadiyah chairmans Amien and Syafii Maarifwhich conformed the Mnhammadiyah's stance to keep equal distance from all political parties, Din is positioning Mnhammadiyah at an equal propinquity with them. Therefore, he has not been reluctant to develop a cordial relationship with major political parties. Early in 2006 he was intensely involved in the establishment of Baitul Mus1imin Indonesia, an Islamic-organizational wing of the secular, nationalist POI-Po He was also frequently invited to deliver his remarks in the PAN national assembly. Similarly, he invited President SBY to deliver his speech in the 2007 Mnhammadiyah annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Jogjakarta. In so doing, Din seemed to maintain all possibility for his political benefit in the 2009 presidential election. These moves surely raised big question marks within the Mnhammadiyah community, as it has been uncommon to see such a blunt political ambition within the Mnhammadiyah tradition. However, Din has officially dismissed speculation that his ties with those political parties have led him to being nominated as a running mate in the 2009 presidential election. "I have never been requested by PDI-P or Megawati to be the party's vice presidential candidate ... It's only a misunderstanding which has been widely reported in the media," he once said. 125 Sure, he has to rhetorically say so, because he has also signed a political contract before his election as the chairman in the 2005 Mnhammadiyah congress. 126 By far, Din seemed officially to honor the contract. When a survey even said he had the opportunity to run for the vice presidential post, Din replied he would not be affected by

125 "Muhammadiyah Sees Party Equally: Din," The Jakana Post, June 4, 2007. The PDI-P will announce Megawati's partner in the 2009 presidential election in its national coordination meeting expected to take place on November 2008 in Surakarta, Central Java. 12' "MuhammadiyahMencoba Lari darlPolitik," Forum Keadilan, No. 12, July 17, 2005, p. 88-89.

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such public opinion. In response to questions on his readiness to participate in the 2009 presidential election, he instead reaffirmed that it was time to enjoy his chairmanship in Muhammadiyah. "It is important to know that I have not yet thought of being active in joining government affairs," he said. 127 While he did not seemingly diminish his own chance in the upcoming presidential election, Din pointed out that he himself had yet to make a decision on whether he would participate in the 2009 general election. According to him now was not the right time for him to respond to issues on his nomination for presidential pOSt.1 28 It is still too early to predict who will win in the 2009 presidential election, since even the pairing has yet to be forged to contest in the race. However, it is almost certain that Muslim leaders will be once again significant factors in the overall 2009 presidential election.

G. Conclusion This chapter by and large indicates that Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia have been highly diverse in composition, resource endowment, and goals; they are arenas of power, struggle, cooperation, and contestation. The composition and dynamics of these civil society organizations have altered dramatically over time in Indonesia, and more change is in sight. While in the previous era the diverging feature of Muslim civil society organizations had embodied the difference between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian frameworks, the post-New Order regime reveals the resembling feature of both the modernist and traditionalist camps in term of their relationship with the state and political society alike. The interaction between the state and Muslim civil society organizations in postSuharto Indonesia has not been necessarily confrontational. Rather, there is much overlap between Muslim civil society organizations on the one hand and political society and the state 127 12.

''Din Syamsuddin yet to Decide Whether to Run for Presidency," Antara News, October 29, 2007. Interview with M. Din Syamsuddin on January 9, 2008 in Jakarta.

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on the other; in different degrees, the boundary separating them has been porous. Moreover, the development ofMusIim civil society organizations has not been necessarily detrimental to the development of political society. There was much synergy between them. For instances, the NU and Muhammadiyah, in a different degree, were instrumentals to the establishment of the PKB and the PAN. The representatives of the NU and Muhammadiyah have also been incorporated in every cabinet of post-New Order administrations. Several leaders of those Islamic organizations also took part in the 2004 presidential elections as candidates of both presidency and vice-presidency. Several local leaders of both organizations took part in local head elections (pilkada). The politics of post-Suharto Indonesia has also been marked by no single dominant party, volatile coalitions and political alliances, and power-sharing arrangements constituting the post-New Order administrations. These power-sharing arrangements surely incorpomted major political powers whose legitimacy was necessary for the resilience of those governments vis-a.-vis political opposition in the parliament and civil society alike. In this regard, the postSuharto cabinets incorpomted not only the representatives of major political parties, but also such Muslim civil society organizations as the NU and Muhammadiyah. Suffice to say that, based on the above-mentioned explanation, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations will continue to play significant roles not only in the Indonesia's political development, but also in many other areas to foster the democratization process.

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CHAPTER IV MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

A. Introduction In the course of the last ten years or more, the political landscape of Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has been transformed almost beyond recognition. In May 1998, Indonesia still had a highly centralized authoritarian regime. From 1999 on, however, Indonesia has staged a series of free, fair and extremely peaceful elections for the country's legislature and - for the frrst time in 2004 - president and had several rotations of government. Indonesians now enjoy extensive political freedoms as numerous political parties, among them Islamic, compete freely for popular support. In brief, Indonesia has made in a short time a remarkable transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. This transition, surely, has not been risk-free. Many people initially seemed to be pessimistic that the Suharto's downfall, who ruled Indonesia with an iron hand for more than 32 years, will lead to anarchy, chaos, and even the breakup of this nation of more than 17,000 islands.! Moreover, to the extent that the political crisis was compounded by a protracted economic crisis, many people had begun to believe that the democratization would fail and Indonesia would fall apart in an accelerating spiral of inter-ethnic or inter-religious violence. Such pessimistic impression, however, is not the case in Indonesia now. Many people now see that the demise of the New Order regime has led to the birth of a new and more democratic Indonesia, with a far more developed civil society. Indonesia's new democracy, in

I See, Emmerson, ''Will Indonesia Survive?" 2000; Cribb, ''Not the Next Yugoslavia," 1999; Armstrong, "The Next Yugoslavia," 2004; Aspinall and Berger, ''The Break-up of Indonesia," 2001; Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?" 2001.

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many respects, has become considerably more stable in the last four years. While Indonesian Muslims appeared to benefit much from the political freedom brought about by the democratic transition, whither Islam in a democratized Indonesia? Do Indonesian Muslims have something positive to contribute to deepen social support for substantive democracy, or will they largely be the impediment and threat to the emergence of an open and plural society? These are some daunting questions which I would like to answer.

B. The Construction of Free Public Sphere Indonesia's national priorities under the New Order regime were defined in terms of economic development. Suharto's economic tasks seemed clear enough, as he suggested in a speech to a Bogor economic seminar shortly after his appointment as acting president in 1966: stabilizing the economy, curbing inflation, and ironing out pricing problems. 2 The requisites for this, from Suharto's point of view, were political stability and social order. To achieve them, the New Order regime generally relied on three pillars of control. 3 First, New Order extended, formalized, and consolidated military control over political life. The dWifungsi (dual function) doctrine legitimated a socio-political function for military, as well as a defense and security role. Army officers were appointed to posts in the legislature and bureaucracy; a formidable intelligence apparatus was developed, as was the military's "territorial structure" which shadowed civilian government structures all the way down to the village level. Second, the government restructured the chief institutions of political and civil

society. The inherited infrastructure of parties, legislature, and elections survived, but it was transformed by a combination of intervention, manipulation, and blunt coercion. The regime refashioned Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) as its electoral vehicle. Enforcement 2 3

Elson, R.E. Suharto, p. 160. Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, pp. 22-23.

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of "mono-loyalty", by which civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, massive mobilization of state resources, and widespread intimidation, delivered Golkar more than 60 percent of the vote in 6 elections (once every five years since 1971 until 1997). The strategy of creating a government-sponsored political party was accompanied by the establishment of corporatist interest groups incorporated in the Golkar networks, whose objective was "to suppress class and group conflicts and instill hannony, solidarity, and cooperation between state and society. ,,4 Complementing its strategy, the first target of corporatization was the association representing government employees (KORPRI). The subsequent target was then labor, business sector, press, Muslim scholar, national youth, peasants, women, and national sports.

Finally, the government sought to constmct a comprehensive ideological justification for authoritarian rule. Government agencies fashioned a revived "Pancasila ideology", which stressed social harmony and the organic unity between state and society.s According to the "family principle" (asas kekeluargaan), individuals and groups were expected to subordinate their own interests to those of the society as a whole. According to the official view, there was no place in Indonesia for conflicting interests either within society or between society and state;6 political opposition is officially declared illegal. Instead, both state and society were deemed as an integrated unity, where deliberation and consensus (musyawarah dan mUfakat) replaced the divisive and conflictual politics of the past.' To establish the political stability and ensure that there was no dissent challenging the New Order, "Heavy surveillance and severe censorship operated in the administration of formal education at all levels, in the mass media, religious rituals, and artistic productions. Most curricula needed to be approved by local authorities. No electronic media were allowed, at least in theory and, until recently (in 1988), in practice, to produce and Mas'oed, "The State Reorganization of Society under the New Order," 1989, p. 18. "The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," 1981. , Aspinall, "The Broadening Base of Political Opposition in Indonesia," 1996, p. 217. 7 Sanit, "Pembuatan Keputusan Politik Musyawarah dan Mnfakat di DPR RI," 1992.

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S Momt,

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broadcast their own news. Reporters and editors from print media received regular threats. To make the threats effective, actual closure of selected media without due legal process occurred from time to time. In certain areas or periods religious leaders had been banned from giving sermons. Theatrical productions, academic seminars, and poetry readings were all vulnerable to attempt by the police and local military authorities to control the content oftexts before they can be delivered in public.',s Based on the explanation above, the New Order hegemonic state power was obviously achieved through a combination of both the apparent and celebrated consent on the one hand, and the perceived but undiscussed coercion on the other. In that hegemonic position, the New Order regime was able to hold authoritarian control over major political, economic, and cultural institutions. It has also managed to reproduce the conditions for its hegemonic power by the use of occasional political violence, witch-hunts, and propaganda. Despite this hegemonic power, resistance movements and oppositional forces regularly emerge from time to time. They have come and gone in the course of Suharto administration, some with more consequences than others, but-until the middle of the 1990s-none has succeeded even just nearly toppling the regime, let alone radically transforming the existing political system. While its sustainable economic growth impressed many people, the Suharto regime remained one of the most durable in the world. The experiences of years ofliving under the authoritarian regime, surely, provided an impetus for pro-democracy dissent. Having aware of the growing demand of democratization, the regime began raising hopes by calling for a new era of keterbukaan (opeunesS).9 This era saw a loosening of the censorship of the press, the release and subsequent reinstatement of certain dissidents, as well as the toleration of political protests, demonstrations, and criticism of the government. The government also created a National Commission for Human Rights • Heryanto, "Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition io the 1990s," 1996, pp. 243-244. 9 Heio, "Indonesia io 1989: A Question of Openness," 1990; Lane, "Openness, Political Discontent and Succession in Indonesia," 1991.

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(Komnas HAM), allowing for the existence of institution that could potentially limit the government's abuse of power. 10 The immediate effect was to open previously restricted areas of debate and stimulate a freer press. Seminars on political issues proliferated. Government ministers and officials commented more liberally on topical issues. Parliamentary hearings were occasions to grill ministers and demand change.!! In addition, under this Indonesian glasnost with relaxed political and social controls, poets, unionists, and religious leaders voiced thoughts and grievances long bottled up. With almost unprecedented bluntness, the press tackled taboo subjects ranging from the business interests of the president's family to the rustlings in some Muslim groups eager for more political power. Satirical plays poked fun at the dynastic ambitions of the First Family.!2 The debate about openness was since 1990 inextricably linked to the issue of succession, the inescapable but unpredictable replacement of President Suharto by someone else-name, manner, timing, and consequences unknown. Discussed in the media, debated in meetings, performed onstage, succession in the early 1990s elaborately foreshadowed the real things as officials, journalists, politicians, artists, students, and others in the elite or middle class tried to open or preempt the term on which the transfer of p,ower would occur.!3 Despite the mushrooming discussions about succession, however, this issue was all about Suharto himself. So long as the president did not explicitly declare his intention to step down, the succession would not happen, as everyone was discouraged to run against him. By that time, unfortunately, he had not made his intention clear, claiming pretentiously that his renomination and re-election were not his own choice but that of the MPR. For Suharto, power

Bertrand, "False Start, Succession Crisis, and Regime Change," 1996, p. 325. Vatikiotis, "Indonesia: A Guide to Succession," 1997, p. 193. 12 Schwarz, "Indonesia after Suharto," 1997, p. 121. 13 Emmerson, "Indonesia in 1990: A Foreshadow Play," 1991, p. 182. 10

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was a matter of personalities, not institutions-an approach to managing power derived from the Javanese culture. In this regard, "Whoever heard of a Javanese Sultan retiring?,,14 It was in this period of openness that the growing demands of reform took place. Various pro-democracy movements continued voicing their disenchantment with the regime, although the era of openness ended almost immediately after Suharto's re-election in 1993 when the government maneuvered political opponents out of power, closed important publications, imprisoned labor leaders, outspoken politicians, and other activists. Broadly speaking, the pro-democracy actors during the late 1980s and early 1990s, according to Anders

Uhlin, consisted of four categories: elite dissident and intellectuals, the old generation of NGOs, student activists, and the new generations ofpro-